REDEFINING AGGRESSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY

Derrick J. Gonzales

INTL498

Professor Jimenez

August 26, 2014

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Setting The Stage

The American military invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks

of September 11, 2001 set a precedent in which an entire terrorist organization was targeted. The

United States decreed that any and all supporters of Al Qaeda, including various other

international terrorist organizations, would become targets as well. Not only did the United

States prioritize the capture or killing of Osama Bin Laden, it also focused on destabilizing Al

Qaeda by eliminating its support structure.1 This new strategy would force military planners to

utilize operational measures which would not only destroy the Taliban’s capacity to conduct

military operations, but also its own systemic support apparatus by turning the Afghan people

against them. However, once routed, the Taliban still maintained a significant presence in

southern Afghanistan, and – with help from Pakistan – continued to attack American and NATO

forces. The subsequent insurgency required a comprehensive response, which the United States

haphazardly employed with varying degrees of success. Unfortunately, the outcome of the

counterinsurgency campaign suffered from a glaring misunderstanding of a local necessity: to

convince the Afghan people to prefer American forces over the Taliban. Ultimately, this

viewpoint persevered for several years and made very little headway. Instead, the United States

should have prioritized their assistance toward alienating the insurgents rather than piecemeal

gestures intended to highlight democratic values and American superiority.

The battle for Afghanistan was never going to be an easy one for America. Once the

reality of the Al Qaeda attacks set in, the United States declared its intention to invade

Afghanistan, search for Bin Laden, and remove the Taliban. However, the presidential

administration (and for all intents and purposes the public as well) felt it necessary to conduct

1 George Friedman, America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 133.

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military operations as soon as possible. This left very little time to collect intelligence, analyze

circumstances, forecast outcomes, and then respond accordingly. For the most part, much of the

American intelligence community had very little knowledge of the area since the collapse of the

Soviet Union. Even its topographical analyses were hampered by substandard maps that had not

seen the light of day since the Soviet invasion.2 The fact that the United States was able to

liberate Afghanistan in such a short time-frame is hard to believe, considering the lack of

conventional military forces and a newfound reliance on information technology.

Once substantial combat ended, however, the new objective revolved around building up

critical infrastructure in Afghanistan, imparting democratic values, and fortifying its national

security apparatus. Before an insurgency ever began, America was implementing

counterinsurgency tactics. The problem was, however, that the United States tried to do this from

a top-down approach, rather than a bottom-up one that included liaising with the local warlords

and tribal chiefs. Instead of taking the approach of T.E. Lawrence, the United States incorrectly

compared the Afghan people to that of a Western nation.3

Operation Iraqi Freedom followed a similar post-combat model. The difference, however,

was less about tribal allegiances than it was about religious fundamentalism. The Sunni and

Shi’a sects of Islam are about as disparate as Arabs, Persians, and Afghans. Finding a way to

collaborate with all of them without enhancing historic rivalries was the true test of the American

military in Iraq and it should have utilized counterinsurgency tactics from the outset, not several

years after the insurgency was in full swing. Beyond the search for weapons of mass destruction

2 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 369-70.3 More commonly referred to as Lawrence of Arabia, T.E. Lawrence was a Middle East archeologist who understood traditional Arabian and Islamic idiosyncrasies, which became invaluable to preventing the Ottomans from overrunning the Levant and Mesopotamia during World War I [Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action & Counterintelligence 6th Edition (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 169.]

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(which involves a propensity of intelligence operatives and specialized tactical units), there was

very little population interaction taking place. In hindsight, several special operations officers

viewed such an oversight as a grave mistake. Without being involved with groups that were

resistant to Islamic fundamentalism, terrorists, or remnants of the Iraqi Army, the generals

conclude, it was impossible to understand and meet the needs of the locals.4

Eventually, the American occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq started to show more signs

of counterinsurgency – both on the ground and in the Intelligence Community. Several new

commanders began to emphasize the use of forward operating bases to facilitate cooperation

between allied forces and the population. Additionally, during the search for Bin Laden in

Afghanistan, military commanders realized their glowing lack of credible human intelligence and

restructured how information was gathered, analyzed, and disseminated. This allowed troops to

be more interactive while on patrols, and gave ground commanders virtual real-time intelligence.

