Counterinsurgency From Below

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CounterinsurgencyfromBelow:

TheAfghanLocalPoliceinTheoreticaland

ComparativePerspective

JoeQuinn

MarioA.Fumerton

November2010


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AbouttheAuthors

Joe Quinn is a counterinsurgency advisor at COIN Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT),in Kabul, Afghanistan. From November 2006 until February 2008 he spent 16 months in Iraq

as a member of the Reconciliation and Engagements Cell (REC) that planned andimplemented the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program. The SOI program essentially hired 106,000Iraqis to serve as Local Defense Forces (LDF) throughout most of the country. Many of histhoughts on the new Afghan Local Police (ALP) program are based upon that experience, andupon what he has seen in Afghanistan so far. He graduated with a Master's degree inInternational and Global Affairs from Harvard Universitys Kennedy School of Government,in May 2010. He also graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, inJune 2002.

Mario Fumerton is Associate Professor at the Centre for Conflict Studies, UtrechtUniversity. His current thematic interests include contentious politics, mobilisation andcollective action, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and reconciliation. His publications includeInsurgency and Terrorism: Is there a Difference? (co-author; in The Character of War inthe 21

stCentury, Routledge, 2010), "Civil defence in Latin American democratic

systems: Peru's Comits de Autodefensa and Guatemala's Patrullas de Autodefensa Civilincomparative perspective" (co-author; in Armed Actors, Zed, 2004),From Victims to Heroes:

Peasant counter-rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000 (RozenbergPublishers, 2002. Published PhD dissertation), and "Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian CivilWar: Peasant Self-defence Organisations in Ayacucho" ( Bulletin of Latin American

Research, 2001). His PhD dissertation was used by Perus Truth and ReconciliationCommission as a reference source on peasant self-defense committees, and the history of

civil war in Tambo District, Ayacucho Department, Peru. He has done fieldwork researchand given consultancy workshops in Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Kenya, and his present research interests include contentious politics, insurgency and counterinsurgency,mobilization and collective action, and reconciliation.

The thoughts and opinions within this paper are the authors alone and do not represent ISAFor CAAT policy.

[email protected]

[email protected]


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COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM BELOW:

The Afghan Local Police in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective

DISCUSSION PAPER

Joe Quinn

Mario A. Fumerton

TheTalibancametoKaman-i-Kalan,atowninKunduzprovince,inMarch2009.

TheresidentsarePashtuns,liketheTaliban.Butthatmadenodifferencetothe

insurgents.Theysetupcheckpointsoutsidethetown,andleviedonthe

populationanushrtaxof10percentonallagriculturalearnings.Thenthe

killingsstarted.First,theTalibankilledalocalmanforprotestingagainsttheir

harshtreatment;theyhunghiscorpsefromatree.Thentheykilledapoliceman

fromtheneighboringvillage,pinninganoteonhisbodythatread:Wewillkill

anyonewhosupportsthegovernment.FortheresidentsofKaman-i-Kalan,

thatwasthefinalstraw.Eldersfrom14surroundingvillagesheldajirga,anddecidedtotakeuparmsagainsttheTaliban.Alocalman,whohadbeen

secretlyhoardingweapons,donatedhisentirecacheofarms.Residentstookup

acollectiontobuymoreKalashnikovs.Theyelectedcommandersandgave

themselvesacommandstructure,andtheytrainedtheirfighters.Thatwasin

thesummer,andinlateNovembertheymadetheirmove.TheytoldtheTaliban

thattheycouldeitherleaveorbeshot.TheIslamistsleft.1

This story of how locals stood up to the Taliban at Kaman-i-Kalan is not unique. The reportsthat trickle in from several parts of Afghanistan are scattered and few; but they have been

slowly growing since mid-2009.2

From Achin to Nangarhar, Herat to Day Kundi, fromPaktika and Zer-e-ko Valley to Kunduz, villages have spontaneously mobilized and taken uparms against Taliban insurgents in the belief that if they are unable to rely upon Afghansecurity forces for protection, then they will defend themselves.3

These developments bring nine inconclusive years of war in Afghanistan to acrossroadsand a dilemma. If harnessed properly and intelligently, organized anti-Talibanvillagers could help cause a cascade or tip, in which momentum against the Taliban

becomes unstoppable.4 On the other hand, critics fear that a new attempt to mobilize ruralvillages into irregular defense forces simply runs the risk that they eventually will degenerateinto predatory tribal militias, warlordism, and bloody inter-community violence, as hashappened with similar initiatives relating to armed civilians in the past.

These concerns find expression in the contrasting politics and policies of a number ofkey actors within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In 2009, former ISAF commander GeneralStanley McChrystal gave his enthusiastic backing to the Community Defense Initiative(CDI): a program whereby anti-Taliban 'militias' in at least 14 areas of Afghanistan werecontrolled and supported by a newly created U.S. special forces group that reports directly toMcChrystal as head of US forces in the country, but which sits outside the authority of theInternational Security Assistance Force, the Nato mission in Afghanistan.5 Even so, AfghanPresident Hamid Karzai himself has been an outspoken critic of and opponents to the idea offorming village defense forces, warning that such groups could become militias in a countryalready plagued by warlordism.6 However, within a few short days after assumingcommand of coalition forces in Afghanistan on 4 July 2010, General David Petraeusmanaged to assuage President Karzais concerns, enough to persuade him to approve theestablishment of village defense guards, which will officially be known as Afghan Local

Police (ALP).


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A presidential decree to establish the ALP was passed in August of this year. 7 Whilethe details of the final shape of the ALP program is, perhaps, still up for discussion, it wouldappear that the Afghan Ministry of Interior already has a fairly clear idea of how it willfunction, and how its organizational and administrative structures will look like. Thefollowing explanation of the ALP program comes from a recent interview by one of theauthors of this paper with Major General Gul Nabi Ahmadzai, Director of General Training

and Education for the Afghan National Police (ANP) at the Ministry of Interior. He is theofficer who will be in charge of training the new ALP. 8

Mario Fumerton: Why is the Afghan Local Police necessary?Maj. Gen. Gul Nabi Ahmadzai: Owing to the security challenges in Afghanistan, from the

Taliban, from al Qaida, from other terrorist groups, the Ministry of Interior (MoI)requested to the government that there should be a local police force in some parts ofthe countryside, and that has been accepted. So, the responsibility of the local policeis at least to take care of their own villages; that would be very helpful.

In Afghanistan, there is a general ideait is a customthat everybody shoulddefend Afghanistan. The task doesn't just belong to the army or to the police; this is a

nationwide task. That is why an Afghan Local Police will be a very good idea. Theidea is that we [Afghans] should at least take over some of the responsibility [forsecurity] from international forces [i.e. ISAF]. The Afghan Local Police will beorganized in those areas where there are already a lot of challenges, places wherethere are some uncertainties.

MF: How is the ALP to be organized?GNA: The ALP will be made up of volunteers, of people who have a good background, who

don't have a crime record, with a very good character. Initially, they will be assignedto defend their own countryside, and their own neighbourhood. They will have theirown rules and regulations.

Their recruitment, and their administrative management will be controlled byvery professional [national] police officers. Those officers will belong to the samedistrict and the same province as the local Afghan Local Police they will supervise.The ALP of a village will have its own leader, which will appointed by the ANPregional or district commander. There will be a presence of both the ALP and theANP in every village where the program is running.

We are going to try out the program in some areas. If it works, then we willextend the program. Of course, in the future, after we have established security inAfghanistan, the ALP will be come absorbed into the Afghan National Police.

The ALP will be under the command of the Deputy-Minister of Security, and

the Minister of Interior. For the first running of the program, the ALP will have10,000 people. I don't know what will happen in the future, whether they are reducingor increasing. It all depends on the results, on if it works. If we have good results,then probably they will be increased. The ALP will be organized in places they arerequired.

MF: What kinds of resources should they receive?GNA: They will have salaries, and their own uniform. They can only carry weapons no

more powerful than AK-47. They are not permitted to carry more advanced weaponsthan that. Their weapons, logistical support, and equipment, will come from the MoI.

MF: How will they be paid, or recompensed for their service?GNA: In the beginning, the budget for the program will come from the United States, to pay

for salaries.


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MF: How should they be trained, and what should be the content of their training?

GNA: They will be given training in their own villages. They will be trained by regular police officers (ANP). Their training course will take four weeks. One part of thecourse will be about rules and regulations, and the other section of the course will betactical. We will tell them what are their responsibilities, and what is their authority.We will also show them the rights of the civilians; that they should take care of

civilians.

MF: How should they be coordinated with the ANP, ANA, and ISAF forces?

