Consociationalism in Netherlands Cheng Mai Paper June 2010

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Attain Political Stability in a divided society: consociational democracy within three European

countries ............................................................................................................................................ 1

Consociationalism in Netherlandsa successful prototype ..................................................... 3

History and Framework of Dutch constitution Since 1814 ............................................... 3

Pillarisation of the era before 1970s .................................................................................. 5

Depillarisation after 1970 .................................................................................................. 7

The case of Belgium: a failure for operationalization of Consociationalism .......................... 10

Development of Belgian constitution before 1960s ........................................................ 10

Further pillarisation after 1960s: the linguistic cleavage ................................................ 12

Institutionalization of the pillarisation from 1970 ........................................................... 13

From consociationalism to pseudo-federation or even separation .................................. 16

The case of SwitzerlandConsociationalism without strong parties ..................................... 18

History of Swiss constitution .......................................................................................... 18

Framework of state structure of the present constitution of Switzerland ........................ 19

Weak party institutions: Causes and Consequences ........................................................ 21

The myth of the case of Switzerland ............................................................................... 26

Conclusion: ............................................................................................................................. 27

Attain Political Stability in a divided society:

consociational democracy within three European

countries

Mai Cheng

PhD Candidate of Constitution

Law School, Peking University,

China

In many divided societies, weve seen political chaos dominate the political stage: violent protest,

coup dtat, civil war or even genocide. Within most of these political turbulent cases, political

parties have played much significant but notorious role and been regarded as groups of

opportunists who care only their own profit. No Wonder under classical constitutional theory,

political party has actually obtained a rather negative reputation. Under Rousseaus general willtheory, only the people as a whole body can govern, and the representative democracy which

regards the British parliament system as the prototype is intolerable by him. In the Federalist

Papers, Madison had also given a rather negative definition of the political parties.1

1 By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, whoare united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens,

or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community, The Federalist, No. 10.

Since its

impossible to eliminate party and factions, he regarded one of the virtue of federalism is its

function to ameliorate the destructive and divisive effect of party activities. Even in the modern

world, few constitutions have recognized a formal status within their constitutions, and for those

who do have prescription in the text of their Constitutions, parties have to perform certain positive


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function, such as contribution to forming the opinion and will of the People,2

or to face certain

restrains, such as obligation to conform to democratic principles.3

In fact, one of the concerns

for the constitutional reform of China is the catastrophic consequence of introduction of

competitive party institutions.

Social division, however, does not inevitably result in political instability. When other countries of

segmented societies are troubled by ethnic, religious or cultural conflict, some equally ethnically

divided European countries have been admired for their political stability, such as the Netherlands,

Belgium before the 1960s and Switzerland. A Holland born scholar, Arend Lijphart, had defined

polities of these countries to be consociational democracy.4

Different to other stable democracies,

such as the US, UK, which is characterized by winner-take-all structure, such as district election

and two party systems within a homogeneous society, Lijphart characterized the consociational

democracy with four basic principles:5

(1) grand coalition, which means political leaders of all

the major segments of the society will join the government and share the government power; (2)

minority veto, which means the minority within the governing group further received veto power

to guarantee that it wont be overwhelmed by the majority; (3) proportionality, which means all

the government privileges and benefits, such as the seats of the parliament, are distributed

proportionally among the various constituent groups, and (4) segmental autonomy, which means

for issues out of common interests, they are left to the decision of the decision of the intra-segment

authorities.

Consociational democracy is operated within not only a segmented society, but also a pillarized

population, which means each segment is highly politically organized, of its own comprehensive

political structure. Political parties root in their respective pillar, have a tight control over the

clientele. The common citizens are shielded from direct contact with people outside the pillars,

which are believed to decrease the potentiality of conflict. The party leaders or political elites at

the tops of the various pillars make compromise and form coalition government. There would be

and would not be formal recognition in the Constitution for the consociationalism, but no doubt

under this structure, in contrast to the negative estimation for the consequences of party activities,

party institutions possess a central status within consociational democracy and will play a positive

role for the smooth and harmonic running of the constitution.

Judging from the theoretical description, it is really a beautiful and perfect resolution to the

constitutional design for segmented nation. But the effectiveness of the consociational democracyand its interaction with the constitution of the nation should receive further research. And the cases

of three countries recommend by Lijphart as models of consociationalism will be discussed in this

paper: the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland.6

2 Art. 137, Partis politiques: Les partis politiques contribuent former lopinion et la volont populaires ,

Constitution fdrale de la Confdration suisse.

We will discuss the history and framework of

the constitutions of these three countries, the real role that political parties play in their respective

3 Article 21, Basic Law of Germany.4 Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, World Politcs, Vol. 21 No. (1969), pp207-225.5 Arend Lijphart, Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links,Journal of Political Science

Vol. 12, No.3 (1979), p499, pp500-501.6 Arend Lijphart, Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical

Linkages,British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr. 1991), pp 235-246.


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polity, the success and failure of these countries. Then as a conclusion, we will remark on certain

key points we should pay attention to in constitutional design for a divided society.

Consociationalism in Netherlandsa successful

prototype

History and Framework of Dutch constitution Since 1814

In 1813, after the defeat of the French army by Russian troops, the Dutch people regained its

sovereignty. Under Napoleonic era, however, the Dutch polity was changed from a confederal

republic, namely the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, to a unitary system. The

confederal character was not formally restored with the leave of French, and the great influence of

French revolution had become a spectre over Dutch polity ever since. But people would see the

anti-authoritarian, or anti-revolutionary more precisely thoughts were still of great influence as

well.7

On 24 August 1815, the King William I of the Netherlands issued the first version of modern

Dutch constitution, established the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. It established at least

formally a constitutional monarchy, with a strong supervision from the King within all aspects of

state life, and one might still find certain heritage of the Republic, such as the appointment of the

members of House of Representatives (lower house) of the States-General by the States-Provincial.

Hence the first constitution of modern Holland was doomed to be revised soon. In 1848, under

leadership of a prominent statesman, Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, and confronting with the pressure

both from the Revolution of 1848 in the surrounding European countries and from Netherlands

domestically itself, King William II had no choice but to accept certain constraints for his

authorities, such as full ministerial responsibility, direct election of representatives of the Lower

Houses, which would lead the Dutch polity to a more substantial parliamentary democracy. In fact,

the constitution of 1848 is generally regarded as the original version of Dutch constitution still

valid at present. Another and probably the last significant revision of the constitution occurred in

1917, with an introduction of universal manhood suffrage, the abolishment of district and

majoritarian election system and establishment of proportional representation at all the three levels

of government, i.e. national, provincial and municipal ones. We will see infra the era around 1917

was a watershed for the constitutional and political development of Holland. Though there have

been major or minor revisions since then, no substantial change took place in Dutch polity

especially for the structure of various government organs.8

One may immediately find from the brief introduction above of the history of Dutch constitution,

that there is no rupture in the constitutional development of Holland which had taken place in

7 Kortmann Constantijn, Bovend'eert Paul, The Kingdom of the Netherlands: an Introduction to Dutch

Constitutional Law, Deventer [etc.]: Kluwer 1993, pp3-22.

8 John W. Sap, The Netherlands Constitution 1848-1998: Historical Reflections, Utrecht: LEMA, 2000, pp31-39;Ken Gladdish, Governing from the Centre: Politics and Policy-Making in the Netherlands, London: Hurst &

Company (1991), pp1-32.


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many other European continental countries, such as France and Germany. There was not a

distinctive group of constitution founders in Dutch constitution history. Though there have been

some breakthroughs, most modifications were introduced and realized gradually, which certainly

contribute the spirit of moderation for the operation of Dutch constitution.

Nowadays, people might say the Dutch constitution is a unitary but decentralized one. On the

national level, the States General is the legislature for the whole territory of Netherlands. Voters

elect the Lower House of the States General, under a proportional system and regarding the whole

country as one district. The Upper House members are elected by members of the provincial

councils which are the legislatures for respective provinces, also based on the proportional system.

