ConceptforJointOperations1

8/14/2019 ConceptforJointOperations1..

1/48

Capstone Concept for

Joint Operations

Version 3.0

15 January 2009

Distribution Statement AApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


2/48

CCJO v3.0

ii

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)


3/48

CCJO v3.0

iii

FOREWORD

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operationsdescribes in broad terms my visionfor how the joint force circa 2016-2028 will operate in response to a widevariety of security challenges. It proposes that future joint force commanderswill combine and subsequently adapt some combination of four basiccategories of military activity -- combat, security, engagement, and relief andreconstruction -- in accordance with the unique requirements of eachoperational situation. The concept is informed by current strategic guidance,but because it looks to the future, it is intended to be adaptable, as it must be,to changes in that guidance.

This concepts primary purpose is to guide force development andexperimentation by: (1) establishing a common framework for militaryprofessionals for thinking about future joint operations, (2) visualizing futurejoint operations for policymakers and others with an interest in theemployment of military force, (3) establishing a conceptual foundation forsubordinate joint and Service concepts, and (4) motivating and guiding thestudy, experimentation and evaluation of joint concepts and capabilities.

The Armed Forces of the United States comprise the Active and Reservecomponents and civilian personnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,and Coast Guard. Each Service possesses its own unique traditions andcompetencies, which contribute to the versatility, flexibility and effectiveness ofthe joint force. Together we support and defend our Nation, its people, itsfriends, and its interests worldwide. We always seek to operate with partners,and lead where appropriate, but we will be prepared to act unilaterally whennecessary to protect our vital national interests. We respond to crisis anddisaster to alleviate human suffering and promote peace. When necessary, wewill confront and defeat those who threaten our national security. Inconjunction with other U.S. government agencies, we are engaged instrengthening and expanding relationships with international partners on aday-to-day basis. These partnerships contribute to creating and maintaining astable environment while concurrently deterring potential adversaries.

Todays U.S. Armed Forces are, I believe, the most capable in ourNations history, and these capabilities provide important strategic advantageswith respect to nearly any situation or potential adversary. U.S. forces canconduct operations on a scale that very few others can approach. Their abilityto project and sustain military power over global distances is unmatched. U.S.joint intelligence capabilities, a key factor in the success of practically any kindof military operation, are the best in the world.


4/48

CCJO v3.0

iv

U.S. military power today is unsurpassed on the land and sea and in theair, space, and cyberspace. The individual Services have evolved capabilitiesand competencies to maximize their effectiveness in their respective domains.Even more important, the ability to integrate these diverse capabilities into ajoint whole that is greater than the sum of the Service parts is an unassailable

American strategic advantage.

However, it is our people who ultimately are our greatest advantage.Their patriotism, training, discipline, leadership, and ability to adapt to anysituation make us both a formidable foe and a reliable friend.

As capable as our joint forces are today, this will not be enough to meetfuture challenges as described in this concept. We will need to develop newcapabilities and change the capacities of existing ones. We will need to createnew joint and Service doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. We willneed to establish new methods for integrating our actions, both internally and

with partners. We will need to select, educate, train, equip and manage ourpeople differently. We will need to envision and create new organizations. Wewill need to develop new technologies and adapt existing ones to new missions.This concept is designed to catalyze that process.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operationsis the most fundamental of allU.S. military concepts. It therefore speaks in terms of broad precepts andassertions that apply across a wide range of possible situations. It will befurther elaborated in subordinate joint and Service operating concepts, whichwill apply its broad ideas to more specific situations. It is not a how-tomanual prescribing detailed methods of execution and does not establish

authoritative doctrine.

The concept progresses from describing an operational problem set toenvisioning an operational solution to those problems to exploring theinstitutional implications of adopting that solution. Sections 1-3 envision whyand under what conditions the joint force of the future will be employed. Thesesections reflect the Joint Operating Environment, a separate but companiondocument. Sections 4-6 describe what the joint force will do and, in broadterms, how it will do it. These sections are the core of the concept. Sections 7and 8 explore the institutional implications and risks associated with operatingthis way. These sections are intended directly to guide the capabilities

development process.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operationsdescribes how the joint forcewill operate in an uncertain, complex, and changing future characterized bypersistent conflict. While the concept focuses on the future, many of itsunderlying concepts are timeless. Military success in the future rarely will bethe product of radically new ideas, but instead will typically result fromadapting these enduring truths to new requirements, conditions and


5/48


6/48

CCJO v3.0

vi



7/48

CCJO v3.0

vii

Table of Contents

Foreword........................................................................................................ iii

1. The Joint Force as an Instrument of Policy................................................. 12. The Joint Operating Environment ..............................................................23. National Security Challenges ..................................................................... 74. Joint Operations as the Integration and Adaptation of Combat, Security,

Engagement, and Relief and Reconstruction............................................. 125. Basic Categories of Military Activity.......................................................... 146. Common Operating Precepts .................................................................... 217. Implications of Adopting this Concept ...................................................... 288. Risks of Adopting this Concept................................................................. 359. Conclusion............................................................................................... 36


8/48

CCJO v3.0

viii



9/48

CCJO v3.0

1

1. THE JOINT FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

The fundamental purpose of military power is to deter or wage war in supportof national policy. In these capacities, military power is a coercive instrument,designed to achieve by force or the threat of force what other means cannot.

While it may be employed in more benign ways for a variety of importantpurposes across a wide range of situations, these other uses should not beallowed to imperil its ultimate ability to wage war.

In a broader sense, the joint force is one of several instruments ofnational policy maintained to help shape the international politicalenvironment in support of U.S. interests. The preeminent requirement of alljoint operations, therefore, is that they help to create or maintain theconditions sought by that policy, whether through coercion or persuasion, andwhether in response to an unexpected crisis or opportunity or as part of adeliberate and proactive plan. Since, even in war, this requirement may extend

well beyond defeating enemy forces in battle, to be an effective policyinstrument, joint forces must provide political leaders a much wider range ofcompetencies than just dominance in combat.

Military force is only one element of national power, moreover, and in thecomplex environment of the future, it rarely will succeed alone. Instead, jointforces typically will operate in conjunction with other agencies of the U.S. andpartner governments, and the success of the endeavor will depend on thesuccess of that partnership. Depending on circumstances, the joint force maylead the national or multinational effort or may support other agencies, usuallyby creating the security conditions that allow nonmilitary agencies to operate.

Military action tends to be the most visible and hazardous expression ofnational policy, and any employment of U.S. military forces, even for benignpurposes, tends to have significant domestic and international repercussions.Hence, whenever possible and appropriate, joint operations should beaugmented or even supplanted by other, less threatening manifestations ofnational power.

While military power can contribute significantly to resolving somepolitical problems, and sometimes is essential to doing so, it rarely will do soexactly as envisioned and without unintended and irreversible consequences.

Moreover, while there are many problems in the world for which military forcesare not an ideal solution, they may be employed nonetheless because theirreadiness, discipline, resources, and deployability make them the mostexpedient option.

As an instrument of policy, military forces never operate in a politicalvacuum. Every joint force commander must accept the reality that politicalfactors will always constrain U.S. military operations, sometimes at significant


10/48

CCJO v3.0

2

cost in operational efficiency. But while joint force commanders must adapttheir operations to the requirements of policy, policy should avoid requiring ofthe joint force what it is incapable of achieving. Reconciling political purposeand military means thus requires candid and continuous dialog betweenpolitical and military leaders.

2. THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The Joint Operating Environment, a companion to this concept, forecasts thetrends that will shape the future environment within which the joint force willoperate. This section summarizes the findings of that document. The findingsdescribe an environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapidchange, and persistent conflict.

The future joint operating environment

will reflect both enduring and changingconditions. The central enduring condition isthe unruly nature of the internationalpolitical system, a universe of autonomouspolities continuously seeking to optimize theirown wealth, security, opportunities, and influence in relation to each other andthe system as a whole. Ultimately constrained only by their own resources andthe countervailing interests of other actors, these entities pursue their variousinterests through a wide range of behaviors toward each other, from friendlycooperation to more or less peaceful competition to outright conflict.

