Contemporary Azerbaijani Historiography on the Problem of "Southern Azerbaijan" after World War II

Contemporary Azerbaijani Historiography on the Problem of "Southern Azerbaijan" afterWorld War IIAuthor(s): Irina MorozovaSource: Iran & the Caucasus, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2005), pp. 85-120Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4030908 .

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CONTEMPORARY AZERBAIJANI HISTORIOGRAPHY ON THE PROBLEM OF "SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"

AFrER WORLD WAR II

IRINA MOROZOVA

Leiden University

In an attempt to fill the post-Soviet ideological vacuum and to consoli- date power, the leaders of the newly independent Azerbaijan turned to continuous search for nation-state identity and re-evaluation of the Azerbaijani historical past. The lost war against Armenia in Nagorno- Karabakh (1988-1994), and the socio-economic crisis of the first half of the 1990s led to indoctrination through the public domain and education system and heavily influenced the new nation's shaping identity.

Azerbaijani nationalism broke out with renewed force after the independence. Defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh sharpened the defensive feelings of the "small Azerbaijani nation", suppressed and divided in former times by its great neighbours, Russia and Iran. Suffering from the post-war low morale, the Azerbaijani people demanded new, com- forting and encouraging national concepts. Not only historians considered it their duty to write on the glories and tragedies of the Azerbai- jani nation, but also intellectuals, publicists, scientists, and journalists from all sorts of backgrounds came together to furnish proof that Na- gorno-Karabakh had belonged to the Azerbaijani people since time im- memorial. The idea of 'the great Azerbaijan state' possessing territory in contemporary Iran, Armenia, and Georgia gained great currency.

One of the most popular themes, within the numerous branches of academia became 'the question of Southern Azerbaijan'. Geographi- cally the so-called Southern Azerbaijan is now in an area north-west of Iran (Iranian Azerbaijan)' comprising two provinces of West Azerbai-

' Originally the term Azerbaijan was the name of the Iranian historical province Asarbai- gan, or Azarbaijan (from older Aturpatakan) in the north-west of the country. This term, as well as its respective derivative, Azari (or, in Turkish manner, Azeri), as "ethnonym", was not applied to the territory north of Arax (i.e. the area of the present-day Azerbaijan Republic, former Arran and Shirvan) and its inhabitants up until the establishment of the Musavat regime in that territory (1918-1920). The population of these two regions, although sharing a common language-a group of closely related Turkic dialects-have mixed ethnic backgrounds: Turkic-in the north, and Iranian in the south (see in detail P. Schwartz, Iran im Mittelalter nach den arabischen Geogra-

? Brill, Leiden, 2005 Iran and the Caucasus, 9.1



86 IRINA MOROZOVA

jan and East Azerbaijan (in both provinces the Turkic Azeri is a dominating ethnic group, although Kurds and Armenians are the second and the third important minorities). The term Iranian Azerbaijan, however, is not widely used in the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan for certain historical-political reasons that will be explained in this article in detail. The main idea is a conviction that the use of this term automatically signals the Azerbaijanis' adjustment to Iran and thus, denies the historically deserved independency of this nation. The current Azerbaijani researchers go back in time to rediscover the separa- tion of the nation at the beginning of the 19th century as a result of the Russian-Iranian wars. The historical records are re-interpreted as a constant struggle of the Azerbaijanis for their unity, and parallels are drawn to the present conflicts and claims of the Republic of Azerbai- jan to Armenia, Iran, and Georgia. For the last fourteen years, history classes at schools and universities of Azerbaijan have been taught from this nationalistic perspective.2 The intellectuals and educators are pres- sured to participate in the nation-building project, sometimes com- promising their trustworthy research.

Nevertheless, the main achievement of the current Azerbaijani historiography on the question of Southern Azerbaijan is utilisation of the previously unavailable documents from Baku and Moscow archives. Although there are obvious drawbacks in selectiveness of these materials and their interpretation, they do fill the lacunae in the international historiography on the Iranian-Russian conflict on the 'Azer- baijani question' after WWII. The recent post-cold war Western pub- lications3 were mostly based on the British Foreign Office and the US Department of State data,4 as well as already published documents in the Iranian, the Soviet and the Western press. The absence of refer-

phen, Bd. 8. A&rbdigdn, Stuttgart-Berlin, 1934; V. V. Bartol'd, Socinenya, tom2/ 1, Moscow, 1963: 703; Garnik Asatrian, "Legenda o 'dvux Azerbajdzanax' i kniga professora E.-O. Reza", Enajat- olla Reza, Azarbajdean i Arran (Aturpatakan i Kavkazskaya Alban'ya), perevod s persidskogo, predislovie i do- polnenya G. S. Asattyana, Erevan, 1998: 3-14; idem, "Suscestvuet li narod azari?" G. Asatrian, Eyudy po iranskoj etnologii, Erevan, 1998: 25-32). However, this discussion lies beyond the scope of the present article, in which the use of the terms "Southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan", "Northern Azer- baijan", etc. must be regarded as the current political realities and already the established termi- nololical tradition in the historiography of the problem.

On the basis of the author's field research in Baku in May 2003 (see Irina Morozova, "Brains for Hire. Education and Nation-building in Contemporary Azerbaijan", ILAS Newsletter, N 33: 3).

3 The cold war Western publications on the Azerbaijan nationalist movement contained not less ideology and myths than those in the Soviet Union (see, e.g. T. Swietochowski, Russian Azer- ba#jan, 1905-1920. The Shaping ofNational Identit in a Muslim Community, Cambridge, 1985).

4 Louise L'Estrange, Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946, Cambridge, 1992.



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AFIER WORLD WAR II 87

ences on the Soviet documentation (and also the relevant materials from Iran, particularly the archive of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party and government in Tabriz that was transferred to the USSR at the end of 1946) has made research conclusions, most logically, one-sided. Despite some progressive attempts to utilise records form various sources, including the Archive of the Azerbaijan Institute of History in Baku and the Russian State Archive of Social-Political History in Moscow and even interviews,5 the subject remains understudied. More records from the former Soviet archives are urgently called for.

The works of the Azerbaijani scholars analysed in this article are mainly based on the Central State Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (CSAAR), Central State Archive of Political Parties and Social Move- ments of the Azerbaijan Republic (CSAPPSMAR), the Archive of the Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic (AMNSAR), the Archive of the President of Georgia, and the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, many questions re- main uncovered even in these works, firstly, because substantial records from the archive of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (RCP(b)) are still closed, and secondly, because of the above-mentioned search for identity and the inability of the researchers to keep professional distance from the subject. In this article we aim to dwell upon the new facts discovered by the Azerbaijani scholars on the events in Southern Azerbaijan during and after WWII and analyse their interpretation in the light of nation-building processes in Azer- baijan Republic currently underway.

It is generally recognised in the international historiography, and the nowadays' Azerbaijani scholars concur with it, that the 'Azerbai- jani question' was a geopolitical matter for the world great powers, including Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, the USA, and Germany. Due to the late-colonialist and post-colonialist Western competition for the zones of influence in the Middle East, the integrity of Iran as an independent state and a player was, indeed, under threat during WWII. Some Azerbaijani historians have stressed the importance of the Caucasus in WWII geopolitics and once again pointed out that the international struggle for Iran was within the Germany's general strategy to get an access to the Caspian Sea and to the Soviet oil industries in Baku6 (which delivered to the USSR's energy market up to 70% of

5 Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaian. Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran, London, New York, 2000.

6 Parvin Darabadi, Geoistoriya Kaspfskogo regiona igeopolitika sovremennosti, Baku, 2002: 141-149.



88 IRINA MOROZOVA

fuel for the "war of motors").7 The Soviet-British military presence in Iran prevented any form of

German-Iranian strategic alliance during the war. The co-existence of a few competing forces in Iran (the old Russian-British great game was reinforced by participation of the other traditional and new players- Turkey and the USA) to a certain extent protected this country from falling apart along ethnic lines by maintaining a certain level of bal- ance. Moscow, London, and Washington had to come to a compromise in the war against Germany, at least for the time till the war was over.

At the same time, some unofficial Soviet agents were forming parti- san detachments along the Soviet-Iranian border and conquering separate settlements, establishing there provisional governments; while the British intelligence services were distributing weapons among the Kurds. As early as in February 1942, Reza Shah was asking Fr. Roose- velt to act as a guaranty for the territorial integrity and independency of Iran. The Iranian government wished to view the USA as an exter- nal supporting power (instead of Germany), standing outside the traditional colonialist competition, with which Great Britain and Russia were associated. Later, the Iranian drift towards the USA became more visible, and after the war the USA played the requested role of a "peace-maker" against the USSR and to a certain extent Great Britain.

The interests of the USSR in Iran derived primarily from the necessity to secure its southern borders, and in this case the memories of the German-Turkish troops threatening the Russian Empire from Iran during WWI were alive. In addition, until the Soviet victory in the war became clear, the Soviet intelligence services had been collecting reports on various threats coming from the Germany's activities in Asia8 (the plans to re-divide the Soviet south in case of the USSR's defeat, etc.). For instance, the evidence for the existence of some particular post-war plans by Iran came even from the opened diplomatic documentation: in the note N 643 from 17. 05. 1940 by the Iranian Em- bassy in the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was called 'Caucasian Azerbaijan' and in the Persian variant of the documents the Iranian General Consul signed as a 'General Consul of Shahan-shah in Caucasian Azerbaijan'.9

7 From the History of Azerbaijan Oil (http://www.gia.az/html/oill.html). 8 See, e.g. Yurij Kuznec, Tegeran 43 (Soversenno sekretno): Krax operacii "Dlinnyj pgyZok" (German-

skaya ten' nad Iranom, etc.), Moscow, 2003: passim. 9 Dzamil Gasanly, ruz.nyjAzerbaidzan: Nac'alo xolodnoj vojny, Baku, 2003:10.