Like most parliamentary governments, the lower house of the States General has a more important

role in the constitution. But different to many other proportional election systems, there is no such

thing like a 5% threshold of the Basic Law of Germany for the entrance of any party into the

parliament. As a consequence, the Dutch PR system is an extreme proportional one. Since there

are 150 seats in the lower house, any party won more the 0.67% of the total votes of the national

election will acquire at least one seat in the lower house. No one will doubt this arrangement will

lead to a large number of parties existing in Dutch democracy. In 2007, there are 11 parliamentary

parties, including a Party for Animals with only 2 seats in the lower house and 1 seat in the

upper house, and nobody know precisely how many parties plus outside the parliament. The

highly segmented reality of the political arena makes it very difficult for any party to win a

majority status by itself, and coalition is indispensable for any successful government.

Composition of the Dutch Parliament Since 2007 9

Party Name Lower House Upper House

Christian Democratic Appeal 41 21

Labor Party 33 14

Socialist Party 25 11

People's Party for Freedom and Democracy 21 14

Party for Freedom 9 0

Green Left 7 4

Christian Union 6 4

Democrats 66 3 2

Party for Animals 2 1

Reformed Political Party 2 1

Independents Senate Fraction 0 1

Total 150 75

According Article 42 of the Constitution, the King and the Ministers constitute the Government.

Prime ministers and other ministers are all appointed by the Royal Decree. There wont be

surprise if people see that the King would always appoint all the ministers recommended by the

parliament, who will form the cabinet. Ministers should not be a MP, which is believed to

9 http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/parliamentary_parties/index.jsp , 2010-5-2 lastvisited;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_the_Netherlands , 2010-5-2 last visited.
http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/parliamentary_parties/index.jsphttp://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/parliamentary_parties/index.jsphttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_the_Netherlandshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_the_Netherlandshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_the_Netherlandshttp://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/parliamentary_parties/index.jsp


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guarantee the ministerial responsibility. As the parliament just proposes not elects cabinet, there is

no provision in the constitution prescribing the resolution when one or even all of the cabinet

members have lost confidence of the parliament. Fortunately, certain constitutional conventions

have been developed, and the minister(s) will step down facing the non-confidence resolution of

the parliament, or the parliament will be dissolved by a Royal Decree according to Article 63 of

the Constitution. But for the party discipline, the typical lines of conflicts are between

parliamentary parties, rather than between constitutional bodies, i.e. the parliament and

government. Many constitutional lawyers have been criticizing the effectiveness of the ministerial

responsibility to the parliament, and suggested direct election of prime minister. All these

proposals, however, are still outside formal procedure.

Below the national level there are two other tiers of governmental level, the province and the

municipality, both of them are headed by a council elected directly by local residents based on

proportional system. Furthermore, on the provincial level, there is a Kings Commissioner who

will preside over meeting of the provincial council. The administration of the province is carried

out by a provincial executive who is also headed by the Kings Commissioner. The Kings

Commissioner is certainly appointed by the central government. In the municipalities, there are

also mayors appointed by the central government and will preside over the municipal councils and

the municipal executives as well. Except for the appointed Commissioner and the mayor, the

executives of the two governments are elected directly by councils respectively. And the

Commissioners and mayors are regarded impartial judges of the final decision of the local

governments. Nowadays, the municipalities become more and more important than provinces and

mayors are always appointed among applicants outside the municipality concerned, which is

believed to enhance the impartial status of the mayor. Theoretically, the provinces and

municipalities have no inherent and independent powers of their own. The parliamentary act can

decide the boundary of their power as it like. The provinces and municipalities have only

concurrent power shared with the central government. Besides, departments of central government

will give instructions to Commissioners and mayors. But in fact, provinces and municipalities are

performing a wide range of government functions.10

In addition, in recent years the central

government has adopted many measures to protect and promote local autonomy, such as financial

decentralization, which gives more tax power to local government.

No separate judiciary system exists within provinces, and there is only one uniform judiciary

hierarchy in Holland. Article 120 of the Constitution provides that the constitutionality of theActs of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts. And there is no special

constitutional court. Nonetheless, the courts can review the conflict between various levels of the

legislations, including that between the Parliamentary act and international treaties.

Pillarisation of the era before 1970s

There is no prescription concerning any political organization outside the government branches,

except for Article 8 of the Constitution saying the right of association shall be recognized.

10 Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands,New York: Palgrave

Macmillan (2005), p161-167


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Conceptually, the Constitution or writer of the constitution must have regard government organ as

the main political arena. But this Dutch presumption has failed also, like what has happened to

most other constitutions. Weve seen the Dutch constitution have established a somewhat unitary

system, with the central government possessing a strong voice in state life, but what is the real

landscape?

With further study of the Dutch political actualities before 1970s, one might comfortably conclude

that Holland is a country of minorities. Weve seen above that under proportional representation

system, no party was able to acquire a majoritarian status in the parliament. In fact, that is a

reflection of the Dutch society, where there were many (at least five) pillars whose strengths were

somewhat equal among them. At least before 1960, religion was an important dividing line in

Dutch society. Three large Christian groups exited, Catholic and Protestant, while the Protestant

were further divided into two groups. Furthermore, the Netherlands has a long history of

liberalism, which means a lot of Dutch residents did not belong to any religious denomination

even they have some religious belief. But even within this religiously independent population,

there was cleavage between the middle class and working class. Each segment had produced a

leading party. Citizens within each pillar would vote for its own parties, and the political arena

was divided distinctively along religious and ideological lines. The political party belonged to

each pillar was just the political wing and elementary party, rather than the mobilizer of the pillar.

Composition of the Dutch Population and the Parties

Membership of

a religiousdenomination

Yes

Catholic Catholic Peoples Party

ProtestantDutch Reformed Church Anti-Revolutionary Party

Reformed Dutch Church Christian Democratic Union

NoLiberals Liberal party

Socialists Labor Party

These were even further factors dividing the Dutch society. With these various dividing forces, the

Dutch society was a highly segmented one. But to the surprise of most observers, there were no

such consequence of the social segmentation as the French experiences during the Third and Forth

Republic like civil war and serious political turbulence in the constitutional history, and people

believe, especially for Arend Lijphart, the phenomenon of pillarisation of the Dutch society was

the key to its political stability.

Under the pillarized state of the society, each social segment is tightly organized. With a large size

of the pillars organizational networks, citizen within a certain pillar can pass all his life, from

cradle to tomb, without interaction with other pillars. In this era of Dutch society, the Catholic

pillar was the most typical one. A Catholic would be born in a Catholic hospital, enter Catholic

school to receive basic education, go to a Catholic university or work in an enterprise owned by a

Catholic, marry a Catholic woman and die and buried in a Catholic cemetery. As his interrelation

with the government, all the work was left to their own pillar parties. All the participation for

average citizen was simply to give their vote to their pillar party.

The Catholic Church has a long history of organizing the society under its own hierarchical


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structure, but the pillar structure was duplicated to large degree by other segments of the Dutch

society as well, such as Protestants, Socialists and Liberals. Under pillarisation, common citizens

were shield from direct political interaction with each other, and all the political decision work

were left to the political elites on the top of the pillar. Since no pillar could form a majority within

the government, compromise and coalition were inevitable, and it was crucial for maintaining the

vested interest of the political elites, who were actually more fear of the political instability than

common citizens. This inherent spirit of moderation was best represented in the Pacification

between 1913 and 1918.

At the beginning of the 20th

century, as a consequence of industrialization, secular working class

came into the political stage and organized themselves out of other traditional pillars, which

brought the rise of Socialists, who together with Liberals would demand the universal suffrage. As

for the Christian groups, they wanted equal funding from the state between religious and secular

schools. These two major plus other issues had brought hostility within Dutch society for yeas.