The result is a complex interactive environment in which events arelargely unpredictable and sometimes counterintuitive. Political entities willresort to aggression or threats of aggression -- some more readily than others --to pursue their interests. Crises will occur, within and between entities, asthey adapt to this environment. The forces of nature and other chance eventsonly add to the complexity. Friction and uncertainty abound under suchcircumstances. Accidents and miscalculations are common, and apparentlynegligible events produce disproportionate and often unintendedconsequences. Strategic surprises inevitably will occur. Indirect effects playout and interact unpredictably over time.

Rather than occurring as a series of isolated episodes, internationalrelations unfold as a continuous fabric in which each event is shaped by thosethat precede it and shapes those that follow. Competitions and conflicts, oncebegun, often take on a life of their own beyond the intentions or control of anyof the participants. It is in the context of this enduring complexity that thetensions, instabilities, disasters, crises, and conflicts inevitably will arise thatcould require the commitment of U.S. joint forces.

Thefutureoperatingenvironment

willbe

characterized

by

uncertainty,

complexity,rapidchange,andpersistentconflict.


11/48

CCJO v3.0

3

A second enduring condition will be Americas status as a global powerwith global interests. American security and prosperity in a globalized futurewill be linked inextricably to those of others. The United States will necessarilybe a leader Nation to which much of the rest of the world will look for stabilityand security. It will continue to fall to the United States and its partner

nations to protect and sustain the peaceful global system of interdependentnetworks of trade, finance, information, law and governance. Maintainingfreedom of action and access around the globe is as much a requirement forthe functioning of this peaceful global system as it is for the conduct of militaryoperations. This will require continuous engagement throughout the world andpersistent presence achieved through the forward deployment of U.S. jointforces.

Reflecting that requirement, a third condition that will continue to governthe conduct of U.S. joint operations is the need to conduct and sustain them atglobal distances. The most likely occasions requiring the commitment of joint

forces will arise, as they have for the past half-century, in places where few orno forces are permanently stationed. Americas ability to project power rapidlyand conduct and sustain operations globally thus will remain criticallydependent on air and maritime freedom of movement and on sufficientstrategic and operational lift. Future operational success will also relyincreasingly on the use of space and cyberspace. Providing adequate lift andmaintaining sufficient control of the global commons -- areas of sea, air,space, and cyberspace that belong to no one state1 -- thus will remain a vitalimperative of future joint force design.

Of the conditions that are changing, perhaps the most significant is what

one observer has described as The Rise of the Rest2

-- the increasing ability ofother states to challenge the United States for influence, if not globally, thencertainly regionally. The economic and military predominance that hasunderwritten U.S. foreign and defense policy for the past two decades can nolonger be assumed. These emerging, advanced military competitors will be ableto pose significant regional military challenges in the event of conflict.

In addition, a variety of nonstate actors -- often motivated by extremistreligious or ethnic ideologies -- are emerging with some of the power of states,but lacking the political discipline imposed by national sovereignty andaccountability. Many of these entities already have or soon could have the

capability and capacity to pursue their interests by armed force. Many operateacross state or even regional boundaries. They rarely adopt the centralizedstructure of states, which would expose them to greater external pressure, butinstead take the form of popular movements or distributed networks, usuallyempowered by the connectivity of the Internet.

This diffusion of power in an increasingly globalized environment, withinwhich some actors neither recognize nor are restrained by generally accepted


12/48

CCJO v3.0

4

conventions of international behavior, greatly complicates conflict prevention,management, and resolution. At the same time, the cultural resistance to orinability to cope with the complexity of modernity risks overwhelming somegovernments, producing failed or failing states. The failure of a state oftenmakes populations more susceptible to social movements based on ethnic or

religious loyalties. These conditions invite humanitarian crises and eveninternal or cross-border armed conflict.

The foreseeable future promises to be an era of persistent conflict -- aperiod of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate entities, andindividual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their politicalends.3 The future is unlikely to unfold as steady-state peace punctuated bydistinct surges of intense conflict. Rather, the major initiatives of U.S. foreignpolicy -- major war, strategic deterrence, foreign humanitarian assistance,security cooperation, and so on -- are all likely to unfold against a globalbackdrop of chronic conflict. Such protracted struggles will not lend

themselves to decisive military victory, but often at best will be amenable tobeing managed continuously over time. Many of these conflicts may cut acrossnational, regional, cultural, and combatant command boundaries, complicatingthe responses to them.

Future conflict may result from a clash of policy interests betweengovernments, but -- as in the past -- is at least as likely to arise within statesand from a wider variety of causes, including religious and ethnic passions,dysfunctional borders, societal collapse, government corruption orincompetence, and natural resource scarcity. Moreover, as demographic,economic, and other patterns shift geographically around the world, the locus

of conflict and crisis likely will shift also, requiring the United States toreevaluate its global posturing of military forces.

At the same time, the means of waging conflict are becoming more lethal,ubiquitous, and easy to employ. Advanced weaponry, once the monopoly ofindustrialized states -- including anti-access and area-denial capabilities --increasingly is becoming available to both less-developed states and nonstateactors. The potential proliferation among a growing roster of states andnonstate actors of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, isparticularly dangerous, and could significantly complicate any future U.S. useof military force. Nuclear weapons will remain one potentially existential threat

to the Nation.

While the U.S. has enjoyed uncontested superiority in space for severaldecades, ever cheaper access to space and the emergence of antisatellite andcounterspace weapons have begun to level the playing field, and the use andcontrol of space for both civil and military purposes is becoming increasinglycompetitive. Likewise, rapid technological improvement of cyber capabilitiesand the relatively low cost of obtaining them will allow states, nonstate actors,


13/48

CCJO v3.0

5

and even individuals to threaten disruption of military, economic, and otherdigital networks anywhere in the world.

Meanwhile, as a result of accelerating transparency and connectivity,traditional military operations have become increasingly sensitive to popular

perceptions and attitudes, both domestic and international. Thanks topervasive media coverage and the growing ubiquity of personalcommunications devices, much of the population can follow, closely andpractically in real time, events they previously would have learned of only afterthe fact, if at all. In addition to complicating the preservation of operationssecurity, that growing transparency risks turning what once would have beeninconsequential military incidents into strategically significant events.Transparency will put greater pressure than ever before on commanders at alllevels, whose every decision and action will be scrutinized and critiqued in realtime by media whose independent access to information will be virtuallyimpossible to restrict.

Greater connectivity makes populations more susceptible than everbefore to manipulation by a variety of actors, some of whom will not hesitate touse disinformation to achieve their objectives. Potential adversaries havealready recognized the strategic importance of the narrative battle and willcontinue to develop and employ increasingly sophisticated methods in thatbattle. Influencing public perceptions of battlefield events thus will becomeboth more important and more difficult for joint forces, and commanders evenat subordinate levels will find themselves nearly as consumed with shaping thenarrative of those events as with planning and conducting the operations thatproduce them.

The challenge of shaping the narrative will only be aggravated bychanging Western attitudes about the use of military force. Pervasive visualimages of human suffering can create pressures to divert joint forces tohumanitarian activities on the one hand and to restrict their use of lethal forceon the other -- a combination that could degrade combat readiness beforebattle and risk outright failure once it is joined.

Another accelerating change in the operational environment iscontinuing urbanization as a result of population growth in cities and theirsurrounding urban sprawls. Such urban areas, especially the burgeoning

cities of the developing world, many of them located along the worlds coasts,can be petri dishes for disease, crime, the emergence of radical ideologies, andcivil conflict. They also present enormous challenges to the conduct of militaryoperations. Operating in urban terrain, in combat or not, absorbs largernumbers of ground troops than operations in practically any other type ofterrain. Moreover, urban combat tends to produce heavier military casualties,at least among ground forces, than combat in other types of terrain. It can alsoproduce high civilian casualties and severe collateral civil damage, especially


14/48

CCJO v3.0

6

when the enemy is a home-grown irregular force deliberately willing to exploitthe protection from detection and attack afforded by concealment among thecivilian populace.

