COMPOSITEWARFARE

The Conduct of Successful Ground Force

Operations in Africa

Eeben Barlow

5

Contents

Author’s Introduction 12

Acknowledgements 14

List of Abbreviations 16

Part 1: Understanding Conflict and War in Africa 18

Chapter 1: Conflict and War in Africa 18

Causes of War and Conflict in Post-Colonial Africa 21

The Hierarchy of War 23

The Concept of Gravity 25

The Trinity of Gravity 26

Military Doctrine and Tactics 29

The Role and Mission of the Armed Forces 30

The Progression of Conflict and War in Africa 32

Clausewitz and Military Leadership in Africa 34

Categorising Warfare 34

The Evolution of Warfare 35

Characterising the African Theatre of Operations 38

The Development of Conflict in Africa 38

The Influence of Terrain and Climate on Tactics 40

The Influence of Technology 41

The Human Element 41

The Enemy 42

Chapter 2: The Relationship between African National Strategy and African Military Strategy 44

National Security Strategy and Policy 48

Defining Military Strategy 50

The Aim of Military Strategy 51

Critical Points 53

The Basic Principles of African Military Strategy 55

Threat Prediction 59

The Dimensions of War 59

The Area of Operations 61

The Operating Environment (OE) 64

The Enemy’s Use of the AO 67

Chapter 3: Warfare, Attrition, Revolution, Operational Design and Manoeuvre 70

Offensive and Defensive Warfare 71

Dictates of Warfare 71

Offensive Warfare 72

The Close Offensive 72

6 Composite Warfare

The Distant Offensive 74

Defensive Warfare 75

Key Reasons for Strategic Failure 78

Operational Level Warfare 78

Military Operations Related to War 79

Military Operations Other than War 79

Military Intelligence Operations 79

Attrition Warfare 80

Revolutionary Warfare 81

Warfare, the AO and the OE 84

Conflict and War in Africa 85

The Levels of Conflict and War 88

Grand Tactics—Operational Art or Operational Design? 89

Key Concepts of Operational Design 90

The Influence of Terrain on the Operational Design 94

From Operational Design to Minor Tactics 95

Key Factors in the Development of the Operational Design 95

Attrition Warfare or Manoeuvre Warfare—Or Both? 98

Manoeuvre Warfare 99

Types of Manoeuvre 100

The Value of Manoeuvre at the Operational Level 101

Forms of Manoeuvre 101

Conventional and Unconventional Warfare 101

Chapter 4: The Modern Principles of War 105

Some Historical Thoughts on the Principles of Land Warfare 106

Modern Western Thinking on the Principles of War 107

A Brief Comparison between Different General Principles of Conventional Warfare 107

Chapter 5: The Classical Manoeuvres of War 110

Characteristics of Manoeuvre 111

The Manoeuvres of War 112

Considering the Manoeuvres 118

Chapter 6: Defending and Protecting the Pillars of State 121

The Development of Tensions 122

Protecting and Defending the State 124

The Pillars of State 124

The Intelligence Pillar 125

The Law Enforcement Pillar 128

The Armed Forces Pillar 130

The Governance Pillar 132

The Economic Pillar 134

The Populace Pillar 136

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The Perception Pillar 138

Establishing Joint Structures 139

Chapter 7: Military Operations Related to War 141

Military Operations Related to War 142

Offensive Operations 142

Planning Considerations for Offensive Operations 145

The Commander’s Intent during Offensive Operations 146

Defensive Operations 146

Characteristics of Defensive Operations 146

The Commander’s Intent during Defensive Operations 149

Supporting Operations 149

Relief Operations 149

Link-up operations 150

Airborne Operations 151

Air Assault Operations 151

Guerrilla Operations 153

Discretionary Warfare Operations 156

Operations in Built Up Areas 158

Joint Operations 158

Strategic Areas of Responsibility, Influence, and Interest 159

Operational and Tactical Fronts, Areas, and Zones where Combat Operations Are Conducted 159

