Crisis Pregnancy Center Ruling, 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

8/13/2019 Crisis Pregnancy Center Ruling, 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

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11-2734-cv (L)

The Evergreen Association, Inc. V. City of New York

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS

FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT

____________________

AugustTerm,2012

(Argued:September14,2012 Decided:January17,2014)

DocketNos.112735cv,112929cv

____________________

THEEVERGREENASSOCIATION,INC.,DBAEXPECTANTMOTHERCARE

PREGNANCYCENTERSEMCFRONTLINEPREGNANCYCENTER,LIFE

CENTEROFNEWYORK,INC.,DBAAAAPREGNANCYPROBLEMS

CENTER,PREGNANCYCARECENTEROFNEWYORK,INCORPORATEDas

CRISISPREGNANCYCENTEROFNEWYORK,aNEWYORK

NOTFORPROFITCORPORATION,BOROPREGNANCYCOUNSELING

CENTER,aNEWYORKNOTFORPROFITCORPORATION,GOOD

COUNSEL,INC.,aNEWJERSEYNOTFORPROFITCORPORATION,

PlaintiffsAppellees,

v.

CITYOFNEWYORK,amunicipalcorporation,MICHAELBLOOMBERG,

MAYOROFNEWYORKCITY,inhisofficialcapacity,JONATHANMINTZ,the

COMMISSIONER

of

the

NEW

YORK

CITY

DEPARTMENT

OF

CONSUMERAFFAIRS,inhisofficialcapacity,

DefendantsAppellants.

____________________

Before:POOLER,WESLEY,andLOHIER,CircuitJudges.

Case: 11-2735 Document: 259-1 Page: 1 01/17/2014 1136388 40

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AppealfromtheJuly13,2011memorandumandorderoftheUnitedStates

DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(WilliamH.PauleyIII,J.)

grantingPlaintiffsAppelleesmotionforapreliminaryinjunctionenjoiningLocal

LawNo.17,whichrequirespregnancyservicescenters,atermdefinedinthelaw,

tomakedisclosuresregardingtheservicesthattheyprovide. Becausethedistrict

courtfoundthatPlaintiffshaddemonstrated,withrespecttotheirFirst

Amendmentclaims,

both

(1)

alikelihood

of

success

on

the

merits

and

(2)

irreparableharm,anditalsoconcludedthatthelawisunconstitutionallyvague,

thecourtenjoinedthestatuteinitsentirety. Onappeal,weconcludethatthelaw

isnotimpermissiblyvague.WealsoconcludethatPlaintiffsfailedto

demonstratealikelihoodofsuccessonthemeritswithrespecttoonechallenged

disclosureprovision,whichrequirespregnancyservicescenterstodiscloseif

theyhavealicensedmedicalprovideronstaff,butthatplaintiffshave

demonstratedalikelihoodofsuccessonthemeritswithrespecttoother

provisionschallengedbyplaintiffsthatrequireotherformsofdisclosureand

impermissiblycompelspeech. Becausetheprovisionsareseverable,however,

wesevertheenjoinedprovisionsfromtherestofLocalLawNo.17. Accordingly,

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thememorandumandorderofthedistrictcourtisAFFIRMEDinpartand

VACATEDinpart,andthiscaseisREMANDEDforfurtherproceedings.

JudgeWesley

concurs

in

part

and

dissents

in

part

in

aseparate

opinion.

____________________

MORDECAINEWMAN,AssistantCorporation

Counsel(MichaelA.Cardozo,CorporationCounsel,

LarryA.Sonnenshein,NicholasCiappetta,Robin

Binder,ofCounsel,onthebrief),CityofNewYork,New

York,NY,forDefendantsAppellants.

JAMESMATTHEWHENDERSON,AmericanCenter

forLaw&Justice,Washington,DC(Cecilia,N.Heil,

ErikM.Zimmerman,CarlyF.Gammil,onthebrief),for

PlaintiffsAppelleestheEvergreenAssociationInc.andLife

CenterofNewYork,Inc.

MATTHEWBOWMAN,AllianceDefenseFund,

Washington,DC(M.ToddParker,Moskowitz&Book,

NewYork,

NY,

on

the

brief),

for

Plaintiffs

Appellees

PregnancyCareCenterofNewYork,BoroPregnancy

CounselingCenter,andGoodCounsel,Inc.

KimberlyA.Parker,ZaidA.Zaid,WilmerCutler

PickeringHaleandDorrLLP,Washington,DC,foramici

curiaePlannedParenthoodofNewYorkCity,NARAL

ProChoiceNewYork,NARALProChoiceAmerica,

Community

Healthcare

Network,

Law

Students

forReproductiveJustice,NewYorkAbortionAccessFund,New

YorkCityChapteroftheNationalOrganizationforWomen,

NewYorkCountyChapteroftheNewYorkStateAcademyof

FamilyPhysicians,NewYorkStateAssociationofLicensed

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Midwives,NationalAbortionFederation,NationalAdvocates

forPregnantWomen,NationalLatinaInstitutefor

ReproductiveHealth,PhysiciansforReproductiveChoiceand

Health,PublicHealthAssociationofNewYork,Religious

Coalitionfor

Reproductive

Choice,

Reproductive

Health

AccessProject,SistersongWomenofColorReproductive

JusticeCollective,theHonorable(Congresswoman)Carolyn

Maloney,insupportofDefendantsAppellants.

BrianJ.Kreiswirth,Chair,CommitteeonCivilRights,

TheAssociationoftheBaroftheCityofNewYork,

NewYork,NY,foramicuscuriaeTheAssociationoftheBar

oftheCityofNewYork,insupportofDefendants

Appellants.

PriscillaJ.Smith,JenniferKeighley,TheInformation

SocietyProjectatYaleLawSchool,Brooklyn,NY,

amicuscuriae,insupportofDefendantsAppellants.

MelissaGoodman,AlexisKarteron,ArthurN.

Eisenberg,NewYorkCivilLibertiesUnion,NewYork,

NY,amicuscuriae,insupportofDefendantsAppellants.

DennisJ.Herrera,CityAttorney,DannyChou,Chiefof

Complex&SpecialLitigation,ErinBernstein,Deputy

CityAttorney,SanFrancisco,CA,foramicicuriaeCity

andCountyofSanFrancisco,insupportofDefendants

Appellants.

DeborahJ.Dewart,JusticeandFreedomFund,

Swansboro,

NC,

amicus

curiae,

in

support

of

Plaintiffs

Appellees.

MaileeR.Smith,AmericansUnitedforLife,

Washington,DC,foramicicuriaePregnancyCare

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OrganizationsCareNet,HeartbeatInternational,Inc.,and

NationalInstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocates,insupportof

PlaintiffsAppellees.

NoelJ.

Francisco,

Jones

Day,

Washington,

DC,

for

amicus

curiaeLawProfessorsInSupportofAppellees,insupportof


SamuelB.Casey,DavidB.Waxman,JubileeCampaign

LawofLifeProject,Washington,DC,foramicicuriae,

AmericanAssociationofProLifeObstetriciansand

Gynecologists,TheCatholicMedicalAssociation,andThe

ChristianMedicalandDentalAssociations,insupportof


JohnP.Margand,ScarsdaleNY,foramicuscuriaeDr.

