Conflict and Development: Roles of JBIC

JBICI Research Paper No.24

Conflict and Development: Roles of JBIC

-Development Assistance Strategy for Peace Building and Reconstruction

in Sri Lanka-

August 2003

JBIC Institute Japan Bank for International Cooperation

JBICI Research Paper No. 24 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) Published in August 2003 Published in August 2003 © 2003 Japan Bank for International Cooperation All rights reserved. This Research Paper is based on the findings and discussions of the JBIC Institute (JBICI). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the JBIC. No part of this Research Paper may be reproduced in any form without the express permission of the publisher. For further information please contact the Planning and Coordination Division of our Institute.

i

Foreword

In recent years, many of the developing countries have become burdened in some form or other with violent conflicts. The internal and regional conflicts that have frequently arisen since the end of the Cold War differ from the traditional conflicts between nations. They are a new type of organized violence which is a mix of military action, organized crime and large-scale violation of human rights. The effectiveness of conventional methods of preventing and resolving these conflicts are limited and thus a new approach is required.

A study entitled ‘Conflict and Development: Roles of JBIC’, was taken up at

the JBIC Institute, as one of the themes for the FY2002 research projects. This research paper is a part of the outcome of this project. In concert with

Japanese and Sri Lankan academics and experts, the study team conducted an analysis of the history and factors of the conflict, the past and current situation of donors’ assistance, the status and progress of the peace process, and the needs for rehabilitation and reconstruction. On the bases of these analyses, the team proposed roles that Japan and JBIC could possibly assume, for peace building and reconstruction in Sri Lanka from a mid-long term perspective.

Even during the course of study, running parallel with the peace negotiations

between the government of Sri Lanka and LTTE, the latest information was provided to humanitarian and development assistance partners in Japan and of other donors. Two workshops were held in Colombo (December 2002) and Tokyo (January 2003) where preliminary findings and recommendations of the study were presented and discussions took place among participants from government agencies, international organizations, academics and NGOs. Also, the chapter containing the main recommendations was distributed at the ‘Tokyo Conference of Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka’ in June 2003.

It is greatly hoped that this report will be widely used as a source of reference

in the field of future development and reconstruction assistance in Sri Lanka, and that it will provide guidance for assistance in peace building and reconstruction of those countries burdened with internal conflict.

Finally, in the process of this study, much support and cooperation was

received from Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Representative of the Government of Japan for Peace Building, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka; H. E. Karunatilaka

ii

Amunugama, Ambassador of Sri Lanka to Japan; Professor Yoshiko Ashiwa, Graduate School of Social Science, Hitotsubashi University; and from persons of relevant organizations, both domestic and abroad. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to these people. August, 2003

Keiichi Tango Executive Director JBIC Institute

iii

<JBIC Staff Members> Yasuo Fujita Director, Senior Economist, Development Policy Research

Division, JBIC Institute Motoko Kanamaru Researcher, Development Policy Research Division, JBIC

Institute

<External Study Team> Hisashi Nakamura Professor, Research Institute for Social Science, Ryukoku

University Monte Cassim Executive Director, Center for Global Education and

Research; Professor, Faculty of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan University

Mika Shimada Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Ryukoku University W.D. Lakshman Professor, Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts,

University of Colombo N. Shanmugaratnam Professor, Center for International Environment and

Development Studies, NORAGRIC, Agricultural University of Norway

Sunil Bastian Research Fellow, International Center for Ethnic Studies (ICES)

Tomoko Tamura Consultant, Kaihatsu Management Consulting, Inc.

<Duration of Study> July 2002 ~ January 2003

iv

North and East Provinces Boundaries (Province)

Boundaries (District)

Public Highway

Other Major Roads

LTTE controlled Areas

National Territory of Sri Lanka

v

Table of Contents Foreword i National Territory of Sri Lanka iv Table of Contents v List of Tables vii List of Figures vii List of Boxes viii List of Abbreviations ix Executive Summary S-1 Introduction 1

1 Background and Objectives 1 2 Study Methodology 3 3 Composition of the Report 4 4 Composition of the Study Team 5

Chapter I Analysis of the Major Causes of Conflict in Sri Lanka 7

1.1 Sri Lanka – An Overview 7 1.2 Analysis of History and Causes of the Conflict 10

1.2.1 Historical Background of the Conflict 10 1.2.2 Intensification of the Conflict 17 1.2.3 Analysis of the Causes of the Conflict 22

1.3 Mechanism that Sustained the Conflict 24 1.4 Effects and Damages of the Conflict 28 1.5 Characteristics of the Sri Lankan Conflict 32

Chapter II Evaluation of Foreign Assistance in the North and East 36

2.1 Development Assistance after 1977 36 2.1.1 Influence of Development Assistance after 1977 36 2.1.2 Development Assistance and Conflict – Evolution of Policies 40

2.2 Development Assistance and Conflict – Donor Responses 43 2.2.1 Working around Conflict 44 2.2.2 Working in Conflict 45 2.2.3 Working on Conflict 47 2.2.4 Some Lessons 49 2.2.5 Variations on the Theme 51

vi

2.3 Current Interventions in the North and East Supported by Foreign Donor Agencies 56 2.3.1 RRR Framework 56 2.3.2 World Bank ‘NEIAP’ and ADB ‘NECORD’ 59 2.3.3 ‘Quick Impact Project’ and ‘Quick Recovery’ 60

2.4 Current Interventions in the North and East by NGOs (Excluding Japanese NGOs) 61

2.4.1 Interventions by International NGOs 63 2.4.2 Interventions by Local NGOs 67

Chapter III Evaluation of Japanese Assistance 83

3.1 Review of History and Current Intervention of Japanese Development Assistance to Sri Lanka 83

3.2 Review of Japanese Assistance in the Area of Peace Building in Sri Lanka 90

3.3 Japanese NGOs: Future Tasks of Assistance in Conflict Affected Areas 95 Chapter IV Peace Process – Past and Present, and the Challenge of Past and Present, and the Challenge of

Reconstruction and Development 98 4.1 Review of Past Peace Initiatives and Processes 98 4.2 The Current Peace Process 110

4.2.1 Main Characteristics of the Fifth Peace Process 113 4.2.2 Sustainability of the Current Peace Process 116

4.3 Challenges of Reconstruction and Development 121 4.4 Need for a Process Approach with Flexibility and Creativity 125

Chapter V Strategy for Japanese Assistance on Peace Building and RRR 131

5.1 Core Issues 132 5.2 Principles and Guidelines 134 5.3 Risk Analysis and Coping Mechanism 137

5.3.1. Macro-environmental Changes 138 5.3.2. Risk Mitigation through Project/Programme Design 139

5.4 Conceptual Framework for Peace Building, RRR and beyond 140 5.4.1 Confidence Building (2002-2005, tentative) 141 5.4.2 Capacity Building (2003-2008) 143 5.4.3 Nation Building (2004-2011) 146

5.5 Japan’s Assistance Strategy 148 5.6 Conclusion: Significance for Sri Lanka and Japan 153

References 157

vii

List of Tables TableI-1 Basic Information of Sri Lanka 9 TableI-2 Main Statistics of Sri Lanka 10 TableI-3 Root Causes of Conflict (before 1983), its Influence and Alternative

Plans 23 TableI-4 Factors that Helped Prolong the Conflict 25 TableII-1 Summary of Some of the Main Donor Funded Projects in the North

and East 54 TableII-2 Overview of NGOs Working in the North and East 62 TableII-3 On-going Projects of CARE Sri Lanka in Conflict Affected Areas 65 TableII-4 On-going Relief Activities of Sewa Lanka (2001-2002) 69 TableII-5 On-going Rehabilitation Activities of Sewa Lanka (2002) 71 TableII-6 Present Activities of Sarvodaya in the North and East

(2000-2002) 77 TableIII-1 The Trend and Composition of Japanese ODA to Sri Lanka (Selected

Years from 1965) 83 TableIII-2 Relative Position of Japan among Donors of Aid to Sri Lanka

(1997-2001) 85 TableIII-3 Relative Contribution of Grants and Loans in Total Japanese ODA to

Sri Lanka (1997-2001) 86 TableIII-4 Foreign Aid from Japan by Purpose (1997-2001) 87 TableIII-5 Japanese Grant Assistance for ‘Grassroots Project’ in the North and

East 91 TableIII-6 Japanese Assistance in the North and East by Grant Aid, Loan Aid

and 2KR Schemes 92 TableIII-7 Japanese Assistance through Multilateral Donor Agencies 92 TableIV-1 Approved Cadre and Vacancies in State Institutions in the North and

East 125

List of Figures

FigureII-1 Role of CARE Sri Lanka 66 FigureII-2 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme of SEDEC: Programme in

North and East (2002) 81 FigureII-3 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme of SEDEC: Areas of Emergency

Relief Activities to be Implemented (2002) 82 FigureIII-1 Japanese Assistance to Sri Lanka (1975-2000) 84

viii

FigureIV-1 RRR through Sustainable Livelihood Development 127 FigureV-1 Principles for Assistance in Peace Building and RRR 138 FigureV-2 Conceptual Framework for Peace Building and RRR 141

List of Boxes BoxI-1 Involvement of Swabhasha Sri Lankans in the Development Process

34 BoxII-1 Micro Credit Programme: Case Study 72 BoxII-2 NEIAP Project: Case Study 73 BoxII-3 Sarvodaya in Jaffna District: Case Study 78

ix

List of Abbreviation AA: Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office of Germany) ADB: Asian Development Bank AMDP: Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme AusAID: Australian Agency for International Development BHN: Basic Human Needs BMZ: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und

Entwicklung (Ministry of Development Cooperation of the Government of Germany)

BOI: Board of Investment CBO: Community Based Organization CFA: Ceasefire Agreement CHA: Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency CISIR: Ceylon Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research CWC: Ceylon Workers Congress DAC: Development Assistance Committee DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration DFID: Department for International Development DMK: Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Dravidian Progress League DUNF: Democratic United National Front EDB: Economic Development Board EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone ENLF: Eelam National Liberation Front EOI: Export Oriented Industrialization EPRLF: Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front EROS: Eelam Revolutionary Organizations of Students ERRP: Emergency Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme FO: Farmers Organization FP: Federal Party GAA: German Agro Action GOJ: Government of Japan GOSL: Government of Sri Lanka GTZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH

(German Agency for Technical Cooperation) HSZ: High Security Zones IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World

Bank) ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

x

ICT: Information and Communications Technologies IDA: International Development Association IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons ILO: International Labour Organization IMF: International Monetary Fund IPKF: Indian Peacekeeping Forces IRDPs: Integrated Rural Development Projects ITDG: Intermediate Technology Development Group (NGO) JBIC: Japan Bank for International Cooperation JCCP: Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (NGO) JETRO: Japan External Trade Organization JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency JRRP: Jaffna Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programme JTF: Joint Task Force JVP: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna People’s Liberation Front KKS: Kankesanthurai Port LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MIRJE: Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (NGO) MOU: Memorandum of Understanding (Often referred to as the

Ceasefire Agreement on Feb. 22nd 2002) N&E (NE, NEP): North and East Provinces NECORD: North and East Community Restoration and Development Project NEIAP: North and East Irrigated Agriculture Project NEPC: North and East Provincial Council NERF: North and East Rehabilitation Fund NGO: Non-Governmental Organization NORAD: The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation NPC: National Peace Council (NGO) NTFPs: Non-Timber Forest Products ODA: Official Development Assistance OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PA: People’s Alliance PCIA: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment PLOTE: People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam PSG: Peace Support Group (NGO) RAW: Research and Analysis Wing of India RDS: Rural Development Society RRR (3R): Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation Rs.: Rupees SCF: Save the Children Fund

xi

SCOPP: Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process SCs: Subcommittees SDN: Subcommittee on De-escalation and Normalization SEDEC: Social Economic Development Centre (NGO) SEEDS: Sarvodaya Economic Enterprises Development Services (NGO) SIDA: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIHRN: Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation

Needs in the North and East SLA: Sri Lanka Army SLBDC: Sri Lanka Business Development Centre SLF: Sewa Lanka Foundation (NGO) SLFP: Sri Lanka Freedom Party SLMC: Sri Lanka Muslim Congress SLMM: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission SU: Sihala Urumaya Sinhalese Heritage Movement TEK: Traditional Ecological Knowledge TELO: Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation TFSR: Tools for Self Reliance (NGO) TNA: Tamil National Army TULF: Tamil United Liberation Front UNDP: United Nations Development Programme UNF: United National Front UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund UNP: United National Party USAID: The United States Agency for International Development VHP: Vishva Hindu Parishad WFP: World Food Programme WHO: World Health Organization WRDS: Women’s Rural Development Society WUSC: World University Service of Canada 2KR: Second Kennedy Round (Aid toward increased food production)

S - 1

Executive Summary

Introduction From the perspective of Japan, Sri Lanka has been an amicable nation with

common footings in relation to history and culture. Situated on the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka is strategically important as a shipping route, and its security is important also for the Japanese economy. Japan, in the view of Sri Lanka, is the largest provider of development assistance (approx. 60% of aid received by Sri Lanka), and JBIC has also supported economical development through yen loans and technical cooperation.

Sri Lanka, has traditionally experienced various conflicts caused by the problems in ethnic background, language, religion and social class. After independence in 1948, the conflict between the Sinhalese (majority) and the Tamils (minority) who have reacted against domination policies have become increasingly apparent. Particularly after 1983, terrorism and land warfare in the North and East region between the government and anti-government organizations of the Tamils have continued, and many cases of deaths, refugees and internally displaced persons have arisen.

However, in February 2002 both parties have agreed on an indefinite ceasefire and in September of that year, peace negotiations were begun. The government of Japan (GOJ) declared a wish to support peace in Sri Lanka, and in October, Yasushi Akashi (Former United Nations Deputy Secretary-General) was assigned as the government representative. At the time of writing, the ceasefire has continued for over one year, and the peace negotiations are witnessing constant progress. The background of this peace in Sri Lanka, can be explained in international and internal contexts.

International factors: International debate after the simultaneous terrorism in USA (e.g. regulation of money laundering); Norway government as mediator; Support for promoting peace by the international community (e.g. monitors of the Ceasefire). Internal factors: War-weariness and support for peace by the people of Sri Lanka; Economical stagnation caused by the military burden; ‘Step-by-Step Approaches’ taken by the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) which aims at developing gradual trust through prioritizing on issues that can be easily agreed upon; Civil society taking part in the peace process.

When political and military issues become the subject in the future, there are fears that the peace negotiations will experience a rough ride. But, it is largely believed that, progress of peace have previously never occurred to this extent, and thus, the current situation cannot double back on peace. It is vital for the

S - 2

international community to take part in this process with a certain amount of resolution.

This study was begun in July 2002, having conducted the preliminary

research in Sri Lanka in April 2002. At that time, there was no clear sight of when the peace negotiations were going to commence. This study, in relation to the consolidation of peace and reconstruction in Sri Lanka, including the role of supporting success in the peace negotiations from the periphery, was aimed to,

(1) Evaluate how Japan (including NGOs) and JBIC can contribute (or have contributed) to the mitigation of the conflict.

(2) Discuss what kinds of reform and considerations should be made, in order to maximize contributions to the peace building of the target country.

(3) Propose the direction of technical and financial support that should be provided by JBIC, in cooperation with other organizations and institutions.

Having acknowledged the issues raised above, the research was launched by establishing a team of specialists, on such areas as, Sri Lankan regional study; economic development; ethnic issues and peace building. Analyses of precedence research were conducted and investigation through interviews, fieldwork, consultations at study forum and workshops were undertaken.

The report is structured into 5 chapters. In chapter 1, a summary of Sri

Lanka’s conflict, in terms of its structural factors, characteristics, historical course, extent of the damage and the mechanisms that prolonged the conflict were examined. In chapter 2, a review of development assistance provided by main foreign aid agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field of peace building and those directed to the northeast region were undertaken and evaluated. In chapter 3, a review of Japanese assistance in Sri Lanka, both governmental, and non-governmental, and activities by civil society was undertaken and evaluated. In chapter 4, taking into account the past four failures in peace negotiations, the characteristics and issues in the current peace process were clarified and the roles of the international community, and uncertain factors or impediments to progress in peace were addressed. In chapter 5, recommendations were made for development assistance strategy for peace building and reconstruction in Sri Lanka, risk analysis and mechanisms to overcome issues were also proposed. And finally, the role of Japan, especially JBIC was suggested.

S - 3

Chapter I Analysis of the Major Causes of Conflict in Sri Lanka < Analysis of History and Causes of Conflict>

If one was to briefly summarize the ethnic structure of Sri Lanka, there are Sinhalese 74%, Tamil 18%, Moors (Muslim) and others 8%. The religions that are followed are Buddhism 70% (mostly Sinhalese), Hinduism 15% (mainly Tamils), Christianity (Tamils and Sinhalese) and Islam (Muslim) 8%. Three languages are used in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese, Tamil and English.

There is a tendency to treat the conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils, as one of ethnic conflict or religious conflict between Buddhism and Hinduism. However, Sinhalese and Tamil identity based on language and religion that we observe today, arose after the independence of the country.

The most important and decisive aspect concerning the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, must be the numerous Sinhala domination polices which were undertaken after independence. As the contextual background, one theory is that the method of rule undertaken by the British before independence, which gave priority to the Tamils within the colony (the method simplified, was to intentionally place importance on a minority race, so that antipathy against occupation was not directed at the British but at the minority race), led to the reactions by the Sinhalese. In fact, at the time of independence, the proportion of Tamils that held specialized and public positions to the whole population was not an insignificant amount and it cannot be flatly denied that certain advantages were given. However, Tamils and Sinhalese alike, elite and lower classes existed in both ethnic groups. The conflict structure that existed in Sri Lanka before independence was between castes, or between ‘highland’ and ‘lowland’ Sinhalese at the most. Therefore it is appropriate to construe that the Sinhalese and Tamil identity that had hitherto been weak, became more conscious after independence.

The upsurge of Sinhala nationalism after independence was mainly based upon Sinhalese Buddhism, and was not initially intended toward excluding the Tamil people. The followers of Sinhalese Buddhism saw the independence from Britain, as simply a transfer of power from colonial rule, to that of one small section of wealthy English speaking elites. They felt that it was just to make Sinhalese, which was the people’s language into the official language, while also seeking to revive the Buddhist faith with the Buddhist monks taking a leading role, and to bring true independence to the people. In reality, they actually attempted social reform, revitalization of the villages and improvement in the living standards of the poor, and acquired the support from the Sinhalese people. However, since this movement was based on Sinhalese-centric policies and on Sinhalese supremacist group, the movement consequently veered towards the exclusion of and conflict with other groups (Tamils). Throughout the political

S - 4

process after independence, the possibility of co-existence of ethnic groups were lost as a result of taking on board policies that would be accepted by the majority Sinhalese. The structural factors of the Sri Lankan civil conflict, are summarized in Table S-1. Table S-1 Root Causes of Conflict (before 1983), its Influence and Alternative Plans

Factor Influence Alternative Plan 1 Language Policy Making Sinhalese the

official language Disadvantage for

Tamils Making Tamil the official

language

2 Irrigation Projects Slow progress in large scale irrigation projects, such as

the Mahaweli Project

Benefits limited to only Sinhalese regional areas

The expansion of the Tamil residential area

in the North and East 3 Settlement

Projects Sinhalese preference over

Tamil during newly developed agricultural land

distribution

Decrease in population and

political power of Tamils in the North

and East

Fair distribution of newly developed agricultural land

4 Decentralization Centralization of government

Maintenance of a Sinhalese majority

government.

Greater autonomy for provincial government.

5 University entrance

GCE A-Level S-1grade adjustment

The decrease of Tamils entering

universities

Proceeding through education based on the level

of standard. 6 Investment in

development Focused only in

South-western areas Gap between regions.

Appropriation of army expenses

The development of projects in the North and East

7 Switch in economic policies

Expansion of social inequalities, arising from

structural reformation towards free market

economy

Dissatisfaction manifesting itself

through the intensification of

ostracism of Tamils

Basic policies towards securing the industry sector, through the maintenance of

‘safety-nets’

8 Poverty of workers The decrease in wages of Indian Tamils

Joint struggle in the Northern and

mountainous areas

Increase in wages and the improvement of living

standards 9 Employment

Opportunities Increase in the number of

unemployed Increase of

volunteers into the army, the militia, or

guerrilla organizations

Job creation. Promotion of industry

10 Nationality problems for

Indian Tamils

The deprivation of the civil rights of Indian Tamils

Actual situation of ‘Stateless’ individuals

Political Participation through granting of civil rights. Improvement of

welfare. Source: Produced by the Study team.

The political movement of the Tamils went through several stages, beginning with peaceful political activities in the mid 1950’s to that of a civil disobedience

S-1 General Certificate of Education at Advanced Level

S - 5

movement in the early 1960’s, and further developed to the incidents of violence in the 1970’s. Soon, the violent conflicts that used to be sporadic incidents became more organized, with direct action being taken against the police, security forces and government property. Eventually by the beginning of the 1980’s the Tamil struggle became a threat to the integrity of the whole Sri Lankan society. The movements that increased in violence coincided with the process of escalated belligerency in the separatist movement.

The objective of their activities in the early stages was the expansion of their regional autonomy within the Sri Lankan state. However, gradually the agitation moved onto converting the singular state structure to that of a federation. Finally, in the North and East regions, considered to be the Tamil homeland, it reached its current phase of an armed struggle for an independent state.

The massacre of Tamils living in Colombo in 1983 became the starting point for the general take up of arms in the conflict. After this event, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were able to gain the support of the Tamils living in the North and East. In parallel to the expansion of the civil conflict, there were also divisions within the Tamil internal forces, and finally the LTTE, which had increased its influence through extremist activities such as suicide bombings, were able to command the whole Tamil cause.

< Mechanism that Sustained the Conflict>

Due to the civil conflict, 20 years had passed with Sri Lanka being separated into Cleared Areas (occupied by the government) and Uncleared Areas (occupied by the LTTE). One can partly explain how the civil conflict was sustained on such a small island, by following the muddy course of the failed peace negotiations. However, this is not enough to fully comprehend structurally, the mechanism that sustained the conflict. Although it is very difficult to simplify such complex issues, some of the points will be raised below, so that it would aid in acquiring a full picture of the Sri Lankan conflict.

S - 6

Table S-2 Factors that Helped Prolong the Conflict

Factors Influence 1 Military expenditure Growth of military budget Development of military industry,

leading to the expansion of conflict 2 Foreign intervention Indian Military Intervention Civil conflict becoming more

complicated and prolonged 3 JVP armed uprising Dissatisfaction of unemployed

rural youth Coinciding with the struggle of LTTEAnti-government riots in the South

causing further complexity of the civil conflict

4 Inter-ethnic conflict Conflict of interests between Tamils and Muslims.

Displacement of Muslims by LTTE

Internal displacement of Muslims Leading to a newly structured conflict

5 Intra-ethnic conflict Conflict between upper and lower castes

Involvement of the lower caste in the LTTE, strengthening military

organization 6 Economic development The commodification of social

relationships. Isolation of the economy from the social and

cultural base.S-2

Greater disparities between the social strata. Growth of dissatisfaction

among the people

7 Overseas remittance Support from overseas Tamils Strengthening of the LTTE military

Source: Produced by the study team <Characteristics of the Sri Lankan Conflict>

Compared with the contemporary separatist movements in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, the Tamil separatist movement has the following differing characteristics.

Firstly, it took nearly 25 years for early movements that raised voices of separatist sentiment to develop into a violent separatist movement. Its transformation progressed from a relatively peaceful agitation in the 1950’s and 1960’s to using extraordinary violent tactics.

Secondly, a large number of heads of government, senior politicians and other leading public figures were assassinated by such ways as suicide bombing, as part of the separatist struggle.

Thirdly, the fact that both the Tamils’ and Sinhalese have a sense of being the minority race can be pointed out. The structure of the Tamil ethnic movement in Sri Lanka is not just simply the demand for the increase of rights for a minority race within a nation-state. Although the Tamils are a minority group within Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese are also said to regard themselves as a relatively minor race, from the context of the whole region including the Tamilnadu of South India. It can be commented that this minority complex has been casting a shadow on the

S-2 Traditionally it was merely a specific social relationship in regional societies. Commodification

in this context means the process of labour, land, property and trust becoming products that could be brought and sold.

S - 7

relationship between the two races in various forms. Fourthly, the issues concerning language, is a key factor in solving the Sri

Lankan civil conflict. In the process of post-independent nation building, Sinhala and Tamil were legally acknowledged as the official and national languages by the central and regional governments and attempts were made for a true independence for the people. However, in reality, there has not been much change since the colonial period; English plays a major role in the strata of society that sustains the industry and public offices. Vast majorities of Swabasha (Non-English speakers), even if they graduate from university, are unable to find employment. There have been various policies undertaken by the state, but reflecting the dissatisfaction that in reality issues have not been resolved, there have been repeated occurrences of political conflict and social rivalry, not only by Tamils but also by Sinhalese youths.

Without dealing with this deeply rooted problem in Sri Lankan society, it would be impossible for durable peace to exist in Sri Lanka.

Chapter II Evaluation of Foreign Assistance in the North and East <Development assistance after 1977>

The Jawardene government that was elected to power in 1977 introduced a free market economy policy to Sri Lanka. This policy was highly valued by the development assistance organizations of developed West and Japan and aid from those countries increased dramaticallyS- 3 . The influence of the development assistance upon Sri Lanka, was far greater than the flow of monetary resources. Not only securing of state budget and distribution of funds, through implementations of structural adjustment, policy based lending became the norm. Studies, consultancy reports, memos, etc., of aid agencies have become influential in the policy making process. Securing foreign assistance became a means of proving legitimacy of its regime to the international community and thus important for the nation’s security. Moreover, external assistance have helped in the emergence of a large number of civil organizations, such as NGOs or CBOs (Community Based Organizations). As a result, the concepts, ideas and discourses expounded by these agencies have become ideologically influential at the level of civil society. The influence of development assistance encompasses society so much that it becomes difficult to treat it merely as an ‘external’ factor. It is now an integral part of Sri Lankan society.

S-3 For example, of the total of $6,140 million received between 1960 and 1985, 70% was received in

the period 1978-85.

S - 8

<Development Assistance and Conflict – Donor Responses> Methodologically it is difficult and almost nonsensical to unravel the

influence of foreign assistance to the conflict or the issue of ‘fungibility’, just by narrowly looking at individual projects, a single sector or a single donor. Unless these specific studies are placed in the overall context of the role of foreign assistance, we would fail in grasping the main picture. If the influence of foreign assistance has become all-pervasive in this society, and if the deciding characteristic of Sri Lanka during the past two decades has been this civil war, how can these two phenomena exist in the same society without interacting? The much more fruitful line of inquiry would be to unravel numerous and diverse linkages between these two phenomena.

In order to discuss the donor responses to the conflict at present we shall use the three-fold classification put forward by Jonathan GoodhandS-4.

(1) Working around Conflict – Donor interventions ‘that rarely take conflict into account to any significant extent or they treat it as a “disruptive factor” to be avoided.’ In this perspective conflict is some sort of an aberration of the ‘normal development’ process.

(2) Working in Conflict – Donor interventions ‘that regard conflict as an issue and account for it in at least some of their plans by attempting to minimize conflict related risks.’ For example, some of the humanitarian assistance programs in the North and East are carried out in a conflict sensitive manner. Influenced by the idea of ‘do no harm’, they try to be sensitive to conflicts and take care not to contribute to conflicts.

(3) Working on Conflict – Donor interventions ‘that actively and explicitly consider ways in which their work can help reduce or manage conflict and promote (long-term) reconciliation.’ These interventions have conflict resolution as a central objective.

A cursory glance at the history of donor involvement since 1977 shows that it

can be divided into two periods in relation to donor attitudes towards the conflicts that have characterized this period in Sri Lanka.

The donor policies during the first period(1977-1989), were preoccupied with supporting the government’s project of developing a market economy and promoting a private sector. Not only were they unaware of the situation of deteriorating ethnic relations and impending catastrophe, they also undertook the funding of projects that in hindsight, had direct political implications on ethnic relations. One example would be ‘Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project (AMDP)’.

S-4 Goodhand (2000)

S - 9

The notable phrase that were often used in this period, “Despite her struggle in ethnic conflict, Sri Lanka has made certain achievements in XXX,” well reflects the stance of the donors. Although there were some exceptionS- 5 , donor interventions at large during this period, falls into the first category, ‘Working around Conflict.’

Towards the end of the 80’s the situation in the country deteriorated so much that it became extremely difficult for donors to ignore conflicts. Incidents of bomb attacks targeting cabinet ministers, the failure of Indian Peace Keeping Operation and large-scale migration of Tamils to European countries did not let donors go unnoticed of the conflict. Moreover, due to the occurrence of frequent regional conflict and terrorism in the post-cold war era, issues regarding conflict were highlighted in various international fora, such as DAC (Development Assistance Committee).

As a result of these factors, in the second period (1990-present), conflict resolution became a major focus of donor intervention in Sri Lanka, and some approaches of the second and third category; ‘Working in Conflict’ and ‘Working on Conflict,’ were introduced. Those included, technical assistance in law, public policy, institutional framework that reinforces peace building and projects that support reconciliation and peace education. However, at the initial stage, there were very few projects that targeted directly at the people in the North and East let alone the Uncleared Areas. <Current Intervention in the North and East Supported by Donors and NGOs>

Having recaptured Jaffna which was under LTTE domination since 1990, the GOSL sought extra funding for rehabilitation of the war torn areas. Given the complex political situation, the donor response was cautious. However, in the subsequent years, some donors (UNDP, World Bank, ADB, GTZ, NORAD, etc) decided to fund a number of projects in the war torn North and East. It is in the context of this expansion of donor-supported projects in the North and East that one observes the entry of the RRR framework (The National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation), which was initiated in 1999. The initial motivation of RRR was principally to try and develop a framework that would coordinate numerous donor supported relief and rehabilitation initiatives in the North and East S-6. Its objectives are to help strengthen Sri Lanka’s capacity to S-5 For example, in this period, apparent improvements were made in political participation and

socio-economic conditions of the population in the plantation sector. It is believed that this prevented the scenario of the armed conflict spreading to the Indian Tamils of this sector. Although it was not explicitly intended to contribute to conflict resolution in the first place, donor intervention in this sector consequently gave positive effects.

S-6 In addition to the projects that has already been mentioned, agencies such as UNHCR, and numerous NGOs undertook projects and activities.

S - 10

(1)Ensure that the basic needs of people affected by conflict are met; (2)Rebuild productive livelihoods; and (3)Facilitate reconciliation across ethnic lines. The framework consists of sets of recommendations of policies, strategies and actions. The process involved a series of community-level consultative workshops and sectoral or thematic workshops to obtain views of diverse groups of stakeholders. World Bank and other foreign development assistance agencies contributed to this process through technical assistance and funding. Although there have been some criticism made, such as the non-participation of LTTE in the consultative process and the lack of reference to long-term economic development policy, these efforts should be well-evaluated for its preparing a social ground towards the peace negotiations, together with the ‘Track 1’ mediation endeavors by Norway Since 2000.

Most NGOs active in Sri Lanka were relief oriented and have so far been concentrating in the Cleared Areas. Few managed to reach the Uncleared Areas. At present, 100 to 150 NGOs (including CBOs) are said to be operating in the North and East. There are organizations campaigning for peace through a negotiated political settlement and for respecting human rights, for which donors of Norway, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany etc also provided generous support. The coordinating body of these NGOs, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA), has held workshops and training sessions on peace building and conflict resolution for NGOs in the North and East. There is a criticism that NGOs have not been playing an active role in peace building and long-term development at the local level in the North and East, however, as it is emphasized in the RRR framework, the partnership among governmental institutions and the civil society is indispensable for the future peace process, and it is hoped that NGOs play an active role. <Some lessons>

The current peace process in Sri Lanka is of recent origin and still in the learning process. For donor agencies to undertake ‘Working on Conflict’ approaches, much is yet to be done in their own capacity building.

(1) Foreign assistance pre se cannot solve conflicts: Agencies must realize that the most important factor in resolving conflicts is the socio-political forces of a given society. Donor efforts should be made to bring about positive changes from the sidelines.

(2) Need of deeper understanding of the recipient society: In order to be able to prevent conflicts, manage conflicts to bring about progressive social transformation, or control conflicts so as not to return to destructive warfare, agencies must gain deeper and subtle understanding of societies.

(3) Mechanism of enhancing ‘Institutional Memory’ of agencies: Securing a

S - 11

much more subtle understanding of societies is a long-term process. Developing mechanisms to accede and improve the institutional memory of agencies will be essential.

(4) Centrality of Politics: Politics will be a subject that aid agencies cannot get away from if they are to deal with conflicts more effectively. Agencies should redress its passive stance on this issue and enhance its capacity for political analysis.

(5) Peace building and Reconstruction is a form of ‘Social Change’: Countries affected by conflicts are those who need fundamental reform of its society structure, which lets the inherent problems of ethnic, religious or economic disparity. Donors should be aware that one would fail to put out the fire completely if only attempting to restore the situation ‘before the conflict’.

(6) Mainstreaming sensitivity to conflicts: In the same manner as issues such as gender and environment have been integrated into the mainstream donor discourses, sensitivity to conflicts needs to be mainstreamed.

(7) Need for Long term involvement: A commitment to conflict resolution essentially means a long-term engagement by the donor country. Project cycles have to be adjusted with such perspectives in mind.

(8) Importance of policy coherence: A donor country has to make sure that its development policies are consistent with other policies of bilateral relationship with the target country; such as foreign relations, promotion of trade and investment and agreements on asylum and refugee issues. For example, a donor country must avoid a situation where her Foreign Ministry is voicing concern about human rights while those promoting trade are interested in selling arms to the same government. Policy coherence and coordination between the donor community and within different branches of a recipient country is also important.

(9) Need for flexibility: The normal project cycle where all details are worked out at the beginning, with clear phases of implementation, might not be suitable for tackling issues arising out of conflicts. Establishment of project management system, which enables flexibility in project implementation, is needed.

(10) New skills: Development of new methodologies, skills, etc that enables agencies to internalize a political analysis within projects is needed. Tools like Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) will be invaluable.

S - 12

Chapter III Evaluation of Japanese Assistance < Review of History and Current Intervention of Japanese Development Assistance to Sri Lanka >

Japan has consistently been the largest donor to Sri Lanka in recent years (approximately 57% of all foreign aid Sri Lanka had received, and as much as 74% of all bilateral aid). The post-1977 period in Sri Lanka’s recent history is characterized by strategies of economic liberalization and export-oriented industrialization (EOI). Japan has contributed to the development of infrastructure facilities in Sri Lanka, which were urgently needed for the success of the country’s EOI strategy. These contributions were made mainly by yen-loans, and have focused on three sectors: transportation, telecommunications and power and energy. The most popular areas for Japanese grant aid to Sri Lanka, were agriculture, education, health and communications. The grant aid programs have, in addition, covered technical cooperation activities – provision of training to Sri Lankans and dispatching of Japanese experts and young volunteers to various parts of Sri Lanka.

Of Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka specifically, the official point of view in

Japan has been that its assistance programs to Sri Lanka is being guided by the following factors:

The strategic/ geographical importance of the country. Traditional friendship between the two countries. The expectation that the high literacy rate in Sri Lanka enables the country to use aid effectively. The strong possibility of economic development in Sri Lanka.

However, several criticisms are often made about Japan’s aid policy in Sri

Lanka: Though grant aid is intended to helpmeet basic needs of the poor, it has tended to help the people in the upper social strata. Japanese ODA has provided infrastructure facilities to some important establishments but some of these establishments have remained quite under-utililized. Japan is using its aid to Sri Lanka to create and maintain a stable market for Japanese industrial goods in Sri Lanka.

<Review of Japanese <Review of Japanese Assistance in the Area of Peace Building in Sri Lanka>

Data do not show any clear sensitivity of Japanese ODA to domestic political conflict in Sri Lanka. The country moved into a period of continuous violence in the

S - 13

1980’s, however, Japanese aid inflow increased in volume during the entire period and were directed to areas beside the North and East. Regarding Japanese-funded projects to the North and East, one could summarize as follows:

Relatively small in size. Most have been in the government controlled areas. Japanese funds to the North and East came as contributions for UN & other multilateral agency-sponsored projects but no Japanese governmental agency or Japanese NGO was operating directly in these regions. All ‘grassroots projects’ supported have been implemented through NGO intermediaries. Bulk of grants given to various public agencies to be used in the North and East came from 2KR funds.

There are several reasons to the above:

ODA basically being an affair of government-to-government nature, there was no mechanism that enabled Japan to act independently in the North and East, without a request from the government. Like other donor countries, Japan also depended on the World Bank and IMF reviews and analysis of policy and believed that the promotion of market liberalization policy was the key to success in development and also in mitigating social conflict. It was only recently that these international institutions (at least the World Bank) started showing some active interest in political conflict as a factor in development. The absence of Japanese NGOs working in the North and East with funding from the Japanese government.

From the above, one would have to say Japanese assistance had low presence in the North and East.

Japanese NGOs were not active in the North and East due to the following

reasons: There were few Japanese NGOs that specialized in the field of conflict resolution and peace building in the first place. The religious composition of the North and East region is largely Hindu and Muslim while Japanese civil society exchange between Sri Lanka, had been initiated mainly by individuals or institutions associated with Buddhism organizations. Among the number of people of Sri Lankan origin working and living in Japan, the proportion of Tamil-Hindu persons is very small this is in sharp contrast to Europe and North America .

S - 14

Whatever the reasons, the areas in the North and East fell largely outside the purview of the mental maps of Japanese civil society institutions. Also, due to the very high value that the government of Japan (GOJ) places on the safety and security of the lives of its citizens overseas, travel bans were placed strictly and this made it difficult for NGOs to expand activities in the North and East.

However, just recently, one can observe growing interest and notable developments in Japanese intervention in conflict resolution. In 2001, an NGO named Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP) opened a resident office in Colombo. JCCP has been working in collaboration with local NGOs and became a member of CHA. In 2002, GOJ declared its willingness to support peace in Sri Lanka, and in October, Mr. Yasushi Akashi was assigned as the government representative. In 2003, a round of peace talks and a donor conference was proposed to be held in Tokyo. Bearing in mind the characteristic of the current peace process, interaction among civil societies and ‘Track 2’ diplomatic exchanges will be essential in supporting the process. Already, some NGOs have begun to move towards extending assistance in Sri Lanka. Creating ‘Sri Lanka NGO Platform’ may be one of the effective ways to provide information and financial support for projects implemented by Japanese NGOs. Chapter IV Peace Process Past and Present, and the Challenge of Reconstruction

and Development <Characteristics of the Current Peace Process Lessons Learnt from Last Four Failiures>

The current peace process represents the fifth major attempt to find a lasting political solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict since it turned into civil war in 1983. Facilitated by Norway, the peace process began with the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) by the GOSL and the LTTE on 22 February 2002. So far, it is regarded by many observers and analysts to be promising and productive.

The present peace process has several features that stand out to show that both parties have learnt much from the failures of the past four attempts.

(1) A cautious but constructive ‘step by step’ approach is being adopted. There is much investment of time in trust building and development of communication channels.

(2) Willingness of both parties to consensually workout the agenda for the talks at every stage.

(3) Consensus between GOSL and LTTE to focus on immediate humanitarian issues as well as rehabilitation, resettlement and development in the North and East while talks proceed towards a final political solution.

(4) Representation of the Muslims of the North and East at the talks

S - 15

enhanced the credibility and legitimacy of the peace process. (5) Collective search for interim institutional arrangements for joint decision

making on all important matters and for governing relief, resettlement and reconstruction (development).

(6) Explicitly shared concern that the war-affected people should receive their fair share of the ‘peace dividend’.

(7) High potential for civil society to play more active roles in peace building and development.

(8) The more explicit stand taken by the country’s Buddhist clergy in support of the peace process. The country’s business community has also been active, through their ‘Sri Lanka First’ and ‘One Sri Lanka’ campaigns.

(9) Consistent involvement of the international community to support strengthening the irreversibility of the peace process from early stages.

<Sustainability of the Current Peace Process>

Progress in the present peace process is extremely noticeable, however, concerns remain as to the sustainability of the peace process and its final result in the form of a political settlement. The key factors that need to be addressed would be the following:

The question of cohabitation between the UNF (United National Front) government and the executive presidency (leader of the Opposition Party, PA (People’s Alliance)), to which is also related the need for bipartisanship. Tamil-Muslim conflicts in the East Distributional conflicts and social exclusion The opposition to the peace process from the JVP (People’s Liberation Front) and extreme nationalists in the South.

Although it is certain that peace is development friendly, the reverse is not necessarily the case. Sufficient consideration should be made so that development does not produce socially excluded groups.

Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN) is constituted of members from the GOSL, LTTE and the Muslim community. This Sub-Committee (SCs)’s role was decided as follows:

(1) Identify humanitarian and rehabilitation needs (2) Prioritize implementation of activities to meet these needs (3) Decide on the allocation of the financial resources for such activities (4) Determine implementing agencies for each of these activities However, there are various challenges that the Sub-Committee and the Peace

Secretariat need to address: (1) Dual Structure of the North and East Provinces: In the North and East,

S - 16

the GOSL and the LTTE have their own military, police, administrative, judicial, revenue collection and relief and rehabilitation structures. It is in reality a situation of dual power. The peace process is expected to transform this situation into one of power sharing, in which the Muslims and Sinhalese residing in the region will also be represented, and in unified structures. However, in the transitional period, appropriate coordinating mechanism is needed, for effective measures to be taken for addressing the capacity gaps and securing efficiency of implementing rehabilitation and development activities.

(2) Displaced persons’ right to return to their original homes: Homes and residential areas are being occupied by the military. It is a challenge to decide what to do with the so-called High Security Zones (HSZ), however, the rights of the displaced to return to their homes and lands need to be enforced with utmost effort, and rational solution must to be found.

(3) Capacity Gaps at various Levels: There is a development gap of 25-30 years between the North and East and the rest of the country. This is also the case with the capacity gaps resulting of loss of human capital, institutional disruption and decay, lack of human capacity development and the failure to fill vacant positions in various government departments. In view of securing absorptive capacity of huge reconstruction projects, and achieving sustainable livelihood for the people of the North and East, vocational trainings and capacity building of various institution of civil society are urgently needed.

(4) Heterogeneities within the North and East: The North and East is heterogeneous in biophysical and socio-economic terms. Moreover, the war has transformed the ethno-political economic landscape of the North and East. . The extent of damages caused by the conflict also varies. There are inter and intra-regional differences when Jaffna, Wanni and the East are considered. The heterogeneities have to be taken into consideration in designing resettlement and rehabilitation projects.

<Need for a Process Approach with Flexibility and Creativity>

The development of the North and East would positively serve peace building if it can enable people to achieve sustainable livelihoods that ensure socio-economic security and human dignity. Such an inclusive, bottom-up process of development can provide an evolutionary basis for peace building from below. This is also a way to reverse social exclusion and to handle distributional conflicts.

From such a perspective, resettlement has to be seen as an integral part of a larger set of activities or interventions aimed at enabling the building of household livelihood systems.

S - 17

A household is a part of a community, which is invariably differentiated according to socio-economic statuses of the households that constitute it. Since the household livelihood system consists of community assets and household assets, any program of resettlement and rehabilitation has to focus on both components paying particular attention to the vulnerabilities of individual households as well as the community.

Given the past experiences and the challenges that exist, a rigid project approach without room for creative adaptations and revision of targets is not appropriate in a war-torn area. Instead, a process approach, which is flexible and allows creative modifications based on experience in the field should be adopted as a rule.

Chapter V Strategy for Japanese Assistance on Peace Building and RRR <Core Issues>

When considering of the roles that Japanese ODA should play in supporting the peace building and RRR of Sri Lanka, core issues to bear in mind would be:

For the GOSL, continued existence of its country as a unitary state. For LTTE, a just solution to meet the earnest desire of the Tamils. For GOJ, to utilize ODA to help harmonize the above.

When the JBIC study team representatives met with the LTTE leadership in the process of investigation, the following points were conveyed after a brief explanation of the characteristics and modality of Japanese development assistance provided by the government.

(1) Given that Japanese assistance was largely of a government-to-government nature, the LTTE would have to work with GOSL to gain access to Japanese aid finances for RRR in the North and East.

(2) Considering the very high value that GOJ places on the safety and security of the lives of its citizens overseas, the LTTE would have to provide assurance of this, particularly since increased commitment by Japan to RRR in the North and East would naturally involve greater participation by an increasing number of Japanese citizens and civil society organizations.

(3) Given that Japan and the international community are committed to a just, pluralistic and sovereign Sri Lanka, the LTTE would have to foster pluralistic coexistence among the Tamil people in the North and East and the Muslim and Sinhalese population who regard these areas as their home, with guarantees of justice and the security of life, property and livelihood.

The LTTE leadership showed positive responses to all of the above even

S - 18

before the commencement of the peace talks (this meeting was held in August 2002). These should be reiterated by GOJ, when further assisting RRR in Sri Lanka.

<Principles and Guidelines> <Principles and Guidelines>

Basic principles and guidelines to be followed in the peace building and RRR processes are noted in Figure S-3.

Figure S-3 Principles for Assistance in Peace Building and RRR

(1) Social Inclusion (2) Cultural Pluralism (3) Spatial Equity (4) Balanced Development

Source: Produced by the study team

Guidelines in implementing the above principles would be to: Propose a broad framework for stepped progression in development Make allowances for non-linear process of social transformation As long as measures taken to strengthen peace are just and fair, make allowances to break existing customs and rules, and, depending on the civcumstances, even the rule of law that lies as obstacles, as necessary evil (e.g. GOSL started to engage in dialogues with LTTE although under Sri Lankan law, they were still branded as an illegal organization). Although closed-door peace negotiations are inevitable, an utmost effort to enforce its transparency is needed. A continuing commitment to peace education to put an end to endemic culture of violence would be essential not only in the North and East, but all of Sri Lanka. This will be one of the ways to alleviate discontents that may be expressed by various groups in the RRR process.

<Risk Analysis and Coping Mechanisms>

An early manifestation of the peace dividend is perhaps the single most important factor for mitigating the risks that a conflict-prone environment is inherently likely to have. When considering risk mitigation, the following two dimensions are important. (1) Macro environmental Changes

In order to shape concrete policy changes aimed at realizing the principles outlined in Figure V-3, assistance that is neither sectoral nor project/program

S - 19

oriented, but rather an overall budgetary supplement might be introduced. The issue of fungibility is likely to be raised in proposing this modality, and also its difficulty of assessment. However, if a system is transparent and acceptable to the donor, and has contributed towards a commonly agreed grater good, it is recommended that such policy support initiatives be financed by donor agencies. In order to create the political climate conductive to promotion of peace process, it is critical to establish participatory systems for a broad and representative range of Sri Lankan citizens to be actively engaged in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the North and East. The culture of violence, particularly endemic to political processes in Sri Lanka, might be mitigated by strengthening the civil defense system. Establishing a neighborhood policing system, much like the Japanese ‘Kouban’ system, where the policeman is seen as a friend and not a foe would be valuable.

(2) Risk mitigation through project/program design

It must be recognized that at the current point of time in the Sri Lankan context, zero risk is an unlikely situation, especially for works to be carried out in the North and East. Transforming a high-risk situation to moderate to low risk is important. At least one of the four principals shown in Figure S-3 should be incorporated as a macro-goal into project/program design. A project that creates win-win situations among different social groups is desirable. A study of the coping mechanisms employed by real beneficiaries, with a view toward incorporating them, where appropriate, into project/program design, might prove to be helpful. Local CBOs with a profound empirical understanding of such coping mechanisms too could be mobilized at the project/programme design stage. In the high-risk period, it is advisable to start with a relatively large number of small projects, rather than the converse.

<Conceptual Framework for Peace Building, RRR and Beyond>

The conceptual framework proposed in this section for peace building, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation, suggests that the long-term perspective should look beyond to wealth creation in a sustainable and equitable manner. A ten-year period, 2002-2011, is tentatively suggested as the time span for this proposal, which is composed of three overlapping phases as shown in Figure

S-4.

S - 20

FigureS-4 Conceptual Framework for Peace Building and RRR

Confidence Building: 2002-2005 (tentative) (1) Arresting and preventing conflict (2) Guaranteeing safety and security (3) Providing humanitarian and emergency assistance

Capacity Building: 2003-2008 (1) Human resources (2) Physical infrastructure (3) Institutions

Nation Building: 2004-2011 (1) Economic and trade development structures (2) Resources and technology access/management (3) Legal systems and governance structures


The target in the first period of ‘Confidence Building,’ should be to maintain ceasefire, take actions to alleviate hardships and lay the foundation for hope in a population that has borne the brunt of a long and violent conflict. Emergency measures should be taken for arresting and preventing conflict, guaranteeing safety and security and providing humanitarian assistance.

The second period of ‘Capacity Building’ is the phase for laying the foundations for sustained development. Capacity Building of human resources, construction of physical infrastructure and strengthening institutional capacity would be the main targets.

