DEFINITION OF CONSTITUTIONPeople vs Perfecto G.R. No. L-18463FACTS: In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887) the accused was charged with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. In this Court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that Article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of Article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto case is found this significant sentence: “Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected Article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.”

ISSUES: Whether or not Mr. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code. On the subject of whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force.

HELD: The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Treason = the crime of betraying one’s country, especially by attempting to kill or overthrow the sovereign or government.

Sedition = conduct or speech inciting rebellion against the authority of a state or monarch

Violation of Art 256 Penal Code Libel LawViolation of Act No. 292 Treason and Sedition Law

Defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:

          In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences

him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances

) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force.

. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law

The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."

          The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel

, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

          According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION 114 SCRA 77

FACTS: 1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition.2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal.4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963.5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.”7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.

ISSUE: Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?

HELD: Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased

on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

RATIFICATION POLITICAL VS JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 50 SCRA 30 (1973)

FACTS On January 20, 1973, petitioner, Josue Javellana filed a case from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner alleged for the following;

1. The president had announced the immediate implementation of the new Constitution thru his Cabinet, including the respondents

2. The respondents are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution

3. The president as a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the citizens assemblies

4. That the respondents are without power to approve the proposed Constitution

5. That the president is without power to proclaim the ratification of the Filipino people of the proposed constitution

6. The election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence, null and void.

ISSUES: Whether or not;

1. The issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?

2. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?3. The aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?4. Petitioners entitled to relief?5. The aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

HELD1. The issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a

justiciable and non-political question. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers characteristic of the Presidential system of government the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely: 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerned mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution.

2. The constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article

XV, Section of the 1935 Constitution. However, in its political aspect, the people may have cast their favourable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, which is what counts most.

3. There was no majority vote reached by the court. Three (3) judges expressed their lack of knowledge or competence to rule on the question, in their statement that under the regime of martial law, free expressions of opinions through the usual media are restricted and they have no means of knowing to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.

4. The court has voted to dismiss the petitions. The effectivity of the Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by the cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore, beyond the competence of the court, is relevant and unavoidable. The 1935 Constitution has pro tanto passed into history and has been legitimately supplanted by the Constitution in force by virtue of Proclamation 1102.

5. The proposed Constitution is in force by the virtue of the people’s acceptance.