JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, petitioner, vs.ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 12, 2001 and Resolution dated November 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.

The facts are:

On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land consisting of 33,130 square meters in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latters workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.

On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.

In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Espaol, petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.

Petitioners Order is partly reproduced as follows:

From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds that the instant case is a callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations, through the extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who connived with this private group on one hand, and some officials and employees of the government agencies responsible for the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other. Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.

Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges be filed against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidants Office, Supreme Court. Manila.

Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents in the pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant case filed before this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents who should serve ten (10) days of detention at the Dasmarias Municipal Jail, Cavite.

Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT No. T-511462 allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its implementation with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the Assessors Office of the Municipality of Dasmarias, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious instruments.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas, the private defendants counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are likewise dismissed. However, the said private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.2 Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judges Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor.

On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were denied outright by petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.

On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. Respondent judges July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein petitioners in direct contempt and ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the Warrant of Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment, dated July 13, 2001, which the respondent judge issued against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Espaol erred in taking cognizance of the Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as charged.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of November 15, 2001.

Hence, this petition.

The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.

The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been described as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court.5

The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign.6 This concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of the judicial institution.7 Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very administration of justice.8

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.11

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI,12 we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel.13 Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction.14 Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.15 Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.

Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took judicial notice of the Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92, assigned to another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.

Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting the required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.17

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

FACTS:On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land consisting of 33,130 sq.m. in Paliparan, Dasmarias. A new TCT was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latters workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that it was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.

On January 2000, Sharcons filed with RTC Dasmarias a complaint for quieting of title, impleading as defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.

In the course of the proceedings, in July 2001, Judge Espaol, petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.

Petitioners Order is partly reproduced as follows:Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges be filed against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidants Office, Supreme Court. Manila.Further, (respondents) until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in contempt x x x Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. x x x, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious.x x xWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE x x x. However, the said private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice.

Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC Imus, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle. Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judges Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor.

On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents, and thus the latter were confined in the municipal jail. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest, but were denied outright by petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which said court granted. The CA ruled that petitioner judge erred in taking judicial cognizance of the Decision in the other civil case for cancellation of title, since it was not offered in evidence in the case for quieting of title. Furthermore, direct contempt of court is criminal in nature and the defendants should have been accorded a hearing. Thus, petitioner judges Order of contempt and the issued Warrants of Arrest were nullified.

ISSUES:1) WON petitioner judge erred in taking judicial notice of the Decision in the civil case for cancellation of title declaring Sharcons TCT and documents as falsified

2) WON respondents should be held guilty of direct contempt

HELD:1) YES. In Gener v. De Leon, we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Such does not fall under Sec. 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on mandatory judicial notice.

2) NO. Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes indirect (not direct) contempt.Contempt of court is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court. In Narcida v. Bowen, this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing. In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule 71, such act is an improper conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel.

Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction. Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.

4. P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner, vs.ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.

Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng La'O (La O) is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is her counsel therein.

G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident which transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent LaO), Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center, which incident was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).

In G.R. No. 199462, LaO, together with the other petitioners, prayed, among others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.

In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity for him.

Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, LaO and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.

On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview, as follows:

Atty. Diokno

So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.

Ernesto Manzano

Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo na ang nagbigay ng hatol.

Monique Cu-Unjieng Lao

Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant because they protected him all these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so confident of what he did, I mean confident of murdering so many innocent individuals.

Atty. Diokno

Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and company have never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by their superiors and some like Marantan were even promoted to our consternation and disgust. Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. hangang ngayon wala pa pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag charge ng homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.

Atty. Diokno

Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the policemen who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who is involved in the Atimonan killings still roam free and remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that police rub-out will not stop until you personally intervene.

Ernesto Manzano

Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.

Monique Cu-Unjieng Lao

Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with us, I mean everything shows that they were murdered.,(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)

Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements and malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed, but also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Marantas position that the press conference was organized by the respondents for the sole purpose of influencing the decision of the Court in the petition filed before it and the outcome of the criminal cases before the RTC by drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the Atimonan incident.