GNA: ISAF will have no direct contact with ALP. But probably ISAF will help the AfghanMoI with providing equipment and salaries. If ISAF wants to have some sort ofconnection with the ALP, they should talk directly with Afghan police or the MoI.

MF: Who should supervise the ALP?GNA: For the time being, the ALP will be under the supervision of the MoI, the Ministry of

Interior. It will not belong to any specific ethnic group, or a political party.

MF: How will the ANP and the MoI respond to the critics of the ALP program,particularly some ANP officer themselves who are against the idea?

GNA: Leadership in making these kinds of decisions is the job of the Afghan government, ofthe MoI. It is not up to police officers to decide whether they like it or dislike it. It isnot their job to decide. Afghan leadership has decided to do the ALP program.Opinions and criticism about the ALP are individual opinions, not a general opinion.This idea of the ALP program came after long research and study.

MF: How will the ALP be different from earlier civilian-based initiatives tried in the past,like arbakai, Local Defence Force (LDF), etc.?

GNA: There should be no misunderstanding that the ALP will be like former militias in thepast. They will be very professional; they will be under the Afghanistan Constitution,working under the Ministry of Interior.

Arbakai and militias in the past mostly belonged to an ethnic or certain sort ofpeople, and they would get direction from the leadership of that ethnic or that party.But the ALP are different because they are under command of MoI-ANP, so they arereally different things. So it has been determined that those mistakes we havecommitted in the pastthose ethnic militias and arbakaiwe should not have themany longer.

MF: If former Taliban fighter want to surrender to a community, and want to be integrated

back into the community, will they be permitted to join the ALP?GNA: Any Afghan who accepts the Afghan Constitution, any Afghan who wants to workwith the Afghan government, and does not have a crime record, is welcomed. But wewill still do a background check, since this is a policy of the Afghan government.

The manner in which GIRoA (and indirectly, ISAF, and the International Community)views, deals with, and utilizes the Afghan Local Police in the months to come will havesignificant strategic, political, and relational repercussions at all societal and political levelsin the future. If this latest local defense initiative is to have some positive and meaningful

part to play within a larger counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, then it is imperative

that we first come to understand why earlier similar attempts went wrong, and how this onecan be handled differently so as to harness its full potential while avoiding past mistakes. Tothis end, this paper aims to inject a deeper theoretical and comparative perspective into thediscussion so as to bring a more balanced appreciation and informed understanding of the


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potential risks and advantages that may arise from establishing the Afghan Local Police(ALP).

We begin with a discussion of the principal objective of population-centriccounterinsurgency: securing and protecting the population. Specifically, we will focus onthe theoretical and practical challenges and difficulties that arise for counterinsurgent forcestasked with population protection. This naturally raises the question: how can these problems

be surmounted? Next, we will consider critically whether the intuitive solutions to the problems of

population-centric counterinsurgency necessarily leads us to the counterintuitive conclusionthat the most ideal counterinsurgent is to be found not among the ranks of the armed forces,

but rather within the local settings where insurgency is being played out. At the face of it,this conclusion seems to be the inherent reasoning behind the idea of an ALPalthough todate such reasoning has not yet been articulated in any sophisticated or coherent way. Whatrole can civilian self-defense forces in general (and ALP in particular) play within a largercounterinsurgency campaign and strategy? We should bear in mind that in our (patronizing)desire to protect the population, it is likely that we will fail to hear (or even to ask) what the

population really needs and wants in regard to their security. A top-down approach always

brings the danger that we will overlook the population's potential to exercise agency in regardto their own self-defenseand this will certainly result in missed opportunities. For most ofthe past 9 years of ISAF and American involvement in Afghanistan, the population hasgenerally been regarded as a passive human terrain through which COINs kinetic and non-kinetic forces and activities flow. As a former U.S. Army company commander explained,The assumption is that security would be provided to the people, not by the people.9 Weadhere to a population-centric COIN, yet we rarely leverage the population. Ironically, this isin stark contrast to insurgency doctrine, where the active participation of the population in

both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts (both offensive and defensive) has long been recognizedand deemed to be essential for success.10

The paper will then move on to consider whether the Afghan Local Police, as it iscurrently envisaged by the MoI, will be substantially different from past attempts atorganizing community defense, like ANAP, AP3, and LDI. We will consider the risksarising from the ALP initiative, and conclude by offering a number of recommendations.

Population-centric COIN: objectives and obstacles

Winning the popular support of the civilian population has been a key strategicprincipleinthetheoryandpracticeofcounterinsurgency(COIN)sincetheearly1960s,

ifnotearlier.11Morerecently,ithascometobeassumedthatsecuringandprotecting

thepopulationisthekeytowinningthecovetedprizeofpopularsupport.Inanycase,this focus defines the way in which the war in Afghanistan is now expected to be

pursued. Consider, for instance, former ISAF commander Gen. StanleyMcChrystalsCounterinsurgencyGuidancedocumentof26August2009,whereinhedeclaresinno

uncertain words: Protecting the people is the mission.We will help the Afghan

people win by securing them, by protecting them from intimidation, violence, andabuse12

Although protecting civilians may seem intuitive to many of us who embrace a population-centric approach to COIN, putting the principle into practice has historically proven to be extremely challenging. One reason for this difficulty is becausecounterinsurgent forces are almost never able to be maintain a presence in all places at all

times where the population might be in need of protection.13 We can refer to this as theubiquity problem.14 Moreover, counterinsurgents will find it difficult to gain the trust,confidence, and (most importantly) the collaboration of the population if they are unable to

sustain a constant presence among the people.


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When there is a numerical shortage of counterinsurgent troops, their ability toestablish a viable presence amongst local populations in every strategic location will beseverely taxed. This is especially so in countries like Afghanistan, Colombia, or thePhilippine island of Mindanao, where rugged and inaccessible terrain makes regular deterrent

patrolling of remote areas all the more difficult to carry out. As expected, zones not underincumbent control lie open for insurgents to move in and impose their own control over the

people by way of persuasion and coercion. In turn, control shapes collaboration, and zones ofinsurgent control are ready source for recruitment and resources for insurgents. As Kalyvasobserves, gaining control over an area brings collaboration, and losing control of an area

brings much of that collaboration to an end.16 Therefore, the counterinsurgents ability toincrease and sustain its presence within a territory can be an important factor in enhancing thedegree of collaboration from the local populationand the same holds true for insurgents. AsMao once wrote, "...we must not forget the consolidation of the base areas, the chief taskbeing to arouse and organize the masses and to train guerrilla units and local armed

forces."17A second challenge associated with the task of protecting the population is how

counterinsurgents can come to know, exactly, whom to protect. Insurgents hide among the

population, like fish in water, according to Mao's famous dictum. This creates what can betermed an 'identification problem' for counterinsurgent forces.18

Besides making it difficult for counterinsurgents to know whom they should protect,the identification problem also makes itdifficult to know whom to fight. ABritish officer in Malaya once observed:Somewhere in that gigantic morasswere fifty veteran terrorists. How werethey to be killed? How were they evento be found?19 And as a German officerfighting partisans in the Soviet Union

pointed out, it was an extremely one-sided type of warfare because theGerman soldier was easily recognizable,and the partisan fighter, because he worecivilian clothes, was not.20

The identification problem can prevent the gathering of accurateinformation, which can lead tofrustration among counterinsurgent

personnel and a heightened risk of

inflicting civilian casualties owing tomistaken identities. For instance, on 21February 2010, up to twenty three (23)local nationals were killed and twelve others injured when the convoy they were travelling inwas mistaken for an insurgent force and engaged with air-to-ground fire.21 In extremeinstances, frustration arising from the identification problem can result in counterinsurgencytroops committing excesses, such as what happened at My Lai, Vietnam, in 1968, at Haditha,Iraq, in 2005, or at Accomarca, Peru, in 1985. The Peruvian military officer in charge duringthe Accomarca massacre later told a journalist: You have not experienced nor seen thesituation that we [soldiers] endure. One can not trust a woman, an old man or a child [inAyacucho Department].22

Unfortunately, for counterinsurgency commander and the intelligence community, theidentification problem can create a tendency "to over overemphasize detailed informationabout the enemy at the expense of the political, economic, and cultural environment thatsupports it."23 Finding creative ways to flag (and to pin down) allegiance and identity within

A KEY CHALLENGE FOR COIN IS HOW TO

GAINCOLLABORATION:InlateJune2009,a

small number of U.S. Marines and British

soldiers were the only foreign forces in

Nawa, a district of 70,000 farmers in

Afghanistan's Helmand province. The

American and British troops could notventure a kilometer from their cramped

basewithoutconfrontingmachinegunand

rocket firefrominsurgents. Local farmers,

waryofreprisals from the Taliban,refused

tomake eye contact with foreign soldiers,

muchlessspeakwiththemoroffervaluable

battlefield and demographic information.15

However, three months later, the first

spontaneous reintegration in Afghanistan

tookplaceinthisdistrict.