Diminishing overseas access is another challenge anticipated in the

future operating environment. Foreign sensitivities to U.S. military presencehave steadily been increasing. Even close allies may be hesitant to grantaccess for a variety of reasons. Diminished access will complicate themaintenance of forward presence, a critical aspect of past and current U.S.military strategy, necessitating new approaches to responding quickly todevelopments around the world as well as more robust exploitation of existingU.S. advantages to operate at sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace.Assuring access to ports, airfields, foreign airspace, coastal waters and host-nation support in potential commitment areas will be a challenge and willrequire active peacetime engagement with states in volatile areas. In war, thischallenge may require forcible-entry capabilities designed to seize and maintain

lodgments in the face of armed resistance.

Resolving many challenges, especially in the developing world, ultimatelywill require establishing or restoring the legitimacy of indigenous governments-- something the United States cannot accomplish unilaterally. This will put apremium on the joint forces ability to work with and through partners toimprove the partners capabilities. Joint forces will almost always findthemselves working with indigenous military and security forces, for whosebehavior they will rightly or wrongly be held accountable.

The future operating environment has the potential to produce more

challenges than the United States and its military forces can respond toeffectively. This has two implications. The first is the importance of shapingdevelopments proactively so that they do not reach crisis proportions requiringthe employment of a sizable joint force. The second is the importance ofestablishing cooperative security arrangements to share the burden ofmaintaining security and stability. Both implications will again place apremium on the use of joint forces for peacetime engagement.

Together, these enduring and changing conditions will present a varietyof complex security challenges, including armed aggression and threatenedaggression, the rise of extremist ideologies and movements, failed governance,

natural and manmade disasters, and violations of international agreements.Surmounting these challenges often will exceed the capabilities of any singleagency of government, including the joint force. Instead, successful futuremilitary operations typically will require the integrated application of all theinstruments of national power. Future joint forces may find themselvesoperating as the military element of an integrated national task force or at leastin close conjunction with other agencies of government.


15/48

CCJO v3.0

7

Moreover, in a globalized world, most such operations will tend to affectmultiple international stakeholders, creating the political if not the operationalneed to act in concert with international partners. Such concerted action,however, inherently is much more difficult to manage than unilateral nationalaction and usually requires significant compromise to maintain unity. Indeed,

in many if not most cases, achieving a common understanding of the natureand cause of the problem may be even more difficult than, and certainly mustprecede, agreeing about the solution. As a result, whether prompted bycooperation, competition, or conflict, future joint operations will require fargreater cultural awareness than U.S. forces have demonstrated before andgreater tolerance of both inefficiencies and limits on operational choice as theprice of closer interagency and multinational collaboration.

3. NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

The conditions and trends identified in the Joint Operating Environmentandsummarized in the previous section forecast five broad national securitychallenges likely to require the employment of joint forces in the future. Theseare not new challenges. They are thenatural products of the enduring politicalenvironment, but they will exhibit newfeatures in the future. None of thesechallenges is a purely military problem.Rather, all are national problems callingfor the application of all the elements ofnational power. Individual joint operating

concepts will address the jointcontribution to dealing with each of thesechallenges in greater detail.

Winning the Nations warsremains the preeminent challenge andprimary justification for maintaining capable and credible military forces.4 Inthe future, as in the past, war may take a variety of forms. It may erupt amongor between states or nonstate entities with war-making capabilities. It maytake the form of classic state-on-state war, insurgency, or civil war. Aims mayrange from outright conquest or revolution to secession to the extraction oflimited political, geographic, or economic concessions. Combatants may range

from the regular military forces of states to paramilitary or irregular forces.They may operate in identifiable military formations using advanced fightingplatforms -- tanks, aircraft, ships, and so on -- or they may be largelyindistinguishable from the civil population. They may employ methods rangingfrom combined-arms tactics to guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage,subversion, unconventional warfare, or other methods usually consideredirregular. This full range of methods will be available to both state andnonstate adversaries, who are likely to adopt some combination.

Fivebroadnationalsecuritychallengesare

likelytorequiretheemploymentofjoint

forces:

WintheNationswars Deterpotentialadversaries Developcooperativesecurity Defendthehomeland Respondtocivilcrises


16/48

CCJO v3.0

8

Warfare against the regular forces of a sovereign state using orthodoxmeans and methods can be called conventionalor regular warfare, whilewarfare against predominantly irregular forces can be called irregular warfare.5The latter tends to be protracted, favors working through partners, andrevolves around the support of the population rather than solely the defeat of

enemy fighting forces. These clean distinctions will rarely exist in reality;however, as often in the past, future conflicts will appear as hybrids comprisingdiverse, dynamic, and simultaneous combinations of organizations,technologies, and techniques that defy categorization.6 Likely adversaries canbe expected to pursue and adopt any methods and means that confer anadvantage relative to U.S. military power -- including methods that violatewidely accepted laws and conventions of war.7 Even an advanced militarypower can be expected to adopt some methods considered irregular byWestern standards, while nonstate actors increasingly are acquiring andemploying regular military capabilities. Rather than attempting to defeat U.S.forces in decisive battle, even militarily significant states are likely to exploit

increasingly inexpensive but lethal weapons in an erosion strategy aimed atweakening U.S. political resolve by inflicting mounting casualties over time.8

In the extreme, any of these forms could involve the use of weapons ofmass destruction. Such use, especially of nuclear weapons, would likelychange both the strategic and operational context of the conflict dramatically.Any form of war is likely to include an ideological element, a war of ideas,which might be a primary or lesser attribute of the struggle. Finally, anyfuture war is likely to involve the exploitation of cyberspace, and war betweenmore advanced states may well include space operations.

The scale of warfare may range from limited strikes or raids to prolongedtheater or multi-theater campaigns. Given the likely limited number ofpermanent U.S. overseas bases and the proliferation of lethal antiaircraft andantiship weapons, future warfare may require forcible entry in the face ofsignificant resistance. Both friendly and enemy operations may target theadversarys civilian leadership, popular will, and the civil infrastructure thatsupports his fighting forces. Hence, as in the past, future war may well imposerequirements to restore civil order and services and to rebuild damagedinfrastructure.

Despite this wide variation, all wars share the same fundamental nature.

In any form or context, war is organized, reciprocal violence for politicalpurposes. War is essentially a violent struggle between hostile andindependent wills, each trying to impose itself by force directly upon the otheror upon some contested population. This struggle combines physical, mental,and moralaspects. It is simultaneously a clash of material means -- weapons,equipment, and supplies; of intellect, as manifested in opposing strategies,operations, and tactics; and of resolve and morale. War is therefore not actionagainst an inanimate object, but is always the collision of two living forces.9


17/48

CCJO v3.0

9

This interactive quality makes war a dynamic process of initiative and responseas each belligerent adapts itself to the other.

As armed politics, war is not a thing apart but exhibits the friction,uncertainty, complexity, and fluidity common to all political interactions. As a

violent form of politics, however, war tends to exhibit all these attributes inextreme measures. To these war adds lethal violence and destruction -- thequalities that distinguish war from other forms of political interaction -- whichhave a significant psychological impact on the people who experience them.Because war reflects a clash of opposing wills, the human dimension is central.War may involve the use of advanced technology, but it is waged by people andtherefore subject to the vagaries of human behavior under conditions ofextreme danger and stress. Any successful U.S. approach to war mustcomport with this fundamental understanding.

In preparing to meet the challenge of future war, the U.S. military faces a

dilemma. Major war against another military power or group of powerspresents the greatest potential threat to national security, but is less likely inthe time frame of this concept than other forms of conflict. In contrast, otherforms of war are all but guaranteed -- in fact, are currently ongoing -- but areunlikely to pose the same existential threat.

Since the surest way to invite a threat is to be unprepared for it, theUnited States must maintain its competency in large-scale conventionalwarfare even while it prepares for and conducts less conventional operations.And since capabilities optimized for either of these requirements may be ill-suited to the other, tradeoff decisions are inescapable. Ultimately, U.S. military

forces must be able to operate across the full range of potential conflicts.

