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Heirs of Eduardo Simon (Petitioner) vsElvin Chan and Court of Appeals (Respondent)GR.NO. 157547February 23, 2011Facts:In 11 July 1997 the City Prosecutor of Manila filed acriminal case in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila charging Eduardo Simon of violatingBP22.Sometime in December 1996, Simon issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank check with adeclared amount of P336,000. The accuse did not have sufficient fund in his account to fund thecheck he issued, contrary to the information he had given to the respondent. Despite noticeinsufficiency of his account

s funds, the petitioner failed to pay the respondent the value of the check within 5 days afterreceiving the notice.Three years later on 3 August 2000, Elvin Chan commenced in the MTC inPasay City a Civil Action for the collection of the principal amount of P 336,000.00.On 17 August

2000, Simon filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to change plaintiff

s attachmnent bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia asa consequence of thependency of another action between parties for the same cause.The plaintiff countered theargument of Simon by pointing out he did not make any allegation as to the exact amount of hisclaim in the criminal case, consitituting an implied right to initiate civil action. The Plaintiff alsocited Rule 111 Section 2, exception to file separate civil action during the pendency of a criminalcase under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the CCP. The case falls underArt. 33 of the CCP.On23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay City granted Simon

s urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to charge plaintiff

s attachment bond for damages. On 31 July 2001, the RTC of Pasay City upheld MCTC

s dismissal of Chan

s initiated Civil Case.Chan appealed to the CA by petition for review with the following issue;Whetheror not the RTC erred in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia.The CAoverturened the decision of the RTC with following legal basis; Though the CA recognized thatcivil case cannot anymore initiated following the filling of a criminal case, the following case fallsunder the exception under Rule 111 sec. 2. The case remanded to the trial court for furtherproceedings.Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition for review.Issue/Issues:1.Whether or not Chan

s Civil action to recover the amount of the bounced check as an independent civil action.2.Whether or not new Supreme Court circular pertaining to BP22 can be appliedretroactively.Ruling:The SC set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June25, 2002. Furthermore, the SC reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by theMetropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and noreservation to file such civil action separatelyshall be allowed or recognized.The aforequotedprovisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No.915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonethelessapplicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactiveapplication of procedural lawsdoes not violate any right of a person who may feel adverselyaffected, nor isit constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule,novested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made toapply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation,considering that no party to an action hasa vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do notretroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what isrequired at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would beunconstitutional for being ex post facto under the ConstitutionFurthermore, for litis pendentia to

be successfully invoked as a bar toan action, the concurrence of the following requisites isnecessary, namely: (a)there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the sameinterest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, thereliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity inthe two cases should be such thatthe judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amountto res judicata in respect ofthe other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of theexistence ofthe third becomes nil.A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No.275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, theparties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil CaseNo. 915-00, thatis, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information inCriminal Case No. 275381 andthe complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both allegedthat Simon had issued Landbank Check No.

0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to

cash,

thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts uponwhich the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgmentrendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan wouldbe recovering twice upon thesame claim.It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay Cityproperly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decisiondated October23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN396 SCRA 443

Facts:Petitioner Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the legal

counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime 2000, petitioner received on its behalfa donation in the amount of Php 200M through Chavit Singson. Petitioner received the donationworth the Foundations account. In 2000, Chavit Singson publicly accused President Estrada andhis family members and friends of engaging in several illegal activities which triggered the filingwith the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the petitioner, JosephEstrada and his son.

On April 4, 2001, Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan Informations against theformer president, one of which, for plunder. No bail was recommended for the provisionalrelease of all the accused including the petitioner. The case was raffled to a special divisionwhich was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. On 25 April 2001, Sandiganbayanissued a resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for theaccused. Arraignment was set on 27 January 2001. In the meantime, petitioner filed withSandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for bail, which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.

Petitioners co-accused Jinggoy Estrada filed a motion alleging that he was entitle to bail as amatter of right.