MichaelJ.New,insupportofPlaintiffsAppellees.

Pooler,CircuitJudge:

DefendantsAppellants(collectively,theCity)appealfromtheJuly13,

2011memorandum

and

order

of

the

United

States

District

Court

for

the

Southern

DistrictofNewYork(WilliamH.PauleyIII,J.)grantingPlaintiffsAppellees

(Plaintiffs)motionforapreliminaryinjunctionenjoiningLocalLawNo.17of

theCityofNewYork(LocalLaw17). LocalLaw17,interalia,requires

pregnancy

services

centers,

a

term

defined

in

the

statute,

to

make

certain

disclosuresregardingtheservicesthatthecentersprovide. SeeEvergreenAssn,

Inc.v.CityofNewYork,801F.Supp.2d197,20001(S.D.N.Y.2011). Thedistrict

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courtfoundthatPlaintiffs,providersofvariouspregnancyrelatedservices,

demonstrated,withrespecttotheirFirstAmendmentclaims,both(1)alikelihood

ofsuccess

on

the

merits

and

(2)

irreparable

harm.

See

id.

at

202

09;

see

also

AllianceforOpenSocyIntl,Inc.v.U.S.AgencyforIntlDev.,651F.3d218,230(2d

Cir.2011)(discussingstandardforpreliminaryinjunction),affd133S.Ct.2321

(2013). ThedistrictcourtalsoconcludedthatLocalLaw17isunconstitutionally

vague. Itthereforeenjoinedthestatuteinitsentirety. Onappeal,weconclude

thatthelawisnotimpermissiblyvague.WealsoconcludethatPlaintiffsfailedto

demonstratealikelihoodofsuccessonthemeritswithrespecttooneofthe

challengeddisclosures,whichrequirespregnancyservicescenterstodiscloseif

theyhavealicensedmedicalprovideronstaff,butthatPlaintiffshave

demonstratedalikelihood

of

success

on

the

merits

with

respect

to

other

provisionschallengedbyPlaintiffsthatrequireotherformsofdisclosureand

impermissiblycompelspeech. Becausetheprovisionsareseverable,weseverthe

enjoinedprovisionsfromtherestofLocalLaw17. Accordingly,the

memorandum

and

order

of

the

district

court

is

AFFIRMED

in

part

and

VACATEDinpart,andthiscaseisREMANDEDforfurtherproceedings.

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BACKGROUND

ThiscaseasksustodecidewhethertheNewYorkCityCouncilandMayor

ofNew

York

City

can

impose

requirements

on

pregnancy

services

centers

aimed

atinformingpotentialclientsaboutthecentersandtheservicesthattheyprovide,

ordonotprovide,withoutrunningafouloftheFirstAmendment.1

I. LocalLaw17InMarch2011,theNewYorkCityCouncilpassedandMayorMichael

BloombergsignedintolawLocalLaw17,whichwasscheduledtogointoeffect

onJuly14,2011,andintendedtobecodifiedintheNewYorkCity

AdministrativeCode(AdministrativeCode).2 Thelawimposesonpregnancy

servicescenterscertainconfidentialityrequirementsandmandatorydisclosures.

Onlythe

disclosures

are

at

issue

in

this

case.

Under

the

law,

pregnancy

services

centersmustdisclose

1WepausetonotethatFourthCircuithasrecentlyresolvedappealsona

similarissue. SeeCentroTepeyacv.MontgomeryCnty.,722F.3d184(4thCir.2013)

(afterrehearingenbanc,affirmingthedistrictcourtdecisionpreliminarily

enjoiningonlyoneofthetwochallengeddisclosures);GreaterBalt.Ctr.for

PregnancyConcerns,

Inc.

v.

Mayor

&

City

Council

of

Balt.,

721

F.3d

264

(4th

Cir.

2013)(afterrehearingenbanc,vacatingthedistrictcourtsgrantofplaintiffs

motionforsummaryjudgmentontheirFirstAmendmentchallenge).

2CitationstotheAdministrativeCodearetoLocalLaw17sadditionsto

Chapter5ofTitle20oftheCode,listedinLocalLaw172.

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(1)whetherornottheyhavealicensedmedicalprovideronstaff

whoprovidesordirectlysupervisestheprovisionofallofthe

servicesatsuchpregnancyservicecenter(theStatusDisclosure);

(2)that

the

New

York

City

Department

of

Health

and

Mental

Hygieneencourageswomenwhoareorwhomaybepregnantto

consultwithalicensedprovider(theGovernmentMessage);and

(3)whetherornottheyprovideorprovidereferralsforabortion,

emergencycontraception,orprenatalcare(theServices

Disclosure).

AdministrativeCode20816(a)(e). Theymustprovidetherequireddisclosuresattheirentrancesandwaitingrooms,onadvertisements,andduringtelephone

conversations.3 Id.20816(f). Thelawimposescivilfinesonfacilitiesthat

3Specifically,thestatuteprovidesthatpregnancyservicescentersmust

providethe

disclosures

(1)inwriting,inEnglishandSpanishinasizeandstyleas

determinedinaccordancewithrulespromulgatedbythe

commissioneron(i)atleastonesignconspicuouslypostedinthe

entranceofthepregnancyservicescenter;(ii)atleastoneadditional

signpostedinanyareawhereclientswaittoreceiveservices;and

(iii)inanyadvertisementpromotingtheservicesofsuchpregnancy

servicescenterinclearandprominentlettertypeandinasizeand

styleto

be

determined

in

accordance

with

rules

promulgated

by

the

commissioner;and

(2)orally,whetherbyinpersonortelephonecommunication,upona

clientorprospectiveclientrequestforanyofthefollowingservices:

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violateitsprovisions,anditgivestheCommissionerofConsumerAffairsthe

authoritytoenforcethedisclosurerequirementsbysealingforuptofivedays

anyfacility

that

has

three

or

more

violations

within

two

years.

Id.

20

818(a)

(b).

LocalLaw17definesapregnancyservicescenterasafacility,...the

primarypurposeofwhichistoprovideservicestowomenwhoareormaybe

pregnant,thateither(1)offersobstetricultrasounds,obstetricsonogramsor

prenatalcare;or(2)hastheappearanceofalicensedmedicalfacility. Id.20

815(g). Thelawprovidesanonexclusivelistoffactorsforconsiderationin

determiningwhetherafacilityhastheappearanceoflicensedmedicalfacility.4

(i)abortion;(ii)emergencycontraception;or(iii)prenatalcare.

AdministrativeCode20816(f).