Moreover, avoiding war is usually preferable to fighting it. Hence, whilethe preeminent challenge for military forces is to wage war, joint forces alsomust contribute to meeting other critical security challenges:

Defending national interests requires not only being able to prevail inconflict, but also deterring potential adversarieswho might threaten the vitalinterests of the United States or its partners.10 These threats could range fromdirect aggression to less openly belligerent actions that nonetheless threatenvital national interests. Deterrence convinces potential adversaries not to take

threatening actions by influencing their decision making. It requiresconvincing those adversaries that a contemplated action will not achieve thedesired result, that the cost of the action will be too great, or that an acceptablesituation can be achieved without it -- or some combination of the three.Because of the gravity of potential nuclear aggression by a growing list ofactors, maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent capability will remain aparticular national security imperative.


18/48

CCJO v3.0

10

State and nonstate threats both can be deterred, although deterring thelatter may be more difficult and complicated. Deterrence must be pursuedboth during peace to prevent war and during war to prevent escalation. Itinvolves general activities, postures, and communications intended to influenceany adversarys decision making, such as maintaining credible defensive and

offensive capabilities, but may additionally include more specific activitiesfocused on a particular adversary, such as implementing a proactive deterrencecampaign or executing flexible deterrent options in response to specific threats.

Since deterrence takes place entirely in the mind of another, it often isimpossible to know whether it is succeeding -- although its failure tends to beunmistakable. Moreover, a potential adversarys actions are influenced notonly by external deterrents, but also by other factors including his own cultureand the value systems of his society and political leadership -- factors thatoften are not well understood outside the society in question. Deterrence thusbecomes even more complicated in the future as the variety of potential

aggressors increases. Actions that deter one potential adversary may havemuch less effect on -- or may even encourage -- another. They may even beperceived differently by the same potential adversary under differentcircumstances.

For all these reasons, developing better ways to measure theeffectiveness of deterrent efforts is a vital requirement. Moreover, becausefuture threats increasingly may be transregional, joint deterrence activitieslikely will require the cooperation of multiple combatant commands.

In the globalized future described in the Joint Operating Environment, itwill be increasingly important to develop cooperative securityby maintaining orstrengthening the global security framework of the United States and itspartners.11 Cooperative securityinvolves the comprehensive set of continuous,long-term and integrated actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. andinternational governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains orenhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and facilitates other operationswhen crises occur. Essentially it is the challenge of fostering a favorablesecurity environment and establishing a solid base for effective crisis response.It can involve strengthening the U.S. security posture in a region, developingallied and friendly capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations,thwarting the emergence of specific state and nonstate threats, alleviating the

conditions that underlie instability, and improving cooperative securityarrangements for enhanced multinational cooperation. Like deterrence,cooperative security can reduce the chances of conflict, but unlike deterrence,it does not involve the threat of force. Cooperative security and deterrenceshould be complementary, each pursuing separate objectives but bothcontributing to security and preventing conflict.


19/48

CCJO v3.0

11

The ultimate obligation of U.S. joint forces is to defend the homeland.12Homelanddefense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domesticpopulation, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggressionor other threats as directed by the President. Homeland defense includes awide range of active and passive measures to prevent, preempt, defeat, and

mitigate the effects of aggression. At the limit homeland defense entailsoutright war, but it also requires significant capabilities and actions short ofwar. Deterrence and cooperative security contribute to homeland defense bypreventing aggression, but qualify as distinct security challenges in themselves.Threats to the homeland can range from missile or other attack by advancedregular militaries to terrorist attack, any of which could involve the use ofweapons of mass destruction or cyber attack.

Homeland defense generally involves the implementation of an active,layered defense that attempts to defeat threats as far from the Nations shoresas possible. Homeland defense requires considerable interagency integration,

as well as cooperation with international partners to interdict developingthreats at their points of origin.

The United States inevitably will find it necessary to respond to a varietyof civil crisesby acting to relieve human suffering and restore civil functioning,most often in support of civil authorities.13 These crises include any kind ofdisruption to civil functioning resulting from any natural or manmade disaster,civic disturbance, or endemic condition that creates a significant threat tohuman life or public welfare. They may be foreign or domestic. They mayoccur independently, as in a natural disaster disrupting an otherwisefunctioning society, or they may occur within the context of a conflict, such as

widespread suffering in a nation embroiled in an insurgency.

Security may often be a factor in crisis response, as the result of thebreakdown of civil order, even when there is no military adversary involved.Moreover, even when a civil crisis occurs independently of existing conflict,there often is the risk that violent conflict might arise out of the disorder andsuffering. This challenge is likely to become more common in the future asmore states find themselves unable to cope with the demographic and naturalresource trends described in the Joint Operating Environment.

* * *

While these challenges are not uniform across the combatant commands, someof which will be focused almost exclusively on cooperative security ordeterrence, while others are actually engaged in warfare, almost any missionassigned to the joint force will reflect one or more of them.

Accordingly, tomorrows joint forces must be prepared to deal with all thesechallenges, anywhere in the world, potentially on short notice and for


20/48

CCJO v3.0

12

indeterminate duration, in response to unexpected events. The specific time,location, and form of any particular challenge will be practically impossible topredict, at least in time to develop forces specifically for that threat. Any ofthese challenges is likely to require joint forces to project and sustain militarypower over global distances and for significant durations. Moreover, each

challenge will tend to evolve over time. Finally, preparing for any one challengewill not necessarily prepare joint forces for another.

4. JOINT OPERATIONS AS THE INTEGRATION AND ADAPTATION OFCOMBAT, SECURITY, ENGAGEMENT AND RELIEF ANDRECONSTRUCTION

The national security challenges of the preceding section establish thepurposes for which joint operations may be required now and in the future.This section describes in general terms how future joint forces will contribute

to meeting those challenges. Subordinate operating concepts will apply thesebroad ideas to more specific situations.

The central thesis of this concept comprises three interrelated ideas thattogether describe broadly how the joint force will operate:

Address each situation on its own terms, in its unique political andstrategic context, rather than attempting to fit the situation to apreferred template.

Conduct and integrate a combination of combat, security, engagement,and relief and reconstruction activities according to a concept ofoperations designed to meet the unique circumstances of that situation.

Conduct operations subject to a continuous assessment of results inrelation to expectations, modifying both the understanding of thesituation and subsequent operations accordingly.

These three ideas are explained in greater detail below. Together they describea generic process of operational adaptation designed expressly to cope with thecomplexity, uncertainty, and change that will define the future operatingenvironment.14 This process applies to all joint operations even though the

specific ends, ways, and means of those operations may vary widely accordingto the situation.

First, in designing joint operations, the joint force commander mustcome to grips with each operational situation on its own terms, accepting thatthis understanding rarely will be complete or entirely correct, but at best willapproximate reality. The Joint Operating Environmentdescribes complex,globalized challenges for which the underlying causes and dynamics will be


21/48

CCJO v3.0

13

anything but obvious, while the repercussions of action often will be broad andunpredictable. The interests of various stakeholders may be unclear, and evenidentifying those stakeholders may be difficult. In this environment, the jointforce cannot afford to applypreconceived methods

reflexively, but instead mustconform its methods to thespecific conditions of eachsituation.

Those methods mustreflect both the internaldynamics of the situationitself, which give the situationits basic operational nature,and the strategic context,

which establishes the broadpolitical and resource limitswithin which operations mustbe conducted. Because ofpervasive uncertainty, bothmay require makingassumptions about the situation based on the best available, but ofteninconclusive, information. Such assumptions must be treated as hypothesesto be confirmed or altered by the evidence developed through action.

Second, in framing a concept of operations conforming to this situational

understanding, the joint force commander must consider the use of combat,security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities. The followingsection discusses these in greater detail. Suffice to say here that most jointoperations will require some combination of two or more of these broadcategories of military activity, which in total embrace virtually every missionthe joint force could be called upon to perform. Operational art thus becomesthe arranging and balancing of combat, security, engagement, and relief andreconstruction activities to achieve the objectives of the joint operation orcampaign -- and their continual rearranging as that operation or campaignunfolds.