The third period of ‘Nation Building’ is the phase for launching the process of sustained, yet sustainable, development. The efforts should follow on the political solution adopted for resolving the conflict in the North and East, but also need to go beyond to integrate Sri Lanka as a nation of diverse peoples and cultures. The aim should be to enable Sri Lanka to face the challenges of development in the global context. The path adopted should be sustainable, in financial and economic terms, as well as in resource and environmental management terms. <Japan’s Assistance Strategy>

In directing Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka in the transformation from a state of conflict, through peace building, to development, the nine-component framework of investment proposed in the previous section can be used as a guide for strategically targeting investments.

The capacity for speedy and effective implementation is a sine qua non for the impact of the peace dividend to be felt in the North and East.

S - 21

As an independent honest broker, Japan, working through Special Representative Akashi, needs to ensure that peace conditionalities are met as aid is disbursed through North East Rehabilitation Fund (NERF) and other mechanisms to the North and East. These conditionalities are imperative for the GOSL to counter any discontent that affirmative action in the North and East might cause in the minds of the Sri Lankan public at large. They are also an important precondition to be negotiated at the political front for success in the social and economic fronts, where JBIC’s considerable volume of development assistance can bear fruit, following the framework and principles outlined earlier on.

Modalities of governance, based on a federated structure, are being discussed by the LTTE and GOSL as the negotiations, which started with confidence building measures, begin to enter the more difficult phase of laying the foundations for lasting peace. No doubt, tensions will be high in this period and political opportunists are likely to attempt to hijack the peace process for their own narrow ends. The international donor community, including Sri Lanka’s largest donor, Japan, can do much to alleviate the situation by linking assistance with the milestones shown below, which would make the path away from violence irreversible, in return for development assistance.

(1) Strict compliance with the CFA and the rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).

(2) Substantial progress on human rights in the North and East. (3) Visible end to child recruitment and the release to their parents of minors

engaged in or being trained for combat. (4) Evidence of the progress of democracy and pluralism in LTTE controlled

areas. (5) Detailed undertakings in regard to the establishment of an acceptable

system of governance, including considerations of a federated structure. (6) Commitment to phased military disengagement by the LTTE and GOSL.

<Conclusion: Significance for Sri Lanka and Japan>

Violent conflicts are always associated with fundamental changes in societies. Hence the better way of conceptualizing such a context is not through notions of ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘reconstruction’, where the prefix re- implies that we are trying to get back to a situation that existed before the conflict, but through notions of ‘transition’. The latter opens our minds to the idea of change and transition will be the fundamental characteristic of the environment in which donors will be working.

As Sri Lanka proceeds to overcome the despair of two decades of violence through the negotiations between the LTTE and GOSL, there is a need to address

S - 22

the deeper sense of discontent that underlies Sri Lankan society. This will require us to address the structural deficiencies in Sri Lanka’s systems of governance and economic management. There are already experiment with new approaches in the quest for tackling those issues:

Regaining Sri Lanka, GOSL’s national planning document, identifies the issues of an inefficient public administration system, mounting public debt, an inadequate secondary and higher education system, jump-starting the economy by revitalizing the private sector, and increasing investment from domestic and foreign sources. e-Sri Lanka, currently at a very early stage in development as a World Bank prepared concept paper, a proposal of modern telecommunications infrastructure, seen as the key to overcoming many of these issues. A set of proposals for the North and East being drafted by SIHRN.

These are all areas where JBIC’s lending modalities could play a strategic role in leading Sri Lanka out of conflict into the path of dynamic and sustainable development.

What has been said thus far has focused on the implications of Japanese

assistance for Sri Lanka. In summary, the two critical factors are: (1) Ensuring that the peace process is on track and irreversible, employing

where necessary peace conditionalities for disbursing development assistance;

(2) Looking beyond the immediate needs of RRR, and even the peace process, to lay the foundations for lasting prosperity for all the peoples of Sri Lanka.

However, in the course of conducting this survey on JBIC’s role in conflict and development, it soon became evident that there will be significant implications for Japan too.

Japan has been largely an important contributor to rehabilitation and

reconstruction assistance in many parts of the world, but has been discreetly content to leave the central role of involvement in peace negotiations to other leading players in the international community. As in the diplomatic initiatives in Cambodia, where Japan played a proactive diplomatic role, her engagement in Sri Lanka too marks a significant break from normal foreign policy practice. One must view her endeavors in peace building in Sri Lanka as an opportunity to chart her own foreign policy initiatives, shaped by a combination of national interest and international stature.

Japan should consider the following points: (1) Maintenance of neutrality in the process is what will give Japan’s voice

S - 23

credibility and help to bind Sri Lankans of a range of political hues to support and promote the peace process as it enters the more contentious areas of negotiation.

(2) The demands of rapid responses, quick decisions and a full-time ground presence in Sri Lanka would stretch the crisis management expertise currently available within Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(3) Mechanisms for engaging civil society institutions in the Sri Lankan peace process should be strengthened. Working with her own civil society institutions and academic institutions towards this common goal in Sri Lanka is likely to transform Japan’s hitherto uni-polar foreign policy into a multi-track effort.

(4) Establishing a standing consultative mechanism between JBIC, GOSL and representatives of various other aspects of the Sri Lankan polity, with Japanese NGOs and academics working in Sri Lanka also providing a most valuable input into a research arm of the same mechanism, bringing sensitive social situations and aspects of local culture and politics into the development aid discussions in Japan.

(5) JBIC’s development assistance programs, tuned in concert with that of JICA and Japanese NGO contributions, can be coupled with the political and diplomatic initiatives under way in a coherent and strategic manner.

The four principles of assistance (Figure S-3) and the nine-component framework (Figure S-4) for strategically locating projects and programs in a non-linear continuum of assistance, and the effective implementation of projects and programmes of relevance to lives and livelihoods on the ground will surely pave the way for Japan to be permanently etched in the hearts and minds of all the peoples of Sri Lanka.

1

Introduction 1 Background and Objectives

In recent years, many of the developing countries have become burdened in some shape or form with violent conflicts or with those latent factors. The internal and regional conflicts that have been frequently arising since the end of the Cold War differ from the traditional conflicts between nations, in that they are a new type of organized violence that mixes military actions, organized crime and large-scale violations of human rights. The effectiveness of conventional methods of preventing and resolving conflicts are limited and thus a new approach is required.

The role of development assistance in the peace building of these regions have been researched mainly by the United Nations, the World Bank and the Western donors, and debates have been undertaken concerning the establishment of projects that have a strong notion of urgency, from grant cooperation and support through the UN and internal organizations. However, the ways in which bilateral loan cooperation organizations could make contributions have almost never been discussed.

Nevertheless, there is a large number of ‘in-conflict’ countries in the world that are saddled with disputes and conflicts, while its government is functioning normally, and within such a group, the cases in which yen-loans are being supplied are significant in number. Moreover, even in the case of a newly recovered country, whose government has collapsed due to civil conflict, there are problems with ‘aid-gaps’ between emergency humanitarian aid and development. Therefore in order to resolve these problems and consolidate peace, the need to tackle issues by being equipped with long-term development visions from the early stage, are increasingly being recognized. Moreover, although it is certain that peace is development friendly, the reverse is not necessarily the case.

It is necessary by recognizing the latent and overt factors, to make sufficient consideration so that development does not produce socially excluded groups, and to actively incorporate policies and projects for the prevention and mitigation of violent conflicts.

By being conscious of the above issues, this study aims to propose what roles JBIC should take for conflict prevention, peace building and reconstruction in the conflict regions. This report was divided in to three parts; (1) A section focusing on the overall discussions and recognizing into a theoretical framework. (2) A case study concentrating upon Sri Lanka, as an ‘in-conflict’ nation. (3) A case study focusing on Afghanistan and the West and Central Asian region. This paper is the outcome of the second.

2

From the perspective of Japan, Sri Lanka has been an amicable nation with common footings in relation to history and culture. Situated on the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka is strategically important as a shipping route, and its security is important also for the Japanese economy. Japan, in the view of Sri Lanka, is the largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) (approximately 60% of ODA received), and JBIC has also supported economic development through yen loans and intellectual cooperation.

Sri Lanka, has traditionally experienced various conflicts caused by the problems in ethnic background, language, religion and social class. After independence in 1948, the conflict between the Sinhalese (majority) and the Tamils (minority) who have reacted against domination policies have become increasingly ellicit. Particularly after 1983, terrorism and land warfare in the North and East region between the government and anti-government organizations of the Tamils have continued, and many cases of deaths, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) have arisen.

However, in February 2002 both parties have agreed on an indefinite ceasefire and in September of that year, peace negotiations were begun. The government of Japan declared its willingness to support peace in Sri Lanka, and in October, Yasushi Akashi (Former United Nations Deputy Secretary-General) was assigned as the government representative. At the time of writing, the ceasefire has continued for over one year, and the peace negotiations are witnessing constant progress. The background of this peace in Sri Lanka, can be explained in international and internal contexts.

International factors - International debate after the simultaneous terrorism in USA (Regulation of money laundering); Norway government’s role as mediator; Support for promoting peace by the international community (Monitoring of the Ceasefire). Internal factors – War-weariness and support for peace by the people of Sri Lanka (Economic stagnation caused by the military burden); ‘Step-by-step’ Approaches taken by the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) developing gradual trust through prioritizing on issues that can be agreed upon; Civil society taking part of in the peace process.

If the tactics of both sides, and political and military issues become the subject in the future, there are fears that the peace negotiations will experience a rough ride. But, it is largely believed that, progress of peace have previously never occurred to this extent, and thus, the current situation cannot double back on peace. It is vital for the international community to take part in this process with a certain amount of resolution.

This study was begun in July 2002, having conducted the preliminary research in

Sri Lanka in April 2002. At that time, there was no clear sight of when the peace

3

negotiations were going to commence. During the investigations up to January 2003, though the peace process had dramatically progressed, at the start of this , the political and economic orders concerning the peace were extremely unclear. The peace conference which was due to be held in May 2002 in Bangkok was postponed, and without the agreement for a next date, it was expected that unstable circumstances would continue, including the possibility of a relapse to conflict. On the other hand, not only IDPs, but also refugees who had escaped abroad were returning to their homeland one after another, taking the opportunity of the ceasefire. It was a time when emergency humanitarian and reconstruction aid was sought, in order for the Sri Lankan people to fully experience the ‘peace dividend’, and consolidate peace itself.

The objectives of this report, including its role in supporting the success of the

peace negotiations from the sidelines, were: (1) To evaluate how Japan (including Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs))

and JBIC can contribute (or have contributed) to the mitigation of the civil conflict that has been achieved thus far.

(2) To analyze what kind of considerations and reforms are necessary to efficiently contribute to the peace building of the target country.

(3) To propose the direction of technical and financial assistance that should be provided by JBIC in cooperation with other organizations and institutions.

2 Study Methodology

In this study, having acknowledged the issues that were raised above, the investigation was conducted through the following methods.

(1) Gathering and analysis of previous research and data: Collection of basic information required for this study from reports, statistical data and dissertations analyzing the history and structure of the Sri Lankan civil conflict, the policies of government thus far, the relationship between aid provided by donor countries and the civil conflict.

(2) Investigation through interviews: Interviews were undertaken with governmental institutions of Sri Lanka, the United Nations, donor agencies, NGOs and research institutions, to understand the Sri Lankan civil conflict, peace effort, the history and present circumstance of foreign aid and its influence on peace building. Suggestions for the role of Japan and JBIC were also acquired.

(3) Fieldwork Investigation: Field study was undertaken to report on the extent of the destruction, current socio-economical issues and the possibility for projects in the North and East Provinces and the plantation regions. The different

4

types of opinions of parties concerned were listened to, as far as it was possible. For example the residents of refugee camps and war-torn areas; governmental officials of the North and East; NGO workers active in the North and East, LTTE cadres and Muslim representatives.

(4) Holding of Study Sessions: Since the preliminary stages of this study, study sessions were held in Japan a number of times. Not only did the opinions from the internal departments of JBIC gather, but also, scholars, specialists and people working in the development assistance arena were invited, and through supplying information, comments and opinions were collected. These have been reflected within the possible boundaries of this report and proposal.

(5) Workshops: Workshops were held in Colombo (December 2002) and Tokyo (January 2003), by inviting governmental agencies, bilateral aid organizations, international organizations, NGOs, research institutions, and stakeholders of private companies. The draft final report of the study was released, and through discussions, opinions from different perspectives were collected, and these have been reflected within the possible boundaries of this report and proposal.

Through the conduction of this study, important opinions from many different

facets of society were acquired. These were invaluable for the integrity of this report, in conceiving effective proposals for the current situation in Sri Lanka. Moreover, during the progress of this study, efforts were made to support the peace process from the periphery and maintain momentum after the ceasefire, through discussion with individuals of various viewpoints.

3 Composition of the Report

The report is structured into 5 chapters. In chapter 1, a summary of Sri Lanka’s conflict, in terms of its structural factors, characteristics, historical course, and extent of the damage and the mechanisms that prolonged the conflict were examined. In chapter 2, a review of development assistance provided by main foreign aid agencies and NGOs in the field of peace building and those directed to the North and East region were undertaken and evaluated. In chapter 3, a review of Japanese assistance in Sri Lanka, both governmental and non-governmental was undertaken and evaluated. In chapter 4, taking into account the past four failures in peace negotiations, the characteristics, issues and the roles of the international community, in the current peace process were clarified, and uncertain factors or impediments to progress in peace were addressed. In chapter 5, recommendations were made for development assistance strategy for peace building and reconstruction in Sri Lanka. Risk analysis and mechanisms to overcome issues were proposed. The role of Japan,

5

especially JBIC was also suggested.

4 Composition of the Study Team

Name Affiliation Post Team Japan Hisashi Nakamura Research Institute for Social Science,

Ryukoku University Professor

Monte Cassim Faculty of Policy Science, Center for Global Education and Research, Ritsumeikan

University

Professor, Executive Director

Mika Shimada

Faculty of Economics, Ryukoku University

Lecturer

Team Sri Lanka W.D. Lakshman

Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts, University of Colombo

Professor

Nadaraja Shanmugaratnam

Center for International environment and Development Studies, NORAGRIC, Agricultural University of Norway

Professor

Sunil Bastian

International Center for Ethnic Studies (ICES)

Research Fellow

Tomoko Tamura Kaihatsu Management Consulting, Inc. Consultant

Prof. Nakamura who headed the study has been pursuing research on Sri Lankan society for the past 40 years. Prof. Monte Cassim provided collaborative investigations. He is a Muslim, which can be called the second ethnic minority race of Sri Lanka. Having studied at the Tokyo Engineering University, he is conversant with Japanese systems. He gained much experience as a civil servant in the international arena. Thus, he is in a position to understand the issues from a broad international perspective. Ms. Mika Shimada has experience in the field of Indonesia, Vietnam and Sri Lanka, and helped in both of the professors’ investigation.

In conducting an investigation of the actual conditions of Sri Lanka, it was possible to gain the cooperation of a leading social scientist of both Sinhalese and Tamil backgrounds. The former Vise-Chancellor of Colombo University, Prof. Lakshman (a Sinhalese), who has held the Chairs of the Sri Lanka Social Science Association and Sri Lanka Economics Association, is a leader of development economics. Prof. N. Shanmugaratnam is a Tamil from Jaffna. He has not only deep knowledge of the peace building efforts in Europe, but has continued a long socio-economic research in the regions where Sri Lankan Tamils have lived. His experience of investigating the villages in the East provinces is particularly valuable. Mr. Sunil Bastian has much

6

experience in overseas research. His main field has been on the aid provided by international organizations and foreign countries toward Sri Lanka, and gave a fruitful contribution. Ms. Tomoko Tamura, has resided in Colombo for more than 10 years, and has much experience as a specialist of UNDP and JICA. She has an abundant knowledge concerning NGO activities in Sri Lanka and gave important contributions as a coordinator for the Sri Lankan team.

Moreover, cooperation was also obtained from the Japan Center for Conflict

Prevention (JCCP). Mr. Yoshiharu Ikekami, the former Acting Representative at the JCCP Sri Lanka office, contributed to the field study by providing networks among governmental organizations and civil bodies related to conflict-resolution. Prof. Kenji Isezaki, of the Postgraduate School, Rikkyo University, also a board member of the JCCP, undertook a field study into DDR (Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration), providing valuable inputs to the team.

7

Chapter I Analysis of the Major Causes of Conflict in Sri Lanka

1.1 Sri Lanka – An Overview

Although Sri Lanka is a small island country situated in the Indian Ocean, there are archaeological remains of significance dating back to as far as 50,000 years. Tradition has it that Prince Vijaya with his 700 followers from the western coast of India having drifted ashore, conquered the inhabitants, and founded the Sinhala dynasty in 483 B.C.. In the middle of the 3rd century B.C. the doctrines of Buddhism were passed on, and ever since the first kings and other powerful figures were embraced as leaders, Buddhism had become the most influential of the religions on this island, and became the source of Buddhist worship, which spread across South-East Asia. In the Northern plains of the island, the world’s most highly developed ancient irrigated reservoir system is being used today.

Sri Lanka, with the advent of the major European powers in the 16th century, was subject to colonial rule by the following nations; Portugal (1505-1665), Netherlands (1665-1798) and Great Britain (1798-1948). The administration of the island itself was not directly controlled by the East India Company nor by the India Office, and in 1802 was incorporated as a colony under direct control of the Colonial Office in London. In 1815, the British took advantage of the internal conflict in the Kandy kingdom, and having annexed the kingdom, succeeded in bringing the whole island under one rule. There were attempts of insurrection against the British in 1818 and 1848, but both were quashed.

After World War I, there was increased political activity towards democratic self-determination and revival of Buddhism by a large section of the Sri Lankan middle class, which had mainly been formed from the plantation related industry. In 1931, through the enactment of the Donoughmore Constitution, Western and modern democratic values, such as the universal suffrage, including women’s suffrage, and also the establishment of the state parliament, recognized a certain level of self-determination for the island citizens. In 1948, after World War II, Sri Lanka achieved independence as a self-governing territory of the British Commonwealth. In 1972, through the establishment of the Constitution, the government changed from that of a self-governing territory to that of a republic.

Sri Lanka falls into the category of a small state in both quantitative and

qualitative terms. Geographically, as an island, it is located in the Indian Ocean and occupies a land area of approximately 65,000 square kilometers with an adjacent 12-mile of territorial waters and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending up to

8

200 nautical miles. Despite the importance in view of its strategic location and value of the commercial routes of the Colombo and Trincomalee harbors, Sri Lanka is overwhelmed by the existence of its huge neighbor, India. The multi-ethnic population does not exceed 20 million, and its population and land area is one sixths that of Japan. In comparison to Japan’s per capita GDP of $ 24,900, Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP is $ 3,250 (purchasing power parity) placing it slightly above poverty line.

In comparison to other South Asian nations and most of the African and Asian large and small states, however, Sri Lanka is outstanding in most of the socio-economic indicators in the areas of literacy, education, health, general welfare and popular participation in community activities. Moreover, Sri Lanka boasts a political system based upon democracy and a democratically founded constitution; a government that has been based on elected political parties; regular elections through voting rights for each citizen, and an independent judiciary system. In the foreign policy guidelines of the Japanese government that have been publicly released, it has been stipulated that great importance should be placed on democracy, for the development of an amicable relationship between the two nations1. The vast sum of aid provided by Japan to Sri Lanka corresponds to such a policy.

In 1977, there was a major political regime change, and Sri Lanka adopted a new Constitution as a prelude to liberalizing the economy. The removal of foreign exchange restrictions and liberalization of international trade, as shall be examined in the next chapter, greatly influenced Sri Lanka’s international relations. It also greatly contributed to the expansion of trade between Sri Lanka and Japan2. It was after 1977, that Japan became to occupy high share of Sri Lanka’s market for electronics and automobiles. Since then, Sri Lanka has undergone social changes in parallel with almost all modern global transformations. Sri Lanka, because of the high levels of welfare from successive government policies, the levels of poverty measured from standard indices are not high3, however from the index of income distribution, degree of equality is not so high. In contrast to the fact that the top 20% of income strata occupy more than 50% of the whole of national income, the bottom 20% only occupy 5.4%.4 In particular the divide between rich and poor is most serious in the city areas.

1 The Diplomatic Blue Book, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Refer to

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook. Japan is among the very small group of nations that annually publish the principles of its foreign policy.

2 Sri Lanka’s major export partners are the United Stated, United Kingdom, Middle East, Germany and Japan. Whereas the main import partners are Japan, India, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. According to statistics available for the year 1999, Sri Lanka’s trade with Japan is as follows: Exports: $160 million- mainly shrimp, tea, computer, and textile products. Imports: $430 million – mainly transport, general and electrical machinery and equipment.

3 25% of the whole population is under the poverty line. (Excluding the North and East area, the poverty line 791.67 rupees/month, equal to $14/month according to 1995/6 figures) JBIC, 2001. JBIC Poverty Assessment.

4 JBIC, 2001. JBIC Poverty Assessment.

9

Rather from an ethical perspective, the differences in income levels arise from abilities in English. Abilities in the English language were a factor that systematically separated the level of economical activity. Formerly, the language that was used affected the economical lifestyles and even the type of clothes that were worn. The influence of the English language was so great, that if one could speak English, one could take part in the trade with main import industries, find employment in companies that used the English language, and therefore able to secure high earnings.

Table I-1 Basic Information of Sri Lanka

- Conventional long form: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka - Area: 65,610km2 ; Population : 19.4 mil. people (2000 figures) - Capital City: Colombo ; Legislative Capital : Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte - Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese 74%, Tamil 18%, Moors and others 8% - Religion: Buddhism 70%, Hinduism 15%, Christianity and Islam - Language: Sinhalese 74%, Tamil 18%, English

is spoken competently by about 10% of the population - Currency: Sri Lankan rupee

Source: Minami Asia wo shiru Jiten, April, 2002, and others

10

Table I-2 Main Statistics of Sri Lanka

Indicator 1996 1999 2000

People

National poverty rate (% of population) 25.0 .. ..

Life expectancy at birth (years) .. .. 73.1

Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 17.3 .. 15.0

Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births) .. .. 17.9

Urban population (% of total) 22.4 23.3 23.6

Illiteracy rate, adult male (% of males 15+) 6.2 5.7 5.6

Illiteracy rate, adult female (% of females 15+) 12.7 11.4 11.0

Economy

GNI, Atlas method (current US$) 13.6 billion 15.7 billion 16.4 billion

GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 740.0 820.0 850.0

GDP (current $) 13.9 billion 15.7 billion 16.3 billion

GDP growth (annual %) 3.8 4.3 6.0

Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 10.8 4.2 7.1

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 35.0 35.5 39.7

Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 43.9 43.3 50.5

Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 24.2 27.3 28.0

Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 19.0 17.7 16.8

Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP) -7.8 -6.9 -9.5

Trade and finance

Trade in goods as a share of GDP (%) 68.6 66.8 73.3

Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting country (current US$) 119.9 million 176.4 million 172.9 million

Present value of debt (current US$) .. .. 7.0 billion

Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services) 8.4 9.9 9.6

Short-term debt outstanding (current US$) 565.0 million 945.8 million 705.4 million

Aid per capita (current US$) 26.5 13.8 14.3

Source World Development Indicators database, April, 2002

1.2 Analysis of History and Causes of the Conflict 1.2.1 Historical Background of the Conflict Historical Background of the Conflict

The greatest issue currently surrounding Sri Lankan society is the ethnic conflict between Sinhalese and Tamil people. From 1983 to the ceasefire in February 2002, the rivalry between Sinhala nationalism and the separatist movement of minority Tamils continued for nearly 20 years.

Since Sri Lanka is geographically located in the South of the Indian sub-continent, there have been movements of immigrants into the country on numerous occasions from the distant past. The characteristic of the ethnic conflict in

11

Sri Lanka can be partially explained by the island’s historical formation of its ethnic society and also by the colonization by Western powers in the 16th century. In this report, however, we shall not pay much attention to the pre-colonial or colonial period of Sri Lankan history. Instead, the period after the attainment of independence shall be taken up. Below is a brief summary of the background to the ethnic conflict. (1) Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Composition

The Sinhalese population5, which is the largest ethnic group, can be separated into highland Sinhalese and lowland Sinhalese. Before Sri Lanka became part of the British territory in 1815, the highland Sinhalese population lived in the central mountainous region of the former Kandy Kingdom, observing the Udarata laws that were their identity laws. Such traditional cultural practices from the Sinhala dynasty are still being passed down through the generations. There are many Buddhist sects, and the city of Kandy, known for the ‘Temple of the Tooth Relic’ is considered to be the center. The low-land Sinhalese are residents of the coastal areas, which were once the territory of the Dutch East India Company. The Roman Dutch Law applied to these people, who had actively received Western culture. It was this ethnic group that received the most influence from the long period of foreign control, which continued from 1505 to 1948.

Among the minority races of Sri Lanka, the Tamil population6 has the greatest influence. The Tamils, many of whom follow the Hindu faith, crossed over from Southern India, at around the same time as the Sinhalese. The social culture of the Sri Lankan Tamils who are mostly gathered in the North and East Provinces, share similar points of social culture with the people of the Kerala province of Southern India and they observe Tesamalai Laws. Their cultural center is the northern city of Jaffna. The Tamil language spoken in Southern India is slightly different in terms of pronunciation and vocabulary. On the other hand, the Indian Tamils, who work on the plantations of the central mountainous region, are the descendants of workers who migrated in the 19th century from Tamilnadu province in Southern India. The scope of mutual exchange between the Indian Tamils and Sri Lanka Tamils is extremely narrow, due to the fact that the origin and cultures of these two ethnic groups are different, and also because most Indian Tamils are from a lower caste. They observe Hindu laws and marriage between Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils are rarely seen.

5 Sinhalese: Genealogy believed to be of Aryan (Indo-European) descent. It is believed that in the 15

century BC, Aryans migrated from Southern Europe and Caspian Sea areas to the Indus River Basin, reaching the island of Ceylon via Western India (such as the Province of Gudjarat).

6 Tamils: Believed to descend from the Dravida people who are said to have founded the Indus civilization. In association with the migration of Aryans, they migrated to the Central and Eastern areas of India. Similar to the Sinhalese, they reached the island of Ceylon and founded their own dynasty.

12

The next powerful minority group is the Moors (Muslims), who observe Islamic law. It is said that they crossed to Sri Lanka in the 10th century, either directly from the Arab countries or via India. The majority of Muslims use the Tamil language as their mother tongue. Although it is said that a large proportion of them are Tamils who have converted to Islam, they form a group of Muslims different from the Sinhalese and Tamils. Many live in the East Provinces, and they are the majority race in the Batticaloa district. Their main means of sustenance is through mining and merchandising of precious stones.

Other groups include, the Burghers, who are descendants of mixed marriages between Sinhalese and Europeans. They use English as their mother tongue and follow Christianity. Also, the Vedda, who are considered to be aboriginal, live in small numbers in the East of the country.

There is a tendency to treat the conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils, as one of ethnic conflict and religious conflict between Buddhism and Hinduism. However, Sinhalese and Tamil identity based on language and religion that we observe today arose after the independence of the country. Moreover, it should be noted beforehand, that the Tamil democracy of Sri Lanka should not be understood simply in the same context of the expansion of rights for a minority group. Although the Tamils are a minority group within Sri Lanka, from the context of the whole region including the Tamilnadu of South India, the Sinhalese are also said to regard themselves as a relatively minor race. For this reason, there has been deep suspicion that the separatist movement of the Sri Lankan Tamils will connect with the political interest of the Tamilnadu province. (2) Sinhala Domination Policy

The most important and decisive aspect concerning the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, must be the numerous Sinhala domination polices which were undertaken after independence.

As the contextual background, one theory is that the method of rule undertaken by the British before independence, which gave priority to the Tamils within the colony, (the method simplified, was to intentionally place importance on a minority race, so that antipathy against occupation was not directed at the British but at the minority race), led to the reactions by the Sinhalese. In fact, at the time of independence, the proportion of Tamils that held specialized and public positions from the whole population was not an insignificant amount and it cannot be flatly denied that they were given certain advantages. However, Tamils and Sinhalese alike, elite and lower classes existed in both ethnic groups. The conflict structure that existed in Sri Lanka before independence were between castes, or the conflicts between ‘highland’ and ‘lowland’ Sinhalese at the most. Therefore it is more appropriate to construe that the Sinhalese and Tamil identity that had hitherto been weak, became more conscious

13

after independence. The platform for Sinhala nationalism that increased after independence, was

mainly based upon Sinhalese Buddhism, and was not initially intended toward excluding the Tamil people. The followers of Sinhalese Buddihism saw the independence from Britain, as simply a transfer of power from colonial rule, to that of one small section of wealthy English speaking elites, and felt that it was just to make Sinhalese, which was the people’s language into the official language, while also seeking to revive the Buddhist faith with the Buddhist monks taking a leading role, and to bring true independence to the people. In reality, they attempted social reform, revitalization of the villages and improvement in the living standards of the poor, and acquired the support from the Sinhalese people. However, since this movement was based on Sinhalese-centric policies, such as the conservation of Buddhism and making Sinhalese the official language, and on supremacist self interest groups, as a result, the movement gradually veered towards the exclusion of and conflict with other groups (Tamils). Throughout the political process after independence, the possibility of the co-existence of large ethnic groups were lost as a result of taking on board policies that would be accepted by the majority Sinhalese7. Keeping in mind such a large course of history, the main policies that gave priority to the Sinhalese are introduced below.

(a) The deprivation of Indian Tamils’ voting rights, and citizenship

After achieving independence in 1948, Senanayake, the leader of the United National Party (UNP) was elected as the first prime minister. However, for the newly independent Ceylon government, the political power of the Indian Tamils posed a significant threat. At the time, the influence of 780,000 individuals was organized through the labour unions, and even before Sri Lanka gained independence, a few delegates represented Indian Tamils in parliament. In the Kandy region, the Sinhalese were traditionally the majority, but in some electoral districts, there were occasions when the power relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamils reversed. For this reason, in the highland areas, through the passing of three laws by government, which were, the 1948 Ceylon Citizenship Act; the 1948 Indian-Pakistan Civil Rights Law; and 1949 Ceylon Elections Amendment Act, the Indian Tamils were dispossessed of their voting rights. Moreover, the laws also stipulated that Indian Tamils could not be recognized as citizens, if they could not prove that their father’s ancestry had lived in Ceylon.8 As a result, Indian Tamils were also unable to acquire citizenship from the Indian government, and in effect they were driven to becoming ‘stateless’. Successive negotiations have taken place and although under the

7 Refer to Hayashi (1997), for an in-depth look at Sinhala nationalism and the political processes after

independence. 8 Due to the British policies, those Indian Tamils that migrated from India were given civil and electoral

rights. Although Tamils who crossed from India, as emigrants or illegally were not given these rights.

14

Sirima-Shastri Agreement, the two countries managed a fixed acceptance ratio for Indian Tamils, (India 8 : Sri Lanka 5), it had taken until the late 1980’s for Indian Tamils to acquire either of the nationalities.

(b) Sinhalese Language Domination Policy

Prime Minister S.W.D. Bandaranaike, who came to power in the 1959 election, fought his campaign along the Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism front. As soon as he was given charge of government, the Official Language Laws (Act No.33 of 1956: Sinhala Only Act) were passed so that the official language that could be used in public offices were limited to Sinhalese. It is widely interpreted that such actions at the expense of Tamils, reflected Bandaranaike’s attempt at mollifying the grievances of the regional intelligentsia, of whom were mainly teachers and Buddhists, and also young traders, who had not received Western style English education. During the period between the submission of the proposal and the passing of the bill, Tamil members of parliament undertook sit-in protests. In turn, as a reaction to these protests, the violence against the general Tamil population spread across the country. One can say that this incident sparked, what was to become afterwards the rise in the ethnic conflict.

In response to the Official Language Laws, the Tamil Federal. Party (FP) bitterly resisted, and in the manner of the Indian federation examples, took steps in the direction of setting up autonomous Tamil language provinces, repealing civil right laws, and seeking a ban on Sinhalese settlement projects. For this reason, negotiations between Prime Minister Bandaranaike and the S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, leader of the Tamil Federal Party took place, and in 1957, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Agreement was established. According to this pact, the Tamil language became a national language and the governance in the Tamil language of the North and East Provinces were agreed upon. As it shall be discussed later, in this agreement concessions were not only made in terms of the Tamil language but also in terms of allowing the establishment of regional governments, education, taxation and also on matters regarding the Tamil’s demand for autonomy. As a result, the Tamil Federation Party managed to prevent the expected Satyagraha (General Strike). However, with Prime Minister Bandaranaike, receiving pressure from the UNP and Buddhist sects, who adopted the policy of the Sinhala language domination, the agreement failed to materialize.

In 1958, the Tamil Language (Special) Law was passed through parliament. This gave the provision for a Tamil resident, if he or she desired it, to receive continuous education in the Tamil language, and use this language also during negotiations with the government and regional government. However, during the discussions concerning the bill, no Tamil representative was involved, and for a number of years the bill failed to be administered. The agreement between Prime

15

Minister Senanayake of the UNP and Chelvanayakam in 1965 acknowledged the previous failures. It was decided that the Languages of Courts Act should be reformed and the special law of the Tamil Language should be removed in the North and East region with this language being restored as the language of governance in the North and East region.

However, after S.W.D. Bandaranaike, had been assassinated by an aggrieved splinter group of the Buddhist stratum, his wife Sirima Bandaranaike who had succeeded in becoming leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), promulgated a new Constitution in 1972, which revived the policy for Sinhalese language domination. Although Sri Lanka had become a fully independent country, and had established itself as a republic, Bandaranaike’s new constitution, in respect to the use of the Tamil language, made Sinhalese the only official language (Article 7) whilst stipulating the 1958 Tamil language special law.

Even the newly reformed Constitution of 1978, showed no sign of changing this tendency and it was concluded that, Sinhalese was the only official language of Sri Lanka, with the Tamil language being the national language (Article 19). However, the language used in parliament and regional governments was the national language, and the citizens were able to receive education in either of the two national languages (Article 21) The official language was defined as the language of government for the whole of Sri Lanka. The Tamil language was permitted to be used for official document records and in the activities of governmental bodies in the North and East provinces (Article 22). The language used in the courts was usually Sinhalese, but in the North and East Provinces the Tamil language was used and if cases were brought to the appeal courts, there were provisions for the use of the national language.

(c) Conservation of Buddhism

In the Republican Constitution enacted in 1972, Buddhism was given a high status and was prescribed as the national religion. Regardless of the fact that Article 18 section 1 No. d guarantees the rights of all religions, Article 6 stated that, the state is fully responsible for the development and conservation of Buddhism. The special treatment of Buddhism, placing it above other religions, naturally increased the dissatisfaction among the large non-Sinhalese populace such as followers of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity.

(d) Preference for Sinhalese in the University Admission System

The Jaffna region historically has had a high level of education in comparison to the other regions. With the aim of resolving the educational gulf between Tamils and Sinhalese, in 1973, the government introduced a standardization system, which gave different minimum levels of requirement between Sinhalese and Tamils. Furthermore, in the following year, a District Quota System was introduced to resolve

16

the gaps between regions. Although in 1970, the percentage of Tamils who entered departments of science

and engineering, which was advantageous for future employment, occupied 48% of the whole of the university places, this figure fell to 16.3% in 1974. In the case of departments of medicine, the figure dropped from 48% to 26.2%. In contrast, for the Sinhalese students who entered departments of science and engineering in 1970, the figure was 51.7% and in 1974, it increased to 78.8%. For the Sinhalese who entered departments of medicine, there is an increase from 49.2 % to 69.9%.9 It is clear from the above figures the extent of the blow felt by the Tamils due to the government policies.

(e) Preferential treatment for Sinhalese in job opportunities

The results of Sinhalese becoming the official language and unequal treatment in university entrance discrimination had direct connections to the employment disparity faced by Tamils. By nature, the Tamils who originated from Jaffna are eager for education, and because of the limitations of primary industry development in a highly dense region, there was a tendency towards having a desire for social advancement, through specializing, in for example, law or medicine, or through becoming a civil servant. However, through the policies stated above, the prospect of finding employment in these fields became difficult. In the 1970’s, a period just before the civil conflict intensified, the unemployment rate of Tamils increased. The proportion of Tamils who worked in the public service before independence was 30%, however by 1975, this value fell to just 6%. In particular, the employment of Tamils into the police force and army sharply dropped from 40% before independence to 4% by 1980.10

(f) Preferential Treatment of Sinhalese regarding Irrigation and Settlement Projects

Large areas of Sri Lanka are dry zones, and only the southwest area is blessed with weather suitable for agriculture. For the Sri Lankan population, which is continuing to increase after independence, there is without doubt too little agricultural land, and the issues concerning the shortage of land, food and unemployment are becoming serious. In order to resolve these issues, the Sri Lankan government has established development policies for large-scale irrigation facilities (e.g. Mahaveli River Development Programme) and has created agricultural land. Re-settlement policies to transfer the Sinhalese who live in the densely populated southern region have also been undertaken.

The Mahaveli River Development Programme was a comprehensive development plan that involved the construction of large dams in the upstream of the Mahaveli

9 Tanaka (1994) p.276. 10 Abeysekera (1984)

17

river system. This system extended to 335km, and it was a wet area due to high precipitation. It was planned for water to be transported from the mountainous southern region to the North and East plains via numerous canal systems. During the 1960’s a basic plan was prepared, in which the North and East area, where Tamils resided was chosen as the center for the construction of basic waterways. However, the Accelerated Mahaveli Development Programme (AMDP) of 1977 by the Jayawardene government ceased the construction of basic waterways in the Northern region, in order to speed up the completion date from a period of 30 years to a few years. Because of this, the benefited area was biased towards the Sinhalese who resided in the east. In addition, the settlement of newly created agricultural land was undertaken in the form of favoring the Sinhalese. The effect of such actions can be clearly seen in the numbers below. If one looks at the population growth rate between 1953 to 1981, regardless of the fact that the population growth for the whole of Sri Lanka was only 85%, in the Eastern region, the Sinhalese population growth rate had increased to 424%, due to the increase of settlement. Moreover, although the population growth rate for the whole of the North and East area was 126%, the Sinhalese population growth rate was 358% compared to 105% for the Tamil population11.

Thus, after independence, the Sri Lankan government have successively brought

about policies, which have put the Tamils at a disadvantage. The high level of treatment, which the Tamils had enjoyed under British rule, was taken away. The identity of the Tamil race was continuously threatened through the political, economic and cultural policies of the government. It was such circumstances that led the Tamils to turn their political activities towards extremism.

1.2.2 Intensification of the Conflict

The political movement of the Tamils went through several stages, beginning with peaceful political activities in the mid 1950’s to that of a civil disobedience movement in the early 1960’s, and further developed to the incidents of violence in the 1970’s. Soon, the violent conflicts that used to be sporadic incidents became more organized, with direct action being taken against the police, security forces and government property. Eventually by the beginning of the 1980’s the Tamil struggle became a threat to the integrity of the whole Sri Lankan society. The movements that increased in violence coincided with the process of escalated belligerency in the separatist movement.

The objective of their activities in the early stages was the expansion of their

11 Tanaka (1994) p.280

18

regional autonomy within the Sri Lankan state. However, gradually the agitation moved onto converting the singular state structure to that of a federation. Finally, in the North and East regions, considered to be the Tamil homeland, it reached its phase of an armed struggle for an independent state.

(1) The Demand for the Expansion of Autonomy and the Government Response

In response to the demand for expanding autonomy in the earlier stages, the government in office, took a policy recognizing autonomy to a certain extent. For example, the Bandaranaike government, at the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam agreement recognized the following points: A newly organized Regional Council; Approval for the unification and separation beyond provincial boundaries; Establishment of regional elections; Transfer of power from the parliament to the Regional Council including areas of the agricultural industry, cooperatives, land development, colony settlements, education, insurance, the fishing industry, housing, society, welfare, water and electricity supplies, and road construction; Recognition of Regional Council jurisdiction over settlement projects, and the recognition of the Regional Council’s management of internal budgets and taxation. Also, the Senananayake government, in the 1965 Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Agreement, recognized the establishment of District Councils. Moreover, the Jayawardene administration established in 1977, made a resolution for setting up of District Development Councils. However such policies of the ruling government, as time passed received much opposition from the conservatives within both the ruling and opposition parties, and eventually never came to fruition. In this way, the Tamils’ insistence for greater autonomy hardened towards separatism and independency. (2) Intensification of the Separatist Movement and Anti-Tamil Movement

In 1972, the Tamil United Front (TUF) was established after the agreement for the coalition of the Tamil Federal Party (FP) and S. Thondaman’s Ceylon Worker’s Party (CWP). In 1975, the party changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The TULF raised the following points for their establishment resolution paper.

The Tamils of Ceylon are distinct and independent nation from the Sinhalese, in terms of language, religion, culture, customs and history. The 1972 Republic Constitution created by the Sinhalese degraded the Tamil people to that of a slave class. Based on the right for self-determination of all races, ‘The free sovereign, secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam’ shall be determined.

In other words, a political party that raised the demands for a separate and independent state by the Tamils was formed for the first time. However, the TULF, whatever the circumstances, was only active within the boundaries of a parliamentary

19

democracy, and did not resort to arms12. However, the government in 1978 enacted a law banning the group that insisted

upon a separate Tamil Eelam independent state. It was insisted that the group disturbed the solidarity and unity of the state, and endangered the national security, social fabric and order through violent acts for the sake of pursuing their objectives. The law also outlawed other groups that insisted upon violence. In July 1979, the Prevention of Terrorism act was enacted. At this time, the extremist separatist movement by the youth organization of the TULF started to become more active. The fatal shooting of Jaffna’s police chief became the reason needed for the issue of the governments’ emergency declaration intended to fully take control of the separatist movement13. This was to become the despair of Tamils who were politically active via parliament.

In response to such movements, the anti-Tamil movement in each region became a recurrent feature. In the summer of 1977, rumors about a rape of a Sinhalese female student of Jaffna, became the flashpoint, leading to gangs of Sinhalese assaulting Tamils. This resulted in 300 fatalities and the creation of 35,000 refugees.

In 1981, a Tamil Member of Parliament (M.P.) belonging to the UNP was killed by a Tamil extremist and in response, Sinhalese police and soldiers set fire to the public library, and the homes of M.P.’s were attacked. Such violence spread towards other regions, and Tamils residing in the Eastern region and Colombo were also attacked.

As the background to such ostracisms, a number of publications have placed blame on the policies of the Jayawardene government chosen during the 1977 elections, which promoted free market economy. The dissatisfaction towards the increase in the ferocity of competition and the expansion of the gulf between the rich and poor in society was not directed towards the government, but towards the Tamil people. The effects of the free market economy policies will be discussed in chapter 2 in detail, but here it should be noted that, the ostracisms slowly escalated and led to the massacre of Tamils in Colombo in the summer of 1983. The fatal shooting of 13 government soldiers in Jaffna by Tamil extremists became the basis for the attacks, looting and arson of Tamil owned shops in the cities of each region. It was a humanitarian disaster, in which nearly 100,000 people sought refuge even in Colombo alone. This violence was the turning point of what was to become a civil conflict that would continue to last for 20 years. It was different in character from the other incidents of

12 CWC, opposed to the separatist movement, later withdrew from TULF and joined the Jayawardene

Administration by forming a coalition with the UNP in 1977. 13 The aim of this law was to prevent individuals or groups from preparing or carrying out terrorist or

illegal activities. If found guilty, there were jail terms from 5 to 10 years or loss of property. For details of the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism act, refer to http://www.peacebrigades.org/lanka/slppta1979.html

20

violence due to the following points. Firstly, the police and security forces either had a direct or indirect hand in the looting and slaughter. Secondly, there were some executive members of the ruling party within the center of the organized violence. Finally, regardless of status or class, or whether or not the victim was connected to the government, every type of Tamil became a target. (3) The Trend towards Violence in the Separatist Movement – The Rise of the LTTE

The grievances and anxiety of the extremists who mostly consisted of young Tamils, was not only hostility towards the Sinhalese, but was also a reaction against the older generation of the Tamil society who adhered to parliamentary democracy.

At the beginning of the movement that had a violent nature, the targets of attack were the Tamils parties who had cooperated in the alliance with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Marxists. As examples, the assassination of a pro-government Tamil M.P., and also the assassination of one of the most prominent Tamil supporter of the ruling government, A. Durayappah, the mayor of Jaffna. This takes on a special significance as the first political assassination associated with the future leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), V. Prabhakaran, then a youth of 17.

By the mid 1970s, the turbulent politics of the Jaffna peninsula began to be treated in Tamilnadu of India as an integral part of its own conflict with the government. The Indian Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), since its own objective for independence was being suppressed, actively supported the separatist tendencies among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka now had a regional impact in South Asia rather than a purely local one because of the strengthened connection with supporters in Tamilnadu.

These militant groups, who had become active as foot soldiers of the separatist struggle, at first, began to strengthen ties between the established politicians of the TULF. However, the Tamil people in the North and East of the country reacted against the idea of a TULF leader occupying the influential position of Leader of the Opposition from 1977 to 1983. Those foot soldiers soon organized a rebel force and stamped their influence on the ideology of separatism by giving it a more radical form through their emphasis on political violence. By the early 1980’s the parliamentarians of the TULF were compelled to cede to them the primary leadership in the separatist struggle. There was a remarkable similarity with the radical nationalist force in the Sinhalese areas of the country, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Both the LTTE and JVP, scorned parliamentary politics and proclaimed a preference for violent tactics.

At its early stages between 1972 to early 1983, the LTTE was only one of several separatist groups operating in the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE and TULF aided each other through mutual support, and strengthened both their positions.

21

However, as the LTTE increased its control over the Jaffna peninsula, the TULF gradually began to lose their ground. Public support for the LTTE increased after the anti-Tamil riots of 1983, the most destructive by far of the post-independence riots, in terms of damage to property and lives lost. The regional support from Tamilnadu became more open than ever before. The LTTE seized the leadership of the movement and was soon strong enough to engage in a struggle on two fronts. In other words, whilst fighting against the security forces of the Sri Lankan state, they also began the systematic elimination of rival groups, such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). The chairman of this party, Sabaratnam was assassinated in May 1986. In the early 1980’s, there had been at least three prominent Tamil separatist groups, and their contending leaders. But by 1986 the LTTE established its status as the only prominent Tamil political organization, and seized full control of the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE set about eliminating members of the TULF leadership, including the chairman, Amirthalingam. They eliminated the leadership of yet another of their rivals, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).

Among the distinguishing features of the LTTE party members is the level of loyalty towards their cause. The loyalty of these individuals was far greater than those of the conventionally trained regular army. These individuals carried a cyanide capsule ready to commit suicide rather than surrender or be captured. This degree of loyalty, reflected by a willingness to die for a cause, if used for attacking purposes, would turn into an extremely dangerous weapon. In other words, suicide bombing were serious threats, in the form of young party members carrying bombs and detonating them. The first case of a suicide bomb attack by the LTTE was on 5 July 1987. In this incident, Captain Miller drove a vehicle packed with explosives into a school, where Sri Lankan soldiers were stationed, killing himself and 18 others in the process. After this incident, once demonstrating its effectiveness as a weapon, 200 suicide attacks have been undertaken over 15 years. The LTTE became the most powerful organization, as an exponent of suicide attacks.

Attacks were taken directly against important government officials. Following the assassination of R. Gandhi, the President of India, in May 1991, the LTTE used a suicide bomber to assassinate President R. Premadasa in 1993. In October 1994, another suicide member killed G. Dissanayake, the presidential candidate of the UNP. On this occasion, over 50 other people, among them members of the cabinet were also killed. In December 1999, during the presidential elections, President M. Kumaratunga was injured in a suicide bomb attack, in which many of his security staff and entourage were killed. Apart from these suicide bomb attacks, in 1991, R. Wijeratne, deputy defense minister, was killed by a time bomb. In 1993, L. Athulathmudali, the national security minister, was shot dead. In this manner, the LTTE managed to eliminate the core of UNP’s political leadership.

The LTTE also attacked the Muslim residents of North and East Provinces. In

22

August 1990, 120 Muslims were massacred at a mosque during prayer in Batticaloa. In 1990, the Muslim population of the Northern Province was expelled. In May 1983, guerrillas of the LTTE attacked the ancient city of Anuradhapura, massacring 150 people, killing even women, the elderly and children. Two years later, in Arantawala in the Eastern Province, 32 samaneras (religious followers) were massacred. Then in January 1998, the LTTE blew up and partly destroyed the Temple of the Tooth Relic (the most sacred site of Sinhalse Buddhist worship) in the ancient city of Kandy.

1.2.3 Analysis of the Causes of the Conflict

As we have seen, the year 1983 marks the turning point where the ethnic conflict

in Sri Lanka developed into a fully armed civil conflict. The mechanisms as to why such a conflict continued without resolution for 20 years shall be looked at in the next chapter. Before this, the root causes that had existed before 1983 shall be examined in Table I-3.