4LocalLaw17statesthat

[a]mongthefactorsthatshallbeconsideredindeterminingwhether

afacilityhastheappearanceofalicensedmedicalfacilityarethe

following:thepregnancyservicescenter(a)offerspregnancytesting

and/orpregnancydiagnosis;(b)hasstafforvolunteerswhowear

medicalattire

or

uniforms;

(c)

contains

one

or

more

examination

tables;(d)containsaprivateorsemiprivateroomorareacontaining

medicalsuppliesand/ormedicalinstruments;(e)hasstaffor

volunteerswhocollecthealthinsuranceinformationfromclients;

and(f)islocatedonthesamepremisesasalicensedmedicalfacility

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Id. Itisprimafacieevidencethatafacilityhastheappearanceofalicensed

medicalfacilityifithastwoormoreofthefactors. Id. Finally,thelawexempts

fromits

provisions

facilities

that

are

licensed

...to

provide

medical

or

pharmaceuticalservicesorhavealicensedmedicalprovideronstaff. Id.

II. NewYorkCityCouncilProceedingsOnOctober13,2010NewYorkCityCouncilMemberJessicaS.Lappin

introducedthebillthatwouldbecomeLocalLaw17,CouncilInt.No.3712010

(Int.No.371),inordertoregulatethepracticesofcrisispregnancycenters

(CPCs), organizationsthatprovidenonmedicalpregnancyservicesandare

opposedtoabortion. TheCouncilsCommitteeonWomensIssuesheldahearingonthebillonNovember16,2010. Atthebeginningofthehearing,

CouncilMember

Julissa

Ferreras,

as

chair

of

the

Committee,

testified

that

the

proposeddisclosureswererequiredbecause[i]fsuchdisclosuresarenotmade,

womenseekingreproductivehealthcaremaybeconfusedand/ormisle[]dby

unclearadvertisingormayunnecessarilydelayprenatalcareorabortion.

Council

Member

Lappin

stated

that

Int.

No.

371

was

about

truth

in

advertising

orproviderorsharesfacilityspacewithalicensedmedicalprovider.

AdministrativeCode20815(g).

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andwomenshealth. TheCommitteethenconsideredtestimonyandwritten

submissionsbothinfavorofandagainstthebill.

TheCommittee

considered

awide

array

of

testimony

in

favor

of

Int.

No.

371sproposeddisclosurerequirements. Severalpeopletestifiedastomisleading

practicesbyCPCs.JoanMalin,PresidentandCEOofPlannedParenthood,

testifiedthatCPCsareoftenintentionallylocatedinproximitytoPlanned

Parenthoodfacilitiesandthattheyoftenusemisleadingnamesandsignage.

MarianaBanzil,theExecutiveDirectoratDr.EmilyWomensHealthCenter,

testifiedaboutaparticularCPCthatwouldparkabusinfrontofherclinic,from

whichtheCPCscounselors,oftenwearingscrubs,wouldofferultrasounds,

harassCenterpatients,tellpatientsthattheCenterwasclosed,oridentify

themselvesas

Center

workers.

Dr.SusanBlank,anAssistantCommissionerattheNewYorkCity

DepartmentofHealthandMentalHygiene,testifiedthatdelayinprenatalcare

decreasesthelikelihoodofahealthypregnancy,delivery,healthynewbornand

mother.

Thats

why

starting

prenatal

care

in

the

first

trimester

is

standard

care

in

obstetricpractice. Shealsonotedthedangersofdelaysinaccesstoabortion

servicesandemergencycontraception.

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ThestafftoldSusanthatsheneededanultrasoundbeforethe

procedure. Thenanotherultrasound. Theyattributedthemultiple

teststouncertaintyabouthowadvancedherpregnancywas.

Becauseofthesedelays,Susanspregnancyprogressedintothethird

trimester.

Susanwas32weekspregnantandstillseekinganabortionwhenshe

consultedmeatourhospitalbasedclinic. Ihadtotellheritwasno

longerpossible:shewasbeyondthelegallimitforabortioninNew

York....[W]henIexaminedSusan,Ifoundhercase

straightforwardonesimpleabdominalultrasoundwouldhave

datedherpregnancyeasily. TheCPChadnomedicalreasonsfor

keepingherwaiting.

JenniferCarnig,DirectorofCommunicationsfortheNewYorkCivilLiberties

Union,discussedherpersonalexperiencemistakenlyenteringaCPC:shefilled

outmedicalhistorypaperwork,gavecontactinformation,andreceiveda

pregnancytestandsonogramfromawomanwearingmedicalscrubs. Kristan

Toth,an

abortion

counselor,

offered

written

testimony

that

some

[of

her

clients]

aresetupforprocedureswithappointments,onlytohavetheseappointments

canceledandrescheduledtimeandtimeagain,inanattempttoprolongthe

processpastapointwhenawomancanhaveaccesstoarealandsafe

abortion

.

.

.

.

Reverend

Dr.

Earl

Kooperkamp

offered

written

testimony

that

he

hadcounseledwomenwhohadsoughtadvicefromCPCsthatwereunableto

discusswiththemthefullrangeofpregnancyoptions. KellinConlin,President

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ofNARALProChoiceNewYork,testifiedandofferedintotherecordacopyofa

NARALReport. Thereport,entitledSheSaidAbortionCausesBreastCancer:

AReport

on

the

Lies,

Manipulations

and

Privacy

Violations

at

Crisis

Pregnancy

Centers,summarizesthefindingsofNARALsinvestigationintoCPCsthrough

websiteanalysis,phonesurvey,inpersonvisits,andreviewofliterature

distributedbyCPCs. ThereportdescribeshowmanyCPCsusemedical

soundingnames,arelocatednearmedicalclinicsandhospitals,provide

pregnancytestingandultrasounds,andrequirepatientstofilloutdetailedforms

solicitingpersonalinformation,allofwhichcreatestheimpressionthattheCPCs

aremedicalfacilities. SeveralcounselorsNARALspokewithgaveincorrect

informationastohowlongawomancanlegallywaitbeforegettinganabortion.

Finally,the

Committee

also

heard

testimony

as

to

how

many

CPCs

solicitedconfidentialmedicalhistoryinformationfromclients.

TestimonywasalsoofferedagainstInt.No.317. ChrisSlattery,the

founderofExpectantMotherCare(EMC),anantiabortionpregnancyclinic,

testified

to

the

work

done

by

EMC

in

counseling

and

providing

care

to

women.

Heconcededthat,attimes,womenconfusedEMCwithaPlannedParenthood

sitelocatedinthesamebuilding,butnotedthatEMCdidnotmislead

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prospectiveclientsaboutthefactthatEMCwasadifferentorganization.

KathleenDooleyPolcha,directoroftheCatholicGuardianSocietyandHome

BureausMaternity

Services

Program,

testified

that

her

organization

informed

prospectiveclientsthattheydidnotprovidemedicalcareoraccesstoabortion,

butbelievedthatcentersshouldnotberequiredtopostdisclosuresigns. Persons

affiliatedwithotherCPCstestifiedabouttheworktheydidcounselingand

helpingwomen;severalnotedthattheirorganizationsclearlyinformedwomen

thattheydonotprovideabortionormedicalcare. Dr.AnneMielnik,aphysician,

testifiedthatCPCsplayavitalroleinhelpingwomen. Shenotedthatshe

consultedwithseveralcenterstoanswermedicalquestionsandprovideurgent

medicalcare. OtherstestifiedtoFirstAmendmentconcerns. Finally,many

peopletestified

in

favor

of

the

services

provided

by

many

CPCs,

offered

concerns

aboutthepotentialhealthrisksofabortion,andwereworriedthatthebillwould

promoteaproabortionagenda.