The concept does not envision these activities occurring in regular ordistinct phases. While some tactical sequencing inevitably will be required,this rarely will be uniform across the operational area. Rather, it is envisionedthat those activities will occur largely simultaneously across the operationalarea.

While the four basic categories of activity constitute the meansof jointoperations, the waysare the concepts by which they are arranged and

Thecentralthesisofthisconceptcomprisesthree

interrelatedideas

that

together

describe

broadly

how

the

jointforcewilloperate:

Addresseachsituationonitsownterms,initsuniquepoliticalandstrategiccontext,ratherthan

attemptingtofitthesituationtoapreferredtemplate.

Conductandintegrateacombinationofcombat,security,engagement,andreliefandreconstruction

activitiesaccordingtoaconceptofoperationsdesignedto

meetthecircumstancesofthesituation.

Conductoperationssubjecttocontinuousassessmentofresultsinrelationtoexpectations,modifyingboththeunderstandingofthesituationandsubsequent

operationsaccordingly.


22/48

CCJO v3.0

14

integrated. As desirable as it might be, no single such concept can prescribethat arrangement across the full set of potential security challenges. Theconcept for an offensive campaign to defeat the armed forces of a hostile state,for example, necessarily will be very different from the concept for helping ahost nation defeat a growing insurgency, which in turn will have little in

common with the concept for responding to a peacetime natural disaster.

In every operational situation, the joint force commander will have todevelop a concept of operations that integrates -- and reconciles the frequentlycompeting demands of -- combat, security, engagement, and relief andreconstruction as they apply. That concept of operations cannot be based on arigid template, but instead must reflect the specific conditions of the situation.This has significant implications for doctrine, training and education.

Finally, the joint force commander must expect that, however carefullyconceived, his initial operational design will prove inadequate in some respects.

His plan therefore must incorporate explicit means of continuously assessingthe results of operations in relation to expectations, and he must be preparedto modify operations when the two diverge. By probing the situation to cause itto reveal itself more clearly, operations themselves thus become a way oftesting early assumptions and expectations.

To succeed, this approach requires making assumptions about thesituation explicit so they can be reconsidered as events unfold. It furtherrequires collecting information not only to monitor tactical execution, but alsoto provide commanders a basis from which to re-evaluate their fundamentalassumptions and modify their operations accordingly.

In short, as both a concession and response to pervasive uncertainty, alljoint operations are fundamentally and explicitly an adaption based on learningabout the situation through action. Both understanding the situation andarranging combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction becomecontinuous activities informed by feedback. Regardless of the mission, themore quickly and appropriately the joint force can adapt itself to its situation,the more successful it will be.15

5. BASIC CATEGORIES OF MILITARY ACTIVITY

All joint forces are designed, organized, equipped, and trained to execute one or

more of four broad types of military activities. These are the basic buildingblocks from which joint operations areconstructed. As indicated above, mostjoint operations will require somecombination of two or more of theseactivities arranged and weighted toaccomplish the mission.

Alljointoperationscompriseoneormoreof

fourbroadcategoriesofactivity:

Combat Security Engagement Reliefandreconstruction


23/48

CCJO v3.0

15

Combataims at defeating armed enemies -- regular, irregular, or both. Itconcludes successfully when those enemies capitulate or are destroyed. It isthe demonstration of credible combat power that primarily deters aggression.

Historically, one or both of two defeat mechanisms have been employed

in combat.16

Attritionwears down an adversarys human and materialresources. Disruptionattacks his organizational cohesion or effectivefunctioning so that even if elements of the enemy system remain undamaged,the enemy cannot operate as a coherent whole. Both defeat mechanisms alsopsychologically affect the enemys will to fight.

When it can be achieved, disruption reduces the need for attrition, savingtime and reducing human and material costs. But the vulnerability of anenemy force to defeat by disruption is sensitive to both its intrinsic characterand the conditions of battle. Generally, the more rigidly structured an enemy,the greater his adherence to decipherable doctrinal patterns, and the greater

his reliance on continuous command and control, the greater his vulnerabilityto disruption. Conversely, the more imbedded an enemy in the theater ofoperations, the less transparent his activities, and the less dependent onexternal sources of logistical support, the less his vulnerability to disruption.

Because they tend to operate dispersed on familiar terrain, avoid regularpatterns, and employ episodic and often redundant command chains, irregularforces tend to be more difficult to disrupt than regular forces. More difficultdoes not mean impossible, however, and given sufficient time and intelligenceresources to unravel an irregular enemys tendencies and structure, even anirregular adversary can be disrupted. Too often, however, combat against an

irregular enemy degenerates into a battle of attrition in which success favorsthe side with the greater stamina or the willingness to apply the greaterruthlessness. Given the future described in the Joint Operating Environment,developing knowledge and doctrine for disrupting irregular enemies comparableto that which exists for regular enemies should remain a priority.

Combat activities and capabilities can vary widely depending on context.The capabilities required to detect and defeat regular forces operating fromadvanced warfighting platforms can be very different from the capabilitiesrequired to defeat irregular forces that blend in with the civil population. Bothwill be very different from the capabilities required to detect and defeat

adversaries operating in space and cyberspace.

The trends described in Section 2 promise a more varied, ambiguous,and politically volatile combat environment than U.S. joint forces have everbefore encountered. While the central task of combat to impose defeat will notchange, how to do so decisively will become increasingly complicated.Moreover, while combat is the essential activity in war, there is much more towinning wars than defeating enemy forces in combat. Above all, joint forces in


24/48

CCJO v3.0

16

the future will need to be able to apply combat power in more varied,measured, and discriminate ways than ever before.

Securityactivities seek to protect and control civil populations andterritory -- friendly, hostile, or neutral.17 They may be performed as part of a

military occupation during or after combat, to help defeat an insurgency, or inresponse to a humanitarian disaster. Unlike combat, they seek ultimately toreassure rather than compel. Security activities conclude successfully whencivil violence is reduced to a level manageable by law enforcement authorities.

Recent experiences have revitalized awareness of both the importance ofsecurity activities and the capabilities needed to conduct them effectively.There now is widespread acknowledgment that security activities may be asessential to success in war as combat; they cannot be relegated to a relativelyfew special-purpose units, but instead must be treated as a competencyrequired of all U.S. general-purpose forces.

Because the premises of security are quite different from -- indeed, oftenopposite to -- those governing combat,18 preparation for conducting securitymissions requires deliberate education and training in areas ranging fromcultural awareness and the laws of armed conflict to acceptable methods ofpopulation control and the administration of justice.

Effective security requires a visible and enduring security presence in thecommunities to be secured. Until that presence can be furnished byindigenous civil law enforcement personnel, nothing can replace sufficienttrained and disciplined military personnel on the ground.

Joint forces engaged in offensive combat must be prepared to establishsecurity in populated areas from the moment organized resistance in thoseareas has ceased, and must continue to do this until the threat of civil violenceno longer exists or until other instruments become available to control it. Jointforce commanders must consider the requirements needed to conduct bothactivities simultaneously while preserving sufficient flexibility for dealing withunforeseen events.

Engagementactivities seek to improve the capabilities of or cooperationwith allied and other partners. They may be conducted as a complement tobroader diplomatic or economic engagement, in aid of a friendly (andsometimes not so friendly) governments own security activities, and evenduring war itself. They are the primary military contribution to the nationalchallenge of establishing cooperative security. Engagement activities typicallyare long-duration undertakings, ending only when they have achieved theirgoals or when either the U.S. or partner government concludes that they havebecome unnecessary or unproductive.


25/48

CCJO v3.0

17

The scope and nature of engagement activities can vary enormously,reflecting differing strategic relationships between the United States andpartner nations. Each engagement effort will be unique and must be framed toaccommodate both U.S. objectives and the concerns of and constraints on thepotential partners.