23

Table I-3 Root Causes of Conflict (before 1983), its Influence and Alternative Plans

Factor Influence Alternative Plan

1 Language Policy Making Sinhalese the official language

Disadvantage for Tamils

Making Tamil the official language

2 Irrigation Projects Slow progress in large scale

irrigation projects, such as the Mahaveli Project

Benefits limited to only Sinhalese regional areas

The expansion of the Tamil residential area in the North

and East

3 Settlement Projects Sinhalese preference over

Tamil during newly developed agricultural land distribution

Decrease in population and political power of Tamils in the North

and East

Fair distribution of newly developed agricultural land

4 Decentralization Centralization of government Maintenance of a

Sinhalese majority government.

Greater autonomy for provincial government.

5 University entrance GCE A-Level14 grade adjustment

The decrease of Tamils entering universities

Proceeding through education based on the level of standard.

6 Investment in development

Focused only in South-western areas

Gap between regions. Appropriation of army

expenses

The development of projects in the North and East

7

Switch in economic policies

Expansion of social inequalities, arising from

structural reformation towards free market economy

Dissatisfaction manifesting itself

through the intensification of

ostracism of Tamils

Basic policies towards securing the industry sector, through the maintenance of

‘safety-nets’

8 Poverty of workers The decrease in wages of

Indian Tamils Joint struggle in the

Northern and mountainous areas

Increase in wages and the improvement of living

standards

9 Employment Opportunities

Increase in the number of unemployed

Increase of volunteers into the army, the

militia, or guerrilla organizations

Job creation. Promotion of industry

10 Nationality

problems for Indian Tamils

The deprivation of the civil rights of Indian Tamils

Actual situation of ‘Stateless’ individuals

Political Participation through granting of civil rights.

Improvement of welfare. Source: Produced by the study team

As it has already been stated, the various problems related to language policies, irrigation projects, settlement projects, university entrance, development investments, and Indian Tamil civil rights, are the fruits of successive governments that have promoted pro-Sinhalese policies. Against such policies, the Tamils have urged for the alternative plans listed above, but because of resistance from the powerful Sinhalese conservatives, such plans have been dismissed 15 . In terms of increase of the unemployed, one can point to the preference for Sinhalese in job opportunities, as it 14 General Certificate of Education at Advanced Level 15 In November 14th, 1987, 13th Amendment of the Constitution enabled the Tamil language to be spoken

as an official language. Also, the UNP Government dismantled the preferential treatment for Sinhalese in University entry in 1977, however these were not effective in reality and problems remained unsolved.

24

has been mentioned earlier. However it is also a reality that the increase of agricultural land and industry promotion were unable to keep up with the ever-increasing population growth. Even Sinhalese, unless a member of the elite class who can speak English, are finding difficulties in gaining employment after graduating from university. These people, whose numbers were not insignificant, were absorbed into the governmental army, militias, or guerrilla organizations, such as the JVP and LTTE, and became the powers that sustained the armed internal conflict.

Moreover due to the policies of free market economy since 1977, the competition between companies became fierce, and the high-level welfare policies were reconsidered. As a result, the gap between rich and poor among the Sinhalese increased. This injustice had brought a dark veil over Sri Lankan society through many complex forms, and one can say that this latched onto Sinhala nationalism, which further developed into sentiments that led to the ostracism of Tamils.

In the 1980’s, the Indian Tamil labour problem was resolved by granting Sri Lankan civil rights to many workers. Their vote for the candidate nominee of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) in the general elections resulted in a major influence being exerted upon the ruling party in the plantation regions. Also in 1977, the CWC formed a coalition government with the UNP, and the planning for increase in welfare for workers, was the only ‘alternative plan’ that materialized as a reform policy. As a result, as it shall be noted in the second chapter, it is believed that the feared scenario of Indian Tamils backing up the Sri Lankan Tamil movement and further diverging the conflict was prevented.

1.3 Mechanism that Sustained the Conflict

Due to the civil conflict, 20 years had passed with Sri Lanka being separated into Cleared Areas (occupied by the government) and Uncleared Areas (occupied by the LTTE). One can partly explain how civil conflict was sustained on such a small island, by following the muddy course of the failed peace negotiations. However this is not enough to fully comprehend the structurally, the mechanism that sustained the conflict. Below, points will be raised, that would aid in acquiring a full picture of the Sri Lankan conflict.

25

Table I-4 Factors that Helped Prolong the Conflict

Factors Influence

1 Military expenditure Growth of military budget Development of military industry, leading to the expansion of conflict

2 Foreign intervention Indian Military Intervention Civil conflict becoming more complicated and prolonged

3 JVP armed uprising Dissatisfaction of unemployed

rural youth Coinciding with the Struggle of LTTE Anti-government riots in the South

causing further comelexing of the civil conflict

4 Inter-ethnic conflict Conflict of interests between

Tamils and Muslims. Displacement of Muslims by

LTTE

Internal displacement of Muslims Leading to a newly structured conflict

5 Intra-ethnic conflict Conflict between upper and lower

castes Involvement of the lower caste in the

LTTE, strengthening military organization

6 Economic development The commodification of social

relationships. Isolation of the economy from the social and

cultural base.16

Greater disparities between the social strata. Growth of dissatisfaction

among the people

7 Overseas remittance Support from overseas Tamils Strengthening of the LTTE military

Source: Produced by the study team (1) Shifting of blame of intra-ethnic problem to that of inter-ethnic (a) Use of political rivalry by Sinhalese

The civil conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE was used many times in the political rivalry of the Sinhalese power. The period of President Premadesa will be used as an example to illustrate this.

President Premadesa was assassinated, after 4 years and 4 months after he came to power in 1989, within his 6 years of office set by the Constitution. However, during his term of office, he parted from the ‘Hierarchical rule of people that received English education’, which had been inherited from the British Colonial period. He was a politician who tried to establish a style of governance appropriate to the Sinhala public, which was not seen during the elitist post-independence Sri Lankan government. The autocratic style of President Premadesa created large rifts within the ruling government.

President Premadesa cut ties with two major cabinet ministers, L. Athulathmudali and G. Dissanayake, who were both supporters of former President

16 Traditionally it was merely a specific social relationship in regional societies. Commodification in this

context means the process of labour, land, property and trust becoming products that could be brought and sold.

26

Jayawardene of the UNP government, and also expelled their supporters from the ruling party. Athulathmudali, after his expulsion formed a new party called the Democratic Union Nationalist Front (DUNF), and as the chairman of the party, was able to make constant results as an organization against the president. However, when high expectations were just beginning to grow, he was assassinated during his speech in a political gathering in Colombo in April 1993. The actual truth as to what happened is not clear, but the opposition parties announced that there were suspicions that the assassination was on the order of the Presidential side, while President Premadesa announced that the LTTE had committed the crime.

In fact, in August 1992, before the start of a new offensive against the LTTE by government forces, in the northern island of Kayts, the Northern Region Army General and government and military officers were conducting a strategy meeting and were killed by car bombs whilst traveling in a jeep convoy. The same general was rated highly as a national hero, not only within the government and military, but also by the opposition party, which included Sinhalese nationalists, and there were moves to elect him as the next presidential candidate from both sides of the government. Even after this incident, there were voices of suspicion from the opposition party’s Athulathmudali, who had commented that Premadesa was behind the crime fearing that the military were gaining power. In the defense committee investigation, it was publicized that the deaths resulted in the jeep blasts due to land mines planted by the LTTE. However the bereaved families, questioning the investigation results of the government, sought the president to search for the truth, by undertaking a just investigation by a foreign specialist. The main opposition party also sympathized with these demands, turning it into a political tool. In November 1992, a car driving past the Taj Samudra Hotel, situated along the waterfront of the city of Colombo was blown up. Commander Fernando of the navy, who was instantly killed, was similarly believed to be the work of the LTTE, but there is also the theory that it had come about due to the clash between the government and military departments.

Thus, violence was adopted in the rivalry among the Sinhalese powers. Shifting the responsibility on the LTTE were recurrent affairs, which had the effect of lengthening and dripping oil onto an already flammable situation. (b) Conflict within Tamil Society

Although the Tamil society of the North and East seems to have been placed under the control and stranglehold of the LTTE, before the civil conflict they were not necessary monolithic. Tamil society had internal conflicts between the Vellar, who were highly educated upper caste who originated from farmers (mainly followers of Hinduism), and the middle and lower castes. The middle and lower castes were discriminated in terms of access to educational opportunities, public facilities and temples. Since 1920, there have been developments in anti-caste system movements,

27

which were often violent in form. In contrast to the Tamil Federation Party that had leaded the liberation

movement up to the 1970’s, which had a majority of Vellars, the LTTE and TELO are mainly made up of Karaiyers, who were fishing people from the middle caste (Many of who are Roman Catholics). It is true to say that the LTTE and TELO were radical organizations, who were able to take the pace off the Tamil Federal Party, and in practical terms were able to establish control over the North and East area as stated before. It can also be said that the anti-caste movement, which increased in the late 1960’s, were one of the moments that turned the Tamil nationalist movement more radical and more combative. In other words, the movement that attempted to demolish the conflicting social hierarchy, which placed Vellars at the top, actually propelled the Tamil nationalist movement, becoming a catalyst for the civil conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils. As the civil conflict lengthened, the caste problem is no longer the major issue, but it is not the case that the conflicts between the castes have disappeared.

(2) International Financial Backup Mechanism for Continuation of Conflict (a) Rise in the military budget, and fungibility

Neither the government forces nor anti-government forces have publicized the accurate details concerning the military budget of the government or private expenditure. However it has been estimated that in recent years, the annual expenditure is approximately US$1000 million which amounts to nearly 10 % of Sri Lanka’s GDP. According to the statistics of the Central Bank, Sri Lanka’s defense expenditure before 1983 were minimal. Until the 1970’s it was not more than 0.5% of the GDP, and in 1982 it was merely 1.1%. However during 1990 to 1994 it rose to 4.0%, and to 5.0% during 1995 to 2000. The ratio of the total annual government expenditure inflated from 7.5% in 1982 to 28% by 2000. In a similar way to the Japanese government, there are other aid-organizations that have fundamental policies of not giving development assistance to countries that use large parts of its government expenditure for military use, and the Sri Lankan government are said to have devised ways to hide their defense expenses. In any case, it can never be described, that the quarter of the annual government expenses that is allocated to defense, is a small amount.

There are debates over ‘fungibility’, that accuse foreign aid for helping prolong the war, by funding the government and creating budget surpluses which consequently supplied the military budget. This will be taken up in the next chapter, but one should recognize the fact that the reason as to why the Sri Lankan government was able to prolong such a bitter war for 20 years, was because a significant part of the government’s annual expenditure was injected into the civil conflict against the Tamils.

28

Amidst the one way direction of destruction and plunder, in a similar way to the ancient city of Anuradaphura, where the main body of farmer-soldiers of the armed forces had amassed, cases of towns that benefited from the munitions business were not few in number. The formation of a close relationship between politicians, government bureaucrats and the military industry, could be said to be a factor that invited the conflict to extend. (b) International financial support network of overseas Tamils

The Tamils who had fled as refugees and immigrants to every corner of the world, having been affected by the conflict, made remittances to their homelands. It is said that a significant number sent money to the LTTE, for the purposes of covering military expenses. Due to the nature of such matters, although no reliable statistics or literature exists, it is believed that the Tamils who live in Canada had the most funds, and that the money which was conventionally laundered in Thailand, was used to acquire weapons and explosives. At any rate, it must be a fact that the reason why they were able to secure funds to maintain the struggle for such a long period of 20 years amidst economic blockades by the government and the serious destruction of livelihoods and infrastructure, greatly weighed upon the international support funds by overseas Tamils. 1.4 Effects and Damages of the Conflict

From the viewpoint of Tamils, causes of the violent confrontation occurred when

the North and East Provinces came to be excluded from major development programs in 1983. For example, the AMDP, which was the single biggest development program of the UNP government that came to power in 1977, excluded the Tamil majority areas, which were included in the original Mahaweli Development Programme. After 1983 the war became the reason to further exclude the North and East from projects such as agricultural development programs. In other words, this region, as well as being the victim of nearly two decades of devastation by war, has also been excluded from development projects. The effects and damages of the conflict will be explained below by focusing on three types. The effects and damages on the economy, the people, social institutions and social capital. It goes without saying that the above are all interrelated with each other.

(1) Economic effect and damages

The region’s production activities, in the form of its contribution to the country’s GDP had dropped from 15% in the 1980’s to only 4% in 1997.

With the progress of the war, this region ceased to be a leading producer and exporter of primary commodities such as grains, onions, chilies, vegetables, seeds and

29

fish. The KKS cement factory, Paranthan Chemicals, the Valachchenai paper factory and the dockyard and fishing gear factories ceased to function.

The war economy grew like a parasite, at the expense of the national economy and social development. The war economy increased in both the formal and informal sectors.

As the internal conflict was prolonged, the ancient city of Anuradhaphura, where the main body of farmer-soldiers of the armed forces had amassed, became the stronghold of economical growth supported by the munitions business.

Forced migrations have led to depopulation and economic decline in many parts of the North and East. It has also led to the destruction of the environment and reduction of arable land. On the other hand, the influx of displaced populations into cleared areas has stimulated economic activities to varying degrees. The town of Vavuniya and its environs represent the most dynamic example of immigration-induced economic expansion. This is largely due to the locational importance of Vavuniya as the north-south gateway. Over the last fifteen years, Vavuniya has grown into a commercial center while agriculture has become more intensified and market oriented in the villages around the town. The presence of entrepreneurs and skilled farmers among the displaced from the North, who supplied cheap labor and foreign remittances, had amplified the economical activities. The implementation of various emergency relief, resettlement and income generating projects by government and NGOs has also contributed to the activation of the local economy along with the rise in land prices. Trincomalee and Batticaloa have also displayed some degree of economic dynamism as a result of the influx of displaced people.

(2) Effects and damages upon the people

The conflict has dramatically transformed the socio-economic landscape of the North and East. From these two provinces alone, more than 65,000 people died due to the conflict, and a manifold number of this were casualties of the conflict. The conflict produced refugees and IDPs on a massive scale. It is said that the number of IDPs was approximately 800,000. Most of them were Tamils but considerable numbers of Muslims and Sinhalese were also displaced. Of the IDPs, approximately 40,000 live in refugee camps17 and the rest stay with friends and relatives or have relocated with state assistance or on their own. 100,000 to 150,000 displaced Tamils have sought refuge in India. More than 600,000 Sri Lankan Tamils have migrated to Western countries since 1983, and the country has lost considerable human capital as a result.18

Moreover, many have suffered from forced migration, physical incapacitation,

17 These are known as ‘Welfare Centers’ in Sri Lanka. 18 Rupasinhe (1998)

30

psychological trauma, and loss of livelihoods and social capital. In terms of basic human development, as indicated by declining literacy, increasing incidence of infant mortality and communicable diseases and deteriorating nutritional status of children.

The North and East have lost considerable human capital due to death and incapacitation and net emigration of skilled persons. In addition, due to the economic embargo, the disruption of health and educational services and the inability of thousands of children to have access to proper schooling in the past two decades, human development and the formation of human capital have been severely constrained. As a result, the institutions dealing with public administration, development and environmental management have been severely weakened. The absorptive capacity of the state’s development institutions in the North and East is said to have diminished to such low levels, that today they are unable to utilize more than 20-30% of the allocations for rehabilitation. The human and organizational capacity gap, compared with the South and West Provinces is severe.

The internal displacement and emigration have drastically altered the demographic structure and distribution of populations in the North and East. During the years of war, the patterns of migration were extremely fluid and geographically uneven. Many families and individuals have gone through multiple long- and short-term displacements. Certain parts of the North and East have been depopulated while some others have received major influxes of displaced people. In many instances, displacement has separated farmers from their land; fishermen from their fishing grounds; workers from their workplaces; and the IDPs have suffered discrimination from society. However, displacement has meant new opportunities for some, especially for those with entrepreneurial skills, initial capital and social networks. Large-scale emigration from the North, especially from Jaffna, to the West has led to an economy of remittance for thousands of families living in the North and in Colombo and other multi-ethnic areas in the South. However, the majority of the displaced have been subject to varying degrees of deprivation.

Populations tended to gather in government-controlled areas that supplied relief and basic social services. The government also used these facilities to move refugees away from the LTTE controlled areas as a part of its war strategy. Many of the IDPs have ended up living in the refugee camps for many years. The cost of living in these areas has been increasing while employment opportunities have remained limited. With the large expanse of land controlled by LTTE, there are small and limited areas where large populations have concentrated. The Batticaloa district presents an extreme case of this type. The situation in the Wanni is also similar.

The Sri Lanka government has failed to fully recognize the rights of the IDPs as proposed Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by the United Nations. Residents of refugee camps were often treated like detainees suspected of links with the LTTE. They were subjected to harassment and some were even tortured by

31

security forces. There were times when they were deprived of their daily rations for weeks. The living conditions in the ‘welfare centers’ were poor and unhealthy. As many children were deprived of regular schooling, dropout rates and absenteeism were high. The repressive pass system restricted their physical mobility and hindered employment opportunities that existed in neighboring towns and villages.

(3) Effects and damages on social institutions and social capital

During the 20 years of internal conflict, the social institutions and social capital were also disrupted and destroyed. For example, the farmers’ organizations, fishing unions, credit societies and other formal and informal associations including social networks have become economically disfunctional due to displacement and wartime restrictions.

Aerial bombardment by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and direct armed clashes on the ground, have caused immense destruction to infrastructure, human settlements and productive assets. The full picture of this devastation caused over the years has just begun to emerge after the recent lifting of the censorship on news from the war-torn areas. The use of landmines and bombs by both the armed forces and the LTTE has caused considerable damage to roads and bridges. The hundreds of thousands of mines buried in various parts of the North and East pose a serious threat to people and livestock, and as a result, have hindered resettlement of displaced families and restoration of livelihoods. Displacement of people has continued since the beginning of the armed conflict, and has brought about various effects.

The LTTE have distributed land owned by the IDPs to landless workers and families of martyrs. The land reforms were lucky for the landless, but for the landowners, they considered it as a usurpation of their property and hence, an illegal act. There are actually ‘tenants’ of LTTE on the lands, who cultivate and pay a seasonal rent to the movement. In the East, the losers include Tamil and Muslim landowners. The Muslim landlords, whose lands in Batticaloa’s Paduvankarai were taken over, have been voicing their grievances more publicly than their Tamil counterparts. Such disputes are not incapable of creating extra unnecessary social conflict.

Long-term displacement, expulsion and clearing and occupation of private land by security forces have created problems regarding land rights. In some areas of land belonging to persons who were displaced or expelled (Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese) have been illegally occupied. The rights of the original owners must be enforced. The security forces occupy considerable extents of private residential areas and farmlands in many parts of the North and East. Boundaries of private properties have been erased through the bulldozing of the land to create defense structures. The dispossessed were poorly compensated or not compensated at all. Under the CFA, the security forces are expected to vacate these properties. However, the issues and

32

potential conflicts over demarcation of boundaries and illegal occupation are becoming serious.

Conflict and displacement have impacted on gender relations in different ways. Death and disappearance of adult males and separation of families have led to increased burdens on women. Female-headed households, which have been increasing in numbers, are the worst affected. Early marriages have become common as a means to safeguard young men and women from arrest and detention by the security forces and to avoid recruitment by the LTTE. However, early marriages were not total safeguards for young men as demonstrated by the growing number of teenage widows. There is evidence of increasing incidence of domestic violence and sexual abuse of women. Displaced women have become casual laborers wherever opportunities existed though at much lower wages than their male counterparts. In addition to taking on household responsibilities many women have had to deal with the security forces, government officials and the LTTE, on matters concerning relief and personal security.

As it has been demonstrated above, the civil conflict had presented substantial damages in various forms to the people living in the North and East areas. After the CFA, the end of conflict and the lifting of sanctions invited economical stimulus to every area of the North and East Provinces. The removal of restrictions on people’s mobility and the social exchange within the agricultural and fishing regions that had hitherto suffered economic decline became active once again. It has enabled even casual workers to move more freely, and look for new employment. In April 2002, the LTTE signed an agreement with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), starting up measures to resolve the conflict with Muslim residents. A few weeks prior to this, a representative of the LTTE tendered a public apology concerning the expulsion of Muslims from the North Province in 1990. However, even these positive movements are running into financial, institutional and technical problems, and it is vital to try to remove such constraints. Moreover, the problems are escalating with the dissatisfaction over the human rights, oppression and child soldiers of the LTTE. The post-CFA movements and issues that need to be looked at for the future, shall be explained in detail in chapter 4.

1.5 Characteristics of the Sri Lankan Conflict

One can say that the characteristics of the Tamil separatist movement are different from the contemporary separatist movements in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, and are therefore interesting as a case study.

Firstly, it took nearly 25 years for early movements that raised voices of separatist sentiment to develop into a violent separatist movement. Its transformation progressed from a relatively peaceful agitation in the 1950’s and 1960’s to using extraordinary violent tactics.

33

The second point is the large number of heads of government, senior politicians and other leading public figures that were assassinated. When comparing South Asia with other regions and states that have broken free of colonial rule, the region is saturated with the memory of violence within its public life. It is a fact that, there are almost no other examples in the world, with the same degree of heads of state and society becoming the victim of bullets and bombs, as is the case in Sri Lanka. Some were symptoms of a deep malaise in the political system. The fatal bomb attack on R. Ghandi, the then President of India, was a unique example of an assassination conducted by a separatist from a neighboring state.

The third aspect is both the Tamils’ and Sinhalese sense of being the minority race. This has already been pointed out earlier on but it can be commented that this minority complex has been casting a shadow on the relationship between the two races in various forms. It is this neighboring country that was the source of the geographical and human support for the separatist movement. Such ethnic solidarity and the awareness of identity, served as an important source of nourishment for the separatist movement that existed on the Jaffna peninsula from the 1950’s.

Fourthly, the issues concerning language, has become a key factor in solving the Sri Lankan civil conflict. Although numerous reasons, among them dissatisfaction in the local communities have been listed as the possible factors which caused the conflict both in the North and South, all these factors are in someway connected to the language conflict between the peoples’ native language, Swabhasha and English. In the process of post-independent nation building, Sinhala and Tamil were legally acknowledged as the official and national languages by the central and regional governments and attempts were made for a true independence for the people. However, in reality, there has not been much change since the colonial period; English plays a major role in the strata of society that sustains the industry and public offices. Those who can command the English language in Sri Lanka is perhaps not more than 10 % of the whole population. Although vast majorities of the vernacular Sri Lankan population live under the language environment of Sinhalese and Tamil, even if they graduate from university, have difficulties finding employment. There has not been much change since the colonial period, because in terms of their relationship to the state, they are frequently compelled to regard themselves as second-class citizens. There have been various policies undertaken by the state, but reflecting the dissatisfaction that in reality issues have not been resolved, there have been repeated occurrences of political conflict and social rivalry. The violent struggles that have been organized by Sinhala and Tamil youths in the post-independent Sri Lanka have sometimes been fought on fronts, centering on securing their social status through reforms in the language issue.

Without dealing with this deeply rooted problem in Sri Lankan society, it would be impossible for durable peace to exist in Sri Lanka.

34

Box I-1 Involvement of Swabhasha Sri Lankans in the Development Process

As Sri Lanka, together with India and Burma, was a colony of the British since the late 18th century, it is part of what is called the English Language bloc. Consequently, every facet of governance, i.e., politics, military, law, economics and society has been undertaken in English. For a Sri Lankan (Sinhalese, Tamil or Muslim), being able to speak the English language without any inconvenience was the requirement for the elite class. On the other hand, the low level paid class of Sri Lankan society was not necessarily connected with the English language, such individuals were called Swabasha (Swabasha : Non English speaker), and were not given the chance to hold and be active in the main offices of the state.

Although there is a high proportion of Swabasha in the country and villages, where the chance of being directly exposed to English is low, one should not lowly value the ability of Swabasha Sri Lankans, solely on the grounds that they do not speak English. In the future, from the perspective of utilizing human resources, although an individual might come from the country and not speak English, it is important to actively employ such brilliant human resources in the public sector, such as the state. For this to be realized, it is necessary to publicly promote the chances of Swabasha’s to raise their English ability. It is not the case that the Swabasha Sri Lankans are rejecting the English Language, rather, they are hoping to acquire strengths in the English language, at a time when they are faced with the internet and a globalizing economy. If those Swabasha who have become rooted within the regions and villages, become active in Sri Lankan society, after acquiring the English language, even if the level is not up to the traditional urban elite, it will enable closer communication with the outside world. There is even the chance that mutual understanding at the popular level between Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims which hitherto has been difficult due to the differing ethnic languages, might actually progress through the English language.

The international community, which has hitherto centered their interaction with the elite class of English speaking Sri Lankans, believed that these people represented the views of Sri Lanka. However, in future it is surely necessary to actively assimilate the views of the Swabasha and to strengthen the cooperation that allows these people to be active, for the development of the whole of Sri Lanka. For example, in the rural areas that are mainly occupied by the Swabasha, it is beneficial to support the nurturing of small-to-medium-sized and venture companies. It is important to support products that are based on the local resources, such as processed medicinal herbs, accessories including jewelry, diverse products of ceramics, rubber based products, activated carbon, handicrafts related to tourism, electronic products, computer software packages.

35

As part of cooperation for Sri Lanka’s Self-help efforts towards sustainable

development, it is hoped that overseas volunteer organizations are actively involved in every type of developmental activity, through for example, exchange programs.

It is very much hoped that progressive cooperation between the ethnic groups will develop, and that the past experience of being a colony of the English Language Bloc should be actively exploited as an advantage against international competition, while cooperation with the international community and economic development through diplomacy, trade and tourism by Sri Lankan human resources, representing all of Sri Lanka, including Swabasha, will in turn connect with the softening of the ethnic conflict and the decrease in poverty of the whole nation.

36

Chapter II Evaluation of Foreign Assistance in the North and East 2.1 Development Assistance after 1977 2.1.1 Influence of Development Assistance after 1977

The regime change in 1977 marks a turning point in the history of foreign assistance in Sri Lanka. The market oriented economic policies initiated by the regime elected to power in 1977 brought about an extremely favorable response from the aid agencies of the developed West and Japan. When it comes to the monetary value of aid received by Sri Lanka the increase after 1977 was dramatic. As stated in a Central Bank report produced on the occasion of fifty years of Sri Lanka’s independence, ‘Sri Lanka received very little aid from the donor community during the period prior to 1977. The total outstanding aid to Sri Lanka from the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) /IDA (International Development Association) as at end 1976 amounted to $ 65 million. As at 30th June 1997, a total of 84 loans amounting to over $1,900 million had been disbursed and remained outstanding with over 95% being concessional assistance from the IDA19. Data in the same report shows that around three-quarters of all funding facilities that Sri Lanka has drawn from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) since independence have come during the post ‘77 period. The picture is similar when it comes to overall aid. For example, ‘of the total of $6,140 million received between 1960 and 1985, 70% was received in the period 1978-85’20. These figures do not include a full picture of non-governmental sources of assistance. If we add this component to the increase in the flow of aid, the figures would even more be significant.

However, the influence of the aid industry in the post ’77 period cannot be understood only by looking at the flow of monetary resources. In the globalized world that Sri Lanka has to operate within, this influence is much wider than depicted by these monetary figures. The following framework can be used to map out this wide-ranging influence. (1) At the level of the state (a) Resource base of the state

Foreign assistance has had a tremendous influence on how the Sri Lankan

19 Central Bank of Sri Lanka (1998) 20 Sorbo (1987)

37

state secures its resources and utilizes them. The important point to note is that the influence is overall and not confined to specific projects for which donor money is allocated. External assistance is important in securing the overall budget and in determining overall resource allocation at the end of the financial year. In other words, development assistance is an integral part of the overall resource base of the state. Therefore agencies providing this assistance cannot ignore the overall performance of the state although they might have earmarked their assistance for a specific purpose. Hence the widely debated question about whether foreign assistance supported the war effort by freeing resources from other areas is not an invalid one21. (b) At the level of policy making

In the post ‘77 period the lending agencies have become extremely influential in the policy making process. With the introduction of structural adjustment, policy based lending became the norm. Aid agencies have an active presence in the country. Studies, consultancy reports, memos, etc., of aid agencies have become influential in the policy making process. Within the country, institutions like the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance, who regularly interact with these agencies have become more important.

This process has gone so far in Sri Lanka that it has become more important to keep tabs on reports coming from these agencies rather for example to follow debates in parliament, which should be the policy making body in a democracy. For example, the content of the report provided by the World Bank for the annual aid group meeting is more important in understanding policy than any proceedings of an elected body. (c) Legitimacy with institutions of global governance

In this globalized world, securing foreign assistance is a means of securing legitimacy at the level of various institutions of global governance. During the past two decades the Sri Lankan elite has performed very well on this front. They have consistently managed to secure development assistance at a reasonable level despite a civil conflict that has had an enormous social cost, an insurgency that was put down with extreme brutality, an electoral process where violence has become endemic, widespread corruption and a bad record of human rights violations. This certainly has given legitimacy to the state irrespective of what has happened in society.

21 Some researchers have started to ask very interesting questions about what happens to the state-

society relationship if states can secure their resource base largely with the help of foreign assistance. One of the questions asked is whether the ability of states to secure foreign funding makes the political leadership less sensitive to the demands of the society.

38

(d) Security of the state The combined effect of all these elements is its impact on the overall security

of the state. For a small underdeveloped country like Sri Lanka securing foreign assistance is important for its own security. Inability to secure foreign assistance can mean undermining the resource base of the state and losing legitimacy in the eyes of institutions of global governance. The combined effect of this could jeopardize the security of the state and its very existence. (2) At the level of society (a) Socio-economic process

The impact of foreign assistance is seen on a variety of socio-economic processes taking place even at the most local level. For example, if one looks at village studies carried out in the 70’s there is hardly any discussion about the impact of foreign assistance. But today it will be impossible to do so. The influence of external assistance and policies promoted by them is seen in the production relation, under which the paddy farmer cultivates his or her land. Many of the initiatives to improve rural infrastructure, social infrastructure or development of off-farm activities are all supported and influenced by foreign funding institutions. (b) New organizations in civil society

During the last two decades foreign assistance has helped in the emergence of a large number of organizations. In the aid jargon these are called NGOs or CBOs. These are terms constructed by aid related literature. Unfortunately this terminology does not help us to understand this phenomenon analytically, because it puts under one rubric very different organizations. Secondly, these are apt to be seen as measures of achieving various objectives for which funding is provided. Much of the discussion about these organizations has been centered on whether they have achieved these objectives or not. The more important issue for Sri Lanka is the very emergence of these organizations supported by external assistance and their relationship to various aspects of Sri Lankan society. They need to be looked at not just as a means of achieving various objectives, but also as a social phenomenon that interacts with the social and political processes of society.22 What we want to emphasize at this point is that the very emergence of these organizations has been an important development in Sri Lanka and external assistance has played a vital role in it.

22 See Wickremasinghe (2001) for an analysis in these directions.

39

(3) At the ideological level Along with this massive increase in aid flows there has been a parallel

expansion of external organizations, agencies, consultants, etc., operating in the country. The sectors covered by these agencies have also expanded. Initially the bulk of the focus was on mainstream development issues. But over the years, with the addition of subjects like governance, human rights, promotion of democracy and conflict resolution, the aid agencies are involved in a wide range of activities. As a result, the concepts, ideas and discourses expounded by these agencies have become influential in the country. This ideological impact of ideas that accompany foreign assistance has a very deep influence in society. Today it is almost impossible to conduct political debates in Sri Lanka outside the ideas generated by the influence of foreign assistance.

The above account of the widespread influence of foreign assistance in a small country like Sri Lanka located in a globalized world has implications on how we conceptualize discussions about foreign assistance. The most important point is that the influence of development aid encompasses society so much that it becomes difficult to treat it as some sort of ‘external’ factor. The boundary between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ disappears, and development assistance becomes an integral part of society. In fact foreign assistance and so-called internal processes of society form a single totality.

Methodologically it is difficult to unravel the role of foreign assistance just by narrowly looking at individual projects, a single sector or a single donor. Unless these specific studies are placed in the overall context of the role of foreign assistance we would fail in grasping the main picture. In many reports that have looked at specific projects one often reads the importance of the overall context. But as soon as the analysis escapes from the narrow confines of the project to look at the context, foreign assistance will loom large as ‘an important factor’ in the context.

If we follow this line of reasoning, the question that some donors still ask about the ‘impact of foreign assistance on the conflict’ almost becomes nonsensical. If the influence of foreign assistance has become all-pervasive in this society, and if the deciding characteristic of Sri Lanka during the past two decades has been this civil war, how can these two phenomena exist in the same society without interacting? The much more fruitful line of inquiry is to unravel numerous and diverse linkages between these two phenomena. However in order to do that we might have to pose these questions in a way different from a narrow positivist ‘cause and effect’ reasoning.

This also means that it will be difficult for donors to identify interventions without an overall vision of Sri Lankan society, however sketchy or imperfect it might be. Since donor influence is all-pervasive, foreign aid organizations have to

40

take a look at the entire society and not just parts that interest them. The focus on the conflict has brought this home to many donors.

Finally Sri Lankans have to find solutions to their problems within this framework of the globalized world. It is very difficult to visualize Sri Lankan outside these globalized structures. However negative the impact of globalization might be, it is within this framework that we need to find answers. The current peace process has all the characteristics of such an attempt. 2.1.2 Development Assistance and Conflict - Evolution of Policies

A cursory glance at the history of donor involvement since 1977 shows that it can be divided into two periods in relation to donor attitudes towards the conflicts that have characterized this period in Sri Lanka. The mid-80’s to late-80’s mark the boundary between these two periods. What defines this differentiation is the entry of a specific theme called conflict or conflict resolution as a policy concern of donors during the latter period.

The donor policies during the first period were characterized by a degree of blindness to the situation of deteriorating ethnic relations. Donors were preoccupied with supporting the government’s project of developing a market economy and promoting a private sector. Some donors supported social development policies within this broad framework.

This was despite the fact that by 1977 the polarization between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan state had gone a long way. The situation deteriorated so much between 1970 and 1977 that the TULF fought and won seats at the election held in July 1977 on a separatist platform. They became the major opposition party to the government that began to liberalize the economy. One of the major issues debated in the country after the 1977 general election was about the mandate that TULF had received in the North and East for a separate state.

By 1977 the deteriorating ethnic relations has already resulted in violent incidents. There was sporadic violence in the 1970-77 period. In August 1977, just after the elections, ‘ethnic riots’ broke out in Colombo and this was an important turning point in the conflict. The government responded to the worsening situation with a military option. The draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act was promulgated in 1979 and troops were sent to the North. This resulted in numerous incidents of human rights violations in the North.

The politics of the South also took a turn for the worse during this period. The new regime was not ready to tolerate any opposition to the policies that it initiated. The opposition from groups such as trade unions, students and civil society organizations was met with violence. The culmination of such politics was the fraudulent referendum of 1982, which postponed the impending general

41

elections. The referendum was rigged at every level and it marks the beginning of the undermining of the electoral process.23

All these political developments and violence seem to have made little impression on donors. Most donors welcomed the policy changes associated with the economy. They were extremely keen on supporting the government in their new economic policies. The discourse in economic development that was deployed hardly took notice of politics or the violence that was quickly becoming the norm in society.

During this initial period, not only were the donors blind to the deterioration of ethnic relations and impending catastrophe, they also undertook the funding of projects that had direct political implications on ethnic relations. The best example that has been analyzed in literature is the AMDP, which absorbed a significant proportion of donor funds in the late 70’s and early 80’s. Mahaweli was the largest land settlement programme undertaken by Sri Lanka since independence. This is probably the most expensive project funded by donors in Sri Lankan history. All the major donors took part in this project. However, irrigation of the dry zone, settlement of people, changes in the ethnic composition due to this process and the political implications of such changes has been the most controversial issue in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. These debates figured during the first major land settlement programme of the post-independent period, the ‘Gal-Oya’ scheme. It was a major issue in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam 24 negotiations of the 50’s, and since then has been a principal grievance of the Sri Lankan Tamils. None of this history, nor the political campaign of the Tamils, seems to have had any effect on the decision-making process to fund the Mahaweli project.25

In this first phase of the post ’77 period there were exceptions to this general rule of ethnic and conflict blindness of donor intervention. We can cite the experience of the plantation sector as an area where donor interventions had a positive effect on managing conflicts. In the aftermath of deteriorating ethnic relations, many expected that the conflict would spread to the plantation sector. People in the plantation sector have linguistic affinities with Sri Lankan Tamils. In the mid 70’s, problems of the plantation people figured prominently in the politics of Sri Lankan Tamils. CWC, the main political party in this sector, was a constituent member of the Tamil United Front, the precursor to the TULF. The socio-economic indicators of this sector were a world apart from the rest of the 23 There are numerous reports of human rights organizations and academic writings that have

documented and analyzed this period. 24 See Chapter I, 1.2.1. 25 At least in the case of some countries there has been a critical debate on the donor involvement in

this controversial project. Canadians lead in these debates. Much of the discussion has been undertaken by academics. See for example, Gilles (1992).

42

country. Given these factors the scenario of the armed conflict spreading to the plantation sector was a realistic one. However this did not happen. In contrast, during this period there was a significant improvement in the political representation and socio-economic conditions of the population resident in the estates.

The primary explanation of these positive developments is political. In 1977, for the first time in independent Sri Lanka, the political leadership of the plantation community had access to state power through the participation of the CWC in the government. This political influence led to steps being taken to resolve some of the fundamental problems facing this population. The resolution of the citizenship issue and entry of this community to mainstream politics was the key. This expanded the political representation of the Indian Tamil population at various levels. The result was an expansion of resources available for welfare of a community hitherto neglected by the Sri Lankan state. In other words, what happened was the integration of the plantation community into the state directed welfare sector from which they had been debarred for generations. This resulted in actual improvements in their conditions, which contributed towards managing conflicts26.

Parallel to these political developments in the plantation sector, was the availability of donor funding to this sector. This was the result of long years of campaigning and agitation about the plight of this section of the Sri Lankan population. Hence what we had in this sector, beginning from around the early 80’s, was a favorable combination of political developments and donors’ interests, which ensured new investment to the sector. These factors not only brought about tangible changes, but also made the community a part of the political mainstream. Hence donors’ involvement supported the management of ethnic relations and conflict in this sector. What needs to be noted here is this did not happen because of explicit conceptualization of donor interventions in conflict resolution terms or because so called conflict resolution experts were designing projects. It was simply a case of donors being there with funds when a Sri Lankan political process was at last dealing with age-old problems faced by this community.27

26 While this was happening in the plantation sector, the state’s responsibility for welfare was being

undermined in the other sectors under the impact of structural adjustment. Several authors have linked the conflicts seen in the ‘Southern’ part of the country to the inequality generated by the withdrawal of the welfare role of the state. The plantation political leadership could counter these trends because of the political clout they enjoyed especially in the first UNP regime.

27 This positive assessment of what happened in the plantation sector should not be taken to mean that things have been resolved. Conflicts never get resolved in that sense. In our view the politics of the plantations is in a flux. The old CWC leadership is gone. There are struggles among a new generation of leadership. Major parties are trying to increase their influence in the sector. The sector has been privatized and private ownership is looking for liberalization of the labor markets and liberalization of the sector as such. All this will create very difficult issues in the sector, while conflict resolution experts are looking for models without being involved in history and social struggles.

43

Towards the end of the 80’s the situation in the country deteriorated so much that it became extremely difficult for donors to ignore conflicts. The 1983 ethnic pogrom against Tamils internationalized the conflict. In the aftermath of the Indo-Lanka Accord28 the armed conflict associated with the North and East conflict was compounded with a violent insurgency from the South. Armed forces reacted to this with an equal degree of ferocity. This was a time when a sizeable area of the country was affected by violence. The resulting human rights violations and disappearances were highlighted in various international fora. The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 also brought Indian troops on to Sri Lankan soil. Such interventions of armed forces across international borders did not go unnoticed in Western capitals. The conflict also resulted in large-scale migration of members of the Tamil minority to Western countries, a large proportion of whom became refugees in those countries. During this time the international discourse on foreign assistance also began to take conflicts as a central issue. As a result of these factors, from around the mid to late 80’s, conflict and conflict resolution became a major focus of donor interventions in Sri Lanka. At present almost all the bilateral donors have these themes as a central issue. They figure quite prominently in the case of the multilateral donors as well. 2.2 Development Assistance and Conflict – Donor Responses

In order to discuss the donor responses to the conflict at present we shall use the three-fold classification of ‘Working around Conflict’, ‘Working in Conflict’ and ‘Working on Conflict’ put forward by Jonathan Goodhand.29 Each of these terms is understood as follows;

Working around Conflict – Donor interventions ‘that rarely take conflict into account to any significant extent or they treat it as a “disruptive factor” to be avoided.’ In this perspective conflict is some sort of an aberration of the ‘normal development’ process. Working in Conflict – Donor interventions ‘that regard conflict as an issue and account for it in at least some of their plans by attempting to minimize conflict related risks.’ For example, some of the humanitarian assistance programs in the North and East are carried out in a conflict sensitive manner. Influenced by the idea of ‘do no harm’, they try to be sensitive to conflicts and take care not to contribute to conflicts. Working on Conflict – Donor interventions ‘that actively and explicitly consider ways in which their work can help reduce or manage conflict and promote

28 See Chapter IV, 4.1. 29 Goodhand (2000)

44

(long-term) reconciliation.’ These interventions have conflict resolution as a central objective.

2.2.1 Working around Conflict

The most important example in this category are economic reform programmes promoted by donors such as the World Bank and IMF without much consideration of the conflicts that these policies can generate. There is also very little debate about how to manage the conflicts that these policies can generate. If we are to go by the more recent recommendations of multilateral agencies like the World Bank, promotion of these policies in future would involve substantial reforms of the state, reforms in the labor market, promotion of market relations in land and commodification of natural resources like water. Many of the infrastructure projects that are geared to provide the necessary environment to these policies also fall into this category.

The implementation of quite a number of these policies will be politically contentious, and the politics of implementing these will involve conflicts. However there is very little evidence to show that donors have taken into account the politics and conflicts associated with the implementation of such policies. This is despite the fact that several writers have in recent times drawn attention to the direct links between liberalization of the economy, the overall inequality that it generated and conflicts that we have seen in the Southern parts of the country. Dunham and Jayasuriya, who have contributed to this debate in recent times, concluded that ‘instead of the social peace and prosperity that had been anticipated, policy reforms and demolition of the “welfare state” have ushered in a much sadder tale of social conflict and political violence.’ 30 A number of these contributions show the importance of managing social inequality rather than absolute poverty if these reforms are to proceed without the social costs that we have already witnessed.

The question here is not only about these specific policies. Perhaps there can be areas of reform that are needed. But the issue is about the almost total absence of understanding of politics, power relations, and conflicts that need to be tackled in implementing these reforms. Such a perspective will not accept the need for these reforms as an end in itself. Economic reforms need to be placed in the context of many other goals such as social stability, and deepening of democracy, which are equally valid. Instead what dominates is a technocratic view of policy reforms and an ideological commitment to them at any cost. Therefore a major

30 See Dunham and Jayasuriya (2000) for an account that links ‘Southern’ conflicts and

liberalization.

45

plank of donor policies is still promoted without a strategy to politically manage the conflicts that underlie these changes.

Projects in the North and East, which are implemented without much consideration of their impact on conflict, would be the other major area of concern in this category. As we shall describe below, with the example of the UNDP, there has been a considerable progress in internalizing the conflict awareness in the projects implemented in North and East. But the process is still at the beginning. Many projects have a long way to go to be effective in this direction. Although, hopefully for a long time, the armed conflict in the North and East has stopped, the society in these areas is characterized by conflicts at number of levels. The adverse relationship between Muslims and Tamils, the insecurity felt by Sinhalese, intra-Tamil conflict based on class and caste can all lead to violence. No society goes through violent conflict without its fundamental structures being shaken. We are about to see how people in the North and East come to terms with these changes. Hence project interventions have to be sensitive to this dynamism and not contribute to the already difficult situation. 2.2.2 Working in Conflict

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) work in the North and East could be taken as an example of an agency that has moved from ‘Working around Conflict’ to ‘Working in Conflict’. One of the first involvements of UNDP in the North and East was in the Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme (ERRP) that was designed after the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987. The accord brought in a brief respite from war and the government of Sri Lanka requested assistance for reconstruction. At the Consultative Group Meeting in December 1987 aid agencies pledged $493 million for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

ERRP was basically a development project with an emphasis on rebuilding of infrastructure. Its components included rehabilitation of social infrastructure, housing, agriculture, roads and bridges, telecommunications, power, railways, education facilities, irrigation and water supply, commerce and industry and the resettlement and rehabilitation of persons affected by the conflict. The project was actually taking care of the aftermath of the conflict without much of an attention being paid to the conflict itself.

The next significant involvement of UNDP in the conflict area was inauguration of the Jaffna Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programme (JRRP) in 1997. Once again this project was initiated after a significant political event; the taking over of Jaffna peninsula by the Sri Lankan army (SLA). By following in the footsteps of the SLA into Jaffna, UNDP was actually becoming a part of the

46

politics of the conflict process. However the project components itself has little to do with conflict. Components ranged from renovating the Jaffna Teaching Hospital to rebuilding local markets. JRRP closed at the end of 2000.

The implementation of the JRRP coincided with a period that began a wide-ranging debate on donor involvement in conflict areas. UNDP’s perspectives of working in conflict areas also began to change. Due to these developments, The Umbrella Programme, which is the largest project implemented under the new Country Cooperation Framework, began to incorporate conflict itself as a serious subject. As stated in the CHA review, ‘key elements of the Umbrella project are economic recovery, capacity building and training and post conflict planning.’ All of these are expected to promote rehabilitation and reconciliation of the North and East.

The project is implemented in a decentralized manner. There are district review boards chaired by government agents that determine specific projects to be implemented. This provides a greater degree of flexibility in deciding specific components. At district level there are linkages with other donors and donor- supported projects.

Specific project components are much more diversified compared to the previous focus on infrastructure. There is a specific component called ‘peace and reconciliation’. The National Mine Action Programme, a project to utilize UN volunteers in capacity building, establishment of a Peace Dividend Trust Fund and supporting the GOSL in emergency preparedness and disaster management are the other components. All these indicate that the overall perspective of the project has moved away from simple rehabilitation of infrastructure to tackling various dimensions associated with the conflict.

The most widespread examples of projects ‘Working in Conflict’ are those that have incorporated sensitivity to ethnic balance in their projects. This approach is very similar to what has been done in relation to ensuring a gender balance. At present most non-governmental projects and some government projects working in multiethnic areas are sensitive to having a balanced ethnic representation among their beneficiaries. The method of ensuring the ethnic balance can vary. Sometimes it is achieved by having a balanced ethnic representation among the beneficiaries. Or it can be achieved by ensuring that the project is spread across areas where different identity groups live. Some projects would also ensure this type of ethnic balance among the staff working in projects. This also means the projects will develop capacities to work in Sinhalese as well as Tamil. Examples of this type of projects are found among mainstream development projects such as projects on vocational training, housing, education, etc.

47

It must be remembered that this sensitivity to proper ethnic balance was there among some donors even before conflict became a fashionable project. For example SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) supported an education project in plantation areas and also undertook a small school development project among the Sinhala villages in order that their intervention did not create a sense of grievance among the Sinhala population in the villages.

These are examples of projects ‘Working in Conflict’ because they try to ensure that the project interventions do not create problems in the area of ethnic relations, by ensuring that projects do not discriminate one group over the others. But they do not try to address the underlying causes of adverse ethnic relations. 2.2.3 Working on Conflict

As argued by Goodhand, ‘Working on Conflict’ are those interventions ‘that actively and explicitly consider ways in which their work can help reduce or manage conflict and promote (long-term) reconciliation.’ These interventions have conflict resolution as a central objective.

A cursory glance at donor strategies, show that there are a variety of ways in which donors try to incorporate ‘Working on Conflict’. (1) Supporting specific state policies that can contribute to conflict resolution

An example of a project in this category which takes social relations that can lead to conflict as a starting point, is the DFID (Department for International Development of UK) funded project titled Education for Social Harmony. This is a project focusing on primary education in the formal sector. It accepts that the education system in Sri Lanka has been one of the underlying causes of the conflict. The project tries to support the content of education and teacher training so that primary education can introduce values that enhance social harmony.

The CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) support to promoting bilingualism within the state structure is an example of a similar project that was undertaken in collaboration with a non-governmental organization, International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES). The main assumption of the project was that the language policy of Sri Lanka, which made Sinhala the only official language, was a fundamental reason for the conflict. The project lobbied successfully to change the law so that Tamil is also made an official language and to set up an Official Language Commission responsible for implementing this policy. These objectives were achieved, but still there are problems in implementation.