OnMarch1,2011,theCommitteeonWomensIssuesapprovedInt.No.

371,

and

on

March

2,

2011,

the

full

New

York

City

Council

passed

the

bill.

On

March16,2011,MayorMichaelBloombergsignedthebillintolaw.

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LocalLaw17includesastatementof[l]egislativefindingsandintent.

LocalLaw171. TheNewYorkCityCouncilfoundthatsomepregnancy

servicescenters

engaged

in

deceptive

practices

about

their

services;

that

these

deceptivepracticescouldimpedeordelayconsumeraccesstoreproductive

healthservicesandwronglyleadconsumerstobelievetheyhadreceivedcare

fromalicensedmedicalprovider;andthatexistinglawsdidnotadequately

protectconsumersfromthesedeceptivepractices. Id. Itfurtherfoundthat

[d]elayinaccessingabortionoremergencycontraceptioncreatesincreased

healthrisksandfinancialburdens,andmayeliminateawomens[sic]abilityto

obtain[reproductivehealthservices],severelylimitingherreproductivehealth

options. Id. TheCouncilstatedthatitenactedthelawtoensurethat

consumersin

New

York

City

have

access

to

comprehensive

information

about

andtimelyaccesstoalltypesofreproductivehealthservicesincluding,butnot

limitedto,accuratepregnancydiagnosis,prenatalcare,emergencycontraception

andabortion. Id.

III.The

Plaintiffs

PlaintiffsTheEvergreenAssociation,Inc.(Evergreen),LifeCenterof

NewYork(LifeCenter),PregnancyCareCenterofNewYork(PCCNY),Boro

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PregnancyCounselingCenter(Boro),andGoodCounsel,Inc.(Good

Counsel)arepregnancyservicescentersunderLocalLaw17. Evergreenand

LifeCenter

provide

avariety

of

pregnancy

related

services

including

pregnancy

testing,pregnancycounseling,ultrasounds,andsonograms. PCCNY,Boro,and

GoodCounselalsoprovidepregnancyservices,butdonotprovideultrasounds,

sonograms,orphysicalexaminations. Plaintiffs,withtheexceptionofGood

Counsel,providetheirservicesfreeofcharge. GoodCounsel,whichoffers

servicestopregnantwomenhousedatitsresidentialfacilities,asksresidentsto

passontheirrentsubsidy(ifonpublicassistance)or10%oftheirincome(if

employed). NoneofthePlaintiffsofferorprovidereferralsforabortionor

emergencycontraception.

Plaintiffsmoved

for

apreliminary

injunction

to

prevent

Local

Law

17

from

takingeffect. Theyarguedthatthelawinfringedontheirfreespeechrights

undertheFirstAmendment. InaJune13,2011memorandumandorder,the

districtcourtgrantedthemotion. EvergreenAssn,Inc.,801F.Supp.2dat197.

Defendants

the

City

of

New

York;

Michael

Bloomberg,

Mayor

of

New

York

City,

inhisofficialcapacity;andJonathanMintz,theCommissioneroftheNewYork

CityDepartmentofConsumerAffairs,inhisofficialcapacity,nowappeal.

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DISCUSSION

LocalLaw17requirespregnancyservicescenterstodisclose(1)whetheror

notthey

have

alicensed

medical

provider

on

staff

(the

Status

Disclosure);

(2)

thattheNewYorkCityDepartmentofHealthandMentalHygieneencourages

womenwhoareorwhomaybepregnanttoconsultwithalicensedprovider

(theGovernmentMessage);and(3)whetherornottheyprovideorprovide

referralsforabortion,emergencycontraception,orprenatalcare(theServices

Disclosure). AdministrativeCode20816(a)(e). Thedistrictcourtfoundthat

thesedisclosurerequirementsviolatedPlaintiffsFirstAmendmentrights,

grantedPlaintiffsmotionforapreliminaryinjunction,andenjoinedthelawinits

entirety.

Wereview

the

grant

of

apreliminary

injunction

for

abuse

of

discretion.

Alliance,651F.3dat230.Adistrictcourtabusesitsdiscretionwhen(1)its

decisionrestsonanerroroflaworaclearlyerroneousfactualfinding,or(2)its

decisionthoughnotnecessarilytheproductofalegalerrororaclearly

erroneous

factual

findingcannot

be

located

within

the

range

of

permissible

decisions. Id.(internalquotationmarksandellipsisomitted).

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Ourreviewofthedistrictcourtsdecisionrequiresustoconsiderthe

appropriatelevelofscrutinytoapplytothelaw,whetherPlaintiffshavemet

theirburden

for

apreliminary

injunction,

and

whether

we

must

enjoin

the

statute

initsentiretyduetovagueness. Asdiscussedbelow,wefindthatLocalLaw17

isnotimpermissiblyvague,andthussevertheenjoinedprovisionsfromtherest

ofthelaw.WealsofindthatPlaintiffsfailedtodemonstratealikelihoodof

successonthemeritswithrespecttooneofthechallengeddisclosures.

I. SeveranceandVaguenessLocalLaw17imposesconfidentialityrequirementsthatPlaintiffshavenot

challenged,alongwithseveraldisclosurerequirementsanddefinitional

provisionsthatPlaintiffshavechallengedbutthatmightbeseverableintheevent

theyare

unconstitutional.

We

must,

therefore,

decide

whether

to

sever

any

offendingprovisionsorenjointhelawinitsentirety.Weholdthatanyoffending

provisionsofthestatutethatinfringeonPlaintiffsFirstAmendmentrights

shouldbeseveredfromtherestofthestatute.

Severance

of

a

local

law

is

a

question

of

state

law.

See

Gary

D.

Peake

ExcavatingInc.v.TownBd.ofHancock,93F.3d68,72(2dCir.1996). UnderNew

YorkLaw,acourtshouldrefrainfrominvalidatinganentirestatutewhenonly

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portionsofitareobjectionable. Id.(internalquotationsomitted). Thequestion

isineverycasewhetherthelegislature,ifpartialinvalidityhadbeenforeseen,

wouldhave

wished

the

statute

to

be

enforced

with

the

invalid

part

exscinded,

or

rejectedaltogether. Id.at73. Here,LocalLaw17providesthat

[i]fanysection,subsection,sentence,clause,phraseorotherportion

ofthislocallawis,foranyreason,declaredunconstitutionalor

invalid,inwholeorinpart,byanycourtofcompetentjurisdiction,

suchportionshallbedeemedseverable,andsuch

unconstitutionalityorinvalidityshallnotaffectthevalidityofthe

remainingportions

of

this

local

law,

which

remaining

portions

shall

continueinfullforceandeffect.

LocalLaw173. Althoughthepresenceofaseverabilityclauseisnot

dispositive,thepreferenceforseveranceisparticularlystrongwhenthelaw

containsaseverabilityclause. GaryD.Peake,93F.3dat72(internalquotation

marksand

brackets

omitted).