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the population will surely aid in enhancing local collaboration, which in turn can improve ourcontextual intelligence and understanding of the complex, dynamic environment at thegrassroots level where the war is mainly being fought, and "where it will be won or lost."24

A third problem for a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency arises whenofficial security forces lack legitimacy and accountability. The police, the army, and othersectors of national or international security forces might regard themselves as the 'protectors

of the people.' The population, on the other hand, might see them differently. Public opinionabout security forces must always first be investigated, and never assumed simply on the

biased basis of Western cultural and institutional experiences. Indeed, more often than not, policemen in developing countries systematically engage in corrupt and abusive practices,and as such enjoy a low degree of popular legitimacy. For example, peasants throughoutPeru have a long history of distrust and animosity towards the national police. 25 Many peopleinterviewed during field research in Peru between 1997 and 2000 said that they consideredmost policemen as corrupt and exploitative, frequently abusive and inconsiderate, and oftendisrespectful towards civilians, particularly peasants.26 A similar image of the police can befound in Afghanistan:

A combination of local loyalties, links to criminal networks, low or no pay, and aresidual culture of impunity contributed to endemic corruption in the ANP. In manycommunities, ANP officers were viewed as predatory and a greater threat to securitythan the Taliban. For many Afghans, the police were identified with demands for

bribes, illegal taxes, and various kinds of human rights violations. They were alsoknown to use house searches as an opportunity to shake down the occupants and stealtheir possessions. Corrupt police practices were felt more directly by the poorestmembers of society: taxi and truck drivers, traders, small businessmen, and farmers.High levels of corruption and a culture of impunity severely undermined thelegitimacy of the Afghan government and further eroded public support for the

police.27

These observations have a bearing on the naming of the Afghan Local Police, sincethe word "police" could prove somewhat disconcerting and detracting for the program. Inconversations that one of the authors had with Afghan locals who will be involved by thisinitiative, many expressed their concern not to be seen as officially associated with theAfghan police, for they feel that the term is loaded with pejorative connotations. Hence, ifthe objective is to cultivate popular support, then counterinsurgents will need to be aware thatto incorporate grassroots anti-insurgent movements completely into unpopular stateinstitutions (like the police) will run the risk of tainting the popular legitimacy that such

bottom-up initiatives enjoy in the first placethereby diminishing their potential to play a

catalytic and strategic role in generating momentum for popular counterinsurgency frombelow.

The qualities and strategic role of counterinsurgency from below

Asia Foundations 2008 survey on perceptions of security found that the most insecure provinces in Afghanistan were Helmand and Wardak (over 75 percent of the populationfeared for their safety), followed by Farah, Herat, Ghor, Badghis, Sar-e-Pol, Kandahar, Zabul,Ghazni, Lowgar, Paktia, Khost, Jowzjan, Laghman, and Nurestan (between 50 and 75 percentof the inhabitants feared for their security).28 More recent survey data on local perceptions of

security collected early this year found that almost 50 percent of Afghans polled perceivedtheir security from violence and crime to be between somewhat or very bad.29 It isquestionable, therefore, whether in the eyes of the Afghans, GIRoA and ISAF forces aresuccessfully meeting the security requirements that people expect and require. As then-ISAF


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commander General McChrystal himself pointed out in 2009, "Nearly eight years ofinternational presence has not brought the anticipated benefits. The Afghan people areskeptical and unwilling to commit active support to either side until convinced of a winning

proposition."30In their attempt to wage a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign,

government and coalition forces in Afghanistan will need to find ways to surmount the three

challenges, identified above, if they are truly to achieve their objective of guaranteeing thesecurity of the Afghan population. In theory, the way forward seems simple. According toBritish Army Field Manual-71876,

presence matters in counterinsurgency if security is to be established and sustained.Only when force levels are high enough can security be both generated and sustainedeffectively. As it is unlikely that any contemporary coalition can deploy and sustainsuch numbers it is essential that the host nation security forces are developed so thatthey become capable of fulfilling this role.31

In reality, however, it is unlikely that official COIN forces alone, working in a top-

down manner, can accomplish this. (Until now, ISAF and GIRoA have taken apredominantly top-down approach toward efforts to provide security.) Establishing credibleand sustainable security requires counterinsurgency forces to have enough troops for the task,whether national or international. But what if the number of international troops isinadequate, and host-nation security forces have not yet been sufficiently developed to fulfillthis role, as is currently the situation in Afghanistan?32 Moreover, if coalitioncounterinsurgency forces are unable to be ubiquitous and to maintain sufficient and sustained

presence in all locations of strategic importance in Afghanistan, how can they keep thesympathetic (yet undecided) population reassured while at the same time frustratinginsurgents in their attempts to intimidate or to co-opt the population? Herein lies therelevance of counterinsurgency from below.

The necessity and effectiveness of irregular civilian defense forces has beendemonstrated numerous times in history. During Europe's tumultuous and war-tornsixteenth-century, many cities and states throughout the continent were defended not by

professional standing armies, but rather by civic guards. A well-known artistic reminder ofthis fact is Rembrandt's masterpiece, De Nachwacht(The Night Watch). This famous

painting depicts the company of Dutch civil guards responsible for defending and policing thecity of Amsterdam. To defend one'sown town or city was not only acivic obligation expected of allcitizens; membership in a civil

guard militia was also a source ofgreat pride and social solidarity forits members. Indeed, the Rembrandt

painting was commissioned and paidfor by the civic guard members whoare portrayed in it, as a visual recordfor posterity of their honor and duty.Similarly, during the AmericanRevolutionary War, it was theMinutemen and militia who foughtthe British in the early years of the

war, before the colonies could raisea viable, professional ContinentalArmy of effective size.Figure 1: "De Nachtwacht"a Dutch civic guard militia from

the seventeenth century


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In a number of insurgent wars and political emergencies since the end of the SecondWorld War, irregular civilian guardsmen have been essential to securing victory for the state.Local groups known as "Home Guards" were instrumentally decisive in helping the Kenyanstate to defeat the Mau Mau, not just militarily but also by encouraging defection to thegovernment side.33 More recent examples of the critical contribution that local civiliandefense groups can play in guaranteeing security to their communities are those of Peru's

comits de autodefensa (self-defense committees) and the Sons of Iraq program. Thesecomparative cases undoubtedly hold valuable lessons and insights for the Afghan LocalPolice program.

Civilians at the Spearhead: the case of Peru's comits de autodefensa

Few examples demonstrate the full potential of bottom-up counterinsurgency better thanPeru's comits de autodefensa. These peasant self-defense patrols emerged within a contextof a sanguinary insurgency launched in 1980 by a Maoist-inspired insurgent organization

called the Communist Party of PeruShining Path. By the time the war had more or lesspetered out in 2000, it is estimated that upwards of 65,000 lives had been lost in what is oneof Latin America's bloodiest armed conflicts.

Early Shining Path actions and successes brought substantial degree of popularsympathy and collaboration with the insurgents. However, despite the substantial initial

popular support and sympathy among the peasantry for Shining Path's drive against poverty,crime, corruption, and neglect, the organization's violent means ultimately undermined itsends. Whatever degree of support and legitimacy they enjoyed among the peasantry quicklyeroded as the insurgents came increasingly to rely on violent coercion to establish theircontrol over the rural population. Consequently, many villages began organizing local self-defense patrols spontaneously, particularly in rural areas where resentment towards ShiningPath ran deepest. In other places, though, it was the Peruvian military that took the lead insetting up village defense groups.

During the first decade of the civil war, the army brought all rural self-defensecommittees under the nominal authority of the army commanders of each province. It isimportant to point out, however, that the army's initiative to organize civilian defense did notconstitute official policy. Indeed, as a practice it was pursued only sporadically, since morethan a few senior officers were against the very idea of indigenous peasants being permittedto handle firearms or to exercise lethal force, even in self defense. While the situationcontinued that villages risked attack from Shining Path for organizing local defense groups,and the government remained ambivalent in its support of the self-defense movement, the

vast majority of peasants remained uncommitted and pragmatic, collaborating erratically withwhichever armed actor posed the most immediate threat.It was during the second half of the 1990s that civil defense organizations known as

the DECAS ( Defensa Civil Antisubversiva) rose to become the most organized, mostsophisticated, and militarily powerful of all the civil defense organizations in Peru. It wasalso the DECAS that formed the vanguard of what eventually would become a widespreadmovement of peasant resistance to the insurgents. With the help of Marine Infantry unitsgarrisoned nearby, the DECAS emerged and developed in the remote Apurmac River valley,which was once a stronghold of Shining Path. On the basis of their own organizational

planning, they created a hierarchical segmentary system whose highest level was the regionalcommittee, followed by the district committee, with the village civil defense committee at the

basic level. The level of mobilization within this system depended upon the gravity of thethreat being faced. Leadership within the committees took the form of number of elected

positions: president, secretary, treasurer, operations commander, and intelligence officer.The general membership of the DECAS, who referred to themselves as "ronderos"


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(patrollers), comprised all able-bodied adults of the village, both men and women, all of whowere expected to participate in the tasks of patrolling and engaging in community defense. 34Some of the villagers brought valuable experience in having served previously as conscriptsin the army.