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AfTER WORLD WAR II 89

The information about the Hitler's plans to create a fort post in the East and get an access to the Caucasus from the south pushed the USSR to speed a military intervention into Iran. On 25 August 1941, the 47-th Soviet army invaded Iran and in a few days occupied the territory of Southern Azerbaijan. Simultaneously the British twelve Indian detachments invaded Iran from the south. On the 17th of September 1941, the Soviet troops arrived in Tehran, and the next day the British armies entered the city. Although the Iranian territory was used as a transit for strategic materials from the Allies to the USSR, the traditional Russian and British strategic interests in the Middle East obviously did not disappear on a short notice, especially against the background of the acute international competition for oil.

The Azerbaijani issue, as any other national question in the Middle East, served as a card for change in big politics and was artificially sharpened and promoted.'0 We do not, however, intend to say that the Azerbaijani movement did not exist as a search for modern identity and claim for social-political changes, and the bibliography under study is the best proof for it. Nevertheless, the recent Azerbaijani historiography provided us with additional evidence that Bolsheviks were the main initiators of the Southern Azerbaijan national movement during WWII.1

One of the previously undiscovered and most unappreciated facts about the Soviet politics in Iran, pointed out by the Azerbaijani author Jamil Gasanly, was the humanitarian assistance of the Soviet Azer- baijan to Southern Azerbaijan even during the first absolutely disastrous for the USSR years of war.'2 Tehran authorities never complied with this dimension of the Soviet politics. When the Azerbaijani activists (on the Soviet initiative) printed the first issue of the newspaper Vatanyolunda ("For the Motherland") in Azeri-Turkish in Tabriz, Ira- nian media started publishing defensive patriotic articles, proving their possessions in the north. At the same time the Turkish press launched a campaign on abolishing the rights of the Turks in Iran. This Teh- ran-Ankara argument on the historical legacy in Azerbaijan was condemned that time by the First Secretary General of the Azerbaijan

'0 On the matter how the Bolsheviks used the national conflicts, see Ervand Abrahamian, Iran: Between Two Revolutions, Princeton, 1982.

" According to some records, I. Stalin assured M. J. Baqirov that "it was necessary to cor- rect the historical mistake by the Russian Emperor Alexander I and to unite the both parts of Azerbaijan" (M. G. Seidov, Obs'c'estvenno-politi6eskaya obstanovka v Azerbajdzane v 1940-e--nac'ale 1950- x godov (Manuscript of a book: 1 1, cited by E. Ismailov, Vlast' i Narod: 1945-1953, Baku, 2003: 62).

12 Gasanly, op. cit.: 19.



90 IRINA MOROZOVA

Communist Party of Bolsheviks (ACP(b)), Mir Ja'far Baqirov on the common ground that the Azeris wanted to determine their future as a nation on their own. Nowadays, this position of Baqirov brings him recognition as a fighter for the Azerbaijani unity despite his brutal repressive politics in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).'3

Moscow interfered and directly influenced Baqirov's views on the international politics around the 'Azerbaijani question'. In the same way the Soviet leaders intended to use the 'Kurdish question' against their main geopolitical competitor in the Middle East-Great Britain. Searching for allies, the Soviet policy-makers expected the Kurds to work together with the Iranian Azeris to promote the interests of the USSR in the region.

In many ways it was Moscow that inspired the discourse on the 'many centuries slavery of the Azeri people', the discourse that was eagerly and emotionally applied to the question of Southern Azerbai- jan during and after WWII, and is also used now by some individual politicians and political groups. "The blood of the nation must be boiling up", those were the words by Baqirov to inspire the representatives of Tabriz intelligentsia in Baku in 1941. "Our nation is like a young wine, boiling and drunk", that is the explanation by a contemporary Azerbaijani politician and researcher in the discussions on his country's domestic affairs.'4

Since the Soviet Bolsheviks distinguished between the revolutionary and diplomatic work abroad, they preferred to form a few competing groups: one more informal, but vitally important (usually the representatives from the Comintern before WWII),15 and the second, official, directly connected with the diplomatic missions of the USSR. Especially if the "national question" was on the agenda, the two groups were definitely formed. The "informal" work according to the line of the RCP(b) was often carried out by representatives of certain nationalities of the USSR (particularly if these ethnicities were present in the country of the Soviet mission), while more formal and official diplomatic tasks were conducted by the messengers from Moscow. For instance, revolutionary work in Outer Mongolia in the 1920s was to a great extent prepared by the Buryats, and in Northern Iran during WWII by the Soviet Azerbaijanis.

'3 Ismailov, op. cit. '4 Author's interview, Baku, May 2003. 15 On the relationships between the Comintern and the Peoples' Comissariat of Interna-

tional Affairs (NKID) in Asia, see Irina Morozova, The Comintern and Revolution in Mongolia, Uni- versity of Cambridge, 2002: 5-15.



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AFTER WORLD WAR II 91

In 1942, Azis Aliyev, the third secretary of the Central Committee of the ACP(b), was stationed in Tabriz as a commander in-chief of the 47th army and led the group that spread activities through the whole territory of Southern Azerbaijan. The Soviet ambassador in Iran A. Smirnov opposed Aliyev's agitation for the Turkic unity of the Soviet and Southern Azeris. Smirnov accused Aliyev in complicating the So- viet relationship with Iran, Turkey, and Great Britain; Aliyev, in his turn, complained that Smirnov did not work productively for the national-liberation movement of Southern Azerbaijan and even created obstacles for it. In spite of the fact that Moscow demonstratively tried to bring both figures to the negotiation table, the contradiction was created precisely by Moscow itself: Aliyev and Smirnov received different instructions. As Gasanly rightfully concludes on the secret trilateral negotiations in Tehran between the USSR, Great Britain, and Iran: "Seeking in such a way for the support from the Allies, the Soviet

Union gradually started putting the "Bolshevik experiment" in Iranian Azerbaijan into a halt".'6

In 1942, Iran received the guarantee of its territorial integrity from the USSR and the Allies: the military-strategic supplies to the USSR were delivered via Iran. However, many Azerbaijani scholars tend to view this Soviet tactics as a sacrifice of the so-called Azeri liberation movement to the Soviet interests. In his book Gasanly (see footnote 9) does not draw a full picture of the situation in the fronts in 1941-1942. Neither he tells the reader about the German influence and Hitler's interests in Iran before and during the war, the fact that proved to be decisive for the USSR in its politics in Iran and alliance

Fig. 1. MirJa'far Baqirov with the United Kingdom and the US. (Gasanly, op. cit.: after 160)

Following the signing of the trilateral agreement among the USSR, Great Britain, and Iran on 29 Janu- ary 1942, the newspaper "For the Motherland" was closed, and nearly the whole group of Aliyev called back. However, when in October




92 IRINA MOROZOVA

1942 against the background of the activities of the new US mission in Iran, Turkey re-launched its propaganda in Iranian Azerbaijan, Mos- cow once again was in need of the Azerbaijani revolutionary movement, and the Soviet Azerbaijanis formed the north-western Iranian division that had its headquarters staff in Tabriz."7

In 1944, following its successful operations in the fronts, the USSR upgraded its politics in Iran and on the Southern Azerbaijani question consequently. In March, the officers and agents from the Soviet Azer- baijan got 44 places in total in the trade representation in Iran."8 The appointees had to receive approval from the CC of the RCP(b) and were supposed to be interviewed by V. Molotov. The Soviet government declared about its additional "cultural and economic assistance" to the population of Southern Azerbaijan. The newspaper "For the Motherland" started being published again. According to the example of the Spiritual Directory of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakh- stan (SADUM) established in 1943, on 6 March 1944, the Directory of the Muslims of the Caucasus was formed in Baku (by the decision of the Bureau of the ACP(b)!). By granting religion and religious figures the Soviets hoped to gain wider support from the population in South- ern Azerbaijan. (However, that was far from being the main goal: the first congress of Muslim clergy and believers of the Caucasus adopted a declaration to the Muslims all over the world. In this declaration they called for jihad against fascism, fascist Germany and Italy, against the plans of Hitler and Mussolini to "conquer the holly lands of Arabia and Egypt".)

That time the Soviet propaganda methods were focused on humanitarian assistance, on building up warm feelings towards the "brothers in the Soviet Azerbaijan". Agitation for the establishment of the Soviet power was practically prohibited as a wrong tactics. Stories about a better life in the Soviet Azerbaijan were especially encour- aged. Ismailov, in his book provides important archival data on what kind of "better life" it was and what enormous hardships and hunger the Azerbaijani agrarian population had to suffer during and after the war.'9 It was exactly against that disastrous economic background in April 1944, when Baqirov found means to supply two boring machines and 700 meters of tube to Qazvin (the people of Qazvin had problems with drinking water and applied for the US help)20 and to

17 Ibid.: 33-34. 18 Ibid.: 40. '9 Ismailov, op. cit.: 21-32. 20 Gasanly, op. cit.: 43.



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AFrER WORLD WAR II 93

start the construction of the automobile road Baku-Astara-Qazvin. The Soviets started competition with the Americans on better technical and economic assistance in Southern Azerbaijan when the war was still on.

In the fall of 1944, the decision was made to reorganise the newspapers "The Friend of Iran", "For the Motherland", and to issue an illustrated journal in Iran in a few languages: Persian, Azeri-Turkish, Armenian, Arabic, and Kurdish. In November, Moscow was sponsoring the Azerbaijani-Iranian society of cultural ties. The Soviet Azerbaijani and Armenian schools were opened in Iran. In spring and summer 1944, about 620 Soviet specialists of various profiles were sent to Iranian Azerbaijan.2' The USSR supported the party Tudeh in Tehran and Southern Azerbaijan and promoted their representatives in the Iranian Majles. Baqirov tried to drag Moscow's attention to Southern Azerbaijan as he could: the Soviet Azerbaijani geologists were giving Moscow the vision of considerable amounts of hydrocarbon in Southern Azerbaijan and reported that these amounts were even not less than in the south of Iran.22

A common current trend in the Azerbaijani historiography is an exaggeration of the oil factor as the focus point in the cold war politics and the current globalisation processes.23 From their point of view, the after-war conflicts between the allies were coursed by the increased competition for energy resources, and Iran was the main object for it.