Even more than other categories of joint activity, engagement is subjectto a myriad of laws and regulations governing everything from limits on fundingand the deployment of military personnel to legislative restrictions on the tasksto which military assistance may be applied. Given these complexities, nothingcan compensate for close and continuous interagency coordination at theindividual country level. The key to that coordination is the country team andthe U.S. Ambassador to whom it answers. As the permanent agent of the U.S.governments diplomatic relationship with the host nation, the country teamalone can negotiate the access essential to effective engagement. And as thePresidents personal representative, only the ambassador has the authority to

insure synchronization of interagency operations. Above all, by virtue of itsroutine political contacts with the host government and its familiarity with localconditions, the country team is uniquely placed to assess the partner nationsability and willingness to accept military engagement and, where those differfrom the U.S. appraisal, to convince the host government to modify its views.For all these reasons, the country team will be the coordinating authority inmost engagement efforts, and the success of those efforts will depend on theeffectiveness of the liaison between and among the regional combatantcommand and the country teams in its area of responsibility.

Trends suggest that engagement requirements increasingly will exceed

the capacities of specialized but manpower-limited organizations such asspecial operations forces and permanent military assistance groups. Theunique capabilities of those forces remain vital, and their capacities may wellexpand. But the reality is that a growing share of joint engagement tasks willfall to general-purpose forces. Accomplishing those tasks withoutunacceptable penalty to their combat capabilities will require innovativeadjustments of joint and service doctrine, organizations, and training.

Finally, not least of the challenges associated with engagement ismeasuring its impact. Because engagement is for the most part a long-termundertaking, the most important results may not be visible until long after it

begins. Indeed, in some cases, as for example when undertaken to help apartner nation improve its ability to deter external aggression, effects maynever be clearly measurable.

Since engagement imposes both direct budget costs and opportunitycosts with respect to the joint forces that conduct them, that inability tomeasure their impact risks undermining the legislative and political supportwithout which no engagement is feasible. Even more than other joint activities,


26/48

CCJO v3.0

18

therefore, engagement depends crucially on the persuasiveness of the strategicnarrative underwriting it, and on the active sponsorship of political, diplomaticand military leaders. In the end, however difficult its results may be toquantify, joint engagement may be the most cost-effective of the Nationsmilitary investments.

Relief and reconstructionactivities seek to restore essential civil servicesin the wake of combat, a breakdown of civil order, or a natural disaster.19 Likesecurity, they may be required in conditions ranging from military occupationto counterinsurgency to a humanitarian crisis. They conclude successfullywhen routine local government and commercial activities are able to meet theeconomic and health needs of the affected communities or when other agenciesare able to take over the relief and reconstruction effort.

Absent effective local law enforcement, relief and reconstruction activitiesmay require concurrent security activities, and often must be integrated with

nonmilitary efforts, both governmental and nongovernmental. Preparation forthis mission must therefore consider two cases, one in which significantcivilian relief assets are present, the other in which they are not. Joint reliefand reconstruction activities may involve significant contractor support; suchsupport will have to be integrated with the other actions of the joint force.

Historically, military forces have shown little concern for the civil damageresulting from combat. That began to change in the last century as thecontinued conduct of combat increasingly fell hostage to the recovery of battle-damaged lines of communication and support facilities such as roads, raillines, ports and airfields. Similarly, failure to attend to essential civil needs in

occupied areas invited popular resistance, suppression of which might requirethe diversion of precious combat forces.

To those concerns must be added the psychological impact of untendedcollateral civil damage, not only on the affected population, but also, broadcastby ubiquitous visual media, on the American public and the internationalcommunity at large. Such untended collateral damage can undermine thelegitimacy of U.S. and partner actions. At home, a natural disaster can havethe same impact, producing a similar demand for the mobility, logistical assets,command and control, and organized and disciplined manpower which, inmany cases, military forces alone possess.

Relief and reconstruction activities conducted during battle differ inseveral important respects from those conducted during prolonged militaryoccupations, and those, in turn, from peacetime operations aimed at assistingcommunities in the wake of manmade or natural disaster. Perhaps the keyvariable is the security conditions within which relief and reconstruction mustbe conducted. Where no significant security threat exists, or where local lawenforcement capabilities suffice to maintain public order, relief and


27/48

CCJO v3.0

19

reconstruction becomes primarily a logistical and engineering problem. Insuch cases, typical of natural catastrophes and post-conflict environments inwhich hostile forces have accepted defeat, military forces rarely will be alone inmounting relief efforts, and their most important contribution may be to assistother organizations in such areas as transportation, communications, logistics,

and emergency health care.

Such benign conditions are unlikely to coexist with combat. Even wherecare has been taken to minimize civil damage, combat inevitably destroys civilfacilities and disrupts social services, particularly in dense urban areas.Meanwhile, the temporary suspension of civil law enforcement risks unleashinglooting, vandalism, and other manifestations of public disorder. Unlessbrought promptly under control, such conditions can make relief andreconstruction virtually impossible. In turn, delay in re-establishing essentialsocial services can feed the disorder, exacerbate the security problem and, inthe extreme, incite the growth of organized resistance.

That said, while security may be a prerequisite for the ultimate successof relief and reconstruction activities, it cannot be a precondition forundertaking them. Both to engage local civil populations and preemptresentment and resistance, efforts to restore essential civil services andencourage the restoration of peaceful daily routines must begin as quickly aspossible after organized resistance has ended. In the context of continuingoperations, in short, security and relief and reconstruction go hand in hand.

The preeminent objective of relief and reconstruction conducted duringcombat will be to maintain offensive momentum or defensive integrity. While

that by no means precludes efforts to ameliorate the conditions of civilpopulations, those efforts must be carefully prioritized to avoid reducingpressure on a still undefeated enemy. In counterinsurgency operations, thetension between these competing objectives can become acute, and joint forcecommanders must constantly reassess and adjust the balance between reliefand reconstruction efforts aimed at supporting continued combat and thoseaimed at improving the conditions of the population.

Where combat against organized resistance has ended or never existed,military relief and reconstruction activities typically are a stopgap measure topreserve life and property until civil and commercial efforts can be organized

and brought to bear. In some cases, however, particularly in less developedareas, the interval between an initial response by joint forces and thedeployment of sufficient civil relief resources to replace them can be prolonged.

Nevertheless, it is essential that military forces begin partnering withother federal agencies and local authorities as rapidly as possible, especiallywhen nongovernmental organizations are involved. Except in the case of reliefand reconstruction incident to combat, straightforward command relationships


28/48

CCJO v3.0

20

rarely will exist, and the greater the number and variety of participatingagencies, the greater the risk of misunderstanding and disputes. Militarycommanders must be able to tolerate a certain degree of ambiguity andinefficiency as the price of successful cross-agency collaboration. They likewisemust allocate sufficient resources and effort to overcoming this challenge.

Effectiveness therefore will put a premium on close and continuous liaison andcommunications.

The employment of joint forces in relief and reconstruction activities,unless carefully monitored and controlled, easily can begin to degrade combatreadiness. Commanders responsible for such operations must be alert to signsof such degradation and take measures to sustain or restore the combatproficiency of the units involved.

* * *

Together, these four categories of activity embrace virtually every mission thejoint force could be called upon to accomplish. Assisting a friendly state todefeat an insurgency, for example, might require combat against organizedinsurgent forces, security to protect the population from intimidation, relief andreconstruction to restore or expand civil services, and engagement to trainhost-nation security forces. Even a more conventional conflict typically wouldrequire joint forces to conduct, in addition to combat, security activities tocontrol secured areas, relief and reconstruction to facilitate continued combat,and engagement to ensure effective cooperation with multinational partners.Homeland defense could involve engagement to deprive nonstate enemies ofsanctuary overseas; security to detect and prevent attack by monitoring land,

sea, air, and cyberspace access; combat to defeat an actual attack; and in theworst event, relief and reconstruction to mitigate the effects of a successfulattack.

Deterrence is a special case because it can involve both thedemonstration of capabilities and the performance of activities. Deterrencerequires the credible willingness to employ defensive and offensive combatcapabilities, including nuclear, to convince a potential aggressor that anyattack would likely fail and would result in unacceptable retaliation. It caninvolve security activities that convince the potential aggressor that attackpreparations likely would be detected. In conjunction with cooperative security

efforts, it can involve a variety of engagement activities to convince thepotential adversary that it can achieve acceptable objectives without attacking.It can also involve engagement with partners to convince a potential aggressorthat an attack would result in a multinational response. Finally, it can involvereconstruction capabilities that demonstrate that even a successful attack willnot achieve its desired objective because the United States will recovereffectively.


