EVOLVING CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

Will SmithPOS 563-Comparative East Asia Security Policy

December 8, 2014

There are three parties that define the Cross-Strait relationship: The

government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing, the government of the Republic

of China (ROC) in Taipei, and the United States. All three of these parties have been directly

engaged in issues regarding the Taiwan Strait since the ROC government fled to the island of

Taiwan in 1949. While the relationship between the island of Taiwan and Mainland China

predates the twentieth century, the two sides of the Strait have changed in profound ways. The

Mainland emerged from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution with a reform program that ushered

in an era of historic economic growth and social change. The island of Taiwan also emerged as

an economic center with a high standard of living and a democratic government that includes

multi-party elections and a strong civil society. The third political force in Cross-Strait relations,

the United States, has presided as a hegemonic power in East Asia since the middle of the

twentieth century and has helped to define the region’s political and economic order. Each of

these actors has also seen its relationships with the others evolve. The Mainland, with its

remarkable economic growth, is quickly becoming a political power in East Asia that is not

afraid to make higher demands of its neighbors, including the government on Taiwan. Yet,

Taiwan has also successfully democratized since 1986, despite threats from Beijing. Within this

environment, political groups like the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) have emerged arguing,

albeit cautiously, for a Taiwanese national identity. These political forces have complicated the

relationship across the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is

arguably closer than ever before thanks to greater economic partnership. The third actor, the

U.S., continues to leverage its position as a regional power in East Asia and behave as mediator

between Beijing and Taipei. Yet as the Mainland and Taiwan have become closer and as Chinese

2

power in East Asia increases, the U.S. is concerned for its continued ability to act as mediator, let

alone perpetuate its special relationship with the Island of Taiwan.

For all three parties involved in the progress of Cross-Strait relations, a variety

of behaviors are necessary. For Beijing, continuing to understand the nuances of Taiwanese

democratic politics is key if it wishes to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan

and reassure Taipei of its political intentions in the Taiwan Strait. Taipei must continue to

nurture its special relationship with the United States, while diversifying its economic portfolio

to secure itself from the Mainland’s possible use of economic leverage in future dealings. For the

United States, the goal should be to continue its role as a credible mediator between Beijing and

Taipei which will also increase Washington’s credibility in the eyes of its other East Asian allies

as it rebalances to East Asia..

Cross-Strait relations, while they may be of greater importance in recent decades, have a

complex history. The island of Taiwan did fall under direct Chinese administration until 1683,

when the Kangxi Emperor defeated the island’s local rulers and established a colonial

infrastructure with a tax system. 1Although the island officially became a directly controlled part

of the Chinese Empire, Taiwan’s population was mostly indigenous, with very little Han Chinese

migration from the mainland.2 The Japanese annexed Taiwan as a colony in 1895. Under

Japanese colonial rule, the island’s infrastructure developed and the economy experienced robust

growth.3 Taiwanese literacy rates surpassed those on the Mainland. Culturally, Taiwan also

diverged, importing Japanese traditions. Japanese colonial rule ended in 1945 when the United

Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration placed the island under the administrative

1 William Rowe, China’s Last Empire, the Great Qing (London: Belknap Press, 2009), 137-138.2 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 141. 3 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 234-236.

3

control of the Republic of China.4 Four years later however, the island became the seat of the

government for the ROC as it fled the Communist takeover of the Mainland in 1949.

The events of 1949 and 1950 set the stage for the standoff along the Taiwan Strait that

exists today. In December of 1949, as Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalists regrouped on Taiwan, it

was generally believed on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as Washington, that the

Republic of China would soon capitulate. The government of Chiang Kai-shek was in poor shape

thanks to a tremendous amount of corruption, disloyalty within the military, and a perilous

financial situation. The Republic of China suffered from rampant inflation that had wiped out the

savings and with it the remaining morale of the Chinese people.5 Additionally, the regime’s

policies on the island of Taiwan from 1945 onward were extremely brutal and included the arrest

of political prisoners as well as government-sanctioned extortion in order to provide desperately

needed funds. Thanks to his government’s practices and defeat in the Chinese Civil War, Chiang

Kai-shek had also alienated his closest ally and financial backer, the United States.6

Only several months later in the spring of 1950, the Nationalist’s odds of survival

dramatically changed. The outbreak of the Korean War pitted the United States and its allies

against the People’s Republic of China on the Korean Peninsula. In order to consolidate a

position against the spread of Communism, the Republic of China on Taiwan was quickly

deemed a strategic asset for the U.S. The Truman administration resumed economic and military

aid to the ROC and sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in order to prevent the breakout of

conflict.7 This renewed support for Chiang’s government culminated with the 1954 signing of

4 Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 588.5 Pakula, The Last Empress, 588-598.6 Pakula, The Last Empress, 599.