The hydrocarbon reserves of Northern Iran did play an important role and orientated the USSR in its late-war drift into the Middle East. However, the Soviet quest for oil did have certain political, geopolitical, and diplomatic motives, and it is difficult to come to the final conclusion what was predominant and what was secondary in the Stalin's desire to obtain an oil concession in the Northern Iran. Nevertheless, the oil disputes between the Soviet Union and the Iranian governments (one Iranian cabinet was even dismissed during this oil game) in 1944-1946 stimulated and enforced the propaganda for the "liberation of Southern Azerbaijan".

On 25 September 1944, the prime minister of Iran Mohammad Sa'ed received a note from the Soviet Union, in which the latter sug-

21 Ibid.: 44. 22 Ibid.: 35. 23 Based on the author's observation at the two international conferences in Baku in May

2003: "Caucasus and Central Asia in the Globalisation Process", organised by Qafqaz Univer- sity; and "Southern Caucasus in the Context of New Geostrategical Relations", organised by Western University.



94 IRINA MOROZOVA

gested that an oil concession in the provinces Semnan, Gorgan, Ma- zandaran, Gilan, and Azerbaijan should be granted to the Soviet government. The supporters of the Soviet proposal were in minority, especially in Tehran, and most of the newspapers particularly close to the Iranian governmental circles, started producing publications against this idea. The Iranian government that already had given oil concessions in the South to Great Britain was very concerned about the threat to the country to be divided by the great powers and was simply afraid of the consequences that might have surfaced if the USSR had received the desired concession. The most common argument in mass media against the concession was: "... the Iranian oil belongs to the Iranian people", the one, more politically advanced (most likely supported by the British intelligence service) "the Soviet government aims not to get the oil, but to take the Northern provinces from Iran". On 25 October 1944, in a month after the unsuccessful negotiations, the Soviet "oil delegation" returned to Moscow, and a huge agitation campaign immediately started in Southern Azerbaijan. About 70 thousand people were on strike against the central government, and that was the Soviet answer to the Premier Sa'ed.

The Soviet Azerbaijani agents working in Tabriz were trying to spread a separatist idea among the population against the central government in Tehran. It was said that there were enough prominent personalities among the people, who could form their own independent (from the Persians) government. The unrest was so massive and effective that a new government was soon formed in Tehran. At the same time the Iranian Majles adopted a law that prohibited any negotiations on oil concession. That was a protective measure of Iran against falling apart and being divided by the powerful allies.

When in spring 1945 the upcoming defeat of Germany was pre- dictable, and the great success of the USSR indisputable, traditional Russian-British competition in the Middle East became more visible. The Allies started focusing on the perspective after-war division of zones of interests. The objectives of Great Britain were to prevent the Soviet penetration further into the Middle East the Persian Gulf and, as far as the situation allowed it, to create obstacles for the Soviet interests in the northern parts of Iran. The British interests concurred with the ones by the USA that happened to be actively involved in Iran for the first time in history.24 To get an access to the Caspian Sea

24 Before WWII, the US involvement in Iran was limited to missionary activities and minor economic and financial links and temporary advisory missions (see Fawcett, op. cit.: 108).




from the Iranian side looked also rather tempting for Great Britain as well, and in April 1945 the British began topo-geological exploration in the areas to the north and north-east from Tehran. Although the official goal of the expedition was the exploration of the basins of two rivers (Lar and Jajarud), the Soviet military intelligence suspected much more than this.

In June-July 1945, the CC of the RCP(b) together with the ACP(b) signed the whole range of secret documentation on the plans to start oil-digging in Iranian Azerbaijan in September 1945. At the same time, it was intended to establish the branches of the Soviet industrial enterprises there. At that time the leaders of the Soviet Azerbaijan reinforced their efforts to achieve the unity of the Soviet and the South- ern Azerbaijan. Mahmud Aliyev, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the ASSR, composed a fact-book on the Soviet Azerbaijan (he called it Northern Azerbaijan) and Southern Azerbaijan. On the 21 pages of this document he presented an explanation for the South- ern and Northern Azerbaijans historical unity. He stated that the people in the north and south shared one culture, historical heritage and morality, identity, folklore, and so on.25 The journal "Azerbaijan", published in the Soviet Azerbaijan and distributed in Northern Iran in 1945-1946, stressed the unity of the "two parts of Azerbaijan" in the spheres of public life, culture and literature. This concept of a "one motherland", of a "united nation" is shared by many Azerbaijani scholars and public activists nowadays.

While the Soviet Azerbaijani leaders agitated for the struggle for the unity of "the separated nation", in Moscow a more pragmatic ap- proach prevailed. On 6 July 1945, the Political Bureau of the CC of the RCP(b) adopted a secret resolution "On the activities of the organisation of the separatist movement in Southern Azerbaijan and other provinces of Northern Iran". The main idea of this resolution was to launch a campaign on establishment of a national autonomous Azerbaijan district (oblast') in Iran.26 The Azerbaijani Democratic Party (ADP) had to be formed to achieve this goal. In July, Baqirov called for a secret meeting of the influential politicians of Iranian Azerbaijan in Baku, and a leader of the perspective party was cho- sen-the former Comintern agent Seyyed (Mir) Ja'far Pishevari.27 The party itself was planned to be formed on the basis of the party Tudeh.

25 Gasanly, op. cit.: 74. 26 Ibid.: 76-78. 27 Ibid.: 84.



96 IRINA MOROZOVA

Upon the results of the Potsdam conference (16 July-2 August 1945), the Allies' troops had to be withdrawn from Iran in six months (by 2 March 1946), a more detailed schedule of the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Iran had to be discussed in September 1945 at the session of the Union of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in London. All the following tactics of the two sides-the Soviet and Iranian, supported by the UK and the USA was based on timing: the Soviets tried to enforce the Azerbaijani liberation movement on a short-scale, and the Iranians to achieve the sooner retreat of the Soviets from their territory and postpone a common official agreement with the separatist ADP. However, the most "hastening" side was the Azerbai- jani leaders themselves, first of all Baqirov, as well as Pishevari from Iran. Each of them was doing everything possible not to miss the his- toric momentum. The situation in Southern Azerbaijan was develop- ing dynamically.

May be the most distinguished achievement of the nowadays' Azer- baijani scholars, as Gasanly, is the (re)-discovery of the Soviet leading role in Southern Azerbaijan movement for autonomy and independence. The fact that the ADP was formed and led under the direct su- pervision from the USSR was often neglected even by the recent historiography.28

In August 1945, the adviser of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran A. Yakubov was sent to Tabriz particularly to promote the formation of the ADP. On 3 September, the ADP proclaimed its establishment and goals: "under the condition of preserving sovereignty and territorial unity of Iran, Azerbaijan should achieve internal independence, so that it could determine its own fate".29 The main issues of the new party programme were the party consolidation, national autonomy and the introduction of the Azeri-Turkish language. Without delay, at the beginning of September, the ADP received money from Baku, as well as equipment for two printing-houses, supplied by typographic materials and paper.

The difference of the ADP from Tudeh was in broader social basis, the potential to involve different layers of the population, especially intelligentsia, wealthy traders and landlords. At first sight the programme of the party did not expose any pro-Soviet intentions. The Iranian government was puzzled and sent to the northern regions weapons and po- licemen in civil clothes. Tehran newspapers started media war against

28 See e.g. Atabaki, op. cit.: 63-99. 29 Gasanly, op. cit.: 93.




the idea of the Azerbaijan autonomy and tried to deny the usage of the Azeri-Turkish language in state institutions and schools. The usage of the Persian language was viewed by Tehran in old style Reza Shah stereotypes: as a guarantee of Iranian integrity. Mohammad-Reza Shah looked upon the people of the Azerbaijan province as Iranian subjects who should be integrated as fully and rapidly as possible. The prohibition of Azeri-Turkish was on the measures to achieve this.30 The pro-government propaganda put ahead such patriotic notions as love for the Shah, historical Iranian legacy, and struggle for strong and independent Iran.

The Iranian Ministry of Internal Affairs instructed the local officials in the north to oppose separatist trends. The Soviet intelligence inter- cepted the secret order of the Iranian General Staff to use weapons against the separatists "even if the Russians attempted to create obstacles". In addition, Tehran was trying to find loyal allies among the landlords in the northern provinces: the latter received weapons and recommendations to address the population to unite under the banner of Islam. According to the Tehran leaders, such a slogan should have provided faithfulness to the central authorities. Some time later, when the Azerbaijani autonomy was de-facto established (for a very short period), but not recognised by Tehran, the Iranians from the southern provinces accused their northern compatriots in the betrayal of the ideas of Islam and called for jihad against them.3" Perhaps, the nowadays' Azerbaijani (the Republic of Azerbaijan) cautious attitude towards the slogans of Muslim unity is rooted in that after-war ideological struggle in Iranian Azerbaijan.

Since the middle of October 1945, the USSR started supplying Iranian Azerbaijan with new weapons of foreign brands.32 Upon the decision by the CC of the RCP(b), 80 specially trained operatives of the Extraordinary Committee (CK) were sent to Southern Azerbaijan. The military detachments consisting of the local population were formed and armed. It was explained to the Iranian government that it was not the ADP, but a "reaction on the brutal attitude of the reac- tionary forces" that provoked the appearance of the detachments. On 4 November, V. Molotov signed a resolution "On broadening trade with Iranian Azerbaijan", in which a significant increase in exports to

30 H. Amirsadeghi, (ed.) Twentieth-centuy Iran, London, 1978: 60. 31 Gasanly, op. cit.: 193. 32 Ibid.: 105.



98 IRINA MOROZOVA

and imports from Southern Azerbaijan was planned for the forth quarter of 1945.