As a result, technical collection assets became more user-friendly and combatant commanders

became more confident in the Army’s ability to counteract Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or the

Sunni/Shi’a insurgents.

The results of this new approach were immediate. Local villagers found that they could

exist without relying on the Taliban or Al Qaeda, the new Iraqi and Afghan governments gained

more confidence, and allied casualties dropped dramatically. Overall, the switch from a

conventional occupation to counterinsurgency became a determining factor for the outcome of

each war. In the end, through the bravery and sacrifice of American and NATO soldiers, as well

as Afghan and Iraqi community leaders and police, the denizens of both nations began a new

4 Or rather, “to first understand them within the context of the operational environment, and then to take meaningful action to effectively influence human behavior toward a desired outcome” [Charles T. Cleveland & Stuart L. Farris, “Toward Strategic Landpower,” The Journal of International Security Affairs no. 25 (2013), 97.]

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decade with an incredible sense of control and responsibility. Counterinsurgency, then, suddenly

became “the most discussed, lauded, and influential military doctrine in generations.”5

One crucial factor is missing from this equation, however, and that is just how effective

United States and NATO forces were in overcoming the opposition. As history has shown, most

conflicts end in large body counts or occupations, whereas the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had

small body counts, followed by ad hoc occupations. In essence, such successes are more tactical

than strategic; they accomplished their initial goals (toppling the fundamentalist and dictatorial

regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively), but have yet to do so with the more long-term

objectives (regional stability through governments willing to hunt terrorists). The reason why is

simple. The United States maintains superiority in tactical military force, but it fails to sustain a

sliver of parity strategically. That is, America can rout the Taliban and Iraqi armies, but it cannot

create change in Islamic countries without the tacit support of local populations. Hence, the

success of the counterinsurgency campaigns conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan were because of

the local populations’ efforts, and not because of America’s might.

A British Boggle

In understanding the value that indigenous mindsets and morale plays during an active

counterinsurgency campaign, it makes sense to analyze historical examples and determine the

true influence of military assistance in countering foes. During the American Revolution, the

British Empire followed the same conceptual framework as did the United States with the

occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. And much like America, the British had tertiary tactical

objectives that were more easily defined and attainable than its overall strategic goal. In other

words, Britain considered its American colonies as a source of vast raw materials, full of

5 Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency (New York: The New Press, 2013), 2.

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Englishmen who would gladly toil endlessly in their fields just to have the fruits of their labors

shipped overseas to be enjoyed by the King and his subjects.6 Much like America using the

Afghan people in hunting Al Qaeda, the British used the American colonists to help expand their

empire. And just like the United States adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would take several

years before London was obligated to introduce a strategic counterinsurgency campaign.

One might think that seeking to seduce a group of people who are similar in virtually

every regard was simple, but it is important to recognize the disconnection between those in the

colonies and in Britain. The imposition of taxes carried with it varying degrees of resentment,

combined with the disposition of London elites versus American socialites, had the effect of

alienating a constituency of fellows – regardless of their familial, genealogic, or historical

lineages. The British Empire was struggling, and the ruling classes in London thought it fair to

have the colonists pay for much of the war debt incurred against the French and Native

Americans. Unfortunately for Britain, by this time cries for independence were fervently making

their rounds. It would seem that the American elites understood the immense value of their

natural resources and wanted to trade internationally. To some degree, then, we can view the

American Revolution as a conflict between British royals who wanted to take advantage of what

the colonies had to offer, and American academics who understood the immense geopolitical

influence their position attributed to them. For sure, it would seem that the average colonist was

stuck in the middle. Much like the Afghans and Iraqis who just tried to survive day-to-day, and

were caught between two competing forces: the Americans and the Taliban/Al

Qaeda/fundamentalists, respectively.