48

(2) Promotion of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights as a means of conflict resolution Some donors link their strategies of ‘Working on Conflict’ to issues related to

good governance, promotion of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Basically these are liberal democratic attempts. There is a belief that liberal democratic models can provide a better framework to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence. (3) Strengthening civil society

This strategy is based on the notion that civil society as a countervailing force to the state can be an agent of conflict resolution. The sphere of civil society is treated largely as a repository of the ‘good’ in society and much hope is placed on it as an agent of resolving conflicts. (4) Community based conflict resolution

This resolution tries to deal with conflicts at the level of society. The beginning of this type of intervention was associated with relief activities. Later on the attempts to link relief with rehabilitation and conflict resolution became a major pre-occupation of donor-supported projects.

It is important to note that all these strategies of ‘Working on Conflict’ have

generated debates and discussions about their relevance and effectiveness, etc. For example, although promotion of democracy is linked to conflict resolution, some would argue that the impact of democratization could be contradictory. In certain contexts it could awaken dormant conflicts, reinforce social inequalities, penalize minorities or fail to broaden popular participation in government.

Similarly the promotion of civil society is also controversial because, as some analysts point out, civil society is an arena of contradictory social forces. Some of the forces that underlie extremism in Sri Lanka’s conflict are found in civil society. What we need is not just promotion of civil society against the state, but a civil society imbibed with values of pluralism and democracy.

There is no doubt that certain type of interventions at community level can avoid the violence at societal level that often accompanies civil wars. There are prejudices, stereotypes at the level of society that need to be tackled. But the key questions are firstly, does the focus at community level allow us to ignore the ruling elite, which are the more powerful forces behind the conflict? Secondly, does it blur the links between ruling elites and social forces represented at community level including some of the NGOs? Fundamentally the focus on an amorphous category called the ‘community’ ignores the power relations that underlie conflicts.

49

These debates and discussions point out that ‘Working on Conflict’ has no simple answers and donors have to tackle a complex set of issues. What we see in Sri Lanka is just the beginning of this type of work. 2.2.4 Some Lessons

Current debates on donor interventions in conflict situations have identified several issues, which need to be taken into account if donors are to ‘work on conflict’ with a greater degree of effectiveness. These issues cover both conceptual and operational aspects. It is argued that donors need to take these issues into account if they are to improve their policies and practices.

However, since donor interest in ‘working on conflict’ is of recent origin, this debate is also of very recent origin. In fact the issues elaborated below are only a beginning of a much longer process of building capacities to handle conflicts. Therefore what is described below should be taken in the spirit of an on-going debate.

(1) Foreign assistance per se cannot resolve conflicts

Although there is no question of donor agencies ignoring the reality of conflict this does not mean that conflicts can be resolved through the intervention of donor-funded projects. As one analyst put it ‘ODA is not a silver bullet’. The most important factor in resolving conflicts is the socio-political forces of a given society. However in a globalized world timely donor intervention, along with socio-political forces of societies can bring about positive changes. (2) Deeper understanding of the recipient society

If donors are to be a supportive factor in resolving conflicts, it is extremely important that donor agencies have a much more subtle understanding of societies. Unfortunately donor agencies work with highly generalized categories such as, the ‘third world’, and ‘developing countries’. Such blanket categorizations are not only incapable of recognizing subtle differentiations between societies but also deny the specificity of histories of these societies. Sometimes it also expects all societies to follow similar unilinear trajectories. Such perspectives are of little help in dealing with complex issues like conflicts.

This deeper understanding of society is required in order to respond to the issues of coping with conflicts. There are conflicts that could be so destructive to societies that they need to be prevented. But there are instances when progressive changes in society will entail conflicts. These conflicts have to be managed in order to bring about the progressive transitions. It will be difficult for donor

50

agencies to make this type of a differentiation without a deeper and subtle understanding of society. (3) Mechanisms for enhancing institutional memory of agencies

Securing a much more subtle understanding of societies is a long-term process. However there are many agencies whose understanding of the recipient society is shallow despite the fact they have operated in a country for decades. Obviously there are few mechanisms in these agencies to enhance their institutional memory. Developing mechanisms to improve the institutional memory of agencies will be essential for gaining better insights into societies where donor agencies are working. (4) Centrality of politics

Politics will be a subject that aid agencies cannot get away from if they are to deal with conflicts more effectively. Politics, defined in the narrow sense of the term as formal party politics or defined in the broad sense of the term as ‘competition between interests, values and ideas’, lies at the heart of conflicts. Much of the explanation of why donor agencies have been conflict blind is because they are either prevented, unwilling or unable to engage in political analysis. This needs to be overcome and they have to enhance their capacity for political analysis. (5) Mainstreaming sensitivity to conflicts

In the same manner as issues such as gender and environment have been integrated into the mainstream donor discourses, sensitivity about conflicts needs to be mainstreamed. This is important even in the case of apparent ‘conflict neutral’ projects such infrastructure development. This conflict sensitivity does not mean that projects have to be abandoned as soon as we detect competing interests. But sensitivity to conflict will give a better insight as to what a project actually means to different sections of the population. It will also help the project to manage competing interests. (6) Long-term involvement

Conflicts often involve complex issues. Resolution of conflicts cannot be envisaged through a short-term involvement of the donor the country. Hence a commitment to conflict resolution essentially means a long-term engagement by the donor country. Project cycles have to be adjusted with such perspectives in mind.

51

(7) Policy coherence The engagement of a donor country with a recipient country covers several

areas with the participation of a number of agencies from the donor country. Maintaining foreign relations, promotion of trade and investment, and agreements on asylum and refugee issues are some of the other areas that the countries, which provide development assistance, are engaged in. In order to be effective in dealing with conflicts there has to be coherence between the policies of all these agencies. For example, it is difficult for a Foreign Ministry to be concerned about human rights if those promoting trade are interested in selling arms to the same government. This is an example of contradictory policies. (8) Co-ordination

Donor interventions in conflict situations will be more effective if there is co-ordination between various branches of one country and among different donors. However this has been one of the most difficult aspects in foreign assistance. In the case of Sri Lanka several existing mechanisms attempt to co-ordinate at different levels. The Paris Donor Forum is aimed at policy level co-ordination, while the aim of the UNDP led donor forum is co-ordination at programme level. Sometimes co-ordination also takes place at operational level. (9) The need for flexibility

Dealing with conflicts is a complex issue. The normal project cycle where all details are worked out at the beginning, with clear phases of implementation, might not be suitable for tackling issues arising out of conflicts. Conflicts demand a greater degree of flexibility and responsiveness from project interventions. Projects have to evolve with new problems that emerge. A rigid unilinear mode of planning will be less effective in dealing with conflict situations. (10) New skills

In order to work on conflicts donor supported project interventions have to develop new methodologies, skills, etc. As we have pointed out, an ability to internalize a political analysis within projects will be crucial. But this requires new skills. Project planning itself will require new methods. Finally tools like Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) will be invaluable for projects working on conflict.

2.2.5 Variations on the Theme

As we have mentioned in section 2.1.2. it was only in the late 80’s and early 90’s, that the reality of violent conflict in Sri Lanka became a focus of donor

52

policies. As it could be expected the response of donors who sought to bring this issues into their policies was within a broad liberal discourse. More specifically, donors who were responsive to the conflict sought to incorporate issues such as human rights, good governance, strengthening of democratic institutions and civil society as an answer to the conflict.

Nevertheless these responses to the newly found interest in conflict were uneven. According to some sources there were disagreements within the donor community of how to deal with the conflict situation or whether to incorporate it into development assistance policies at all. ‘In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Consultative Group Meetings between bilateral donors and international financial institutions in Paris provided the venue for sometimes heated discussions on whether good governance and human rights issues should be considered development issues and thus addressed with development instruments.’31

The most robust response to these issues came from a group of countries, which are now popularly known as the ‘like minded countries’ within foreign aid circles. This group included Norway, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, and the UK. These donors have had an interest in social issues even before the conflict became a fashionable topic. In the case of Sri Lanka they were the major funds of innovative social development programs. When issues about human rights and good governance came to the fore these donors became the most important backers of these issues. Similarly they did not have any problems in expanding funding to the civil society when it was placed on the agenda of donor countries. With this background they incorporated conflict issues quite rapidly into their portfolio. In recent years there has been a significant investment on their part to deal with conflict issues. This includes investment in their own countries through research, support for NGOs, etc.

Within this group of ‘like minded countries’ that began to incorporate conflict issues much more intensively into their policies, there is of course a great degree of variations in strategies as well as focus areas. For example Sweden, a donor with a relatively smaller funding portfolio but influential in the realm of ideas in social development, brought conflict as a focus through the development cooperation agreement signed with the Sri Lankan government in February 1998 and valid until December 2002. The new agreement ‘brought a shift in focus and concentration from primary education and rural development to promotion of development for peace and democracy and sustainable economic growth which benefits the poor.’32 In the bilateral agreement a wide range of ideas are given as examples of projects that support peace and democracy. These include support for

31 Bush (2000). 32 Bush (2001) op. cit.

53

local peace promotion initiatives, projects which support dialog between parties to the conflict, support for legal and institutional framework that strengthens peace, projects that supports culture of non-violence, and projects that support democratic development and respect for human rights. Both government and non-governmental partners were considered as partners.

The strategy adopted by the UK also included both governments as well as NGOs. Their support includes promotion of public policies that can promote peace and funding to NGOs. DFID support for an educational programme that promotes social harmony is an example of the former and the support for Oxfam GB and Save the Children Fund (SCF) are examples of the latter. These international NGOs implemented their projects through local partners. In these projects promotion of human rights and peace building has become a major component.

Canada provides an example of a totally different strategy. In 1991 as a result of a policy review Canada decided not to initiate any new projects with GOSL. All its funding were channeled through NGOs with a focus on human rights and good governance. Therefore the focus on conflict has taken Canada away from the state and totally into the civil society.

International Organization like the IMF, who focus on the macro-budget issues did not change their policies very much in line with all this development. However, it has been pointed out that the political implications of such radical economic reforms demanded in the agreement document of the new Structural Adjustment Facility, should be discussed in more detail.

The next landmark in this latter day evolution of donor policies in relation to

Sri Lanka’s conflict was the entry of SLA into the Jaffna peninsula. In 1995 as a result of the breakdown of the negotiations between PA government and the LTTE, armed conflict resumed in the North and East at its highest intensity. Calling it a ‘war for peace’ the government pursued the war with aim of dislodging LTTE from Jaffna peninsula. LTTE has been in control of Jaffna from 1990. After a costly war the SLA entered Jaffna in 1994.

Having recaptured Jaffna, the GOSL sought extra funding for rehabilitation of the war torn areas. Obviously the influx of large scale funding would have helped the government to consolidate its position in the peninsula. Given the complex political situation the donor response was cautious. However in the subsequent years donors decided to fund a number of projects in the war torn North and East (See Table II-1). One objective would have been to at least begin some development activities in these areas that were neglected by donors for so long.

It is in the context of this expansion of donor-supported projects in the North and East that one observes the entry of the RRR Framework (The National

54

Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation). The initial motivation of RRR was principally to try and develop a framework that would co-ordinate numerous donor supported relief and rehabilitation initiatives in the North and East. In addition to the projects that has already been mentioned, agencies such as UNHCR, and numerous NGOs undertook projects and activities. The situation was also complicated by the proliferation of government agencies that were involved in the implementation process. It was this confusion that made some donors seek a coherent framework that would co-ordinate all activities. Table II-1 Summary of Some of the Main Donor Funded Projects in the North and East

Project Focus Area covered Investment Period Funding agency

Development and Rehabilitation of Batticaloa (DERBA)

Rehabilitation and Development

Batticaloa District

Rs.520 mln.

6 yrs. from 1999

NORAD

Integrated Food Security Programme (IFSP)

Food and Nutrition sector

Trincomalee District Rs.559 mln.

5 yrs. from 1999

GTZ

North East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP)

Rehabilitation and Development

Ampara, Batticaloa, Vavuniya, Mannar, Mullativu, Killinochchi, Border districts of Anuradhpura, Pollonnaruwa Moneragala, Puttalam

Rs.3013.2 mln.

5 yrs. from 2000

World Bank

North East Community Restoration and Development Project (NECORD)

Relief Rehabilitation and Development

8 Districts of the North and East Provinces

Rs.3720 mln.

5 yrs. from 2001

ADB

Teachers in service programme (GTZ/TIP/BESP)

Primary teachers in service training


Rs.9.952 mln.

9 yrs. from 1999 (three phases)

GTZ

General Education Project (GEPII & TETD)

Infrastructure of education development


Rs. 180.4 mln for 2002

7 yrs. from 1998

World Bank

Secondary Education modernization project

Development of computer education


Rs.39.78 mln.

3 yrs. from 2001

ADB

Source: http//www.nepc.lk - Website of North and East Provincial Council

55

However, given the centrality of conflict and conflict resolution by this time, it was not possible to ignore peace and reconciliation. Hence another ‘R’ representing reconciliation was added to Relief and Rehabilitation, and the RRR framework was born. Departing from the traditional way of developing a policy framework the RRR adopted a process/participatory approach where in addition to reports from consultants, information was gathered through some sixty odd workshops held throughout the country. These workshops were also a means of providing legitimacy to the framework among the beneficiaries and civil society organizations.

There is a more detailed discussion of the RRR framework in the next section of this report. But the point we want to make here is the scope (inclusion of reconciliation) and the manner (participatory/process approach) reflects the discourses that have come to dominate donor discussions. It was not possible to limit the exercise just to relief and rehabilitation. Planning of the framework had to have extensive consultation with stakeholders. The latter was expected to provide a framework that will be conflict sensitive.

The most recent event that is bound to bring in new variations in this overall theme of donor response to conflicts is the opening of negotiations between GOSL and LTTE. After some initial hesitancy about the peace process and complications arising out of dealings with LTTE, most donors seem to have taken a decision to engage with the process. Some of the drive for this engagement seems to come from political factors. Nevertheless the very fact that a large number of agencies have traveled to LTTE held areas and has engaged with them demonstrates willingness to support the peace process with funds whatever the future complications might be. This also shows how far donors have come in incorporating conflicts into their portfolios.

Beyond this willingness in general terms one can expect varied responses and focus depending on the mandate of the organization, their strategic interests, etc. Some of the developments within the donor community in this new context look more like continuation of the trends mapped out above. For example, responding to the government’s request for emergency funds to meet the needs of IDPs the World Bank has granted a soft loan of $ 31 million. This project called the ‘North and East Emergency Reconstruction Project’ will have the objective of providing income and employment opportunities for the returning IDPs, restore urgently needed health care and water supply and build institutional capacity in the North and East Provincial Council (NEPC) to implement long term reconstruction activities. Funds will be channeled through Ministry of Home Affairs, Provincial Councils and Local Government. NEPC will be the implementing agency. The communiqué which announced the project stated that the priorities for this project were developed on the basis of a joint rapid

56

assessment survey carried out by the government together with World Bank’s International Development Association, ADB (Asian Development Bank), WHO (World Health Organization) and GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation). Furthermore, the project will be anchored within the RRR framework33.

Going by this description this project sounds very similar to the ones already undertaken by the World Bank. Agencies have played a major role in determining its priorities. There is no evidence of any role being played by the newly established Sub-Committee on humanitarian issues as a result of the negotiation process between GOSL and LTTE. There is an attempt to fit this into the RRR framework that was developed before the peace process began. The only difference is there is a new target group, in other words, IDPs. But by all accounts this seems to be conventional in method.

However there are examples of totally new departures of donor funding as a result of the peace process. Some of the interesting examples are the US funding for the peace secretariat, Canadian funding for Forum Federations (this is an Ottawa based organizations that promotes federalism), seeking to carve out a role in the political committee of the negotiation process and UK support for Defense Review Committee that has the objective of reforming the SLA. All these three initiatives reflect donor involvement in issues directly concerned with the politics of the peace process. Hence the debate on foreign aid and conflict is expanding rapidly beyond the discussion on relief and rehabilitation to include most of the critical issues in the process. Certainly from a hesitant beginning in the late 80’s and early 90’s, variations in the theme of donor responses to the conflict have expanded to include most aspects related to the peace process. 2.3 Current Interventions in the North and East Supported by Foreign Donor

Agencies 2.3.1 RRR Framework

The National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (RRR Framework), finalized in June 2002, was an outcome of a process initiated by GOSL in July 1999. Its objectives are to help strengthen Sri Lanka’s capacity to:

Ensure that the basic needs of people affected by conflict are met. Rebuild productive livelihoods. Facilitate reconciliation across ethnic lines. The process involved a series of community-level consultative workshops and

sectoral or thematic workshops to obtain views of diverse groups of stakeholders.

33 The Island (Newspaper), $ 31 m. WB loan for the North and East, 23rd November, 2002

57

The RRR Framework consists of sets of recommendations of policies, strategies and actions. The policies relate to the human rights of war-affected people and to relief, development and rehabilitation. In more specific terms, policies have been outlined for the following areas: application of International Humanitarian Law; rights of the displaced; rehabilitation and development; reconciliation and peacebuilding; and programme management and coordination. Furthermore, based on the policies outlined, the Framework recommends actions to be taken and identifies the agencies responsible for them. While focusing on short and medium term needs, the Framework stresses the need to integrate ‘post-conflict preparedness’ in the ongoing RRR process and recommends the setting up of a high level working group for planning the policies for post-conflict Sri Lanka.

The Framework identifies several state institutions as leading actors in relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation with international agencies and NGOs as key partners. It recommends the setting up of committees from the local to the national level to ensure bottom-up planning and implementation. Recognizing the prevalence of higher incidence of poverty in the North and East than in other parts of the country, the Framework emphasizes the need to pay special attention to ways and means of applying the prescriptions of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy in the North and East. (1) Strengths and Weaknesses of the RRR Framework

The RRR framework is regarded as an important official document although it is not so clear as to what extent the ongoing rehabilitation and development activities are linked to or inspired by it (see below). The Framework, as stated by its authors, is both a process and a product and hence the Framework in its present form has to be regarded as a product of a certain phase of the process. Therefore it can be said that the process-approach is extremely advantageous. However, it is pertinent to look at the strengths and weaknesses of the Framework, as it exists today. (a) Strengths

Stakeholder participation: This enabled the identification of some of the major deficiencies and obstacles34 to RRR and ways of dealing with them. Clear recommendations of policies and actions: The Framework provides clear recommendations of policies and actions on key issues, many of which have remained neglected for a long time. For example, the rights of war-affected

34 These include the lack of a clear policy on the rights of the displaced and other war-affected people,

the communication gap between government and conflict-affected groups, lack of co-ordination among governmental agencies engaged in relief and rehabilitation, information and knowledge gaps and the absence of a clear and coherent strategy for conflict resolution and reconstruction.

58

people, the special case of the rights of IDPs, the lack of coordination of relief activities and the issue of language parity. Recognition of the role of state institutions and state-civil society partnership in RRR: The Framework reinforces the importance of state institutions in rebuilding the war-torn North and East while highlighting the roles of civil society bodies and the need for cooperative action between governmental and non-governmental actors.

(b) Weaknesses

Non-participation of the LTTE: The Framework process is entirely government led and government-centred in the North and East. There is no evidence that the LTTE was included at any stage in the process (July 1999-June 2002). The LTTE was in control of large areas of land where 20-30% of the region’s population lived where it was the de facto government and state. Further, the LTTE wielded strong power and influence over relief and rehabilitation activities in the areas under government control. The exclusion of such a dominant player from the process and the activities to follow could cause problems in the implementation of any major RRR programmes. Today, the GOSL and international donors have recognized the LTTE as the most important political player in peace making and development. The earlier omission and the current official recognition of the LTTE make it necessary to redefine the Framework’s scope and review the recommendations with a view to include the organization. Non-recognition of the existence of parallel structures of administration in the LTTE-controlled areas: The Framework does not address this reality and its consequences to RRR in the North and East. Lack of reference to economic policy: This is a major omission given the special situation in the war-torn areas. The Framework does not say anything about the incentives/disincentives of the prevailing economic policy for rehabilitation and development. Neglect of the issue of land rights and fishing rights of returning IDPs: While focusing on human rights of the IDPs in general, the Framework fails to address the problem of land rights and fishing rights of persons returning to their homes after long-term displacement. Inadequate recognition of capacity gaps and the challenges of overcoming them: Even though the prime objective of the Framework is to strengthen Sri Lanka’s capacity to deal with the challenges of RRR, there are no clear recommendations on how to build capacities at various levels from households and local communities to NGOs and state institutions. The recommendations are primarily statements on establishing structures, not on how to raise their

59

capacities to perform the roles identified for them. State institutions in the North and East suffer from severe capacity limitations not only because they are badly understaffed but also due to inadequate competence of existing personnel.

2.3.2 World Bank ‘NEIAP’ and ADB ‘NECORD’

Several projects dealing with rehabilitation and development are already under implementation in the North and East. Most of them were formulated before the RRR framework was finalized in its present form. Some of them can be related to the Framework although they make no explicit reference to it. The more recent interventions seem to pay some attention to the Framework.

Two major interventions are the North and East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP) funded by the World Bank ($32m) and the North and East Community Restoration and Development Project (NECORD) funded by the Asian Development Bank ($40m). NEIAP, which began in 2000, has as its final target, 10% of the 4,000 villages in the North and East. The project is operating in 248 villages at present. Implementation is much slower than expected due to serious capacity constraints. The NECORD project was approved in January 2002. Currently it is at the stage of screening and approving of proposals. In addition, there are several relatively small-scale bilaterally funded projects in the North and East provided by Germany, Norway, the UK, Australia and the Netherlands. The projects aim for the rehabilitation of local infrastructure, drinking water supply, resettlement of IDPs, vocational training and the securement of food.

Of the more recent interventions, NEIAP and NECORD share some of the key conceptual elements of the RRR framework. Both subscribe to a process approach and are led by senior professionals with field experience in the region.

NEIAP adopts a participatory approach in which the local community identify their specific needs with regard to restoration of minor irrigation schemes and local capacity building. The local bodies revived and strengthened are the Farmers Organization (FO), Rural Development Society (RDS) and Women’s Rural Development Society (WRDS). The implementation of the project involves judicial ministries and a partner NGO selected to assist in social mobilization and training of target groups. The project provides loans for cultivation and other self-employment projects. According to a Director of the Project, the performance so far has been uneven in the sense that some villages have done better than others. The project has a time frame of five years. It is likely to take longer at the current rate of progress.

The objective of the NECORD project is ‘to contribute to the government’s overall relief and rehabilitation program for the North and East by improving the

60

living conditions and well-being of communities that have been affected by the conflict, particularly those that contain significant proportions of IDPs’35. The components of the project include a range of complementary activities in the following sectors: health, water supply and sanitation, education, shelter and roads. The project is expected to operate in close coordination with other ongoing projects of the government, international donors and NGOs. Its time frame is between January 2002 and June 2007. 2.3.3 ‘Quick Impact Project’ and ‘Quick Recovery’

Currently, two initiatives are underway to address short and medium-term issues of resettling or relocating IDPs. One is the Quick Impact Project for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the North and East Region (‘Quick Impact Project’) prepared by the GOSL (May 2002). This consists of project proposals for donor financing. The other is the Joint Strategy to Meet the Immediate Needs of Returned Internally Displaced Persons (‘Quick Recovery’) prepared by GOSL and the UN (July 2002). This is expected to complement the first project by targeting the 100,000 voluntary returnees. International funding is being sought for both projects and implementation has yet to begin.

The ‘Quick Impact Project’ has the following objectives: Resettlement/Relocation of IDPs Permanent houses for IDPs Rehabilitation of immediately needed infrastructure Equipment for hospitals and schools Income generation (targeting vulnerable) The ‘Quick recovery’ which complements the above, has identified the

following Immediate Areas of Need: Mine Clearance Food Agriculture and Fisheries Emergency employment Health and Nutrition Water and Sanitation Education Protection of the rights of IDPs, women, and children Non-food items (shelter etc.) Capacity building and Coordination Both projects are not competing with any of the ongoing projects.

35 ADB (2001).

61

2.4 Current Interventions in the North and East by NGOs (Excluding Japanese NGOs)

Sri Lanka is known to have the highest number of NGOs per capita in South

Asia, although there are wide variations in the numbers estimated by different sources; for example, there were 25,000-30,000 according to the NGO Commission (1993), and 50,000 as reported by USAID in 1997. In the North and East, there are 100-150 NGOs (including CBOs) operating at present. Most of them are relief oriented and have so far been concentrating in the government-controlled areas. A few are working in LTTE-controlled areas. Of the nearly 50 international NGOs in the country, 15-20 are operating directly or in partnership with local NGOs in the NEP.

Some local NGOs, supported by foreign donors, have been consistently campaigning for peace through a negotiated political settlement. The more active among these include the National Peace Council (NPC), People's Peace Front, Sarvodaya and some church-based peace groups (such as the Christian Workers Fellowship and Center for Society and Religion). There are also a few active peace lobbies such as the Peace Support Group (PSG) and Women's Coalition for Peace. Unfortunately, the Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), which was a pioneer in the field, is no longer active. CHA has held workshops and training sessions on peace building and conflict resolution for NGOs in the North and East. Some international donors have been extending generous support to local NGOs engaged in human rights and peace campaigns (see below).

In the North and East, Sri Lankan and international NGOs have been playing a significant role in emergency relief and health care while also supporting income generation through restoration of farming, fishing and other self-employment activities. NGOs have also paid special attention to the more vulnerable and deprived groups such as widows and traumatized children. The table below gives an overview of NGOs working in the North and East.

62

Table II-2 Overview of NGOs Working in the North and East 36

Organizations

Activities largely focused on basic

needs

Conflict related issues given an

importance

International NGOs 1. Action Contre la Faim (ACF) 2. CARE International 3. The Christian Children’s Fund of Canada (CCFC) 4. The Danish Refugee Council (DRF) 5. FORUT 6. Helvetas 7. Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) 8. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 9. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) 10. Oxfam GB 11. Plan International 12. Save the Children (SCF Norway) 13. Save the Children (SCF UK) 14. Survivors Associated 15. The World University Service of Canada (WUSC) 16. ZOA Refugee Care, Netherlands

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X

Local NGOs 1. All Ceylon Hindu Congress (ACHC) 2. Community Trust Fund (CTF) 3. Family Rehabilitation Centre (FRC) 4. Institute for Human Rights (IHR) 5. Lanka Evangelical Alliance Development Service (LEADS) 6. Sarvodaya 7. Methodist Church 8. Peace & Community Action 9. Rural Development Fund 10. Sewa Lanka Foundation 11. Social Economic Development Centre (SEDEC) 12. Sri Lankan Churches Child Care Association (SLCCA) 13. World Vision Lanka (WVL) 14. Y-GRO Ltd.

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X

Souce: Based on De Silva. M (2002)

However, there is a criticism that Sri Lankan and international NGOs have not been playing an active role in peace building and long-term development at the local level in the North and East. The reasons for this include the following:

Grassroots level initiatives for peace building were severely constrained by the repressive, militarized conditions that prevailed in the North and East. NGOs

36 In identifying the categorizations provided in the table we have depended on the write up provided

in this article. Those projects where there is a specific mentioning of conflict resolution/peace building, etc. are included in column two. Mere mentioning of ‘community based’ approaches in the manner found in the traditional discourses of development does not qualify the organization to be included in column two. However it is important to remember that this is a very tentative exercise based on information provided by the said article. Therefore it should be treated only as a very preliminary exercise in classification.

63

consciously avoided being openly identified with a political stand on the ethnic conflict and preferred to define their agendas within a narrow framework of relief to which they added some development activities. This option was chosen to avoid antagonizing either of the protagonists. The dominance of the humanitarian emergency approach in the war-affected areas discouraged long-term programmes integrating peace building and development. Most of the local NGOs are dependent on foreign funding and the donors tended to give priority to short term relief measures. Where some rehabilitation and development was undertaken, it was not linked to peace building or long-term development. The dependence on external sources has had a corrosive effect on the autonomy of local NGOs to develop their own programs based on identified short and long-term needs and priorities. The limited time horizon for external funding and the uncertainties about continuation were serious disincentives to NGOs to plan long term development work. NGOs, both local and foreign, tended to act on their own agendas without adequate coordination. NGOs in the North and East and border areas tended to operate along ethnic lines with little or no sustained efforts toward building bridges across ethnic divides to promote peace.

2.4.1 Interventions by International NGOs

Activities of the CARE Sri Lanka will be introduced as an example of an

international NGO active in the conflict affected area. CARE Sri Lanka was established in 1956 as a Country Office of CARE International. The organization focused on food-related programmes and on addressing maternal and child health issues. In the 1980’s, CARE diversified its programme portfolio in response to the changing needs of the country and its wider objective of poverty alleviation. During the 1990’s, CARE’s project portfolio continued to reflect a commitment to poverty alleviation. The programme strategy focused on improving household livelihood security of poor households. By the late 90’s, CARE was implementing 10 projects through its head office in Colombo and 17 sub offices employing over 200 staff.

CARE Sri Lanka has three main areas of operation, which are the North and East conflict affected areas, the dry zone, and the plantation sector. In the North and East, CARE works in all of the conflict-affected areas, including LTTE controlled areas. The strategy of CARE in the North and East is to have two

64

types of project components as below so that the community can achieve both physical and social development: (1) Hard components

These are traditional type of activities for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, such as health, education, nutrition, shelters, agriculture, income generation, water and sanitation. The time frame of these project varies from short-term, which are targeting quick impacts, to mid-term and long-term. (2) Soft components

These are the projects aiming at capacity building: Develop local organization structure such as NGOs and CBOs Reconciliation and dialog (for example, VOICE and PRIDE, see Table II-3). Capacity building for micro credit activities (savings, establishing mini-banks, training, linkage with external organizations, etc). The on-going projects of CARE in the North and East are summarized in the

following table.

65

Table II-3 On-going Projects of CARE Sri Lanka in Conflict Affected Areas

Local initiatives for tomorrow (LIFT)37 – Time frame March 2002-2007 Geographical coverage Jaffna, Batticaloa, Kilinochichi, Mullaitive, Mannar and

Vavuniya districts Target population Approx. 20,000 families, women, partner organizations

Project implementation CBOs, NGOs, government agencies Donor agency CIDA

Promote Rights, Dignity & Economy for the War Affected Families (PRIDE) Time frame July 2002-June 2005 Geographical coverage 5 conflict-affected districts Target population 50,000 conflict-affected households Project implementation CBOs, NGOs, UN agencies, related institutions of

Provincial Councils, etc. Donor agency The Commission of the European Union

Assistance to Conflict Affected Households Time frame July 2001- June 2004 Geographical coverage “Uncleared” areas in Wanni, which includes Mullaitive,

Kilinochichi and parts of Mannar and Vavuniya districts

Target population 20,000 families Project implementation Local associations, cooperative, NGOs, CBOs Donor agency AusAID, Royal Netherlands Embassy

Capacity Building of CBOs in Jaffna (CAB-Jaffna) Time frame 2000-2003 Geographical coverage Jaffna Peninsula Target population 1,700 households Project implementation CARE, Local CBOs Donor agency DFID

Vulnerable Groups Organized in Conflict Area (VOICE) 38 Time frame 2000-2003 Geographical coverage The North and East Provinces Target population Conflict-affected communities Project implementation CARE Donor agency Royal Netherlands Embassy and Department for

International Development Source: Documents provided by CARE Sri Lanka, November 2002

37 Capacity development of community based organizations in conflict affected areas of Sri Lanka 38 Training program to help local staff develop skills in inclusive decision-making and community

conflict resolution.

66

One of the important roles of CARE in the North and East is to co-ordinate the foreign donor agencies and local implementing agencies, like local NGOs (see the figure below). Their tasks are to enable the foreign donor agencies to reach the community through local implementing agencies, and to enable the local implementing agencies to acquire the necessary funds for activities.

Figure II-1 Role of CARE Sri Lanka

Source: Presented by CARE Sri Lanka, 2002.

However, when CARE is involved in a project with foreign donor agencies, government authorities and local implementing partners, the staff members of the CARE sometimes have to suffer due to the inadequate conditionality of the projects, which ultimately gives them more problem than benefit. A Programme Director of CARE Sri Lanka explained about the necessary conditionality, which should be addressed in a project, funded by foreign donor agencies through government and local government authorities in the following way.

Firstly, as for the administrative conditionality, there should be a time framework for the government and local government to disburse the fund to the implementing agencies, in order to avoid unnecessary delay. The implementing agencies should also have independence and flexibility. For example, the implementing agencies should have independence in selection of project staff members, to avoid the government and local government favoring their own people.

Secondly, as for the operational conditionality, the implementing agencies should possess the independence and freedom to select geographical area,

CARE Sri Lanka

Local NGOs & CBOs

Local NGOs & CBOs

Local NGOs & CBOs

Community/ beneficiaries

-----Co-ordination

-----Co-ordination

Foreign donor agencies

67

beneficiaries, type of interventions and local partners of the project. For example, it is permitted for the donor agencies and government authorities to set up certain ‘selection criteria’ of beneficiaries, but it is not appropriate for them to select the beneficiaries by themselves. He added that it would be very difficult for all parties involved in the project to share a clear definition of the beneficiaries, such as ‘the poor’ and ‘the vulnerable’.

It should be noted that CARE had carried out intensive survey in the Wanni area, named ‘Household livelihood and security assessment’. The objectives of the survey were to identify the constraints of the people in the area to meet the basic needs, and to identify the management strategies of the vulnerable groups. It provides us detailed information on the socio-economic condition of the vulnerable communities under different environment. 2.4.2 Interventions by Local NGOs

Local NGOs in Sri Lanka are divided into 3 categories according to the period in which they were established. The NGOs in the First Generation are Christian charity organizations, which were established before the ethnic conflict started. They often employ retired civil servants and their activities are based on charity and voluntarism. The NGOs in the Second Generation mushroomed during the period of 80’s and 90’s funded by foreign agencies. They tend to employ middle-level technical experts and put more emphasis on practical achievement, compared with the NGOs belonging to the First Generation. The NGOs in the Third Generation are CBOs with young staff members, most of whom are working in the LTTE controlled areas39. Most of the NGOs implementing humanitarian assistance belong to the Second Generation. They are motivated by the financial and organizational support rendered by foreign agencies.

There are some non-Christian NGOs, which were established before the conflict. Sarvodaya was established in the 1950s, and is one of the biggest NGOs in Asia. It is based on Buddhist philosophy, and has implemented voluntary work for rural development and poverty eradication. It is highly appreciated not only in Sri Lanka but also in Japan and Western countries and has received funds from various foreign assistance agencies. The founder, Dr. Ariyaratne, has received many international awards including the Magsaisai Award.

CHA was established in Colombo in 1997 in order to coordinate various NGOs as well as encouraging communication among them. It aims at improving effectiveness, professionalism and transparency of the NGOs activities. The members of CHA are International NGOs and local NGOs working in Sri Lanka.

39 Godhand and Lewer (1999).

68

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), and diplomatic organizations from Canada, England and Sweden, and bilateral donor agencies like USAID (United States Agency for International Development) are participating in it as observers40.

The Sewa Lanka Foundation (SLF), Sarvodaya, and SEDEC (Social Economic Development Centre) are among the most active local NGOs working in the North and East. The backgrounds, activities, future plans and evaluation of the activities will be described hereafter. Interviews of staff members and programme beneficiaries, a literature review, data collection, and field visit were the study methods used41. (1) Sewa Lanka

The present Chairman, Mr. Harsha Naveratne established the Sewa Lanka Foundation42 in 1992,43. It has made remarkable achievements in humanitarian assistance and rural development in and around the conflict affected areas in the North and East. In the North and East, it has offices in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Ampara. The German Agro Action (GAA) is the biggest funding agencies for Sewa Lanka. Other donors include UNHCR, World Bank, UNICEF, ADB, and Embassy of Japan.

Sewa Lanka is implementing activities mainly in Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara Districts in the North and East, and in border areas in Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa Districts in the North Central Province. It has recently started relief activities in Kilinochichi. In the North and East, Sewa Lanka has its office and staff working in every Province except Kilinochichi. It has also implemented activities such as integrated rural development in the plantation areas in Nuwara Eliya District. Activities such as inland fisheries, and water and sanitation have been implemented in Hanbantota and Moneragala Districts in the southern dry zone.

The major activity of Sewa Lanka in the North and East and in the border areas is to supply emergency relief to the conflict-affected people. The other main activities are to supply food, raw materials for the housing construction and cooking facilities for the IDPs in the welfare centers. The purpose of the activity was to improve nutrition, especially among the infants and school children, by

40 There are 30 members and 15 observers. CHA Newsletter vol.3-4(1999) p.44. 41 However, it should be noted that due to the limited time schedule, the field visits were done only

in the Vavuniya and Trincomalee Districts. Only staff interviews and a literature review were done for the study on SEDEC.

42 ‘Sewa’ means ‘service’ or ‘work’. 43 Mr. Harsha established Sewa Lanka after he worked for Sarvodaya as a senior director for a long

period. As well as the Chairman, many staff working for Sewa Lanka have long term working experience in community development in Sarvodaya.

69

supplementing the insufficient amount of rationing by the government. For example, Sewa Lanka provided 100 tons of food per day in emergency relief to the people who had just evacuated from their hometown, due to bomb blasts in a military operation44 conducted by the SLA in February 1999. At that time, ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) negotiated with the government and LTTE on the transportation of the food, UNHCR provided means of transportation, and Sewa Lanka supplied food in Colombo as well as distributed it to the people with the help of government officers. One of the most important aspects in the early stage of the emergency relief activities is to support the landless and jobless poorest of the poor who are the first to be forced out from where they lived. Table II-4 provides the details of the activities.

Table II-4 On-going Relief Activities of Sewa Lanka (2001-2002)

No. Project name District Donor agency Project period

No. of families

benefited

1 Emergency relief programme for cyclone affected people in Trincomalee

Trincomalee AA/GAA Jan-Apr 2001 (4months) 1,750

2 Food for IDPs and resettlers in the Wanni

Vavuniya, Mannar BMZ/GAA May-Dec,2001

(7months) 4,580

3 Agricultural inputs (seeds,fertilizer and tools) for settlers and resettlers in the Wanni

Vavuniya, Mannar BMZ/GAA

Jul-Dec 2001 (5months)

3,000

4 Emergency relief for victims of drought in Moneragala

Moneragala BMZ/GAA Oct-Dec 2001 (3months) 4,370

5 Emergency relief for victims of the flood in the North

Kilinochchi, Mullaithivu,

Mannar, Vavuniya

AA/GAA Jan-Apr 2002 (3months) 2,000

6 Humanitarian aid for IDPs in the North

Manthai West

(Manner) AA/GAA May-Sep 2002

(4months) 1,980

7 Start support for returnees and relocated families in the North

Kilinochchi,Vavuniya

North, Mantai West

(Manner)

BMZ/GAA Apr-Dec 2002 (5months) 4,939

Source : Presented by Sewa Lanka Foundation, 2002. They are also implementing a rehabilitation programme for resettlers in

Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Ampara with the assistance of UNHCR. This program includes construction and rehabilitation of roads, tanks and wells; assistance for

44 In the Operation Ranagosa, SLA tried to recapture the road from Vavuniya to Mannar peninsula,

which was controlled by LTTE that time.

70

water supply; animal husbandry and agriculture. They have expanded their activities into Mannar after the CFA in 2002. In three divisions in Trincomalee, they implement assistance programme to fulfill basic human needs (BHN), such as water supply and rehabilitation of the inner village roads to the resettlers. This programme was undertaken by the fund from the Grassroots Grant Assistance of the Embassy of Japan. See the details of the activities in Table II-5.

Their strategy for intervention is to mobilize villagers so that they can develop their autonomy, through encouraging participation in the development programme and educational activities, and also by establishing a CBO called the ‘Sewa Society’.

71

TableII-5 On-going Rehabilitation Activities of Sewa Lanka (2002)

No. Projects Areas Donor organizations

Period of implement

ation Beneficiari

es

1 Livestock assistance Vavuniya UNHCR

Apr-Jun, 2002

(3 months) 20 families

2 Income generation activities Vavuniya UNHC May-Aug,

2002 (3 months)

19 families

3 Construction of 50 latrines Vavuniya UNHCR Apr-Aug,

2002 (4 months)

50 families

4 Assistance for paddy cultivation,construction of latrines, and supply of agriculture tools

Vavuniya UNHCR Aug-Nov.

2002 (4 months)

415 families

5 Emergency rehabilitation of tanks Mannar UNHCR

May-Jul, 2002

(3 months) 1648

families

6 Supply of roofing materials Mannar UNHCR

Aug-Oct, 2002

(3 months) 306

families

7 Income generation activities for returnees of coastal villages

Manner UNHCR Aug-Oct,

2002 (3 months)

190 families

8

Integrated rural development (construction of additional school building, latrines, community centers and wells for drinking water, supply of school furniture)

Trincomalee UNHCR Apr-Oct,

2002 (7months)

300 students

9 Integrated rural development (constructions of wells for drinking water, latrines, schools and community halls)

Trincomalee UNHCR May-Nov,

2002 (7months)

58 farmers

10 Vocational training (sewing) Trincomalee UNHCR

May-Nov, 2002

(7months) 30

individuals

11 Supply of training facilities Trincomalee UNHCR May-Nov,

2002 (7months)

150 individuals

12 Revitalization of the rural economy using locally available resources

Trincomalee Embassy of Japan

Mar,2002-Feb,2003

(12months) 407

families

Source: Presented by Sewa Lanka Foundation, 2002.

They also undertake social mobilization, training and the supervision of the implementation of NEIAP in 10 Districts. In Polonnaruwa, they implement

72

activities targeting women and children in collaboration with the local CBOs and the assistance of UNICEF. The following is a case study of the micro-credit programme.

BoxII-1 Micro Credit Programme: Case Study

Samalankuram, Vavuniya District

The village of Samalankuram consists of 55 households, with a mixture of traditional and resettled residents. All of the residents are Tamils. In 1977, they were attacked by the Sinhalese people who lived near the village, and most of the villagers fled to live with relatives elsewhere or ended up in refugee camps. A few years later, the refugees were gradually resettled.

In 1998, they established a Sewa Society, and have been implementing a saving and micro credit program. At present, the total number of the Society is 38. The micro-credit program is funded by OXFAM, and technically assisted by Sewa Lanka. The loan amount for each individual is between Rs.5,000 and Rs.10,000, at an interest rate of 2% per month. The repayment period is 5 to 10 months. They utilize the loans for animal husbandry, such as goat rearing and poultry, and agriculture activities such as red onion cultivation. In addition to the above mentioned loans for economic activities, they have a loan called a ‘society loan’, in which they can obtain an interest free loan of Rs.5,000 in case of a funeral. The society loan is taken from the fund, which was generated from the compulsory savings by the society members, of which amount is Rs.100 per month.

The micro-credit program provides opportunities for the villagers, who cannot enjoy the benefits of commercial loans, to live without depending on usuries. The society loan is also utilized for the villagers to avoid falling into a vicious cycle, in which they borrow money from a usury in an emergency and are forced to pay it back at high rates of interest every months and finally become poorer and poorer.

A director of Sewa Lanka45 mentioned that the organization is the only local

NGO, which has been working in Wanni area even before the CFA. She added that it has a big advantage in working to further relief and rehabilitation efforts, since the people in the North and East greatly appreciate its 8 years of service. She seemed to have gained confidence through her experience of working under a lot of hardships during the period before the ceasefire, when even entering the conflict affected areas was a challenge. She also mentioned that, although she is a Sinhalese, she is appreciated by LTTE as a director of Sewa Lanka, and is guaranteed unrestricted movement in the North and East.

Since Sewa Lanka is working within a framework of the Government Agencies, they can avoid unnecessary interference from LTTE, and be neutral and independent. They are in partnerships with small and medium scale local CBOs.

45 Interview with the director of Sewa Lanka, September 2002.

73

However they are not working with TRO (Tamil Relief Organization, an NGO affiliated with the LTTE).

At programme sites of Sewa Lanka in Vavuniya and Trincomalee, by observing opinions and attitudes of the staff, and the impacts of the program and participation of the local people, one can observe that they were quite active in the field and confident with their achievements during the past eight years. And it seems that the senior management staff has been keeping good personal relationships with government officials as well as LTTE, who are working at decision-making level, and it helped the geographical expansion of the activities. It plays an important role in the NGO consortium, by coordinating donors and identifying the needs of the local people.

Sewa Lanka undertakes social mobilization, community capacity building, and supervision of the implementation of the programme in NEIAP in both districts. Despite the difficulties of coordinating with local government in several villages, it has achieved remarkable outputs. NEIAP is the programme to implement a set of activities in a village, such as rehabilitation of irrigational tanks, and inter village roads, construction of wells for drinking water, and the income generation programme, by adopting participatory village development approaches. The duration of each project is 18 months. Since it includes middle-sized infrastructure buildings, which are some of the most urgent needs of the villagers, they can generate a strong impact on the affected villages. Hereafter, a case study on NEIAP will be introduced.

BoxII-2 NEIAP Project: Case Study

Galmethiyawa South, Trincomalee District The village is one of the target villages of NEIAP in year 2002. There are 279

households in the village, and among them, 89 households are composed of the re-locaters from other villagers. All of them are Sinhalese. In 1987, the villagers were attacked by LTTE. After they evacuated from the village it took several months, before they were resettled in Galmethiyawa. There are 56 widows who are head of the households. In the village RDS and the FO, which has 112 members, are the implementing agencies of NEIAP. WRDS will be the implementing agency of the income-generating project.

The President of the FO, the CBO responsible for undertaking the rehabilitation of the tank, mentioned that the participation of the villagers is remarkable, and that all the villagers were actively involved in the Project. They already completed the compulsory contribution of the volunteer labor, which was to be 10% of the total budget, since they had the participation of more than 100 villagers everyday. They are paid Rs. 250 per day for the wage labor. More than half of the participants of the wage labor are females. He also mentioned that the Project is very effective with financial transparency, and added that he observed that 90% of the budget was spent for the benefit of the village. When asked the detailed budget of the

74

Project, he responded clearly and quickly that the total budget of the Project was Rs, 3,000,000, and that Rs. 2,150,000 was earmarked for the reconstruction of the tank.

He had a lot of confidence in the Project. He even mentioned that they managed to allocate Rs. 100,000 out of the Project budget overhead to the FO in order to implement additional construction. The farmers recognized that the height of the sluice gate of the tank, which was designed according to the estimate made by the technical officer of the Provincial Irrigation Ministry, was not enough.

At the moment, the most urgent need of the village is to reconstruct another tank in the village. A problem relating to use of the tanks will usually arise if there are several tanks in a village and only one of them has been reconstructed. In this village, too, the needs of the 73 households, who will be benefited from the reconstructed tank, will be satisfied, but 10 households, who are farming using the water from the other tank, are feeling unfairly treated, and insist they need to reconstruct their tank as well. The president insisted that they have to solve the problem urgently otherwise, the solidarity of the villagers, which has been created by the Project, will be strained. He added that they already requested several donor organizations to assist in solving the problem, but have not obtained any positive replies yet. They have no opportunity to obtain assistance from the World Bank, since as a staff member of Sewa Lanka mentioned, the World Bank has a policy of not funding the NEIAP village again for a period of 10 years.

A staff member of Sewa Lanka mentioned that the progress of the Project in the village was most remarkable compared with the other NEIAP villages, because of the active participation of the villagers. As of September 2002, the construction was almost completed, although the Project only began in early 2002. The factor that most contributed to the active participation was that of the FO’s president and his strong leadership. He had negotiated with the Divisional Council and the other authorities so that the Project was not delayed. He mentioned, “The FO can utilize the balanced fund for other activities, by minimizing the cost for overhead to the local government, by minimizing the duration of the construction46”. This factor must have contributed to the incentives for efficient implementation. He added that the mobilizer in charge of the village was also very capable. Other factors, such as the Project being long waited after the years of conflict, and that the fund for the Project is relatively big as well as the Project having been adequately designed to fulfill most of the needs of the villagers, has contributed the effective and efficient implementation of the Project.

The above mentioned case study is one example of the success of NEIAP.

However, a senior staff of Sewa Lanka working in Trincomalee47, mentioned that the implementation rate of the NEIAP was only 13% compared with the plan. He explained that although a NEIAP committee is formed in the Divisional level, the fund disbursement and other work of the Project tends to be delayed in the Divisional level. This is due to the fact that there is no full time staff for NEIAP in this level, and all the committee members are working for the Project using

46 The overhead cost appears to be paid monthly. 47 Interview with the Consultant, September 2002.

75

their spare time, and they have less financial incentives to work for it. Another reason for delay is that the technical officers in Divisional Council

have to make cost estimates for the construction of roads and wells and technical officers in the Provincial Irrigation Ministry have to make estimates for the reconstruction of tanks. However, because of the lack of capacity and incentives for them, the submission of estimates is always delayed and takes even two to three months.

He mentioned a potential solution to the problem would be to appoint a full time staff member to the Project at the Divisional Level. He advised JBIC not to totally depend on the government structure in the project implementation strategy, and to keep control in certain areas, although the government should take the initiatives, as it is the nature of the bilateral assistance.