The Soviet overall assistance to the ADP aroused concern among the other ethnicities in Northern Iran. The leaders of a few Kurdish tribes applied to Baqirov with a request to help them with organising the same kind of Kurdish Democratic Party as the ADP. They wanted to open Kurdish hospitals, schools and send the Kurdish youth to study in the USSR.33

In autumn 1945, the Soviet army consolidated its forces in the north and prevented the Iranian troops from relocating there. This situation naturally led to a diplomatic conflict, in which, however, the USSR was first a winner. On 17 November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran handed a note to the Soviet Embassy with a protest against the Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Iran and against the Soviet support of some tribes and leaders in the north of the country, including the ADP. The Iranian side reminded that such actions contradicted with the trilateral treaty of 1942. At the same time Tehran insisted on sending additional troops to the north. The reply from Moscow came fast: the Soviet government considered the engagement of additional Soviet troops in Iran to be "inappropriate" and, thus, viewed the additional Iranian troops as "unreasonable". The threat was almost uncovered. At the same time the note claimed that the events in Iranian Azerbaijan were solely an internal affair of Iran, for which the Soviets carried no responsibility whatsoever.

On the matters of Southern Azerbaijan the views of Moscow and Baku differed. If for Baqirov this question was, indeed, of national identity concern, the "Kremlin four" (I. Stalin, V. Molotov, L. Beria and G. Malenkov) were thinking in terms of global international politics and used the "question of Southern Azerbaijan" as a card in their post-war politics in the Middle East. The Soviet sponsorship of the Azerbaijani separatist movement in Iran was to a great extent Stalin's action upon the Iran's refusal to give him oil concessions. When the Tehran government tried to establish better diplomatic relations with the USSR in exchange of the Soviet political retreat from Iranian Azerbaijan, they first received uncompromised refusal.

The scheme of the development of the Azerbaijan autonomous movement was the following: the Soviet Azerbaijani agents in Tabriz34

Ibid.: 103-104. 34 The reporters in Iran were A. Yakubov; the Commissar of Azerbaijani State Security S.

Emelyanov; the "Tabriz three"-M. Ibragimov, G. Gasanov, A. Atakishiev; the General Consul



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AFITER WORLD WAR II 99

instructed the ADP leaders and sent documentation and reports to Baku; in Baku Baqirov summed everything up and forwarded the documentation with his analysis and suggestions to Moscow. In Mos- cow the final decisions were made and these decisions had to be sent back via Baqirov and implemented in Tabriz. Moscow had practically an overall control over the Soviet Azerbaijani leaders and it tended to

manipulate the movement in Iranian Azerbaijan. Although as a main sponsor and genera- tor it had the decisive word in the Azerbaijani politics, some things were out of control.

It became clear that the interpretation of the final goal of the movement by Moscow and Pishevari differed. The latter

Fig. 2. Seyyed (Mir)Ja'far Pishevari was unlikely to be fully satisfied (Gasanly, op. cit.: after 160) with the autonomy within Iran,

but dreamt about the establishment of the Azerbaijani National-De- mocratic Republic under the influence of the USSR, according to the pattern of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The further unity with the Soviet Azerbaijan was also considered, and, probably, not only by Pishevari. Gasanly does not provide the reader with his own reflections on the position of Pishevari (although with the politics of Baqirov on Southern Azerbaijan he seems to concur), but points out the efforts from Moscow to control Pishevari (the son of Pishevari was invited to study in Baku under very good conditions).

The leaders of the Azerbaijani movement for independence could have viewed Outer Mongolia as an example to follow. However, the international situation in the Middle East differed substantially from the same in the Far East. If in the East Asian policy the USSR suc- ceeded to use its international influence and accomplished de-jure independence for Outer Mongolia from the People's Republic of China (de-facto independence had been already achieved in 1921), in the Middle East it faced old and more previously and currently successful contra-players the United Kingdom and the USA. Stalin was going to play the Azerbaijani card according to the circumstances. Never- theless, in the Soviet Azerbaijan the expectations for success were very

in Tabriz A. Krasnykh; Vice-Consul N. Kuliev; the commander of the Soviet Army in Iran general Glinskij; the member of the military council general Russovij, and others.



100 IRINA MOROZOVA

high in autumn 1945, and Baqirov was instructing his agents in Ira- nian Azerbaijan "not to lose any minute".

In the middle of November new demonstrations took place in the Northern Iranian cities-Tabriz, Maragheh, Mianeh, Sarab, Ardabil, Astara, and others. More than 150 thousand signatures were collected for the petition to claim the right to establish Azerbaijani electoral institutions and national governance. The participation of the armed detachments (Feda'ian) in the demonstrations, organised by the ADP, frightened some landlords and traders within the party. They started to suspect a possible liquidation of private property that might have followed next after the demonstrations.

On 20 November, the so-called Azerbaijan National Congress (of 646 delegates) started its first working day. Pishevari declared the programme of the party that was also meant as a programme for the nation: "... we would win the autonomy for Azerbaijan... restore its de- stroyed cities and villages, open schools and high educational institutions. The National Azerbaijani Government will fairly solve the disputes among peasants and landlords and we will be an example for the whole Iran".35 Pishevari also addressed the Congress on the reaction of the central government in Tehran: he said that the government instead of taking the opinion of the Azerbaijani nation into account wrongly applied to the foreign states so that they could help to solve the "Azerbaijani question". Pishevari pointed out that the fate of the Azerbaijani nation had to be decided not by London or Ankara, but only at the Azerbaijani national meeting.36 Following the suggestions by some delegates, the Congress ambitiously proclaimed itself as the Constituent Assembly of Azerbaijan. Although the after-Congress declaration stressed that the Assembly had no intentions to separate from Iran, however, in order to provide a full-scale national autonomy, it planned to broaden the organisation of local Azerbaijani authorities, reorganise them into a National Parliament (Milli Majles) and create a National Government. The Azeri-Turkish language was supposed to become a state bureaucratic and educational language for Autonomous Azerbaijan. The adherence to peaceful solutions was emphasised, however, only under the condition of the acceptance of the programme by the central government in Tehran.

Tehran tried to react in public, diplomatic, secret and military ways: by anti-ADP, anti-Soviet Azerbaijani propaganda, by stimulat-

35 Gasanly, op. cit.: 118-119. 36 Ibid.: 119.




ing the idea of better relationships with the USSR, trading with the ADP leaders and the Soviets, and by preparing military air forces to suppress the separatist movement.37 When the London radio was translating news on the riots of separatists in Iran and the Soviet supplies of weapons to them, the Soviet newspapers ("Izvestiya") attracted public attention to the similar actions of the British in Palestine, Egypt, and Indonesia. On 29 November, the US government, to whom Teh- ran applied in that crisis, sent a note to the USSR asking to fasten the process of withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Iran and fulfil it by 1 January 1946. In the return note the Soviet government stated that it did not find that measure necessary. V. Molotov was assuring the Am- bassador of Iran in Moscow that the USSR respected the sovereign rights and independence of Iran.

The Iranian attempts to negotiate and settle down the Azerbaijani question did not lead to any benefits in autumn 1945. Although Pishevari had a number of meetings with the newly appointed Gover- nor General of Tabriz Ahmad Bayat, he was instructed by the Soviet consultants to adhere to the programme adopted by the Assembly, to stick to the point of autonomy and resist the Tehran tactics of pro- longing the negotiation and winning the time.

The Iranian side, as well as the British and US intelligence services, did have some information about the Soviet active role in the events in the Iranian northern provinces; Tehran hoped that the Azerbaijani movement would come to a halt with the Soviet troops' withdrawal from its territory. On 8 December, the UK Ambassador in Moscow suggested V. Molotov to discuss the question of evacuation of the So- viet and British troops from Iran. The Ambassador of Iran in Wash- ington, Hoseyn 'Ala, asked the US state secretaryJ. Birns to raise the Iranian matter at the forthcoming meeting in Moscow. Meanwhile, the press-secretary of the US Embassy in Iran, K. Yang, had a meeting with Pishevari. During the meeting he mentioned that the actions undertaken by the ADP were in fact anti-constitutional. Pishevari re- plied that Constitution was a manifestation of legal demands and rights of people and the Azerbaijani nation had its historical rights and fair demands in the same way as the American people used to have on the way to democracy and this way had not been blocked for them by the existing Constitution.38

3 Ibid.: 126-129. 38 Ibid.: 140.



102 IRINA MOROZOVA

Gasanly characterises the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan at the beginning of December as a diarchy: the ADP had a real control over the territory and population, but it lacked representation in the official institutions in Tehran, while the Iranian central government could not influence the events and did not dare to send troops to Tabriz.39 By 3 December, the Azerbaijan National Parliament was elected (the twelve newly elected deputies were Pishevari, Biriya, Qiyami, Padegan, Javid, Rafi'i, Shabestari, Elhami, Nikju, Ipakchiyan, Mashinchi, and 'Azima) and the allowance from Moscow to open the first session of this organ was received. On 11 December, the whole territory of Iranian Azer- baijan was under the ADP's control, the Feda'iyan military groups seized Maragheh, Sarab, Bostanabad, Marand and some other cities. On 12 December, the first meeting of the National Parliament took place in Tabriz, the local police was disarmed and the Governor Gen- eral Bayat together with the 6 journalists of Tehran newspapers was escorted from the city on 13 December. At the same day, Pishevari and the commander of the Tabriz garrison Colonel 'Ali-akbar Derakhshani signed the capitulation of the garrison and incorporation of its former military personnel into the government of Azerbaijan (under the condition of their oath of allegiance). On 14 December, Tabriz was in the hands of the ADP. As Gasanly points out, the diarchy was over in Southern Azerbaijan.