Two parliamentary committees were established with all party leaders to find a solution for these

serious conflicts. At last, a single package deal came up. The Socialists and Liberals would agree

the equal funding of the state to both kinds of the schools, while the Christian Groups would

accept a universal suffrage. Even those small parties who oppose both reforms were appeased by

the abolishment of district and majoritarian system and adoption of proportional representation

system, which would give then a chance to survive.11

The pacification of 1917 is regarded as the

most successful example of Dutch consociational democracy. After that, the pillarized structure of

the Dutch society was even enhanced.

The direct relationship between PR system and Dutch consociational democracy is doubtful,

because even before the adoption of PR system of 1917, there were still multi parties in Holland

under the district and majoritarian election institutions. Then we could see, even taking the

positive effect of PR system into consideration, without other explicit constitutional design, the

Netherlands had developed its own consociational democracy outside the formal prescription of

the Constitution, which formed a large part of Dutch unwritten constitution. For certain countries

like UK, the constitutions are just recognition of the political systems. For the case of the

Netherlands, however, consociationalism is really a product self-grown even without the

recognition of the Constitution.

Depillarisation after 1970

Weve seen that the religious pillar was the typical pillarisation organization in the pillarized

society of Holland, because the successful operation a pillar needs the deferential spirit of the

pillar residents, while believers tend to follow the clergies who are the actual organizer of the

religious polity. But with the fall of religious influence and furtherance of secularization of Dutch

society, religious organizations have been losing its domination in Dutch politics. The Catholic

network used to be the most well organized segment of the Dutch society, but since 1970s, the

number of Catholic adherents declined steadily since then.

11 Ken Gladdish, Governing from the Centre: Politics and Policy-Making in the Netherlands, London: Hurst &

Company (1991), pp25-27.


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Roman Catholics in The Netherlands12

Year Population Roman Catholics Percentage

1970 13135802 5320000 40.5 %

1980 14227848 5620000 39.5 %

1990 15027027 5560000 37.0 %

1995 15493889 5385258 34.8 %

2000 15987075 5060413 31.6 %

2005 16335509 4406000 27.0 %

2006 16357992 4352000 26.6 %

2007 16405000 4311000 26.3 %

Other Christian populations are also on the process of declination. As a result, the vote those

religious parties received declined parallelly. Since the first half of the 20th century, there had been

three major Christian parities, one of Catholics, the Catholic Peoples Party, and two of Protestants,

Anti-Revolutionary Party and Christian Historical Union, each belonged to one of the three

religious pillars. We could see from the table below,13

until the beginning of 1960s, votes for all

these three parties were relatively stable. But at late 1960s, the vote percentage began to drop

dramatically.

PartyPercentage of Vote (%)

1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972

Catholic People's Party 31.7 31.6 31.9 26.5 22 17.7Anti-Revolutionary Party 9.9 9.4 8.7 9.9 9 8.8

Christian Historical Union 8.4 8.1 8.6 8.1 6 4.8

Total 50 49.1 49.2 44.5 37 31.3

As a response to this serious challenge, in 1977 these three parties were united to form a new party,

the Christian Democratic Appeal. Though the declination tendency was slowed down to some

extent, but its still losing followers.

Percentage of vote for Christian Democratic Appeal (%)

Year 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006

Percentage 31.9 30.8 39.4 34.6 35.3 22.2 18.4 27.9 27.3

With the shrinking of the religious segment, other pillars that were losing their rivals to resist also

have been fading. Weve seen in the pillarized era, social division produced five major parties

more or less associated with one of the five major pillars. After 1970s, voters began to vote

outside their fading pillar,14

12

and electoral volatility has been increasing significantly. About

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_the_Netherlands , 2010-5-2 last visited.13 Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands,New York: Palgrave

Macmillan (2005), p98.14 Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, New York: Palgrave

Macmillan (2005), p90.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_the_Netherlandshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_the_Netherlandshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_the_Netherlands


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one-third of the Dutch voters would switch their choices betweens elections. Another one-third of

the electorates declare they will vote for the same party in two elections.

With the increasing election volatility, the occurrence of oversized or grand cabinet coalition in

pillarisation era becomes rare since late 1960s.15

When the cabinet has the support of more than

two-thirds of the Lower House, it is regarded as an oversized one. The characters of the various

cabinets after the Second World War are presented in the table below. We could see, after 1970,

there were only two oversized coalition cabinets, compared to the 5 oversized coalition cabinets

before 1970.

Coalition Size and Status of the Cabinet

Date installed Coalition Size Status

July 3, 1946 61.0% Minimal wining

August 7, 1948 89.0% Oversized

March 15, 1951 76.0% Oversized

September 2, 1952 81.0% Oversized

October 13, 1956 85.0% Oversized

December 22, 1958 51.3% Minimal wining

May 19, 1959 62.7% Minimal wining


April 14, 1965 70.7% Oversized

November 22, 1966 42.0% Minority

April 5, 1967 57.3% Minimal wining

July 6, 1971 54.7% Minimal winingJuly 20, 1972 49.3% Minority


December 19, 1977 51.3% Minimal wining

September 11, 1981 72.7% Oversized

May 29, 1982 43.3% Minority

November 4, 1982 54.0% Minimal wining


November 7, 1989 68.7% Oversized

August 22, 1994 61.3% Minimal winingAugust 2, 1998 64.7% Minimal wining



July 7, 2006 48.0% Minority

February 22, 2007 53.3% Minimal wining

According to Lijphart, oversized or grand coalition is one the four primary symbols for

consociational democracy. But weakening of grand coalition does not really mean the end of

15 Id., p110;Netherlands cabinet Balkenende-4,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Balkenende_cabinet , 2010-05-23 last

visited.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Balkenende_cabinethttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Balkenende_cabinethttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Balkenende_cabinethttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Balkenende_cabinet


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consociationalism. With the pillars crumbing, however, the Dutch society is not becoming a

population homogeneous. In fact, the Dutch society is becoming even more fragmented, with the

large number of parties as a proof. That what really has changed is that segments are no longer

separated from each other, and more and more citizens have membership overlapping different

segments, which is believed to contribute the stability of the political system. The

consociationalism remains the guiding spirit for the state life of the Netherlands. Most government

actions are carried out based on a wide range of consultation, even with oppositions, and the

continuity and stability of the government policy is thus secured. Though there have been some

critiques for the immobilism and low efficiency of this political arrangement, the Dutch

government is still basically a consensus government.16

The case of Belgium: a failure for operationalization of

Consociationalism

Consociationalism has been grown

outside of the formal text of Dutch constitution, and it seems to continue to exist under a new

context, consociationalism without pillarisation. The Netherlands is really a successful prototype

for Netherlands born political scientist Lijpharts consociationalism theory.

Development of Belgian constitution before 1960s

Not until the 1789s revolution against the Austrians, the word Belgium had not been regularly

used even by the subsequent Belgian people themselves. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, the

Great Powers in Europe decided to build a strong country to the North of France as a buffer.

Weve seen above the Low Countries were united to a United Kingdom of the Netherlands, under

the reign of William I. But King William Is Protestant attitude and dictatorship had irritated

Belgian people most of whom were Catholics a lot. In 1830, a revolution broke out with the

support of Catholic clergies who were seriously against the Protestant Dutch king who had been

prosecuting Catholics in Holland, and of the Liberals who opposed the royal authoritarianism,

especially for the Belgian underrepresentation in the Dutch parliament, together with the military

assistance from France, who had a great influence at least in the south region of Belgian, the

Wallonia.

After the success of the revolution, Belgian people had formally for the first time in the history the

chance to determine their own fate. Though under the general label of Belgian people, there

were in fact two distinct communities sharing no common socio-cultural heritage, no common

language and even no natural frontiers, all of which are considered the "normal" characteristics of

a united nation. People will admit these cleavages still exist at present. This background has

determined the bumpy road and the possible failure of the end for the Belgian nation construction

effort.