Here,

we

consider

the

severability

clause

along

withtheCityCouncilsinterestinprovidingconsumeraccesstoinformationand

thepreventionofdeception,seeLocalLaw171,aswellasthestatutes

confidentialityprovisions,enactedtoprotectconsumerspersonalandhealth

information,

which

function

independent

of

the

disclosure

requirements,

see

AdministrativeCode20817.WethinkitclearthattheCityCouncilwould

wishforseverance.

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ThisdoesnotendouranalysisbecausePlaintiffsargue,andthedistrict

courtheld,thatLocalLaw17sdefinitionofthetermpregnancyservices

centersis

impermissibly

vague

and

that,

for

this

reason,

the

entire

statute

shouldbeenjoined. Astatutecanbeimpermissiblyvagueforeitheroftwo

independentreasons. First,ifitfailstoprovidepeopleofordinaryintelligencea

reasonableopportunitytounderstandwhatconductitprohibits. Second,ifit

authorizesorevenencouragesarbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement. Hillv.

Colorado,530U.S.703,732(2000).

LocalLaw17hastwodefinitionsforpregnancyservicescenters. The

firstdefinitionincludesfacilitiesthat,likePlaintiffsEvergreenandLifeCenter,

provideultrasounds,sonograms,orprenatalcare. AdministrativeCode20

815(g).5The

second

definition

includes

other

facilities,

that,

like

Plaintiffs

PCCNY,Boro,andGoodCounsel,donotprovidesuchservices,butthathave

theappearanceofalicensedmedicalfacility. Id.Withregardtothissecond

definition,thelawprovidesthat

5The

parties

do

not

seriously

argue

that

this

first

definition

is

vague

as

appliedtoentitieslikeEvergreenandLifeCenter,whichindisputablyprovideat

leastsomeoftheservicesspecifiedinthestatute.Forthisreason,evenifthe

dissentwererightthattheseconddefinitionisimpermissiblyvagueasappliedto

thePCCNYPlaintiffs,seeDissentat[3n.1],thiswouldnotnecessarilyrequirestrikingtheentirestatuteasopposedtomerelythatseconddefinition.

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[a]mongthefactorsthatshallbeconsideredindeterminingwhethera

facilityhastheappearanceofalicensedmedicalfacilityarethe

following:thepregnancyservicescenter(a)offerspregnancytesting

and/orpregnancydiagnosis;(b)hasstafforvolunteerswhowear

medicalattire

or

uniforms;

(c)

contains

one

or

more

examination

tables;(d)containsaprivateorsemiprivateroomorareacontaining

medicalsuppliesand/ormedicalinstruments;(e)hasstaffor

volunteerswhocollecthealthinsuranceinformationfromclients;

and(f)islocatedonthesamepremisesasalicensedmedicalfacility

orproviderorsharesfacilityspacewithalicensedmedicalprovider.

Id.(emphasisadded). Thelawaddsthatitisprimafacieevidencethatafacility

hasthe

appearance

of

alicensed

medical

facility

if

it

has

two

or

more

of

the

factors. Id. Plaintiffsarguethat,becausethislistoffactorsisnonexclusive,

LocalLaw17bothfailstogivefairnoticetoregulatedfacilitiesandauthorizes

discriminatoryenforcement. Thedistrictcourt,acceptingthissecondargument,

foundthestatutetobevagueandenjoineditinitsentirety.

Wedisagree. ItissignificantthatthedeterminationofLocalLaw17s

applicabilityisnotsolelybyreferencetotheaforementionedfactors. Instead,the

determinationisboundbytherequirementofanappearanceofalicensed

medicalfacility. Thelistedfactors,whilenonexclusive,areobjectivecriteria

thatcabinthedefinitionofappearance. SeeUnitedStatesv.Schneiderman,968

F.2d1564,1568(2dCir.1992)(Theseguidelinestendtominimizethelikelihood

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ofarbitraryenforcementbyprovidingobjectivecriteriaagainstwhichtomeasure

possibleviolationsofthelaw.),abrogatedonothergroundsbyPostersNThings,

Ltd.v.

United

States,

511

U.S.

513,

518

19,

524

n.13

(1994).

In

this

way,

the

statute

differsfromthenonexclusivefactorsatissueinAmidonv.StudentAssociationof

StateUniversityofNewYork,whichwerethesolecriteriaguidingapplicationof

thereferendaatissueandwhichincludedindividualfactorsthatwere

themselvesvagueandpliable. 508F.3d94,104(2dCir.2007). Therequirement

ofanappearanceofalicensedmedicalfacility,combinedwiththelisted

factors,isenoughtogivenoticetoregulatedfacilitiesandcurtailarbitrary

enforcement.

Theuseofnonexclusivefactorsisadmittedlyimprecise,butthe

prohibitionagainst

excessive

vagueness

does

not

invalidate

every

statute

which

areviewingcourtbelievescouldhavebeendraftedwithgreaterprecision. Rose

v.Locke,423U.S.48,49(1975). Manystatuteswillhavesomeinherent

vagueness,forinmostEnglishwordsandphrasestherelurkuncertainties. Id.

at

49

50

(internal

quotation

marks

and

alterations

omitted).

BecausetheNewYorkCityCouncilwouldhavewishedthestatutetobe

enforcedwiththeinvalidpartexscinded,GaryD.Peake,93F.3dat73,and

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becausewefindthatLocalLaw17isnotunconstitutionallyvague,weenjoin

onlytheportionsofthelawthatinfringeonPlaintiffsFirstAmendmentrights.

II. AppropriateLevelofScrutinyThepartiesdisagreeabouttheappropriatelevelofscrutinytoapplyto

LocalLaw17. Bothagreethatthelawcompelsspeech. Plaintiffsurgeusto

applystrictscrutiny. Mandatingspeechthataspeakerwouldnototherwise

makenecessarilyaltersthecontentofthespeech. Rileyv.NatlFed.oftheBlindof

N.C.,Inc.,487U.S.781,795(1988). Wethereforeconsider[lawsmandating

speech]tobecontentbasedregulationssubjecttostrictorexactingscrutiny.

Id.;seealsoTurnerBroad.Sys.v.FCC,512U.S.622,642(1994)(Lawsthatcompel

speakerstoutterordistributespeechbearingaparticularmessagearesubjectto

thesame

rigorous

scrutiny

as

laws

that

suppress,

disadvantage,

or

impose

differentialburdensuponspeechbecauseofitscontent.).

Thereareexceptionstothisgeneralrule,andtheCityanditsamiciput

forthanumberofargumentsastowhyweshouldsubjectLocalLaw17s

compelled

disclosures

to

a

lesser

level

of

scrutiny.

First,

they

point

out

that

a

lesserdegreeofscrutinyappliestocompelleddisclosuresinthecontextof

campaignfinanceregulation,CitizensUnitedv.FEC,558U.S.310,36667(2010),

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theregulationoflicensedphysicians,PlannedParenthoodofSe.Pa.v.Casey,505

U.S.833,884(1992),andcommercialspeech,Zaudererv.OfficeofDisciplinary

Counselof

the

Supreme

Court

of

Ohio,

471

U.S.