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, theprosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27schedule. However, Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an orderdeclaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard BEFORE petitioners arraignment on27 June. On June 1, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner aswell as all the other accused during the hearing on the petitioner for bail considering that underSection 8, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence adduced during thehearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.

The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may becommenced because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The people further

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stress the it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he filed a petition for bail and if hepleads guilty, then there would be no need for him to file said petition. It is also the contention ofthe people that it is only during arraignment that the accused is informed of the precise chargeagainst him. He must then be arraign first prior to bail hearings to prevent him from late onassailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of thecharge considering that under section 8 of Rule 114, evidence presented during bail hearings arereproduce in the trial. Arraignment before bail hearings also diminished the possibility ofaccuseds flight since trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has beenarraigned.

However, the bail hearing again did not proceed because the petitioner filed with theinformation a motion to quash the amended information on the grounds that as against him, the

amended information does not allege a combination of series of over or criminal acts constitutiveof plunder. According to the prosecution, the motion to quash the amended information wasantithetical to his petition for bail.

Petitioner also prays for the issuance of habeas corpus.Issues:

(a) W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bailmay be conducted.

(b) W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during thependency of his petition for bail.

(c) W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is mandatory(d) W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling:(a) Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered therebyrendering the issue of whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings inthe petitioners case moot. Nonetheless, the court held that arraignment of an accused is not a

pre-requisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition forbail as soon as he is deprived of his of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.

In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is authorized, bail should begranted before arraignment otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion toquash. However, this pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petitionfor bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of hisliberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived ofliberty even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The case of Lavides must beunderstood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as amotion to quash. Hence, in that case, the court held that to condition the grant of bail to anaccused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he had to choose betweenfiling a motion to quash and thus delay his petition for bail and forgoing the filing of the motion toquash so that he can be arraign at once ad therefore be released on bail. Such would underminethe constitutional right of the accused.

When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior

to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies that an application for bail in a case involving anoffense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused isarraigned. Sandiganbayan therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excessof jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of hispetition for bail.(b) Court dins no inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his

filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for the release of the person in custody ofthe law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validityof a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit of law. These towrelied have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. However, it is true thatif a motion to quash a criminal complaint or information on the ground that the same does not

charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released,the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.(c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to have his petition for

bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearing might be converted into a full blowntrial. Prosecution on the other hand claims that joint hearings will save the court form having tohear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidences. There is noprovision in the Rules of Court governing the hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed bydifferent accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial ofthe case against the other accused. The matter should be addressed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court. In the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account notonly the convenience of the state, including the prosecution but also that of the petitioner and the

witnesses.In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or bail hearing, the

court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receivingand considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of thehearing which is early to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court doesnot try the merits or enter into the inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidenceagainst the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further suchevidence as has reference to substantial matters. In the case at bar, the case against formerPresident Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the formerpresident in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding assumes completelydifferent dimension. The proceeding will no longer be summary since the proceedings will be fullblown which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. The joinder of the petitioners bail willbe prejudicial to the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right ofpetitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn againcommitted a grave abuse of discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition

for bail with the trial of the case against former president.

(d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is charged with acapital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under Section 8 of rule 114, there must be ashowing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong forthe court to grant him bail., thus, upon an application for bail, by the person charged with acapital offense, a hearing must be conducted where the prosecution has the burden of showingthat the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt is strong, bailbecomes a matter of right, which is not so in the case at bar.

In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted ny the courts even when theperson concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. The writ maybe issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid under the lad had not later becomeinvalid. However, there is no basis fir the issuance of the writ in the case at bar. The general ruleis that the writ does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in thecustody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issued the same

applied, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest. Petitioner in factvoluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities.EDWARD S. SERAPIO, pet i t ioner , vs . HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES

FACTS;Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing theresolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail.

The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the LegalCounsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established inFebruary 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and

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underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advancestudies of young Muslim educators and scientists.

Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf adonation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur GovernorLuis Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner receivedthe donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundations treasurer who later deposited itin the Foundations account with the Equitable PCI Bank.

