Consociational democracy

Operation and pre-conditions

Recap

Consociational democracy: A form of consensus democracy Parties and elites cooperateTypically characterized by Power-sharing at the top

larger than normal coalitions Elite accommodation

‘Subcultural’ autonomy: Key groups have power to regulate their own affairs (or at

least some of them)

Typical characteristics

Grand or (nearly grand) rather than minimum-winning coalitions

Proportional allocation/sharing out of positions & policies

Mutual veto Some degree of subcultural autonomy:

“sovereignty in their own sphere”

Cases:

Netherlands Belgium Austria Switzerland Lebanon before 1982

Netherlands:

Religious and class cleavages: schools suffrage “social question”

Mobilization of Calvinists, Catholics & Socialists

Formation of a segmented or pillarized society (19th & early 20th c)

Pacification Settlement

All-party settlement, negotiated 1913-1917 Entrench state support for denominational

schools in Dutch Constitution Universal manhood suffrage from 1918

Universal suffrage from 1922 Proportional representation

Plus requirement to vote Entrench proportional allocation

From 1918-1960s

Larger than minimum-winning coalitions Divisive issues settled by proportional allocation Broadcasting as template:

Catholic, Calvinist, Social Democratic and Liberal broadcasting organizations share time on two radio frequenciez

Proportional allocation of funds to Catholic, Calvinist & state (secular) schools

Proportional allocation to other groups, entities: e.g. housing corporations, organizations providing social welfare

Late 1960s & beyond:

Challenges to party elites ‘De-pillarization’ Regrouping of parties Merger of some former subcultural organizations:

Trade Union federations Employers associations

Result: Vestiges remain: A large # of parties Separate schools ‘Delegations of authority to former religious or ideologically based

organizations Netherlands remains a consensus democracy but no longer

consociational

Lijphart’s argument

Netherlands lacked cross-cutting cleavages Should have ‘flown apart’ as a result Didn’t because:

Elites saw the dangers of conflict Compromised instead

In addition: Fact of segmentation results in a ‘self-denying’ hypothesis:

pillars or segments don’t clash because they don’t interact

Pre-conditions:

Consociation more likely if: authoritative elites well-defined segments or subcultures Mutual balance of power (no one group is

dominant) International pressures encourage

cooperation

Problems:

Was the Netherlands as divided & conflict ridden as Lijphart argues?

Role of ordinary citizens? What happens if elites are not authoritative?

How do elites sell compromises? How democratic is consociational

democracy?

Is consociation a viable solution for deeply divided societies?Application to Sri Lanka? Cypress? Balkans?

Canada The former Czechoslovakia?

Other solutions? How different is consociational democracy?