However, the future of the Azerbaijani liberation movement was completely dependent on the USSR and, thus, its diplomatic success. As the deputies of the National Parliament rightfully postulated: any Iranian government was able to overthrow the Azerbaijani autonomy if the Soviet troops were not present in the country. Consequently, on a long-term scale even a full autonomy within Iran did not look as a proper solution and the leaders of the ADP promoted the idea of establishing an independent peoples' democratic state according to the model of the MPR. Baqirov and his colleagues in Baku shared this idea on a popular ground of the "great imperial 'Farsi' chauvinism".40 This attitude towards Iran and its state politics, also on "Azerbaijani question", could be still noticed in the Republic of Azerbaijan.41

The perspective establishment of the independent state was la- belled by the CC of the ADP as the second stage of the national liberation struggle. For the third stage, the unity of the Soviet and Ira-

9 Ibid.: 137. 40 Ibid.: 143. 41 Interviews by the author in Baku, May 2003.



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AJ3TER WORLD WAR II 103

nian Azerbaijans was planned (as the materials of the meetings between the representatives of the both sides, including Baqirov and Pishevari, demonstrate).42 Their opponents criticised the two leaders for personal ambitious plans to rule in the perspective unitary state. Whether or not Baqirov and Pishevari viewed such a state within the USSR or not and whether their positions on the matters differed is still not entirely clear. The Gasanly's citations show that Baqirov practically fully controlled the Soviet Azerbaijani agents in Iranian Azer- baijan and was able even to frame the content of their petitions to the centre. He wanted the idea of the Azerbaijani unity to sound conven- ient without any contradictions and he was rather successful in that. An unavoidable future unity of the Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijans seemed to be logical outcome of the reports coming from Tabriz. Naturally, Moscow was aware of that and made sure that it had a contra-force in the face of official diplomats in Tehran. In addition, Moscow never refused a good contact with Tudeh, although the ADP leaders had conflicts with it.

In official notes to the Allies, Iran requested immediate and full evacuation of all foreign troops from the country.

The USSR could not let the Azerbaijani ambitions become visible and shed a shadow on the Soviet international reputation. When the Azerbaijan National Parliament at its first sessions created cabinet of ministers (including Pishevari, Prime Minister, Mirza 'Ali Shabestari, Mohammad Biriya, Salam-ollah Javid, Gholam-Reza Elhami, and Ja'far Kaviyani),43 the ministries of foreign affairs and defense were not formed despite some voices for it. In addition, the ADP leaders prom- ised to send 25% of the collected taxes to the state treasury of Iran, while the rest was supposed to be spent on the needs of Azerbaijan autonomy.

These official proclamations of the Azerbaijani Majles provided Moscow with a pretext to stick to its argumentation that the USSR was not interfering into the internal affairs of Iran, and the problem of Iranian Azerbaijan was caused by repressive and imprudent policies of the Iranian government in Tehran, which on top of all demonstrated unfriendly gestures towards the Soviet Union. At the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs in Moscow in December 1945, the USA and Great Britain unsuccessfully endeavoured to bring Stalin and

42 Gasanly, op. cit.: 144. 43 For the characteristics of the social background of the ADP leaders and the cabinet of

ministers of Azerbaijan National Parliament, see Atabaki, op. cit.: 1 15-126, 130-131.



104 IRINA MOROZOVA

Molotov to the immediate solution of the "Iranian question". The time was won by Moscow, and the Iranian efforts to fasten the process of withdrawal of the Soviet troops collapsed. Iran sent a protest to Moscow, London and Washington, threatening to bring the "Azer- baijani question" to the UN General Assembly, on which Stalin re- plied that the USSR was not afraid to discuss the matter at the UN Assembly.

However, the USA managed to make a point out of the Azerbai- jani question and strengthened its alliance with Iran against the influence of the USSR. Gasanly sees the start of the cold war in this issue: an idea was spread that Azerbaijan was only the first part in a chain of events that could happen in Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries.4 There was some truth in these speculations: the Azerbaijani case seemed as an option to follow for a number of Kurdish tribes and other ethnicities in Asia. The US recommendations to the Iranian government included concessions to Azerbaijan, like the introduction of the Turkish language and the establishment of the local self-governance in Azerbaijan province in accordance with the Iranian Constitu- tion, so that Tehran looked fair enough in the eyes of the international community.45 After the Moscow meeting in December 1945, the Ira- nian Ambassador in the USA received the confirmation that the USA was going to support Iran in case of its application to the UN Assem- bly.

On 19 January 1946, during the sessions of the UN General As- sembly in London, the question "On disagreement between Iran and the Soviet Union" was suggested for discussion by the head of the Ira- nian delegation Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, a native of Tabriz, by the way. Despite the protest by the head of the Soviet delegation A. Vy- shinskij, the question was on the agenda of the meeting of the UN Se- curity Council on 28 and 30January. As a result, the Security Council requested that the two sides informed the Council about the process of negotiations.4'

Gasanly is not free from a certain preconceived notion in his de- scription of the ADP's policy in Iranian Azerbaijan. The actions by the ADP look too fair, and the support of the population-exaggeratedly overwhelming. In fact, as some other scholars proved with a reference to the Persian sources, the ADP faced some resistance in Southern

44 Gasanly, op. cit.: 157. 45 Ibid.: 159. 46 See Jalal Matini, "Salgard-e nejat-e Azarbaijan", Irangenasl, N 3, 2004 (Azarbaijan dar

tarix-e Iran): 413-432.




Azerbaijan and the Tehran garrisons not always easily capitulated.47 There were victims from both sides. Whether or not all the layers of the population indisputably accepted the party of democrats, perform- ing according to the Bolshevik revolutionary tactics that did not ex- clude violence at all, remains a question. Gasanly himself mentions the anti-democrats' riots organised by the influential landlord Mahmud- khan Zolfaqari.48 Especially against the background of the Baqirov's opinion about the "southern comrades" being not attentive enough to the questions of economy, finances, transportation, agriculture and grain supplies,49 Gasanly's optimism in covering the success of Pishe- vari provokes hesitations. The general living conditions did not improve within a few months of the democrats' domination: the northern provinces occurred to be even more isolated from the rest of the country (the ADP threatened to stop paying Tehran 25% from the taxes collected), there was a shortage of bread and other products in the mar- kets. The post-war weakened Soviet Azerbaijan provided economic assistance to Iranian Azerbaijan, facilitated trade and re-launched industries; it also supplied the Iranian province with oil and oil products.50 However, even this was not sufficient, and the economic co-op- eration with the USSR did not go very smoothly. The Soviets had neither legal opportunity nor tactical space to realise that. Pishevari requested such scale of economic and financial assistance from Baqi- rov that the latter was obviously not able to cover: the list included the stimulation of the Soviet trade organisations to purchase commodities, technical assistance to the Azerbaijan National Government, delivery of special equipment to print Azerbaijan national currency, sales of modern agricultural machines and irrigation equipment to Azerbaijan, and etc.5' Baqirov tried hard to work for such a trade treaty; he also suggested increasing, at least temporarily, Soviet purchases in South- ern Azerbaijan and to provide credit to the National Bank of Azer- baijan. The abilities of Baqirov did not correspond to his ambitions: hunger was reported in many agricultural regions of the Soviet Azer- baijan and, thus, money had to be spent to improve the deteriorating domestic situation. InJanuary 1946, Baqirov sent to Moscow a pecu- liar document on the struggle against unemployment and improving social sphere. The document was called "On the need in labour force

47 Atabaki, op. cit.: 133. 48 Gasanly, op. cit.: 190-19 1, see also Atabaki, op. cit.: 97. 49 Gasanly, op. cit.: 178. 50 Ibid.: 179. 5' Ibid.: 208-209.



106 IRINA MOROZOVA

for the Azerbaijan SSR"; it postulated that the ASSR would be soon in need of 80-85 thousand people to develop oil industry and after-war constructions, and the labour force from Iranian Azerbaijan could be a logical solution to the problem.52 Moscow did not agree to that.

Another interesting "way out" was proposed by Baqirov to the members of the Azerbaijan National Government: "...to shout daily through the Tehran media that you are strangled, robbed, killed and to ask assistance from the international community".53 The repressive actions by the ADP had their place. Some simple facts witness that. If in December 1945 the number of party members was 70 thousand, in January 1946 it somehow increased up to 187 thousand. Even the leaders of the party themselves publicly recognised some serious breaches during the admission to the party.54

Gasanly selects some reports written by foreign observers, who compared Northern and Southern Azerbaijan, the pro-Soviet reports that stress the achievements of the Soviet Azerbaijan and the back- wardness of Iranian Azerbaijan55. The author concludes that the So- viet Azerbaijan became a "gravity center" for all Iranian Azeris. He also points out that the ADP's deputies did not view the assistance from the Soviet Azerbaijan as a foreign interference. Baqirov tried to promote the Soviet Azerbaijani specialists into the Ministries of the Azerbaijan government in Tabriz and for this he received approvals from Moscow.

The speed of the events in Southern Azerbaijan at the end of 1945 beginning of 1946 exceeded expectations of Moscow and started increasingly contradicting the international diplomacy that the USSR had to observe. The Azerbaijan National Parliament finally announced its intentions to establish an independent state. Exactly during the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, Na- tional Parliament adopted a law on "Organisation of the Azerbaijani People's Army".56 (Simultaneously they announced amnesty for the Azeri prisoners and in a couple of days issued a law on the introduction of the Azeri-Turkish language at schools.) Most naturally, Stalin, who was trying to convince the Allies in Moscow in his absolute non- interference into the Iranian matters, prohibited the immediate publi- cation of the law on the army. The US policy-makers and advisers

52 Ibid.: 201-202.

5 Ibid.: 179. 54 Ibid.: 209. 55 Ibid.: 165. 56 Ibid.: 170.




were trying to convince Iran to make concessions to Azerbaijan: at least to introduce the Azeri language and let the elected local governments function in the northern provinces. At the same time, to give an example for the Soviet Union to follow, the USA and the UK with- drew their troops from Iran at the beginning of 1946. The Soviet military presence in Iran seemed to be never than ever dangerous for the neighbouring Middle Eastern countries and the Allies. Turkey was accumulating complaints about the Soviet expansionistic plans: Stalin claimed for a number of Turkish provinces of Georgia and Armenia, and the people in Soviet Georgia and Armenia took these claims even more seriously than the Generalissimos himself.

