PEOPLE VS SALVADORFacts:

On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his Toyota Prado and drove out of the Coliseums parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car while behind was a Toyota Hi-Ace van. Upon reaching Imelda Avenue, the Hi-Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was about to follow suit, but the Hi-Ace suddenly stopped and blocked the Civic. Six men with long firearms alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey approached the Civic, which was just about two to two and a half meters away from Albert,pointed their guns at the driver, who turned out to be Pinky,and motioned for her to step out of the car and ride the Hi-Ace. Two men ran after the "watch-your-car" boy in a nearby parking lot, but Albert no longer noticed if the two still returned to the Hi-Ace.Roger and Robert came near the Prado and gestured for Albert to likewise alight from the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace.

When Albert rode the Hi-Ace, he saw Marcelo in the drivers seat and beside him was Ricky. Morey was behind the driver. So too were Jubert. Roger and Robert rode the Hi-Ace after Albert did. Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made to wear dark sunglasses. The men took Alberts wallet containing PhP 9,000.00, his drivers license and other documents. They also took his Patek Philippe watch which costs PhP 400,000.00. He was ordered to write a letter to his wife informing her that he was abducted and indicating therein the names of persons from whom she could borrow money to be paid to the accused-appellants as ransom. Albert remembered having stayed in the basement until the early hours of April 12, 2002.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Ruling:

The instant appeal lacks merit. The CA correctly found that the essential elements comprising the crime of kidnapping for ransom were present and that the accused- appellants conspired in its commission.

People v. Uyboco,enumerated the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom, viz:

In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were indicted for forcibly abducting Albert, are all private individuals. Albert was taken on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six days, during which period, threats to kill him and demand for ransom were made.PEOPLE VS BALDOGOFacts:

The accused Gonzalo Baldogo and Edgar Bermas who were both serving time for the crime Murder at the Iwahig Penal Colony, were employed as domestic helpers by Julio Camacho Sr. One evening while their master was away, they killed his son Jorge and kidnapped his daughter Julie whom they took to the mountains and detained her for more than five days. They saw uniformed men looking for Julie. However, accused-appellant hid Julie behind the tree.She wanted to shout but he covered her mouth. Baguio left Julie in the mountains to fend for herself.Julie went tothe lowlands & there she asked for help.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and kidnapping.

Ruling:

The trial court convicted accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659.41The trial court is correct. There is no evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by accused-appellant and Bermas before he was killed. The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable only if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the kidnapping or serious illegal detention. In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously held that the killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery. Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.

As for kidnapping, in this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from her house through force and dragged to the mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of accused-appellant and Bermas. She was prevented from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently then, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining Julie.BALEROS VS POEPLEFacts:

Early morning of Dec. 13, 1991, Malou was awakened by a smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled to break free but his attacker was pinning her down, holding her tightly. When her right hand finally got free, she grabbed and squeezed the sex organ of his attacker. The man let her go, enabling Marilou to seek help from her maid and classmates living nearby.

Renato Baleros, Jr. moved for a partial reconsideration of a SC decision acquitting him of the crime of attempted rape but adjudging him guilty of light coercion. It is Baleros' submission that his conviction for light coercion under an Information for attempted rape, runs counter to the en banc ruling in People v. Contreras where the Court held: The SOLGEN contends that Contreras should be held liable for unjust vexation under Art. 287(2) of the RPC. However, the elements of unjust vexation do not form part of the crime of rape as defined in Art. 335. Moreover, the circumstances stated in the information do not constitute the elements of the said crime. Contreras, therefore, cannot be convicted of unjust vexation.

Issues:1. Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

2. Whether or not the accused is guilty of unjust vexation.

Held:

1. Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. The appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Yes. He argues that the Information against him does not allege that the act of covering the face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and disturbance. The SC wish to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.The paramount question in a prosecution for unjust vexation is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts of the Baleros.PEOPLE VS ASTORGAFacts:

Accused told Yvonne who is was only (8) years old to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused immediately grabbed and hold her hand. Accused placed his hand on her shoulder and covered his mouth. She asked him where they were going and accused answered that they were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction because her grandparent's house is at Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she continued crying. the two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group were suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken.

Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He answered towards Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their destination was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.