7 Pakula, The Last Empress, 603-604.

4

the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty that virtually guaranteed the long-term survival of the

government of the Republic of China and the continued administrative separateness of the island

of Taiwan from Mainland China. Additionally, until 1979 Washington did not view the island of

Taiwan as an official part of the Chinese state and took the stance that it was an occupied

territory administered by the Republic of China, some day to become a part of China proper.8

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Republic of China on Taiwan was marketed as

“Free China,” and considered instrumental in the containment of and defense against the spread

of Communism in East Asia. What’s more, economic and military aid from the U.S. totaled $4

billion, with $1.5 billion earmarked for industrial development, throughout the 1950s and 1960s.9

These economic circumstances quickly changed however due to the island’s rapid economic

development. The island’s per capita income rose between 1949 and 1996 from $170 to $13,500

while unemployment remained low and inflation post-1949 remained generally stable.10

Taiwan’s economic success prior to the 1980s has a great deal to do with the ROC government’s

economic policies. This included initial reforms in the education system that caused the rate of

illiteracy to fall between 1949 and 1989 from 40.25 percent to 6.8 percent (Brown). A more

educated workforce and increased agricultural production during the 1950s allowed for heavy

investment in Taiwan’s fledgling industrial sector. Government-imposed high tariffs and a policy

of import-substitution helped to foster domestic industry while carefully regulated interest rates

encouraged the accumulation of financial capital that could be invested into Taiwanese

8 Pakula, The Last Empress, 615. 9Kerry Brown, Justin Hempson-Jones, and Jessica Pennisi, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” (2010): 3.

10 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 4.

5

businesses.11 The result was a booming economy both in absolute terms as well as relative to its

neighbor on the other side of the Strait.

Coinciding with Taiwan’s impressive economic growth however was changing political

and social circumstances that ultimately prompted the ROC government in Taipei to institute

dynamic reforms by the 1980s. In terms of international space, the ROC on Taiwan had

successfully preserved its diplomatic standing with much of the international community until

the 1970s. This was thanks to its strategic role in a U.S.- dominated international order opposed

to the Communist bloc. This favorable environment however began to change by the end of the

1960s. With President Nixon’s inauguration in 1969, Washington’s policy toward China began

to shift in the midst of an unfavorable situation in Vietnam and a need to wedge apart the

People’s Republic of China from the Soviet Union. 1971 was the beginning of a process toward

diplomatic isolation for Taiwan. In that year, the “representatives of the government of Chiang

Kai-Shek” were expelled from the United Nations, to be replaced by representatives of the

People’s Republic of China.12

Throughout the 1970s, greater engagement continued between Washington and Beijing.

This included visits by the Nixon administration to Beijing in 1972 and 1975. Of the major items

agreed upon between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China, the Shanghai Communiqué in

1972 was very significant for Taiwan. Within the Communiqué, the United States agreed to

acknowledge the One-China Policy as well as dismantle a number of military installations on the

island. This emerging cooperation between the Mainland and the U.S. was met with hostility on

Taiwan, where the general public felt “betrayed and isolated.” Indeed, as their closest ally and

biggest enemy both continued with rapprochement, the ROC government and the people of

11 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 5. 12 Pakula, The Last Empress, 625.