. During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecutionmoved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued anorder declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment

on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed theirrespective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception ofevidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may beconducted.HELD:The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition forbail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of hisarrest or voluntary surrender(Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCAD 369) . an accused need notwait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. In Lavides vs. CA, 324 SCRA 321, it washeld that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise theaccused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. This pronouncement should beunderstood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a

motion to quash the informations filed against him. It was explained that to condition the grant ofbail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choosebetween: (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motionto quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held; and (2) foregoing the filing of a motionto quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This wouldundermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint orinformation sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not necessarythat an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. Forwhen bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior toarraignment .

LAVIDES VS CAG.R. 129670February 1, 2000FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for childabuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing forstrongerdeterrence and special protection against child abuse,exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties foritsviolation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without awarrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the

police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant LorelieSan Miguel reported to the police tha ttheir daughter, then 16years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignationthat night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel inDiliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time thepolice received reports ofpetitioners activities.When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him withLorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and anunderwear,whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of thearresting officers, whichwere submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art.III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 wasfiled against petitioner.petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause; (2) For theImmediate Releaseof the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful WarrantlessArrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as aMatter of Right underthe Law on Which He is Charged

.nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, andbythree other minor childrenNo bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separateapplications for bail in thenine cases.TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the rightto post bail in theamount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 forall the cases under thefollowing conditions:a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiverof appearance during the trial of these cases.He shalland must always be present at thehearings of these cases;b)In the event that he shall not be able todo so, his bail bonds shall be automaticallycancelled and forfeited, warrants forhisarrest shall be immediately issued and thecases shall proceed to trial in absentia;c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; andd)Approval of the bail bonds shall be madeonly after the arraignment to enable thisCourt to immediately acquirejurisdictionover the accused

;Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him.Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial courttosuspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed amotion in which he prayed that the amounts of bailbonds bereduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be doneprior to his arraignment.the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitionersmotions toreduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspendarraignment. Accordingly, petitioner wasarraigned during whichhe pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then orderedhim released upon posting bailbonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 orderand the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trialconference was set on June 7, 1997.The Court of Appealsdeclared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the groundthat the issuehad become moot and academic. Petitioner takesissue with the Court of Appeals with respect to itstreatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court whichmakes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void andthat his

arraignment was also invalid because it was heldpursuant to such invalid condition.ISSUE: WON the condition is voidand the arraignment invalid.HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise theaccusedmay be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if theinformation is quashed and the case isdismissed, there wouldthen be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the secondplace, the trial court couldensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering hispresence at any stage ofthe proceedings, such as arraignment.Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions ofbail is that "the accused shall appear before theproper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"whileunder Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at thearraignment is requiredto condition the grant ofbail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choosebetween (1) filing amotion to quash and thus delay his releaseon bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, hisarraignmentcannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of amotion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once andthereafter bereleased on bail. These scenarios certainlyundermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put ontrial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient tocharge him with a crime and his right to bail.The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997

that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is validand is inaccordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail underRule 114, 2(c) is that "The fai lure of theaccused to appear at thetrial without justification despite due notice to him or hisbondsman shall be deemed anexpress waiver of his right to bepresent on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shallproceedin absentia." JjscArt. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trialsin absentiaallows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certainstages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at

arraignment and plea,whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenevernecessary for identification purposes, and(c) at the promulgationof sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case theaccused may appearby counsel or representative. At such stagesof the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot bewaived.IT

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DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OFPETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID.Contrary topetitioners contention, thearraignment did not emanate fromthe invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall bemade only after thearraignment." Even without such a condition,the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum,although thecondition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid,his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him arevalid.