Another solution he proposed would be to increase the financial incentives of the people involved. He explained that the delay is not because of the lack of capacity, but because of the lack of financial incentives for the technical officers. He talked of his experience with other projects of Sewa Lanka in which they have obtained estimates from technical officers from the Divisional Council within two weeks time, when the officer was given some financial incentives. He added that the same thing could happen to NEIAP. Otherwise, they should tender the implementation, including estimation and construction, in order to create competition. In Vavuniya, according to the suggestion made by Sewa Lanka, the World Bank introduced a test case to tender implementation of a NEIAP project and a private construction company won the contract and carried it out efficiently.

As well, he suggested that NEIAP should have more flexibility in implementation, so that a project will not be cancelled, even if it does not show much progress during the time of 18 months.

(2) Sarvodaya Movement48

Sarvodaya is an indigenous NGO, established in 1958, that implements participatory rural development. The founder and the President, Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne, laid the foundation for Sarvodaya, when he was a science teacher for a high school in Colombo. He did this by resuming ‘Shramadana49’, which is a traditional work style in Sri Lanka. At the end of the 1970’s, Sarvodaya began to be highly regarded by various foreign donor agencies, especially those from Western countries, including the United States. They have received a number of international awards. In the 80’s, Sarvodaya expanded its activities nationwide, by utilizing abundant funding from abroad. In the 90’s, it had to face a lot of

48 Lanka Jathika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya, is the official name of the Movement. 49 ‘Shramaya’ means ‘service’ or ‘work’, and ‘dane’ means ‘sharing’.

76

constraints, such as harassment by the president as well as a drastic reduction of funding from Western donor organizations, etc. At present, despite the reduction of the number of the staff and centers, it still carries out various activities, like integrated rural development, micro credit and peace building, etc.

Before the conflict intensified, Sarvodaya had centers in each district in the North and East Provinces, and was implementing its rural development programme. Later, as the security situation became worse, they practically stopped activities in Jaffna, Manner, Kilinochchi and Mullaitive. However they kept on working in Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara and Vavuniya. Like Vavuniya, there were some centers that were occupied by the SLA. Since 2002, as the security situation improved due to the CFA, Sarvodaya has begun to expand its activities in the North and East. At the moment, it has centers and staff in each District. See the details of the activity in Table II-650.

50 The activities in the Table II-6 are coordinated by ‘5R’ section in Sarvodaya Head Quarters. ‘5R’

stands for Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Reawakening. The naming shows that the objective of the activities in the North and East is to achieve the goal of Sarvodaya, ‘awakening of all’.

77

Table II-6 Present Activities of Sarvodaya in the North and East (2000-2002)

Area Project No. of beneficiaries Donor agencies

Jaffna (2000-2002)

Income generation activities, support for widows, psycho-social education, integrated rural development, mine action programme, income generation for mine victims, awareness programme on peace building, agriculture inputs and water supply for re-settlers, construction of pre-school building and wells for drinking water.

315 villages 1903 individuals 340 families

AusAID, SBW51, UNICEF, USAID, Japanese Embassy, NORAD, EU, OWOP52

Manner (2001-2002)

Reconstruction of wells, community halls and roads, revolving funds for paddy cultivation, farming and goat rearing, construction of latrines and housing, training for staff and CBOs on capacity building, psychosocial education, integrated rural development, awareness programme on peace-building, home-based training for mothers.


UNHCR, USAID, Japanese Embassy, NORAD, SCF, UK, OWOP

Trincomalee (2002)

Construction of latrines and housing for IDP, reconstruction and construction of wells, awareness programme on peace-building

45 villages 682 families

UNHCR, NORAD, OWOP

Vavuniya (2000-2002)

Training on conflict resolution, psychosocial education, integrated rural development, training for staff and CBOs on capacity building, awareness programme on peace-building


NORAD, USAID, Japanese Embassy, DRC

Kilinochichi (2002)

Integrated rural development, awareness programme on peace-building


Japanese Embassy, NORAD

Mullaitive (2002)

Awareness programme on peace-building

10 villages NORAD

Kalmunai (2002)

Construction of community hall, wells for drinking water, awareness programme on peace-building.


Niigata International Cooperation Association, NORAD, OWOP

Batticaloa (2002)

Awareness programme on peace-building, Income generating activities, construction of housing and latrines, water supply, vocational training (three wheeler and masonry), HIV education, training on food processing, construction of pre-school building, pre-school teachers’ training.


NORAD, OXFAM, WUSC, ILO, UNICEF, OWOP

Source: Presented by Sarvodaya Movement, 2002.

51 Stichting Bevordering Woningbouw in Netherlands. 52 One World One People (A Japanese NGO).

78

As shown in Table II-6, Sarvodaya not only puts a great deal of emphasis on infrastructure building in the North and East, but on its awareness and education programme as well. Geographically, it had started working from Jaffna and Manner, and now expanding its activities in Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Kilinochichi, Mulative Kalmunai and Batticaloa. It should be noted that the activities in the area of Ampara, Kantale and Padaviya, are coordinated by the another branch of the organization, called the Social Development Division, and are therefore not included in Table II-6.

Box II-3 Sarvodaya in Jaffna District: Case Study

Rehabilitation program for widowed and single-parent households Sarvodaya Jaffna District Center was established in 1966. It had

implemented integrated rural development projects; however, due to the influence of the conflict, it could not be actively involved in the activities in early the 90’s. As soon as the government recaptured the Jaffna peninsula in 1997, they established a center in Jaffna and started working there with the fund from NGOs in the Netherlands. At the moment, it is carrying out activities aiming at improvement of the socio-economic situation of the conflict affected community as described in the above table.

Among them, the project named ‘Rehabilitation of widows and single headed families’ funded by UNICEF, is remarkable on its combination of micro-credit scheme and welfare assistance for the most vulnerable groups in the community. The objective of the project is to improve the livelihood of the widows and single parent households in Jaffna district by providing opportunities for income generation. The coordinator of the Sarvodaya District Center, Jaffna, designed the project in a unique way, taking the vulnerability of the beneficiaries into consideration. It has two components, which assists and compensate each other, as follows;

Component-1: Provision of loan for Rs. 7,500 for income generation activities.

The repayment period is one year with a 6 month grace period. The interest rate is 6%. The repaid money will be used as a revolving fund to provide more loans. Component-2: Welfare assistance which contains provision of livelihood assistance worth Rs. 1,500 (Rs. 500 per month for the period of three months), educational materials worth Rs. 500 to encourage the children to attend school, and mixture of cash and food worth Rs. 3,000 (Rs. 500 per month for the period of 6 months) to improve nutrition of the children in the family.

There is a criticism for micro-credit project that it does not help the poorest of

the poor. However, the staff members of the project stressed the project is really helpful for the truly destitute, since component-2 (welfare) makes component-1 (loan) sustainable and efficient. They added that if they do not have component-2, the beneficiaries might spend the part of the given loan to their daily essentials, such as food.

79

They also mentioned that one of the important factors for the income generation activities is sustainability. By the field visit we made, we found that animal husbandry, such as poultry, goats rearing and cattle rearing, as well as vegetable cultivation were the most popular activities for income generation project. However, according to their observation, they now advise the beneficiaries not to involve in poultry, since birds might die due to the unexpected climate changes. This is to ensure sustainability.

Some of the beneficiaries we met in the villages were asking an additional loan, which the project staff valued positively. They suggested that they needed repeat provisions of loans twice or three times, to make their business sustainable. The project staff identified the necessity to industrialize the income generation activities. For example, now that each beneficiary of cattle rearing were able to sell milk daily, it would be more profitable and sustainable for them if they could industrialize their activity, by establishing a cooperation, or by making value-added milk products. In order to do so, they need linkages with external agencies for production and marketing. These are the areas, where the foreign donors and international NGOs can involve in effectively.

As it was mentioned earlier, the main characteristic of Sarvodaya’s activities

in the North and East is to implement a multi-dimensional approach for peace building and conflict resolution. This approach includes encouraging dialog and inter-personal exchange between different ethnic groups as well as training programme, cultural activities, meditation, etc. The list below represents the main programme for peace building and conflict resolution:

Peace dialog: A three-day workshop with youths from the Sarvodaya villages, aiming at facilitating a dialog between different ethnic groups, and eradicating prejudice through mutual understanding. Interface dialog: A one day workshop with community leaders, aiming at facilitating a dialog between different ethnic groups, and eradicating prejudice through mutual understanding. Conflict resolution: A three-day training program for villagers who are participating in Sarvodaya activities. The training, which invites outside lecturers, is aimed at learning about peace building and conflict resolution in order to deepen participants’ understanding of them. Peace meditation: Carried out in various religious places. Open gathering to the people in the region, and establish spiritual solidarity for peace though meditation. Peace Youth Gathering: A gathering to discuss how the youths can contribute to peace building, with the participation of religious leaders, artists and academics.

These activities on peace building and conflict resolution are coordinated by the ‘Sarvodaya Peace Secretariat’ and will be implemented by the ‘Sarvodaya

80

Shanthi Sena Sangamaya (Sarvodaya Peace Brigade )’ and the ‘Social Empowerment Division’ and district centers. (3) SEEDS

‘Sarvodaya Economic Enterprises Development Services (SEEDS)’ is implementing a nationwide micro credit programme, and is ready to expand its activities in the North and East. In September 2002, the activities of SEEDS in the North and East are as follows:

Disbursed loans, which total Rs. 830,000 in Kalmunai. The average amount of a loan for each individual is Rs. 10,000. The loans are utilized for processing dry fish, packing rice flour, cane weaving and small-scale business, etc. Disbursed loans for 15 trainees who completed the vocational training on TV/radio repair, which was initially funded by WUSC (The World University Service of Canada). The amount of the loan for each individual is Rs. 10,000. The interest rate is 24%. Planning a feasibility study and pilot project on the tile industry in Batticaloa, with the collaboration of the Eastern University.

(4) SEDEC

SEDEC stands for ‘Social Economic Development Center’, and is recognized as ‘Caritas Sri Lanka’, which is the branch of the international Catholic organization. It has 12 Diocese in Sri Lanka including the North and East, and is implementing programme such as an Animation programme (various training and income generation programme, etc.), a Women’s movement, Peace building, relief as well as rehabilitation in the North and East. Most of the fund have been provided by the Caritas Groups in developed countries. They are also funded by other foreign donor agencies, such as embassies and UNHCR, by being facilitated by the Caritas Groups.

The senior staff of SEDEC mentioned that SEDEC had good access to the conflict affected areas in the North and East. This is because in the North and East Provinces the number of Catholics is relatively high. There are Catholic Churches and mission schools in every region, and bishops are often playing a role as community leaders, which facilitate SEDEC to be actively involved in assistance in conflict affected areas. They also mentioned that, since most of the funding agencies of SEDEC are the Caritas Groups, they consider themselves as ‘partners’, not as ‘donors and recipients’, which has created liberal and democratic relationships between them, and has promoted flexibility and independence in programme management. These are the primary characteristics of SEDEC, in comparison with the two local NGOs mentioned earlier.

81

SEDEC are carrying out two types of activities with regard to the conflict. The first set of activities are the ‘Peace Building Activities’ and the other set are the ‘Relief and Rehabilitation Activities’ in the North and East. The Peace Building activities, as listed below, are implemented in partnership with the CBOs and local governments:

Cultural activities for youths. For example, drama and arts competitions within the theme of ‘peace’. Peace education programme for school going children Awareness programme Advocacy for political decision makers Exchange programme for youths and families

The relief and rehabilitation programme in the North and East commenced

in 1992. There are various activities such as, emergency relief, housing construction and water supply for resettlers as well as vocational training and educational programme, etc. They also implemented emergency relief for the victims of drought and cyclones. As for the programme and areas in detail, see Figure II-2 and II-3.

Figure II-2 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme of SEDEC:

Programme in the North and East (2002)

Relief supplies36%Vocational training

1%

Shelter27%

Relief assistance todetainees and their

families2%

Income generationprogramme

8%

Water and sanitation4%

Educational training20%

Advocacy programme1%

Rehabilitation forphysically disabled

1%Rehabilitation oftrauma victims

0%

Source: Presented by SEDEC, 2002.

82

Figure II-3 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme of SEDEC:

Areas of Emergency Relief Activities to be Implemented (2002)

Mannar15%

Batticaloa5%

Bordervillagers

4%

Trincomalee5%

JaffnaPeninsula

10%

Vanni61%

Source: Presented by SEDEC, 2002.

At the moment, the main activity of SEDEC is the emergency relief activity

in the Wanni area. They are expecting additional funding from abroad, since the Caritas Group’s interests in developed countries towards the relief and rehabilitation assistance is increasing recently. SEDEC mentioned that they were planning to expand their activities and shift the main focus of their activities from ‘emergency relief ’ to ‘rehabilitation, reconstruction and development’, utilizing their good access to the communities, even in the LTTE controlled areas.

83

Chapter III Evaluation of Japanese Assistance 3.1 Review of History and Current Intervention of Japanese Development

Assistance to Sri Lanka

Japan’s economic assistance to Sri Lanka commenced under the Colombo Plan. The first item of economic assistance from Japan to Sri Lanka was a yen-loan of $5 million (¥ 1,800 million), provided as commodity aid under the label of technical cooperation in 1965. The Japanese aid, so commenced, rose to $134 million or by about 27 times in 2000, making Japan one of the major donors of Sri Lanka. From a total of $ 25 million during 1965-69, Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka rose to $ 292 million during 1980-84.

Total Japanese assistance during 1995-99 was $ 1029 million. Looked at from the Japanese side, Sri Lanka is the eighth largest recipient of Japanese aid during the last decade, grants and loans put together. Japanese grant aid, having started in 1969 at $ 0.5 million, also surged at a high rate rising to a total of $268 million during 1995-99. During 1965-2000, Sri Lanka had received a total capital flow of $ 3,133 million from Japan as grants and loans together. The composition and overall trend of the Japanese bilateral aid to Sri Lanka in five-year periods since 1965 are summarized in Table III-1 (see also Figure III-1).

Table III- 1 The Trend and Composition of Japanese ODA to Sri Lanka (Selected

Years from 1965) Rows (2) - (6) : US $ million

Grant Assistance Period Total Grant

Aid Technical

Co-operation

Loans Total Assistance

Grants (%)

Loans (%)

(1) (2)= (3)+(4)

(3) (4) (5) (6)= (2)+(5)

(7)= (2)/(6)

(8)= (5)/(6)

1965-69 0.5 0.5 0 25.00 25.50 1.96 98.041970-74 2.5 2.5 0 44.90 47.40 5.27 94.731975-79 54 54 0 128.20 182.20 29.64 70.361980-84 159.58 136.93 22.65 132.68 292.26 54.60 45.401985-89 355.93 285.69 70.31 358.05 713.98 49.85 50.151990-94 398.51 291.51 107.11 490.69 889.20 44.82 55.181995-99 416.85 267.50 149.35 612.63 1029.48 40.49 59.512000 37.2 n.a. n.a. 96.80 134.00 27.76 72.24Sources: Economic Co-operation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu

Enjo; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Keizaikyoryoku no Genjo to Mondaiten, 1985-2000; Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA in Sri Lanka 2000.

84

Figure III-1 Japanese Assistance to Sri Lanka (1975-2000)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

Year

US

$ M

illio

n Grants

Loans

Total ODA

Source: Economic Co-operation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu


As Figure III-1 shows, Japanese aid to Sri Lanka, despite minor fluctuations, has shown a general upward trend throughout this period. The period since 1977 witnessed a dramatic upsurge in total ODA, both grant and loan assistance, from Japan. This reflects partly the Japanese government response to policy changes in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka commenced its liberalization programme this year. Abandoning the import substitution strategies of the past, the country had embraced an outward-looking or export-oriented strategy of industrialization and development. The increase in aid flow from Japan after 1977 partly reflects the transformations that have taken place in the Japanese economy.

Since 1985, Japan has consistently been the largest donor to Sri Lanka. In the few recent years (e.g. 1999-2001) Japan contributed approximately 57% of all foreign aid Sri Lanka had received, and as much as 74% of all bilateral aid. Table

III-2 clearly shows how Japan has come to dominate the foreign assistance inflows to Sri Lanka.

85

Table III- 2 Relative Position of Japan among Donors of Aid

to Sri Lanka (1997-2001) ( )

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001Grants from Japan as % total bilateral grants 44.3 29.7 44.9 21.5 35.8Grants from Japan as % grants from all sources 32.5 23.9 32.6 17.0 29.5Loans from Japan as % of total bilateral loans 80.8 83.1 71.3 47.2 73.1Loans from Japan as % of loans from all sources 59.8 37.7 32.6 20.6 53.9ODA (grants + loans) from Japan as % of ODA from all bilateral sources

93.1 96.6 79.3 64.2 77.5

ODA (grants + loans) from Japan as % of ODA from all sources

72.9 66.4 67.3 35.9 69.1

Source: External Resources Department of the Treasury, Sri Lanka.

At the time Japan commenced its economic aid program in Sri Lanka, the assistance offered took the form predominantly of loans. Loans maintained their dominance in total assistance offered by Japan to Sri Lanka till about the end of the 1970’s. During 1975-79, the loans proportion was 70% of total ODA (Table III-

3). Maybe because Japan became a major economic and technological power in the world economy by about this time, there was a gradual rise in the grants proportion of Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka after the 1970’s. Till about the middle of the 1990’s, the proportion of grant aid remained around 50% of total ODA. Sri Lanka had gone up from the ‘low income’ to the ‘low-middle income’ category in the World Bank’s country classification during the second half of the 1990’s. The period since then has witnessed a gradual increase again in the proportion of loans in total Japanese ODA. In year 2000, loans have come back to 72% of total. According to the data set maintained by the Department of External Resources of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Finance53 in 2001, the loan proportion has indeed risen to 94% of the total.

53 These data are different from the data obtained from Japanese sources as given in Tables III-1 and

-3. Reconciliation of the two data sets is difficult and not attempted here.

86

Table III- 3 Relative Contribution of Grants and Loans

in Total Japanese ODA to Sri Lanka (1997-2001)

( ) Grants Loans

1965-69 2.0 98.0 1970-74 5.3 94.7 1975-79 29.6 70.4 1980-84 54.6 45.4 1985-89 49.9 50.1 1990-94 44.8 55.2 1995-99 40.5 59.5

2000 27.8 72.2 Sources: Economic Co-operation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu


The post-1977 period in Sri Lanka’s recent history is characterized by strategies of economic liberalization and export-oriented industrialization (EOI). This period has also corresponded with a period of expansion of Japan’s economic assistance to Sri Lanka. EOI strategy required massive investment of capital in order to make the physical infrastructure suitable for EOI development. In particular, improved infrastructure facilities in road transport, sea-ports, airports, communication systems, power and energy, training institutions and so on were a necessary pre-condition for the acceleration of foreign investment in export-oriented industry and also for development of foreign trade. There was thus heavy demand for foreign assistance in Sri Lanka during this period for the construction and upgrading of infrastructure facilities, to which Japan responded. The heavy concentration of Japanese aid to Sri Lanka in physical infrastructure projects can be seen in Table III-4. The flow of official capital from Japan is classified into four groups in this Table; physical infrastructure, social sectors, economic activities/ development and other. This classification has been made without the benefit of detailed information about how the funds involved were actually used. The classification should therefore be treated as nothing but indicative of orders of magnitude.

87

Table III- 4 Foreign Aid from Japan by Purpose (1997-2001)

(US $ million,%) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Physical Infrastructure 223 71.1 202.0 81.0 198 87.5 49.5 73.6 291 83.3Power & Energy 26 8.3 71.6 28.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 45.6 13.0Ports & Shipping 0 0.0 0 0.0 17.6 7.8 49.5 73.6 0 0.0Ground Transport 19.5 6.2 3.2 1.3 36.7 16.3 0 0.0 154 44.1Posts & Telecom. 83.6 26.6 95.7 38.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0Water Supply & Sewerage

94.1 30.0 0 0.0 36.2 16.1 0 0.0 39 11.1

Housing & Urban Development

0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 52.8 15.1

Construction 0 0.0 0 0.0 107 47.3 0 0.0 0 0.0Irrigation 0 0.0 31.2 12.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0

Social Sectors 34.6 11.0 14.8 5.9 8.6 3.8 4.8 7.1 14.8 4.2Education 12.3 3.9 14.5 5.8 8.2 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0Health 11.7 3.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 4.8 7.1 14.8 4.2Cultural 0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0Media 10.6 3.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0

Economic Activities/ Development

56.4 17.9 8.2 3.3 18.5 8.2 13 19.3 43.7 12.5

Agriculture 11.1 3.5 8.2 3.3 6.7 3.0 5.4 8.0 4.8 1.4Fisheries and Aquatics

0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 7.6 11.3 0 0.0

Private sector Development

45.3 14.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 38.9 11.1

Rural Development 0 0.0 0 0.0 11.8 5.2 0 0.0 0 0.0Other 0 0.0 23.8 9.6 0.4 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0

Environment 0 0.0 23.4 9.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0Balance of payments 0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0

Total 314 100 249 100 225 100 67.3 100 350 100Source: External Resources Department of the Treasury, Sri Lanka

Through the mechanism of yen loans, Japan has contributed to the development of infrastructure facilities in Sri Lanka, which were urgently needed for the success of the country’s EOI strategy. Infrastructure projects so supported have mainly been in three sectors; transportation, telecommunications and power and energy. These three sectors alone covered nearly two-thirds of the total yen loans in the post-1977 period. The balance was directed to the improvement of various sectors such as irrigation, agriculture, fishery & forestry, water supply, drainage etc. The yen loans to Sri Lanka that had a diversified structure were important in helping Sri Lanka to achieve the goals of its EOI strategy. Over time since 1977, the volume of loans provided increased and interest rates on these loans fell. The maturity and grace periods pertaining to these yen loans also increased. The relief these developments have provided to the borrowing country, however, was offset to a significant extent by the large appreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the Sri Lanka Rupee during the recent past. However, it should be pointed

88

out that positive wealth redistribution effect on inflation for borrowers countered the negative effects of the appreciation of the yen.

The most popular areas for Japanese grant aid to Sri Lanka, consuming more than three-fourths of the total, were agriculture, education, health and communications. Some of these projects are widely known among, and highly acclaimed by, the people of Sri Lanka. In addition to the large and popular projects, there were large numbers of small-scale assistance schemes undertaken by Japanese grants in Sri Lanka. The examples include (1) the supply of equipment and production inputs for the agricultural sector, (2) improvement of housing for low-income people, (3) poverty alleviation projects and (4) small projects for rehabilitation of irrigation tanks, channels, roads, bridges and rural hospitals. The grant aid programmes have, in addition, covered Technical Co-operation activities – provision of training to Sri Lankans and dispatching of Japanese experts and young volunteers to various parts of Sri Lanka. During 1965-99, Japan has trained 4,640 persons in Sri Lanka and dispatched 3,974 Japanese experts, researchers and volunteers to Sri Lanka.

At the global level too by 1989, Japan became the largest supplier of ODA to developing countries. Even by the end of the 90’s ($10.732 billion in 1998), Japan has retained this largest donor position.

Japanese ODA has been criticized widely for its very high commercial-orientation.

In terms of the share of grants in total ODA (39.6 per cent in 1996/7) Japan was rated the lowest among the 21 DAC member countries. The grant element of total foreign aid provided by Japan was estimated at 78.6% in the same year, also ranking the lowest among the DAC countries.

Japan announced the basic operational principles of its ODA in Japan’s ODA charter in June 1992:

Consideration to humanitarian needs Recognition of inter-dependency Protection of natural environment Support of self-help efforts.

It has also been announced that conditions of democratization and military expenditures of the countries expecting Japanese assistance would be considered in determining suitability to receive assistance. It is pointed out, however, that these principles are too abstract to be adequately effective in guiding ODA funds in the desirable directions.

Of Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka specifically, the official point of view in Japan has been that its assistance programs to Sri Lanka is being guided by the following factors:

The strategic/ geographical importance of the country.

89

Traditional friendship between the two countries. The expectation that the high literacy rate in Sri Lanka enables the country to use aid effectively.

The strong possibility of economic development in Sri Lanka.

However, several criticisms are often made about Japan’s aid policy in Sri Lanka:

Though grant aid is intended to help meet basic needs of the poor, it has tended to help the people in the upper social strata.

Japanese ODA has provided infrastructure facilities to some important establishments but some of these establishments have remained quite under-utililized.

Japan is using its aid to Sri Lanka to create and maintain a stable market for Japanese industrial goods in Sri Lanka. To support the last point, the critics point out that Sri Lanka has had a large

and persistent trade deficit with Japan throughout the period 1965-2000. The cumulative trade deficit of Sri Lanka with Japan for this period exceeded US$ 4 billion. Total ODA to Sri Lanka from Japan during this period was only about a quarter of this cumulative trade deficit.

The prevalence of a dependency frame of mind regarding foreign aid is quite common among elite groups and policy makers, more so perhaps than among the general public. Not only in respect of projects assisted by Japan, but also projects funded by other donors, an often-heard complaint is that Sri Lanka does not make adequate effort for sustainability of aid-created institutions and maintenance of aid-created assets. This is part of the above argument regarding persistent aid dependence. The other part of this argument is that even after nearly 40 years from the setting up of the World Bank led Sri Lanka aid group in 1965, the country remains badly dependent on foreign assistance in its development programmes. In 1997, Sri Lanka went up from the ‘low income’ to the ‘lower middle income’ group in the World Bank classification of countries in the world. At that time, instead of being pleased, policy makers of the country were heard expressing concern that Sri Lanka would henceforth cease to be eligible for concessions in foreign aid open to ‘low income’ countries.

Another major problem in regard to foreign aid in Sri Lanka pertains to its low rate of utilization. During the recent past the rate of foreign aid utilization has been around 15% of total foreign aid commitments. Administrative red tape, inadequacy of counterpart funds and limited manpower skills were behind this poor rate of foreign aid utilization. Performance rates are likely to be even less in the North and East, which were affected by civil war and therefore are found to be suffering from serious absorption capacity problems.

90

3.2 Review of Japanese Assistance in the Area of Peace Building in Sri Lanka

Data do not show any clear sensitivity of Japanese ODA to domestic political conflict in Sri Lanka. The period after the early 70’s witnessed continuing conditions of violent conflict in Sri Lanka, though the severity of prevailing conflict varied from time to time. After the military suppression of the 1971 insurrection, relative peace prevailed till about the mid-80’s though during the intervening period there were also incidents of violent conflict – e.g. the ethnic riots of 1978. The country moved into a period of almost continuous violence, particularly in the North and East of Sri Lanka, but with repercussions also elsewhere, after the mid-80’s. During this entire period of violence, however, Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka continued in high gear and in fact increased in volume as noted above. Despite minor fluctuations, Japanese aid inflow increased most rapidly since the mid-1980s, corresponding with the period of escalating separatist violence. The aid from Japan during this entire period was confined mainly to projects in areas other than the North and East. The exceptions were a few very small projects operative in the conflict zones, although, because of extensive war activities, these areas remained in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The general tendency among donor countries to treat areas in conflict to be outside the scope of development assistance produced this result even in the case of Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka.

A few small projects to be implemented in the North and East of Sri Lanka received Japanese assistance over the last few years. Table III-5 indicates the several such ‘grassroots projects’ assisted by grant assistance. Table III-6 provides the list of projects in the North and East assisted by the Japanese through grants, loans aid and 2KR schemes. Table III-7 sets out projects, which were implemented in these regions by Japanese funds channeled through multilateral institutions.

91

Table III- 5 Japanese Grant Assistance for ‘Grassroots Project’

in the North and East

Year Project Implementing agencies

Amount (US$)

1995 Provision of vehicles for the use of mobile clinic service in Batticaloa

Medicine Sans Frontiers

84,000

2000 Rehabilitation of the surgical unit of the Batticaloa General Hospital

Medicine Sans Frontiers

86,000

1998 Installation of computers for the Jaffna University

Jaffna University 47,000

1999 Developing rural communities in Trincomalee

Sewa Lanka Foundation

71,000

2001 Upgrading welfare centers in Batticaloa ZOA Refugee Care, Netherlands

33,556

2001 Construction of five new community centers for the displaced people

JCCP 45,679

2002 Promotion of peace building through newspaper campaigns

Sri Lanka First 56,007

2002 Promotion of peace building through publication of newsletters and books

National Peace Council of Sri Lanka

29,892

2002 Developing 30 villages on 5R Strategy in 4 Northern districts (Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mannar and Vavuniya)

Sarvodaya Movement

42,880

2002 Re-vitalization of rural economy by rehabilitating irrigation tanks using locally available resources in Trincomalee District

Sewa Lanka Foundation

55,939

2002 Promotion of peace building through greeting cards campaign during the Sinhala and Tamil New Year period 2000

People’s Peace Front

3,798

2002 Promotion of peace through an awareness programme during Poson Poya 2002 in Mihintale

People’s Peace Front

4,110

Source: Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka

92

Table III- 6 Japanese Assistance in the North and East by Grant Aid,

Loan Aid and 2KR Schemes Year Project Implementing agencies Amount

1993,1996 1999, 2000

Improvement of housing for low-income people in Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Ampara and Trincomalee (Grant Aid)

National Housing Development Authority

JY 177 mil

2000 Improvement of the National Blood Transfusion Services (Loan aid)

JBIC JY 1,508 mil

1994/1995 Agriculture assistance for the families affected by disturbance in the North and East (2KR)

Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Social Welfare under Sarvodaya Movement

Rs. 25,160,000

1995/1996 Strengthening of Wan Ela Tank in Trincomalee District (Kantale) (2KR)

Ministry of Irrigation and Energy

Rs. 16,000,000

1995/1996 Provision of fishing facilities to the people living below poverty level (2KR)

Department of Fisheries

Rs. 450,000

1995/1996 Onion cultivation in Vavuniya District and Chilly cultivation (2KR)

North East Provincial Council

Rs. 1,340,000

1995/1996 Establishment of farmers organization (2KR)


Rs. 8,030,000

1995/1996 Dairy development through co-operatives (2KR)


Rs. 13,600,000

1999-2002 Fishing community self-help housing investment (2KR)

Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development

Rs. 375,000,000


Table III- 7 Japanese Assistance through Multilateral Donor Agencies Year Project Implementing

agencies Amount

(US$)1997-2002 Provision of medicine and medical equipment

for the whole country including the North and East

UNFPA 28,512,450

2000-2002 Provision of accommodation and relief to IDPs for human security

UNHCR 4,600,000

2000-2002 Human security, medical care, livelihood and emergency humanitarian assistance for victims of the armed conflict

ICRC 1,128,000

2002 UNHCR programme in South Asia Sub-region, which includes Sri Lanka, human security and other UNHCR activities

UNHCR 2,400,000

2002 Food security for IDPs World Food Programme

1,100,000


93

Taking information in all these three Tables together we can arrive at the following conclusions:

Relatively to other Japanese-funded ODA projects, those in the North and East have been small in size. From mid-1990’s to 2002, 26 such projects were recorded but they involved a total of less than $25 million. Total Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka during 1995-2000 was in excess of $ 1150 million.

Except for one or two isolated projects, all these have been in the so called ‘Cleared Areas’. Outreach to so called ‘Uncleared Areas’ is seen only from 2002.

Part of Japanese assistance to the North and East came as contributions for UN and other multilateral agency-sponsored projects. No Japanese governmental agency or Japanese NGO was operating in these regions.

All ‘grassroots projects’ supported have been implemented through NGO intermediaries.

Bulk of grants given to various public agencies to be used in the North and East came from 2KR funds. Japanese authorities have shown lack of concern or have been indifferent

about violent domestic political conflict in the delivery of aid to developing countries for many reasons. The Japanese authorities have strongly believed that giving and receiving of foreign aid is a government-to-government affair. The government of Sri Lanka did not have the capacity to implement development projects in the North and East of the country because of conditions of violent conflict there. No requests were made, therefore, for aid funds to implement projects in these regions. According to accepted principles and practices of foreign aid, the Japanese authorities did not have mechanisms to provide assistance to areas of conflict, working independently of the recipient country’s government. In any case, projects in conflict areas would have appeared in the eyes of Japanese authorities as projects of low implementation potential and therefore, of low priority rating. Things were made worse as there were no Japanese NGOs working in the North and East of Sri Lanka under conflict conditions with funding from the Japanese government54.

There is also another aspect to this problem. Like other donor countries, Japan also depends on the World Bank and IMF reviews of policy in deciding whether policies adopted in a country like Sri Lanka are sound and whether the funds made available for development work are efficiently used. It was only

54 There were several Japanese NGOs working in the South and West, however, none in the area of

conflict-resolution, prevention and humanitarian relief, until JCCP opened its office in Sri Lanka in 2001.It can be said that, for the NGOs working in the South and West, it was difficult to expand their community development activities in the North and East due to the travel ban imposed by the Japanese Government in view of protecting her nationals.

94

recently that these international institutions (at least the World Bank) started showing some active interest in political conflict as a factor in development. Prior to the time when this interest in political conflict had developed, the international development advice, in respect of Sri Lanka, was that the policies of liberalization adopted in from the late 1970’s, were the recipe for successful development. Rapid development, achieved through such ‘market friendly’ policies, was seen as the solution also to growing social conflicts. Rapid increase in Japanese assistance from the early 1980’s may be viewed as a positive response to such thinking, as Sri Lanka was moving strongly forward in its programme of liberalization at this time. Also important is the fact that from this time onwards, there was a sharp increase in demand for imports and Japan has been the source of an important share of these imports.

One sees important changes in Japanese attitudes in regard to the question of inter-relationships among development, violent conflict and conflict resolution. In fact, attitudinal changes could also be seen on the Sri Lankan side. A branch office of the newly established ‘Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP)’ was opened in Colombo in 2001. Overtures have been made about the interest of the Japanese government to play a proactive role in the resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict. On Sri Lankan side, there were the important political changes since 2001 and the commencement of the currently on-going peace process. Unlike in the past, when the Sri Lankan government itself was not ready to involve itself in any significant way in humanitarian work in the North and East, during the current peace process the government has shown willingness to provide humanitarian assistance to war-affected people in these regions. It has furthermore indicated its preparedness to undertake the following simultaneously – negotiations for a permanent settlement, humanitarian assistance to people affected and long term development. On the peace front, Sri Lanka’s current approach is to adopt a step-by-step approach and to negotiate for a political solution after or along with a process of confidence building and search for resources to reconstruct war-torn areas. Along with other countries and institutions in the donor community, the biggest donor to Sri Lanka, Japan, also has expressed its willingness through various ways to participate in this complex exercise. The government of Sri Lanka appears to place greater hope on Japanese assistance than on assistance from other quarters as traditionally, Japan was its main benefactor.

Thus from mid-2002, Japan began to consider contributing to the peace building process in Sri Lanka. Soon, Japan will formulate an economic development programme that aims to bring benefits of the peace process to the entire people in Sri Lanka. The details of the package were discussed when the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka visited Japan in early December 2002. Japan has

95

appointed a special envoy, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to help Sri Lanka in peace negotiations. He has visited Sri Lanka and also participated in the Oslo conference. The Japanese government is expected to host a major donor conference in Tokyo in 2003 and to provide a venue for GOSL to conduct one session of its negotiations with the LTTE.

After several ceasefire agreements and aborted peace negotiations between the warring parties – the GOSL and the Tamil rebels, the LTTE – there is today a cease-fire agreement that has held for one full year. There are clearly significant problems in the peace process but the majority of people are hopeful of a permanent return of peace to their conflict-ridden island nation.

3.3 Japanese NGOs: Future Tasks of Assistance in Conflict Affected Areas

Japan is Sri Lanka’s largest donor country and a very important trading partner for the island nation. Given this, one would expect a fair deal of exchange among Japanese NGOs and civil society in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately this is not quite the case, especially when it comes to activities in the conflict affected areas in the North and East. It is pertinent to ask why this is the case.

Today there are many Japan-Sri Lanka civil society exchanges initiated largely through individuals and institutions associated with Buddhist organisations in the two nations. These were almost invariably activities pioneered by individual persons (often Buddhist monks) who have visited, mostly from Sri Lanka to Japan, and also occasionally from Japan to Sri Lanka. Many well-known Sri Lankan civil society links with Japan have been pioneered by persons (often Buddhist monks) who have lived in Japan, learnt the Japanese language and befriended Japanese philanthropists and/or religious leaders. Learning Japanese language has been established well since about the 70’s in “Sinhala”-majority areas of Sri Lanka. No educational institute in the North and East is known to be teaching the Japanese language. Another apparently important fact is that among the number of people of Sri Lankan origin working and living in Japan, officially or unofficially, the proportion of Tamil-Hindu persons is much smaller than their proportion in the Sri Lankan population. This is in sharp contrast to populations of Sri Lankan origin in Europe and North America. These are some reasons as to why no significant Japanese civil society links developed involving people and institution in the North and East of Sri Lanka. The religious composition of these regions – being largely Hindu and Muslim – was no doubt a factor but as noted, it is more than a purely religious matter.

Whatever the reasons, the areas in the North and East fell largely outside the purview of the mental maps of Japanese civil society institutions. Many are

96

the links between Sri Lankan religious and other civil society institutions and Japanese religious organizations. These links have not extended to areas of conflict. The image of Sri Lanka as a Buddhist country also has perhaps colored other civil society exchanges. Most of the exchanges are of small scale, with the Japanese side being responsible for either project funding or the exchange of human resources for some specific charitable work.

There are today no Japanese NGOs with a permanent programme in the conflict affected areas of the North and East, except for JCCP, which has been working in collaboration with a local NGO, Sewa Lanka, in these areas over the past few years. JCCP is a member of the CHA. Just recently, another Japanese NGO, Bridge Asia Japan, has established an office in Colombo, with a view toward assisting in reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation activities in the North and East.

One other development NGO, which has a nine-year presence in Sri Lanka, is Tools for Self Reliance (TFSR) Japan, working with local counterparts like the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) Sri Lanka, the Matale Heritage Centre and several community based organisations. TFSR Japan sends tools and provides grassroots technological assistance to village communities to foster self-reliance in energy, water, soil, food processing, appropriate technology education, metal work and carpentry work. The organization has some experience in working in the border villages in the South-East (Moneragala), in the South (Embilipitiya, Hambantota) and in other deprived areas of the country.

Although it has not worked in the North and East as yet, a proposal has been drafted for doing just that, with a flagship project on Rehabilitating the Victims of Armed Conflict (ROVAC), possibly in partnership with a British NGO. Possibilities of taking its technical expertise in the fields described earlier to the North and East as part of the RRR Programme are also being discussed.

Considering the delicate nature of the current fifth peace process in Sri Lanka, civil society exchanges and ‘Track-2’ diplomacy between Japan and Sri Lanka would certainly be welcome. Stressing the absence of arms manufacture and its unique Peace Constitution (especially Article 9), which renounces war forever, Japanese NGOs could be a strong force supporting the peace initiatives in the North and East. Therefore, it is suggested that a Sri Lanka NGO Platform be created, with information and project finance support extended to interested Japanese NGOs. Using this platform, their participation in the CHA should also be encouraged. The nature and function of such a platform can be discussed, particularly in regard to its role in Japan and in Sri Lanka.

Through a diverse range of NGOs participating constructively in peace building and RRR projects in the North and East of Sri Lanka, Japan’s ‘Track-2’ diplomacy could also come of age, ushering in a great deal of trust and goodwill

97

among the peoples of the two nations. The year 2002 is the 50th anniversary of diplomatic exchanges between Japan and Sri Lanka. These relations commenced after the Peace Conference in San Francisco in 1952. At this historic conference, Sri Lanka refused war reparations and advocated that Japan be allowed immediate re-entry into the international community. Considering this, one could not ask for a more propitious timing than the present for strengthening civil society exchanges between the two countries in the cause of amity, peace and development.

98

Chapter IV Peace Processes Past and Present, and the Challenge of Reconstruction and Development

The current peace process represents the fifth major attempt to find a lasting political solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict since it turned into civil war in 1983. Facilitated by Norway and regarded by many observers and analysts as promising and productive, the peace process began with the signing of the CFA by the GOSL and the LTTE on 22 February 2002. This chapter begins with a brief review of the past attempts since 1985 to find solutions and proceeds to analyze progress of the on-going process up to December 2002. The main focus of the analysis will be the achievements, the sustainability of the process itself and the challenge of reconstruction and development of the war-torn North and East. 4.1 Review of Past Peace Initiatives and Processes55

The past attempts to find a political solution to the Sri Lankan conflict are best described as journeys on a rocky road, a series of ups and downs with hopes raised and then dashed. The landmarks in this regard may be listed as follows:

The Thimpu Talks, 1985 The Indo-Lanka Accord, 1987 The Premadasa-LTTE Talks, 1989-90 The Kumaratunge-LTTE Talks, 1994-95

(1) The Thimpu Talks and the Delhi Accord (1985)

In July 1985, under the auspices of the Government of India, a GOSL delegation met with a group representing the different Tamil liberation organizations in Thimpu, Bhutan. The Tamil delegates were from the Ealam National Liberation Front (ENLF), a newly formed alliance comprising the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamil Liberation Organization (TELO), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Eelam Revolutionary Organizations of Students (EROS), the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam(PLOTE) and Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). Prior to the Thimpu Talks, President Jayawardena met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi in June for the first time. This was soon followed by a visit to Colombo by India’s Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari. Under India’s

55 The review presented here draws on the following sources in addition to the author’s own

knowledge of the past peace initiatives and processes: Loganathan (1996), Swarmy (2002), Silva and Peiris (2002).

99

pressure, the GOSL and the Tamil militant groups announced a cessation of hostilities on 18 June.

Initially, of the Tamil organizations, only the TULF and PLOTE were the most willing to participate in the Thimpu Talks. The other groups (which have formed the ENLF) agreed after much coaxing by New Delhi. The Indian initiative came after the collapse of an all-party conference held in Colombo in 1984 and in which the TULF represented the Tamils. India’s move was motivated by a desire to bring the militant organizations to the negotiating table. Further, the Indian government under Rajiv Gandhi was keen to improve relations with the GOSL. The relations had been strained during the time of his predecessor and mother Mrs. Gandhi as Colombo was unhappy with the Indian government’s support in the form of military training and other facilities to Tamil militant groups. Now Delhi was sending signals to Colombo that it was eager to see an end to the armed conflict and that it was prepared to play honest broker to workout a political settlement within a united Sri Lanka. India was also concerned that the separatist war in Sri Lanka and the political activities of the Sri Lankan Tamil militants in India might contribute to a revival of separatism in Tamil Nadu. This concern was a major motivating factor for India to mediate a settlement of the Sri Lankan conflict without a division of the country.

Two rounds of talks took place in Thimpu in July and August 1985. In the first round, which lasted six days, the Tamil delegation put forward a set of four demands, which have come to be known as the Thimpu Principles, as basic conditions for talks:

Recognition of the Tamils as a distinct nationality; Recognition of the right of the Tamils to an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity;

Recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their home.

The leader of the GOSL delegation (a lawyer by profession and brother of

President Jayawardena) replied that the first three principles were unacceptable if they were to be taken at their face value and given the accepted legal meaning. He stated that they must be rejected for the reason that they constituted a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. However, he observed that there was room for a fruitful exchange of views if the principles were given a meaning and construction that did not entail the creation of a separate state. On the fourth demand, he said that the GOSL did not acknowledge the right of any of the Tamil delegates to negotiate on behalf of all Tamils living in Sri Lanka. He pointed out that the ‘Tamils of recent Indian origin’ had their own

100

representatives. He said that the GOSL could only offer a solution within the existing constitution of Sri Lanka, which meant that the government could not go beyond devolution through the district council system. The Tamils first wanted the four principles to be recognized. The first round of talks did not go very far and there were hardly any signs of the two sides finding any common ground although they agreed to meet again.

Clashes broke out between the SLA and Tamil militants in Jaffna (Valvettiturai) on July 20th. There were several incidents of bomb attacks although the ceasefire was not totally abandoned by the warring parties at this stage. However, violence escalated as the second round of talks commenced on August 12th. The Tamil delegates staged a walkout, a few days after the talks began, saying that the SLA was continuing to attack the Tamil people. They alleged that the army was committing acts of genocide. New Delhi tried hard to get the talks going. The LTTE withdrew from the talks while the other groups reduced the size of their delegations. But the Thimpu exercise had actually collapsed even before the second round of talks began. It was undertaken at the behest of India without proper preparation and confidence building. The ceasefire also ended as the talks broke down.

However, India continued its diplomatic efforts with the GOSL and persuaded the latter to agree to a framework of devolution based on provincial councils. This framework, which came to be known as the Delhi Accord of 1985, was the brainchild of the Indian government. It provided for a wider devolution of power to provincial units. The GOSL accepted it with reluctance but the Tamil militants did not. The TULF, which was initially positive towards the Accord, withdrew its support under pressure from the militants. Even though it failed to see the light of day, the Delhi Accord served the purpose of putting provincial (as opposed to district) devolution on the agenda of future peace initiatives. As for the Tamil liberation organizations, they continued to enjoy the patronage of the Tamilnadu government and the support of considerable sections of the country’s Tamil population. RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) continued to supply arms to the different militant groups. However, Delhi reacted to the defiance of the Tamil militants by ordering the immediate deportation of LTTE’s theoretician Balasingham, TELO’s delegate Satyendra and Chandrahasan, a pro-TELO activist who was doing humanitarian work, among Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. In the North and East of Sri Lanka, clashes continued between the SLA and Tamil militants. Increasing number Tamil and Sinhala civilians were being massacred.

The Thimpu fiasco exposed the fact that the protagonists were not yet ready

for peace talks. It also exposed India’s dilemma created by its own dual approach of playing patron to the different groups of Tamil militants and wanting to be a

101

mediator between them and the GOSL at the same time. However, the Tamil militant organizations gained recognition and political legitimacy by participating in the Thimpu talks.

(2) The Indo-Lanka Accord (1987)

Much blood had been shed and many lives were lost between the abortive Thimpu talks of 1985 and the Indo-Lanka Accord signed by Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and Sri Lankan President, J.R.Jayawardena on 29 July 1987. In its quest for supremacy the LTTE had wiped out the top leadership of TELO and many of its cadres. PLOTE was badly weakened to the extent of virtual paralysis by internal turmoil and purges. The LTTE had expanded in military strength and become the most dominant force on the battlefield. EROS and EPRLF were still active but militarily far inferior to the LTTE and threatened by it. The ENLF had ceased to function and the unarmed TULF was further marginalized as the conflict had become completely militarized and the war had escalated along with internecine clashes between militant groups.

India, as noted above, was continuing its efforts even after the failure of the Thimpu Talks. Some of the basic elements of the Indo-Lanka Accord were already agreed upon between the two governments, the acceptance of the province as the unit of devolution by the GOSL being the most important among them. However, the period preceding the ceremonial signing of the Accord had its dramas. The first one was a face to face meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Prabhakaran in Bangalore in November 1986 in the presence of the Tamilnadu Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran (regarded as the chief patron of the LTTE at that time). Ramachandran had persuaded Prabhakaran (who was living in Chennai) to meet the Indian P.M. in Bangalore. Prabhakaran, who was not happy with the devolution package proposed by Gandhi, returned to Chennai and soon moved back to Jaffna. The GOSL chose this moment to launch a major offensive to capture Jaffna. However, contrary to GOSL’s expectations, India not only increased its material support to Tamil militant organizations but also took the most dramatic step of ‘food drop’ on the Jaffna peninsula by its air force planes – an act that violated Sri Lanka’s air space and sent a powerful message to the GOSL to stop the offensive and agree to India’s proposals for a new peace process. India also had to resort to a lot of arm-twisting of the LTTE to have the proposals accepted.

The Indo-Lanka Accord’s basic premises included the following key clauses: The preservation of the unity, sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka (Clause 1.1).

The nurturing of the distinct cultural and linguistic identity of each ethnic group (Clause 1.3) within the framework of a multi-ethnic and a multi-

102

lingual plural society (Clause 1.2), where all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfill their aspirations (Clause 1.5).

The recognition of the North and East Provinces as ‘areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples’ (Clause 1.4).

A significant feature of the Accord was that the ‘temporary’ merger of the North and East Provinces to form a single administrative unit with one elected Provincial Council, one Governor, a Chief Minister and a Board of Ministers. The future of the temporary merger was to be decided after a referendum at the end of one year. Under the terms of the Accord, the Government of India was to underwrite and guarantee the resolutions and cooperate in the implementation of the proposals which included the surrendering of arms by the Tamil militant groups and the confinement of the Sri Lankan security forces to the barracks (Clause 2.14). An ‘Indian Peace keeping Contingent’ – which came to be known as the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) – was to be set up to ensure the surrender of weapons by the militants, the return of the Sri Lankan troops to barracks and to maintain the peace.

The LTTE leadership was not happy with the Accord. Before the signing of the Accord, Prabhakaran was flown to New Delhi where he was asked by the Indian Prime Minister and government officials to accept the Accord. He showed his resentment and was still ‘in virtual custody’ at Ashok Hotel in Delhi when the signing ceremony took place in Colombo56. However, the Tamil people greeted the news of the Accord with great excitement, which turned into mass euphoria when the IPKF arrived in the North and East. The Indian army was welcomed with garlands and bouquets by masses of Tamil people who believed that ‘Mother India’ had finally come to liberate and save them. Cessation of hostilities began on July 31 and the militants were expected to hand over their weapons within 72 hours from the commencement of the ceasefire, i.e. by August 3.