6

Taiwan began to rethink their own political identity. The Kaohsiung protests of 1979 that saw the

island’s political opposition united for the first time and put pressure on the ruling KMT

government to reform. 13

With the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, his son and successor Chiang Ching-kuo

sought a new political path for Taiwan in the wake of growing diplomatic isolation. Ching-kuo’s

efforts at democratization reached a turning point in 1986 with the lifting of martial law and the

ban on opposition political parties. In that same year, the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) was

formed to challenge the incumbent Kuomintang.14 With the democratization of Taiwanese

politics initiated in 1986, the need for the KMT and other political organizations like the nascent

DPP to appeal to the Taiwanese public in free and fair elections led to a reshuffling of policy

objectives. Cross-Strait relations and the identity of the island of Taiwan were significant pieces

of this reshuffle. Until 1986, the official policy of the KMT government in Taipei toward cross-

strait relations was “no contact, no negotiations, and no compromise”.15 Coinciding with the end

of martial law in 1986, President Chiang Ching-Kuo announced in a Washington Post interview

that the island of Taiwan would pursue democratic reform and liberalization. This move toward

democratization was as much in response to the growing political opposition forces on the island

as it was to Taiwan’s political isolation after the United States shifted diplomatic recognition to

Beijing. A democratic and free Taiwan had the potential to garner greater sympathy from the

United States, and thus grant Taipei greater access to political engagement with Beijing and

Washington.16

13 Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” The China Journal: 2005, 3.

14 Pakula, The Last Empress, 632. 15 Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” 22-25. 16 Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” 27.

7

While Chiang Ching-Kuo’s KMT government utilized democratic reform in order to

change the character of cross-Strait relations, opposition parties, finally able to participate openly

after 1986, further complicated the discussion about Taiwan’s relationship with the Mainland in

domestic politics. One of the emerging political forces in the 1980s was “native political

activism” that challenged the KMT’s prevailing belief that Taiwan and the Mainland must

eventually be reunified. These nativists, who were for the most part ensconced in the major

opposition Democratic People’s Party, generally believed that Taiwan was emerging as a very

separate entity from Mainland China.17 While opinions varied amongst nativists regarding

Taiwan’s political destiny relative to the Mainland, the very radical wing of the Democratic

People’s Party supported the island’s eventual independence. Although only a small minority of

Taiwanese agreed with the idea of outright independence, it became clear that, by the 1990s,

most individuals saw themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. In addition perceptions of

identity, Taiwanese attitudes toward the Mainland also demonstrated a level of cultural

disassociation, wherein Taiwanese looked dismissively toward Mainland culture, society, and

national identity.18

While Taiwan increasingly saw itself from the 1980s onward as possessed with a unique

identity and culture that was separate from Mainland China, the island’s economic relationship

across the Taiwan Strait moved closer. While initial Taiwanese investments in the Mainland

were small, amounting to only $20 million by 1986, the number rocketed to $100 million in 1987

following the Mainland’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) liberalization, and $420 million by

1988. By 2007, 37,488 Taiwanese companies were invested in the Mainland totaling

17 Wu “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” 8. 18 Peter Hays Gries and Jenny Su, “Taiwanese Views of China and the World: Party Identification, Ethnicity, and Cross-Strait Relations,” Japanese Journal of Political Science: 2013, 9-10.

8

approximately $100 billion.19 Beyond geographic closeness and shared language, Taiwanese

companies have sought out the Mainland’s low labor costs and relatively lax environmental

regulations. This strong level of Cross-Strait investment, primarily flowing from the island of

Taiwan to the Mainland, has created greater economic interdependence on both sides of the

Strait. This made any action on the part of the government in Taipei to upset the status quo with

the Mainland very unpopular with the Taiwanese public.

These push and pull factors concerning feelings of changing identity and greater

economic interaction with the Mainland have left most Taiwanese with moderate, almost

ambivalent feelings about cross-Strait relations. Functioning within a democratic environment,

political parties like the KMT and the DPP have responded in kind. The 1992 Consensus formed

in Hong Kong via an unofficial meeting between the Association for Relations Across the

Taiwan Strait (Mainland) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (Taiwan), was a significant move

by the KMT government to address the new political and economic realities surrounding Cross-

strait relations. The consensus generally states that both sides of the Strait agree that Taiwan and

the Mainland are each a part of one China, however that One-China Principle has different

interpretations in Taipei and Beijing.20 This mutual recognition of different interpretations of the

One-China principle meant a move away from the political extreme for the KMT, and toward

warmer relations with the Mainland, chiefly through the acknowledgement and respect for

Beijing’s different interpretation of one China. The Democratic People’s Party has refused to

recognize the 1992 consensus, and has included individuals who have championed the cause for

Taiwanese independence. Yet despite this, the DPP throughout the 1990s departed from its

19 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 11. 20 Robert Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” Foreign Affairs: March/April 2008, 1-2.