Lily Lim v Kou Co Ping a.k.a Charlie CoGr. No. 175256 and Gr. No. 179160 August 23, 2012Principle: A single act or omission that cause damage to an offended party may gave rise totwo separate civil liabilities on the part of theoffender

(1)civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100of the Revised PenalCode and (2) independent civil liabili ty, that is civil liability that maybe pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. Theindependent civil liability may be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omissioncomplained of as felony. It may alsobe based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treatedindependently from the criminal action byspecific provision of the Article 33 of the CivilCode.Facts:FR Cement Corporation issued several withdrawal authorities for the account ofcement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement andTigerbilt. Each withdrawal authority containedprovision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked byFRCCMarketing Department.Filcement and Tigerbilt sold their withdrawal authorities to Co.On February Co then sold thesewithdrwal authorities to Lim. Using the withdrawal authoritiesLim withdrew cement bags from FRCC on a staggred basis. Sometimein April 1999, FRCC didnot allow Lim to withdraw the remianign bags covered by the withdrwal authorities. Lim clarifiedthe matterwith Co and administrative manager of Fil-Cement, who explained that the plant

implemented a price increase and would onlyrelease th goods once Lim pays the price diffrenceor agrees to receive lesser quantity of cement.Lim filed case of Estafa throughMisappropriation orConversion against Co. The Regional Trial Court acquitted Co.After the trial on the civil aspect ofthe criminalcase the court also found Co not civilly liable.Lim sought a reconsideration which theregional trial Court denied. On March 14, 2005 Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civilaspect ofthe criminal case.On April 19, 2005 Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damagesbefore the RTC.Issue:Whether or not there is no forum shopping for a private complainant topursue a civil complaint for specific performance anddamages while appealing the judgement onthe civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?Ruling: A single act or omission that cause damageto an offended party may gave rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of theoffender(1)civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100of the Revised PenalCode and (2) independent civil liability, that is civil liability that maybe pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. Theindependent civil liability may be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as

felony. It may alsobe based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treatedindependently from the criminal action byspecific provision of the Article 33 of the CivilCode.Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,

jurisprudence holds that the offended party maypursue two types of civil liabi lities simultaneouslyor cummulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentiaor res

judicata.The criminal cases of estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action forcollection is anchored on culpa contractual.The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, ithaving been insituted together with criminal action. On the other hand, thesecond action, judgingby the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from contractual obligationand fortortious conduct.The Civil Case involves only the obligation arising from contratc and from

tort, whereas the appeal in the stafa case involves onlythe civil obligations of Co arising from theoffense charged.

FITZGERLADAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; October 27, 2006NATUREPet i t ion for Rev iew on Cert iorar i assai l ing theresolut ion of CA which grantedthe Motion for bail of accused-appellant and herein respondent VictorKeith Fitzgerald.FACTS- An in fo rm at i on wa s f i le d in th e RT C ch ar gi ng Fitzgerald, an Aust ralian ci tizen,with the violation of Art.III Sec 5, pa r (a ), s ubpar (5) of R A 761 03statingthat, said Fitzgerald, actuated by lust, and by the use of drugs wil l ful ly,unlawfully and feloniouslyinduced complainant AAA, a minor, 13 years of age,to engage in prost itut ion by then and thereshowering said AAA with gif ts,clothe s an d foo dand there after having carnal knowle dge of her inviolation of theaforesaid law and to her damage andprejud ice.RTC rendered a decision finding respondent Guiltyof S e c 5 , p a r ( a ) ,