However, while the Tamil public was in a state of euphoria, things were not working out as expected as far as the implementation of the Accord was concerned. In Jaffna, LTTE leaders were angered by the captivity of their leader in New Delhi. They organized protest marches and sit-ins in different parts of the peninsula demanding the release of Prabhakaran. The expected arms surrender did not materialize. LTTE’s Jaffna commander Kumarappa told the IPKF chief in Jaffna that the Tigers would never hand over any weapon unless their leader personally came and instructed them to do so. Prabhakaran was flown back to Jaffna on August 2nd. On August 4th, he addressed a crowd of over 50,000 people at

56 For a vivid account of the events around the Indo-Lanka Accord and history of the LTTE, see

Swamy (2002) op.cit.

103

the Suthumalai Amman temple grounds. He made it clear to the audience that he had to accept the Accord because ‘a great power has decided to determine our political fate in a manner that is essentially beyond our control 57 ’. He also announced that the Tigers would surrender weapons as required by the Accord. The Tigers surrendered only two vanloads of arms. The other groups also handed over some of their weapons.

In the South, the Accord was rejected by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and other Sinhala nationalist parties. Street protests in Colombo against the Accord turned violent leaving 38 people dead and several state-owned buses damaged. The SLFP accused the government of betrayal and turning the island into a dependency of India. The JVP campaigned virulently against the Accord and aroused anti-Indian sentiments that were evident among sections of the armed forces. A Sinhala naval rating attacked Rajiv Gandhi with his rifle while the Indian Prime Minister was inspecting a guard of honor. The Indian government, however, went ahead with the agreed plan to implement the Accord, which included the establishment of an interim administration for the merged North and East province until the elections for the Provincial Council to be held before the end of 1987.

An Interim Advisory Council of 12 members was to be set up to administer the two provinces. India had earlier promised the Tamil parties that equal representation would be granted to all groups in the interim council. The LTTE was not happy with equal representation and demanded a larger share. While this issue remained unsettled, Thileepan, LTTE’s political leader for Jaffna, went on an indefinite hunger strike. He accused the IPKF of collaborating with the Sri Lankan government in Sinhala colonization of Tamil areas and condemned the Accord and India. The Thileepan fast was a major political event staged by the LTTE. On September 26, the Indian Ambassador Dixit flew to Jaffna and informed Prabhakaran that the LTTE would have seven of the 12 seats in the interim council. Prabhakaran accepted the offer but did not stop Thileepan’s fast. Thileepan died and his death caused an emotional wave of anti-Indian feelings in Jaffna.

Of the remaining five seats in the interim council two were to be allocated for the TULF, two for GOSL and one for a representative of the Muslim community who was to be nominated by the GOSL. The Interim Council was to be headed by an Administrator, also to be nominated by the LTTE. The LTTE submitted two lists to President Jayawardena, one for the selection of the seven Interim Council members and the other for selecting the Administrator, and the President made his choice. The LTTE was dissatisfied with the President’s choice of Administrator, 57 Swamy (2002) op.cit.

104

C.V.K. Sivagnanam, the former Municipal Commissioner of Jaffna, and also wished to have two of the Interim Council members replaced. The LTTE wanted the President to choose N. Pathmanathan – a civil servant who had just been released after 45 months of detention under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The President refused to replace Sivgnanam with Pathmanathan. The LTTE asked Sivagnanam to refuse to accept the post and he did so in writing.

The peace process was turning to be less peaceful due to sporadic armed clashes. These clashes involved the LTTE and other Tamil groups. There were also incidents in which the SLA was involved. The LTTE was more openly showing its hostility towards the IPKF. It warned the Tamils not to have close contacts with the Indian army. Trouble broke out when the Sri Lankan navy intercepted two trawlers carrying arms and ammunition and arrested 17 Tigers on board on October 5. Among those arrested were Kumarappa and Pulendran, the Tiger commanders for Jaffna and Trincomalee respectively. The LTTE accused the government of violating the Accord and demanded the release of its men. The government refused and decided to take the prisoners to Colombo. The LTTE demanded that they should not be taken to Colombo. The Indian Ambassador appealed to President Jayawardena and Defence Minister Athulathmudali not to take the 17 men to Colombo. This was turned down. The 17 Tigers bit their cyanide capsules. Twelve of them including Kumarappa and Pulendran died although all 17 were rushed to a nearby hospital run by the IPKF. The peace process had no chance of survival after this. A showdown between the LTTE and IPKF became unavoidable.

As the IPKF and the LTTE were locked in war, a Provincial Council was formed with Varatharaja Perumal of the EPRLF as Chief Minister in December 1988. Elections to the Council were held only in parts of the East (and not in the North) and even those were under highly questionable conditions. The Council had a board of ministers and an office in Trincomalee. In the meantime, the LTTE was evicted from Jaffna by the IPKF. The civilian toll was rising in the North and East. The EPRLF hastily conscripted a Tamil National Army (TNA) with the assistance of the Research analysis Wing (RAW). The TNA was no match to the LTTE which crushed it without much difficulty and took away most of the arms supplied to the TNA by India. The LTTE was inflicting heavy losses on the IPKF. The EPRLF-led Provincial Council’s days were numbered. The election of R. Premadasa as President was advantageous to the LTTE. Premadasa wanted the IPKF out of Sri Lanka. He ordered the SLA to supply weapons to the LTTE with which he had found a common cause against the IPKF. In December 1989, the Congress government led by Gandhi lost power to the National Front led by V. P. Singh. The National Front had pledged in its election campaign to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka. It implemented the pledge and by June 1989 the IPKF had

105

completely withdrawn. The new government in Delhi also wanted the North and East Provincial Council dissolved. However, the Provincial Council collapsed soon after the IPKF left but with a last minute drama of defiance staged by the Chief Minister who made a unilateral declaration of an independent Tamil Eelam. Apparently, the Indian embassy was taken by surprise. The Chief Minister and a few others were flown to India in an Indian air force plane. By then Premadasa had already begun talks with the LTTE. Thus ended the saga of the Indo-Lanka Accord.

Loganathan, a former spokesman and theoretician of the EPRLF and currently a researcher and commentator on the ethnic question and peace processes, and Ropers sum up the lessons of the Indo-Lanka Accord phase as follows58:

While there were discussions on substantive issues, the process itself excluded the direct participation of the Tamil organizations. The crucial factor is that the LTTE and other Tamil organizations were not co-signatories to the peace accord.

Matters relating to structure was left to be legislated (i.e. the 13th Amendment) after the signing of the agreement between Delhi and Colombo. The process itself relied heavily on ‘proximity talks’ and not direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict.

The third party involvement (i.e. India) was viewed with suspicion by GOSL as well as the LTTE, whilst both sought to utilize it to their own advantage. In the process India failed to gain the confidence of both parties and inevitably became embroiled as the third party to the conflict.

(3) The Premadasa-LTTE Talks (1989-90) and the Moonesinghe Committee

(1991-93) The Premadasa government opened a dialogue with the LTTE in April 1989.

By inviting only the LTTE for talks, the President indirectly recognized it as the Tamil party that really mattered. LTTE leaders were flown to Colombo to talk to the President and senior members of the Cabinet, led by Foreign Minister A.C.S. Hameed, an experienced Muslim political leader from the Central Province who had maintained a personal communication channel with the LTTE. Anton Balasingham led the LTTE team. The government also closed down strategic army camps in the North, in Thondaimannar, Velvettithurai and Point Pedro, at the request of the LTTE. The government, it appeared, was going a long way to placate the LTTE. However, there was no clear agenda for the talks. The withdrawal of the IPKF and dissolution of the North and East Provincial Council

58 See Loganathan and Ropers (2002).

106

dominated the talks in the early stages. An agreement was reached on cessation of hostilities from April. Talks went on for nearly 14 months at varying intervals before they ended without any positive results. The ceasefire was broken many times and armed conflict resumed. In the first two weeks of June, the LTTE had attacked 20 police stations and 18 army camps in the North and East. the civilian casualties were also high.

The underlying reasons for the breakdown of the peace talks are not so clear. However, it would seem that the merger of the North and East and the extent of devolution the government was willing to grant were among the main contentious issues. This was the first time the two protagonists had direct talks. In hindsight, it can be said that there was insufficient preparation and the two parties were not able to find some common grounds beyond their shared opposition to the Indo-Lanka Accord and the IPKF. Further, Loganathan and Ropers (2002) note that the negotiations were of a covert nature based on short-term interests.

After the breakdown of the talks and as the war continued, President Premadasa initiated a new series of discussions with Tamil parties represented in parliament and some other non-LTTE groups. A parliamentary select committee chaired by Mangala Moonesinghe M.P. carried out this task. That committee worked within the premises of the 13th Amendment of the 1978 constitution. The select committee was unable to achieve much although its proceedings went on from 1991 through 1993. Here again the two main Sinhalese parties, UNP and SLFP, did not agree to the demand of the Tamil parties for a permanent merger of the North and East provinces into one predominantly Tamil speaking province.

President Premadasa paid with his life in a bomb blast, where 23 civilians died and 52 were injured, presumably carried out by a suicide bomber of the LTTE on 1st May 1993. Premadasa’s death was reminiscent of Indian Prime Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in May 1991 in a bomb blast carried out by a female LTTE suicide bomber in southern India. (4) The Kumaratunga- LTTE Talks (1994-95)

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga became President of Sri Lanka in August 1994 and embarked on the fourth Peace Process. She had just won the presidential election with an unprecedented majority on a promise to bring lasting peace and to put an end to the violations of human rights going on under the previous regime. Some of her election campaigners spent considerable time explaining concepts such as federalism and devolution to the Sinhalese people. The majority of the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim voters chose her. In fact, she gained the overwhelming support of the Tamil voters. The LTTE had favoured Kumaratunga against the UNP candidate Srima Dissanayake, the widow of

107

Gamini Dissanayake, whose place she took after he was killed along with several others by a suicide bomber who blew herself up at one of his election rallies. The TULF actively campaigned for Kumaratunga. Her victory raised people’s expectations all over the country. In the North and East, there was euphoria again and the newly elected President was very popular. In the South, the peace initiative enjoyed widespread support among the Sinhalese people. It appeared that the situation was ideal to find a negotiated settlement. The fourth peace process began with a lot of promise.

Relaxing a transport embargo on 28 essential items to the North, the President offered to have unconditional talks with the LTTE in the same month which was welcomed by the LTTE. The President and Prabhakaran had exchanged a series of letters regarding various aspects that required careful consideration. When the helicopter carrying the GOSL delegation landed in Jaffna on 13th October 1994, people flocked in their thousands to welcome the delegates. Lionel Fernando, a former governor of Jaffna and a member of the delegation, described the enthusiasm displayed by the people as ‘absolute euphoria’. The GOSL delegation was led by Balapatabendi, Secretary to the President. The other members were Navin Gunaratne (an architect in the private sector) and Rajan Aseerwatham (an accountant who was newly appointed as Chairman, Bank of Ceylon). There were no senior ministers or politicians in this delegation and none of the delegates had any known previous experience in political negotiations of the kind they were expected to conduct. The LTTE delegation was led by Karikalan, a senior leader of the organization from the East. He was assisted by Thamilchelvan, who later became the head of the LTTE’s political wing.

After two rounds of preliminary talks, a declaration of cessation of hostilities was signed between the GOSL and the LTTE on 5 January 1995. Among the items agreed upon by the two parties after much deliberation were the following:

The LTTE and the security forces of the GOSL would maintain their positions on the ground, keeping a minimum of 600 meters between each other.

The Sri Lankan Navy and Air Force would not cause any obstruction to legitimate and bona fide fishing in specified areas.

At the outset, there was a fundamental difference between the two sides on

the issues to be addressed first. The LTTE wanted normalization as a prerequisite for negotiations on substantive political issues. They wanted the economic embargo and other restrictions removed in order to normalize the day-to-day life of the people. The GOSL wanted substantive or core issues to be taken up first. This difference in the approaches of the two sides in setting the agenda for the talks remained unresolved and was a major source of tension between them throughout the negotiations. We shall return to this point later.

108

At the next round of talks on 14th January 1995, the LTTE demanded the withdrawal of the army camp at Pooneryn and the opening of the land route between the Jaffna peninsula and the mainland through Sangupiddy. The GOSL agreed to readjust the forward defence lines of the Pooneryn Camp by moving them back 600 meters. On 15 January, Thamilchelvan made the following demands of the GOSL:

LTTE cadres should be allowed to carry arms in the Eastern Province; LTTE cadres should not be subject to checks and screening at various road checkpoints;

Lifting of the economic embargo imposed by the GOSL; Permit fishing activities without hindrance in the Eastern Province.

The LTTE would not accept the establishment of Peace Committees until the mobility of their armed cadres and movement in coastal waters and the issue of fishing rights were agreed upon. The Kumaratunga government agreed to relax the embargo on all essential items to the North and East Provinces, remove restrictions on fishing except within a two-mile radius of a GOSL security camp, move back the forward defense lines of the camps at Elephant Pass and Sangupiddy and open the roads linking the Jaffna peninsula to the mainland to traffic. However, the LTTE said that the government was not able to implement any of these because the Sri Lankan military was against those steps.

The Peace Process ended on 19 April 1995 with an LTTE attack on two naval gunboats in Trincomalee harbor. The reasons cited by Prabhakaran in a notice to Kumaratunga, dated 18 April 1995, were:

Government’s failure to remove the Pooneryn Army Camp; Government’s refusal to allow LTTE cadres freedom of movement in the Eastern Province carrying arms;

Government’s failure to relax all restrictions on fishing, alleged to have been pledged in a letter from Kumaratunga to Prabhakaran.

The ceasefire was over and the country was back into war again after four

rounds of peace talks, which had led not to better understanding but to increased bitterness between the PA government and the LTTE. The government and LTTE accused each other for the collapse of the peace process. The President launched a ‘war for peace’, which kept escalating. Both parties expanded their arsenals with newly purchased weapons. The government recaptured Jaffna from the LTTE in December 1995. Then it launched a major operation to open the A9 highway to Jaffna. This turned out to be disastrous for the SLA. The war, however, continued and it seemed that the government was going for the military option at any cost.

109

On the other hand, the government also began a rehabilitation and reconstruction program in the areas under its control – in the ‘Cleared Areas’ as opposed to the ‘Uncleared Areas’. The Relief and Rehabilitation Authority for the North (RRAN) was created in 1996. In 1994, the subject of rehabilitation and reconstruction was added to the Ministry of Shipping and Ports. Earlier, in January 1995, the Presidential Task Force for the North was established to prepare an Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation Program (ERRP). However, with the escalation of the armed conflict after April 1995, the ‘Cleared Area’-‘Uncleared Area’ dichotomy became more pronounced with the people in the latter facing enormous hardships due to an economic embargo that included many essential goods including medicines. The scale of the humanitarian crisis and the political and logistical challenges of wartime relief, rehabilitation and development assumed unprecedented proportions. The war had become geographically more widespread and consequently internal displacements, which were going on since the beginning of the armed conflict, became a major problem. On both sides, military considerations tended to take precedence over humanitarian ones.

In the years after taking Jaffna, the SLA went through a series of debacles that cost the government and the country dearly. The Sri Lankan army had been losing soldiers and equipment at unacceptably high rates. The security forces were suffering from low morale and high rates of desertion. Recruitment drives failed to yield expected results. The country was clearly becoming war-weary. The economic costs of the war were soaring and the government was constantly in trouble trying to bridge budget deficits. A war economy was expanding at the expense of the national economy to the detriment of long-term development. The debt burden was rising. In these circumstances, President Kumaratunge sought Norway’s assistance to explore the prospects for peace talks. On the LTTE side, the military victories were won at high human costs. The Tigers were also facing difficulties finding new recruits. They were criticized repeatedly by Amnesty International and the UN for conscripting children for military training. The Tamil people who had endured nearly two decades of armed conflict desired an end to the war. Norway began its role as a facilitator in the year 2000. The first year of facilitation proved to be quite difficult and clearly exposed the need for trust building as a first step towards formal talks. After the collapse of the last peace talks the PA government and LTTE were engaged not only in a higher intensity war but also in recrimination and a propaganda war at the international level. The government was actively canvassing to have the LTTE banned in Western countries. There was hardly any basis to build trust between the two. Moreover, the PA government was beginning to doubt the benevolence of the Norwegian facilitator.

110

Looking back at the failed fourth peace process, the following observations are of significance:

There was a failure to invest sufficient time in trust building and to work out an agenda for negotiations based on mutual consent. The two parties had different priorities to be taken up at the negotiating table. Early communication between the protagonists took the form of letters exchanged between the President and the leader of the LTTE through the ICRC. This had its limitations as a method of communication, and it was not better, compared with using a third party mediator, in terms of building trust.

In the absence of trust building, both sides were suspicious of each other’s military intents, strategies and plans. This became evident after the failure of the talks when they accused each other of preparing for war while talking peace.

The LTTE became suspicious that the government had a hidden agenda to isolate them from the Tamil people by adopting unilateral programs of humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. The government announced the formation of a Presidential Task Force for ERRP while the talks were going on without consulting the LTTE. Subsequently, the LTTE was invited to participate but then it was too late and suspicion had grown deep.

Regarding the initiative attempted in year 2000: The same government that had invited Norway to facilitate a new peace process was taking every step to have the LTTE banned abroad. This contradictory position and the perception of the LTTE that within the country the government was working with an agenda of militarily weakening them and politically isolating them from the Tamil people ruined all prospects of bringing the protagonists to the negotiating table.

4.2 The Current Peace Process

The night is dark I am far from home One step enough for me - Cardinal Newman -

The above quote in a speech by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe sums

up his approach to negotiations with the LTTE. After his election victory on a pledge to bring peace to the fractured island in December 2001, a ceasefire agreement (CFA), commonly referred to in the press as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), was signed on 22nd February 2002 between the GOSL and the LTTE.

111

The change of government opened up an opportunity to revitalize the facilitating role of Norway. Following a unilateral ceasefire declaration and offer of unconditional talks by the LTTE,, the newly elected Wickremasinghe government swiftly moved towards initiating a new peace process. A cessation of hostilities was agreed upon by the GOSL and the LTTE on 24 December 2001. This was to be reviewed monthly, until a formal CFA, crafted with Norwegian assistance was signed by both parties. This took place on 22 February 2002. The Agreement provided for the setting up of a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) consisting of international and Sri Lankan members to monitor the ceasefire. The period between 24 December and 22 February was fraught with tension on the one hand, as the resolve of both parties was tested to the utmost with charges of hidden agendas and external interferences emanating from opposition sources. However, with the progress of the ceasefire and removal of security checkpoints, the Sri Lankan public began to feel safer and freer to move around after several years. This and the new government’s offer of humanitarian assistance to the peoples of the North and East, and increasing efforts to normalize their lives and livelihoods inspired confidence in the new peace process.

The people of the North showed their appreciation of the immediate measures taken by the government by warmly welcoming Prime Minister Wickremasinghe when he visited Vavuniya, and later Jaffna. The personal safety of the Prime Minister on these visits to Vavuniya and Jaffna was underwritten by the LTTE. A Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) was established under the Prime Minister’s Office in January 2002. A senior diplomat serving as Sri Lanka’s ambassador to China, Bernard Goonetilleka, was appointed as Director-General of SCOPP. At the Cabinet level, Milinda Moragoda, Minister of Economic Reforms, Science and Technology, was called to coordinate SCOPP. Moragoda and Goonetilleka embarked on a series of direct negotiations with senior LTTE representatives of the political wing. Most of these discussions took place in Kilinochchi, the de facto headquarters of the LTTE, with S.P. Tamilchelvan as the main LTTE negotiator. As agreed by both parties, the LTTE’s Peace Secretariat was opened in December 2002 in Kilinochchi, as a counterpart to SCOPP. The Ambassadors of Japan and Norway ceremonially opened the Secretariat.

The passage of goods and people is freer than it has ever been in recent times between the North and East and the rest of Sri Lanka. The opening up of the A9 highway to Jaffna has helped revive social and economic links between the North and the rest of the country. The new environment enabled the LTTE to focus more systematically on relief and rehabilitation, especially in areas which had suffered badly due to the economic embargo. A large industrial and trade fair was held in Trincomalee in August 2002, opened by the Prime Minister, bringing investors from the rest of Sri Lanka to seek trading opportunities with their countrymen in

112

the North and East. At another level, people to people contacts across ethnic divides have become a constant feature of the current peace process.

While these and other positive developments have inspired optimism, there have also been some disturbing movements. There have been allegations that the LTTE has been conscripting and training new cadres, abducting individuals and bringing in weapons. Further, concerns have also been raised about the taxes imposed by the LTTE on goods taken into the North. This practice amounted to a double taxation on the people as the government already taxed the goods concerned. The abduction and conscription of children by the LTTE in the period since December 2001 is the subject of several confidential police reports and is also a cause for concern. Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the LTTE is attempting to transform itself into an organization that can run a civilian administration. In the areas under their control, the Tigers have their own police force, courts and even a development bank. These are viewed with alarm by some quarters. However, the LTTE has explained that they needed to maintain law and order and promote development in the areas under their control, where the writ of the Sri Lankan state did not run.

At the time of writing, the CFA has now held for 10 months and the cessation of hostilities for over 12 months. This is the longest and most effective ceasefire Sri Lanka has experienced in the last two decades. At the time of writing, three face to face meetings have taken place between the GOSL and LTTE delegations, two in Thailand in September and November and one in Norway in December 2002. After each meeting, both parties have been claiming that the progress achieved was much more than they had expected although major issues remain to be addressed. A major breakthrough in the talks came when the LTTE committed itself firmly to work together with the GOSL to find a solution based on the concept of internal self-determination within a united Sri Lanka. In finding an appropriate solution, both parties agreed to study alternative federal options. Observers have described the breakthrough as a paradigm shift. After the Oslo talks, delegates of the LTTE visited Switzerland as guests of the government of that country to study the Swiss model of federalism. This exercise was facilitated by the German Berghof Foundation. More study tours of this kind are expected to be undertaken by the delegates in the future. They are expected to visit Canada in the near future.

While such advances were being made in the negotiations, concerns have been expressed in the country about the rights of the Muslim people of the North and East and the Tamil-Muslim tensions in the East, which could potentially harm the peace process. The LTTE has tendered a formal apology to the Muslims of the North for expelling them en masse in October 1990 and said that they were free to return to their homes in the North. However, 12 years of displacement has

113

made it difficult for most of the expelled Muslim families to return to their original homes in Jaffna, Mannar and Mullaitivu. In the East, the LTTE had evicted many Muslims from their lands and distributed some of the lands to Tamils. The Tigers have also established large farms for food production for their own consumption and for sale on lands taken from Muslims and Tamils. The Muslims have been demanding the return of their lands. The LTTE has recently agreed to solve this problem. However, not only Muslims, but also many Tamils have lost access to their lands as well due to eviction by the SLA to establish military camps and high security zones. In some areas, Muslims and Sinhalese have occupied lands belonging to Tamils, while Sinhalese have also been displaced from some other areas in the North and East. Another disturbing factor is the LTTE’s unwillingness to allow opposition parties such as the EPDP to do political work in the North and East. LTTE has yet to show in practice its acceptance of political pluralism among the Tamils in the North and East. Fortunately, these issues are receiving the attention of the government and the LTTE and they are expected to be taken up by the newly created Subcommittees.

4.2.1 Main Characteristics of the Fifth Peace Process 4.2.1 Main Characteristics of the Fifth Peace Process

The present peace process has several features that stand out to show that both parties have learnt much from the failures of the past four attempts, which have been reviewed above. It is quite obvious that a cautious but constructive step by step approach is being adopted. The more distinguishing features of the current process are: (1) Investment of time in trust building and development of communication

channels; This is in marked contrast to all previous attempts and, evidently, it has paid off as it serves as the basis for the consensual approach that is being adopted to conduct the negotiation process.

(2) Willingness of both parties to consensually workout the agenda for the talks at every stage; This flows from the above.

(3) Consensus between GOSL and LTTE to focus on immediate humanitarian issues as well as rehabilitation, resettlement and development in the North and East while talks proceed towards a final political solution; This approach has helped resolve a conflict that hampered the fourth peace process from its inception. As noted earlier, the LTTE was keen that

114

immediate steps should be taken to normalize the day-to-day lives of the people in the North and East as quickly as possible. The present government acceded to this request without any problems and thereby not only removed an impediment to the peace initiative but also earned the confidence of the people. It may be noted that by the time the fourth peace process began, resettlement, rehabilitation and development had become urgent priorities due to the displacements and devastations caused by the protracted war. A growing number of people in the North and East and those in the ‘Uncleared Areas’ in particular were subject to untold hardships. Deprivation had become inter-generational. However, the government of the time was more keen to discuss what it considered as core issues first, even though it had decided to undertake its own relief and rehabilitation programs. Furthermore, from the LTTE’s prspective, the government used humanitarian relief and rehabilitation as a political weapon to attract Tamil civilians from LTTE-controlled areas to government-controlled areas.

(4) Representation of the Muslims of the North and East at the talks; This has enhanced the credibility and legitimacy of the peace process as it paved the way for the Muslims of the North and East to be represented through their main political party at the negotiations. The internal problems of the SLMC seem to be affecting the participation of the Muslim representative in the talks. However, the acceptance of the LTTE and GOSL to have Muslim representation shows that they recognize the Muslims of the North and East as a distinct community whose collective security and human rights must to be ensured in a future political solution.

(5) Collective search for interim institutional arrangements for joint decision making on all important matters and for governing relief, resettlement, reconstruction (development); This is evident from the conceptual shifts regarding the type of the more immediate interim arrangements to move towards an interim administration and beyond. At the first meeting of the delegations held in September 2002, a decision was taken to set up a Joint Task Force (JTF) to deal with relief, resettlement and development. At the next meeting in November, the concept of JTF, which remained inadequately defined, was abandoned in favor of three Subcommittees (SCs) on: Immediate Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation; Military De-escalation and; Political Issues. At the time of writing, the SC have been appointed and steps are ongoing to establish their secretariats.

115

(6) Explicitly shared concern that the war-affected people should receive their fair share of the ‘peace dividend’; The ceasefire, the progress in the talks and the prevailing atmosphere has contributed to some degree of economic revival in the North and East. Furthermore, there is growing optimism about accumulation of a peace dividend through a dynamic revival of the national economy. There is a shared concern that the war-affected people should become beneficiaries of the peace dividend.

(7) High potential for civil society to play more active roles in peacebuilding and development; The prevailing environment is more conducive than ever before for civil society organizations to engage in rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation (RRR) activities. It also provides opportunities to reactivate and redefine the RRR process initiated in 1999 as a more inclusive program of action involving multiethnic and secular as well as religious organizations. Bodies such as the CHA, which provides a forum for a large number of NGOs, are able to play a more dynamic role today. A remarkable development is the more explicit stand taken by the country’s Buddhist clergy in support of the peace process. The country’s business community has also been active in civil society through their ‘Sri Lanka First’ and ‘One Sri Lanka’ campaigns. Organizations such as the National Peace Council, Center for Policy Alternatives, Women’s Coalition for Peace and Sarvodhaya are active at various levels in promoting the peace process. However, the potentials of the civil society to promote reconciliation and equitable human development remain to be more fully tapped. Furthermore, regarding the role of civil society in the North and East, a lot will depend on how the Subcommittees and their Secretariats relate to civil society organizations.

(8) Involvement of the international community; The international community, especially the countries that provide development aid and Multilateral agencies such as the UN, has welcomed the Sri Lankan peace process and pledged their support for the promotion of peacebuilding and development. The entry of Norway as the facilitator and the establishment of the SLMM with international participation marked the beginnings of direct and indirect involvement of the international community. The willingness of several countries to host the Lankan peace talks is an indication of the interest these countries have in assisting Sri Lanka to find lasting peace. So far talks have been hosted by Thailand and Norway. The next round will be held in Japan, which is Sri Lanka’s biggest ODA partner. South Africa and Maldives have also offered to become hosts.

116

An international event of considerable significance to the peace process was the donor conference held in Oslo on December 5 where G8 and 24 countries and institutions from Scandinavian, Asian and other related regions were represented. USA, Britain and Japan sent high-level delegates to this conference. Several countries pledged financial support for reconstruction and development. At the conference itself, direct commitments were made by some countries to a total of $70 million. However, of greater significance is the commitment of the governments concerned to do whatever they could to strengthen the peace process. Though a significant non-participant at the conference, the Government of India has reiterated its support to a settlement that met the aspirations of the Tamil people within a united Sri Lanka. 4.2.2 Sustainability of the Current Peace Process

The ceasefire is holding and the SLMM reported recently that violations are becoming fewer. The talks have produced remarkable results and the adversaries, i.e. GOSL and LTTE, are establishing an increasing sense of trust, which has been reported to the public through the electronic and print media. Although the progress is extremely noticeable, serious concerns remain as to the sustainability of the peace process and its final result in the form of a political settlement. The key factors that need to be addressed to enhance the sustainability of the peace process and ensure the expected results are:

The question of cohabitation between the UNF government and the executive presidency (leader of PA), to which is also related the need for bipartisanship.

Tamil-Muslim conflicts in the East. Distributional conflicts and social exclusion. The opposition to the peace process from the JVP and extreme nationalists in the South.

We discuss each of these briefly. (1) Cohabitation and Bipartisanship

The prevailing relationship between the UNF government and the Executive Presidency leaves much to be desired. It is one of confrontation and recrimination. This is unhealthy for democratic governance and harmful to the peace process.

The government does not have sufficient numbers in parliament to overcome constitutional barriers and is engaged in a battle with the president at the cost of winning the co-operation of the opposition, a prerequisite for a long-term solution. During the period after the first round of peace talks in September, in the run-up to the second round of talks, there was a major incident in this continuing drama of conflict between the president and the cabinet. This started with the cabinet

117

presenting a bill to parliament to remove the powers the Constitution grants to the president to dissolve parliament after a period of one year from the previous election. Fearing that the president would take actions to dissolve parliament in December, the UNF government planned to ensure its stability by removing this particular power of the executive presidency through a constitutional amendment. Several persons challenged the legality of the proposed 19th amendment in the Supreme Court. In mid-October, a 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled that there should be not only a two-thirds majority in Parliament but also a favorable decision from a referendum to pass this constitutional amendment. The government’s immediate reaction was to state that they would go for a general election rather than a referendum. However, the President did not choose to dissolve parliament.

There were two reactions from the government to the court judgement. One was to give a further try to make cohabitation with the president work satisfactorily. The second was to dissolve the parliament and go for a general election. This talk of a General Election died down after 10-15 days of the Supreme Court judgment. There was no significantly contentious action or statement from the president’s side either. The PA also appears not to be in a strong position to desire an election right now. The UNF may marginally increase its numbers in parliament in a general election but not even the greatest optimist in the party would hope to gain two thirds of the legislature.

We are in no position to offer any solution to overcome the estrangement between the two key institutions caused by competing short-term political interests and personality clashes. However, it would seem that without reconciliation between the president and the government, it would not be possible to move towards the much needed bipartisanship to obtain the necessary support in parliament to institute constitutional changes. The president has acknowledged the positive achievements of the talks so far. She has not sought to use her powers to block the peace process. The leader of the opposition has stated that his party is for a solution that guaranteed the rights of all peoples in Sri Lanka. However, when it comes to extending support to the peace process, the president and the spokesmen of the main opposition party (PA) have put forward conditions that appear premature and impractical at this stage. For instance, the demand that the LTTE must lay down arms before further talks is not a helpful one at this point of the peace process. Demobilization and decommissioning have to wait till a political settlement is in hand. The best way to hasten the arrival of this stage is to support the government’s efforts to find a political settlement. The need for a better dialogue and confidence building between the president and the PA on the one hand and the government on the other cannot be overemphasized.

118

(2) Tamil-Muslim conflicts in the East The East has become the real testing ground of the peace process. The

ceasefire and the peace process in general seem to be more stable in the North so far. The situation is different in the East mainly due to Tamil-Muslim tensions. Furthermore, the local conflicts are exploited by forces that are keen to derail the peace process. The GOSL, the LTTE, the international community and the local populations have become aware of this.

Factors contributing to instability in the East: There are several factors that contribute to the current tensions and instability in the East. Some of them have been operating for long periods while others have entered the scene more recently in the form of spoilers of the peace process. Needless to say there are inter-connections between both factors.

Tamil-Muslim tensions: Successive governments and the Sri Lankan armed forces have been exploiting Tamil-Muslim differences to weaken the Tamil demand for a permanent merger of the North and East provinces and also to undermine the LTTE’s military strength. Muslim home guards were created by the SLA as an appendage to intimidate and harass Tamil civilians in the name of protecting the Muslims from the Tigers.

The SLA also used the Muslims as informants which angered the LTTE. The LTTE had attacked and massacred Muslim civilians. They expelled Muslims from parts of Batticaloa and some other areas in the East. Muslims lost access to large extents of land they owned as a result.

The local LTTE leaders justified the eviction of the Muslims by claiming that the lands they owned were originally Tamil lands and taken unfairly from Tamils by Muslims. This view has gained some support among Tamils although there is no basis for the LTTE’s claim.

The SLA has been systematically promoting Tamil-Muslim conflict. The LTTE’s treatment of the Muslims has led to the emergence of youth militancy among the Muslims in the East.

Communalist politics continued to damage Tamil-Muslim relations. Chauvinist activities of some civil society groups among Tamils and Muslims.

Backgrounds of conflicts in Trincomalee (Tamil-Sinhalese-Muslim tensions)

can be noted as follows: Trincomalee is the most contested territory in the North and East. Tamils claim Trincomalee to be their capital and that the ‘Sinhala governments’ have been systematically ‘Sinhalising’ this predominantly Tamil district. However, today the district population is equally divided among the three ethnic groups.

119

The state bureaucracy, the SLA, and the Buddhist clergy have been working together for decades to convert Trincomalee into a Sinhala majority area. It is also well known that this was designed to break the contiguity of what the Tamils call their traditional homeland. This has been a major source of tension between Tamils and Sinhalese.

Tamil-Muslim tensions have also developed in Trincomalee due to conflicts between local LTTE groups and Muslims.

JVP, Sihala Urumaya, SLFP, and other Sinhala nationalist groups are active in Trincomalee.

Chauvinist activities within the CBOs from all three communities.

Forces opposed to the current peace process (spoilers) are active in the East where they see many an opportunity to derail the peace process. These forces are both domestic and foreign.

Domestic forces including the JVP, SU (Sihala Urumaya) and other chauvinist groups are active in the East with a view to disrupt the peace process. There are some extremist Muslim groups and anti-LTTE Tamil groups that are actively involved in creating confusion and tension. The LTTE’s local leaders failed to abide by the agreement between SLMC leader Hakeem and Prabhakaran. They were suspected of aiding and abetting violence against Muslims. The Sri Lankan media has not been playing a helpful role in calming communal tensions in the East.

As for foreign spoilers, there is widespread concern in Sri Lanka about India’s involvement to the ongoing peace process. There is a perception that India’s RAW and the VHP are involved in disrupting the peace process. It is also believed that India may also be unhappy about the growing influence of the US in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs. Furthermore, the US’s role is being seen by Sinhala nationalists as unwanted interference. However, the government and LTTE regard the US as a supporter of the peace process. Meanwhile, factors that can contribute to stability in the East are as follows:

More effective enforcement of the CFA. More active and proactive engagement of local CBOs in reconciliation. Early and amicable settlement of conflicts over land. A multiethnic but predominantly Tamil speaking central government bureaucracy in the North and East.

Conflict-sensitive reconstruction/resettlement etc. with the widest possible participation of stakeholders.

Institutionalization of the Subcommittees and their Secretariats as credible, legitimate and conflict-sensitive bodies.

120

Removal of SLA camps from residential areas and establishment of a Tamil speaking police force in Tamil-Muslim areas.

More positive role played by the media.

(3) Distributional conflicts and social exclusion The armed conflict was primarily caused by the ethnicization of conflicts over

distribution of resources, social and economic opportunities and political power. The peace process is expected to produce an appropriate political solution based on devolution and power sharing. However, it is necessary to have a broader view of distributional conflicts and social exclusion in the country as a whole and in the war-torn North and East, as they can be exploited by communalist forces to destabilize the peace process. Some sources in the South have been trying to create the impression that donors are rushing to the North and East with development aid neglecting the other parts of the country. In the East, it is not uncommon to hear Tamils say that all the aid is being channeled to the North, to Jaffna in particular at the expense of the East. There is absolutely no basis for such views, yet they are expressed at different levels and forums including seminars and workshops on the peace process. However, distributional conflicts and social exclusion do exist and policy makers should take them seriously. The development process is spatially and socially uneven. For instance, more than 50 percent of the country’s GDP is generated in the two districts of Gampaha and Colombo, and the per capita income of Colombo district is six times that of Moneragala. Furthermore, some segments of the society suffer from increasing deprivation and exclusion irrespective of ethnicity. However, the danger exists that the negative socio-economic effects of uneven development in the South may be exploited by communalist parties claiming that resources that should be used to overcome deprivation and poverty in the South are being diverted to the North and East.

(4) Opposition from JVP and extreme nationalists in the South

The JVP has emerged as a dynamic third force in Southern politics. It has attracted sections of the Sinhala youth, urban workers and the rural poor. It is today the most vocal and active opponent of the peace process. It holds regular anti-peace process rallies in different parts of the South. Its campaigns are joined by the more extremist Sinhala nationalist groups including members of the Buddhist clergy and some leaders and supporters of the PA. The main slogan of these forces is that the present peace process is heading towards a division of the country. They are vehemently opposed to federalism or autonomy as they claim that it would inevitably lead to secession. They condemn the Prime Minister as a traitor and Norway as a supporter of the separatists. Fortunately for the peace

121

process, these campaigns have not had any major disruptive effect so far. However, these forces have to be countered by keeping the Sinhala people fully informed and well educated on all aspects of the peace process and the alternative solutions that are being explored. 4.3 Challenges of Reconstruction and Development

As noted elsewhere in this study, there is a development gap of 25-30 years between the North and East and the rest of the country due to the protracted war and exclusion of the region from major development projects prior to the armed conflict. This development gap has different dimensions. For instance, human development has suffered severe reversals and deprivations of various kinds have become inter-generational. Another dimension is the enormous capacity gap in terms of human knowledge and skills and institutional and organizational abilities to meet the needs of reconstruction and development. The country faces the challenge of bridging the development gap in the shortest possible time in order to reintegrate the North and East with the rest of the country59.

The socio-economic effects of the war, the short, medium and long term interventions to deal with them, and the institutions responsible for these interventions at the regional, national and international levels are presented at the end of this chapter. In this section, after providing basic information on the newly established Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN) and an overview of displacement and major on-going interventions, we address some of the broader challenges and issues facing the Subcommittee and its Secretariat. (1) Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in

the North and East The SC has 8 members, 4 from LTTE and 4 from GOSL, 2 of whom are

Muslims. It will have a Secretariat with a Director and 2 Deputy Directors. There will be 4 units under the Secretariat: Monitoring and Appraisal (international); Information; Finance; and Audit. The SC will have District level Committees. The SC’s role will be to:

Identify humanitarian and rehabilitation needs. Prioritize implementation of activities to meet these needs.

59 We hasten to add that when we speak of a development gap between the North and East and the

rest of the country, it is not implied that development in the rest of the country has been spatially and socially equitable. The point is that exclusion and war have widened the gap between the two parts of the country. No other part of the country has suffered the scale of devastation suffered by the North and East as a result of the war.

122

Decide on the allocation of the financial resources for such activities. Determine implementing agencies for each of these activities.

The SC is expected to ensure the involvement of all ethnic communities so that their needs and aspirations are considered. Priority is to be given to the mobilization of local labour and local institutions in the implementation of activities. Soon after its formation, the SIHRN assisted the government of Norway in the preparations for the donor conference held in Oslo on 5 December 2002. One of the main reasons behind the conference was to mobilize financial resources for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation in three priority areas as agreed by GOSL and LTTE:

Resettling and rehabilitating IDPs. Rehabilitating war-affected women and children. Providing livelihoods for war-affected people in the North and East.

(2) An overview of displacement in the North and East

Total number of IDPs: more than 1 million. IDPs living in Welfare Centres: 42,000 families. IDPs living with friends and relatives: 142,000 families (receiving food rations).

IDPs with friends and relatives but do not receive food rations from GOSL – number not known.

IDPs living on their own without depending on GOSL assistance –number not known.

Refugees in Tamil Nadu camps: 66,000 persons; thousands of refugees live outside these camps.

(3) Most Affected Areas

LTTE-controlled areas have much higher percentages than GOSL-controlled areas. In the LTTE Areas such as Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar and Vavuniya, 75% of the total population (373,303) are regarded as IDPs, while in GOSL controlled areas, such as Mannar, Vavuniya, Jaffna, Trincomalee, only 23% of the total population (1,048,805) are regarded as such. Both areas together, IDPs account for 37% of the total population. However, it should also be noted that Batticaloa and Ampara are not included although there are the existence of IDPs in this region. 30,000 war widows and 300,000 war-affected children in the North and East Provinces. (4) Dual structures

In the North and East, the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE have their own military, police, administrative, judicial, revenue collection and relief and

123

rehabilitation structures. It is in reality a situation of dual power. The peace process is expected to transform this situation into one of power sharing, in which the Muslims and Sinhalese residing in the region will also be represented, and unified structures. However, in the transitional period, appropriate coordinating mechanism is needed, for effective measures to be taken for addressing the capacity gaps and securing efficiency of implementing rehabilitation and development activities.

Interim mechanisms to coordinate planning and implementation of rehabilitation/ development programmes need to be well thought out as they should also serve the transition towards unified structures.

How to do it efficiently in terms of resource use and achievements? How to move towards unified administrative and security structures? Capacity gaps (see below)

(5) Displaced persons’ right to return to their original homes

Homes and residential areas are being occupied by the military, which includes High Security Zones (HSZ). Among those who want to return, there are families evicted from their homes and villages by the Sri Lankan security forces in order to establish military camps, bunkers and HSZ. Military personnel are occupying many houses in the North and East. In Valikamam North alone more than 20,000 families were evicted to create HSZs. The rights of these families and others in similar situations to return to their homes and lands need to be enforced without much delay.

If the original houses and lands are totally or heavily destroyed, they need to be rehabilitated before any resettlement can happen.

The problem of encroachment of private and alienated state lands exists in various parts of the North and East. Reasonable solutions have to be found with due consideration to the well being of all parties concerned.

Also, the rights of the people expelled from their towns and villages by the LTTE and the Sri Lanakan security forces have to be met. These include Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese, although the former two are larger in numbers.

(6) Capacity gaps at various levels

The low absorptive capacity already seen in the implementation of NEIAP and other projects is a reflection of multiple capacity gaps, which exist in state institutions, the private sector, and in civil society. The LTTE has its capacity constraints as well. The capacity gaps are a result of loss of human capital, institutional disruption and decay, lack of human capacity development and the failure to fill vacant positions in various government departments. The personnel shortages of the more critical government services are shown in Table IV-1. It can

124

be seen that shortages exist in practically all services including provincial and local administration, education, health and technical services of various kinds. Apart from the shortages in numbers, there are also gaps in quality and competence of the personnel to effectively contribute to rebuilding a war-torn society and economy. Further, existing institutions have to be reformed to be conflict sensitive and able to promote reconciliation in collaboration with civil society organizations

In the North and East, there is a huge shortage of skilled workers, especially carpenters, masons and technicians who are badly needed to rebuild the infrastructure and human settlements. There is also a need to develop de-mining skills on a large scale. Many of these skills can be transferred through the approach of ‘learning by doing’. The unskilled can learn from the skilled by working together. This type of skill development can be institutionalized by setting up local vocational centres.

Furthermore, competence building is urgently needed in enterprise development, environmental management and local conflict resolution.

A whole range of development institutions exist in the state-community interface. Examples are: FOs, RDS, WRDS, Multi Purpose Cooperative Societies and Fishermen’s Cooperatives. Examples of bodies in civil society are voluntary organizations such as Thrift and Credit Cooperative Societies, Savings groups, and NGOs and CBOs concerned with peacebuilding and development.

The needs of these institutions may be summed up as follows: Building organizational capacities with women’s participation for collective action to manage resources; access information and markets; develop savings and credit schemes; resolve local conflicts; negotiate contracts; implement projects and defend rights.

(7) Heterogeneities within the North and East

The North and East is not a homogeneous entity. It is heterogeneous in biophysical and socio-economic terms. Moreover, the war has transformed the ethno-political economic landscape of the North and East. . There are inter and intra-regional differences when Jaffna, Wanni and the East are considered. The heterogeneities have to be taken into consideration in designing resettlement and rehabilitation projects. They pertain to the following:

Uneven impact of the war-displacement, destruction, environmental consequences. Demographic impact of the war-net out-migration from the North and East; Net in-migration in all Northern and Eastern Districts except Jaffna, which experienced net out-migration (>250,000).

Intra-district variations in population concentrations and ethnic composition. Differences in resource endowments, environmental problems and economic

125

opportunities. Area specific, group specific vulnerabilities.

Table IV-1 Approved Cadre and Vacancies in State Institutions

in the North and East

Critical Service

Approved cadre

Present strength

Urgent requirement

Sri Lanka Administrative Service: Provincial Local Authorities DS/AGA

Total

44 41 144 229

19 01 61 81

25 40 83 148

Sri Lanka Accountant Service: Province Local Authorities DS/AGA

Total

62 06 71 139

40 01 47 88

22 05 24 51

Sri Lanka Administrative Service 361 120 241 Teachers Service 27,227 23,427 3800 Principal Service 1790 1174 616 Sri Lanka Agriculture Service 32 22 10 Sri Lanka Animal Production and Health Service

109 42 67

Sri Lanka Engineering Service 84 70 14 Sri Lanka Audit Service 03 - 03 Sri Lanka Planning Service 146 55 91 Sri Lanka Architecture Service 02 - 02 Sri Lanka Inland Revenue Service 09 - 09 Sri Lanka Medical Service 563 361 202 Sri Lanka Dental Service 86 50 36 Sri Lanka Technological Service 703 447 256 Sri Lanka Draughtsman Service 44 14 30 Para Medical Service

Pharmacists 133 71 62 P.H.I.I 383 281 122 Nurses 1198 666 532 Mid Wives 1125 741 484

Source: Office of the Chief Secretary NEPC (December, 2002) 4.4 Need for a Process Approach with Flexibility and Creativity

Given the past experiences and the challenges that exist, a rigid project approach without room for creative adaptations and revision of targets is not appropriate in a war-torn area. Instead, a process approach, which is flexible and allows creative modifications based on experience in the field should be adopted as a rule.

126

The development of the North and East would positively serve peace building if it can enable people to achieve sustainable livelihoods that ensure socio-economic security and human dignity. Such an inclusive, bottom-up process of development can provide an evolutionary basis for peace building from below. This is also a way to reverse social exclusion and to handle distributional conflicts.

From such a perspective, resettlement has to be seen as an integral part of a larger set of activities or interventions aimed at enabling the building of household livelihood systems.

A household is a part of a community, which is invariably differentiated according to socio-economic statuses of the households that constitute it. Since the household livelihood system consists of community assets and household assets, any program of resettlement and rehabilitation has to focus on both components paying particular attention to the vulnerabilities of individual households as well as the community.

A framework to conceptualize the whole challenge of resettlement and linking it with sustainable livelihood and peace building is shown in Figure IV-2.

Conceptual point of departure here is the household livelihood system, which consist of community assets that include material and non-material assets, and household assets. Material assets include various common property goods such as irrigation tanks, fishing grounds and other commonly held and collectively used utilities. Non-material assets include formal and informal associations, and organizational abilities within the community, all of which are nowadays referred to as social capital in general, the most important element of which is trust.

Household assets consist of material assets, and the knowledge and skills available in the household. Here, we are talking about land rights, water rights, fishing rights, access to employment, market, quality health care and education and other public entitlements such as poverty reduction allowance. These together constitute the means of livelihood of the household.

Then we need to identify the vulnerability factors. Communities as well as households are exposed to various vulnerabilities. In the North and East these are related to human security, the quality of the assets, property rights, environmental uncertainties, market uncertainties, human health hazards.

Development interventions should strengthen the household livelihood system and minimize the vulnerability factors or their effects.

Once the model is grasped in this fashion, the other components fall into place; for example, the components of a larger program, such as clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), resettlement and relocation packages, education and health, capacity building, local infrastructure development, market and information and reconciliation processes. The policy and institutional environment determines the incentives and disincentives for various activities. It

127

is very important to consider these factors in designing policies and identifying priorities of programs and projects.