In the beginning of their organization, the peasant patrollers were armed only withhomemade weapons, like spears, clubs, axes, and slingshots. Some patrollers had a

homemade firearm of sorts, and a lucky few possessed shotguns or antiquated Mauser rifles.Over time, however, villagers were able to acquire more shotguns and Mauser rifles byselling their crops and livestock, while the Marines provided them occasionally with smallquantities of more potent weapons of war, like hand grenades and an automatic rifle or two.

The DECAS routinely engaged in deterrent patrolling, which kept the insurgents offbalance and prevented them from returning and infiltrating into areas recently wrested fromtheir control. By taking primary responsibility for patrolling rural areas, local self-defenseforces could compensate for the fact that there were never enough government forces, ontheir own, to guarantee the safety of the rural population. "We [didn't] have enough soldiersto patrol and control the entire countryside," the army officer in charge of all the rural self-defense committees told me in 1997. "We don't have the capacity for it. For this reason we

have to rely on the presence of the rondas in areas where we cannot always be."35Local self-defense groups also made effective use of former insurgents, who were

integrated subsequently into the peasant patrols after they had defected from Shining Path.Such individuals brought with them a wealth of intelligence about the enemy, includingknowledge of their tactics and the locations of their supply caches.

The DECAS were not only restricted to routine patrolling. They also played an activecounterinsurgency role by planning and executing a number of fairly large and complexoffensive operations. Such operations illustrated a model effort of joint DECAS-Marinecooperation: the peasant patrollers, who possessed intimate knowledge of the terrain and thehuman terrain, did the scouting and skirmishing; the Marines (and eventually the Army)

provided the muscle by supporting the peasant patrollers with immediate overwhelmingfirepower, once contact with the enemy was made. Working together in this fashion, theDECAS and Marines constituted a formidable force. They succeeded in pushing ShiningPath out of the entire Apurmac River valley, and went on to force the rebels into thedefensive throughout most of the Andean highlands.

The expansion and proliferation of local defense forces in general can be understoodnot only in organizational and strategic terms; the symbolic, dramatic, and sociologicaldimensions were equally important. The peasantry's revolt against Shining Path did not erupteverywhere, at the same time. Rather, the DECAS' expansion throughout the ApurmacRiver valley and eventually into the Andean highlands of south-central Peru was built uponthe early success of very localized uprisings against Shining Path. The symbolic significance

of these initial victories, however, was amplified as news of the first violent clashes againstShining Path spread like a bushfire throughout the valley. News of the peasant patrols andtheir exploits disseminated throughout the population faster than the actual self-defensegroups themselves multiplied. In the process, facts became embellished. What might havestarted as reports of "one hundred peasant patrollers" could, ten kilometers further up thevalley, end up as a story of "five thousand peasant patrollers." As the reports became myth,and myth fanned excitement and optimism among the valley's inhabitants, Shining Path's ownimage of invincibility began to crack and crumble. The confidence of villagers to resistShining Path was bolstered by the idea that "the ronderos are coming!"36

The expansion of the DECAS can thus be visualized in terms of the classic ink-spotanalogy, where, starting from a localized epicenter, the peasant self-defense movement grew

steadily outwards in all directions. The seed for this expansion was the original DECAS ofonly a handful of neighboring villages. Yet it swelled into a widespread and powerfulmovement that rode the crest of a wave of myths and rumorsarmed propaganda, if youwill. Such tales glorified and exaggerated the concrete victories of the peasant patrollers over


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Shining Path fighters, and depicted the ronderos as "liberators." Whether intentional or not,the effect of these exaggerated stories was that they functioned as a sort of force multiplier,which helped to sway the minds of peasants further afield who were otherwise initiallyhesitant to support the DECAS in their rebellion against Shining Path. DECAS success lay inthe fact that it was grassroots movement that was created by local villagers themselves, withthe immediate backing of Peruvian Marines who were astute enough to take a secondary

supporting role, rather than presuming to take the lead in that autochthonic process.A number of innovative schemes, designed entirely by DECAS leaders, became

standard practice by self-defense committees throughout the south-central Andes, andtherefore deserve special mention, here. The most striking was their pioneering efforts withregard to reintegrating, reconciling, and rehabilitating former insurgents back into ruralcommunities. Whereas government soldiers and policemen had been known to execute"presumed terrorists" summarily, the DECAS by comparison initiated a system whereby so-called "arrepentidos" (repentant insurgents) were placed under the community's strictobservation and constant supervision until such time as it was deemed that their repentancewas sincere. The process of repentance and reconciliation was not only functional or

procedural; it also had a ritual dimension.37 Arrepentidos were expected to confess their

"sins" publicly (Peru has a very strong Catholic tradition). Moreover, they were givenopportunities to prove their loyalty and sincerity, mainly by participating in routine

patrolling, and in the larger DECAS-led military operations. Indeed, rebels captured in battlewere generally considered by the DECAS leaders to be more valuable alive than dead, for itwas from former Senderistas that theDECAS obtained much of theirintelligence concerning the strengthand movement of rebel forces, and,most importantly, the identity of thoseclandestine Shining Path 'moles' thathad secretly infiltrated ruralcommunities.

A second importantinnovation of the DECAS was tocreate in each district a "Comandos

Especiales" (Special Commandos),which was an elite force of the best

patrollers from the DECASorganization as a whole. Individualmembers, known as "rentados" (hiredguards), were paid a small monthly

salary from financial contributions pooled together from all the familiesin the district. In addition, theyreceived special military trainingfrom military officers at the localarmy base, and were equipped with the very best weapons that the communities couldaffordusually, the highly prized Mauser rifles. Every community within a district provideda rentado to the district's Comandos Especiales. This practice of creating a mixed unit

proved an excellent way to overcome traditional inter-community squabbles while at thesame time creating a new sense of corporate identity, united in the collective purpose ofexercising self-defense against a common enemy. Often, such a group's sense of solidarity

and identity became so strong that they even came to wear their own special "uniform," like atracksuit, or indigenous ponchos all of the same color (see Figure 3).

Throughout the 1990s, closer cooperation between the peasant self-defensecommittees and government troops brought dramatic improvements in relationships between

Figure2:Aunitof"ComandosEspeciales"

fromTamboDistrict,Peru,in1997


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the armed forces and the peasantry in general. Much had changed in mutual perceptions fromthe days when the first military detachments that came from the Peruvian coast regarded allAndean peasants with great suspicion, as likely Senderista sympathizers. On the other side,

peasants no longer regarded Peruvian soldiers as an "army of occupation," brutal and vicious,who had come only to kill, rape, and steal. By helping to bridge and strength trust and

positive interactions, local defense forces in the Andean highlands of Peru have therefore

played a critical role in improving and consolidating good relations between the armed forcesand the population at large, in a way that government troops could never have achieved ontheir own.

In 1991, the new president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, passed legislation that gaveofficial recognition to the peasant self-defense groups, and to their right to bear firearms.They were baptized with a new name: Comits de Autodefensa y Desarrollo (Committees ofSelf-Defense and Development, or CAD for short). In addition, the Fujimori governmentalso adopted the DECAS' practice of repentance and reintegration as the basis for its Law of

Repentance and Amnesty. With official recognition came stricter government monitoring andcontrol of the self-defense committees. From the mid-1990s onwards, the army introducedcertain bureaucratic formalities and procedures in the operational practices of the CADs.

These included such mechanisms as obliging CAD leaders to write up a weekly report oftheir activities, and requiring CAD patrol commanders to obtained a signed declaration fromthe leaders of every community they visit stating that while in that village the patrollers didnot commit any abuses or crimes. Such controls and protocols were designed to make civildefense patrols more accountable to the military for their actions in order to prevent the riseof local warlords, and to preclude their potential for human rights abuses.

Hence, as partially indigenous initiatives the civil defense movement in Peru's south-central Andean highlands had always enjoyed a degree of popular legitimacy right from thevery start. In fact, by the mid-1990s, one can safely say that the vast majority of peasants inthe region had come to regard the CADs not as another predatory force, but rather as thelegitimate and effectively guarantor of the peasantrys peace and security.