In 1830, after separated from the Dutch Kingdom, a provision government and a national congress

16 Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, New York: Palgrave

Macmillan (2005), pp 207-218.


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were set up to draft a constitution for the new nation. During the debate, these French speaking

elites decided a republic was not adapted to the social and political realities of Belgium and a

monarchy was conducive to Belgian constitution. Although this idea frustrated some revolutionist

who proposed an aborted coup dtat to prevent the newly established Belgium breaking away

from a monarchy from falling into another kings dictatorship, a constitutional monarchy was

established eventually. Besides, these political leaders mainly from the middle class believed there

should a constitutional institution to curb the extreme feeling of the common citizens. While

suffrage was seriously restrained by property status, these statesmen believe a Senate with higher

qualifications different from the House of the Representatives would contribute much to the

political stability.17

Hence from the foundation, the main function of the Senate is not a forum for

regional bargain, but a curbing institution on lower classes. A hybrid of Dutch and French

constitution came into existence at last, just like composition of the Belgian population. The

constitution founding history reflects vividly the adaptive and conservative spirit of the Belgian

political elites, which will probably lead the constitution to recognize the political realities without

bold effort to change the reality under certain rationalist ambition. The essence of compromise of

consociationalism is probably reflected the best by the Belgian constitution.

Most part of the constitution was keep untouched until 1893, when the labor unions and Socialists

had become a new political force in the state life. Before that, the Catholics and Liberals were the

two oligarchic dominating classes in Belgian.18

Universal suffrage was introduced and limitation

for voting conditions and candidate qualification were loosened gradually since then, and the

domination of the middle class was replaced by a typical pillarized society similar to the

Netherlands at least before the 1960s. There were three pillars in the Belgian Society during this

period: the Catholics, the Socialists and the Liberals. We dont need to repeat the life of the person

belonging to the Catholic pillar in Dutch society before 1970s. We need just mention Belgium is

the first country who adopted the proportional representation system for its national parliament

election of 1890 in the world.

17 A. de Dijn , A pragmatic conservatism. Montesquieu and the framing of the Belgian constitution (18301831),History of European Ideas 28 (2002), 227245.18 Maurice Vauthier, The Revision of the Belgian Constitution in 1893, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.4 (Dec., 1894), pp. 704-729.

19 Kris Deschower, From Consociation to federation: How the Belgian Parties won, in Kurt Richard Luther andKris Deschouwer eds, Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political parties in consociational democracy , London:

Routledge, 1999, pp78.

Results of election to the House of Representatives (1919-39) (%) 19

Year Catholics Liberals Socialists Total

1919 38.8 17.6 36.6 93.0

1921 41.3 17.8 34.8 93.9

1925 38.6 14.6 39.4 92.6

1929 38.5 16.6 36.0 91.1

1932 38.6 14.3 37.1 90.0

1936 38.8 12.4 32.1 83.3

1939 32.7 17.2 30.2 80.1


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Composition of the Belgian government (1917-39)20

Date Installed Party Composition

4 August, 1917 Cath-Lib-Soc

1 June, 1918 Cath-Lib-Soc

21 November, 1918 Cath-Lib-Soc20 November, 1920 Cath-Lib-Soc

16 December, 1921 Cath-Lib

13 May, 1925 Cath

17 June, 1925 Cath-Lib

20 May 1926 Cath-Lib-Soc

22 November 1927 Cath-Lib

5 June, 1932 Cath-Lib

25 October, 1932 Cath-Lib

20 November, 1934 Cath-Lib

25 March, 1935 Cath-Lib-Soc

13 June, 1936 Cath-Lib-Soc

23 November, 1937 Cath-Lib-Soc

15 May, 1938 Cath-Lib-Soc

21 February, 1939 Cath-Soc

18 April, 1939 Cath-Lib

3 September, 1939 Cath-Lib-Soc

After the WWII, during the elections of 1954 and 1958, a similar school issue like the case of the

Netherlands in the 1917 became the main cause for the political tension. At last, all the three major

parties from the three pillars agreed on a School Pact, like that of the Netherlands around 1917.

The Belgian politics entered into a deconfessionalization process and religious issues faded out of

the political landscape from then on. But different to the Dutch case, the pillarisation situation

didnt fade together with the deconfessionalization or secularization process. Another issue with

much more divisive force came into the center stage: the language.21

Further pillarisation after 1960s: the linguistic cleavage

As weve mentioned above, the Belgian people are actually composed of two diverse ethnic

groups, and its territory right covers across the linguistic frontier between the Romance and

Germanic languages. In the north part of the country the Flanders, people speak a kind of dialect

of Dutch and they are called Flemish. The south part of the country, the Walloon has been under

great influence of France, and the French is the dominant language for the Wallonia people.

Walloon had in the first place been industrialized, while the Flanders remained to be an

agricultural area until the WWII. Hence the Wallonia had a prestige in the state life. Even for elites

of the Flemish, they would speak French rather than Flemish as a symbol of social status. When

20 Id., p77.21 James A. Dunn, Jr., The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium: A Study in the Institutionalization of Ethnic

Conflict, The Western Political Quarterly 143, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), p147


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the Constitution of 1830 was adopted, Article 30 prescribed the use of the languages spoken in

Belgium is optional and may only be regulated by law, and only in the case of acts by the public

authorities and of legal matters.22

Though the Flemish constitute the major part of the

population, because of the dominant status of the French-speaking elites during the founding era,

it was easy for the provision government to adopt a statute to declare French as the sole official

language of the Country.

For most time of the period before the 1960s, the Walloons had enjoyed both economic and

political preponderant status in the state life of Belgium. During the one and half centuries after

the independence of Belgium, the Belgian political attention had been focused mainly on equal

election right, the freedom of religious education. Even during the first stage after the WWII, the

Royal Question had aroused most concerns of Belgian people.23

And some Flemish movement

members had collaborated with the German invader during the two world wars (each time

Germany wants to invade France, they conquer Belgium first), so the linguistic issues had been

postponed for a long time.

But after 1960, when most controversies in political dialogue had been settled, the linguistic issues

emerged at last. The social and economic changes also contribute to the salience of the problem.

After the WWII, the Wallonia regions heavy industry has been declining with foreign competition,

while the Flanders has been benefitting from the industrialization process and international trade.

Consequently, the economic gravity shifted from the south to the north. The Flemish cultural

consciousness woke up with its booming economy, and the Flemish people became more and

more intolerable for the French cultural domination in their lives. What is worse, since the

Flemish population constitute the major part of Belgian demographics, the Wallonia also feared

the central government would be manipulated by the Flemish majority, and they want to acquire

more local autonomy.24

Institutionalization of the pillarisation from 1970

These two trends determined the character of the constitutional reforms

in the recent four decades, which further divided the Belgian society with a former relatively

lament factor. Since the Flemish wants to diminish or even eliminate the French influence in their

community, and the Walloon is reluctant to adopt a bilingual status for their region, the central

government has no choice but to separate the country into two linguistically homogeneous regions

except for the bilingual capital: Brussels.

Before 1970s, the Flemish movement actually has achieved much equal status. In 1898, 68 years

after the independence of Belgium, the Flemish was declared to be the second official language of

the country.25

22 Richard Cullen, Adaptive Fedearlism in Belgium, University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2,

1991, pp346-358.

In the 1930s, the parliament further passed a series of laws modifying the

Francophone character of the country. But the Flemish movement seemed still unsatisfied with

23 John Fitzmaurice, The Politics Of Belgium: A Unique Federalism, London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

(1996), pp46-47.24 WILFRIED SWENDEN and MAARTEN THEO JANS , Will It Stay or Will It Go?Federalism and the

Sustainability of Belgium, West European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 5 p877, 2006, p88125 James A. Dunn, Jr., The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium: A Study in the Institutionalization of Ethnic

Conflict, The Western Political Quarterly 143, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), p146.