Chapter 8: Military Operations Other than War 179

Security Threats and Social Challenges Facing Modern Africa 180

Threats 180

Challenges 185

Command and Control during MOOTW 186

Categories of MOOTW 187

Objectives of MOOTW 189

The Principles of MOOTW 190

The Primary Principles of MOOTW 190

The Dynamic Principles of MOOTW 192

Rules of Engagement 192

Implementing MOOTW in Hostile Areas 195

MOOTW Threat Levels 197

Chapter 9: Military Intelligence Operations 198

Types of Intelligence Collection Operations 199

Covert Operations 200

The Role of Intelligence 200

Categories of Military Intelligence 201

Sources of Intelligence 202

The Classification of Intelligence Sources 205

8 Composite Warfare

The Principles of Intelligence 206

The Intelligence Sequence 207

Protecting the Intelligence Product 209

Operational and Tactical Intelligence 210

General Intelligence Failures 211

Chapter 10: Warning Orders, Deployments, Orders and Force Projection 213

Threat Levels 213

Warning Orders 214

Readiness States 215

The Importance of Warning Orders 215

Deployment Groups 216

Echelons 217

Deployment Drills 217

Characteristics of Deployment Drills 218

Battle Group Deployment Drills 219

Reconnaissance 220

Appreciations and Plans 221

Map and Time Appreciations 222

Appreciations, Designs for Battle, and Plans 222

Orders 225

Types of Orders 225

Characteristics of Orders 226

Presentation of Formal Orders 226

Force Projection 227

The Cycle of Force Projection 228

Chapter 11: Phases of Composite Warfare 229

Typifying Conflicts and Wars 230

Classification of Wars 230

Phases of Composite Warfare 231

Part 2: Conventional Manoeuvre during Composite Warfare Operations 245

Chapter 12: The Advance 245

Aims of the Advance 245

Reasons for Conducting an Advance 246

The Principles of the Advance 248

Planning the Advance 250

Advance Objectives 252

The Use Of Echelons in the Advance 252

Composition of an Advancing Force 254

Modes of Advance 255

Conduct of the Advance 256

Layout of the Advance 258

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Advance by Night 259

Leading the Advance 259

Movement During the Advance 260

Chapter 13: The Advance-to-Contact and Meeting Engagement 262

The Advance-to-Contact 263

The Meeting Engagement 266

Find, Fix, Bind, Attack/Strike and Annihilate 268

Chapter 14: The Attack or Strike 269

Types of Attacks 270

Composition of an Attack Force 272

Composition of a Strike Force 272

The Enemy’s Centre of Gravity 272

Terminology 274

Principles of the Conventional Attack 276

Stages of the Attack 278

Sequence of a Hasty Attack 279

Sequence of a Deliberate Dismounted Attack 280

Armour and Infantry in the Attack 281

Combined Infantry-Armour Attacks 282

Exploitation 287

Consolidation 287

Decision to Attack Mounted or Dismounted 288

Night Attacks 289

Attacks in Built-up Areas 298

Attacks against Bunkers and Other Fortified Positions 301

Manoeuvre Options 302

Chapter 15: The Defence 304

Reasons for Conducting a Defensive Operation 305

Types of Defence 305

Classification of Defence 306

Defensive Doctrine 306

Concepts of the Defence 307

Terminology Associated with the Defence 308

Principles of the Defence 309

Considerations when Planning the Defence 312

Developing the Engagement Area 319

Occupation of a Static Defensive Position 320

Fire plans 321

Obstacles 321

The Defensive Battle (Static Area Defence) 324

Routine and Discipline in the Defence 325

10 Composite Warfare

Chapter 16: Retrograde Operations 328

The Aim of Retrograde Operations 328

Basic Considerations when Conducting a Retrograde Operation 329

Phases of a Retrograde Operation 330

Conducting the Withdrawal 330

Principles of the Withdrawal 332

Enemy Threats to the Withdrawal 335

The Delaying Action 335

Characteristics of Delaying Positions 354

The Retirement 354

Conducting Retrograde Operations at Night 354

Planning the Retrograde Operation 355

Part 3: Unconventional Manoeuvre during Composite Warfare Operations 358

Chapter 17: Unconventional Warfare, Armed Anti-Government Conflicts, Guerrilla Warfare, and Civil War 358

Schools of Thought on Unconventional Warfare 359

Contributing Causes of Unconventional Warfare 360

Commonalities of Unconventional Warfare 361

Maslow and Anti-Government Forces 361

From Political Dissatisfaction to Armed Anti-Government Actions 363

Starting the Anti-Government Movement 365

The Principles of an Armed Anti-Government Campaign 367

The Armed Struggle Cycle 371

Objectives of Modern Guerrilla Warfare 372

Principles of Guerrilla Warfare as Applied by AGFs 373

Typical Guerrilla Tactics as Applied by AGFs 375

From Anti-Government Campaign to Civil War 376

Chapter 18: Planning Counter-AGF Operations 379

Why Governments Fail to Counter Armed Conflicts 379

Why the Armed Forces Fail at Countering a Conflict 383

Applying Pressure on the Anti-Government Forces 386

Coordination of Effort During a Counter AGF Campaign 387

Strategic Planning Considerations during Counter-AGF Campaigns 388

Some Operational Considerations during Counter-AGF Operations 390

Some Tactical Considerations during Counter-AGF Operations 394

Structuring Counter-AGF Forces 395

Developing a Counter-AGF Doctrine 396

Area Domination 397

Positioning of MOBS and FOBS 400

Campaign Progression During a Counter-AGF Operation 400

The Conduct of Operations 402

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Part 4: Composite Warfare Operations 404