626,

650

51

(1985).

From

this,

they

arguethatthedistinctionbetweenprohibitionsonspeechanddisclosure

requirementsshouldbepertinenttoouranalysis,andthatweshouldreview

LocalLaw17underintermediateexactingscrutiny. Doev.Reed,561U.S.186,130

S.Ct.2811,2818(2010). Second,theyarguethatthestatesauthoritytocompel

physicianstoprovideinformationaboutabortion,seeGonzalesv.Carhart,550U.S.

124,157(2007);Casey,505U.S.at884,alsoappliestotheregulationofnon

licensedindividualswhoprovidepregnancyrelatedservices. Finally,theCityarguesthatLocalLaw17regulatescommercialspeech,subjecttoeither

intermediatescrutiny,

see

Cent.

Hudson

Gas

&

Elec.

Corp.

v.

Pub.

Serv.

Comm.

of

N.Y.,447U.S.560,56366(1980),or,ifthelawcompelsdisclosureofpurely

factualanduncontroversialinformation,rationalbasisreview,Zauderer,471

U.S.at651.

The

district

court

considered

and

rejected

all

of

these

arguments.

We

find,

however,thatweneednotdecidetheissue,becauseourconclusionsarethesame

undereitherintermediatescrutiny(whichlookstowhetheralawisnomore

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theburdenimposedbytheregulationinquestion. SeeUnitedStatesv.Playboy

EntmtGrp.,Inc.,529U.S.803,813(2000);Cent.Hudson,447U.S.at566.

Turningto

the

case

at

hand,

we

hold

that

the

district

court

correctly

determinedthatPlaintiffshaveestablishedirreparableharm. Whereaplaintiff

allegesinjuryfromaruleorregulationthatdirectlylimitsspeech,theirreparable

natureoftheharmmaybepresumed. BronxHouseholdofFaithv.Bd.ofEduc.of

CityofN.Y.,331F.3d342,349(2dCir.2003). Mandatingspeechthataspeaker

wouldnototherwisemakenecessarilyaltersthecontentofthespeech. Riley,

487U.S.at795. LocalLaw17,asitcompelsPlaintiffstomakedisclosuresorface

penalties,isclearlyadirectlimitationonspeechthatcreatesapresumptionof

irreparableharm.

Withrespect

to

the

merits,

we

hold

that

the

Citys

interest

in

passing

Local

Law17iscompelling. TheCityhasstatedthatitenactedthestatutetoinform

consumersabouttheservicestheywillreceivefrompregnancyservicescentersin

ordertopreventdelaysinaccesstoreproductivehealthservices. SeeLocalLaw

17

1.

The

City

considered

a

wide

variety

of

testimony

related

to

these

interests,

includingtestimonyandreportsfrommedicalprofessionals,socialworkers,

clergy,andreproductivehealthworkersaboutmisleadingpractices,patient

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experiences,andthedangersofdelayinaccesstoreproductivecare. [T]heState

hasastronginterestinprotectingawomansfreedomtoseeklawfulmedicalor

counselingservices

in

connection

with

her

pregnancy.

Madsen

v.

Womens

HealthCtr.,Inc.,512U.S.753,767(1994);seealsoAm.LifeLeague,Inc.v.Reno,47

F.3d642,656(4thCir.1995)([P]rotect[ing]publichealthbypromoting

unobstructedaccesstoreproductivehealthfacilitiesservessufficiently

compellinggovernmentalinterests.).

Atissueinthiscaseiswhethertherequireddisclosuresaresufficiently

tailoredtotheCitysinterests.Weevaluatetherequireddisclosuresindividually,

beginningwiththeStatusDisclosure.

A. StatusDisclosureThe

Status

Disclosure

requires

pregnancy

services

centers

to

disclose

whetherornottheyhavealicensedmedicalprovideronstaffwhoprovidesor

directlysupervisestheprovisionofalloftheservicesatsuchpregnancyservices

center. AdministrativeCode 20816(b).Wedisagreewiththedistrictcourt

and

hold

that

the

Status

Disclosure

survives

review

under

strict

scrutiny.

Understrictscrutiny,thechallengedregulationmustbenarrowlytailored

topromoteacompellingGovernmentinterest. PlayboyEntmt,529U.S.at813.

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Thestatutemustusetheleastrestrictivemeanstoachieveitsends. Id.Whilethis

isaheavyburden,itisnottruethatstrictscrutinyisstrictintheory,butfatalin

fact.Adarand

Constructors,

Inc.

v.

Pena,

515

U.S.

200,

237

(1995)

(internal

quotationmarksomitted). InFirstAmendmentchallenges,regulationshave

survivedstrictscrutiny. InBursonv.Freeman,forexample,theSupremeCourt

employedstrictscrutinyinevaluatingastatutecarvingoutacampaignfree

zoneoutsidepollingplaces. 504U.S.191,19394(1992). Balancingtheminor

limitationprescribedbythestatuteagainstthehistoricalconcernswithvoter

intimidationandelectionfraud,theCourtheldthatthestatutewasnarrowly

tailoredtothestatesinterestinprotectingtherightofcitizenstovoteand

conductingreliableelections. Id.at198210. InRiley,theSupremeCourt

suggestedthat

arequirement

that

solicitors

disclose

their

professional

status

wouldbenarrowlytailoredtothestatesinterestininformingdonorshowthe

moneytheycontributeisspentinordertodispeltheallegedmisperceptionthat

themoneytheygivetoprofessionalfundraisersgoesingreaterthanactual

proportion

to

benefit

charity.

487

U.S.

at

798;

see

also

id.

at

799

n.11.

The

First

Amendmenttestisconcernedwithabalancingofinterests. Here,strikingdown

theStatusDisclosurewoulddeprivetheCityofitsabilitytoprotectthehealthof

itscitizensandcombatconsumerdeceptionineventhemostminimalway.

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TheStatusDisclosureistheleastrestrictivemeanstoensurethatawoman

isawareofwhetherornotaparticularpregnancyservicescenterhasalicensed

medicalprovider

at

the

time

that

she

first

interacts

with

it.

Such

alaw

is

required

toensurethatwomenhavepromptaccesstothetypeofcaretheyseek. Plaintiffs

havesuggested,andthedistrictcourtheld,thatalternativemeansexist:theCity

couldsponsoradvertisementsorpostsignsoutsideofpregnancyservices

centers;itcouldprosecutefraud,falseadvertising,andtheunauthorizedpractice

ofmedicineundercurrentlaw;anditcouldimposelicensingrequirementson

ultrasoundprofessionals.7 SeeEvergreen,801F.Supp.2dat20809. Butthese

alternatemeanswillnotaccomplishtheCityscompellinginterest. City

sponsoredadvertisementsandsignscannotalertconsumersastowhethera

particularpregnancy

services

center

employs

alicensed

medical

provider,

because,amongotherthings,thisisdiscretefactualinformationknownonlyto

theparticularcenter. Enforcementoffraudorotherlawsoccursonlyafterthe

fact,atwhichpointthereproductiveservicesoughtmaybeineffectualor

7Asthedistrictcourtnoted,NewYorkstatedoesnotimposelicensing

requirementsonultrasoundtechnicians. Evergreen,801F.Supp.2dat209. The

districtcourtsuggestedthattheCitycouldimposelicensingrequirementsor

lobbythestatetodoso. Id.