At the same time the leaders of Tudeh, inspired by the development of the "democratic movement" in Iranian Azerbaijan, prepared a document, memorandum of actions called "The political situation in Iran and the activities for the development of the democratic movement". The authors of the memorandum stressed the stimulating ef- fect of the events in Azerbaijan on the general political tendencies in Iran towards democratisation and progress. A "democratic upheaval" was welcomed in other parts of Iran and in the capital. It is interesting that Gasanly views the positions of Tudeh as something not useful for the Azerbaijani movement, since, according to his interpretation, the events in Azerbaijan should not be viewed solely as a part of the general democratisation movement in Iran. It seems that his opinion does not differ from that by the leaders of the Soviet Azerbaijan after the war: the whole bench of materials was collected on the struggle between Tudeh and the ADP.57

In January 1946, Pishevari and his government faced the problem of how to maintain the conquered power and to lead hungry people to struggle for independence without losing their popular support. The government had to pay the salary to the officials for December 1945. Since 4 January, trips outside the territory of Azerbaijan were re- stricted, and a special requirement was requested from those willing to leave the province.58

On January 6, the National Government of Azerbaijan charged the Azeri-Turkish language with the status of the state language and announced the establishment of the Azerbaijan State University in Tabriz. (The University was opened on 12 June 1946, and the core body of its staff consisted of professors and specialists from the Soviet

5 Ibid.: 175-177. 58 Ibid.: 191.



108 IRINA MOROZOVA

Azerbaijan.) As early as 11 January, Baqirov requested from his agents in Tabriz to facilitate the adoption of the Constitution. On 15 Janu- ary, National Parliament confirmed the decision to prepare the draft plan of the Constitution and formed a Constitutional Commission; the next day the ministers of the Azerbaijan National Government signed the document "The demands of the Azerbaijani Nation". This document contained different argumentation for independence. The document approved the perspective establishment of the Azerbaijan National Democratic Republic and pointed out the basic principles for its formation: democracy and elective state institutions. The Constitu- ent Assembly was charged to work out the Constitution and, thus, determine the fate of the nation. The basic civil rights and private property were among the main principles for the perspective Constitution. At the same time, the expropriation and redistribution of the former state lands were also planned. A geographical map with the marked boundaries of the perspective Republic was attached to the document. The territory of the Republic encompassed the main Northern Iranian cities: Tabriz, Ardabil, Urumiyeh, Miandoab, Maragheh, Salmas, Khoy, Marand, Miyaneh, Enzeli, Maku, Ahar, Zanjan, Qazvin, and Hamadan. The map also included the areas of the Kurdish tribes, and it was stated in the document that the boundaries of the Northern Kurdistan would be determined after the question of the state admini- stration was settled.59 The Armenian minority in the Northern Iran was not mentioned. Later the Armenians also announced their plans to establish the National Armenian Republic near Urumiyeh, and on 22 January 1946, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan announced the autonomy of Kurdistan within Iran. Although Baqirov and Pishevari preferred the cultural autonomy of the Kurds within the Azerbaijan Republic, Moscow strongly stood for the establishment of the Kurdis- tan Republic.

In the first days of February 1946, after the famous speech by Sta- lin (9 February) on the great strength of the Red Army, the contradictions of the former allies in the matters of international politics crystal- lised. Moscow gave a permission to publish the decision on the formation of the Azerbaijan Peoples' Army that had been made in Decem- ber 1945. 104 Azerbaijani officers were commanded from the Baku Military District (okrug) to the Iranian Azerbaijan.60 According to the decision of the CC of the RCP(b) from 6 July 1945, 6 million riyals

59 Ibid.: 203-205. 60 Ibid.: 228.




were allotted to the needs of this army.6' Soon 17 thousand soldiers were recruited to the National Army in Southern Azerbaijan. Ac- cording to the plan, the army had to be disciplined and fully functional by 1 July 1946. About 250 officers of the local population were trained, and a group of young people was sent to the Soviet Azerbai- jan to gain military education.62 On 15 February, on the occasion of the first levy among the Southern Azerbaijan population, a demon- stration was organised in Tabriz. The members of the National Gov- ernment addressed the demonstrators on creation of the national well- equipped modern army.

Along with the formation of the army, the ADP launched other "reforms" in Iranian Azerbaijan, most of them concerned courts and confiscation of land and property. Baqirov was busy with supplying tractors to the newly proclaimed republic, constructing telephone line between Baku and Tabriz, and the transmitting radio station and stu- dio in Tabriz. All these were accomplished with a record speed.

While the Soviet Azerbaijan was working on the practical aspects for the future unity, Moscow and Tehran had to conduct further steps towards a diplomatic dialogue that was requested by the UN Security Council. Due to the Soviets promotion, Ahmad Qavam (Qavam al- Saltaneh) was elected as the new Iranian Prime Minister (with the support of Tudeh) and approved by the Iranian Parliament (Majles) on 17 February. Already on 19 February, Qavam flew for a long-to-be- visit to Moscow. Molotov was the main counterpart of Qavam, whereas Stalin granted the Iranian Premier only with a few meetings. The Moscow negotiation provoked worries about the real USSR's course in Iranian Azerbaijan, and the Soviet agents in Iran were regularly informing Baqirov about the reaction of the Azerbaijani public there.

During this negotiation at the end of February beginning of March, Qavam and Molotov came to no conclusion. The Soviet side suggested what it called "a compromise solution" (perhaps, in the eyes of the victorious Moscow leaders the solution was, indeed, a compromise) on the wide rights of Azerbaijani autonomy within Iran and the creation of the Soviet-Iranian joint venture on exploration, extraction and processing oil in the Northern Iran. Qavam first agreed only on a few points concerning Azerbaijan autonomy, but not on the equal status of the Azeri-Turkish language and the existence of autonomous

61 Ibid.: 230. 62 Ibid.: 229.



110 IRINA MOROZOVA

military troops. The main dispute was, however, around the question of the evacuation of the Soviet troops. At that stage, the USSR insisted that the Soviet troops would be only partly withdrawn from some areas of the Northern Iran after 2 March 1946. This condition was un- acceptable for the Iranian side. However, the Soviet leaders were putting pressure on Qavam, who already began demonstrating some signs for future concessions on oil with a hope to trade the complete retreat of the Soviet militaries from Iran. In March, the Soviet side provided more explanation for its politics in Iran in official memorandums. In these documents, one of the reasons for the stay of the Soviet troops in Iran was security of oil industry in Baku. This explanation may only seem superficial for those, who are not familiar with the history of the geopolitical game in the Middle East and around the Caspian Sea in 1939-1940. The Azerbaijani historian Parvin Darabadi on opened sources draws a picture of the British and French plans to conquer the Southern Caucasus and to cut the USSR from its main oil reservoirs.63 These ideas had been quite popular in the military and political circles of the Allies before April 1940, and Stalin could not forget about them after the war. So far, in the Soviet official memorandums in 1946, Iran was accused in plans to create contradictions among the great powers and using it, to conquer the Soviet Azerbaijan and Turkmenia.64 The exposing articles appeared in the Soviet press (the newspaper "Izves- tiya") with numerous references on former history of the Russian-Ira- nian relationship, particularly in 1919-1921. Despite all the attempts of Iran, the Soviet troops stayed on its territory before 2 March, and the Moscow radio announced the decision to withdraw troops only from Mashhad, Shahrud and Semnan.

On 4 March, fifteen Soviet armoured brigades crossed the north- western Soviet-Iranian border (and that was still during the Qavam's mission to Moscow!) and started moving from the Turkish-Iranian border to Tehran. Another army started its way from Bulgaria to the Turkish border with Europe. The "Kurdish Republic" in Mahabad declared its independence, and the Georgian SSR officially announced its territorial claims to Turkey. In world historiography these events are widely recognised as the beginning of the cold war, since they marked the direct confrontation between the USSR and the Western states (primarily the UK and the USA) that was not solved by means of diplomacy, but provoked consolidation of public domains in

63 Darabadi, op. cit.:129-141. 64 Gasanly, op. cit.: 242-243.



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AFIER WORLD WAR II ill

these countries against each other. The history of the Soviet military activities in the Middle East in 1946 and the diplomatic war between the USA and the USSR, including the opened opposition in the UN, have been described quite thoroughly,65 and we would not repeat the story in this article. Nevertheless, we would once again point out that the protocols of the RCP(b) on the matter are not opened yet, and the uncertainty about the reasons for the Soviet sudden decision to withdraw troops from Iranian Azerbaijan on 24 March still remains. Some of the versions covered by the US historiography66 are not widely accepted and provoke criticism.67 In the light of the above-mentioned work by P. Darabadi, Stalin's rapid offensive military penetration into the Middle East may be viewed as a warning to those, who still could be keeping plans to get access to Baku oil reserves through Southern Azerbaijan.68 However, this discussion lies beyond the scope of our article.

Fig. 3. A caricature from those days (Gasanly, op. cit.: after 304)

After his return to Tehran in the middle of the Soviet military intervention, Qavam was pushed to make concessions to the USSR on the joint oil company, however, he did it in such a way (without

65 R. Rossow, "The Battle of Azerbaijan 1946", The Middle East Journal, no. 1, winter 1956: 17; Harry S. Truman, Memnories: Years of Trial and Hope. 1946-1952, New York, 1956: 94-95.