Civilians at the Spearhead: the case of the Sons of Iraq

During the spring of 2007, Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) Commander, General DavidPetraeus, and Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) Commander, General Ray Odierno,tasked the Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC) to create a 'Reconciliation and EngagementsCell' (REC) in order to expand the success of the Anbar Awakening to other parts of Iraq.One of the authors of this present discussion paper was one of the five officers initiallyassigned to the REC Cell, and as such witnessed the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program grow from

500 Iraqis to 100,000 Iraqis, while security drastically improved.The Sons of Iraq program came into being as an Operation Order (OPORD) that gaveguidelines for subordinate units to hire local security guards, using CERP (CommandersEmergency Response Program) funds. The guidelines had no mention of tribal affiliations orreligious preferences towards the Sunnis. The OPORD was simply a tool that commanders onthe ground could use to help shape and hold the battlefield. Some commanders used it, andsome did not. There was never a plan to hire mostly tribal, Sunni security forces; it justturned out that way based on the specific nature of Iraq at the time. Similarly, there shouldnot be a plan to create local-defense forces in Afghanistan explicitly along ethnic lines.

Many experts, journalists and policy advisors have a variety of misconceptions aboutthe SOI programmisconceptions based on a lack of understanding as to what, exactly, the

program was, and how it developed. Some critics point out that the SOI experience has littlebearing on the case of Afghanistan because the SOIs were all tribal. In fact, while it is truethat many of the SOI contracts were tribal-based, this is not true for all of them. The reasonwhy many commanders decided to use a tribal-based SOI force is because that is what


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worked in certain regions of Iraq. At the same time, many other SOI contracts were given tocommunity leaders, business leaders, political leaders, and even insurgent leaders. After all,Iraq is a still largely a tribal society, and so it can be expected that SOI leaders would haveaffiliations to their tribe. However, this was never a reason for choosing who should be anSOI leader. For the American commanders on the ground, leaders for SOI contracts werechosen on the basis of the amount of influence they had in society, and not on their particular

tribal or religious affiliation.Indeed, SOI memberswhich included former traders, former farmer, and even

former insurgentswere paid a humble salary to provide an important service: localsecurity. Yet an important secondary effect of the money paid to SOI members was a boostto local economies. As members brought stability to towns and villages, markets wererejuvenated. SOI members spent their salaries at local markets to provide for their families.Keeping the SOI lesson in mind, one can imagine that the expansion of the ALP programcould also play an important role in economically and logistically supporting local leaders,local entrepreneurs, and local security forces against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

In re-examining the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, it is essential to remember why the program achieved results. What were the

reasons for the success of the SOI program? First,it was a local, bottom-upapproach. The SOI program was notimplemented from Baghdad, the GreenZone or Camp Victory. In an OperationsOrder, Commanders on the ground weregiven left and right limits, and thenexecuted the program.

Second, Coalition Forces supervised the SOI program. CoalitionForces collected biometrics on each of theSOIs, closely supervising and partneringwith them. Coalition Forces also carefully

presided over connecting the SOIs to IraqiSecurity Forces (ISF) and the IraqiGovernment.

Third, Coalition Forces paidthe SOIs. The SOIs signed temporary,

paid contracts. The SOIs signed contractsswearing cooperation with the IraqiGovernment. The SOI contracts were

done in 3-month installments, therefore giving Coalition Forces leverage to end paymentsdue to misbehavior, serving as a sort of sanctions over the volunteers.And fourth, Coalition Force Commanders raised SOI numbers as needed. Eventually,

the SOI program was capped at 106,000, but in the beginning, Commanders were given thefreedom to sign up SOIs as they deemed fit to overwhelm the insurgency.

To conclude, in its simplicity the Sons of Iraq program knocked out three birds withone stone. The SOI program employed former insurgents to provide local security, therebyreintegratingthem into the Government.

Theoretical reflections on the strategic value of counterinsurgency from below

Clearly, the historical record provides compelling evidence that irregular local defense forcescan play a vital role in assuring the success of counterinsurgency campaigns. They do so bysolving those fundamental challenges of population-centric COIN that we discussed earlier in

Figure3:Paidtocleancanalsduringtheday,

defendingtheirvillagesatnight.


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this paper. It is the locals themselves who are best suited to solve the identification problembecause they naturally possess all of those cultural and linguistic qualities so highly valued byregular counterinsurgency forces. The population can hide insurgents; but insurgents arevulnerable if the population decides to identify and turn them in. If, indeed, insurgents arelike fish in the sea, then the most effective way to inhibit or prevent their ease of movementthrough the population is to turn the water toxic by organizing and empowering local

populations that are fed up with insurgents and willing to stand up to them.The forces of insurgency and of counterinsurgency compete not only for control of

the population, but also for the control of spacesnot just physical space, but also socialspaces. Denying the enemy social spaces in which to hide, in which to spread propagandaand to recruit fighters, in which to demonstrate that their governance is superior to that of thegovernmentall this is absolutely necessary for success in counterinsurgency. In reality,governments rarely have the capacity to deploy and sustain the necessary numbers of regularsecurity forces to maintain a presence, and therefore control, in all the possible strategicallyimportant geographical and social spaces. A well-directed local self-defense initiative,however, can be the essential ingredient for addressing the ubiquity problem faced by theregular security forces. If properly organized and supervised, a local self-defense forces can

help to compensate for the 'ubiquity problem' that counterinsurgents face by taking over taskssuch as deterrent patrolling and, when necessary, providing immediate defense of the

population within the boundaries of their territory. This division of labor can help to free upregular COIN forces for more pressing tasks. Furthermore, "while the individual [villageguard] members may be focused on defending their villages or families, the fact that they are

permanently presentin their villages are operating in places they know well allowsincumbents to tap into private information."38 Consequently, one can reasonably expect thatthe active collaboration with the government that local defense forces would bring canenhance that which Major General Flynn has deemed essential for fixing Intel inAfghanistan: namely, "gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts ofoperation and the distinctions about the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population." 39

From a practical and strategic point of view, the formation of local defense groups plays one additional significant function: namely, it can serve to fasten down the naturaltendency of rational actors to shift allegiances continually in accordance with the fortunes ofwar, as Afghans are well known to do. Forming a village defense group constitutes a publicdeclaration of collaboration with the government. This exposes the population to violentreprisals from insurgents; for by the very act of forming such groups, villagers compromisethemselves. "Because militias threaten insurgents, they quickly become the insurgents'

primary targets."40 As such, people who openly and actively oppose insurgents through self-defense groups will quickly find that their only course of action, if they wish to survive, is tocontinue collaboration with the government. Therefore, the counterinsurgent actor must be

able to quickly recognize this as an opportunity to create bridging social capital

41

with localcommunities. If a counterinsurgent actor fails to reciprocate with concrete actions to supportlocal initiatives of self-defense, then it will surely lose credibility, along with thecommunity's trust, allegiance, and willingness to collaborate.

Having established the theoretical and practical reasons as to why the idea of localdefense makes both theoretical and practical COIN sense, we must now turn to the question:to what extent is the ALP program, as currently envisaged by the Ministry of Interior,

suitable for spearheading counterinsurgency from below in Afghanistan?


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Is the ALP suited to spearheading counterinsurgency from below?

What is the profile of the 'perfect counterinsurgent'? In Afghanistan, his skill sets would includethe following:

He speaks fluently the local language, either Pashto and/or Dari;

He is culturally sensitive, with years of experience in Afghanistan; His communication and IO abilities are flawless;

He is an expert on the local history and terrain of his district, perhaps even of hisprovince;

He eats with the people;

He sleeps with the people;

He lives among the people;

He enjoys the respect, legitimacy, and support of the people;

He is related by kinship to the local people, and therefore to a great degreeaccountable to them;

He wants nothing more than to protect the people.

His name is Lalay and there are thousands of 'perfect counterinsurgents' in Afghanistan, justlike him. Lalay led a revolt of local farmers in Gizab, Afghanistan, to rid his village of theTaliban.42 The contention with the Taliban began when the insurgents killed several ofLalays family members with a roadside bomb. The Afghan Government gave Lalay $24,000as compensation for the incident, but then the Taliban demanded that he hand the money overto them. To pressure Lalay to cooperate, the Taliban detained his father and brother. At this

point, Lalay organized the revolt against the Taliban with the help of ISAF Special Forces.After successfully helping Lalay and his fellow villagers to driving out the Taliban, theSpecial Forces went on to train other locals, whom they fondly dubbed the 'Gizab Good

Guys,' in order to defend their village. The Special Forces connected the Gizab Good Guysto the Afghan District Government, which helped them to bring in development projects.