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unobtainable. Finally,thelicensingandregulationofultrasoundprofessionals

willnotalertconsumerstothestatusoftheplaceinwhichsuchprofessionalsare

employedunless

the

licensing

and

regulation

scheme

itself

requires

disclosures

comparabletoLocalLaw17sStatusandServiceDisclosures.Moreover,notall

regulatedcentersprovideultrasounds,soalicensingandregulationeffortaimed

onlyatthosecentersthatdoprovideultrasoundswouldnothelppatientsseeking

medicalassistanceatothercenters. TheStatusDisclosureistheleastrestrictive

meansofprovidingreadyinformationaboutpregnancyservicescentersto

consumers.

Similarly,LocalLaw17isnotoverlybroad. Inordertonarrowlytailora

lawtoaddressaproblem,thegovernmentmustcurtailspeechonlytothedegree

necessaryto

meet

the

particular

problem

at

hand,

and

the

government

must

avoidinfringingonspeechthatdoesnotposethedangerthathasprompted

regulation. GreenPartyofConn.v.Garfield,616F.3d189,209(2dCir.2010). The

districtcourtheldthatthestatutewasoverinclusivebecausenotallpregnancy

services

centers

engage

in

deception.

We

acknowledge

that

this

is

so.

However,

whiletheCityconsidereddeceptionbycertainCPCsinitshearing,theproblemit

soughttosolveisadifferentone. LocalLaw17seekstopreventwomanfrom

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mistakenlyconcludingthatpregnancyservicescenters,whichlooklikemedical

facilities,aremedicalfacilities,whetherornotthecentersengageindeception.

Thelaw

thus

applies

to

facilities

that

have

the

appearance

of

alicensed

medical

facility.

Weconcludethattherequirementthatpregnancyservicescentersdisclose

whetherornottheyemploymedicalprofessionalsisnarrowlytailored. Our

holdingfindssupportintheSupremeCourtsdecisioninRiley,where,as

mentionedabove,theCourtsuggestedthatarequirementthatsolicitorsdisclose

theirprofessionalstatusisanarrowlytailoredrequirement[that]would

withstandFirstAmendmentscrutiny. 487U.S.at799n.11.8 TheSupremeCourt

hassubsequentlyfavorablycitedtoRiley. See,e.g.,Illinoisexrel.Madiganv.

TelemarketingAssocs.,

Inc.,

538

U.S.

600,

623

(2003);

Intl

Socy

for

Krishna

Consciousness,Inc.v.Lee,505U.S.672,70607(1992)(Kennedy,J.,concurring).

OtherCircuitshavereliedonRileytoupholddisclosurelawsrequiringsolicitors

8WenotethattheplaintiffsinRileydidnotchallengethestatusdisclosure

requirement,making

the

Supreme

Courts

discussion

of

the

requirement

dicta.

487U.S.at799. Additionally,theCourtwasdividedoverthisissue. Seeid.at803

(Scalia,J.,concurringinpartandconcurringinjudgment)(Idonotseehow

requiringtheprofessionalsolicitortodisclosehisprofessionalstatusisnarrowly

tailoredtopreventfraud.).

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onstaff;and(2)theMontgomeryCountyHealthOfficerencourageswomen

whoareormaybepregnanttoconsultwithalicensedhealthcareprovider. 779

F.Supp.

2d

at

459

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

The

plaintiffs

challenged

theordinanceonFirstAmendmentgroundsandsoughtapreliminaryinjunction.

Evaluatingunderstrictscrutiny,thedistrictcourtrefusedtoenjointhefirst

requireddisclosure,notingthat

therecordisatleastcolorableatthisstagetosuggestthatthe

disclaimeris

narrowly

tailored

to

meet

the

interest:

only

requiring

those[pregnancyclinics]topostanoticethatalicensedmedical

professionalisnotonstaff. Itdoesnotrequireanyotherspecific

messageandinneutrallanguagestatesthetruth.

Id.at471. Afterrehearingtheappealenbanc,theFourthCircuitaffirmedthe

districtcourt. 722F.3dat18892. AsJudgeWilkinsonstatedinhisconcurrence

inCentro

Tepeyac:

[I]nexercisingitsbroadpolicepowertoregulateforthehealthand

safetyofitscitizens,thestatemustalsoenjoysomeleewaytorequire

thedisclosureofthemodicumofaccurateinformationthat

individualsneedinordertomakeespeciallyimportantmedical...

decisions.... [TheStatusDisclosure]reliesonthecommonsense

notionthatpregnantwomenshouldatleastbeawareofthe

qualifications

of

those

who

wish

to

counsel

them

regarding

what

is,amongotherthings,amedicalcondition.

Id.at193.WesimilarlyconcludethattheneutralmessagerequiredbytheStatus

Disclosuresurvivesstrictscrutiny.

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B. ServicesDisclosureTheServicesDisclosurerequirespregnancyservicescenterstodisclose

whetheror

not

they

provide

or

provide

referrals

for

abortion,

emergency

contraception,orprenatalcare. AdministrativeCode20816(c)(e).Wehold

thattheServicesDisclosureisnotsufficientlytailoredtotheCitysinterests

undereitherstrictscrutinyorintermediatescrutiny.

Evaluatingunderstrictscrutiny,weapplythesametailoringanalysisto

theServicesDisclosureaswedidwithrespecttotheStatusDisclosure. Aswe

explainedabove,requirementsthattheCitysponsoradvertisementsorpost

signs,prosecutefraudandfalseadvertising,orimposeultrasoundlicensing

requirementsareinsufficienttoensurethatwomenarereadilyawareofwhether

ornot

aparticular

pregnancy

services

center

provides

the

services

sought.

However,onthisrecord,theStatusDisclosure,byitself,mightnarrowlysatisfy

theCitysinterest,asitalertsconsumerstoasmallbitofaccurateinformation

aboutthetypeofserviceseachcenterprovidesmedicalornonmedicaleven

though

it

does

not

discuss

specific

services.

Cf.

Centro

Tepeyac,

722

F.3d

at

190

(consideringwhether,inlightofordinancesstatusdisclosure,thecitysmessage

thatpregnantwomenshouldconsultwithalicensedhealthcareproviderwas

unneededspeech).

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Regardlessofwhetherlessrestrictivemeansexist,theServicesDisclosure

overlyburdensPlaintiffsspeech. Whenevaluatingcompelledspeech,we

considerthe

context

in

which

the

speech

is

made.

Riley,

487

U.S.

at

796

97.

Here,

thecontextisapublicdebateoverthemoralityandefficacyofcontraceptionand

abortion,forwhichmanyofthefacilitiesregulatedbyLocalLaw17provide

alternatives. [E]xpressiononpublicissueshasalwaysrestedonthehighest

rungonthehierarchyofFirstAmendmentvalues. NAACPv.Claiborne

HardwareCo.,458U.S.886,913(1982)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

Mandatingspeechthataspeakerwouldnototherwisemakenecessarilyalters

thecontentofthespeech. Riley,487U.S.at795. Arequirementthatpregnancy

servicescentersaddressabortion,emergencycontraception,orprenatalcareat

thebeginning

of

their

contact

with

potential

clients

alters

the

centers

political

speechbymandatingthemannerinwhichthediscussionoftheseissuesbegins.