When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those who chased knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonne's home.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of kidnapping.

Held:

No. The court agreed with the appellants contention. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellants forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no lock up. It is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move. Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.

Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion orcoaccion gravehas three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.PEOPLE VS CASTILLOFacts:

On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of Mr. and Mrs. Luis De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F. Paraaque, Metro Manila. In the morning of said date, Femie, another housemaid of the Cebreros and Barias relative, bathed and dressed up Rocky, the couples six year old son and afterwards advised Baria that someone, who was also a Cebrero househelper, will fetch RockyAt about 8:00 a.m., a tricycle arrived. On board was a woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag Baria assisted Rocky to board the tricycle. The tricycle brought Rocky and the woman, whom Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag, to a nearby "Mcdonalds". Thereat, they were joined by another woman whom Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo. The three proceeded to a house far from the "Mcdonalds" where Rocky slept "four times". On March 2, 1995, at about 7:20 p.m., his phone rang. The caller was a woman telling him, "Bigyan mo ako nang isang million", to which he replied, "Hindi ko kayang ibigay ang isang million". The caller told Luis that she will call back later on. Luis Cebrero received a telephone call and instructed Luis Cebrero to be in Paco, Obando, Bulacan, alone. Luis Cebrero received another call on that same night instructing him to stop in front of the Farmacia Dilag and walk on the street beside it going to a chapel and to drop the money on the chapels terrace. A car arrived and stopped in front of the chapel. The man alighted and placed a bag in front of the chapel and immediately left (p. 10,supra). After about forty (40) minutes, two women appeared, proceeded to where the bag was dropped. On seeing the bag, the women laughed and left. After about two (2) minutes, the two women returned, picked up the bag and immediately left.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of kidnapping and serious Illegal detention.

Ruling:

We affirm the trial courts judgment convicting Castillo. However, we acquit her co-accused Padayhag.

To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,the prosecution must establish the following: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer.

Unshaken by rigorous cross-examination, Rockys testimony would have been more than enough to convict Castillo. The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.

Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them, was not harmed, and was even cared for during his detention. This argument is pointless. The essence of kidnapping is deprivation of liberty. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly.Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor.MARZALADO VS PEOPLEFacts:

Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by Luz Marzalado, the mother of herein petitioner, Salvador Marzalado, Jr. Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano. Judgment was rendered against Albano, who was ordered to vacate the leased premises and to pay the unpaid rentals. Albano appealed to the RTC. During the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply of the unit was cut off due to non-payment of bills. As a result, Albano transferred her children to her father's house, four houses away, leaving a maid to sleep in the unit. Albano claims that she went to her unit. She noticed that the lead pipe she used to hang clothes to dry was missing. When she returned the following day, she discovered the padlock of the main door changed, preventing her from entering the premises. She went to see petitioner but he was not around. Albano again returned to her unit. She peeked through the window jalousies and saw that the place was already empty. She immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials, who in turn, advised her to go to the police. Thereafter, she filed a complaint for grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling and theft against petitioner. Albano tried to see the accused, but again failed. This time she noticed that the roofing of her unit had been removed and the main door locked from the inside. She was informed that Marzalado, Jr., and his female companion took her lead pipe and Marzalado, Jr., took her personal belongings and brought them inside his house.

However, according to petitioner, on November 3, 1993, he was on his way home when he saw water in a continuous stream flowing out of Albano's unit. He then searched for Albano but to no avail. He reported the matter to the barangay officers and asked for two barangay tanods to accompany him to the vacated unit. They went inside the unit where they found an open faucet, with water flooding the floor.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of qualified trespass to dwelling.

Ruling:No. In trespass to dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter's will.

What remains now is the issue of whether the entry of petitioner Marzalado, Jr., was legally justified. We rule that it is, based on the circumstances of this case.

As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet"As Albano herself admitted, she and her children already left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalado, Jr.'s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.

Thus, we find the evidence on record insufficient to hold petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Palpable doubt exists in our mind as to the guilt of petitioner.REYES VS PEOPLEFacts:

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing derogatory remarks against Agustin Hallare.

When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence, Col. Monzon sped away.

The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.

Issue:

Whether or not Reyes is guilty of grave threats and oral defamation.

Ruling:

The fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect."Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.