6 Dave R. Palmer, George Washington’s Military Genius (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2012), 31.

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The British military strategy against the colonists began similarly to the United States’

strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Taking control of population centers was the overarching

objective, and was intended to decentralize the American resistance and control trade. The

British were obsessed with the cities of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. However, the

colonies were already decentralized, so the capture of one or a number of these cities did not

have the effect that London had hoped for. The de facto federalism employed by the different

colonies did not allow such strategic success. The loss of New York, for example, did little to

degrade the revolutionary zeal of the colonists. Indeed, Philadelphia was a grander target but

because of its isolation it held no significant tactical advantage.7 The control of cities was the

traditional way of waging warfare in Europe, and the British assumed that such tactics would

lead to success in America.

Once the British realized that there was no quick end to the conflict, they began to

consider the validity of population control. Being in possession of New York, the British could

ingratiate themselves with the locals and rely on information gained from loyalists and special

agents. This was a conundrum for Britain, whose military superiority was hardly a result of tricks

and double-dealing; however, they felt it necessary given the unique circumstances of the

colonies.8 For one, the use of espionage was essential to defeating the revolution. Most British

military officers had grown up fighting in Europe, and were disgusted by the colonists’ use of

unconventional tactics and irregular warfare. It was important that they gain a foothold with the

colonists and seek information regarding arms caches and the location of revolutionary leaders.

7 Ibid., 47.8 Brian Kilmeade & Don Yaeger, George Washington’s Secret Six: The Spy Ring That Saved the American Revolution (New York: Sentinel, 2013), 69.

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This, however, was easier said than done. British occupiers were constantly being

accused of abusing local populations and taking advantage of their positions.9 Instead of

alienating the revolutionaries, the British proved that eroding the public’s trust can have dire

consequences. George Washington’s spy network was integral to the success of the Continental

Army, and a crucial aspect of its effectiveness was the network’s ability to collect intelligence

from British officials. Washington’s knowledge of British intentions explains just how effective

colonial spies were, and how out of touch the British espionage program was. There was a stark

difference between the two armies’ intelligence sources: the British were consistently limited to

information gleamed from the upper echelon, while the Americans took advantage of

information collected from the lesser class.10 This disproportion in the quality of intelligence

would ultimate deceive the British several years later.11

The failure of the British to properly conduct a counterinsurgency campaign against the

American colonists ultimately determined the outcome of the war. For starters, the American

Revolution relied on very few colonists taking up arms. In this regard the British missed a golden

opportunity by not trying to coerce the poor and destitute of the colonies into resisting the calls

for independence. If it had done so, it is very unlikely that the patriots would have been able to

sustain any measure of engagement against the British. The lack of a support system would have

been devastating to the patriot cause.

Additionally, British forces failed to take advantage of the Continental Army, who were

no strangers to abusing local populations as well. Much of what the English did to patriot 9 Daniel Marston, The American Revolution 1774-1783 (New York: Routledge, 2013), 79.10 Kilmeade & Yaeger, 135.11 Needing to keep the British forces from marching south, Washington utilized his spy network by spreading misinformation about a supposed colonist attack on New York. This information was accepted by Britain’s leadership who maintained a garrison in the north, allowing a mixed American/French force to march on Yorktown [Timothy Walton, Challenges In Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 57-8.]

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sympathizers was copied by the Continentals against loyalists and pacifists.12 If the British had

sought to empathize with the abused peoples, instead of replicating the abuses, their intelligence

collection process would have been more refined and effectual. However, they brutalized the

denizens of the cities they occupied, often quartering themselves against the wishes of

homeowners and dolling out public lashings for those who resisted.13

The sad truth concerning Britain’s position in the colonies is that, regardless of which

tactics and strategies were employed to alienate the Patriots, its victory was hardly ever within

reach. For the most part, the British Army was fortunate to face so few partisans and

revolutionaries. Even if it could have turned the population against the Continental Army, the

necessary promises made by Britain would have gone unresolved. Having a coherent

counterinsurgency plan relies on quick turnaround from what is needed to what is provided. On

average, English ships would take six months to travel round-trip between London and New

York.14 This situation was further exacerbated by the British Empire’s worldwide struggle

against other rivals, and in particular France, who redefined the conflict once allying with the

Americans.