Rileyisagaininstructive. Inthatcase,theSupremeCourtstruckdowna

statelawthatrequiredsolicitorstodisclosetopotentialdonorsthepercentageof

charitable

contributions

that

were

turned

over

to

charity.

Id.

In

striking

down

themandatorydisclosure,theCourtnotedthatifthepotentialdonoris

unhappywiththedisclosedpercentage,thefundraiserwillnotlikelybegivena

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chancetoexplainthefigure;thedisclosurewillbethelastwordsspokenasthe

donorclosesthedoororhangsupthephone. Id.at800.Wefacesimilar

concernshere.

The

Services

Disclosure

will

change

the

way

in

which

a

pregnancyservicescenter,ifitsochooses,discussestheissuesofprenatalcare,

emergencycontraception,andabortion. Thecentersmustbefreetoformulate

theirownaddress. Becauseitmandatesdiscussionofcontroversialpolitical

topics,theServicesDisclosurediffersfromthe brief,bland,andnonpejorative

disclosurerequiredbytheStatusDisclosure. SeeTelco,885F.2dat1232.

Finally,weconsiderwhetheradifferentanswerwouldobtainunder

intermediatescrutiny,whichlookstowhethertheregulationatissueisnotmore

extensivethannecessarytoserveasubstantialgovernmentalinterest.Whileitis

acloser

question,

we

conclude

that

it

would

not,

considering

both

the

political

natureofthespeechandthefactthattheStatusDisclosureprovidesamore

limitedalternativeregulation.

C. TheGovernmentMessage

Finally,

the

Government

Message

requires

pregnancy

services

centers

to

disclosethattheNewYorkCityDepartmentofHealthandMentalHygiene

encourageswomenwhoareorwhomaybepregnanttoconsultwithalicensed

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provider. AdministrativeCode20816(a).Wealsoholdthatitisinsufficiently

tailored.

First,less

restrictive

alternatives

exist.

As

the

district

court

in

Centro

Tepeyacnoted,thegovernmentinterestinensuringthatwomendonotforego

medicaltreatmentmightbesatisfiedoncewomenwereawarethat[pregnancy

servicescenters]donotstaffamedicalprofessional. 779F.Supp.2dat468;see

alsoCentroTepeyac,722F.3dat190. Second,theGovernmentMessagediffers

fromboththeStatusDisclosureandtheServicesDisclosureinthattheCitycan

communicatethismessagethroughanadvertisingcampaign. TheCitysbroad

messagedoesnotrequireknowledgeofdiscreteinformationavailableonlyto

individualpregnancyservicescenters.

Weare

also

concerned

that

this

disclosure

requires

pregnancy

services

centerstoadvertiseonbehalfoftheCity. Itmaybethecasethatmost,ifnotall,

pregnancyservicescenterswouldagreethatpregnantwomenshouldseea

doctor. Thatdecision,however,asthislitigationdemonstrates,isapublicissue

subject

to

dispute.

The

Government

Message,

mandating

that

Plaintiffs

affirmativelyespousethegovernmentspositiononacontestedpublicissue,

deprivesPlaintiffsoftheirrighttocommunicatefreelyonmattersofpublic

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concern.Alliance,651F.3dat236(affirminggrantofpreliminaryinjunction

enjoininggovernmentagenciesfromrequiringnongovernmentalorganizations

toexplicitly

adopt

statements

opposing

prostitution

as

acondition

of

receiving

governmentfunds). ThecircumstancesheredifferfromAllianceintwokey

respects:(1)theregulationheredoesnotrequirethespeakertoclaimthemessage

asitsown,seeid.at237,butinsteadqualifiesthatitcomesfromthegovernment;

and(2)theregulationherewasnotenactedasaconditiontothereceiptof

funding. Thefirstdistinctionisoflittleconcernhere,becausealawthatrequires

aspeakertoadvertiseonbehalfofthegovernmentoffendstheConstitutioneven

ifitisclearthatthegovernmentisthespeaker. SeeWooleyv.Maynard,430U.S.

705,715(1977)(invalidatingstatutethatturnedspeakersprivateproperty[into]

amobile

billboard

for

the

States

ideological

message).

The

second

distinction

furtherunderscorestheFirstAmendmentviolation.Whilethegovernmentmay

incidentallyencouragecertainspeechthroughitspowerto[choose]tofundone

activitytotheexclusionoftheother,Rustv.Sullivan,500U.S.173,193(1991),it

may

not

directly

mandat[e]

that

Plaintiffs

affirmatively

espouse

the

governmentspositiononacontestedpublicissuethroughregulations,like

LocalLaw17,thatthreatennotonlytofineordefundbutalsotoforciblyshut

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downnoncompliantentities,Alliance,651F.3dat236;seealsoTurner,512U.S.at

642(1994)(Lawsthatcompelspeakerstoutterordistributespeechbearinga

particularmessage

are

subject

to

the

same

rigorous

scrutiny

as

laws

that

suppress,disadvantage,orimposedifferentialburdensuponspeechbecauseof

itscontent.).

Basedontheabove,weholdthattheGovernmentMessageis

insufficientlytailoredtowithstandscrutiny.

CONCLUSION

Fortheforegoingreasons,thememorandumandorderofthedistrictcourt

isAFFIRMEDinpartandVACATEDinpart.WeREMANDforfurther

proceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse

40 Foley Square

New York, NY 10007

ROBERT A. KATZMANNCHIEF JUDGE CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFECLERK OF COURT

Date: January 17, 2014

Docket #: 11-2735cv

Short Title: The Evergreen Association, Inc v. City of

New York

DC Docket #: 11-cv-2055

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK

CITY) DC Docket #: 11-cv-2342

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)

DC Judge: Pauley

BILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS

The requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill of

costs is on the Court's website.

The bill of costs must:

* be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment;

* be verified;

* be served on all adversaries;

* not include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits;

* identify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit;

* include the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, a

cover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page;* state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form;

* state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in New

York, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction;

* be filed via CM/ECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies.


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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse

40 Foley Square

New York, NY 10007

ROBERT A. KATZMANNCHIEF JUDGE CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFECLERK OF COURT

Date: January 17, 2014

Docket #: 11-2735cv

Short Title: The Evergreen Association, Inc v. City of

New York

DC Docket #: 11-cv-2055

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK

CITY) DC Docket #: 11-cv-2342

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)

DC Judge: Pauley

VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS

Counsel for

_________________________________________________________________________

respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk to

prepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the

________________________________________________________________

and in favor of

_________________________________________________________________________

for insertion in the mandate.

Docketing Fee _____________________

Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________

Costs of printing brief (necessary copies ______________ ____) _____________________

Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________

(VERIFICATION HERE)

________________________

Signature


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