9

radical calls for independence in order to maximize votes that are largely moderate. This

departure has included phrases such as “boldly moving westward,” and other calls for greater

engagement with the Mainland. The DPP’s move toward the center was further enforced during

the 2000 presidential elections wherein the party’s presidential candidate and former staunch

independence advocate, Chen Shui-bian, swore against independence and called for better links

with the Mainland.21 A significant milestone in Chen’s and the DPP’s move to the center was the

Resolution on the Future of Taiwan in which Chen and other DPP leaders acknowledged the

legitimacy of the government of the Republic of China. This acknowledgement in 1999 was a far

cry from previous beliefs that the ROC must be replaced with a purely Taiwanese political

system.22

Even with its move toward the center in the 2000 presidential election, the DPP’s

conspicuous attempts to expand Taiwan’s international space and status as independent from the

mainland ultimately ensured its political demise in 2008. The DPP President Chen Shui-bian

strained Cross-Strait relations starting with his refusal to accept either wording of the One-China

Principle, or the 1992 Consensus. This was followed by Chen’s evocation of the United Nations

Charter as proper framework for continued talks between Taipei and Beijing, a move that

suggested that interactions between Taiwan and the Mainland were of a state-to-state nature.23

The result of the DPP government’s more radical agenda regarding cross-Strait relations strained

Taiwan’s relationship with the United States, hindered the development of business partnerships

between Mainland and Taiwanese businesses, and proved to be unpalatable for a largely

21 Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” 18. 22 Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” 18-20. 23 Sheng Lijun, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: April 2001, 13-15.

10

moderate Taiwanese public. The 2008 elections consequently were a landslide victory for Ma

Yingjeou and the KMT.24

While the Taiwanese viewpoint on Cross-strait relations has grown to become a complex,

nuanced series of opinions thanks to the island’s democratization and emerging sense of a

separate identity, the Mainland Chinese perspective has remained largely unchanged and

obstinate with the belief that both sides of the Strait are part of one China. As the Nationalist

government of the Republic of China regrouped on Taiwan at the end of 1949, Chairman Mao

Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China in Beijing.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Mao’s Communist regime focused on consolidation of control

over Mainland China through what became a series of disastrous policies such as the Great Leap

Forward and the Cultural Revolution. As with Taipei, the PRC absolutely refused negotiation,

compromise, or contact with the government of Chiang Kai-shek with whom they were

technically still at war. Although the ROC on Taiwan was guaranteed protection through a

mutual defense agreement with the United States, the island’s international space throughout the

1960s and 1970s gradually diminished as more states formally recognized Beijing as the

legitimate government of China. This culminated with rapprochement throughout the 1970s

between Washington and Beijing, and finalized with formal recognition in 1979. For Cross-strait

relations, a relatively warmer relationship between the PRC and the U.S. meant that Taipei’s

closest ally was willing to facilitate warmer relations between Taiwan and the Mainland. The

Mainland’s economic reforms from 1979 onward and the ensuing Taiwanese investment only

encouraged informal dialogue between Taipei and Beijing, done through the Association for

Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation in Hong Kong. What is

24 Jianwei Wang, “United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science: October 2010, 4.

11

arguably the most significant milestone of this era of warmer Cross-Strait relations was the 1992

Consensus and the acknowledgement that there are different interpretations of the One-China

Principle. Indeed, this Consensus demonstrated that Taiwan and the Mainland were willing and

able to discuss more sensitive issues of political division.25

Significant diplomatic progress and economic interdependence notwithstanding, the

Mainland’s military and political measures to counter Taiwanese political continued, even

increased distrust on both sides of the Strait. While the buildup of armaments directly across

from Taiwan is not a new phenomenon, Beijing’s arsenal there has been enhanced with missiles

and other weaponry that can strike more decisively should war ensue. What’s more, the PRC has

demonstrated its capabilities without hesitation at several points throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

One of these major military exercises occurred in 1996 as Taipei held its first free and fair multi-

party elections. Missile tests in the Taiwan Strait coincided with stern warnings from Beijing

demanding that the Taiwanese not elect leaders who did not adhere to the One-China principle.26

This behavior of threats and military demonstrations was repeated in 2000 with further warnings.