Conclusively, the British Army missed several instances which could have shaped the

outcome in its favor. Britain’s ultimate goal was not to destroy the population, but to subjugate

the revolutionaries and keep trade flowing. It required its vast resources and needed to maintain a

foothold in North America to prevent further Spanish and French incursions. But its predicament

was impossible to change. Any insurgency in this situation would have been successful as long

as it had the support of the local population. The only distinct chance the British had for success

12 Marston, 80.13 Kilmeade & Yaeger, 75.14 Palmer, 30.

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would have been to turn the population against the revolutionaries. In turn, this could have

influenced France’s decision to ally itself with the Patriots. In doing so, Britain could have

prevented the threat of a comparable naval force allied with an indigenous (and constantly

recruiting) land force.

A Setback In South Asia

For two decades the United States and its allies sought to pacify the French Indochina

region of communist insurgents, often killing innocent civilians in the process. What was

initially a shadow war fought between intelligence operatives and guerrillas slowly developed

into open conflict in which tens of thousands of troops deployed. In keeping with traditional

American military doctrine (whose foundation lies with the European brand of warfare), the

American response was blatantly conventional. General William Westmoreland believed that

overwhelming firepower would limit the enemy’s ability to fight and sap the will of the North

Vietnamese.15 Westmoreland would be proven wrong, and not because his approach was not

effective, but because the concept of counterinsurgency took place much too late and much too

constrained. If the American military initiated conflict with the purpose of turning the population

against the communists, then it would have been much easier to effectively conduct the search-

and-destroy missions it became infamous for. Ultimately, more civilian lives would have been

saved and the outcome of the war could have had a different result.

Any objective analysis of American intelligence use in Vietnam should emphasize the

lack, thereof, of intelligence that was intended to convince the population that the communists

were the true enemy. Indeed, before official United States military operations commenced there

was very little intelligence success within Vietnam. One glaring example looks humane and

15 Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, no. 2 (March/April 2013), 110.

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courageous on the surface, but with further investigation is riddled with flaws. The Central

Intelligence Agency was tasked with transporting Vietnamese citizens from the North to the

South, which it did very well. Overall, over six-hundred thousand people were relocated to South

Vietnam. This huge humanitarian exploit should be enough to count as a success; however, the

operation failed to recognize the tens of thousands of enemy intelligence operatives located

within the refugee group.16 Needless to say, any such counterinsurgency campaign would have

been difficult to achieve with even a marginal amount of success when the population is littered

with communist operatives.

An unfortunate side-effect of the lack of cohesion between the American forces and the

civilian population was the large casualty numbers of both entities. Fighting a guerrilla war

undoubtedly has a negative impact on the surrounding populous, and similarly, competently

fighting an insurgency against a people that are dissimilar to American forces is near impossible.

Which is why the locals should always be considered force multipliers in any counterinsurgency.

They know the local cultural sensitivities, they know the most likely ambush areas, and they

speak the language and understand how the insurgents think. Furthermore, if convinced to

actively take up arms against the insurgents, indigenous forces can often create a stunningly

large military advantage for the military. Such was true of the Montagnard tribes of Vietnam

who were so effective at countering the Viet Cong.

To its credit, the United States did attempt to offer incentives for the local populace to

turn against the communists. Most notably, financial and agricultural aid was provided to the

government of South Vietnam to assist with developments intended to project its power.17 The

problem with this approach was how the money was spent and who truly was served by it. A

16 Joseph J. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA (New York: MJF Books, 2001), 330.17 Gentile, 115.

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proper counterinsurgency campaign deploys special advisors or military personnel to small

villages or towns were insurgent doctrine is most likely to be influential. However, the assistance

supplied was being used to shore up the political clout of the South Vietnamese presidency. As a

result, the communists continued to make progress with the poorest Vietnamese, and American

casualties continued to climb.