s u b p a r ( 5 ) of R A 7 6 1 0 a n d sentenced to an indeterminate term of prisionmayormin (8Y 1D) to prision temporal max (17Y 4M1D).U p o n c o m p l e t i o n o f h i s s e n t e n c e , h e s h a l l b e deportedimmediately and forever barred from entryto the Philippines. He was acquitted on thecase o f rape . O n t he bas is o f t he ev i den ce add uce d, t he cour t considered theview that the the circumstancesof the accused indicate a probability of flight and thatthere isundue risk that the accused may commit asimilar offense, if released on bail pendingappeal.- On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction, modifyingthe penalty to imprisonmentof prision temporal (14Y8M 1D) to reclusion perpetua (20Y 1D)- Fitzgerald filed for aMotion for a New Trial and asupplemental appeal to the motion on thegro und t h a t n e w m a t e r i a l o f e v i d e n c e n o t p r e v i o u s l y a vail abl ehas surf aced. CA granted t he motion f o rnew t r i a l . The or i g in a lrec ord s o f t he cas e wereremanded t o t he RTC, wh ich was a lso d i rec tedtorece ive new evide nce. The motion to transf er therespondent to the NationalPenitentiary was denied.- T h ep e o p l e f i l e a M F R , w h i l e F i t z g e r a l d f i l e d a M o ti on t o f i x b ai l w it hManifestation. Both motionswere denied by CA. The bail application wasdeniedpursu ant t o S ec . 7 Ru l e 114 RO C. The max i mum pena l ty imposab lein accordance w i th RA 7610 i s rec lu s io n per pe t ua andt h e e vi d e nc e o f g u i l t i s strong.- The people filed a petition fro review on certiorari. Itwasdismissed which became final and executory.-F i t z g e r a l d f i l e d w i t h C A a M o t i o n f o r E a r l y T r a n s m i t t a l o f t

h e R e c o r d s a n d f o r t h e R e - Examination of the Penalty Imposed and aMotion forBail. CA issued the assailed resolution granting bail.It stated that although the evidenceof guilt is strong,Fitzgerald is of old age and not in the best of health.Bail was granted premisednot on the grounds statedin the motion for bail, but on substantial justice andconsidering new trialwas granted in the case.- RTC ordered Fitzgeralds temporary re lease uponfiling a cashbond of P100 000.00.Petitioners Claim> People filed this petition to annul the CA Resolutionarguing that the CA erred in granting theMotion forBail despite the crime charged was punishableb yr e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a a n d t h e e v i d e n c e o f g u i l t i s s trong.Plaintiffs Claim

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> th e gr an t for ne w t r ai l ne ga te d th e pr ev io us findings of the existence of s trongevidence ofguilt. T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r o v i s i o n a l r e l e a s e i s o n humanitariangrounds, citing his deteriorating healthand old age.ISSUES1. WON CA had jurisdiction over the motion to postbail after issuing the resolutiongranting new trial2. WON CA erred in allowing bailHELD1. (the ruling on this matter is limited to this specificcas e) Whe n the SC gra nts new tri al, itv ac at es t he j u d g m e n t o f t h e T C c o n v i c t i n g t h e a c c u s e d a n d r e ma n ds t hecase to the TC for recept ion of newly-

d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e a n d p r o m u l g a t i o n o f a n e w judgment.-H o w e v e r , w h e n C A g r a n t s n e w t r i a l , notwithstanding

Sec1 Rule 125 ROC providing for theuniformity of the procedure between the SC and CA,CAmay decide questions of fact and of law. When itgrants a new trial pursuant to Sec14 Rule 124ROC, itmay either a) receive the new evidence under Sec 12o r b ) r e f e r t h e c a s et o t h e c o u r t o f o r i g i n f o r r e ce pt io n o f s uc h e vi d en c e u n de r S ec 1 5. ineithercase, it does not relinquish to the TC jurisdiction overthe case. It retains sufficient authorityto resolve theincidents in the case and decide its merits.- E ve n w he n C A r em an de d t hecase t o t he TC, CA re ta ine d app e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . CA re t a in ed i t s author ityto act on the respondents bail application.2. The right to bail emanates from the right tobepresumed innocent. It is accorded to a person inthec u s t o d y o f l a w w h o m a y b y r e a s o n o f t h e presumptionof innocence he enjoys,

b e a ll ow ed p r o v i s i o n a l l i b e r t y u p o n f i l i n g o f a s e c u r i t y t o g u a r a n t e e h i s app ea ra nc e be fo re an y co ur t, as required under specific conditions.- Bail is a matter