The respondents, in their Comment,3 argue that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions of their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that this petition is intended to stifle legitimate speech.

The petition must fail.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x x x

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.5 This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.6

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.8 The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.91wphi1

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights.10

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.11

The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.

As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.

As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.

"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice."12 By no stretch of the imagination could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents.

Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases.13 The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.14 In the present case, such necessity is wanting.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate JusticeChairperson

5. CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR., Petitioners, vs.MANUEL O. SANCHEZ, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 13, 2008 Decision1 and April 28, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100911, which affirmed the September 3, 2007 Resolution3 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226.

The relevant facts are as follows:

On July 1, 2002, respondent Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. (Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002.4 Petitioners, along with their co-defendants, filed an Answer with Counterclaims5 and, thereafter, a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants Affirmative Defenses,6 which was denied on August 9, 20027 by Hon. Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, now a member of the Court of Appeals.

On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which the court granted in an Order dated September 10, 2002 directing, thus:

On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and pursuant to Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, in relation to Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants are ordered to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following documents:

1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;

2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants;

3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub of the stock certificate; and

4. The tape recording of the stockholders meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.

The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in the office premises of defendant corporation within reasonable business hours of a business day before the pre-trial with costs to be shouldered by the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration9 (MR) of the August 9, 2002 Order, which denied their motion for preliminary hearing. Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to Defendants Motion for Reconsideration,10 attaching therewith an alleged certification issued by the National Printing Office to support their contention of lack of cause of action on the grounds, among others, that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1996, as amended, has not been duly published in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Pending resolution of the MR, petitioners filed on January 21, 2003 a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order.11

For his part, respondent, on October 7, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion to immediately allow him to inspect and photocopy the documents and to compel petitioners to deposit with the court the documents subject of the September 10, 2002 Order.

On December 9, 2002, then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Order12 denying petitioners MR of the Order dated August 9, 2002 and considered respondents omnibus motion as a reiteration of his earlier motion for inspection and production of documents; thus, the immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order was simultaneously ordered.

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002. However, the CA denied the same in its Decision dated June 29, 2004. Petitioners MR was likewise denied on November 3, 2004. A petition for review was filed before this Court, but We denied it per Resolution dated January 10, 2005.

In the meantime, respondent sought to enforce the September 10, 2002 Order. The supposed inspection on September 30, 2002 was not held per the trial courts Order dated September 27, 2002.13 The January 22, 2003 inspection also did not push through after petitioners and their co-defendants again moved for its deferment.14 When the court eventually denied their motion on June 16, 2003, respondent set the inspection to August 1, 2003.15 On said date, however, Atty. Matias V. Defensor, then Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged to be out of town and petitioner Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman) purported to have shown no willingness to comply with the directive.16 The matter was reported to the trial court, which merely noted respondents Report and Manifestation.17 On November 3, 2003, respondent moved for the issuance of an order for immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order, as reiterated in the Order dated June 16, 2003, but the court denied the same in its May 24, 2004 Order.18 Respondents motion for issuance of writ of execution suffered the same fate when the trial court denied it on February 10, 2005.19

When this Court settled petitioners challenge to the Orders dated August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion for Clarification and to Resolve Plaintiffs Pending Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and to Set the Case for Pre-Trial Conference.20 Acting thereon, Judge Ramon Paul L. Hernando, likewise now a member of the Court of Appeals, who took over Branch 93 after the appointment of Judge Bruselas to the CA, issued the July 10, 2006 Order,21 which directed the immediate execution of the September 10, 2002 Order, and set the case for pre-trial.