Over several years, however, American forces would learn to adjust their operations so

they would be more conducive to influencing the locals. They realized their lack of awareness

with historic Vietnamese tradition, and focused on understanding their language and their

culture. Special operations units would move into villages, train the locals to fight the insurgents,

teach them advanced agricultural techniques, and lay the foundation for civic responsibility and

service.18 Such an approach had the characteristics of a genuine counterinsurgency campaign,

and the results were much more accommodating to the American Congress and a public who

were fed up with the deaths of young draftees and the lack of tangible progress.

Fighting the Vietnamese in Vietnam with a conventional force built to fight on the open

plains of Europe was a strategic failure that affected every tactical maneuver and operation

throughout the course of the war. Even when counterinsurgency did take hold, it was being

conducted through conventional means. Like trying to sew with a sword, the American military

in Vietnam was too big, too bulky, and too destructive. Instead of conducting counterinsurgency

operations in the aftermath of death and despair, the cause of democracy would have been better

served by, at the very least, including Vietnamese groups in the decision processes leading up to

military action.

18 Walton, 150.

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Additionally, from an intelligence standpoint, the Vietnamese were ill-served by an

American intelligence community that failed to do is research before committing itself. Initially,

the main objective was to fight secular communism with proselytizing capitalism. Washington,

D.C. invoked the will of the Vatican over a country in which the majority of its inhabitants were

practicing Buddhists.19 The United States flaked on a golden opportunity to alienate the

insurgency who were already discriminating and abusing Buddhist adherents. If it had coopted

such a large group, it would have been able to conduct humanitarian assistance and military

action with a higher degree of efficacy. Unfortunately, America was unable to do so and fought a

disastrous war against an entrenched enemy that held advantages of terrain and population

control. The United States would have been better served by taking a lesson from the Soviet

invasion of Finland during World War II.20

An Afghan Accident

The previously used examples are intended to showcase the difficulty of conducting

counterinsurgency that focuses only on the advantages of supporting government forces. In both

the American colonies and Vietnam the indigenous populations had virtually no prior structure

that would independently influence support for or against either party. In response, the British

and Americans focused on shoring up central governmental control, focusing on large population

centers and emanating out from there. More recently, however, the insurgency in Afghanistan,

and to a lesser degree in Iraq, was not concentrated in the larger cities. It was built around the

tribal nature of disparate Afghan ethnicities and their traditional frontier lifestyles. It was such

19 Trento, 332.20 Another haphazardly conducted invasion by conventional forces against an enemy with the advantage of unconventional terrain and skirmishing, when all was said and done – though victorious – the Soviet Army casualties equated to over 400,000 killed and wounded. This lesson, though ignored by the Americans in Vietnam, was used to remarkable effect by Germany during its invasion of the Soviet Union [Alexander Swanston & Malcolm Swanston, The Historical Atlas of World War II (New York: Chartwell Books, Inc., 2008), 43.]

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historical legacy that allowed the Taliban to take control of the south; eventually pushing

resistance forces to the north. But Afghan military tradition has never focused on occupations or

the control of cities; it has always revolved around the mobile warfare that accompanies such

arduous terrain. Hence, battling the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan became inherently

reliant on America’s cooperation with the local population who could offer insight and

intelligence to enemy positions.

The beginning of military operations in Afghanistan could not have gone any better for

the United States. A massive aerial bombardment and cooptation of Tajik and Pashtun resistance

movements was too much for the Taliban to handle. In response, they retreated from their cities

and took up defensive positions in the countryside and villages. Based upon a network of tribal

relations, Taliban forces were able to disrupt several American and NATO attempts to eradicate

them. However, it would only be a matter of time before the Taliban was pushed out of the

country. Unfortunately, the United States did not have a plan in place for this eventuality. It

never came to Afghanistan with a plan for occupation, but it did realize the potential of using

Afghan cities as bases to hunt Al Qaeda from.21 This mistake would haunt the American effort to

pacify the Taliban because it prevented counterinsurgency tactics from being effective until

several years later.