Chapter 19: The Principles of Counter-AGF Operations 404

The Myth of ‘Hearts-and-Minds’ 405

Responsibilities during an AGF Campaign 405

Attacking Anti-Government Forces 408

Operational Planning Considerations 411

Strategic Principles of Counter-AGF Operations 411

Tactical Principles of Counter-AGF Operations 414

Tactical Considerations 417

Chapter 20: Countering Conflict and War in Africa 419

Developing Military Strategies and Operational Designs 420

The Future African Battlefield 421

Defining Composite Warfare 422

Preparing For Future Conflicts And Wars 422

Approach to Composite Warfare 424

Strategic and Operational Considerations of Composite Warfare Operations 427

Characteristics of Composite Warfare 432

Chapter 21: Composite Warfare: Goals, Commonalities, Requirements and Scenarios 436

Goals 436

Commonalities of Composite Warfare Operations 437

Minimum Requirements for Success 437

Future Scenarios 438

Countering an Armed Anti-Government Uprising 438

Countering a Hostile Military Incursion 441

Countering a Proxy Force Supported by a Hostile Regional or Foreign Government 444

Conducting a Military Campaign Against a Hostile Government 446

Chapter 22: The Principles of Composite Warfare, Unconventional Mobile Operations and the African Pillars of War 451

The Primary Principles of Composite Warfare 451

The Dynamic Principles of Composite Warfare 458

Applying The Principles Of Composite Warfare 464

Operational Concepts of Composite Warfare Operations 464

Unconventional Mobile Operations 466

African Pillars of War 471

Chapter 23: Structuring the Ground Forces for Composite Warfare Operations 473

Functions of the Armed Forces during Composite Warfare Operations 473

Criteria for Successful Composite Combat Operations 474

The African Armed Forces 475

Factors Influencing the Organisation and Structure of Composite Warfare Forces 475

The Composite Warfare Ground Force 477

The African Army Group 477

12 Composite Warfare

The Composite Warfare Division 480

The Division Headquarters 480

The Mobile Force 480

The Tactical Air Support Group 481

The Pillar Support Group 481

The Combat Operations Group 482

The Combat Operations Armour Group 483

The Combat Operations Artillery Group 484

The Composite Warfare Battle Group 484

The Battle Group HQ 484

The Special Operations Group 485

The Air Assault Group 486

Sniper Group 487

The Combat Team 487

The Infantry Troop 488

The Motorised Infantry Team 488

The Mechanised Infantry Team 488

The Riverine Team (Optional) 490

The Armour Team 490

The Combat Engineer Team 491

The Mobile Fire Support Team 491

The Indirect Fire Support Team 492

Pioneer Support Team 492

Logistics Team 493

Light Workshop Team (LWT) 493

Tactical Air Support 493

The Medical Team 494

The Teams, Assault Teams, Fire Teams and Sticks 494

Chapter 24: Stability, Fragile and Failed States, and Deterring Conflict and War 496