Though on a smaller scale, the story of the 'Gizab Good Guys' is reminiscent to that ofthe Anbar Awakening in Iraq, which was led by Abdul Sattar Abu Risha during the spring of

Figure4:Oneofthelocaldefenseguardsknownasthe'GizabGoodGuys,'following

behindtwoAfghanNationalPolice(ANP)officers


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2007. The combination of Sattars family being murdered by 'al Qaeda in Iraq' and the overallanger among the tribes with the brutally strict codes of Al Qaeda led to a revolt in Ramadithat spread across Anbar Province. As mentioned earlier, that revolt would go on to inspirethe much larger and tide-turning success known as the Sons of Iraq program.

It would appear, therefore, that the 'perfect counterinsurgent' is to be found within theAfghan population itself. On the other hand, it is debatable whether the ALP, as it is

currently envisaged and designed by the Afghan Ministry of Interior, is the optimal vehiclethrough which to develop and exercise the full potential of Afghanistan's 'perfectcounterinsurgents.'

Government-sponsored local defense initiatives, like the ALP, are nothing new inAfghanistan.43 Such initiatives, under a bewildering variety of acronyms, have been seen

before in Afghanistan over the past five years: ANAP (Afghan National Auxiliary Police orpolis-e kumaki); AP3 (Afghan Public Protection Program, orniru-ye muhafezat-e mahalli-yeamniat); LDI (Local Defense Initiative, or ibtikar-e defa'-e mahali); APPF (Afghan PublicProtection Force). Critics of these initiatives point out that "programs and their acronymscome and go at remarkable speed in Afghanistan"44; but to date little effort has been made tolearn from the mistakes and lessons of prior experiences before new, yet similar, initiatives

are again launched. Let us briefly look at what some of the problems that arose from theseinitiatives, and the lessons they hold for the ALP program.

The ANAP

The ANAP was initiated in 2006 as a temporary stopgap measure for addressing the slow andcumbersome process of developing Afghan National Security Forces, particularly in the faceof an aggressive, resurgent Taliban that was gaining traction in the south of the country. It

proved short-lived, and the program was shut down in 2008. The stated aim of the ANAPwas to provide community policing so as to "ensure government control of territory" by"taking part in joint operations with ANA, ANP and the National Directorate of Security(NDS)."45 It was authorized to grow up to a maximum of 11, 271 recruits, but only around9,000 members had been deployed before the program ended.

After the ANAP program was launched in Zabul in September 2006, a number ofwidespread problems soon emerged. Contrary to the program's initial intentions, "recruitswere ill suited to 'community policing' because, for the most part, they were not from thecommunity."46 Many had come from places outside of the communities that they eventuallywould operate in. Indeed, some of the recruits did not even speak the local language (e.g.Dari-speaking ANAP posted to Pashto-speaking communities in Zabul).

In theory, members were to be recruited locally, on the basis of community

recommendation and a clean criminal record. However, "on paper, vetting was to beconducted by the MoI and NDS but in reality very little vetting was done."47 Poor vetting practices resulted in the ANAP program being heavily infiltrated by jihadi commanders"eager to access the salaries and resources of ANAP for their fighters."48 Clearly, such asituation only exacerbates the 'identification problem,' rather than contributing to its solution.Moreover, massive desertions in the ranks of the ANAP reportedly occurred already in itsfirst months, due to long delays in payment.49

According to Lefvre, the ANP came to resent the ANAP because (1) it was prone toinfiltration by jihadi networks,50 and (2) it became a potential rival for recruitment into theANP. Namely, it presented most of the benefits associated with the police (e.g. a similaruniform, salary, firearms and other equipment, ID documentation, employment) without

requiring the same level of training from its recruits, and with the benefit of likely being posted closer to home. It is hardly surprising that "aspiring recruits often chose the easierroute [i.e. ANAP], further hindering [the ANP's] struggling recruitment drive."51 Afraid thathistory was about to repeat itself, these reasons can also account for why, at a COIN shura


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held at Camp Julian in August 2010, many ANP officers expressed grave concerns andreservations about the government's newest plan to set up the ALP.

The AP3

Discussions between U.S. and Afghan officials in October 2008 on how to improve securityconditions at the local level led to the creation of the Afghanistan Public Protection Program,in the summer of 2009. Designed, implemented, and funded by the American militaryalthough under the nominal authority of the MoIthe AP3 is a community engagement

program that promotes local governance, local security and project development in order toextend GIRoA legitimacy to the district level. Its stated goal was to "prevent insurgentattacks on key infrastructure and facilities...[thereby increasing] stability that establishes theconditions for greater development...[and] extending the legitimate reach of the Governmentof Afghanistan."52 For mainly strategic reasons, the program was initiated in Wardak

province in March 2009. Unfortunately, Wardak was possibly not the most ideal location to pilot this project. Whereas the Provincial Governor, Halim Feda'i, claims that local elders

had approached him in 2008 to request the creation of a Wardaki-managed local defenseforce,53 others present a different story. At a MoI-sponsored seminar in Kabul in 2008,Wardaki local community were vocal in their misgivings about the program and refused tosign a memorandum of understanding with the government.54 Instead, they drafted astatement requesting a greater role for the ANA and ANP in the province...55 These elderstold the governor and other officials during the meeting that they were not prepared to agreeto AP3 because Wardak had painful experiences with government-sponsored militias duringDr Najibullah's regime... These elders reminded participants that infighting among rivalmilitias caused 2,000 deaths in Wardak during the war and AP3 would likely lead to moreinfighting.

The MoI stipulated that selection of AP3 'guardians' would be done at district-levelshuras, preferably through the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), being run bythe Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). In practice, though, it seems thatthe AP3 program had many of the same vetting problems that the ANAP experienced. Evensenior MoI officials admit that neither the MoI, nor the National Directorate of Security(NDS) or American Special Forces have the capacity to screen every recruit thoroughly.56 AsLefvre observed, "experiences with the ANAP suggest that any vetting mechanism isunlikely to detect infiltration from insurgents or criminal networks. Vetting is not a priorityin the management of the AP3...."57

The program picked up momentum after the appointment of Ghulam Muhammad asAP3 commander in December 2009. He is a controversial figure, since he has formerly

served as an insurgent commander inHarakat-e Inqilab-e Islami,Hizb-e Islami (Gulbuddin),and the Taliban regime. After his arrest by American forces in 2004, he appears to havedefected to the government side. The Special Forces now regard him well, and he presumesto report only directly to them, thereby bypassing the Deputy Provincial Chief of Police.58"The decision to appoint an AP3 commander for the province subverted the originalcommand and control charts issued by MoI, which only mentions that district-levelcommanders should report to the ANP district chiefs."59 This has created friction betweenthe ANP and the AP3.

In regard to recruitment, soon after assuming command, Ghulam Muhammad quickly brought his mujahedeen followers into the AP3, without consulting local elders, and indisregard for the formal processes of vetting andshura selection. As a result, many Wardakis

have grown to distrust the AP3 program and to question whether it is still in their bestinterest, for it now appears to have been hijacked by a "strongman" who enjoys the backingof U.S. Special Forces.


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Even so, the incomplete data nevertheless suggests that security conditions in theprovince have noticeably improved since the AP3 started, particularly on the main roads andhighways. What, then, is the likely future of this program? As far as U.S. officials areconcerned, the program has been "a success" in Wardak. But given that it has proven to beresource-intensive and slow to start up, it will not be expanded to other provinces. 60

The LDI

Yet another program is the Local Defense Initiative (LDI), formerly known as theCommunity Defense Initiative (CDI). The idea appears to have come from Americanmilitary planners, who were dismayed by the perceived problems with the AP3 program inWardak and so decided to experiment with smaller projects in mid-2009. It is the U.S.Special Forces who have designed and implemented the LDI program in different parts of thecountry. As of October 2009, CDIs had been started in Herat (with Noorzais, Tajiks,Barakzais at Shindand), Kandahar (with Alikozais at Arghandab), Nangarhar (with Shinwarisat Achin), and Paktia (with Chamkanis, Mangals at Chamkani. By March 2010, LDIs were

also to be found in Daikundi, Helmand provinces.61According to the Local Defense Initiative Strategy document, the purpose of the LDI

is to "secure local communities by denying insurgents access to and support in localcommunities" by reversing the "reasons insurgents are effective at the village level: poverty,unemployment, lack of adequate protection, lack of education."62 On paper, the strategy forundercutting insurgent relevance at the village level is to provide "responsibility andemployment to village members...[so that] villagers no longer provide a source of support forinsurgents...[and] will not allow insurgents to live within their village or allow villagemembers to join the insurgents."63 LDI 'defenders' were, according to Special Forces staff inKabul, to be used solely in a defensive manner, and not to be deployed in combat operations.