The quintessential goal of counterinsurgency is to win the hearts and minds of the people

who support the insurgents. By turning them against an opponent, it becomes extremely difficult

to maintain any semblance of resistance. The Taliban was a repressive regime from its outset, so

the ability of the United States to cooperate with the locals should have been easy. However, the

American intelligence program in Afghanistan had become stillborn since the 1980s. Contacts

21 Friedman, 134.

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and networks developed during the Soviet invasion by the United States were eventually

discarded as the world became more unipolar. By the time of the American invasion, the only

personnel with contacts within the resistance movements had been out of government for years,

and the collection managers had very little human intelligence experience. In a society that

emphasizes community and tradition, the collection of intelligence on the ground was of the

utmost importance, and America was severely lacking in its ability to do so. If it had this

capability at the outset it would have been easier to influence the local population against the

Taliban, as well as convince them that it would be better in the long run to assist the Americans

and liberate Afghanistan from the fundamentalism that had taken over in the past decade.

The true heroes in the Afghan insurgency were not American generals or policies, but the

Afghans themselves. They felt the strain on a personal level: in their villages and mosques.

Success relied more on village elders and communities taking responsibility for their own safety

and security, and less about the humanitarian aid and airstrikes NATO could provide. Unlike the

British who failed to utilize poor and unemployed American colonists, the Afghan Local Police

program instituted a community-based security apparatus in which unemployed Afghans were

given training and a stipend to protect their towns and villages.22 With assistance from American

and NATO troops, the Afghan police began to push back against the Taliban, who had

continuously and brutally murdered community leaders in an attempt to control the population.

This example shows how military support can be used within counterinsurgency to great effect;

however, the actual turn of the population relies more on the ill effects of the insurgents rather

than the piles of cash or specialized training American forces brought to bear.

22 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 2014), 274.

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In the end, the Taliban were defeated by the Afghan people who were fed up with their

brutality. Combined with necessary counterinsurgency operations, such as the focus on civic

duty, the Taliban was losing heart and fearful that the nation was turning against it. Indeed, after

the 2004 elections, many in the Taliban were prepared to surrender due to the lack of public

support.23 The resulting effects of the public denouncement of the Taliban were effective in

allowing the central government in Kabul to solidify its foundation and enhance infrastructure

improvement. The Americans in Vietnam tried to accomplish this in reverse by giving aid to an

ill-prepared government instead of assisting the public directly. The lesson to be learned from

this is that no government can operate without public support, and the counterinsurgency in

Afghanistan only began to show improvements after the public chose to support the government.

Fortifying the Foundation

Throughout the military history of the United States one thing is certain: grand strategy is

ever-changing. What worked in Vietnam may not have worked in Afghanistan. What worked in

the American colonies may not have worked in Iraq. The counterinsurgency tactics used against

the Americans during the revolution was unique to the situation at hand. They could not have

been properly utilized in any of the modern wars. Additionally, the American public is unwilling

to send their young men and women to fight and die in exotic locales for undefined objectives or

goals. The Global War on Terror is yet another example of insurgencies dictating the strategy of

the United States military.

Since the end of World War II insurgencies have had a lifespan of roughly a decade.24

With the lack of nation-versus-nation warfare since the collapse of the Soviet Union, virtually all

conflicts have involved insurgencies. Unfortunately, it would seem that the United States has yet 23 Rumsfeld, 682.24 Boot, 113.

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to learn its lesson, and the proof lies with the current struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The lack

of an emphasis on the importance of connecting with the local populations directly lead to the

power and potency of the insurgencies. The quick military victories in both theaters once again

proved the might of America, but the subsequent occupation and institutionalization has yet to

show lasting improvements.

Before engaging in combat with the colonists, the British were in possession of the

greatest military of the time. However, there were several failings in the years that led up to the

revolution which prevented them from understanding just how crucial population control would

become. First of all, the British hierarchy was ignorant of the mentality that influenced the

colonists to revolt. No British administrator had ever been to the colonies to see first-hand how

the people lived.25 This misunderstanding would eventually influence their operational decisions

and have a disadvantageous effect on British military efficiency and morale. British military

operations were inherently dysfunctional because of the lack of colonial understanding: military

leaders continuously underestimated the strength of the colonists.26 This misunderstanding could

have easily been avoided if the British had attempted to turn the population against the Patriots.