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these achievements. At last, the Constitution was reformed substantially in 1970, which is just a

beginning for further substantive constitutional reform during the next four decades, which

transformed a unitary country into a federation. In 1994, the Constitution finally recognized

Belgium as a federal state, made up of three Regions and three Communities. Pillarisation has

been successfully institutionalized, but it doesnt seem to be the end of the story.

The linguistic cleavage in the Belgian society is officially recognized by the

Constitution.26

Article 2 of the Constitution prescribes the Belgium is made up of three

Communities: the French Community, the Flemish community, and the German-speaking

Community. But since the German-speaking group constitutes a rather minor part of the

population, most check and balance mechanism operates between the two major linguistic groups.

In the parliament, the MPs of each house, the House of Representatives and the Senate, are

divided respectively into two linguistic groups. For any initiative concerning linguistic aspects,

double-majority is necessary: the initiative must firstly be approved by both of the two linguistic

groups, and total support for the initiative should exceed two thirds of the total votes expressed in

the two linguistic groups. For other issues, Article 54 also introduced an Alarm-Bell Procedure.

When three-quarters members of one of the linguistic group believe the initiative will do grave

damage to the relationship between Communities, the parliamentary procedure for the initiative

will be suspended, and the initiative will be transferred to the Council of Ministers for its

recommendation on the initiative within 30 days. This is typically the minority veto or mutual veto

mechanism characterized by Lijphart for the consociational democracy. This procedure could only

be applied for once for each imitative. Members of the executive branch, the Council of the

Ministers are also divided equally between the two linguistic groups, except for the Prime

Minister.

The intentionally linguistic division of the central government is not the most distinctive feature of

the reformed Belgian Constitution. The Constitution of 1970 has recognized the Kingdom of the

Belgium as a federal state. It is not only territorially but also corporately decentralized. There are

three Regions, the Walloon Region, the Flemish Region, and the Brussels Region, operating

parallel to the three linguistic Communities. The Communities possess vast powers concerning

education, linguistic and cultural issues together with co-relationship between different

communities. As for the regions, various powers of the central government have been devoluted to

them as well, including independent tax powers and approval of international treaties. Both theCommunities and Regions have councils elected directly by voters belonging to them. As for the

capital, Brussels, whos located with the Flemish Region but its major population is French

speaking people, the arrangement is more complicated. It belongs to a separate bilingual Region

together with a joint community from the two Communities, the French Community and the

Flemish Community. In the unitary era, there were three tiers of the government, the central, the

provincial and the municipal ones, similar to the arrangement of the Netherlands. After the

26 Article 43 of the Belgian Constitution:

[Linguistic Groups](1) For cases determined by the Constitution, the elected members of each House are divided into a French

linguistic group and a Dutch linguistic group, in the manner determined by law.(2) The senators referred to in Article 67 (1)(2,4,7) make up the French linguistic group of the Senate. The

senators referred to in Article 67 (1)(1,3,6), make up the Dutch linguistic group of the Senate.


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federalization reform, a new tier is inserted between the province and the central government, the

Region and the Communities, and the provinces and the municipalities have more supervision

from the Communities and the Regions. Besides, powers of the provinces have been transferred

gradually to the Regions.

State Structure of Belgium

We can find from the figure above that the present power structure of Belgium is really

complicated and fragmented. The Regions and Communities all have their own legislative and

executive powers which overlaps each other for certain population. And the Flemish Community

has merged with the Flemish Region. Then the Flemish Community has authorities for the entire

Flemish region, but it could only govern through the Joint Community for the Brussels Capital

Region. And the Walloon Region is under governance of both the German-Speaking Community

and the French Community. One might concern that interaction between these various governmentorgans divided strictly along linguistic lines would be source of even more conflicts which are

institutionalized.

Besides, after decades of constitutional transformation with decentralization and devolution as the

major theme, the central government has been hollowed to a large extent.27

The Communities and

the Regions has the residual power, and its believed the federal bodies within the Belgian

Federation are not subordinated to the whole but equal in status.28

27 Wilfried Swenden, Marleen Brans Andlieven De Winter, The Politics of Belgium: Institutions and Policy under

Bipolar and Centrifugal Federalism, West European Politics,Vol. 29, No. 5, 863 , 2006, p872

The legislations of the

28 Lucas Prakke and Constantijn Kortmann eds, Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member State, Kluwer: Deventer

2004, p78.


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Communities and the Regions have the same legal status with federal laws.29

Fortunately, the judicial branch is not federalized. Before the constitutional reform of 1970, the

judiciary was of a unitary and hierarchical structure with certain specialized courts and tribunals,

such as the administrative courts, the Council of the State, which is a proof of the French influence.

In 1970, a Court of Arbitration was set up whose jurisdiction is over the competence of various

government organs. Its jurisdiction has been expanded by subsequent legislations. In 1989, the

Court of Arbitration was recognized as the Constitutional Court by legislation. But even for this

politically independent institution, linguistic division exists within its composition. The

constitutional court composed of 12 judges, with equal number of judge from each of the two

linguistic groups. These two groups of judges will elect a president from their own language group,

then there are two presidents for the Court.30

Finally in 2005, the legislature confirmed the

authority of the Court over all fundamental rights of the Belgian constitution.31

Weve seen the

Constitutions of Netherlands and France have had a substantial influence for Belgian constitution

since the founding era. But with this even furthering process of federation and probably the

attempt to keep the nation united, Belgium has adopted an active constitutional court which is

alien to both of these two countries.

Since one might doubt the legitimacy of the linguistic division principle which dominate the

Belgian constitutional transformation, it is noteworthy that the European Court of Human Rights

has indeed considered partly the principle, and declared any difference in treatment which might

stem form it does not necessarily constitute discrimination,32

and linguistically divided election

system that entails the need for linguistic minorities to cast their votes for persons capable of and

ready to use the language of their region did not necessarily constitute a threat to the interests of

minorities.33

From consociationalism to pseudo-federation or even

separation

Although the legitimacy of the linguistic division might have been settled positively,

the effect of the deliberate division needs more consideration.

The federation process of Belgium is unique in comparison with other classical federalist

countries, for the latter countries, such as U.S. the federation was formed on the process ofunification of independent states. As for the Belgian case, the federalization takes the top-down

process and is a transformation from a unitary state. When founded in 1831, most nation

construction effort was spent on unification of the two major communities of the country and a

highly unitary system emulating the French system was established. For most modern federal

29 Patricia Popelier, The Role of the Belgian Constitutional Court in the Legislative Process, Statute Law Review26(1) (2005), p22, p23.30 Title Ii: Organization Of The Constitutional Court, Chapter I: Judges Of The Constitutional Court, Special actof 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court31 Patricia Popelier, The Role of the Belgian Constitutional Court in the Legislative Process, Statute Law Review26(1) (2005) , p22, p23.

32 E.C.H.R. 23 July 1968, concerning certain aspects of the linguistic arrangements for education in Belgium,Publ.Cour., Series A, vol. 6, 7 and 42.33 E.C.H.R. 2 March 1987, Mathieu-Mohinet Clerfayt, Publ. Cour., Series A, vol. 113 57.


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countries, weve seen a centralization tendency in them, with the central government acquiring

more and more powers. In the Belgian case, however, weve seen a process in reverse. All these

odd developments are actually artificial consequence rather than a natural progress, which might

reflect certain weakness of consociational democracy.

In the 1960s, the linguistic issues have been the main target for Flemish movement for over a

century, and Dutch has acquired actually the equal status in the state life. But the economic fall of

the Walloon region and the rise of the Flemish region have the Flemish movement desire for

further radical change: formation of a separate country based on their region. Confronting this

reality and far from taking some steady action to continue the depillarisation process which had

already happened in their north neighbor country and to advance the unification effort, the three

dominant political group split along linguistic lines as well,34

and promoted the

institutionalization of the ethnic division. Now there are no longer three dominant national parties,

but three regional party families with heritage of the three traditional parties.