In addition to a sore response to Taiwanese democratization, Beijing has periodically jockeyed

with Taipei for greater international space. The Mainland has economically rewarded or

politically pressured a number of the ROC’s remaining diplomatic allies in sub-Saharan Africa,

Latin America, and the Pacific to switch recognition to Beijing, actions that have decreased trust

across the Strait.27 Beneath the Mainland’s behavior toward Taiwan are Mainlander attitudes that

have remained largely obstinate in the belief that Taiwan is a part of China. Indeed, a 2005

survey estimated approximately 70% of Mainland Chinese believe that Taiwanese independence

25 Wang, “The United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” 3. 26 Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” 2. 27 David Brown, “Building Trust Across the Taiwan Strait,” Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations,” 5.

12

must be prevented through whatever means necessary.28 Consequently, while those on Taiwan

possess a more complex and dissenting mix of viewpoints about the future of Cross-Strait

relations, Mainlanders remain relatively unchanged in their beliefs.

Taiwan’s democratization has also made progress on Cross-Strait relations for the

Mainland more difficult. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Beijing struggled to sustain warmer

relations with Taiwan while also remaining steadfast to its view that Taiwan is a part of China.

Major political blunders on Beijing’s part occurred in the 1996 and 2000 elections when military

demonstrations across the Taiwan Strait in response to the DPP’s and other group’s growing

popularity caused public opinion in Taiwan to sway toward political factions that supported a

more autonomous Taiwan. This outcome however was the opposite of what Beijing had tried to

encourage. The Mainland had attempted to intimidate the Taiwanese into voting against

candidates like Lee Teng-hui in 1996 and Chen Shui-bian in 2000, both of whom supported

“more separatist policies,” that included greater distance in the Cross-Strait relationship.29 The

strategy backfired, and a frustrated Taiwanese electorate threw their support toward Lee and

Chen at the expense of Lien Chan and other candidates who wished to be more steadfast to the

One-China Policy. Learning from its miscalculations, as early as 1997, PRC President Jiang

Zemin invited representatives from “all of Taiwan’s political parties to participate in

reunification talks” under the condition that the DPP abandon its “Taiwan independence stand.”30

This conciliatory tone continued into the 2000s with increased exchanges between ARATS and

SEF and repeated invitations to Chen Shuibian’s DPP government to participate in reunification

talks. The culmination of Beijing’s change in posture toward Taiwanese politics was a

28 Zheng Yongnian, “China’s New Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relations,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific: 2007, 62. 29 Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” 3. 30 Sheng, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations,” 16.

13

groundbreaking visit to Beijing by KMT Chair Lien Chan in 2005. This visit spurred successive

trips to the Mainland for political meetings by Taiwanese leaders from both the KMT and DPP.31

Amidst the Mainland’s cooperation and development of a new approach to relations with Taipei

however is also a continued buildup of armaments along the Taiwan Strait. Most significantly,

this includes short and medium-range missiles that give PRC forces the ability to “destroy

Taiwan’s prosperity before the United States has a chance to intervene” in the Strait.32

The third party involved in cross-Strait relations, the United States, can be credited for

the political divide between the Mainland and Taiwan. It was the U.S. that, in 1950, guaranteed

the survival of the Republic of China on Taiwan when the island was suddenly considered to be

of strategic importance in the greater struggle against the expansion of the Communist bloc in

Asia. Consequently, Taipei and Washington signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 and the

U.S. and its allies around the globe recognized the ROC on Taiwan as the official government of

China, isolating the PRC. By the beginning of the 1970s however the U.S., faced with an

unsuccessful war in Vietnam and interested in a new strategy of isolating the Soviet Union,

began to pursue rapprochement with the Beijing. Secret meetings in Beijing between Secretary

of State Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1971 were followed by an official state visit by

President Nixon in 1972. Successive agreements between Washington and Beijing to normalize

relations, including the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, were met with feelings of betrayal in

Taipei. Fears of abandonment also extended to Washington, where it was generally believed that,

as relations normalized with Beijing, unofficial relations and security guarantees should remain

in place between the United States and the island of Taiwan. Consequently, the Senate passed the

31 Richard Weixing Hu, “Taiwan Strait détente and the changing role of the United States in cross-Strait relations,” China Information: 2013, 7.