29/48

CCJO v3.0

21

How each activity will be conducted will vary with context. Combat insupport of counterinsurgency will differ from combat to defeat cross-borderaggression by the armed forces of a hostile state. Recovery from a naturaldisaster at home or abroad will differ from relief and reconstruction pursuantto combat in an occupied territory. That said, the basic aims, means, and

concepts associated with each of these activities will change little from case tocase.

Combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction must all becompetencies of the joint force. While some special-purpose forces willspecialize in particular aspects of one or more, general-purpose forces must beable to operate in all four types of activity in one way or another. Currently,U.S. joint forces possess codified doctrine for the conduct of combat, butdoctrine and capabilities with respect to the other activities are less robust.That imbalance must change. That said, it is important to keep in mind thatwhile other agencies can perform security, engagement, and relief and

reconstruction, only the military can conduct combat.

6. COMMON OPERATING PRECEPTS

Regardless of the combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief andreconstruction activities,several broad precepts willunderlie all successful future joint operations. In effect,these precepts elaborate the

central thesis described inSection 4. All flow logicallyfrom the conditions andchallenges described earlier.None is fundamentally new,although the emphasis eachreceives and how it isimplemented in the futuremay change. Subordinatejoint operating concepts willapply these precepts in

greater detail to more specificsituations.

Achieve and maintainunity of effort within thejoint force and between thejoint force and U.S.government, international,

Thesepreceptswillunderliefuturejointoperations:

AchieveandmaintainunityofeffortwithinthejointforceandbetweenthejointforceandU.S.government,

international,andotherpartners.

Planforandmanageoperationaltransitionsovertimeandspace.

Focusonoperationalobjectiveswhoseachievementsuggeststhebroadestandmostenduringresults.

Combinejointcapabilitiestomaximizecomplementaryratherthanmerelyadditiveeffects.

Avoidcombiningcapabilitieswheredoingsoaddscomplexitywithoutcompensatingadvantage.

Drivesynergytothelowestechelonatwhichitcanbemanagedeffectively.

Operateindirectlythroughpartnerstotheextentthateach

situation

permits.

Ensureoperationalfreedomofaction. Maintainoperationalandorganizationalflexibility. Informdomesticaudiencesandinfluencethe

perceptionsandattitudesofkeyforeignaudiencesasanexplicit

andcontinuousoperationalrequirement.


30/48

CCJO v3.0

22

and other partners. The problem of achieving and maintaining operationalcoherence is more important and difficult than ever before given therequirement to operate in multiple domains simultaneously in conjunction withother national agencies, international partners and nongovernmentalorganizations. After decades of effort, U.S. joint forces have established

effective mechanisms for achieving internal unity of effort based on a singlemilitary chain of command, although the requirement to ensure thatequipment, procedures, and so on are interoperable persists. The challenges ofthe future will require joint forces to achieve this same level of unity betweendifferent joint forces and with other governmental and nongovernmental actors,both U.S. and international, even when formal unity of command is infeasible.They also will require future joint forces to integrate with partners with whomthey have never integrated before and at lower echelons than ever before. Inmany cases, joint forces will require the ability to integrate effectively withpartners who are technologically less advanced.

Mechanisms for achieving unity of effort necessarily will differ acrosssituations and among participants. Some actors will integrate fully with thejoint force. Others, such as some international partners, may cooperate openlywhile requiring operational autonomy. Still others, such as somenongovernmental organizations, may find it necessary to distance themselvesfrom military forces for reasons of their own credibility and security. The jointforce will have to be extremely flexible about establishing nonstandardrelationships -- an example of the direct imposition of political factors onoperational conduct.

Two basic situations apply. Where military considerations predominate,

the joint force likely will integrate the national effort and will have toincorporate partners into its command and control processes. Where otherconsiderations predominate, some other government agency likely will integratethe national effort, with the joint force adapting itself to that agencysprocedures. Even in this case, the joint force, because of its resources andwell-established planning methods, will likely provide significant support to thelead agency. Both basic situations will have implications for communications,organization, procedures, and training.

Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space.This concept calls for continuous adaptation to changing circumstances, which

often can be done within the context of an existing operational design.Sometimes, however, situations will undergo fundamental shifts. These willrarely be uniform in time and space across an operational area, but they canbe critical periods in the conduct of operations. The future joint forcecommander will have to recognize these fundamental transformations in thesituation and transition quickly and smoothly in response to them. Failure todo so can result in problems ranging from lost momentum or opportunities tomore or less significant setbacks to outright mission failure. Conversely,


31/48

CCJO v3.0

23

successful transition can allow the joint force to seize the initiative in asituation and garner disproportionately favorable results.

These transitions may often involve the replacement of one organizationby another -- either within the joint force or between the joint force and

another U.S. or international agency, but they almost always will require somefundamental reorienting of existing forces. In any event, they will requirefundamental shifts in operational behavior -- such as from combat to securityactivities, with their potentially contradictory imperatives.

Transitions of this magnitude cannot be improvised, but must beplanned, even if the precise timing of the shifts cannot be predicted -- andaccepting that surprises inevitably will occur despite the best analysis. Thiswill require efforts to anticipate potential situational transformations as well asvigilance to operational shifts as they occur. Key also will be mechanisms forquickly reorienting the force despite the natural inertia of ongoing operations.

Especially vital will be retaining key commanders and commands in placeduring transitions, to avoid abrupt breaks in operational continuity.

Focus on operational objectives whose achievement suggests thebroadest and most enduring results. Designating operational objectivesthat, if achieved, generate the intended outcomes is a key task of operationaldesign in any situation. A situation can be thought of as a system, a collectionof elements interacting to perform certain functions that are essential to thecontinued existence of that system -- whether the system is an adversarysfighting forces, a society reeling from a natural disaster, or a collection of statescreating a regional cooperative security arrangement. Some elements and

functions of the system invariably will be more important to the existence ofthe system -- and offer the joint force greater leverage against it -- than otherstoward which applying effort will contribute only marginally.

The idea is to focus efforts on objectives that appear most critical to thecontinued overall functioning of the system rather than those that impactindividual elements but leave the system unaffected. In the case of combat,this would mean attacking to disrupt the enemys functioning as a cohesivewhole, rendering him ineffective as a combat force even if whole units remainundamaged -- and exposing him to piecemeal destruction, if necessary.Conversely, in the case of relief and reconstruction, it would mean focusing on

those tasks that would most efficiently create or restore some basic level offunctionality in local institutions and infrastructure -- in this case to enhancerather than disrupt the functioning of the system.

Identifying critical objectives will depend more on judgment than oncalculation. Full understanding of the dynamics of any operational situationwill remain fundamentally unachievable, and planning for joint operationsshould not be predicated on false expectations of certainty. Initially,


32/48

CCJO v3.0

24

operational objectives may have to be tentative, and commanders must beprepared to shift those objectives as the situation develops. The choice offactors on which to concentrate efforts thus should be treated as a hypothesisto be tested by action.

In many situations, the systemic nature of the problem may not beobvious. The operating patterns of irregular enemies, for example, tend to beless easily discerned than those of regular forces. Likewise, some systems aresimply less vulnerable than others to system-level influence. Networks oflargely autonomous elements, for example, tend to be less vulnerable to systemdisruption than centralized hierarchies. Such systems ultimately may have tobe dealt with by dealing cumulatively with the individual elements.

Regardless of the approach, it is important to recognize that any actionin a situation will change the situation. Operational design must always bealert to this, revising objectives as necessary.