For the election of House of the Representative of the Parliament at present, the country is divided

into 11 election districts, with 10 provinces plus the capital region. All the 150 members of the

House of the representative are directly elected by voters based on a proportional representation.

All the parties will prepare lists for each district. The number of seats available depends on each

district's population. For the Senate, there are 40 directly elected senators, 21 community senators

and 10 co-opted senators. There is also a fourth category with an undetermined number of the

senators by right. For the 40 directly elected senators, 25 will be elected from the Flemish

Community, 15 will be from the French Community. There are just two lists -- one for the Flemish

community and the other for the French Community. Residents of Brussels, the third community,

choose from one of the two lists. Belgium's tiny German-speaking community select from the

French list. For the 21 Community senators, 10 each come from the Flemish and the French

Community Councils, and one comes from the German Councils. Six Dutch speakers and four

French speakers of the co-opted senators are elected by the previous two groups. After the

elections, the MPs will be assigned to the two linguistic groups according to their elective origin.

There are also several senators by right who are adult family members of the King and they

belong to no linguistic group.

According to this election arrangement, no party now could have an election campaign across the

linguistic division line recognized by the constitution. All the national elections are reduced toregional elections, and the elites of the two ethnic groups will only make the compromise at the

central government level. But since the exercise of the federal powers is reduced largely to the

mere continuous search for a compromise between the two linguistic groups, no political party

will defend the power of the central government seriously. Because the Flemish Region has been

talking about more sovereignty, and transforms the federation into even loosely linked

confederation, the future for the Belgian federation is even more troublesome.

One might conclude from the analysis above the former parties under the consociational

34 Kris Deschower, From Consociation to federation: How the Belgian Parties won, in Kurt Richard Luther andKris Deschouwer eds, Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political parties in consociational democracy , London:

Routledge, 1999, pp74-107.


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democracy had utilized the consociational techniques to institutionalize and perpetuate the

consociational mechanism, such as the alarm bell and double-majority procedure as minority veto,

the institutionalized linguistic division in the central government as segmental autonomy. In the

Dutch case, however, weve seen the consociationalism developed outside the formal prescription

of the Constitution, and the social division within the pillarized society faded away gradually with

the general modern wave of secularization. On the contrary, in the Belgian context, the temporary

pillarized situation of the society was solidified even within the Constitutional framework. The

political elites might have bent too much to the inherent immobilism of consociationalism. One

the other hand, people should also admit language as the cleavage factor in the Belgian context is

much more difficult to be overcome in comparison with religious and ideological ones. And when

the linguistic factor is combined with other more visible differentiating element of the country,

such as the geographic separation of the two linguistic groups, it will demand much more genius

for the political elites and party leaders to bridge the social gap. At least now we should admit, an

over-positive declaration for consociationalism in realization of smooth running of

consociationalism might be too optimistic.

The case of SwitzerlandConsociationalism without

strong parties

History of Swiss constitution

The Swiss constitutional history is both simple and diverse. Except for short invasion period by

the Napoleons army, the main theme for the constitutional development of Switzerland is to

preserve the diversity of the state, maintain the mutual-respect atmosphere among the various

constituent territories of the country.

After the official starting point of Swiss polity of 1291 when the three Cantons singed a treaty and

created a defense union, the union had been successful in preventing the predominance of the

neighboring great powers in the Europe. Owing to its military success and good reputation of its

merchants, the union expanded gradually with more cantons to join in. But before the invasion of

the Napoleons invasion, the different entities that formed Switzerland were not equal, and their

status depended on the treaty that they signed.35

But the sovereignty of the cantons was

guaranteed, and consequently different cantons had developed different political regimes. During

this period, most cantons were of oligarchic systems and centralized to diverse degrees.36

But the harmony between cantons sometime did break up, especially for the religious factor. At

the end of the 18th

century, industrialization in the surrounding countries and the introduction the

French Revolution triggered increasingly strong demand for centralization and modernization of

Switzerland. In 1789, when Napoleon invaded Switzerland, the unitary regime emulating that of

France had been established for a short period. After the failure of this unification effort, Napoleon

35 Clive H. Church, The Politics and Government of Switzerland, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan (2004), pp11-19.36 Thomas Fleiner et al.,, Swiss Constitutional Law, Berne: Staempfli Publishers Ltd.(2005), pp21-23.


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recognized the autonomy of Switzerland, but the equal status between various cantons remained.

After Napoleons defeat, Switzerland reestablished a loose confederation. Conservative forces,

mainly the Catholics prevailed during the initial stage of the Confederation, but liberals had been

increasing their influence during the next three decades. During the French revolution of 1830, the

liberalism expanded dramatically within the Swiss society, and more and more cantons adopted

liberal constitutions. For fear of losing control of the Confederation and in order to limit the

pressure for centralization and democratization of the Protestant and reformed cantons, the

conservative Catholic canon formed a secret union.37

Since this union was in violation of the

treaty of the Confederation and the Catholics refused to dissolve it, the religious cleavage

cumulated eventually in a short and unbloody civil war of 1847 with the victory of the Liberals at

the end.

In 1848, the People and the Peoples of the Cantons of Switzerland adopted a federal constitution

which was a compromise between the liberals and the conservatives. Partial centralization was

introduced, but the cantonal autonomy and diversity was also guaranteed through certain

limitations on the authorities of the central government. The modern constitutional framework of

Switzerland was hence established. In 1874, the constitution was completely revised, and the state

organization structure was not changed decisively, but certain instruments crucial to the

maintenance of a stable Swiss polity were introduced, such as the facultative referendum, and the

freedom of religion. Finally in 1999, a second total revision of the Constitution occurred, but this

revision is mainly a rewriting of the text.

This brief reflection of the Swiss constitution show us that, different to both the Dutch and

Belgian case which were both the creations of foreign powers to a large extent, the Swiss

constitution is a nearly self-grown product for the choice of various ethnic groups within the Swiss

society. Facing four surrounding big countries, the reluctance of the Swiss people(s) to join any of

them makes mutual-respect and tolerance with each other among these various groups very

important. Though its important for Switzerland to survive among its big neighbors to have a

somewhat powerful central government, especially during the two world wars, ample room for the

various constituent canons to develop as they choose is vital for the success of the Swiss

constitution. And we will see this has determined the constitutional structure which could be dated

to more than one and a half century ago.

Framework of state structure of the present constitution of

Switzerland

When first adopt in 1848, we could see s somewhat strong influence of the Constitution of the U.S.

The Swiss parliament, the federal assembly is composed of two councils: the National Council

(the House of Representatives) and the Council of the States (the Senate). But different to the

Constitution of the U.S., there is no special authority for the National Council, and both Councils

have equal powers. The members of the National Council are elected based on a proportional

37 Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexander H. Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a

Consensus Democracy, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press (2008), pp1-5.


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representation, with each cantons being counted as an election district. But since the populations

of the cantons are diverse, and some small cantons wont receive even one seat under the purest

form the proportional representation, each canton is guaranteed at least one seat in the parliament.

At present, there are six canons have only one seat in the National Council, and elections in this

Cantons are de facto majoritarian.38

As for the Council of the States, each council can elect two

members except for the so-called half cantons which could only elect one representative.

In comparison with the parliaments of the Netherlands and Belgium, the session period of the

Federal Assembly is really limited. The Assembly will be in session for four times, each session

will last for only three weeks. Besides, based on a militia-system, members of the Assembly are

all non-professional politicians who are simultaneously participating in other business, especially

for interests groups. These arrangements and other factors that we will discuss below lead to the

low efficiency of the Swiss parliament.

The executive, the Federal Council of the Switzerland is the most distinctive even all over the

world. Actually, its composition and function is the best reflection of the diversity and

consensus-democracy of the Swiss polity. The Federal Council consists on seven members. Each

member of the Council is elected individually by the joint session of the two Councils of the

Assembly. Besides partisan factors, the religious and linguistic factors are balanced among the

members. Though there is non explicit prescription for concrete composition of the Council in the

Constitution or the statues, both of the two religious groups, the Catholics and the Protestants,

three of the four official linguistic groups will have their representative in the Federal Council.