66 James A. Thorpe, "Trumans Ultimatum to Stalin on the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis: the Making of a Myth", The journal of Politics, vol. 40, 1978: 190.

67 Gasanly, op. cit.: 271. 68 Darabadi, op. cit.: 135, 146.



112 IRINA MOROZOVA

Shah's official approval) that there would be no problem for the future governments to change this decision. He also proved his "progressive- ness" by dissolving the Iranian Parliament and arresting the former popular leader Seyyed Ziya Tabataba'i. The USA and the UK did not welcome this pro-Soviet line. So far, Qavam was trapped between the US secret advisers, who recommended submitting an official complaint to the UN Security Council, and the Soviet "warnings" not to do it. In the end, Qavam did apply to the UN, but soon had to call the complaint back after his cabinet accepted the idea of a joint Soviet- Iranian oil company. Nevertheless, the USA and most of the countries represented in the UN Security Council were not quick to remove the matter from the agenda.

The reaction of the leaders of the Azerbaijan movement (both in the Soviet Union and Iran) on the Stalin's decision to withdraw the troops was painful: Baqirov could hardly cope with the decision,69 but had to obey the order; Pishevari first did not want to comply. The argument by them against the Soviet retreat was a threat of the "hypo- critical and reactionist" policy of Tehran. They did not believe in the promises provided by Qavam and the Iranian government, they were sure that the autonomy would be denied on the basis of the Iranian Constitution, the ADP leaders executed and conflicts with the Kurds provoked. In many ways they occurred to be right.

Obviously, Pishevari felt betrayed. His first reaction on the Baqi- rov's instructions to start negotiations with Tehran was an emotional speech in front of the Soviet agents Ibragimov, Gasanov, Atakishiev, and Kerimov, in which he referred to the events in Gilan in 1920. Ac- cording to him, the Azeri revolutionaries had been fooled round and left in the hands of brutal Tehran reaction, and he predicted the repe- tition of these events in 1946.70 (The same feeling might have had Baqirov towards Stalin.) Gasanly bitterly recognises the troops' retreat as a first Soviet loss in the cold war that led the Azerbaijani movement for independence to collapse.7" He provides the readers with a citation from the emotional speech by Pishevari: "Let the whole world know that the Azerbaijani people, particularly its democratic party and Na- tional Government, perished not because of cowardice, but in the

69 M. G. Seidov, op. cit., apud Ismailov, op. cit.: 63. 70 Gasanly, op. cit.: 285. There is also another interpretation: according to an eyewitness,

Pishevari had never had illusions with regard to the Soviets policy towards the revolutionary movements (see Hamid Molla-Zadeh, Rdzhd<ve sar-be-mohr: Ndgoftehd-ye vaqdye'e Azarbadian, Tabriz, 1976/1998: 20).





hard liberation struggle against the Iranian Shah's government... we will raise the population in the villages and cities... and will defend Azerbaijani's territory from ... the reactionist government. We will struggle till the last man, the valiant Azerbaijanis are ready for this, or let us mobilise all our forces, simultaneously contact all democratic groups in Iran, and go for Tehran, overthrow the Shah's government and establish democratic government in Iran; in that case we will have a big perspective... [we will have perspective for the real independence of Azerbaijan.-I. Morozova] .72

After the retreat of the troops, the USSR was still sponsoring the ADP in terms of money, lorries, military instructors, etc. Baqirov re- mained very active in stimulating material and organisational help to Iranian Azerbaijan. He made desperate attempts to preserve the ADP and what he called "the unity of Azerbaijani people". He also hoped to recruit employees for the perspective Soviet-Iranian oil company from the Iranian Azeris.73

The Iranian government signed the agreement with the Soviet Union that contained certain concessions to Iranian Azerbaijan (the Azeri-Turkish language was allowed in the first five classes at schools). However, the concessions were nothing in comparison with the previous plans by the ADP leaders and were viewed as a simple giving up of the already achieved positions. Pishevari and Shabestari insisted on the continuation of their military expeditions; at least they wanted to preserve their army and use it as a means of threat during the negotiation with Qavam.74 Baqirov, on his side, was ordered to suggest a withdrawal of the heavy armament back to the USSR, otherwise it could have been used as a proof for the Soviet military assistance to the separatist movement in Azerbaijan. According to Gasanly's interpretation, Baqirov concurred with Pishevari, that Azerbaijan province and the ADP should maintain a strong military detachment and that would be a means of pressure on Tehran during the negotiations.75 Baqirov was in charge of preparing Pishevari for holding negotiations with Qavam in order to achieve legal recognition of the ADP by Teh- ran and to help its future alliance with the other democratic parties in their joint campaign for the changes in the Iranian Constitution.76

72 Ibid.: 286-287. 73 Ibid.: 295. 74 Ibid.: 296-297. 75 Ibid.: 310-311. 76 Ibid.: 298-299.



114 IRINA MOROZOVA

To build a ground for negotiations the Iranian side chose Fath-'Ali Ipakchiyan as a representative and sent him to Tabriz. The first step of the Qavam cabinet was recognition of the ADP as a democratic party. However, the other items on the agenda of the negotiations, such as the organisational structure of local authorities in Azerbaijan, the formation of army and police were difficult to find a consensus on. Pishevari and Ipakchiyan agreed for Tehran as an official place for the negotiations and the ADP chose the members of their delegation with Pishevari at its head. On 29 April 1946, the negotiations started, and in the beginning no one wished to make concessions. If ADP felt pressure only from the Soviet side, which that time was trying to make them more flexible for Tehran, Qavam was manoeuvring between the USSR and the USA. For the USSR it was important that the both sides come to an agreement. If it did not happen, the Premier Qavam had all the chances to lose his chair, and less friendly to the USSR forces could have come to power. Qavam also did not have full consensus with the Shah on the Azerbaijan question.

On 10 May, the Tabriz delegation proposed the new draft of the agreement, containing 15 items. That draft was not acceptable for Tehran. The negotiations were about to fail, the contradictions between the Soviet view and the Pishevari's plans deepened. He seemed to have lost his trust in the Soviet assistance and did not listen to the recommendations of the Soviet Azerbaijani agents in Tabriz. On the basis of the Baqirov's reports, Stalin decided to address Pishevari himself. He wrote to him a famous letter77 on 8 May. In the letter he expressed his concerns that Pishevari wrongly perceived the situation in- side the country and on the international arena also. Stalin explained to him that he had to withdraw troops from Iran and China so that the Americans and British were not able to use it against the USSR and the revolutionary struggle all over the world. He also pointed out the necessity to use contradictions between the Shah and Qavam and to support the latter against the former, trying to neutralise American influence in Iran. Commenting on the Pishevari's personal ambitions in the Azerbaijan movement, Stalin wrote: "... You said that at the beginning we inspired you up to the heaven and then threw you into ruin and discredited you... We used here a usual revolutionary trick, known to every revolutionary. ...In Iran... it was necessary to put a

7The Archive of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, F. 6, S. 7, Sch. 34, D. 544, 1. 8-9; see Natalia I. Yegorova, "The 'Iran Crisis' of 1945-1946: A New from the Russian Archives", Working Paper, Cold War International Histogy Project, N 15. Wash., DC, 1996: 23-24; Molla-Zadeh, op. cit.: 123-127.




threat to the government, to create conditions for their concessions... Without pushing forward, in the current situation in Iran you would not have got such an opportunity to claim for your demands that the Qavam government has to agree now. This is the law of revolutionary movements".78

Stalin was quite sincere in his pointing out the Bolshevik quintessence of organising revolutionary movement to Pishevari. Since the 1910s the Bolsheviks, and Stalin in particular, had worked out their own tactics in dealing with various national movements in Asia. In fact, the communists did not care much about nationalism, however, under certain circumstances they could make a temporary "alliance" with popular leaders of nationalist movements. As early as December 1917, Lenin and Stalin addressed all the Muslims of Russia and Asia to start the liberation struggle against "all forms of exploitation". Searching for a strong ally, the nationalists and Muslim populists became rather loyal to the Bolsheviks. At the beginning of the 1920s the ideologists of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were trying to adjust some communistic ideas to their concepts of national development. Consequently, those popular ideologies were a contradictive mix of principally oppositional to each other teachings: religion and commu- nism, nationalism and modernism. Nevertheless, the main reason for the Bolshevik-nationalist "alliance" was purely political. For example, in 1917-1920, in Bukhara the local communists united with the Young Bukharists against the Emir, and in Khiva-with the Young Khivins against the Khan. Unlike their predecessors in the Tsarist government, the Bolsheviks were planning to overthrow the monarchs of Bukhara and Khiva and annex the territories of the khanates to Russia.

At the same time the communists never had illusions about the future of their "friendship" with nationalists of the Caucasus and Asia. The RCP(b) Platform on national question was very direct in formu- lating the main principle of dealing with nationalist movements: "At distant parts of the country, the Communist must remember: I am a communist, that is why I have to act according to the situation and make concessions in favour of the local nationalist elements, which want and are able to work tolerantly in the framework of the Soviet system... By doing this it would be possible to get rid of the local nationalism with success and push the wide sections of the local popula-

78 Cited by: Gasanly, op. cit.: 330.



116 IRINA MOROZOVA

tion to the Soviet power side".79 This quotation demonstrates fully the quintessence of the Bolsheviks' strategy and tactics in Asia: from a temporary alliance with the nationalists and all layers of the population that could be of some assistance, till the open struggle against them and their complete liquidation. However, the realisation of this strategic Bolsheviks' plan did not go smoothly, and in Soviet historical textbooks, which were written some time later, the nationalists were accused of all difficulties and hardships at the first stages of socialist state building.