of right to an accused personincus to dy for an of f en se not pu ni sh ab le by dea th , reclus ion perpetua or l ifeimprisonment, but a matterof discretion on the part of the court, concerning onefacing anaccusation for an offense punishable bydeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonmentwhenevidence of guilt is strong.4- RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of theexistence of strong evidence of guilt. UnderSec 6(b)Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows forreceptiono f n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e , b u t m a i n t a i n s e v id e n ce a l r ea dy pr es en te d or on re co rd . In th epresent case, no new evidence had beenintroducednegating the earlier findings of the RTC and CA. Bail4Sec 4 and 5 Rule 114 ROC, and Sec 13 Art III 1987 Constiwas not a matter of right but a mere privilege subjectto the discretion of CA.- However, the CAadmitted that the bail was basedon health reasons disregarding the substantive andprocedural

requirements on bail.- CA made no specific findings that the respondentsufferedfro m an ail men t of suc h gra vity tha t his continued confinement during trial willpermanentlyimpair his health or put his life in danger.- M ore over , the re is find ing onthe record on thepotent ial r isk of respondent committ ing a similaroffense.Dispositivep e t i t i o n i s g r a n t e d a n d t h e C A r e so lu ti on a nn ul le d a nd s et a si de . T heba il bondpos t ed i s can ce l led . L e t an o rd er o f a r r es t i s su eagainst the personof the accused.

PEOPLE v LAGON185 SCRA 442FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990

LAGON:FACTS-On July 7 1976 a criminal act ion was f i led with theCity Court of Roxas chargingLagon with estafa forallegedly issuing a P4,232 check as payment forgoodsknowing she had insuff icient funds. Howeveron Dec. 2, as the trial commenced,the City Courtdismissed the information on the ground that thepenalty prescribed bylaw for estafa was beyond thecourt s authority to impose. Hence this pet it ion forreview.ISSUE

WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the caseHELDNO- I t is sett led doctrine that jurisdict ion of a court incriminal law mattersi s de te rmined by t he law ine f f ec t a t t he t im e o f t hec om m e n c e m e n t o f t h e criminal action and not the law in effect at the timeof thecommission of the offense charged.-U n d e r S e c 8 7 o f t h e J u d i c i a r y A c t o f 1 9 4 8 , municipal judgesin the capitals of provinces andsub-provinces and judges of city courts shallha ve like jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged withan off en se wi th in th ei rrespect ive jurisdict ions,inwhi ch pe na l t ie s pr ov i de d do no t ex ce ed pr is io ncorrecc ional or fines noexceeding P6,000 or both. -A t th e t i me of th e co mm is s i on of th ecr im e, th eimposable penal ty under Art 315 of the RPCwasarresto mayor in i ts maximum per iod to pr is ioncorrecc ional i t is minimumperiod, fal ling well withinth e ju ri sd ic t i on of th e Ci ty Co ur t.

B u t w h e n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d , P D 8 1 8 h a d i n c r e a s e d t h e i mp os ab lepenalty to prision mayor in its mediumperiod.-The real question raised by petitioner iswhether thesaid doctrine disregards the rule against retroactivityof penal laws. It has beenrep eat edl y hel d tha t incriminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determinedby wha t may bemeted out to the offender in aftertrial but by the extent of the penalty which thelawimposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by theCourt inw h i c h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s f i l e d , i t i s r e t a i n e d r ega rd le ss of whether the evidence proves a lesseroffense which carries a penalty that wouldotherwisefall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.-In the instant case, should the informationbe refi ledw i t h t he RTC, t he cou r t may no ti m p o s e a m o r e o n e r o u s p e n a l t y u p o n L a g o n . A l t h o u g h t h e R T C r e t a i n ssubject-matter jurisdiction to try and decidethe refiled case under PD 818, given the date ofthecommission of the crime (before effect ivity ofPD 8 1 8 ) , t h e l o w e r p e n a l t y p r o v i d e d i n A r t 3 1 5 ( oth er wi se wi th in th e

ju ri sd ic ti on of th e Ci ty Co ur t) should be imposed.

DispositiveWH ERE FOR E, th e C ou rt re so lv ed to DENY the peti tion