32 Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” 2.

14

Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 that promised U.S. defense of the island of Taiwan in the event of

attack.33 Additionally, the American Institute in Taiwan, an organization reporting to the State

Department, replaced formal diplomatic relations.

With diplomatic recognition switched to the PRC in Beijing, the U.S. role in Cross-Strait

relations transformed from staunch supporter of the government on Taiwan, to concerned

mediator for cross-Strait dialogue with the goal of eventual reunification. Indeed, in the 1972

Shanghai Communiqué, Washington agreed to the One-China policy, including the belief that

Taiwan is a part of China. What this agreement does not specify is the manner in which China

should be reunified, leaving a level of “constructive ambiguity” that allowed the U.S. to not

delegitimize its former diplomatic ally on Taiwan.34 Washington supported Cross-Strait

investment in the 1980s as well as Taiwan’s democratization from 1986 onward. Just as the

Taiwanese public has mixed feelings toward cross-Strait relations, leaning toward neither the

extreme of prompt reunification or full independence, so too does the United States support a

status quo in which economic issues are tackled in lieu of more sensitive political difficulties.

One of the main reasons for this is because of fears in Washington that aggressive posturing

between Taipei and Beijing could lead to U.S. entrapment thanks to its security commitments

spelled out in the Taiwan Relations Act. What’s more, it is generally believed in Washington that

conflict in the Taiwan Strait, regardless of its cause, is seriously damaging to U.S. political and

economic interests on both sides of the Strait and elsewhere in East Asia.35 Subsequently, the

U.S. has banned state visits by Taiwanese officials, with the exception of ROC President Lee

Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater Cornell University in 1996, and has also criticized Taiwanese

33 Pakula, The Last Empress, 628. 34 Chen Weihua, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Protested.” China Daily: December 2014. 35 Wang, “United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” 3.

15

overtures for greater international space in organizations like the U.N and calls for

independence.36 Conversely, Washington has reacted swiftly to security threats from the

Mainland. The Taiwan Relations Act was put to the test in 1996 when, in the midst of the

island’s first free and fair elections, President Clinton ordered the deployment of “two aircraft

carrier battle groups within the vicinity of Taiwan” and warned Beijing against further missile

tests in the Taiwan Strait.37

Apart from these flashpoints of military posturing, the United States has repeatedly

promoted continued negotiations. Shortly after pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-bian one

the 2000 presidential election, the Clinton Administration reaffirmed the One-China Policy and

encouraged continued dialogue between Taiwan and the Mainland.38 Other U.S. allies like Japan

and Australia followed suit with similar statements in support of the One-China Policy, despite

the victory of a Taiwanese political party that sought to overhaul the nature of cross-Strait

relations. In 2007, when President Chen pushed for a referendum in the UN on the political

status of Taiwan, the Bush Administration sent “stern warnings” to Chen’s government that such

actions would strain relations with the U.S. possibly force Washington to reconsider the state of

its relationship with the island. These actions on the part of the U.S are credited for appealing to

the Taiwanese people in the 2008 election, as well as sent a strong signal to Beijing about

Washington’s commitment to cross-Strait dialogue. Indeed, in 2008 the Bush Administration

encouraged Taipei to consider “reopening dialogue” with the Mainland, after years of strained

relations thanks to Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence policies. 39Ultimately, the U.S proved in

36 Wang, “United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” 6. 37 Sheng, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations,” 38 Sheng, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations,”13. 39 Weixing, “Taiwan Strait détente and the changing role of the United States in cross-Strait relations,” 12.

16

the 1990s and 2000s to be able to successfully leveraged its special relationship with Taipei

while avoiding a serious strain on relations with Beijing.

The current state of affairs in the Taiwan Strait continues to be wracked with ambiguity.