In his letter to Pishevari, Stalin noted that if Pishevari followed his plan he would be blessed as a pioneer of progressive-democratic movement in the Middle East. That was the main gap between the two revolutionaries: the Bolsheviks had a more global view in their politics, modernistic in certain ways, while Pishevari might have failed to stretch his vision beyond the conceptual boundaries of what he believed to be "historical Azerbaijan".

The future development of events is efficiently described in literature: the USA were pressing on Qavam and Shah, promoted a new Ambassador Gorge Allen in Tehran and tried to keep the "Azerbai- jani question" on the agenda of the UN Security Counsil; the Soviet Union brought both Qavam and Pishevari to an agreement. The agreement signed and approved in the middle of June, in fact, contained more concessions of Tehran to Azerbaijan than vice versa. The most important item of the agreement was official recognition of the Azerbaijani National Parliament in the form of a local elected government. Azerbaijan received a vital right to form its own military detachments and police. It was also given the right to make its own appointments within its territory defined by the agreement. The redistribution of lands held by the ADP was legalised, but the Commis- sion had to be formed for compensation and reimbursement to the former landlords. In his speech on Tabriz radio Pishevari declared that the new epoch started for the Azerbaijani people.

Further, the Soviet Union tried to unite the efforts of Tudeh and the ADP, and both parties became very active. The anti-Qavam tendencies, provoked by those who blamed him for instability and concessions to separatists, were simultaneously increasing. At the end ofJune, the Iranian government announced about the elections to the National Majles. Qavam seemed to be maintaining the pro-Soviet course and

79 eetvertoe sovesic'anie CK RKP(b) s otvetstvennymi rabotnikami nacional'nyx respublik i oblastej. Stenografi6eskij ot6et, Moscow, 1923.



"SOUTHERN AZERBAIJAN"AfTER WORLD WAR II 117

established his own Iranian Democratic Party on 29 June. This party had the same left radical programme as the ADP and Tudeh. Obvi- ously the last two perceived the new one as a competitor. The leaders of Azerbaijan condemned the "hidden imperialistic intentions" of the new party and claimed that Qavam by forming this party and starting reforms in Iran was closing the door for Azerbaijan to independence. Their ambitions for complete independence became more distinct: co- existence with other "bigger" nations in one state, even democratic one, did not look like an attractive option.

By creating his own democratic party Qavam demonstrated certain intentions to liquidate the Pahlavi dynasty. The intelligence service of the Soviet Azerbaijan suspected that the goal of Qavam was a victory in the elections to Majles and establishment of a personal dictatorship. Thus, he might have repeated the history of Reza Shah coming to power.

The coming period was marked by the intensified contradictions among the leaders of the ADP and between the Soviet diplomats and revolutionary agents. Baqirov was struggling against the anti-Pishevari campaign conducted by the Soviet diplomats.80 Pishevari had conflict- ing relationships with Salam-ollahJavid, the general governor of Tab- riz and the former minister of internal affairs of the National Azerbai- jan Government. However, these disputes did not prevent the ADP from a celebration of its one-year anniversary on 3 September 1946. Baqirov (and the current Azerbaijani historiographers concur with him) believed (or tried to convince Moscow) that all the political and economic difficulties underway in Iranian Azerbaijan in autumn 1946 were caused and initiated by the secret reactionist politics of Qavam.8"

The third stage of negotiations between Tehran and the Tabriz delegation was long, unproductive and occurred to be the last one. Qavam wanted to bring clarity to the negotiations and receive guar- anties that Azerbaijan was not going to separate from Iran. However, the Azerbaijani claims to sustain their army and run their own bank signaled about the contrary. On 1 August, ready to compromise further Qavam brought three leaders of Tudeh into the cabinet.

This act of Qavam was unexpected to the opponents of the Soviet interests in Iran. Consequently, the British organised the rebellion of tribes in the south of Iran. The tribes claimed for the same rights as the Azeris in the north and were protesting against the influence of the

80 Gasanly, op. cit.: 362, 384-385. 81 Ibid.: 388.



118 IRINA MOROZOVA

Russians on the politics in Tehran. That time Qavam was about to write a complaint on the UK to the UN Security Council. The "peace-keeping" US Ambassador convinced him not to do it.

The USSR was demanding more concessions from Qavam and one of them was construction of airport in the Northern Iran. The direct influence from the Soviet Embassy came upon the cabinet. Shah demanded resignation of Qavam. In order to preserve his position the latter had to change his course radically. On 19 October, the new cabinet was announced, all the Tudeh representatives were dismissed. Reaction against the ADP was planned, also according to the US and UK advisers. On 28 October, the US State Department sold weapons on 10 million dollars to Iran.82

Pishevari and Baqirov were applying to Moscow for military assistance. However, they received means for ideological and cultural-educational work in Southern Azerbaijan, but nothing on military ex- penses.83 The seize of Zanjan (on the border with the Azerbaijan province) by Iranian troops provoked serious worries not only in Tabriz, but also in Baku. On 21 November, Qavam announced his decision to place troops and police in all parts of the country to provide security and justice during the forthcoming elections. The same day Pishevari, Shabestari, Javid and Padegan had a meeting in Tabriz. They decided to send a telegram to Qavam, stating that Tehran military engagement into Azerbaijan contradicted their previous agreement. If Qavam, despite the message, insisted on the military engagement, they were going to resist. If he denied Azerbaijan's participation in the parliamentary election, then the ADP leaders planned to call for the independent election into the National Iranian Majles in Tehran. If this was not possible they hoped to re-establish their own Azerbaijani National Parliament.84 They reported to Baqirov about 20 thousand soldiers on their side, expressed confidence in the future victory and once again asked for weapons and armament. However, Stalin armed and strengthened only the Soviet troops on the southern borders with Turkey and Iran.

Pishevari attempted to promote an idea of the preventive attack on the Iranian army, but received strict instructions from Baqirov not to initiate the military conflict.85 On 4 December, the Iranian army started moving in the direction of Azerbaijan. At the same time the

82 Ibid.: 376. 83 Ibid.: 380-38 1. 84 Ibid.: 389-391. 85 Ibid.: 399.




Iranian representative in the UN Security Council reported about "the current situation in the Azerbaijan province". The Moscow press commented the events as an "internal Iranian affair", and the Soviet government offered the Southern Azerbaijani revolutionaries nothing but "moral support". By 14 December, when the Iranian troops entered Tabriz, the ADP leaders already gave up and many of them, including Pishevari, left to the USSR.86

On the separatist territories, the Iranian militaries and police per- formed in the way that had been expected from them: the active ADP leaders were shot, the supporters of the movement were put into pris- ons, and many people were prosecuted by court martial. The Azeri- Turkish language at schools was prohibited, and the newspapers in Azeri were closed. The re-establishment of the control over the Azer- baijan province on 20 December Tehran viewed as the re-unity of the nation, and Baku (till nowadays)-as a return of occupational regime. Washington considered the outcome as the first case won by the UN.

In July 1994, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Heidar Aliyev signed a Memorandum on the development of friendly relationships with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the Memorandum, the Azerbaijani-Iranian border was announced inviolable, and the both sides stated that they did not have any territorial claims towards each other.87 However, the Soviet legacy of the newly independent Azer- baijan is, above all, the necessity to secure the hydrocarbon reserves and positions in the Caspian Sea. In this area the disputes with Iran still create obstacles to the development of bilateral relations, since the status of the southern part of the Caspian Sea is not determined yet. In the general discontent about the politics of Iran that exists in the Azerbaijani public domain88 the "Southern Azerbaijan question" has resurfaced.

According to the general conviction by the Azerbaijani scholars, the Azeri (i.e. Turkic-speaking) population in Iranian Azerbaijan and other parts of Iran currently accounts for 30 millions, however, their rights are violated, since they are refused to receive education in their language, and are indoctrinated by Shi'ite Islamic identity that serves

86 By 1954 the total amount of the emigrants from the Southern Azerbaijan in the USSR accounted for 9022 people. Since 1947, 1097 emigrants were arrested in the ASSR (Gasanly, op. cit.: 417).

87 E. Axundova, Mgnoven4ya Istiny, Baku, 2003: 36. 88 Authors' interviews with the staff members of the Azerbaijan Oil Academy and journalists

of the Turan News Agency, Baku, May 2003.



120 IRINA MOROZOVA

the interests of Tehran.89 The Republic of Azerbaijan officially sup- ports the US politics of "democratisation" in the Middle East and in Iran in particular. Certain political circles gladly greet in Baku the representatives of the so-called National Movement of the Awakening of Southern Azerbaijan, who emigrated from Iran to travel around the world, condemning the violation of human rights in the Islamic Re- public. However, these representatives stand for federative state organisation in Iran, and the majority of the Azerbaijani activists in Iran-for Azerbaijan autonomy rather than an independent state.90 The Azeri people in the northern provinces of Iran often do not share the sharp feelings for unity and liberation movement with the former Soviet (Northern) Azerbaijan.9' The idea of unity is promoted mainly by the Republic of Azerbaijan, also through the so-called World Con- gress of the Azerbaijanis.92

Whether or not the history can repeat and the question of "South- ern Azerbaijan" can become a card for change in current geopolitics and serve for the interests of the dominating player in the region-the USA we cannot predict. However, it is clear that the forces that are going to participate in the Azerbaijani nation-building would have a voice in determining the situation in the Middle East and the Caspian Sea.

89 Interview of Prof. Mussa Gasymly, Baku State University to the radio "Svoboda" from 23. 07. 2003.

90 Interview of E. Zeinalov, the director of the Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan, to the radio "Svoboda" from 23. 07. 2003.

9' Authors interviews in Baku, May, 2003; see also Interview of Ziya Musaevich Bunyatov to "Zerkalo", 21 october, 1989.

92 Interview of Teimur Eminbeili, the Press Secretary of the World Congress of the Azerbai- janis, to the radio "Svoboda" from 23. 07. 2003.



Documents

Contemporary Azerbaijani Historiography on the Problem of "Southern Azerbaijan" after World War II