On February 9, 2007, Judge Hernando issued an Order22 inhibiting himself from handling the case in view of his "close friendship relation" with petitioners counsel and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another sala. The case was subsequently re-raffled to RTC Branch 90 presided by Judge Reynaldo B. Daway, who likewise voluntarily recused himself from the case per Order23 dated July 13, 2007. Finally, on July 30, 2007, the case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 226 presided by Judge Leah S. Domingo Regala.24

On November 28, 2006, the parties agreed to defer the pre-trial conference until the actual conduct of the inspection of records/documents on December 12, 2006.25 Before said date, however, petitioners and their co-defendants moved to hold the inspection to January 11, 2007, which the court granted.26

During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced by the Acting Corporate Secretary, Atty. Antonio V. Meriz, and one of the staff, Malou Santos, was the Stock and Transfer Book of the Corporation. They alleged that they could not find from the corporate records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the tape recordings taken during the stockholders meetings, and that they needed more time to locate and find the list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the Corporation.27 This prompted respondent to file a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that an order be issued in accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court (Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 (Interim Rules).

On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Resolution, the concluding portion of which ordered:

In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the order dated September 10, 2002, this Court reiterates the said order:

"sFurther sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court find that defendants have been in bad faith in complying with the order of September 10, 2002 despite the order of this Court.

Both plaintiff and counsel, as well as defendants and counsel, are therefore ordered to meet on November 13, 2007 at the corporate offices of defendant firm between 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. so that faithful compliance with the order of September 10, 2002 may be done, otherwise, this Court shall allow the plaintiff to present evidence to prove their prayer in their Manifestation with Omnibus Motion filed on January 31, 2007 and issue a resolution based on the same accordingly.

SO ORDERED.28

Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for Certiorari (With Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction).29 In resolving the petition, the CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. According to the appellate court, the September 3, 2007 Resolution was issued pursuant to Section 3,30 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, with the suppletory application of Section 1,31 Rule 27 of the Rules. It noted that, except for the sanctions contained therein, the assailed Resolution merely reiterated the September 10, 2002 Order of Judge Bruselas, which petitioners did not dispute in accordance with Section 2,32 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules or via petition for certiorari. The CA further held that petitioners were not denied due process as they were able to move for a reconsideration of the September 10, 2002 Order, but not opted to file the same with respect to the September 3, 2007 Resolution.

Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for contempt of court and the possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA opined that the case of Dee v. Securities and Exchange Commission33 cited by petitioners is inapplicable, since the September 3, 2007 Resolution merely warned petitioners that they would be cited for contempt and be fined if they fail to comply with the courts directive. Moreover, it said that the penalty contained in the September 3, 2007 Resolution is in accord with Section 4,34 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, in relation to Section 3,35 Rule 29 of the Rules.

Petitioners moved to reconsider the CA Decision, but it was denied.36

Before Us, petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize them sua sponte or without regard to the guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge Sardido37 is not proper and calls for the exercise of Our power of supervision over the lower courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay,38 among others, they claim that the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.

We deny.

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court39 or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice40 may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others." Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,41 We said:

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.42

If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.43 In this case, the threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable range of penalty.

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen44 is instructive:

x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.

In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. (Calimlim) clarified the procedure prescribed for indirect contempt proceedings. We held in that case:

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondents answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly. (Citations omitted.)

As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that is, through a verified petition, the rule is already settled in Regalado v. Go:

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.

The Rules itself is explicit on this point:

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have the duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt proceedings and the main action.

But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.

In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to explain their failure to bring the accused before the RTC for his scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was not yet sufficient to initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount to a show-cause order directing the petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in contempt. The formal charge has to be specific enough to inform the person, against whom contempt proceedings are being conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise, he or she will be cited in contempt. The Order must express this in clear and unambiguous language.

x x x x

Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much less to exercise the discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from any party to be docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case precisely because it is the show-cause order that initiated the proceedings.

What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to due process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the respondents answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished accordingly.

x x x x

In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to defend himself or herself and have a day in court a basic requirement of due process. This is especially so in indirect pcontempt proceedings, as the court cannot decide them summarily pursuant to the Rules of Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him or her, and there must be a hearing, and the court must investigate the charge and consider the respondents answer.45

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated.1wphi1 To the Courts mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in indirect contempt proceedings. It states:

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order.

The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite.46 Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The March 13, 2008 Decision and April 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100911, which affirmed the September 3, 2007 Resolution of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, are AFFIRMED.