The strategy document stipulates:

"village leadership, along with District Governors, Chief of Police and NDSare responsible for vetting LDI 'defenders';

village leadership is responsible for verifying "that members of the LDI arereceiving payments, ensure the performance and readiness status of the LDIand demand loyalty and responsible action under a compact framework";

LDI groups "will not have authority to act outside their home village area orform alliances with other LDI forces."64

Unlike earlier programs, like the ANAP and AP3, the government did not officially

arm 'defenders'; rather, members were expected to provide for their own weapons. LDImembers receive individual payment through the MoI. In addition, communities withsuccessful LDIs could also expect "government assistance" in the form of micro-developmentand infrastructural projects, upon approval of the District Governor.

While the strategy gives the impression of a single, coherent, uniform program for theLDI, in practice one sees striking differences in implementation and outcomes. The positiveLDI experience in Nagahan village, Arghandab District, presents a model example of whatthe program can potentially achieve. The village was chosen by Special Forces fieldcommanders in mid-2009, on the basis of the following selection criteria: "(a) a history,

presence or willingness to accept the 'arbakai model' and a tradition of 'resistance' [toTaliban]; (b) strategic importance of the area, both for the Taleban and for the government

and the international military and (c) logical feasibility and access. Based on these clearcriteria, one of the sites selected was the village of Nagahan, in Kandahar Province.

The initial problem, however, was that locals were uninterested in becoming involvedwith ISAF because since 2007, Arghandab District had been the target of numerous Taliban


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attacks, which had succeeded in intimidating the local population. Neverthless, SpecialForces, together with the District Governor, held initial discussions with local elder-leaders."Following several meetings, this materialized into an official 'invitation' to the SF from thevillagers of Nagahan."65 A small team of U.S. Special Forces came to live in the village in

November 2009. They established themselves in a qala, together with around 25 'defenders'who lived with them. A second group of around 50 'defenders' lived in surrounding houses of

the village.Arghandabi 'defenders' were, according to elders, selected at Nagahan and district

shuras. The elders felt themselves to be more capable than the government of managing andcontrolling the vetting process because they "know all of these people."66 Moreover, theytook it as an important sign of respect that they were always consulted and kept in the loop bythe SF in regard to deciding LDI affairs. Quinn, one of the authors of this paper, made asimilar observation on this critical point of fact while embedded with an ODA67 Team in Zer-e-koh valley, Herat province: "During my embed period, General Petraeus visited ZerekohValley and conducted a Shura with the local Elders.... The one word that kept coming upduring the Shura was "consultation." As one of the head Elders of the valley said, "Everytime CPT Adams does something, he does it with our consultation. This is the difference."68

Arghandabi 'defenders' routinely conducted foot patrols together with the SpecialForces, thereby bringing a dramatic improvement in the level of local security. This has alsoraised the population's trust and confidence in the SF, and in the LDI's ability to defend them."If someone tries to infiltrate the community from the outside, we know immediately," one

Nagahan elder told Lefvre. "Two days ago, some of the villagers captured members of theTaleban placing IEDs near Khal-e-Shak village. We stopped them and handed them intoAfghan security forces."69

The development side of Arghandab's LDI consists of cashfor-work and crops-for-work projects, funded and managed by the U.S. military. Projects include seed and fertilizerdistribution, the construction of a flood-protection wall, road and culvert construction, amongothers.

The benefits and positive changes brought to Arghadab by the LDI has not goneunnoticed by the neighboring district of Khakrez, who are also keen on starting up an LDI intheir own communities. However, some elders from Khakrez believe that although the LDIcould greatly benefit their district, they nevertheless feel that Khakrez lacks the necessaryconditions to make the LDI effective. Namely, there are long-standing feuds betweendifferent ethnic groups living in the district, and many inhabitants believe that both thedistrict governor and the chief of police are corrupt.70

Unfortunately, reports from other areas where the program is being pursued suggeststhat it is not everywhere as smooth and successful as in Arghandab. For example, in Achindistrict, Nangarhar province, US Combined Joint Task Force-82 attempted to organize the

entire Shinwari tribe (400,000 members) into an LDI.

71

This was regard as threatening byother tribes in the district, who saw it as upsetting the balance of power in the area. As aresult, local conflicts have flared up not only between the Shinwaris and other tribesinhabiting the district, but also between Shinwari sub-tribes.

An LDI project in Nili district of Daikundi province also ran into problems soon afterit was launched. For rather than giving the responsibility for bottom-up recruitment andvetting to village or districtshuras, as was done in Arghandab, the same mistake of the AP3in Wardak was repeated in Nili LDI project:

In early 2010, several people from Daikundi reported that the US military hadrecruited a jihadi commander named Sedaqat, originally from Khideer district, to

assemble a group of up to 500 men to assist with security in the province. Sedaqat isa well-known troublemaker who was behind the 2008 kidnapping of two Frenchnationals working for the NGO Action Against Hunger.... The local populationgreeted Sedaqat's recruitment to LDI with surprise and dismay. "When he was asked


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to go to the American base, at first the people thought that he would be arrested andthey were very happy about this. Instead, they seem to be empowering him," says onelocal official.72

Quite simply, the LDI projects in Achin and Nili were problematic because they werenot carried out according to the same 'philosophy' as in Arghandab. Clearly, both projects

were again very top-down in their implementation, particularly in regard to the selection ofLDI members and commanders. 'Consultation with local elders'a crucial element forgaining collaboration and trust in local-level engagementswas not followed. Furthermore,a massive LDI project that concentrates on only one tribe within a heterogenous district, likeAchin, risks exacerbating inter-ethnic jealousies and clashes. Its size makes it cumbersometo manage, and more vulnerable to failure. As Kilcullen wisely points out: "Small is

beautiful.... Keep programs small: this makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key and(importantly) recoverable if they fail."73 By contrast, though we must be careful not to

prematurely declare Arghandab's LDI experience a resounding success, it neverthelessillustrates very clearly how "counterinsurgency from below" can look like, and what it canachieve, in the Afghan context.

ALP: Critical Observations and Recommendations

In the light of the theoretical and empirical discussion presented in the previous sections ofthis paper, we would like to conclude by offering our critical observations andrecommendations in regard to how the ALP might, and could, develop in the future.

The ALP 'Tug of-War': VSP vs. ANAP

The Village Stability Platform (VSP) is a decentralized, bottom-up approach to localstability, where ISAF ODA Teams clear semi-permissive to non-permissive environments,then live amongst the local population to bring security, governance, and development toareas without GIRoA presence. One of the downfalls to VSP is that there is limited, if any,Afghan partnership in executing the program. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police(ANAP) was a hastily assembled, additional police force that the MoI generated in early 2007to answer the shortfalls of security forces against the rise of Taliban in southern Afghanistan.Approximately 9,000 Afghans from six southern provinces were paid, trained (10 days) andequipped by the MoI. These supplementary forces were quickly released into the fight underthe ANP with limited supervision and tenuous connection to shuras, which is the village

governing body. The majority of ANAP personnel just simply deserted or joined theinsurgency, with 3,200 coalescing into the ANP. ANAP is an example of the disaster thatmay occur when local forces are expeditiously assembled through a top-down, bureaucraticapproach.

Our interview with Major General Ahmadzai already gives us a glimpse of what theALP will look like. And it appears that the MoI is currently following a model that is almostidentical to that of the ill-fated ANAP not because they see it as the best strategic approach,

but because it is simply the only method that they are comfortable with, or perhaps the onlyone know to them. ANAP is an example of the disaster that may occur when local forces areexpeditiously assembled through a top-down, bureaucratic approach. In the coming months,as the ALP program is cobbled together, ANAP should be a constant reminder of what the

program should not be.During negotiations over the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program in the coming

months, there will most likely be a tug-of-war, where ISAF will attempt to align theprogram with the Village Stability Platform (VSP), a decentralized, bottom-up approach to


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local security, while the Afghan MOI will look to align the program closer to the failedAfghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) program, a centralized, top-down approach. It isimperative that ISAF pulls the ALP program closer to the VSP methodology in order to forgea successful program.

Partnership and mentorship with Afghan counterparts is not something that onlyhappens at the tactical level. ISAF must remind GIRoA/MOI of the failures of ANAP and

coach them towards taking a more decentralized, bottom-up approach, even if pushing for amore decentralized program stalls the implementation of ALP. It is simply imperative that wehave the right ALP program that works for the Afghan people at the village level.

The Village Stability Platform (VSP) is not perfect and neither are the approaches ofthe MoI towards local security. Hopefully, though, ISAF can coach, teach, and mentorGIRoA about the merits of VSP in order to pull them towards taking a more decentralized,

bottom-up approach to ALP. Negotiations and partnership is all about makingaccommodations and compromising with the other party. I strongly believe that ISAF andGIRoA can come to an accommodation and agreement to work the program as partners inorder to bring effective local security to the Afghan people.