The Federal Councilors could be reelected without term limit. For most time, the Councilors are

reelected which enhance the stability and continuity of the executive. The operation of the

government, including the legislative works revolves around the Council the Council is the head

of the executive, and most bill are drafted by the Federal Council. Though both the Assembly and

the Council are not able to dissolve each other, the Council in fact dominates the Assembly.

Similar to the American Constitution, there is a Federal Supreme Count, but according to Article

190 of the Constitution, the Federal Supreme Court shall apply the federal acts and the

constitutional review against the federal law is prohibited.39

Comparing with the American constitution, the Swiss federalism is not introduced to serve as a

corrective to a majoritarian democracy, but unites the participatory democracies of Canons under acommon federal government. The Federal has only enumerated powers by the federal constitution,

and the cantons have the residual powers. Hence the cantonal sovereignty is more substantial

under the Swiss constitution. According to Article 56 of the Constitution, the cantons can conclude

treaties within foreign countries, a similar power in the reformed Belgian Constitution of 1999.

And Cantons can establish inter-cantonal treaties and institutions under Article 48 of the

Constitution, which are prohibited by the U.S.40

38 Thomas Fleiner et al.,, Swiss Constitutional Law, Berne: Staempfli Publishers Ltd.(2005), p74

Constitution in the American context. Though

both of the powers are under certain limitations of the Federal Constitution, the cantons enjoy

substantial autonomy. And for a long time, the Federal Supreme Court has allowed constitutional

39 Id., p 29.40 (1) No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation, Section 10, Article 1, U.S. Constitution.


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rights to be interpreted in different ways in the various cantons. For instance, Article 4 of the

Swiss constitution of 1874 had prescribed the equal rights of men and women, but the womens

right to vote was not introduced at the cantonal level until 1989 in the Canton of Appenzell

Ausserrhoden. Other fundamental rights of the Constitution, such as the right to religion, the right

to education face the somewhat similar situation. Switzerland thus has adopted the most loose

federalist constitution in the world, and this feature and another character of the Constitution has

determined the uniqueness of the consociationalism in Switzerland: direct democracy.

Weak party institutions: Causes and Consequences

Before we turn to the actual status of the Swiss party institutions, we should make some further

study on Swiss federalism. Though the Swiss politics is famous for its stability, Switzerland has a

more diverse society than that of the Netherlands and Belgium. When the Netherlands used to be

divided by religion, and Belgium is being propelling by the linguistic divisive tide, Switzerlandactually have both of these two diversities.

In history, the Swiss society used to be evenly divided among the two Christian groups, Roman

Catholic Church and the Swiss Protestant Church. In 2000, it was estimated that about three

quarters of the population belongs to one of the two major Christian groups: Roman Catholic

Church (42% of the population) and the Swiss Protestant Church. And the population is also

divided into two linguistic groups: the German and the French.

Religious Composition of Swiss Population200041Religion Percentage (%)

Christian

Roman Catholic 41.8

Protestant 33.0

Orthodox 1.8

Old Catholic 0.2

Other Christian Groups 0.2

Muslim 4.3

Jewish 0.2

Other Religions (Buddhism, Hinduism etc.) 0.8

No Formal Creed 11.1

41 Claude Bovayr & Raphal Broquet,Recensement Fdral De La Population 2000 : Le Paysage Religieux En

Suisse, Neuchtel: OFS, December 2005.


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Linguistic Composition of the Swiss Population2000:42

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

German 72.1 69.4 64.9 65.0 63.6 63.7

French 20.3 18.9 18.1 18.4 19.2 20.4

Italian 5.9 9.5 11.9 9.8 7.6 6.5

Romanche 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5

Other 0.7 1.4 4.3 6.0 8.0 9.0

Though religion had led to cleavage among the Swiss people, in light of the general modern wave

to secularization, the denominational division is no longer salient in Swiss society. As for

linguistic issues, after the fading away of the religion, the linguistic issue doesnt emerge as

another divisive factor for the Swiss society, as the development of Belgium. And this might be

partly explained by the federalism character of Switzerland.

Although the Swiss society is apparently segmented as whole, but composition of each segment is

really homogeneous, and the most important form of the segments are the cantons. If in the

classical pillarized society, the pillarisation structure is vertical which divide the whole nation, for

the case of Switzerland, federalism constituted a functional equivalent to pillarisation, i.e. the

formation of separate organizational infrastructures by each culturally defined community.

Federalism and pillarisation not only create culturally segmented communities but also contribute

to their peaceful coexistence in the new nation-state.43

Survey data show that the two most

powerful identities in Switzerland are the cantonal identity and the Swiss identity. Few people

would choose the linguistic identity.44

No wonder the Federal Constitution has bent too much to

the autonomy of the Cantons. An in light of the cooperative federalism, unlike the dual federalism

of the US, although the central government dominates the legislation of various statues and

regulations for the whole federal, such as the unitary civil code, criminal law etc., it relies

significantly on the cantons for the implementation. Then within the three tiers of the Swiss

governments, the federal, the cantonal and the municipal, the expenditure of each counts for one

third of the total expenditure of the whole budget,45

which is a result of more than one and half

centuries of centralization and might be the best sign for the substantial independence of the local

government of Switzerland.

The important role of the local government, especially for the cantonal government and the

42 Georges Ldi & Iwar Werlen,Recensement Fdral De La Population 2000 : Le Paysage Linguistique EnSuisse, Neuchtel: OFS, Avril 2005.43 Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexander H. Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a

Consensus Democracy, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press (2008), p7.44 Robert A. Goldwin et al., eds, Forging Unity Out Of Diversity: The Approaches Of Eight Nations , Washington,

D.C. : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1989), p247.45 Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexander H. Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a

Consensus Democracy, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press (2008), p41

YearPercentage

Language


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federalist character makes the parties are all canton based. Even for some national parties, the

membership of the cantonal branch is the perquisite to join the national party, and the intra-party

structure is rather loose. In fact, in comparison with the situation of local level, the partisan

activities are really weak and resources-limited. Hence we wont be surprised when we find the

Federal Assembly is in a real segmented situation.

Party Composition of the Federal Assembly of Switzerland since 200746

Name of PartyCouncil of the States National Council

Seats Percentage Seats Percentage

Swiss People's Party 6 13.0% 58 29.0%

Social Democratic Party 9 19.6% 42 21.0%

The Liberals 12 26.1% 35 17.5%

Christian Democratic People's Party 15 32.6% 31 15.5%

Conservative Democratic Party 1 2.2% 5 2.5%

Green Party 2 4.3% 20 10.0%

Green Liberal Party 1 2.2% 3 1.5%

Evangelical People's Party 0 0.0% 2 1.0%

Christian Social Party 0 0.0% 1 0.5%

Federal Democratic Union 0 0.0% 1 0.5%

Ticino League 0 0.0% 1 0.5%

Swiss Party of Labour 0 0.0% 1 0.5%

Total 46 100% 200 100%

Besides the militia system and the federalist structure of the state as the weakening factors for the

party institutions in Switzerland, another feature of the Swiss constitution also contributes to

diminishment of the influence of the relatively dominant parties. Direct democracy in Swiss

constitution is not only an ideal but also a matured practice. The Constitution provided two forms

of direct democracy: popular initiative and referendum. According to the Constitution, any

100,000 voters can propose a popular initiative for a complete or partial revision of the

constitution, which would be submitted to the vote of the People. Certain issues, such as

amendments of the Constitution, should be presented to the vote to the People of the Switzerland

and the Cantons, to acquire a double majority. Further more, 50,000 voters and eight cantons

among the 23 cantons are eligible to request a referendum for all federal acts inter alia, and this

procedure is defined by the Constitution as optional referendum.47

Especially for the optional

referendum, since the turnout rate for referendum tends to be around 30% of the total voting

population, it means a minority counting 16% of the citizenry would veto the proposal initiated by

the leading parties in the parliament.48

No wonder the optional referendum is the most active

direct democracy institutions in Switzerland. All these arrangement further weaken the influence

of the relatively strong parties.