Another historic example of counterinsurgency in action was the Malay Emergency in

which ethnic Chinese conducted a communist insurgency in the British colony of Malay. This

time around, at least, the British came prepared. The inclusion of a specialized military force to

ingratiate themselves with the population turned the tides against the communists, and the

Special Air Service became the seminal counterinsurgency model that the United States would

eventually follow in Vietnam. The lessons learned in Malay should have been properly employed

in every counterinsurgency since then, however, it would seem that the United States would only

25 Palmer, 38.26 Ibid., 49.

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utilize them after many years of stalemates and high casualty numbers. It was in Malay that the

British truly understood the advantage of coopting the local population, believing that living with

the locals, recognizing their cultural sensitivities and taking advantage of their innate knowledge

of the surrounding areas was the turning point in the conflict. In essence, by showing the local

population a willingness to endure what it endured – “germs and all”27 – they would, in fact, have

a greater connection with friendly forces than with the insurgents who only wanted to use them

for recruiting, sustenance, and entertainment.

In conclusion, every insurgency that the United States has been a part of has been unique

in its makeup, direction, and ideology; however, the same basic strategy to counterinsurgencies

continues to be employed. Unfortunately, this strategy is more reactive than is required when

battling indigenous forces. Additionally, the international support that modern insurgencies

receive make disruption more difficult – which is why it is so important to emphasize to the

locals, not only the advantages of assisting friendly forces, but the disadvantages of continuing to

help the enemy.

During the American Revolution, the colonists received support from the French. The

British should have tried to convince the population that they were more English than French,

and that a Patriot victory will undoubtedly increase France’s influence over them. In Vietnam,

the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong received assistance from Russia and China. The

United States should have used such knowledge to highlight the lack of an indigenous nature of

the insurgency, showing the population just how out of control they really were. This could have

assisted American forces in preventing the use of Laos and Cambodia as supply routes into

South Vietnam by involving those populations as well and discussing the violation of

27 Peter Dickens, SAS: Secret War in South-East Asia (New York: Ivy Books/Ballantine Books, 1983/1992), 29.

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sovereignty that the communists were perpetrating against them. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was

being supported by Pakistan. In Iraq, the Sunni and Shi’a militant groups would often receive

assistance from the likes of Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. To combat these groups, the United States

should reinforce the idea of a sovereign Iraq and Afghanistan that was free of external meddling.

This means, however, that America will have to set the example by being less involved in the

internal politics of the nation, but it should maintain its intelligence and political contacts with

the hopes of continuing to enhance population control.

The American colonies, Malay, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq all have one thing in

common: the people were the most important factor in counterinsurgency. By employing them

against the insurgents, a friendly force dramatically increases its chances of success, as well as

dramatically reducing casualties at the same time. However, coopting a people involves more

than just throwing millions of dollars at the problem. It requires policies that involve the general

public in national decision making, solidifying security in all regards, and providing

infrastructure to those people who are the most oppressed. By utilizing counterinsurgency during

an occupation, a friendly force is inherently willing to maintain such a posture for a substantial

amount of time as no insurgency ends quickly. To do so, these forces must be willing to deploy

forces into the heartlands of nations and attempt to influence its people away from desperation

and cruelty. By highlighting the negative aspects of the insurgents, counterinsurgency becomes

increasingly more effective once additional aid is provided. As journalist Carlotta Gall concludes

about the role that the population plays:

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…connect the people to the government by providing security and basic

assistance; and then turn that connection into an enduring relationship so the people see their

future with the government, not with the insurgents.28

28 Gall, 115.

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Bibliography

Boot, Max. “The Evolution of Irregular War.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 92, no. 2 (March/April

2013): 100-114.

Cleveland, Charles T., and Stuart L. Farris. “Toward Strategic Landpower.” The Journal of

International Security Affairs no. 25 (2013): 95-99.

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