Figure IV -1 RRR through Sustainable Livelihood Development

Source : Shanmugaratnam (2002b)

Household livelihood system

Community Assets: Material Assets, Social capital

Household assets

Means of livelihood

Vulnerability factors

Macro, Meso Policy Environment

Removal of landmines & UXO

Infrastructure Resettlement/

Relocation

Packages

Markets Information

Education Health

Local power relations

Capacity Building

C O -O R D I N A T I O N

Socio-Economic location (Class,

Skills, Demographic Status, Gender

etc) + Contextual Factors

Reconciliation processes

128

Basic Principles and guidelines to follow in project formation and the prioritisation of those projects will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, we simply list up the areas of intervention needed in the North and East’ their urgency (Short, Mid and Long Term; ST, MT, LT) and key institutions which are likely to be effective in implementing them, in order to understanding how huge and wide ranging the assistance needs in the North and East are.

(1) Human security issues

(a) Death/ Permanent incapacitation; Compensation Reverse trend; State (b) Net outmigration; Encourage resettlement/ relocation by integrating peacebuilding

(ST), Subsidies and Soft loans (ST), Advisory services, Peace education (MT); State, Lending institutions, CBOs, Media and International Agencies.

(c) Deskilling; Employable skill development (ST, MT); Relevant State and Non-State Agencies

(2) Lack of human capacity development (Education) (a) Total lack of formal education –approx. 30,000 children; Special primary

and secondary schools (ST, MT); Ministry of Education and International Agencies

(b) Disruption of formal education–high dropout rate; Reintegration of dropouts (special programmes similar to above) (ST, MT); Ministry of Education and International Agencies.

(c) Irregular attendance and non-completion of GCE OL; Motivate parents and children, Integrate youth into skill development and employment programmes(ST, MT); Ministry of Education and International Agencies.

(d) Shortage of trained teachers; Recruit and train teachers (MT); Ministry of Education and International Agencies.

(e) Lack of vocational training facilities; Vocational training facilities – carpentry, masonry, plumbing, mechanical skills, food processing, small enterprise development and management (MT); Ministry of Education, NGOs, Private sector.

(3) Lack of human capacity development (Health) (a) High incidence of infant mortality, maternal mortality, morbidity,

malnutrition, mental disorders; Rehabilitate, expand and update primary and secondary healthcare systems, Improve food security and nutrition, enhance health education (ST, MT); State, WHO, UNICEF and NGOs.

(b) Acute shortage of all categories of personnel; Improve public health education, Recruit and train staff; Develop Faculty of Medicine and Teaching Hospital in Jaffna University, Training programmes in Tamil for

129

nurses and other health workers (ST, MT); State and International Agencies.

(4) Institutional/organizational capacity gap

(a) Due to death and outmigration; Employ and train staff (ST, MT); Ministry of Education, Private Sector, NGOs

(b) Weakening of state institutions, shortage of personnel; Design and offer crash courses in development of war-torn areas (ST, MT), Upgrade professional capacities (ST, MT, LT); Ministry of Education, Private sector, NGOs.

(c) Lack of personnel and professional capacity; Enable social capital formation and establishment of associations; State, NGOs and UN Agencies.

(d) Weakening of local associations and social networks (FOs, Fishermen’s Coops, RDSs, WRDSs, credit societies, etc.); Social mobilization and training; Promote women’s participation; Integration of returnees and local non-displaced persons; Savings and Credit schemes, Revolving funds (ST, MT); State, NGOs, UN Agencies.

(5) Mines and UXO (Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu,

Trincomalee); Demining and Removal of UXOs (ST); State, UN Agencies and NGOs.

(6) Damage to infrastructure and human settlements

(a) Transport and communication infrastructure (Vavuniya-Kankesanturai; Valaichenai-Batticaloa); Rehabilitate and expand highways/ main roads, Rehabilitate damaged roads; construct new roads, Re-build the railway (ST, MT); CBOs, State, Lending Institutions.

(b) Power and Energy; Increase power supply, Develop alternative energy sources (solar, wind, biogas etc) (ST, MT, LT); State and International Agencies.

(c) Land and irrigation; drainage infrastructure; Clear and develop abandoned farmlands (ST), Rehabilitate village tanks and irrigation and drainage systems, community participation (ST, MT); CBOs, FOs, State, International Agencies.

(d) Lack of access to clean drinking water; Increase supply of clean drinking water; private and community wells, pipe-borne water supply, purify using locally available technology (ST, MT, LT); CBOs, State, Private sector.

(e) Pollution of groundwater; Improvements of Purification technologies and institutions (ST, MT): CBOs, State and NGOs.

130

(f) Health infrastructure; Rebuild and modernize health infrastructure (LT); State and International Agencies.

(g) Education infrastructure (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary); Rebuild schools laboratories and research facilities (LT); State and International Agencies.

(h) Human settlements; Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Houses (MT, LT); State and International Agencies.

(7) Displacement /Loss of livelihood; Recognize and enforce rights of IDPs (UN

Guidelines), enable safe and socio-economically sound resettlement or relocation of returnees (MT, LT); State, CBOs and International Agencies.

(8) Loss or disruption of market links / weakening of credit institutions; Restore

market links, cold storage facilities for perishables (fish, farm produce etc.), Credit institutions (MT); State and Private sector.

(9) Environmental problems (Deforestation, Coastal zone erosion and lagoon

degradation, Encroachment into tanks and ponds etc); Plan and implement rehabilitation activities, enforce appropriate environmental regulations (MT). State, NGOs.

131

Chapter V Strategy for Japanese Assistance on Peace Building and RRR

The issues involved in charting a strategy for directing Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka in the context of the unfolding peace process have two facets that we must recognize from the outset. The more obvious of these relates to what needs to be done in regard to capacity building and project/programme design for ensuring that the peace process remains on track, that immediate humanitarian assistance is assured and that the foundations for lasting peace and sustainable development are laid in Sri Lanka. This chapter will principally focus on these aspects. However, we must not overlook the significance of this engagement for Japan, particularly in terms of a foreign policy shift, the implications of this on the design and execution of development assistance programmes and, most importantly, on capacity building within Japan to meet the new international obligations of being proactively involved in peace building.

In this chapter, we will try to identify in section 5.1 the core issues for Japanese engagement, followed in section 5.2 by an appreciation of the key principles and basic guidelines that need to be followed in peace building and the relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation (RRR) process. Section 5.3 looks at the risks entailed in the exercise and at ways in which they might be incorporated into development assistance project/programme design, taking into consideration the coping mechanisms that have evolved on the ground. Based upon this, Section 5.4 enters into the heart of the problem, drafting a conceptual framework for peace building and RRR. A ten-year time frame (2002-2011) has been tentatively suggested as the long term period of commitment, organized in three overlapping phases, viz: A Confidence Building phase (2002-2005), a Capacity Building phase (2003-2008) and a Nation Building phase (2004-2011). This suggestion is being made, however, with the understanding that non-linear shifts among project/programme components may be necessary in keeping with changes in the ground situation as a negotiated settlement emerges around the series of talks between the LTTE and GOSL. Nevertheless, it will provide a reasonably clear picture of the nature of Japan’s (and other donors’) commitments to all parties involved, predictable in the way it proposes to evolve but not inflexible. Section 5.5 focuses on the execution of this commitment, looking particularly at how Japan could work by optimizing its role in the Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN). Section 5.6 concludes with an assessment of the significance of these proposals for Sri Lanka and the capacity building issues that have to be addressed in Japan.

132

5.1 Core Issues

Sovereignty is indeed the core issue at stake. Perhaps the most powerful lever that Japan can bring to bear on ensuring that Sri Lanka remains a sovereign state comes from the conditionalities associated with its development assistance programme. These were the subject of discussion when the JBIC study team representatives met the LTTE leadership, represented by the Head of its political wing, S.P. Tamilchelvan, and its economic wing, represented by Tamilendi, together with representatives of a Sri Lankan development bank and members of the Secretariat Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), led by Ambassador B. Goonetilleka. A brief summary of the main issues discussed at this meeting, held at the LTTE Headquarters in Kilinochchi on 26 August 2002, is as follows:

The JBIC team, represented by Professor H. Nakamura (Head) and Professor M. Cassim, briefly explained the nature and modalities of development assistance provided to Sri Lanka by the government of Japan (GOJ) and went on to seek LTTE views in regard to the following: (1) Given that Japanese assistance was largely of a g-to-g nature, the LTTE

would have to work with GOSL to gain access to Japanese aid finances for RRR in the North and East.

The LTTE response to this was that it has been working with GOSL on a variety of issues and would be willing to do so in this regard as well. The implication of this could be construed as a willingness to relinquish the demand for Tamil sovereignty and a willingness to work within the confines of a sovereign state of Sri Lanka, represented by GOSL. Speculative as this might have been at the time of this meeting in Kilinochchi, events at Sattahip in September 2002, notably the LTTE statement on the final day of the meeting indicating willingness to call off its demand for a separate state and further clarification of this at the Bangkok meeting in November 2002 and the Oslo conference in December of the same year, bear out this surmise. It is noteworthy that the LTTE leadership was willing to indicate its intentions at this meeting, three weeks prior to the Sattahip talks of 16-19 September 2002. It was certainly indicative of an increasing sense of trust between the LTTE and SCOPP since the beginning of that year. (2) Considering the very high value that GOJ places on the safety and security of

the lives of its citizens overseas, the LTTE would have to provide assurance of this, particularly since increased commitment by Japan to RRR in the North and East would naturally involve greater participation by an increasing number of Japanese citizens and civil society organizations.

133

The LTTE representatives at the meeting indicated absolute assurance in this regard. Quoting S.P. Tamilchelvan, albeit through an interpreter, “…we will ensure the safety of Japanese citizens and offer greater protection to them than we would to our own lives and property.” While the meeting was not a venue for obtaining binding commitment, the statement by the head of the political wing of the LTTE is indicative of the respect with which the LTTE regards Japan and the international community. As a nation which has transformed itself from the ravages of war and built up a giant, globally integrated economy while retaining the essence of its culture and traditions, people-to-people exchanges between Japanese citizens and the peoples of the North and East of Sri Lanka could be a welcome component of the peace process. This does require the establishment of a mechanism for greater involvement of Japanese civil society in Sri Lanka. Civil society exchanges are of strategic importance in the Confidence Building phase, creating a climate of trust and mitigating risk for subsequent market-oriented exchanges and large-scale investments in infrastructure development and commercial ventures.

(3) Given that Japan and the international community are committed to a just,

pluralistic and sovereign Sri Lanka, the LTTE would have to foster pluralistic coexistence among the Tamil people in the North and East and the Muslim and Sinhalese population who regard these areas as their home, with guarantees of justice and the security of life, property and livelihood.

The response to this by the LTTE representatives was that they were working on this and would need some more time before they could sort this out. The seriousness with which the LTTE leadership regarded this issue is evident from their willingness to have Mr. Rauff Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), participate in the peace negotiations at Sattahip and thereafter. The presence of their military commander in the East, Colonel Karuna, at the Bangkok talks and the subsequent establishment of the Subcommittee on De-escalation and Normalization (SDN) is further evidence of this. The terms of reference of the SDN, drafted on 3 November 2002 at the Rose Garden talks in Bangkok, contain a commitment to ‘resolve local issues, as deemed necessary by the parties, in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya (also covering Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu), Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara, corresponding to the locations of the six district offices of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)’. In this process, the very sensitive issue of disarmament of the LTTE and the withdrawal of GOSL forces from the High Security Zones (HSZ) will have to be taken up. However, it is optimistic to expect an early accord on disarmament and demobilization because the LTTE would lose one of its principal bargaining chips at the negotiation table if this were to happen before a just political settlement

134

has been agreed upon. (4) Given an increasing commitment by Japan and the international donor

community to RRR in the North and East, what would be seen by the LTTE as the urgent priorities?

Their commitment to clearing the North of landmines in order to expedite resettlement of returning IDPs (est. 800,000 persons in all) and refugees from India (est. 200,000 persons) was mentioned by the LTTE. This is an important issue, considering the length of time that demining actually requires (8 months per square mile). While the rapid rate of IDPs return is proof of their confidence in the peace process, there are indeed many vexing problems associated with resettlement. Land and water rights of returning IDPs and refugees, fishing rights and restrictions to navigation, and the level of intrusiveness of GOSL military encampments in the North and East, particularly in the HSZ, are among the more complicated issues which have to be addressed. They are particularly complex in the East, where these rights issues take on an ethnic dimension since the Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim communities are all involved. The situation in the East is also critical because a false move could set off a militant movement among disaffected Muslim youth in Batticaloa and Ampara. In addition, although not discussed at this meeting, the issues of rehabilitation and inclusion, particularly of armed cadres, the disabled victims of armed conflict, women-headed households and war orphans, also need to be addressed. The LTTE felt that the development issues needed to be discussed by their own task force before a prioritized agenda was prepared. It is heartening to note that the three subcommittees established after the Bangkok talks in November are addressing many of these critical issues. Nevertheless, capacity building for plan preparation for RRR in the North and East is an area that might be prioritized for immediate technical assistance. 5.2 Principles and Guidelines

Keeping in mind the core issues outlined in the previous section, let us try to

elicit some basic principles and guidelines to be followed in the peace building and RRR processes. It is perhaps wise to look at a continuum of development options, rather than at discrete projects. The OECD Guidelines proposed in 2001 suggest that international assistance be directed in four areas, viz: 1) Preventing violent conflict, (2) poverty reduction, (3) expanding trade capacities, and (4) sustainable development. Taken in this order, these guidelines do take on the semblance of a continuum of development options. These OECD Guidelines will be taken into account in the strategy proposed for prioritizing development options for Sri

135

Lanka in this chapter. The guarantee of social and economic inclusion in a manner that would bring

out the best in a pluralistic society such as Sri Lanka is another principle we should keep in mind in preparing guidelines for action. Whilst recognizing that a strong measure of affirmative action is indeed imperative for the North and East, given the pluralism of Sri Lankan society, a certain measure of balance is important when directing investments for development. This balance involves consideration of cultural identity, including ethnicity and language, and its spatial implications. Thus, while looking at the deprivation in the North and East, we must remember that a similar situation of underdevelopment exists in the deep South and Southeast, and in certain areas of the central hills, where a radical Sinhalese insurgency movement under the banner of the JVP was born in 1971. The central hills of Sri Lanka are also home to a large concentration of people of Indian Tamil origin, with an identity and history that distinguishes them from the Tamil people in the North and East, but who have suffered no less in terms of social and economic deprivation, and perhaps for even longer.

While ensuring that the principles of social inclusion, cultural pluralism, spatial equity and balanced development are followed, it is important that Sri Lanka does not become an inward looking nation. The country has to be developed against a rapidly globalizing environment of trade and investment and will have to come to terms with working with the international community and its institutions. While the rest of Sri Lanka has had a foretaste of this very competitive and sometimes harsh environment since the liberalization of the economy since 1978, the situation in the North and East is quite different. Gradually shut out of the formal global economy since 1983, for nearly two decades this region has been trapped in the shrouds of a closed economy. The North and East will certainly need to learn how to manage a regional economy in the context of an international open market economic system, whilst also integrating with the rest of the Sri Lankan economy. The structures that facilitate this will have to be fair and equitable. This is imperative if social discontent, not just in the North and East, but also in the deprived areas of the South, Southeast and the central hills, is to be contained.

While it is common to anticipate a linear transformation in proposing a rationalized plan, the very nature of a conflict entrenched environment, riddled with suspicion and mistrust, makes this a difficult task. Yet, a totally random and ad hoc approach is also irresponsible, to say the least. Thus, while proposing a broad framework for stepped progression, it is important to recognize that the transformation from conflict to peace and development requires that we make allowances for non-linear processes of social transformation, while keeping the overall goals, namely peace and development in a fair and just society, firmly in

136

mind. In accommodating this, we may have to contravene some social taboos of civil society, such as breaking established protocol and, on occasion, even the rule of law. While it might be possible to reconcile breach of protocol in the name of expediency required for urgent trouble-shooting when the peace process itself might be threatened, how does one justify pragmatism in breaking the rule of law? In order to answer this, we might draw some inspiration from Hegelian thought.

In Hegelian thought, fulfilling human need is seen as the goal towards which society aspires. In order to achieve this, society is seen to organize itself around Systems of Association and Systems of Rule. These systems are perceived in a very broad sense. Systems of Association would include legally established bodies, like public agencies, private firms and charitable trusts, as well as informal associations like private clubs and civil society groups, such as Putnam’s famous bowling clubs and associations which shaped the culture and social capital of contemporary society in the United States. Systems of Rule would include the legislative structure and legal system as well as covenants and informal codes of practice embedded in local cultures.

These two Systems are seen as having a dynamic interaction in providing for human need. Thus, it is conceivable that one might take precedence over the other, given the circumstances at a particular point of time. From this we could argue that in times of social stress, that inadequacies emerge in the formal Systems of Rule and established associations of people, which are unable to deal with these sudden and sometimes drastic changes. These shortcomings are met, as society transforms to a new state of equilibrium, by the emergence of new Systems of Association and new informal codes and rules. At the new point of equilibrium, these informal codes of practice and rules are transformed into a fresh corpus of formal Systems of Rule. The dynamic relationships between Systems of Rule and Systems of Association also determine access to resources, critical for producing the goods and services necessary for meeting human needs.

Applying the above thinking to the Sri Lankan peace process would help us explain breaches of convention and rule and perhaps even justify those breaches, since the larger cause of peace and human welfare is being met. This is important in refuting charges of illegality, which have been leveled at the GOSL in conducting peace negotiations with the LTTE, and in gathering the support of civil society for the furtherance of peace. Such an understanding is also important for donor countries supporting the Sri Lankan peace process to explain to their own polity the rationale for overlooking breaches of protocol and law. This is precisely why it is critical for closed-door peace-building negotiations between the LTTE and GOSL to be supported by the open involvement of Sri Lankan and donor country civil society institutions in actually transforming the ground situation

137

through a transparent RRR process. This is particularly important in the early confidence-building phase, on the path toward realizing the peace dividend.

Finally, in looking at the principles and guidelines that will help shape Sri Lanka transform from a state of conflict to one of peace and development, a continuing commitment to peace education might be mentioned. This is important not only because of the hope of ending nearly two decades of violent conflict through the current dialog between the LTTE and GOSL, but also because there does appear to be an endemic culture of violence in certain segments of Sri Lankan society. This sits uneasily on what is usually a pacifist and tolerant civil society. It manifests itself most frequently at election-time, when the supporters of the contesting political parties often resort to violence to prove a particular point. There is obviously a deep-rooted sense of discontent lying at the roots of such violence, which was so aptly portrayed by Henry Jayasena in the 1960s in his visionary play on the dilemma faced by youth educated in the vernacular languages, ‘Apata puthe magak netha’ (There is no way for us, my son), which fuels this violence. The emergence of both Sinhalese (JVP) and Tamil guerilla movements, since the 1970s, can also be traced to this discontent. This too needs to be addressed in the peace building process, supporting broad-based programmes for social, economic and cultural inclusion, which cover not just the North and East but all of Sri Lanka. 5.3 Risk Analysis and Coping Mechanisms

An early manifestation of the peace dividend is perhaps the single most important factor for mitigating the risks that a conflict-prone environment is inherently likely to have. Speaking metaphorically, it is important that all parties involved understand that safe back streets are absolutely essential if business is to thrive on the high streets. To this end, concrete projects/programmes that alleviate hardship and nurture hope across a broad section of the Sri Lankan population is important for ensuring that the peace process initiated in December 2001 does not suffer a serious setback. When considering risk mitigation, two dimensions are important, viz: (1) Risks that require changes in the macro-environment, and (2) Risks that can be mitigated by project/programme design.

138

Figure V-1 Principles for Assistance in Peace Building and RRR

(1) Social Inclusion (2) Cultural Pluralism (3) Spatial Equity (4) Balanced Development

Sourse: Produced by the study team

5.3.1 Macro-environmental Changes

In shaping the macro-environment to mitigate risk, the importance of concrete policy changes aimed at realizing the principles of (1) social inclusion, (2) cultural pluralism, (3) spatial equity, and (4) balanced development cannot be over-emphasized. Technical assistance is a key factor. It may also be pertinent to consider assistance to the general budget of GOSL, i.e.: Assistance that is neither sectoral nor project/programme oriented, but rather an overall budgetary supplement, with the freedom and flexibility to meet changes in the macro-environment as the peace process unfolds and to establish policy incentives based on the principles outlined above. The issue of fungibility is likely to be raised in proposing this modality and indeed, since all funds are potentially fungible, this points to the importance of evaluating how the fungible funds were actually used. The difficulty of doing so is compounded because such policy-led transformations go beyond mere economic restructuring into the less easily assessed realms of social engineering, However, if a system for evaluating the results of the policy initiatives financed in this fungible modality can be established, especially in regard to how they have furthered the four principles outlined above as important for risk mitigation in the macro-environment, then it is recommended that such policy support initiatives, be financed by donor agencies. Thus, although fungibility has acquired a negative connotation in recent times in the ODA lexicon, if it is transparent and acceptable to the donor, and has contributed towards a commonly agreed greater good, then the funds need not be kept only within the narrow confines of the project/programme objective for which they were originally intended. For a society transforming rapidly in political, social and economic terms, such latitude in ODA could provide much succor, provided the conditions just stated are met.

The second major factor is to ensure that the peace process is kept on track. This will require the LTTE demand for a just solution for the Tamil people to live in dignity to be integrated with the GOSL stance that the preservation of a sovereign state of Sri Lanka is of paramount importance. In order to create the political climate conducive to this, based on the principles outlined in the previous

139

paragraph, the establishment of participatory systems for a broad and representative range of Sri Lankan citizens to be actively engaged in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the North and East is critical. This could establish the environment for reconciliation and for softening the extremist views held by certain segments of the Sri Lankan population. CHA, established as part of the RRR process, is an important platform in this regard. It is all the more important because it also enables civil society representatives from the donor countries to engage with their Sri Lankan counterparts and work towards the common goal of RRR. Mechanisms for increasing the participation of Japanese civil society representatives in the CHA are recommended.

The mitigation of the culture of violence, particularly endemic to political processes in Sri Lanka, by strengthening the civil defense system is the third risk-mitigation factor at the macro-level that needs to be addressed. The current government’s initiative to establish an independent Police Commission, which will minimize, if not eradicate, political interference in the affairs of civil security and justice, is a step in the right direction. Discussions held with senior GOSL police officials by the JBIC team indicate the value of establishing a neighborhood policing system, much like the Japanese ‘Kouban’ system, where the policeman is seen as a friend and not a foe. The international donor community might consider how technical assistance can be extended in this area to Sri Lanka. The success of these endeavors are, however, contingent on both the LTTE and GOSL showing that they have the political will to work toward replacing the sense of fear in an insecure social environment with a sense of trust that characterizes a safe and secure society. There are also elements of international criminal networks, especially those involved in drug-running, armaments and illicit trade, which have begun to take root in Sri Lanka over the past two decades or so. International assistance in weeding out these elements can also be seen as important if both the LTTE and GOSL are to succeed in establishing a system of governance, civil defense and justice that assures every Sri Lankan citizen of a safe and secure life.

5.3.2 Risk Mitigation through Project/Programme Design

It must be stated at the outset that one or more of the four basic principles of social inclusion, cultural pluralism, spatial equity and balanced development mentioned earlier must be reflected in project/programme design as a macro-goal if risk is to be mitigated. Creating win-win situations with project synergies directed towards the major goals is ideal. The model proposed for ADB’s urban project design and coverage (Ohta and Cassim, 1987), is indicative of this. It must be recognized though, that at the current point of time in the Sri Lankan

140

context, zero risk is an unlikely situation, especially for works to be carried out in the North and East. Thus, evolving a system for progressively transforming a high-risk situation to moderate and low risk is important. How might this be done?

A study of the coping mechanisms employed by real beneficiaries, with a view toward incorporating them, where appropriate, into project/programme design, might prove to be helpful. Several internationally funded case studies on local (communal or personal) responses to crises already exist and these could be analyzed in greater detail. Local CBOs with a profound empirical understanding of such coping mechanisms too could be mobilized at the project/programme design stage. Linking the project financing system to collective responsibility by the real beneficiaries, with successful implementation being tied to the promise of the next level of assistance, might be important to promote project/programme replicability. This is of particular relevance in projects/programmes where cost recovery is required.

In the high-risk period, it is advisable to start with a relatively large number of small projects, rather than the converse. It is an added bonus if these projects can be grouped to generate synergies. Pilot projects initiated should be viewed as exemplary cases and live laboratories for mutual learning and inspiration. The goals and objectives of these projects/programmes should be inspirational and conciliatory, enabling hitherto contentious protagonists to work together toward the greater common good. This also requires a clear and predictable framework with projects and programmes being located in a progressive transformation from peace building and RRR, through capacity enhancement of human resources, infrastructure and institutions, to sustainable development in the years ahead. The time frame and contents of such a framework, and a strategy for project/programme prioritization, are discussed in the following section.

5.4 Conceptual Framework for Peace Building, RRR and beyond

The conceptual framework proposed in this section for peace building, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation, suggests that the long-term perspective should look beyond to wealth creation in a sustainable and equitable manner. A ten-year period (2002-2011), is tentatively suggested as the time span for this proposal, which is composed of three overlapping phases, viz: A Confidence Building Phase in the short-term (2002-2005) a Capacity Building Phase in the medium-term (2003-2008), and a Nation Building Phase in the long-term (2004-2011). The aims and objectives of each of these periods will be expained hereafter.

141

FigureV-2 Conceptual Framework for Peace Building and RRR

Confidence Building: 2002-2005 (tentative)

(1) Arresting and preventing conflict (2) Guaranteeing safety and security (3) Providing humanitarian and emergency assistance

Capacity Building: 2003-2008

(1) Human resources (2) Physical infrastructure (3) Institutions

Nation Building: 2004-2011

(1) Economic and trade development structures (2) Resources and technology access/management (3) Legal systems and governance structures


5.4.1 Confidence Building (2002-2005, tentative)

The projects/programmes designed in this period of confidence building can be classified as those aimed at realizing the following objectives:

(1) Arresting and preventing conflict (2) Guaranteeing safety and security (3) Providing humanitarian and emergency assistance

The target in this short-term phase is the implementing of an immediate

action program for RRR. The underlying aim should be the speedy alleviation of hardship, laying the foundations for hope in a population that has borne the brunt of a long and violent conflict. The focus should be on helping individuals and families regain their lives and livelihoods and to make up for nearly two lost decades. Thus, great importance should be paid to listening to the ‘voiceless voices’ of those who have been hapless victims in a spiral of misery. Surveys such as those carried out by Ashiwa60 and platforms for dialog, such as the CHA, are important vehicles for gaining this understanding. In this period, where individuals and families are the focus, many breaks with established procedure might be called for. Following the line of thought indicated in section 5.2, it is a period when Systems of Association might have to prevail over Systems of Rule. It is important to remember, though, that although affirmative action will concentrate in the North and East, balanced development targeting pockets of

60 Published as an article in the advertisement column of Daily News, August 23rd, 2002.

142

deprivation in the rest of the country must also be addressed in parallel. The type of projects/programmes that one might conceive for this period

could include the following:

(1) Arresting and preventing conflict (a) Assistance to the peace secretariats of the GOSL (SCOPP) and LTTE,

including financing the core activities of conducting the peace talks and the meetings of the three sub-committees.

(b) Supporting peace education across Sri Lanka, including programmes for each community to learn the others’ language and appreciate each other’s culture.

(c) Financing projects/programmes and policy initiatives that will lead to risk mitigation in the macro-environment by promoting social inclusion, cultural pluralism, spatial equity and balanced development.

(2) Guarantee of safety and security61 (a) Technical, material and logistical assistance for speeding up the pace of

de-mining operations in the North and East, with priority being given to areas where the rate of IDPs and refugee returnees is likely to be high.

(b) Technical and logistical assistance, including the provision of trained personnel, for third party monitoring and mediation in connection with the agreements reached between the GOSL and LTTE as the peace process unfolds.

(c) Technical assistance for strengthening civil defense systems in Cleared and Uncleared Areas in the North and East, as well as the rest of the country, with the initial aim of affording maximum safety and security to the civilian population, but ultimately leading to all parties abiding by the rule of law.

(d) Assistance for creating the climate for demobilization and disarmament, including training and apprenticeship schemes for the entry of armed personnel into alternative jobs in the civilian sector or international peace keeping operations and amnesty programmes for deserters, conditional on the return of personal weapons.

(3) Emergency and humanitarian assistance (a) Priority assistance for rehabilitation of the civilian and military victims of

armed conflict all across Sri Lanka, including those who have been afflicted by physical disability and psychological trauma, war widows and orphans,

61 It is recognized that items b, c and d above may require a longer time frame than 2002-2005.

143

and child soldiers. (b) Priority assistance for settlement of returning IDPs and refugees from

overseas in the North and East, including technical and financial assistance for home building and livelihoods assistance.

(c) Technical and financial assistance for rebuilding community infrastructure and social institutions, including minor roads, small tanks and associated irrigation infrastructure, immediate water supply and sanitation systems, health clinics, schools, recreation spaces, places of worship and community access to electricity, using symbolic institutions like the village tank and places of worship.

(d) Considering that this phase focuses on regaining the lives and livelihoods of individuals and families, building hope and confidence in communities and creating trust-building interactions among Sri Lankans as a whole, it is important to promote modalities of assistance that strengthen civil society engagement in these RRR activities, including support to participatory platforms like the CHA, and projects/programmes that enhance community self reliance.

5.4.2 Capacity Building (2003-2008)

The projects/programmes designed in this period of capacity building should focus on the following areas:

(1) Human resources (2) Physical infrastructure (3) Institutions

The target in this medium-term phase is the transition from meeting the

immediate needs of RRR to laying the foundations for sustained development. The underlying aim in human resource capacity development should be to provide the peoples of Sri Lanka the technical, logistical and organizational basis for building upon the hopes nurtured through the confidence building activities already under way. The focus should be on building the physical infrastructure and the institutional structures that will set the stage for bringing out the creative talent of the peoples of Sri Lanka and enable them to live with each other in an atmosphere of trust and friendship. It must be recognized that the political situation is still likely to be in a state of flux, as a just and final solution is being negotiated. Thus it is imperative that all parties involved should come to a common consensus that the investments in this period are for a shared and common good. In regard to institutional aspects, it is a period directed at the consolidation of the Systems of Association (see section 5.2) required for the

144

transition from conflict to development. SIHRN might have to evolve into a forum for facilitating such discussions in respect to the North and East, while mechanisms will have to be explored to foster constructive nation-wide dialog among the peoples of Sri Lanka. The role of the media in this context is an important consideration.

The type of projects/programmes that one might conceive for this capacity building period could include the following:

(1) Human Resources (a) Considering the long term effects of sustained conflict and poverty in Sri

Lanka on malnutrition, poor sanitation, the spread of infectious diseases, widespread prevalence of physical disability and psychological trauma, projects/programmes directed at improving nutrition regimes, access to health and counseling services and an understanding of the implications of poor health and nutrition for development as a whole are recommended.

(b) Education projects/programmes, directed at improved access from basic through to higher education with measures to reduce drop out rates in the formal education system, enhancing the quality of vocational and professional education, introducing life-long education systems, taking advantage of emerging information and communications technologies (ICT), and prioritizing assistance to those whose educational progress has been disrupted by conflict, are recommended.

(c) Training programs for a wide range of stakeholders in project/programme development and management, including public administrators, private sector representatives, managers of civil society institutions, media representatives and educators, are recommended.

(d) Considering Sri Lanka’s long commitment to gender equity, which has resulted in a significant demographic dividend in terms of a low birth rate, projects/programmes for mobilizing women for development, including greater participation in the labour force and in positions of decision-making in society, are recommended.

(e) Projects/programs directed at citizenship education, inculcating an appreciation of the twin principles of rights and responsibilities by individuals and the collective in a democratic society, understanding the principles underlying egalitarianism and equal opportunity, planning one’s life in a responsible manner, understanding the importance of ethical and moral behavior, and working towards bringing out the creative richness of diversity in a pluralistic, multi-cultural society.

145

(2) Physical Infrastructure (a) While recognizing the absolute importance of developing modern nation-wide

or region-wide trunk line infrastructure for road, rail, air and sea transport, utilities such as power, telecommunications, water supply, and sewerage, and the nation’s unique irrigation infrastructure, considering the high investment costs and long-term amortization of such projects/programmes, it is suggested that absolute priority be given in their design and implementation to working towards integrating Sri Lanka as a nation, by enhancing business and inter-personal exchanges among her peoples and regions, ushering in prosperity for all.

(b) Investing in mega-infrastructure systems, defined as infrastructure systems that link Sri Lanka with the international community, such as international ports and airports, as well as in international logistical systems and telematic (computer and telecommunications) systems, which will enhance the nation’s participation in international trade regimes and cross-border exchange of people, goods, services, capital and information.

(3) Institutions (a) Strengthening government, local authority and civil society institutions in

their capacity to carry out plan formulation and execution, ensure good governance through transparent and accountable processes is recommended.

(b) Strengthening institutional capacity for economic management, including process reviews for macroeconomic management, monetary and fiscal policy development, finance institutions such as banks, development finance institutions and intermediary finance institutions, with particular emphasis on strengthening the role of microfinance institutions, are recommended.

(c) Strengthening public and private sector institutions for increasing trade capacities for development, including regulatory bodies such as customs and excise, promotional bodies such as the EDB, BOI and SLBDC, industry associations and chambers of commerce, research and development support systems for industry such as the CISIR, market access promoting business information support systems and risk management through the insurance system, are recommended.

(d) Strengthening institutions related to civil safety and security, including reviews of the police and emergency services (fire and ambulance), and the criminal justice system, with particular emphasis on respect for the independence of the judiciary at all levels, expediting trials and reducing the financial burden of litigative processes for the citizens as well as the state.

146

(e) Fostering the development of public information institutions, strengthening the independence of the print and broadcast (radio and television) media, with a special focus on enhancing media literacy in the light of emerging technological innovations integrating broadband television, mobile telephony and the internet, and laying the foundations for media content production and dissemination by empowered civil society representatives, are recommended.

5.4.3 Nation Building (2004-2011)

The projects/programmes designed in this period of nation building should focus on the following areas:

(1) Economic and trade development structures (2) Resources and technology access/management (3) Legal systems and governance structures

The target in this long-term phase is the transition from capacity building to

actually launching the process of sustained, yet sustainable, development. Building on the foundations laid in the capacity building phase, in this nation building phase, the aim should be to enable Sri Lanka face the challenges of development in the global context, taking advantage of international collaboration wherever possible and yet also being competitive in the world arena. The path adopted should be sustainable, in financial and economic terms, as well as in resource and environmental management terms. The review of and reforms to existing legal structures and the adoption of new ones related to all aspects of governance, in other words, establishing the new Systems of Rule (see section 5.2) required for post-conflict Sri Lanka, should be the focus of this phase. These efforts should follow on the political solution adopted for resolving the conflict in the North and East, but also need to go beyond to integrate Sri Lanka as a nation of diverse peoples and cultures. It is important to keep in mind that using its diversity in a complementary fashion, the undivided strength of the nation will enable it to better meet the challenges of global competition and realize a brighter future for all its peoples. Considering the dynamic nature of such a situation, the Systems of Rule established for democratic post-conflict governance should guarantee that new Systems of Association can be born and have the freedom to advocate socioeconomic and political transformation whenever it is for the greater good of the peoples of Sri Lanka.

The type of projects/programmes that one might conceive for this nation-building period could include the following:

147

(1) Economic Structures and Trade Capacities (a) Financing the reforms required for implementing national development

policy in the coming years, taking the Regaining Sri Lanka (2001) initiative as a starting point for dealing with debt reduction, increasing savings and investment, dismantling regulatory and administrative barriers and enhancing resource mobilization, with special attention to establishing the incentives (including policy-based financing) and regulatory structures required to mobilize investment from the domestic private sector as well as international investors.

(b) Using microfinance and enterprise credit systems creatively, from nurturing fledgling enterprises to deal with an internationalized open market system to the fostering of innovation in and incubation of competitive small and medium sized enterprises.

(2) Resource and Technology Access/Management (a) Developing national energy and natural resource mobilization plans,

establishing incentives and regulatory regimes for ensuring stable supplies of energy and natural resources and their optimally efficient use, promoting the development of alternative domestic sources, and establishing international agreements with foreign governments and suppliers where necessary.

(b) Creating mechanisms for mobilizing and using traditional and high technologies for wealth creation, including the establishment of knowledge networks and technology pools, intellectual property rights management systems, international inter-university research and development alliances to reduce high technology development costs, and the promotion of partnerships among industry, government, academia and other stakeholders (such as the design community and civil society institutions) in product/service development and merchandizing.

(c) Establishing the incentives and regulatory structures for value-added utilization of Sri Lanka’s natural resource base, including the optimal use of its diverse tropical ecosystems, traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), and gene pool management of these biodiverse ecosystems, leading to the development of organic agriculture, sustainable fisheries, food processing, ecotourism, non-timber forest products (NTFPs), marine biological and mineral resources, indigenous medicines and health care systems.

(d) Establishing the incentives and regulatory structures for value-added utilization of the nation’s rich heritage and diverse cultural assets, including

148

its ancient irrigation systems, leading to the further development of the tourist industry, but ensuring broad-based participation to ensure that the benefits are widely distributed across the regions and peoples of Sri Lanka.

(e) Achieving greater efficiency and qualitatively higher service delivery through the e-Sri Lanka initiative, mobilizing ICT for improved government, education, health and business services, and exploring the best avenues for entering the international ICT market.

(3) Legal Systems and Governance Structures (a) Technical assistance to both the LTTE and GOSL for evaluating the

implications of different alternatives of a democratic, locally autonomous system of governance for Sri Lanka, including consideration of the pros and cons of different federated solutions, symmetrical and asymmetrical solutions, other alternative solutions to guarantee local autonomy, and their implications for the legislative, judiciary and executive powers of governance.

(b) Technical assistance to understand and establish the accompanying fiscal transfer mechanisms for guaranteeing that all local governments have the financial resources to execute their mandate of local autonomy, with Japan’s own experience in transforming from a centralized military state to a decentralized locally autonomous state over the last six decades also being taken up for analysis, starting with the early post-war discussions of the Kanbe Committee through to the recent initiatives of several reformist prefectural governors.

(c) Technical assistance to ensure that the checks and balances necessary for guaranteeing democratic governance, local autonomy, and justice will be established, including citizenship education to understand one’s rights and duties, and incentives that will promote the active participation of a vibrant civil society in governance and social capital development, whilst recognizing that in the years of transition, the international community may have to play a neutral, monitoring role, yet gently pressurizing with the leverage of conditionalities in development aid and market access when necessary.

5.5 Japan’s Assistance Strategy

In directing Japanese assistance to Sri Lanka in the transformation from a state of conflict, through peace building, to development, the nine-component framework of investment proposed in the previous section can be used as a guide for strategically targeting investments. It is particularly useful for: (1) Locating a project/ programme and its principal components in the continuum

149

of transformation from conflict to development. (2) Monitoring over time the changing investment emphasis using the nine

component elements of the framework. (3) Project/programme evaluation by matching the nine-component investment

framework against performance criteria based on the four principles of assistance, namely: social inclusion, cultural pluralism, spatial equity and balanced development.

(4) Improved liaison among international donors, using the nine-component investment framework and the four principles of assistance to coordinate aid pledges and monitor their performance upon implementation.

(5) An objective communications tool for GOSL and the LTTE to communicate to their respective political constituencies the progress of 3R and post-3R development programmes in a transparent and accountable manner.

International donor assistance to the North and East is likely to be directed

through the SIHRN. Central to its operations is the establishment of a special fund, the North and East Rehabilitation Fund (NERF), with the World Bank as custodian. Considering that the Japanese Government’s Special Representative to Sri Lanka, Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, is a Special Advisor to SIHRN, there is little doubt that Japanese aid will be directed to the North and East, but the extent to which Japan will use the modality of the NERF per se remains to be seen. There is a prevailing view that accountability to the Japanese public is better served through existing bilateral and multilateral channels. In cognizance of this concern, which might also hold true for others in the donor community, a range of possible funding modalities for the development of the North and East will be established in accordance with the consultations at the international donor conferences for the support of Sri Lankan rehabilitation and reconstruction. The role of an independent auditor has also been stressed as a means of enhancing transparency and accountability in the use of the fund.

While the LTTE appears to favor using the district level office of the government body to assist in coordination, with NGOs as a principal means of execution, the question of using the considerable institutional capacity of the North and East Provincial Council remains unresolved. Certainly, the capacity for speedy and effective implementation is a sine qua non for the impact of the peace dividend to be felt in the North and East and the GOSL would be wise to discreetly offer all possible assistance in this regard, after frank consultation with the LTTE through the mechanisms of the SIHRN.

As an independent honest broker, Japan, working through Special Representative Akashi and her Foreign Ministry development aid experts, needs to ensure that peace conditionalities are met as aid is disbursed through NERF

150

and other mechanisms to the North and East. These conditionalities are imperative for the GOSL to counter any discontent that affirmative action in the North and East might cause in the minds of the Sri Lankan public at large. They are also an important precondition to be negotiated at the political front for success in the social and economic fronts, where JBIC’s considerable volume of development assistance can bear fruit, following the framework and principles outlined earlier on.

Shortly after the establishment of the CFA in February 2002, discussions with several parties involved in both Sri Lanka and Japan, regarding the role of Japanese assistance, the following five factors were outlined as important in shaping the peace process and leading it towards success:

Skills development in negotiating for peace. Creating the climate for dialog among the various stakeholders. Disarming, demobilizing and demining. Identifying projects for the promotion of social and economic inclusion. Legal and institutional reform as the basis for good governance and lasting

peace.

Let us briefly review the significance of Japan’s involvement in the above. In retrospect, the designation of Ambassador Yasushi Akashi as Special representative of the GOJ and Japan’s active commitment to the Sri Lankan peace process, has complemented the commendable strides which the LTTE and SCOPP had made in regard to the negotiation process, one round of which is to be held in Japan from 18-21 March 2003. Japan’s presence has certainly enhanced the climate for dialog among various stakeholders. Sri Lanka’s occasionally vitriolic press notwithstanding, the Sri Lankan public at large, including the Tamil peoples and the LTTE, perceive Japan as a neutral party. The JBIC study on Conflict and Development, of which this report is a part, followed shortly by a JICA needs survey mission, working in concert with other bilateral and multilateral donors, has already identified a series of projects for the promotion of social and economic inclusion. A further needs assessment mission is also being planned, to complement the investigations conducted by ADB, World Bank, UN agencies and bilateral donors in the North and East.

Modalities of governance, based on a federated structure, are being discussed by the LTTE and GOSL as the negotiations, which started with confidence building measures, begin to enter the more difficult phase of laying the foundations for lasting peace. No doubt, tensions will be high in this period and political opportunists are likely to attempt to hijack the peace process for their own narrow ends. The international donor community, including Sri Lanka’s largest donor, Japan, can do much to alleviate the situation by imposing peace

151

conditionalities, which would make the path away from violence irreversible, in return for development assistance.

Among the causes of tension in the rest of Sri Lanka, outside the North and East, are uncertainties regarding LTTE commitment to the peace process. These are manifest in worries regarding whether the LTTE might be engaged in the clandestine strengthening of its armed cadres in this period of truce. Repeated violations of the CFA by the LTTE and continuing recruitment of cadres, including allegations of forced conscription of minors, have been cited as a cause for concern. GOSL defense of the LTTE position tends to weaken its credibility in the eyes of its national constituency. Perhaps it is timely, now, for these concerns to be addressed. They could be discussed at the SIHRN Meetings and the Sixth Round of Peace Negotiations, to be held in Japan from 18-21 March 2003, because allaying the fears of a national constituency is an important precondition for national consensus regarding a federated structure of governance within a unitary Sri Lanka, which the LTTE have agreed to work toward at the Oslo Conference in November 2002. Peace conditionalities, which donor countries, including Japan, might want to see in place by the Tokyo Donors’ conference in June 2003, may be outlined as follows: (1) Strict compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and the rulings of the

Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). (2) Substantial progress on human rights in the North and East. (3) Visible end to child recruitment and the release to their parents of minors

engaged in or being trained for combat. (4) Evidence of the progress of democracy and pluralism in LTTE controlled

areas. (5) Detailed undertakings in regard to the establishment of an acceptable system

of governance, including considerations of a federated structure. (6) Commitment to phased military disengagement by the LTTE and GOSL.

Considering the last two conditions mentioned above, it is only when a fair and just system of governance acceptable to all parties becomes clearly evident that the LTTE and GOSL are likely to consider demobilizing their forces. Incentives to do so, however, should be indicated from the earliest possible opportunity. Current discussions investigating the prospects of re-training a cadre of GOSL forces to be involved in international peace-keeping operations, and the ILO’s initiative of alternate employment for armed cadres in infrastructure development on the condition of disarmament are indicative of such efforts.

Laying off the armed forces is a very sensitive problem even though there are still hope for encouraging by utilizing donor funds in their reintegration. It is said that still 80 thousand of them exists only in the army, even excluding paramilitary

152

and volunteer forces, demobilization of which is less formidable. Full scale demobilization, however, is a strictly military operation, when it

involves heavy artillery and non-personal combat weaponry, and needs to be handled with a great deal of delicacy. Although Japan might not consider herself to have the expertise to execute such a military operation, her moral stance on this matter, voiced through the office of Special Representative Akashi and his position in SIHRN, can be most effective. The time is fast approaching for discussing some form of balanced reduction of arms by both the LTTE and GOSL. Even while retaining defensive arms, if the LTTE can be persuaded to give up or withdraw their long-range artillery, it would pave the way for the GOSL to consider dismantling the HSZ. This would also help to accelerate the process of resettlement, where the LTTE claim the HSZ to be a major impediment. Demining, on the other hand, is most urgent. GOJ has made financial assistance available for demining operations to hasten the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees returning from overseas.

It is important that the LTTE pay attention to ethnic sensitivities across the country, if they are to help realize a federated structure of government within a unitary Sri Lanka. In particular, the sentiments of the people residing in the central mountainous region, where the plantation workers of Indian Tamil origin mostly live, and the South and Southeast, which are predominantly, though not exclusively, deprived Sinhalese areas, will also have to be considered. Also, while the urgency of rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the war-ravaged North is important, the rather more complex situation in the East also needs considerable attention. The situation is very different in the North, dominated by the Tamil population, and the East, composed of a significant mix of Sinhalese and Muslim peoples as well. In the East, which is still exceedingly tense at times, the mechanisms for pluralistic participation in governance structures are particularly important.

How big a threat is the instability in the East to reconstruction work and especially to the work of international agencies such as JBIC? So far no group has targeted foreign personnel or any particular ongoing project in reconstruction. However, the uncertainty created makes it necessary to adopt flexible and process oriented interventions, such as those suggested in Section 5.4. Furthermore, it is important that the interventions are inclusive of diverse stakeholders, paying particular attention to farmers, fishing folk, the landless poor, and other vulnerable groups, as well as to the different ethnic groups in the East. This could go a long way in winning the confidence of this pluralistic population. A just solution for the East could also contribute considerably to relaxing the tensions and uncertainties felt around the rest of the country too and here, the ball is very much in the LTTE court. The four principles for development assistance described

153

earlier are important guidelines to Japan and other international donors in this context. 5.6 Conclusion: Significance for Sri Lanka and Japan

Violent conflicts are always associated with fundamental changes in societies. In Sri Lanka what we might be witnessing is a fundamental change in the way people living in the North and East will be governed. The relationships between various sections of people in the North and East are also changing. Hence the better way of conceptualizing such a context is not through notions of ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘reconstruction’, where the prefix re- implies that we are trying to get back to a situation that existed before the conflict, but through notions of ‘transition’. The latter opens our minds to the idea of change and transition will be the fundamental characteristic of the environment in which donors will be working. Donors should see themselves as shaping the evolving process and not merely responding to an outside demand. The earlier in the process that one gets in, the better the chances of influencing the process. In a way this is already happening. For example the very fact that some donor representatives have traveled to the uncleared and met the LTTE has helped in bringing LTTE into the development arena and to be mindful of the importance of dialog with the international community.

As Sri Lanka proceeds to overcome the despair of two decades of violence through the negotiations between the LTTE and GOSL, there is a need to address the deeper sense of discontent that underlies Sri Lankan society. This will require us to address the structural deficiencies in Sri Lanka’s systems of governance and economic management. Regaining Sri Lanka, GOSL’s national planning document, identifies the issues of an inefficient public administration system, mounting public debt, an inadequate secondary and higher education system, jump-starting the economy by revitalizing the private sector, and increasing investment from domestic and foreign sources. A modern telecommunications infrastructure is seen as the key to overcoming many of these issues. The proposals for e-Sri Lanka, currently at a very early stage in development as a World Bank prepared concept paper, need to be studied in greater depth. They could cover the electronic domains of government administration, education, health and welfare, business and security. SIHRN is also currently working out a set of development proposals for the North and East. These are all areas where JBIC’s lending modalities could play a strategic role in leading Sri Lanka out of conflict into the path of dynamic and sustainable development.