Fragile and Failed States 498

Deterring Conflict and War 502

Appendix l 504

Pseudo-Operations: An Approach to Countering AGFs and Terrorism 504

Appendix ll 509

Guideline Approach: The Development of A National Security Strategy (NSS) 509

References 509

Historical Overview 509

The Aim of the National Security Strategy 509

Positioning the National Security Strategy 509

Concepts, Definitions, and Terms 509

National Strategic Guidelines 509

Strategic Vision 509

Strategic Challenges 509

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The Desired End State 510

Assumptions 510

Strategic Environment 510

The Potential for War and Conflict 511

Identification of National and Vital Interests 511

Global Trends 511

Threats and Challenges against the State 511

Priority Strategic Environments 513

Sources of Information 513

Roles, Missions, and Tasks 514

Intelligence Operations 514

Law Enforcement Operations 514

Military Operations 514

Government Department Operations 515

Political Warfare Operations 515

Strategic Warfare Operations 515

Psychological Warfare Operations 515

Ways 516

Means 516

Alignment 516

Contextualising 516

Strategic Deficiencies 516

Priorities to Enable the NSS 516

Strategic Timeline 516

Joint Operations 516

Checks and Balances 516

Implementation i.e. Strategic Template 516

Policies 516

Annexure: 516

Notes: 516

Appendix lll 518

Coercive Diplomacy 518

Appendix lV 521

The Phases of a Commander’s Operational Design 521

Appendix V 522

The Raid 522

Appendix Vl 526

Relentless Pursuit: A Neglected Coin Principle? 526

Appendix Vll 530

16 Things Every Soldier Must be Taught 530

Appendix Vlll 531

Some Basic Formations 531

Stick formations 531

Fire Team formations 532

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brigade commander, occasional division commander, and special advisor to several chiefs of staff.

When I started writing a book about the conduct of military operations in Africa, I did so not as an attempt to counter the many good books on conflict, war and warfare that already exist, but to enlighten African scholars and soldiers on how I believe they should go about defending their countries.

Many modern day African armies are clones of the armies established by their once colonial masters, Cold War allies, or new international allies. Many of the principles and TTPs1 they were—and are still being—taught relate to fighting in Europe and the Middle East and not in Africa. Some of these concepts are not even relevant to Africa as Africa does not possess nuclear rocket forces, strategic air forces, or large naval fleets. Indeed, Africa is currently the dumping ground for bad advice, and old and sometimes obsolete weapons from both the East and the West.

With complex, diverse, and ever evolving demographics, the potential for conflict and war remains a very real danger. Internal differences and foreign interference have merely added to the confusion and tension.

African conflicts and wars are generally low-tech and are fought with ‘boots on the ground’, often with little or no close air support. This has resulted in numerous costly and protracted conflicts and wars.

A lack of actionable and credible intelligence, poor strategies and plans, acceptance of poor advice, inadequate doctrines, lack of training and equipment, and lack of political direction and independent will has resulted in many half-fought conflicts and wars. These have simmered for years in several countries, and finally erupted in chaos and misery, affecting millions of people in the process. Indeed, Africa bears testimony to the fact that half-fought wars are never won.

There are many outstanding military scholars who will criticise my approach to ending a conflict or war in Africa. Criticism is good as healthy debate can only lead to improvements within the armed forces that are tasked to ensure the safety of their countries and citizens, and bring about peace as rapidly and economically as possible. I will gladly accept any positive criticism from those who have actually helped beleaguered governments to succeed, either in winning wars or ending conflicts in Africa.

African conflicts and wars are not fought along politically correct lines; nor should they be fought to achieve stalemates merely to satisfy international organisations, foreign governments, and NGOs—there is simply too much at stake.

These conflicts and wars are brutal, vicious, and savage, and often fought at very close quarters.

If Africa is to take its rightful place in the world, it must bring these conflicts and wars to a speedy conclusion.

My hope is that this work will assist armies in Africa to do just that.

Eeben BarlowPretoria, 2015

1 Tactics, techniques, and procedures

20 Part 1: Understanding Conflict and War in Africa

Part 1: Understanding Conflict and War in Africa

Chapter 1

Conflict and War in Africa

Despite the political rhetoric, the wars we fight are about control, influence, and resources. Unless we work together, we will give these three critical requirements to those

who seek our downfall. If we allow that to happen, we will become slaves in our own lands. The choice we have is simple: become someone’s proxy or choose our own destiny.

– Author to the deputy minister of defence of an African government, 2013

War is the result of hostilities between the political leaders of opposing nations and it is aimed at achieving a subjective geo-political result. Historically, state on state aggression has been expressed through ‘conventional warfare’ but since the end of the Cold War,1 this has been the exception rather than the norm.

In certain instances, state on state aggression may appear as war fought by other means (clandestine and covert warfare, psychological warfare, diplomatic warfare, economic warfare, cyber-warfare, strategic communications operations, and proxy forces doing battle on behalf of sponsor governments). Specific political, economic, and/or military goals can also be achieved by intimidating opponents through political and military posturing.

Conflict, for the purpose of this work, will refer primarily to internal (domestic or national) dissent. Whatever the cause, conflict, left unchecked, may result in the development of armed anti-government movements2 which can spill across national borders into neighbouring states and result in limited military actions involving proxy forces. Though this work will focus on the manner in which combat operations are conducted, specific attention will be given to military operations in post-Cold War Africa.