Combine joint capabilities to maximize complementary rather thanmerely additive effects.The Services have evolved diverse sets of capabilitiesto operate effectively in certain situations and physical domains. The essenceof joint operations is not only to match each Service to its proper situation sothat it contributes most effectively to success, but also to combine Servicecapabilities such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for thevulnerabilities of the others. Joint synergy essentially scales up thecommonly understood mechanism of combined arms.20

Achieving that sort of complementary synergy requires more than just

understanding the particular capabilities and limitations that each componentbrings to the operation. It also requires the ability to visualize operationsholistically, identifying the preconditions that enable each component tooptimize its own impact and then diagnosing how the other components mighthelp to produce them. It requires the ability to think in terms of theperformance of joint functions -- maneuver, fires, intelligence, command andcontrol, force protection, logistics -- independent of a specific Service ordomain. Finally -- not the easiest challenge -- it requires the ability andwillingness to compare alternative component missions and mixes solely fromthe perspective of combined effectiveness, unhampered by Serviceparochialism.

Above all, achieving joint complementarity requires mutual trust that themissions assigned to components will be consistent with their intrinsiccapabilities and limitations; that those capabilities will not be risked forinsufficient overall return; and, above all, that component obligations onceaccepted will be executed as promised. As a later precept suggests, the lowerthat component synergy routinely can be driven, the greater will be theprospect of developing that mutual confidence.


33/48

CCJO v3.0

25

Avoid combining joint capabilities where doing so adds complexitywithout compensating advantage. Joint synergy is not a natural outcome ofmulti-Service operations. The requirement to be able to operate jointly imposesconstraints on the Services, which the Services willingly accept because of thedemonstrated tremendous increase in collective operational impact that

effective joint integration provides. That integration requires explicit effort,however, and is achieved only at a cost in increased complexity and greaterrequirements for training, technical, and technological interoperability, liaison,and planning.

The U.S. Armed Forces in recent decades have succeeded in driving downthe costs of joint integration through a variety of organizational, procedural,technological, and training mechanisms, and the synergy achieved bycombining Service capabilities usually more than offsets the added complexity.In some situations, however, the benefits of joint integration cannotcompensate for that additional complexity, and requiring joint integration

becomes operationally unwise.

Where a task is suited to the capabilities of one or two Services, andwhere involving the remaining components would merely increase complexitywithout compensating operational benefit, doing so should be avoided. Inshort, joint synergy must be understood to be a means to greater operationaleffectiveness, not an end in itself. The joint commander must recognize thelimits of synergy in any given situation and optimize joint effectiveness withinthose limits.

Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managedeffectively. The future operating environment will demand the application ofmilitary power in ever-smaller increments, which in turn will require theachievement of joint synergy at ever-lower echelons of command. Jointintegration that was once achieved at the component level or slightly below willbe achieved routinely in the future at drastically lower echelons -- even down tothe small-unit level.

Thanks to advances in areas ranging from communications andinformation sharing to munitions effectiveness, it increasingly is becomingpossible to achieve joint synergy at lower echelons of command withoutincurring the risks and inefficiencies associated with piecemealing the assets

themselves. Thus, in the future, the chief prerequisites for the continueddevolution of joint synergy downward will have to do with cross-Serviceeducation and training and the continued development of more flexible andadaptable joint planning and coordination mechanisms -- all of which help tolower the inherent costs of joint integration.

In addition, the more widely the premises and practices of missioncommand, including the encouragement of subordinate initiative, are infused


34/48

CCJO v3.0

26

throughout the joint force, the more effective the devolution of joint synergy willbe.

Above all, the further downward the commitment to joint synergy isdriven, the more completely one force, one fight will become internalized

throughout the joint force, increasing not only its operational flexibility, butalso its institutional robustness.

Operate indirectly through partners to the extent that eachsituation permits. In a future likely characterized by frequent andwidespread military challenges, not even the United States will be able torespond directly to every crisis. In addition, any large-scale employment ofU.S. military forces abroad invites political repercussions simply because it isthe United States that is acting. Indeed, some will oppose almost any U.S.military commitment, no matter how limited or benign, solely to restrain theexercise of American power. In these circumstances, friendly surrogates

assisted by the joint force may be able to conduct operations when the directemployment of U.S. forces would be objectionable or infeasible. In otherinstances, such as counterinsurgency, eventual success may depend on theindigenous government demonstrating its own sovereign power, and the overtexercise of power by U.S. forces may ultimately be counterproductive.

Even more than in the past, therefore, the future joint force mayincreasingly find it necessary to pursue its objectives by enabling andsupporting such partners, whether friendly nations, internationalorganizations, or some other political entity. This typically will require U.S.forces to minimize their own visibility by operating in a supporting role,

allowing those partners to take the lead, even at some expense in reducedoperational efficiency. Mounting such indirect operations will more likelysucceed where prior engagement activities by special and general-purposeforces -- including military advice and planning, foreign military sales andother forms of security assistance -- have laid the necessary political andmilitary groundwork.

Finally, even when the scale or seriousness of a strategic threat requiresthe direct employment of sizable U.S. forces, such operations will usuallybenefit from the operations of partners augmented by U.S. support.

Ensure operational freedom of action. Achieving the advantage ofsynergy requires that joint forces maintain freedom of action on the land and

sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace -- in both the operational area andthe global commons. In recent decades, U.S. forces have enjoyed virtuallyuncontested maritime, air and space supremacy. In some future situations --most cases of disaster relief, for example -- there will be no adversary to contestfreedom of action. But as the Joint Operating Environmentpoints out, agrowing number of potential adversaries in the future will have the capability to


35/48


36/48

CCJO v3.0

28

narrative explaining those operations to various audiences. It will not beenough to act appropriately; it will be just as important to engage in the debateabout how to interpret those actions, and it will usually be best to initiate thedebate on terms of the joint forces own choosing.

Because in an increasingly saturated information environment signalswill have to compete for the attention of their audiences, it will be important forthe joint force to coordinate its messages and images -- and to maintain unityof effort by integrating those messages with those of its partners. Moreover,since deeds send stronger messages than words, it is important that actionsboth large and small be consistent with the resulting narrative. Few things willdestroy credibility more quickly than actions that are incompatible with statedintentions.

7. IMPLICATIONS OFADOPTING THIS CONCEPT

Adopting this concept hassignificant implications for theway the Services organize, man,train, and equip the units thatcompose the joint force. Giventhe broad scope of a capstoneconcept, these implications willnaturally be broad. Subordinateconcepts, with their narrower

scope, will derive more specificimplications.

The common theme to allthese implications is creatinggreater adaptability and versatilityacross the force to cope with theuncertainty, complexity,unforeseeable change, andpersistent conflict that willcharacterize the future operating

environment. These implicationsinclude:

Build a balanced andversatile joint force. The singleclearest implication of thisconcept is that the United States

Institutionalimplicationsofadoptingthisconceptinclude:

Buildabalancedandversatilejointforce. Improveknowledgeofandcapabilitiesforwagingirregular

warfare.

Improveknowledgeofandcapabilitiesfornuclearwarfareandoperationsinchemical,biological,radiologicalandnuclear

environments.

Improveknowledgeofandcapabilitiesforsecurity,engagement,andreliefandreconstructionactivities.

Renewemphasisonandunderstandingofstrategicdeterrence,includingnucleardeterrence.

Creategeneralpurposeforcescapableofoperatingindependentlyatincreasinglylowerechelons.

Maintainthecapabilitytoprojectandsustainmilitarypoweoverglobaldistances.

Improvetheabilitytooperateinurbanenvironments. Improvecapabilitiesandcapacitiesforcovertandclandestin

operations.

Markedlyincreaselanguageandculturalcapabilitiesandcapacities.

Institutemechanismstopreparegeneralpurposeforcesquicklyfornewmissionsets.

MarkedlyimprovetheabilitytointegratewithotherU.S.agenciesandotherpartners.

Improveorganizationalsolutionsforprotractedmissionsthacutacrossgeographicalboundaries.

Developinnovativeandadaptiveleadersdowntothelowestlevels.

Developjointcommanderswhoaremastersofoperationalart.

Developseniorleaderswhoareexpertsnotonlyintheoperationalemploymentofthejointforce,butalsointhe

developmentandexecutionofnationalstrategy.

ImproveServiceandinstitutionaladaptabilitytodealwithrapidchange.


37/48

CCJO v3.0

29

must have balanced and versatile forces able to accomplish a wide variety ofpotential missions. This will require a broad array of forces and capabilitiesthat can be tailo

Documents

ConceptforJointOperations1