What has been said thus far has focused on the implications of Japanese assistance for Sri Lanka. In summary, the two critical factors are:

154

(1) Ensuring that the peace process is on track and irreversible, employing where necessary peace conditionalities for disbursing development assistance; and

(2) Looking beyond the immediate needs of 3R, and even the peace process, to lay the foundations for lasting prosperity for all the peoples of Sri Lanka.

However, in the course of conducting this survey on JBIC’s role in conflict

and development, it soon became evident that there will be significant implications for Japan too. We may see this from three perspectives, viz:

(1) Significance for Japan’s foreign policy; (2) Involvement of Japan’s civil society; and (3) Implications for Japan’s overseas development assistance agencies,

including JBIC.

Japan has been largely an important contributor to rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in many parts of the world, but has been discreetly content to leave the central role of involvement in peace negotiations to other leading players in the international community. As in the diplomatic initiatives in Cambodia, where Japan played a proactive diplomatic role, her engagement in Sri Lanka too marks a significant break from normal foreign policy practice.

Since the appointment of Special Representative Akashi, and the regular visits by his team to Sri Lanka, Japan’s profile in the Sri Lankan peace process has steadily risen. A series of visits by officials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including a visit by Minister Yoshiko Kawaguchi, the proposal to hold one round of negotiations between the LTTE and GOSL in Japan from 17-21 March 2003, and a commitment to hold an international donor conference in Tokyo in June 2003 has heightened this further. Given this increasing prominence, it is likely that Japan’s role will also be subject to increased scrutiny by Sri Lanka’s vociferous media. Given this, it is imperative that Japan’s neutrality in the process be maintained. This is what will give her voice credibility and help to bind Sri Lankans of a range of political hues to support and promote the peace process as it enters the more contentious areas of negotiation.

In addition, Japan will have to liaise closely with the international community of donors and with significant overseas political players in the Sri Lankan crisis, including India whose support is critical to any solution that evolves from the peace process. All of this economic and political liaison activity will have to be carried out against a rapidly changing ground situation in Sri Lanka and the fluctuating focus of the peace talks between the LTTE and GOSL. The demands of rapid responses, quick decisions and a full-time ground presence

155

in Sri Lanka are likely to stretch the crisis management expertise currently available within Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, a commitment to capacity building in Japan’s foreign service to meet these demands will be critical, particularly if the engagement in Sri Lanka is seen as a precursor of Japan’s foreign policy commitments in the future. Certainly, the world at large, and the Asia-Pacific region in particular, will be waiting expectantly to see how Japan performs in her new role. This is a most important step to pave the way towards a well-deserved (and perhaps long overdue) permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

This path will, however, not always be easy. Debate on the postwar constitution (particularly Article 9), doubts about dispatching her Self Defense Forces to trouble spots in the world, responding to questions as to whether she will continue to be too cautious, especially given the increasing threat to the safety and security of her nationals, and other such challenges are likely to confront Japan on the international political front in the years to come. One must view her endeavors in peace building in Sri Lanka as an opportunity to chart her own foreign policy initiatives, shaped by a combination of national interest and international stature. Public sentiment in Japan will play an important part in these decisions. Towards this end, Japan would do well to strengthen the mechanisms for engaging civil society institutions in the Sri Lankan peace process. Working with her own civil society institutions and academic institutions towards this common goal in Sri Lanka is likely to transform Japan’s hitherto uni-polar foreign policy into a multi-track effort. This diversity of information and opinion within Japan, shared in an atmosphere of trust, which comes from having worked on a worthwhile cause together, is essential when quick decisions have to be made in high-risk situations.

Recent efforts at harnessing a variety of inputs into Japanese aid policy is evident in the case of development assistance for Sri Lanka too, since Japan expressed her firm commitment from the conflict resolution phase with the dispatch of Special Representative Akashi in November 2002. A Sri Lankan Aid Advisory Group has been established with Professor Essho of Hosei University as Chair. This body incorporates a wide cross-section of ideas from NGO, academic and aid agency representatives. Japanese religious bodies, particularly Buddhist institutions, too can help a great deal in bringing lasting peace to Sri Lanka. In addition to their relief and developmental contributions to Sri Lanka, they can provide a strong message of support for the peace process by working with their Sri Lankan counterparts and endorsing Japanese government’s commitments and peace conditionalities.

Several NGO forums have also been held and more are being planned as the June donor conference in Tokyo draws near. In this connection, however, it might

156

be useful to create a Sri Lanka NGO platform in Japan. It is important, however, to ensure that many of the regional project-centered NGOs who have been working over several years in Sri Lanka are represented at such forums. The current structures tend to make it easier for the larger NGOs, often advocacy-centered, and those from the Tokyo to attend such gatherings. Perhaps a more decentralized platform, covering the different regional blocks, with the support of a web-based information exchange infrastructure, needs to be set in place in preparation for the international donor conference in June.

Such an infrastructure would enable Japan to gather support for her foreign policy initiatives in Sri Lanka as well as for designing her development assistance projects/programmes. Given the size of her presence in the Sri Lankan development aid landscape, Japan’s policies need to be more mindful of the changing ground situation and domestic needs in Sri Lanka, against the background of a complex, pluralistic political process. This is particularly important for a large policy-based lending institution like JBIC. It might be prudent to consider establishing a standing consultative mechanism between JBIC, GOSL and representatives of various other aspects of the Sri Lankan polity, with Japanese NGOs and academics working in Sri Lanka also providing a most valuable input into a research arm of the same mechanism, bringing sensitive social situations and aspects of local culture and politics into the development aid discussions in Japan.

However, whilst navigating the tricky and sometimes treacherous path of these political issues, it is important to keep in mind that that there must be matching performances on the ground, which address the diverse development needs of the peoples of Sri Lanka. JBIC’s development assistance programmes, tuned in concert with that of JICA and Japanese NGO contributions, can be coupled with the political and diplomatic initiatives under way in a coherent and strategic manner. The four principles of assistance (Figure V-1) and the nine-component (Figure V-2) framework for strategically locating projects and programmes in a non-linear continuum of assistance, detailed in Section 5.4, indicate how this might be achieved. This could well be the basis for setting the scope and mission of the consultative mechanism for Japanese development assistance to Sri Lanka. It could also contribute to setting the agenda for the June 2003 meeting of international donors in Tokyo. However, more importantly, it is the effective implementation of projects and programmes of relevance to lives and livelihoods on the ground that will surely pave the way for Japan to be permanently etched in the hearts and minds of all the peoples of Sri Lanka. Both the governments of Sri Lanka and Japan, and their respective institutions, need to always bear this in mind.

157

References

In Japanese Ashiwa, Yoshiko. (1997,1998) Data base compilation of Sri Lankan Ethnic

Studies and trend survey on Sri Lankans residing in Japan, Hitotsubashi University, Basic research(C)(2) Final Report

_____ 2002. Sri Lanka-Tamil and Sinhala, road to peacebuilding, Sekai. Asia Press International, ed. 2000. Wounds of Asia, Cure of Asia, Fubaisha. Imiya.; Mudeyanserage.; Kamarawati. 1991. Socio-Psycological Analysis of

Sinhala-Tamil Conflictin Sri Lanka, Keio University. Okumura. 1992. “Dispute Settlement of 12 mayors of Sinhalese villages in Sri

Lanka”, Houjinruigaku no Chihei, Seibundou. Kusumoto. 1993. “Comparative study of Ethnic Conflicts in Sri Lanka and

Malaysia” Nenposhakaigakuronshu, Kantoushakaigakkai Suntasiran, Dilmar. 1995. International Response to Sri Lankan Conflict and

Peace Building Networking and Appeals in Japan, Niwano Peace Foundation.

Sekine, Yasumasa. 1996. “Asia2 What are the causes of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka?” Gekkan Minpaku, Kawade Shobou Sinsha,

Funao, Akiko. 2002. Issues and Challenges of Humanitarian Relief Activities for Internally Displaced People”, Ryukoku University Keizaigaku Ronshu 41.

_____ 1999. “Sri Lanka Challenges of Human Rights Committees in a Multicultural Society” Buraku Kaiho Kenkyu 131.

Tanaka, Masahito. 1994. “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka Background and its interpretation ” Okamoto, Kimura., ed. Contemporary History of Conflict-Affected Regions, Doubunkan.

Nakamura, Hisashi. 2002. “Study Notes; Economic Prospect and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka” Ryukoku University Keizaigaku Ronshu 39- .

_____ 1995. “Sri Lanka: New President, seeking for Reconciliation in mal du siecle”, Economist.

Hayashi, Akira. 1997. “Ethnic problems in Sri Lanka: Relations with politics after independence” Bunkei Ronsou, Humanities Department Edition.

_____ 1996. “Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka Focusing on immigration, education, economic policy and Cast background of Militant Groups”, Bunkei Ronsou, Humanities Department Edition.

_____ 1994 “Socio-political Dynamism in Contemporary South Asia Movements of Gandhi and Narayan in India and Ethnic Conflicts in Sri Lanka”, University of Tokyo.

Matsuo, Masatugu. 1997, 1998. Study on the Political feature of Language in Ethnic Movements and Conflicts, University of Hiroshima, Basic Research

158

(C) Study Report. Matsui. 1994-1996 “Anthropological Study on Generation and Circumvention of

Ethnic/ Religious Conflict in the Indian Subcontinent”, Kokusaigakujutu Kenkyu, University of Tokyo.

In English (2002-1983)

Abeyratne, Sirimal. 1998. Economic change and political conflict in developing countries : with special reference to Sri Lanka, VU University Press.

_____ Sirimal. 2002. Economic roots of political conflict: the case of Sri Lanka, The Australian National University, Dept. of Economics, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies.

Abeysekera, C. 1984. “Ethnic Representation in the Higher State Service”, in Social Scientists Association (ed.) Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka, Karunatne.

Abeysinghe, Ariya. 1988. Economic consequences of the ethnic conflict: 1983-1987, Centre for Society & Religion.

Ahmed, Ishtieq. 1996. State, nation and ethnicity in contemporary South Asia, Pinter.

All, Ameer. 1984. “Islamic revivalism in harmony and conflict: the experience in Sri Lanka and Malaysia”, Asian Survey 24: 296-313.

Allen, Douglas. 1992. Religion and political conflict in South Asia : India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, Greenwood Press.

_____ 1993. Religion and political conflict in South Asia : India, Pakistan, and Sri lanka, Oxford University Press.

Amnesty International. 1991. Sri Lanka-the Northeast : human rights violations in a context of armed conflict, Amnesty International Publications.

Amunugama, Sarath. 1991. Buddhaputra and Bhumiputra? Dilemmas of modern Sinhala Buddhist monks Relation to ethnic and political conflict”, Religion, April.

Anatol, Lieven. 1988. “Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka”, International Affairs, Autumn.

Apter, David E, ed. 1997. “The legitimization of violence”, Macmillan. Argenti-Pillen, Alex. 2002. Masking terror : how women contain violence in

Southern Sri Lanka, University of Pennsylvania Press. Article. 1996. “Silent war censorship and the conflict in Sri Lanka”, Article 19, _____ 1998. “Fifty years on : censorship, conflict and media reform in Sri Lanka”,

Article, 19. Arunatilake, Nisha.; Jayasuiiya, Sisira.; Kelegama, Saman. 2001. “The Economic

Cost of the War in Sri Lanka”, World Development, V29: 1483-1500. Asia Watch. 1992. The Sri Lanka conflict and standards of humanitarian law : an

159

appeal to the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE leadership. Austin, Dennis. 2002. “Terrorism, Srilanka and a Letter from President

Kumaratunga”, The Round Table, 363. _____ 1994. Democracy and violence in India and Sri Lanka, Pinter. _____ 1992 ; Gupta, Anirudha. 1988. Lions and tigers : the crisis in Sri Lanka, The

Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. Ayivan, Viktar. 1989. Sri Lanka in crisis : road to conflict, Sarvodaya Book Pub.

Services. Azam, Kousar J. 2001. Ethnicity, Identity, and the state in South Asia, South Asian

Publishers. Azar, Edward E. 1990. The management of protracted social conflict: theory and

cases, Ashgate. Baiakrishnan, Sahivate. 2000. “Breaking the deadlocks”, New Routs, 5, 26-31. Bass, Daniel. 2001. Landscape of Malaiyaha Tamil identity, Marga Institute. Bercovitch, Jacob. 1996. Resolving international conflicts : the theory and practice

of mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Bhardwaj, Surindwe M. 1989. “Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka”

The Geographical Review, Jan. Bhasin, Avtar Singh. 2001. India-Sri Lanka relations and Sri lanka’s ethnic

conflict documents, 1947-2000, Indian Research Press. Boucher, Jerry. ; Landis, Dan. 1987. Ethnic conflict: international perspectives,

Sage Publications. Bray, John. 1990. “Sri Lanka : The Conflict Within”, Asian Affairs, June. _____ 1989. “The Break-up of Sri Lanka : The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict”, Asian

Affairs, June. Brow, James 1990. “The incorporation of a marginal community within the

Sinhalese nation” Anthropological Quarterly, Jan. Brown, Michael E.; Ganguly, Sumit. 1997. Government policies and ethnic

relations in Asia and the Pacific, MIT Press. Bullion, Alen J. 1995. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil crisis, 1975-1994; an

international perspective, Pinter. Bush, Kenneth David. 1995. Cracking open the ethnic billiard ball : bringing the

intra-group dimension into ethnic conflict studies : with specia reference to Sri Lanka and Northen Ireland, University of Notre Dame, Joan B. Kroc institute for International Peace Studies.

_____ 1994. The intra-group dimensions of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland, University Microfilms international.

_____ 1990. Negotiating ethnic conflict the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987, National Library of Canada,

_____ 2001. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Swedish Development

160

Cooperation with Sri Lanka, Sida. Central Bank of Sri Lanka.1998. Economic Progress of Independent Sri Lanka. Ceran, Nakarkovil. 2001. Uyir kollum varttaikai, Kalaccuvatu Patippakam. Chandraratna, Donald. 1995. Sri Lanka : perspective on the resolution of conflict,

Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies. _____ 1993. Sri Lanka : perspectives on the resolution of conflict, Indian Ocean

Centre for Peace Studies, The University of Western Australia. Cheran, Rudhramoorthy. 1999. “Sri Lanka : human rights in the context of civil

war”, Refuge, 18, 4-9. Cheung, T.W. 1990. “Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies : Sri Lanka, Thailand

and Burma”, International Migration Review, Spring. Christie, Kenneth., ed. 1998. Ethnic conflict, tribal politics : a global perspective,

Curzon Press. Coakley, John., ed. 1993a. “Special Issue on the territorial management of ethnic

conflict”, Regional Politics and Policy, 8 1-213 _____ 1993b.The territorial management of ethnic conflict, Cass Connor, Robert J. 2002. Defeating the modern asymmetric threat, Naval

Postgraduate School, National Technical Information Service. Darby, John., ed.; Mac Ginty, Roger., ed. 2000. “The Management of peace processes”,

Macmillan. Dayas, Vije. 2000. Vargavadi yuddhayata 25 vasarak , Kamkaru Mavata

Prakasakayo. De Mel, Neflcufer. 2002. “Fractured Narratives: Notes on women in conflict in Sri

Lanka and Pakistan”, Development 45, 99-104. De Munck, Victor Celestin. 1985. Cross-currents of Conflict and Cooperation in

Kotaboya (Muslims, Kinship, Sri Lanka), University of California. De Silva, K. M. 2000. Conflict and violence in South Asia : Bangladesh, India,

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, International Centre for Ethnic Studies in association with Netherland Institute of international Relations, Clingendael.

_____ 1999. Sri Lanka, ethnic conflict, management and resolution, International Centre for Ethnic Studies.

_____ 1998a. Ethnic conflict in Buddhist societies : Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Burma, Westview Press.

_____ 1998b. Reaping the whirlwind : ethnic conflict, ethnic politics in Sri Lanka, Penguin Book.

_____ 1996. Sri Lanka, ethnic conflict, management and resolution, International Centre for Ethnic Studies.

_____ 1995. The “traditional homelands” of the Tamils: separatist ideology in Sri Lanka: a historical appraisal, International Centre for Ethnic Studies.

161

De Silva, K. M., ed. Peiris, G. H., ed. 2000. Pursuit of peace in Sri Lanka: past failures and future prospects, Internet Centre Ethnic Studies.

De Silva, K. M., ed.; Samarasinghe, S. W. R. de A., ed. 1993. Peace accords and ethnic conflict, Pinter.

De Silva. K. M.; May, Ronald James. 1991. Internationalization of ethnic conflict, Inter Publishers

De Silva, Manik. 1999. “Sri Lanka’s civil war”, Current History, 98, 426-32. De Silva, Minuka. 2002. “An overview of assistance provided by humanitarian

Agencies in the north and east and support provided by donors”, Year Book 2001, Consortium for Humanitawian Agencies.

De Silva, Purnaka L. 1997. “Sri Lanka : futures beyond conflict”, Futures, Dec. De Zoysa, Piyanjali. 2001. “Conflict-related trauma in an Asian country: a report

from Sri Lanka”, International Review of Psychiatry, 13. DeVotta, Neil. 2002. “Liberalism and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka”, Journal of

Democracy, 13, 84-98. _____ 2001. From linguistic nationalism to ethnic conflict : Sri Lanka in

comparative perspective, The University of Texas at Austin. _____ 2000. “Control democracy, institutional decay, and the quest for Eelam:

explaining ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka”, Pacific Affairs, 73, 55-76. Demusz, Kerry. 2000. Listening to the displaced : action research in the conflict

zones of Sri Lanka, Oxfam. Departamentuva, Pravrtti. 1983. Sri Lanka beyond conflict, GP. Dept. of Information, Sri Lanka. 1983. Sri Lanka, beyond conflict. Dissanayaka, T.D.S.A. 1995. War or peace in Sri Lanka: an in-depth account of the

current quest for peace: written without fear or favour with malice to none and magnanimity to all, Swastika.

_____ 1993. The dilemma of Sri Lanka : an in-depth account of the current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Swastika (Pvt.) Ltd.

Dunham, David. Jayasuriya, Sisira. 2000a. Equity, Growth and Insurrection: Liberalisation and the welfare Debate in Contemporary Sri Lanka, Oxford Development Studies, Vol.28, No.1.

_____ 2000b. Liberalisation and political decay: Sri Lanka’s journey from a welfare state to a brutalized society, Pravada, Vol.7, No.7.

Eller, Jack David. 1999. From culture to ethnicity to conflict: an anthropological perspective on international ethnic conflict, University of Michigan Press.

Esman, Milton J.; Herring, Ronald J. 2001. Carrots, sticks, and ethnic conflict : rethinking development assistance, University of Michigan press.

Farrant, Richard. 2000. “Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka : Pearl of the East or Island of Tears?”, Asian Affairs.

Ferdinands, Tyrol. 1992. Hopelessness and challenge : the mission of the Church in

162

situations of conflict : Sri Lanka, Jointly published by Christian Conference of Asia, International Affairs and Commission for Justice & Peace of the National Christian Council of Sri Lanka.

Fernando, J. Basil. 1991. Sri Lanka : militarization vs.modernization, Asia Monitor Resource Center.

Francis, Dana. 1998. Mediating deadly conflict: lessons from Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel/Palestine, Liberia, Sierra Leone, & Sri Lanka, World Peace Foundation.

Frank Cass Publishers. 1999, “Children and conflict: rights and realities” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 15 313-422.

Fry, Douglas P.; Bjorkqvist, Kaj. 1997. Cultural variation in conflict resolution : alternatives to violence, Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers.

Fugierud, Oivind. 1998. Space and movement in the Sri Lankan conflict, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Osio.

Gaan, Narottarn. 2000. Environmental causes of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: intra and inter state, Peace Research Abstracts.

Gamage, Siri.; Watson, Ian Bruce. 1998. Conflict and community in contemporary Sri Lanka, South Asian Studies Assosiation.

Ghosh, P.A. 1999. Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and role of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), A.P.H.Pub. Corp.

Gilles, David. 1992. Canadian Aid, Human Rights and Conflict in Sri Lanka, in Aid as Peacemaker, Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict, Carleton University Press.

Godhand, G. and Lewer, N., 1999. NGOs and Peace-building in Complex Political Emergencies, CHA newsletter vol.3-3.

Gomez, Mario.; Papanicolas,Koula. 1996. The people in between : Sri Lankans face long-term displacement as conflict escalates, U.S.Committee for Refugees.

Goodhand, Jonathan. 2000. Aid, conflict and peace building in Sri Lanka , DFID. Gooneratne, Tilak. 1986. “The present situation in Sri Lanka”, Asian Affairs, 17:

33-45. Goonetilleke, D.C.R.A.. 1992. “Sri Lanka’s “ethnic” conflict in its literature in

English”, World Literature Today, Summer. Greenberg, Richard. 1986. No island is an island anymore : international

ramifications of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Institut universitaire de hautes etudes Internationales.

Grobar, Lisa Morris. Gnanaselvam, Shiranthi. 1993. “The economic effects of the Sri Lanka civil war”, Economic Development & Cultural Change Jan.

Gunatilleke, Godfrey . 2001. Negotiations for the resolution of the ethnic conflict, Marga Institute.

Gunawardana, R.A.L.H. 1995. Historiography in a time of ethnic conflict :

163

construction of the past in contemporary Sri Lanka, Social Scientists’ Association,

Guy, Gran. 1990. “Ethnic Conflict and Human Rights in Sri Lanka : an Annotated Bibliography”, World Development, April.

Hancock, Landon E. 1996. The patterns of ethnic conflict, Haug, Marit. 2001. Combining service delivery and advocacy within humanitarian

agencies : experiences from the conflict in Sri Lanka, Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Dagmar. 1999. Security aspects of the conflict in Sri Lanka, Strategic and Security Studies Unit, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University Kebangsaan Malaysia.

_____ 1989. “Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka”, Pacific Affairs, Spring.

Hollup, Oddvar. 1992. Ethnic Identity, violence and the Estate Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, Round Table.

Howard b. Scaffer. 1996. “Sri Lanka in 1995 : a difficult and disappointing year”, Asian Survey, Feb.

Human Rights Watch Asia. 1992. The Sri Lankan conflict and standards of humanitarian law, Human Rights Watch.

_____ 1995. Sri Lanka: stop killing of civilians, Human Rights Watch. Imiya.; Mudiyanselage.; Kamalawathie. 1991. Sri Lanka: A Socio-Psychological

Study on Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic, Keio University. Institute for Developing Economies, 2002. “Conflicts in the Third World

International Relations and Nation Building”, Conflicts and Nation Building in the Third World Project, Interim Report.

Islam, Nasir. 1990. “Ethnic differentiation, relative deprivation and public policies in Sri Lanka”, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 17, 15-30.

Jalalzai, Musa Khan., ed. 1995. Terrorism and ethnic violence in South Asia, Pubs Emprium 200.

Jandt, Fred Edmund.; Pedersen, Paul. 1996. Constructive conflict management : Asia-Pacific cases, Sage Publications.

Jayawardena, Kumari. 1985.Ethnic and class conflicts in Sri Lanka : some aspects of Sinhala Buddhist consciousness over the past 100 years, Sanjiva Books.

Jayawardena, Kumari., ed.; Uyangoda, Jayadeva.,ed. 1986. “Special issue on the national question in Sri Lanka”, South Asia Bulletin, 6 : 1-47.

Jensen, Allan. 1995. The rise of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka a study of local, national and international dynamics, National Library of Canada.

Jeyakumaran, Annappah. 1988. Crucified hope : beyond liberation : an appeal to the churches of Sri Lanka to guide the people of Sri Lanka to overcome the ongoing ethnic conflict,

164

Johnson, B. L. C. 1998. Jaffna, bloody Jaffna, Minerva. Joshi, Charu Lata. 2000. “Ultimate sacrifice: faced with harassment and economic

deprivation, young Tamils are ready to give up their lives” Far Eastern Economic Review, 163, 64-7.

Joshi, Manoj. 1996. “On the razor’s edge: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19, 19-42.

Kandiah, Thiru. 2001. The media and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Marga Institute.

Kearney, Robert N. 1986. “Tension and conflict in Sri Lanka”, Current History, 85: 109-12.

Keethaponcaian, S. I. 2001. “Third party role in an ethnic conflict: Indian involvement in Sri Lanka”, Peace Research Abstracts, 38, 451-600.

Keyes, Charles F. 1990. “Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies : Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Feb.

Khory, Kavita Rusi. 1991. Separatism in South Asia : the politics of ethnic conflict and regional security.

Kois, Lisa M.; Francis, Dana.; Rotberg, Robert l. 1998. Sri Lanka’s civil war and prospects for post-conflict reconstruction, World Peace Foundation.

Krishna, Sankaran. 2001. India’s role in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, Marga Insitute.

LaBine, Randai. 2001. Religion and conflict: a study of identity and nationalism in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Afghanistan.

Laffin, John. 1997. The world in conflict : war annual 8 : contemporary warfare described and analysed, Brassey’s.

_____ 1996. The world in conflict : war annual 7 : contemporary warfare described and analysed, Brassey’s.

_____ 1994. The world in conflict: war annual 6 : contemporary warfare described and analysed, Brassey’s,

Leary, Virginia A. 1983. Ethnic conflict and violence in Sri Lanka : report of a mission to Sri Lanka in July-August 1981 on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, ICJ ; AAICJ.

Lindstrom, Olof Ronny. 1991. A theoretical approach to ethnic conflict in a nation that has undergone changes in its ethnic structure.

Little, David. 1994. Sri Lanka : the invention of enmity, United States Institute of Peace press.

Loganathan, Bhawani. 2000. Gendering humanitarianism : an annotated bibliography on gender and capacity building in armed conflict, International Centre for Ethnic Studies.

Loganathan, K. and Ropers, N. 2002. Conceptualizing a Road Map for Peace in Sri Lanka, Centre for Policy Alternatives (mimeo).

165

Loganathan, Ketheshwaran. 1996. Sri Lanka : lost opportunities : past attempts at resolving ethnic conflict, Centre for Policy Research and Analysis, Faculty of Law, University of Colombo.

Long, Roger D. 1994. “Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia : India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka”, Journal of Third World Studies, Spring.

Lyon, Alynna June. 1999. International contributions to the mobilization of ethnic conflict: Sri Lanka, Iraq and Rwanda.

Manikkalingam, Ram. 2001. Political Liberalism, social pluralism, and group conflict, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Manogaran, Chelvadurai. 1987. Ethnic conflict and reconciliation in Sri Lanka, University of Hawaii Press.

Manogaran, Chelvadurai., ed.; Pfaffenberger, Bryan., ed. 1994. The Sri Lanka Tamils : ethnicity and identity, Westview.

Marashall R. Singer. 1996. “Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict : have bombs shattered hopes for peace?”, Asian Survey, Nov.

Marga Institute. 2001. A history of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka : recollection, reinterpretation & reconciliation.

Marks, Tom. 1996. “Sri Lanka: reform, revolution or ruin? The intense phase of Asia’s longest war”, Soldiier of Fortune, 21, 35-94.

Marshall R, Singer. 1992. “Sri Lanka’s Tamil-Sinhalese sthnic conflict : alternative solutions”, Asian Survey, August.

Meyer, Eric. 1989. “The break-up of Sri Lanka : the Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict”, International Affairs Summer.

Misra, S. S. 1995. Ethnic conflict and security crisis in Sri lanka, Kalinga Publications.

Montville, Joseph V., ed. 1990. “Conflict and peacemaking in multiethnic societies”, Macmillan.

Moxon-Browne, Edward. 1992. “Sri Lanka : History and Roots of Conflict”, International Affairs, Jan.

Mukarji, Apratim. 2000. The war in Sri Lanka : unending conflict?, Har-Anand Publications.

Munasinahe, Sarath. 2000. A soldier’s version : an account of the on-going conflict and the origin of terrorism in Sri Lanka , Market Information Systems.

Muni. S.D. 1993. Pangs of proximity : India and Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis, SAGE publications.

N. Kearney. 1985. “Sri Lanka : national conflict and the Tamil liberation struggle”, Journal of Development Areas, April.

Naidoo, Josephine.; Schaus, Pamela J. 1998. The tragedy of Sri Lanka : ethnic conflict and forced migration, Wilfrid Laurier University.

Navrang. 1984. Sri Lanka, the ethnic conflict : myths, realities & perspectives.

166

Nesiah, Devanesan. 2001a. Tamil nationalism, Marga Institute. _____ 2001b. “The claim to self-determination : a Sri Lankan Tamil perspective”,

Contemporary South Asia, 10, 55-71. Nilan Fernando. 1998. “Sri Lanka in 1997 : inching toward a durable peace”, Asian

Survey, Feb. Nithyanandam, V. Nithi. 2001. “Changing Scenarios of Tamilian Culture : Some

Thoughts on the Cultural Dimensions of the Ethnic War in Sri Lanka”, Asian Ethnicity, 2.

Obert, Robert. 1986. “Administrative conflict and decentralization: the case of Sri Lanka”, Public Administrative and Development, 6: 163-74.

Ofstad, Arve. 2002. “Countries in violent conflict and aid atrategies : the case of Sri Lanka”, World development, Oxford Pergamon 30.

Olsen, Bendigt. 1989. The Sri Lanka conflict : a study of elite perceptions, Chr. Micheisen Institute, Development Research and Action Programme.

Otis, Pauletta. 1998. Policies and Precipitants of Ethnic Conflict, Case Study: Sri Lanka, University of Denver.

_____ 1988. Policies and precipitants of ethnic conflict case study : Sri Lanka. Otis, Pauletta: Carr, Christopher D. 1986. “Sri Lanka and the ethnic challenge”,

Conflict 8: 203-16. O’Sullivan, Meghan L. 1999. Identity and institutions in ethnic conflict : the

Muslims of Sri Lanka. _____ 1998. Civil strife, civil society, and the state : how Sri Lanka coped during

wartime, Queen Elizabeth House. Papanicolas, Koula.; Gomez. Mario. 1996. The people in between : Sri Lankans face

long-term displacement as conflict escalates, U.S. Committee for Refugees. Peck, Robert A. 1987. “Resolving the Sri Lanka conflict”, Department of State

Bulletin, 87: 68-71. Peebles, Patrick. 1990. Colonization and ethnic conflict in the dry zone of Sri

Lanka, Association for Asian Studies. Pemadasa, Alavattagoda. 1994. Trastavadayak vu avasthavadaya ha eya madime

avasthavadi piliveta, Jatika Vira Padanama. Perera, Jayantha. 1992. “Political development and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka”,

Journal of Refugee Studies, 5: 136-48. Perera, Jehan. 1998. Yuddhayada? Samayada?, Jatika Sama Mandalaya. Perera, Liyana Atukoralalage Sasannk. 1991.Teaching and Learning Hatred: the

Role of Education and Socialization in Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict (Sinhalese, Tamil, Textbooks), University of California.

Perera, Sasanka. 1998. New evangelical movements and conflict in South Asia : Sri Lanka and Nepal in perspective, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.

Perera, Vasanta. 1984. llam trastavadaye ssba muhunuvara, S.I.: s.n.

167

Pfaffenberger, Brayn. 1991. “The Break-up of Sri Lanka : The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Feb.

Phadnis, Urmila. 1984. Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka : an overview, Gandhi Peace Foundation.

Philipson, Liz. 2001. Negotiating processes in Sri Lanka, Marga Institute. _____ 1999a. Breaking recurring themes in the cycles of war and peace in Sri

Lanka, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics.

_____ 1999b. “Sri Lanka’s trials”, New Routes, 4 : 21-5. Phukon, Girin. 2002. Ethnicity and policy in South Asia, South Asian Publishers. Ponnambalam, Satchi. 1983. Sri Lanka: National Conflict and the Tamil Liberation

Struggle, Zed Books, Limited, St. Martin’s Press. Premdas, Ralph R. Samarasinghe, S.W.R. de A. 1988. “Sri Lanka’s ethinic conflict :

the Indo-Lanka peace accord”, Asian Survey, June. Ratcliffe, Peter. 1996. “Race”, ethnicity and nation : International perspectives on

social conflict, UCKL Press. Reilley, Brigg; Simpson, issbel; Ford, Naihan. 2002. “Conflict in Sri Lanka”, British

Medical Journal 324. Roberts, Michael. 2001. Sinhala-ness and Sinhala nationalism, Marga Institute. _____ 1993. “Sri Lanka. History and the Roots of Conflict”, Ethnic and Racial

Studies, Jan. Rogers, John D.; Spencer, Jonathan.; Uyangoda, Jayadeva. 2001. “Sri Lanka:

political violence and ethnic conflict”, Peace Research Abstracts, 38. _____ 1998. “Sri Lanka : political violence and ethnic conflict”, The American

psychologist, July. Romanucci-Ross, Lola.; De Vos, George A. 1995. Ethnic identity : creation, conflict,

and accommodation, Alta Mira Press. Ross, Marc Howar ad.; Rothman, Jay. 1996. The conflict, management implications

of major theories of ethnic conflict, Internaitonal Centre for Ethnic Studies. Rotberg, Robert., ed. 2001. “Vigilance and vengeance: NGOs preventing ethnic

conflict in divided societies”, Peace Research Abstracts, 38, 605-751. _____ 1999. Creating peace in Sri Lanka : civil war and reconciliation, World Peace

Foundation and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Brookings institution Press.

Rothenberg, David M. 2002. “Negotiation and dispute resolution in the Sri Lanka context: lessons from the 1994-5 Peace talks”, Peace Research Abstracts, 39, 311-456.

Ruiz, Hiram A.; Hope, Katie. 1997. Conflict and displacement in Sri Lanka : a U.S. Committee for Refugees site visit report, U.S. Committee for Refugees.

Rupasinghe, Kumar. (ed.) 1998. Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka : efforts, failure

168

and lessons, International Alert. Rupesinghe, Ajit. 2000. “Principled peace, democratic development”, New Routs 5,

18-24. Rupesinghe, Kumar. 1992. Internal conflict and governance, St. Martin’s Press in

association with the International Peace Research Institute Oslo. _____, ed. 1987a. Ethnic conflict and human rights: a comparative perspective,

Bulletin of Peace Proposals. _____ 1987b. Development and conflict in Sri Lanka, International Alert. Rupesinghe, Kumar.; Verstappen, Berth. 1989. Ethnic conflict and human rights in

Sri Lanka : an annotated bibliography, H. Zell. Rupesinghe, Kumar.; Verstappen, Berth.; Phillip, Anton S. 1993. Ethnic conflict

and human rights in Sri Lanka : an annotated bibliography, H. Zeil. Ryan, Stephen. 1990. Ethnic conflict and International relations, Ashgate. SIM. 1985. Ethnic violence, development, and human rights: final report of the

second consultation, Utrecht, 1-3. SLE. 2001. Conflict-threat or opportunity? : land use and coping strategies of

war-affected communities in Trincomalee Sri Lanka, Centre for Advanced Training in Rural Development.

Samarasinghe, S. W. R. de A. 1984. “Sri Lanka in 1983 : ethnic conflict and the search for solutions [political, economic, and Diplomatic situation]”, Asian Survey, 24 : 250-6.

Samarasinghe, S. W. R. de A.; Coughlan, Reed. 1991. Economic dimensions of ethnic conflict, Pinter, St. Martin’s Press.

Sangarasivam, Yamura. 2000. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the cultural production of nationalism and violence: representing the integrity of nation and the choice for armed struggle, Syracuse University.

Saravanamuttu, P. 1995. Domestic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Its Regional Implications, The Centre.

Sardesai, Shonall. 2001. The management and mismanagement of ethno-regional conflicts ; The case of South Asia, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Sathananthan, Sachithanandam.; Rajasingam, Manoranjan. 1996. The elusive dove : an assessment of conflict resolution initiatives in Sri Lanka, 1957-1996, Mandru (Institute for Alternative Development and Regional Cooperation).

Schrijvers. Joke. 1999. “Fighters, victims and survivors: constructions of ethnicity, gender and refugeeness among Tamils in Sri Lanka”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 12: 307-33.

Selladurai, Bamini.; Iracentiran, Cupa. 1998. Citariya Cittarttan Kotai Patippakarn.

Sellers, Dawn. 1988. Modernaization and political conflict : the problem of majority

169

parliament rule for the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Shanmugaratnam, N. 2002a. Challenges to Peacebuilding and Development in

the Interim Phase: A Political Economic Perspective, Paper presented at the Conference on the Role Transitional Arrangements in Negotiating a Political Settlement in Sri Lanka, Murten, Switzerland, 15-17 April 2002.

_____ 2002b. Key Issues for the Proposed Joint Task Force, Presentation at the Workshop on the Proposed Joint Task Force and the Interim Phase, Jointly organised by the Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Berghof Foundation, 18 October 2002, JAIC Hilton, Colombo.

Shantha, K. Hennayake. 1991. “Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka”, The Journal of Asian Studies, May.

Siokke, Kristian. 1996. “Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as post-colonial political projects from ‘above’, 1948-1983”, Political Geography, 17, 83-113.

Somasundaram, Daya. 1997. “Abandoning Jaffna Hospital: ethnic and moral dilemmas”, Medicine. Conflict and Survival, 13: 333-47.

Sorbo. Gunnar M. et al, 1987. Sri Lanka,Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, University of Bergen,Centre for Development Studies.

Spencer, Jonathan. 1995. Learning from the particular: intellectuals and ‘ordinary people’ in situations of ethnic conflict, Centre for South Asian Studies of the University of Edinburgh.

_____, ed. 1990. Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, Routledge. Stirrat, R.L. 1989a. “Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies : Sri Lanka, Thailand

and Burma” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Jan. _____ 1989b. “The Break-up Sri Lanka : The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Jan. Sumantra, Bose. 1995. “State crises and nationalities conflict in Sri Lanka and

Yugoslavia”, Comparative Political Studies, April. Swamy, Narayan M.R. 2002, Tigers of Lanka – from boys to guerillas, updated

edition, Vijitha Yapa Publishers. Swan, Bernard. 1986. Peace and conflict in a poor country, Sri Lanka: an

introduction , Australian Institute of International Affairs. Tambiah, S. J. 1986. Sri Lanka : ethnic fratricide and the dismantling of democracy,

Univ Chicago Press. Thangarajah, Crcil Yuvaraj. 1997. State Violence, Ethnicity, and Identity: The

Case of Eastern Sri Lanka (Violence, State formation), The University of Rochester.

Thomas, C. Joshua. 1995. Sri Lanka’s turmoil and Indian Government : a study of ethnic conflict, Omsons Publications.

Tschuy, Theo. 1997. Ethnic conflict and religion : challenge to the churches, WCC Publications.

170

Udagame, Deepika. 1998. “Taming of the beast: judicial responses to state violence in Sri Lanka”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 11, 259-94.

Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 1990. State violence and ethnicity, University Press of Colorado.

Vanniasingham, Somasundaram. 1989. Sri Lanka : the conflict within, Sangam. _____ 1988. Sri Lanka, the conflict within, Lancer. Vasantha-Rajah. 1996. Tamil exodus and beyond : an analysis of the national

conflict in Sri Lanka. Venkateshwar Rao, P. 1988. “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka : India’s role and

perception”, Asian Survey, April. Watson, I.B. 1999. Conflict and community in contemporary Sri Lanka, Gamage,

Sirisena. Saga Pubilcations. Whittington, Sherrill. 1987. Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka : background, recent

developments, and the prospects for resolution, Legislative Research Service, Dept, of the Parliamentary Library.

Wickrametunge, Lasantha. 1995. Sri Lanka, the ethnic conflict, East-West Centre, Program on Communication and Journalism.

Wickremasinghe, Nira. 2001. Civil Society in Sri Lanka, New circles of power,Sage. Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. 1994. S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the crisis of Sri Lanka

Tamil nationalism, 1947-1977: a political biography, Hurt. _____ 1988. The berak-up of Sri Lanka : the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, Orient

Longman. World Press Review. 2000. “Sri Lanka’s enduring ethnic violence: an island

paradise a wash in blood”, World Press Review, 47, 20-3. Wynne, Alison. 1988. Lament for Lanka : voices from an island in conflict,

Christian Conference of Asia, International Affairs Committee Young, Miriam. 2001. “Making peace in Sri Lanka”, Current History, 100, 183-6. _____ 2000. “Sri Lanka’s long war”, Foreign Policy in Focus , 5, 1-4. Zartman, I. William. 1995. Elusive peace : negotiating an end to civil wars,

Brookings institution. Zompetti, Joseph P. 1993. Sri Lanka : colonialism and conflict. Zwier, Lawrence J. 1998. Sri Lanka : War- torn island, Lerner Publications.

JAPAN BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (JBIC)

http://www.jbic.go.jp/ 4-1, Ohtemachi 1-Chome Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8144, Japan Telephone +81-3-5218-9720 (JBIC Institute) Facsimile +81-3-5218-9846

Osaka Branch

13th Fl., Aqua Dojima East 4-4, Dojimahama 1-Chome Kita-ku, Osaka 530-0004, Japan Telephone +81-6-6346-4770 Facsimile +81-6-6346-4779

Overseas Network

Representative Office in Beijing 3131, 31st Fl., China World Trade Center, No.1 Jian Guo Men Wai Ave., Beijing 100004, The People's Republic of China Tel. 86-10-6505-8989, 3825 8, 1196, 1197 Fax.86-10-6505-3829,1198 Hong Kong Office Suite 3706, Level37, One Pacific Place, 88 Queensway, Hong Kong Tel. 852-2869-8505 7 Fax.852-2869-8712 Representative Office in Bangkok 14th Fl., Nantawan Building, 161 Rajdamri Road, Bangkok 10330, Thailand Tel. 66-2-252-5050 Fax.66-2-252-5514,5515 Representative Office in Hanoi 6th Fl., 63 Ly Thai To Street, Hanoi, Viet Nam Tel. 84-4-8248934 6 Fax.84-4-8248937

Representative Office in Jakarta Summitmas II 7th Fl., Jl. Jenderal Sudirman, Kav. 61-62, Jakarta Selatan, Jakarta, Indonesia Tel. 62-21-522-0693 Fax.62-21-520-0975 Representative Office in Kuala Lumpur 22nd Fl., UBN Tower, Letter Box No.59, Jalan P, Ramlee 50250, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Tel. 60-3-2072-3255,2201,2202 Fax.60-3-2072-2115 Representative Office in Manila Office 31st / Floor, Citibank Tower, Valero St. corner Villar St., Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines Tel. 63-2-848-1828, 752-5682 Fax.63-2-848-1833 35 Representative Office in Singapore 9 Raffles Place, #53-01 Republic Plaza, Singapore 048619 Tel. 65-6557-2806 Fax. 65-6557-2807 Representative Office in Colombo Level 13, Development Holdings 42, Navam Mawatha, Colombo 2, Sri Lanka Tel. 94-1-300470, 300471, 300472 Fax.94-1-300473

Representative Office in Dhaka IDB Bhaban (5th Floor), E/8-A, Begum Rokeya Sharani, Sher-E-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka-1207, Bangladesh Tel.880-2-811-4081, 6700 (Direct) Fax.880-2-811-3336 Direct Representative Office in Islamabad House No. 62, Ataturk Avenue, G- 6/3, Islamabad, Pakistan Tel. 92-51-2820119 Fax.92-51-2822546 Representative Office in New Delhi 3rd Fl., DLF Centre, Sansad Marg, New Delhi 110001, India Tel. 91-11-371-4362, 4363, 7090, 6200 Fax.91-11-371-5066, 373-8389 Representative Office in Sydney Suite 2501, Level 25, Gateway 1 Macquarie Place, Sydney, N.S.W. 2000, Australia Tel. 61-2-9241-1388 Fax.61-2-9231-1053 Representative Office in Moscow 123610 Moscow, Krasnopresnenskaya Nab.12, World Trade Center, Office No. 905, Russian Federation Tel. 7-095-258-1832, 1835, 1836 Fax.7-095-258-1858

Representative Office in Frankfurt Taunustor 2, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Tel. 49-69-2385770 Fax.49-69-23857710 Representative Office in London 4th Fl., River Plate House, 7- 11 Finsbury Circus, London, EC2M 7EX, U.K. Tel. 44-20-7638-0175 Fax.44-20-7638-2401 Representative Office in Paris 21, Boulevard de la Madeleine 75038 Paris Cedex 01, France Tel. 33-1-4703-6190 Fax.33-1-4703-3236 Representative Office in Cairo Abu El Feda Bldg., 16th Fl., 3 Abu El Feda Street, Zamalek, Cairo, Egypt Tel. 20-2-738-3608 9 Fax.20-2-738-3607 Representative Office in Nairobi 6th Fl., International House, Mama Ngina Street, P.O. Box 49526, Nairobi, Kenya Tel. 254-2-221420, 221637 Fax.254-2-221569

Representative Office in New York 520 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor, New York, NY 10152, U.S.A. Tel. 1-212-888-9500, 9501, 9502 Fax.1-212-888-9503 Representative Office in Washington, D.C. 1909 K st., N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A. Tel. 1-202-785-5242 Fax.1-202-785-8484 Representative Office in Bogota Calle 100, 8A-55, Oficina 715, World Trade Center, Torre C, Santafé de Bogotá, D.C., Colombia Tel. 57-1-621 -1828, 1838, 1845, 1849, 1878, 1889 Fax.57-1-610-7293 Representative Office in Buenos Aires Ave. del Libertador No.498, Piso19, 1001 Capital Federal Buenos Aires, Argentina Tel. 54-11-4394-1379, 1803 Fax.54-11-4394-1763

Representative Office in Lima Av.Central,643, San Isidro Lima 27, Peru Tel. 51-1-442-3031 Fax.51-1-440-9657 Representative Office in Mexico City Paseo de la Reforma 265 Piso-16, Col. Cuauhtemoc, Mexico, D.F. 06500, Mexico Tel. 52-55-5525-67-90 Fax.52-55-5525-34-73 Representative Office in Rio de Janeiro Praia de Botafogo, 228-801 B,Botafogo, CEP.22359-900, Rio de Janeiro, RJ,Brazil Tel. 55-21-2553-0817 Fax.55-21-2554-8798 Toronto Liaison Office P.O.Box493, 2 First Canadian Place, Suite3660, Toronto, Ontario, M5X 1E5, Canada Tel. 1-416-865-1700 Fax.1-416-865-0124

JBICI Research Paper Series1 1. Issues of Sustainable Economic Growth from the Perspective of the Four East Asian Countries,

December 1999 2. Organizational Capacity of Executing Agencies in the Developing Countries: Case Studies on

Bangladesh, Thailand and Indonesia, December 1999 3. Urban Development and Housing Sector in Viet Nam, December 1999 4. Urban Public Transportation in Viet Nam: Improving Regulatory Framework, December 1999* 5. Current Situation of Rice Distribution System in Indonesia, December 19992 6. Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China and Japan, March 2000 7. Rural Enterprises Finance: A Case Study of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural

Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand, November 20003 8-1. Issues of Sustainable Development in Asian Countries: Focused on SMIs in Thailand, December

2000 8-2. Issues of Sustainable Development in Asian Countries: Focused on SMIs in Malaysia, December

2000 9. Policy Issues and Institutional Reform in Road Sector in Developing Countries, February 20014 10. Public Expenditure Management in Developing Countries, March 2001 11. INDIA: Fiscal Reforms and Public Expenditure Management, August 2001 12. Cash Crop Distribution System in the Philippines - Issues and Measures to Address Them -,

March 2002 13. MERCOSUR Experience In Regional Freight Transport Development, March 2002 14. Regional Cooperation for Infrastructure Development in Central and Eastern Europe, March

20025 15. Foreign Direct Investment and Development: Where Do We Stand?, June 2002 16-1. Development Assistance Strategies in the 21st Century (volume1), July 2002 16-2. Development Assistance Strategies in the 21st Century (volume2), July 2002 17. Education Sector in Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, July 20026 18. Regional Cooperation Strategy on Interconnected Power Networks in Indochina, August 2002 19. Impact Assessment of Irrigation Infrastructure Development on Poverty Alleviation: A Case Study

from Sri Lanka, November 2002 20. Macroeconomic Impact of IT Adoption and Diffusion, December 2002 21. Cost Benefit Analysis of Participatory Approach Conceptual Review and Framework for

Qualitative Analysis , January 2003 22. Higher Education Development in Asia Inter-University Collaboration and University-Industry

Cooperation , May 2003 23. Direction of Development Policy of Central American Countries, August 2003 24. Conflict and Development: Roles of JBIC Development Assistance Strategy for Peace Building

and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka , August 2003 *No.1~No.14 were published as ‘JBIC Research Paper Series’. JBIC Institute, Japan Bank for International Cooperation 4-1, Ohtemachi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8144, Japan Tel: 03-5218-9720, Fax: 03-5218-9846 (Planning and Coordination Division) Internet: http://www.jbic.go.jp/

1 Full texts can be downloaded from the JBIC website. 2 In Japanese only. English summary can be downloaded from the JBIC website. 3 In Japanese only 4 In Japanese only 5 In Japanese only 6 In Japanese only

ISSN 1347-5703

4-1, Ohtemachi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8144, Japan Tel: 03-5218-9720 (JBIC Institute )

Internet: http://www.jbic.go.jp/