The Role of the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI)

Apparently, the MoI intends to take exclusive management of this program. To repeat whatMajor General Ahmadzai stated in our interview: "ISAF will have no direct contact withALP." This is disturbing given the MoI's poor track record on managing the ANAP and theAP3, especially in regard to vetting and payment of salaries. Moreover, "where the informalarmed groups have been considered a relative success, this was usually in large part...due totheir close relations with adequately trained and experienced international [i.e. SpecialForces] military forces."74 At this moment in their development, it is highly unlikely that theANP has the military capability to clear "non-permissive environments" in preparation forinducing an ALP initiative in local settings. Local populations will simply not compromisethemselves by resisting insurgents if there is not a credible force to back them upimmediately when the insurgents come to burst through the gates.

At this stage of the counterinsurgency campaign, ISAF cannot completely rely onAfghan capacity to execute such an important program like the ALP. The opportunity issimply too precious to be lost. On the other hand, ISAF cannot go at it alone, without Afghanknowledge and an Afghan face to the program. Instead, we need an effective ALP programrelying on partnered ISAF-ANSF oversight to rapidly seize the momentum and cripple theinsurgency.

The time-consuming bureaucratic burdenadministration, training, logistics, etc.

that is in store for the MoI in running this program is also an important point to consider.(The MoI has already experienced this with the ANAP.) Indeed, the MoI already has itshands full in trying to correct the problems and inefficiencies within the ANP, withoutneeding to take on board yet more problems and responsibilities that come along withadministering a local police force. The government must be careful not to worsen morale inthe national police, as what happened during the ANAP experience. The combination oflimited supervisory capacity and lack of enthusiasm for the idea of local police forces withinthe MOI may lead to GIRoA slow playing the program, intentionally or not. UncheckedMOI supervision of the program could lead to missing out on tactical and strategicopportunities to use the ALP to reverse the momentum of the insurgency. The best way toaddress these grounded concerns, therefore, is to ensure that ALP program is supervised and

developed by ISAF, with tacit partnered supervision by the MoI, even if MoI is the one that is'publicly' seen to be supervising the program.

The MoI serving as the paymaster for the ALP program bring the danger of repeatingthe mistakes of the ANAP and AP3 initiatives. Since the United States will initially be


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In a perfect world, the number of ALPs members should be mission dependent (orMETT-T). But since we operate in Afghanistan, a cap on the total number of ALPs isnecessary in order to assuage President Karzai and the Afghan Government's inherent fear ofmilitias. We would approximate, though, that the number of ALP members needed in orderto achieve a crippling blow to the insurgencys momentum should more realistically besomewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 men. Therefore, in order to arrive at the requisite

numbers, we recommend three courses of action:

1. Clarify with GIRoA that the 10,000 ALP figure does not include individuals alreadycurrently involved in ongoing initiatives, like the Village Stability Platform (VSP);

2. ISAF units partnered with ANSF units should urgently implement the ALP programunder current GIRoA limitations in order to demonstrate (and widely publicise) earlysuccess so as to encourage further expansion of the program;

3. Each Regional Command (RC), spearheaded by Special Forces, should conduct anALP assessment to determine a wish list of ALP locations and numbers of ALP

personnel. The assessments should give ISAF Headquarters greater fidelity betweenthe optimal number of ALPs and the acceptable number of ALPs by GIRoA.Somewhere in between those two figures is the reasonable number of ALPs to make aCOIN-effective program.

ALP Training, Recruitment, and Uniforms

We must not forget that the main task of Afghan Local Police (ALP) members is to protecttheir own communities, and to mitigate Taliban safe havens in rural villages by helping tosolve the identification and ubiquity problems that regular COIN forces encounter at the localsetting. As such, they do not require the formal, extensive training that GIRoA is proposingfor the program. Working together with ANA Commandos and assisted by conventionalsecurity forces, it should be the Special Forces that provide basic training in marksmanship,communications, deterrent patrolling, and the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Indeed, SpecialForces already have substantial experience in training local defense forces (LDFs); thisshould carry over to the training of ALP. ALP training should be done on-the-job, and bespecific to the local culture and the social environment in which village they will beoperating. In terms of supplies, Hesco barriers, radios, better weapons, and sufficient

provisions are about all they really need to carry out their work. If GIRoA and ISAF wish toseize the opportunity and the apparent growing momentum of anti-Taliban resistance, then

they do not have the luxury of immersing ALP recruits in four weeks of training while thebattle for Kandahar rages on. What the Taliban should face in the coming months is a hardfight against ANSF and ISAF forces; then, when they retreat to rural villages expecting torecuperate and obtain logistical support from an acquiescent population, they will instead findthemselves staring down the barrel of a gun, courtesy of the ALP program.

Selection of possible ALP sites should follow the three clear and simple criteria usedby Special Forces field commanders in Arghandab. If current conditions do not seem to fitthe selection criteria, then creative field commanders will need to investigate and to assesswhether it is possible to exogenously 'shape' current conditions. This should not be done in atop-down fashion, but in conjunction with attempts to get elements of the population involvedin grassroots efforts at reshaping local conditions. While it is true that every setting, every

village, every population has its own complex characteristics which makes it "unrealistic tothink that [one] model can simply be replicated in other areas,"75 it is also true thatindividuals are not slaves to social structures and cultural traditions. Individuals can, and do,change their social-cultural conditions in a variety of creative ways, when it is in their interest


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to do so; the trick for the outsider, however, is to find ways to facilitate social change in amanner that is acceptable to the people that one is dealing with.

It is important for the effectiveness and integrity of the ALP program that recruits to alocal ALP force truly come from that community, and are known to the inhabitants. Nobodyfights harder to protect a family than a member of that family. The appointment of localcommanders should be left to the elders to decide in shura, in order to avoid the top-down

mistakes that we presented examples of, above. Indeed, it is only the community membersthemselves who can solve the 'identification problem,' so long as the ALP does not turn into ahuge gang of individuals both from inside and outside the community. As much as possiblelocal elders should always be consulted on ALP matters. Furthermore, to keep the ALPsystem from stagnating, regular meetings should be held with local elders and authorities atleast up to the district level.

Besides providing training, ISAF Special Forces and ANA commandos should provide a 'rapid reaction' force that is embedded within every district where the ALPfunctions, with the capacity to provide immediate fire support when required. In turn, a

population organized into ALPs will be the protective defensive barrier against insurgentambush and attack for the rapid reaction team. Do not build walls between yourselves and

the people. The people will protect you. The people are your wall against the insurgents,was the guidance issued by an AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) commander to histroops on Jolo island.76 And it worked.

After the AFP ground force commander issued the above guidance to his troops, theymoved to occupy a previously Abu Sayyaf Group controlled village on Jolo Island.They built no walls or fortifications between themselves and the people they weresupposed to protect. This instantly built rapport and trust between the villagers and thetroops. As the troops moved down a dirt road towards the nearby beach to pick upsupplies they were stopped by one of the villagers. The troops were told about daisy-chained 81mm mortar rounds with a pressure detonation device that was left behind

by the ASG to inflict damage on the AFP troops. The force protection measureworked.

In ethnically heterogenous districts, one might consider forming elite groups of ALPwhose members are drawn from the various ethnic groups living in the district, just like theComandos Especiales of Peru. This might be a way of diffusing inter-ethnic competitionaround ALP projects, while at the same timecreating or strengthening bridging socialcapital between various villages. Over time,such elite ALP teams could also take over the

tasks from Special Forces of helping to trainnew ALP recruits. Most importantly, theycan be the vanguard that keeps the generalwill to resist the Taliban high, thus ensuringthat the ALP movement does not succumb toorganizational inertia.

As we have seen in the case examplesof Peru's Comits de Autodefensa y

Desarrollo, and the Sons of Iraq, uniformsare symbolically important for irregulardefence forces; for it gives members a sense

of corporate identity, pride, and respect.Therefore, some type of uniform is a likely agood idea in order to distinguish the ALPfrom the enemy. According to Special

Figure 6: LDF uniform in Zer-e-ko valley.

A model for the ALP?


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Forces personnel and local Afghans, there is a general opinion in rural communities that localdefense volunteers do not want to be specifically associated with the police. To force recruitsto dress up in uniforms that look very similar to the police might even turn off local villagemen and elders from the program. During the time one of the authors of this paper wasembedded with an ODA team in the Zer-e-ko valley, he observed what locals regarded as an'appropriate uniform' for the local defense forces. This uniform consisted of traditional

Afghan garbs in different colors to differentiate separate LDF sections, with a Romannumeral on the right shoulder (see Figure 6). In so far as they do not look like outsiders, thetraditional Afghan garb keeps t

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Counterinsurgency From Below