Where rebel groups, anti-government forces,3 fifth columnists,4 terrorist groups, and other politically, economically, and ideologically driven forces initiate and engage in conflict, the development of action and reaction remains relevant, even though the conflict may appear as unconventional warfare. In such instances, armed anti-government forces try to replace existing political orders illegally and violently. They will also try to seize control of assets and resources in their respective areas of operations as it is control over these that gives them their perceived economic power and the financial wherewithal5 to sustain conflict. The approach they take to achieving their aims will have a direct bearing on the nature of the conflict and the political and military counter-responses undertaken to contain and negate their actions.

There are many diverse cultures, traditions, religions, and languages in Africa. There are

1 Cold War: A term coined by US financier and presidential advisor Bernard Baruch in 1947, and given currency by the journalist Walter Lippmann. It denotes a state of hostility between rival blocs (specifically Western and Soviet) involving economic, political, and subversive actions that do not result in overt war (Scruton, R., 1983, A Dictionary of Political Thought, London, Pan Books).

2 Armed anti-government uprisings or movements are also commonly referred to as insurgencies.3 Armed anti-government forces will henceforth be referred to as AGFs. AGFs include all armed and/or

destructive forces (rebel groups, guerrillas, and terrorists). The enemy can thus consist of AGFs or hostile armed forces. AGFs can be driven by nationalist and/or other ideals or act on behalf of a sponsoring government.

4 Fifth columnists are anti-government elements or groups that aim to undermine the government from within. Their activities are usually covert and they often act in conjunction with and in support of AGFs.

5 It is imperative that armed forces work in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies as many of these conflicts are funded by organised crime.

21 Conflict and War in Africa

also numerous political and ethnic differences. These, coupled with poverty, hunger, loss of hope, disparity of wealth, and oppression, often make conflict inevitable.

When politics and diplomacy fail, conflict and/or war become unavoidable and in Africa, conflicts and wars often flare up or reignite in spite of diplomatic and political efforts.

The escalation of verbal conflict into armed conflict is continued by the armed forces6 of the nations involved, or by armed anti-government forces attempting to wrest control from governments having been so ordered by their respective political leaders or financial sponsors. The conflict or war will continue until one side accepts defeat or accepts a ceasefire and capitulates.

As such, conflict and war may become the mechanism by which governments enforce domestic or foreign policies and the armed forces, the instrument of force by which the security of a state is ensured. A state may also use proxy forces to further its influence and can additionally, collapse a target government by creating the perception that it is under external control or under siege.

Due to the reciprocal nature of conflict and war, those beyond Africa do not usually consider actions like genocide, mass-murder, and aggressive occupation of territory to be war, as war is characterised by organised national armed forces doing battle against one another. While many view the conduct of war as a cultural phenomenon, the practice of war is not linked to any particular type of political organisation, philosophy, or society. Indeed, the conduct of conflict and war can be traced back to wars between villages, city states, tribes, cultures, religions, nations, and empires from the beginnings of human history.

The following objectives and goals must be borne in mind when considering the general functions of the armed forces:

• To continually assess the politico-military environment and the real, potential, or predicted threats against the state

• To deter hostile forces7 that aspire to collapse and replace the government or seize areas that may provide economic or political advantages

• To contain hostile forces that have commenced offensives against the government• To neutralise hostile forces that pose a direct armed threat to the state and the

government• To degrade the command and control structures of hostile forces• To exhaust hostile forces• To annihilate hostile forces

Assessing the developing politico-military environment and existing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats is an ongoing intelligence function. The armed forces must—at all times— know what the potential for conflict and war is, the types of threats they may face, and how the threats will appear (i.e. conventional or unconventional).

To deter hostile forces, the armed forces must present a definite and credible threat and overcome the enemy with aggressive fire-and-manoeuvre. The armed forces’ ability to deter threats is enhanced by structure, organisation, training, equipment, doctrine, and leadership.

Containing domestic hostile forces that have commenced offensive actions against the government involves supporting law enforcement agencies by conducting operations to stabilise hostile areas that may harbour AGFs. If the threat is regionally based, the armed forces will be required to contain it by conducting defensive and offensive operations. If a hostile armed force has invaded the country, containment may involve halting the enemy’s advance and forcing it into a defensive position, after which a counter-offensive must be launched to destroy it, or compel the enemy forces to withdraw. 6 The term ‘armed forces’ refers to state-controlled military forces which include ground forces, air forces, and

naval/riverine forces. It must not be confused with ‘armed force’ which implies force by the use of arms.7 Hostile forces can include AGFs and hostile armed forces from neighbouring or even regional and

international governments.