46 http://www.parlament.ch/ , 2010-5-28 last visited.

47 Chapter 2: Initiative and Referendum, Title 4: The People and the Cantons, Federal Constitutionof the Swiss Confederation48 Thomas Fleiner et al., Swiss Constitutional Law, Berne: Staempfli Publishers Ltd. (2005), p72.
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Use of the three direct-democratic institutions from 1848 to 200749

PeriodMandatory Referendum Optional Referendum Popular Initiative

Total Accepted Refused Total Accepted Refused Total Accepted Refused

1848-1873 11 2 9 - - - - - -

1874-1880 3 2 1 8 3 5 - - -1881-1890 4 3 1 8 2 6 - - -

1891-1900 9 6 3 10 3 7 5 1 4

1901-1910 5 4 1 4 3 1 3 1 2

1911-1920 9 8 1 3 2 1 3 2 1

1921-1930 10 8 2 5 1 4 13 2 11

1931-1940 8 8 0 9 2 7 6 0 6

1941-1950 7 4 3 7 4 3 7 1 6

1951-1960 22 14 8 11 4 7 9 0 9

1961-1970 14 12 2 8 4 4 7 0 7

1971-1980 47 36 11 18 11 7 22 0 22

1981-1990 25 18 7 12 6 6 29 3 26

1991-2000 36 28 8 36 25 11 34 2 32

2001-2207 11 6 5 21 17 4 24 3 21

Total 221 159 62 160 87 73 162 15 147

Percentage 100.0% 71.9% 28.1% 100.0% 54.4% 45.6% 100.0% 9.3% 90.7%

Under this situation, the leading parties have no choice but to achieve consensus as much as

possible during any legislation process, in case there would be successful optional referendum

initiated by the minority group. Consequently, all the political groups who are capable of initiate

referendum have been integrated into the federal government, especially for members coming

from the four major parties. When initially installed after the civil way, the victorious Liberals

monopolize the Federal council, but then other parties were gradually absorbed. And especially

after the WWII, for more than forty years, the distribution of members of the Federal Council is in

accordance with a magic formula, a stable composition between the four major parties of the

parliament.50

Composition of the Federal Council 51

PartyThe

Liberals

ChristianDemocratic

People's Party

SwissPeople's

Party

SocialDemocratic

Party

1848-1891 7 0 0 0

1891-1919 6 1 0 0

1919-1929 5 2 0 0

1929-1943 4 2 1 0

49 Id., p57.50 Pascal Sciarini & Simon Hug, The odd fellow: Parties and consociationalism in Switzerland, Luther Richard

Kurt & Deschouwer Kris eds, Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in ConsociationalDemocracy,Lodon: Routledge (1999), p151.51 http://www.inffab.ch/bundesrat.html , 2010-5-30 last visited.
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1943-1953 3 2 1 1

1953-1954 4 2 1 0

1954-1959 3 3 1 0

1959-2003 2 2 1 2

2003-2010 2 1 2 2

As a result, the voters choice can hardly influence the action of the government which results in a

significantly low volatility of election,52

though the Swiss society has witnessed substantial

change both domestically and internationally. In fact, some remarks believe this phenomenon is a

trade-off between the direct democracy and the voters influence. The voters can impede the

political process driven by the political parties, and as qui pro quo, they leave some independence

for the political parties as a whole body.53

The weakness of the party institutions leads not only to limited control capacity of the parties on

the voters, but also the feeble coordination function of the parties between various governments

organs, especially for the central and local governments. As a response to the need of

governmental coordination need, under the authorization of the federal constitution, various

inter-governmental instantiations, especially those inter-cantonal ones have been established.54

52 Pascal Sciarini & Simon Hug, The odd fellow: Parties and consociationalism in Switzerland, Luther Richard

Kurt & Deschouwer Kris eds, Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in ConsociationalDemocracy,Lodon: ROUTLEDGE (1999), p152;

For example, though each canton has equal status in the Council of the States, but the Cantonal

governments were unsatisfied for their underrepresentation in the Council of the State, in 1993,

based on many already existing Conferences of Cantonal Directors which deal with specific issues

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_federal_election,_2007, 2010-5-31 last visited.53 Butler Michael et al. eds, The Making of Modern Switzerland, 1848-1998, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

(2000), p102.54 Nicole Bolleyer, Consociationalism and Intergovernmental Relations: Linking Internal and External

Power-Sharing in the Swiss Federal Polity, (2006) Swiss Political Science Review 12(3), pp 1-34.
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among various cantonal governments, a general inter-cantonal exchange channel was established,

the Conference of Cantonal Executives,55

of which representative of the federal government can

participate the meeting. When most coordination work between the various government organs are

carried out by national parties outside the formal constitutional institutions of the state, the Swiss

government has institutionalized these coordination channels facing the lack of effective party

coordination role.

Anther consequence of the weakness of the party functions might be the low efficiency of the

government, especially for the federal government. The decision making process is complex and

slow. For legislation of bills, it takes a minimum twelve months period. Especially in complex or

contested cases it may even take up to twelve years. And for most time the bill is initiated by the

Federal Council, it will also impede the efficiency of the executive, especially when dealing with

some major policy issues.56

The myth of the case of Switzerland

Weve seen above that the Swiss people are still rather religiously and linguisticaly diverse

population. When religion had made serious cleavage within the Dutch society and the linguistic

issue is tearing Belgium, the seemingly permanent political stability appears to be a myth which

could not be explained by consociationalism considering the weakness of party institutions.

In fact, as weve discussed above, the consociationalism might have taken another form in the

Swiss case. The federalism of Switzerland has combined with consociationalism. Though the

vertical pillarisation of the Swiss nation might be inconspicuous, the cohesiveness within the

Cantons might form another segment within the nation. In fact, the Constitution has grant

explicitly the protection of diversity, but these protected diversities are actually institutionalized

diversities, which means they will need the institutional recognition of the government, and at

most time the Cantonal government. And all these institutionalized diversities are rather

indigenous and traditional diversities, which are based on certain territory. Concerning the

linguistic issue, although the Federal Constitution has prescribed four official language, but no

Canton has adopted all these four official languages at the same time. When communicating with

municipal authorities, the territoriality principle will prevail, which means only the traditional

local language will be regarded as official language. A German-speaking Swiss in aFrench-speaking municipality might have to address the municipal authorities in French and even

sent their children to French-speaking schools.57

Another evidence for the protection limited on institutionalized and traditional diversity is the

difficulty for immigrants to acquire a Swiss citizenship. Switzerland does not accept a melting pot

policy like that of the US. To acquire a Swiss citizenship, a foreigner must have resided in

Switzerland for more than 12 years. After that he will need not only the recognition of the Federal

55 Id., p1656 Thomas Fleiner et al., Swiss Constitutional Law, Berne: Staempfli Publishers Ltd. (2005), p51;

Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexander H. Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in aConsensus Democracy, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press (2008),p115-116.

57 Thomas Fleiner et al.,, Swiss Constitutional Law, Berne: Staempfli Publishers Ltd. (2005), p194.


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government, but also the authorization of the Cantonal and municipal authorities. And the

applicant must be judged by these authorities to have abandoned their original identities and have

been assimilated into the local community. Within certain municipalities, a popular vote is a

precondition for grant of Swiss nationality.58

Under these conditions, one might think the political stability of Switzerland to be a myth when

comparing with other Continental counties. But locating in the center of the Europe and

encompassed by four major countries, the Swiss people might know they have no choice but to

stand together to defend their independence. Hence the rejection of the Swiss people to join the

Documents

Consociationalism in Netherlands Cheng Mai Paper June 2010