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Basic technological approaches
Key recent developments
• 12 December 2013: President Putin’s State of the Nation address
• 9 January 2014: First test flight of WU-14 (China)• 7 August 2014: Second test flight of WU-14• 25 August 2014: Second test flight of Advanced
Hypersonic Weapon (United States)
Putin’s 2013 State of the Nation qddress
“The ramping up of high-precision strategic non-nuclear systems by other countries, in combination with the build-up of missile defence capabilities, could negate all previous agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and disrupt the strategic balance of power…
Russia will respond to all these challenges, both political and technological. We have all we need in order to do so. Our military doctrine and advanced weapons, weapons that are being and will be deployed, will unconditionally allow us to ensure the security of the Russian state.” Russian President Vladimir Putin (December 2013)
Other key Russian statements
• Recent series of statements by senior officials:• New heavy ICBM “would provide the capability of creating a strategic
high-accuracy weapon system with a conventional payload with practically global range, if the U.S. does not pull back from its program for creating such missile systems.” Col. Gen. Karakayev (December 2012)
• “Taking into account the U.S. activity, Russia is forced to develop [non-nuclear, strategic offensive arms] arms in future.” Deputy Defense Minister Antonov (April 2013)
• Periodic reports of testing a maneuverable, hypersonic re-entry vehicle since at least 2004 (unclear whether goal is to develop a nuclear or non-nuclear payload)
Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2
• Program initiated in 2003• Planned range of 17,000 km (global reach with
weapons based on east and west coasts)• Tests in April 2010 and August 2011; both
terminated less than 3 minutes into a planned 23 minute endo-atmospheric flight, before “equilibrium gliding” was achieved
• Downgraded to risk mitigation program, i.e. effectively cancelled, in 2012
Advanced Hypersonic Weapon: Basic concept
• Endo-atmospheric boost-glide system• Congress forced DoD to fund AHW in FY08• NAS (2008): Range of 8,000 km [?]• Evolutionary design based on SWERVE• Could be land- or sea-based• At least a decade away from deployment
• Side note: Tactical Boost Glide Program appears in DARPA/AF FY15 Budget request
Advanced Hypersonic Weapon:Flight tests
• Successful test in November 2011 over 3,800 km
• Second test, over longer range with significant cross-range maneuver, failed in August 2014 due to booster malfunction
• Retest likely (but no official announcement)
Capability-based planning
“We prefer actually in our shop not to talk about specific scenarios, but a set of attributes that targets have…Those attributes are time-urgent, very distant, perhaps highly defended or in other ways access denied for the United States; high value targets, high regret factor for not striking a target; and potentially an interest in low collateral damage.It is those kinds of targets…that make us think that this particular kind of capability is very valuable.”
Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, 2007
Possible CPGS missions
• Denying a new nuclear proliferator the ability to employ its nuclear arsenal
• Destroying or disabling antisatellite capabilities• Countering anti-access/area-denial capabilities• Killing high-value terrorists and disrupting terrorist
operations
WU-14 flight test II
• First flight test in January 2014 (presumably successful)
• WU-14 is Pentagon’s designation• WU is designator for Wuzhai/Taiyuan
• Photos of crash site appeared on social media in August 2014
• Media report of second WU-14 test on 7 August
Geolocating the crash site
• Work with Jeffrey Lewis and Catherine Dill
• Crash site turns out to be near a spa resort in the Mongolian desert about 200 km south east of Ordos
Keep-out zones
• Westward launch • Eastern zone
identical to January test
• Crash site outside keep-out zone
• Range of 1,750 km• Very limited cross-
range maneuvering
Analysis of WU-14 test
• The launch’s purpose was, almost certainly, to test a hypersonic glider.
• The test was probably a failure.• The WU-14 appears to be significantly less ambitious than
the U.S. Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.• What is the significance of a liquid-fueled booster?• Technically driven—need for greater burn-out velocity?• Financially driven—use of retired missile is cheap?• Strategically driven—goal is delivery of nuclear warheads?
CPGS weapons do not solve the ISR challenge of hunting mobile missiles
• Accuracy• “Refresh rate”• Need continuous or near-continuous coverage• Visual reconnaissance satellites, HUMINT, SIGINT [?] inadequate• In-theatre capabilities (aircraft) or space-based radar needed
• Timeliness• Discrimination• Trucks on busy roads v. mobile missiles
Potential paths to escalation—including to the nuclear level
• Warhead ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether an incoming warhead was conventional or nuclear• Dominant issue: overstated re Russia; understated re China
• Destination ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether it was the target of a CPGS attack
• Target ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether the United States intended to attack a conventional or nuclear target with a CPGS weapon
• Crisis instability: Pressures felt by an adversary to use or threaten to use “strategic” weapons out of concern that they lacked survivability
No CPGS system possess all the desirable characteristics for risk reduction
• Desirable characteristics• Separate deployment areas for CPGS and nuclear weapons• Different trajectories for CPGS and nuclear weapons• Use of boosters with no nuclear association for CPGS• Predictable trajectories for CPGS weapons• Observable mid-course trajectories for CPGS weapons• Limited CPGS deployments
• Strategic risks of boost-glide systems not appreciated• Cooperative risk reduction measures more effective than
unilateral measures
Confidence-building measures can help address warhead ambiguity and survivability concerns
• Warhead ambiguity• Inspections• Surveillance• Notifications (could also help with destination ambiguity)
• Survivability concerns• Can include non-prompt systems on reciprocal and politically binding basis• Data exchanges• Declarations• Joint studies• Observation of exercises
The feasibility of treaty based-limits depends on basing mode
• Make some/all CPGS weapon types treaty accountable• Address Russian and Chinese survivability concerns
• Conventional ICBMs & SLBMs are New START accountable• Disagreement over boost-glide missiles (but probably academic)
• Treaty inclusion very difficult for some some basing modes• Strong Navy opposition to inspections on SSNs and surface ships• Inspections on SSBNs and SSGNs already occur—but this basing mode
exacerbates warhead ambiguity