The most encouraging portion of cross-Strait relations is economic. In fact, what is considered to

be “the crowning achievement” of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration is the signing of the Economic

Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between Taipei and Beijing in 2010. Generally

speaking, the ECFA eases trade regulations, lowers tariffs, and allows for greater commercial

and industrial cooperation between Taiwan and the Mainland.40 Although the Ma

administration’s broader reason for the ECFA is to integrate Taiwan into the global economy

through the easing of regulation, tariffs, and other blockages, the agreement’s primary purpose

and impact has been on Cross-Strait economics. Following the signing of the ECFA, an initial

list of 267 exports from the Mainland valued at $2.86 billion and 539 items for export from

Taiwan totaled at $13.83 billion were earmarked for lower tariffs and relaxed trade barriers. It is

predicted that, as the ECFA is implemented in more areas of trade between Taiwan and the

Mainland, the nearly $100 billion Cross-Strait trade will continue to grow, creating 260,000 jobs

on Taiwan.41 In addition to economic dividends across the Taiwan Strait, it is hoped that

Beijing’s signing of the ECFA means that it will accept the legitimacy of Free Trade Agreements

(FTAs) between Taiwan and other states, an issue that is currently a barrier to the island’s further

integration into the global economy. Indeed, the Ma administration had this benefit on its mind

after the Mainland signed a China-ASEAN FTA that gave Mainland businesses greater access to

Southeast Asian markets than their Taiwanese counterparts.42 Taipei also seeks membership in

40 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 20-32. 41 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 27. 42 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 28.

17

the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that has been championed by China and the

ECFA is meant to be a stepping-stone to possible future participation.

While the ECFA has been heralded by Beijing, the Ma administration and many in the

KMT as a triumph for Taiwan’s economy, skeptics in the opposition have pointed to the

possibility that the ECFA may push Taiwan’s economy towards a dangerous level of dependence

upon the Mainland. Indeed, already 40% of Taiwanese exports are destined for the Mainland

and, although high technology and service industries continue to thrive on Taiwan, cheaper

Mainland factories now manufacture many components of their products. What is also

concerning to skeptics is that Taiwanese business has inordinately invested in one market,

Mainland China.43 By 2013, approximately 60% of Taiwanese FDI was concentrated in

Mainland China. With the ECFA making it easier than ever for Cross-Strait investment, this

percentage is expected to increase unless diversification to other markets is encouraged.44

From a Mainland perspective, Taiwan’s economic closeness since the end of the 1980s

has been extremely beneficial. The ECFA in 2010 meant even greater access to Taiwan’s

markets for a growing list of Chinese exports such as petrochemicals, cars, and textiles, as well

as granting access to Taiwanese markets for Mainland business sectors ranging from medicine to

aircraft maintenance. Although the Mainland has always provided Taiwanese industry with

cheap labor, the ECFA has cut down regulations to allow Taiwan business even more access to

competitively priced labor. The ECFA and preceding agreements in 2009 have also opened up

100 new sectors of Taiwanese industry for Mainland direct investment. 45While regulations on

Mainland investment continue to remain stringent, such as a 10% institutional investment cap,

43 Sheng, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations,” 7. 44 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 35. 45 Brown, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 37.

18

greater cooperation between Mainland and Taiwanese business has occurred. One example is

China Mobile’s talks for a stake in one of Taiwan’s major telecommunications companies.

Coinciding with a closer Cross-Strait economic partnership, the United States has also

moved closer economically to both Taiwan and Mainland China. Taiwanese imports to the

United States amount to $13.4 billion and, despite its lack of formal diplomatic recognition from

Washington, Taiwan maintains a bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)

since 1994 with the United States.46 Washington has also stated numerous times, most recently

through the 2013 Taiwan Policy Act, that it seeks an eventual Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with

Taiwan. This expansion in U.S. investment and economic partnership with Taiwan has happened

alongside greater U.S. investment and economic partnership with the Mainland. Most recently

economic dialogue between the Washington and Beijing has focused around the Strategic and

Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in which both sides called for greater “macroeconomic

cooperation” and the U.S. in particular stated the need for a more balanced trade relationship47.

Over the subject of Cross-Strait economic cooperation, the Obama Administration has applauded

the signing of the ECFA and has continued Washington’s encouraging stance toward economic

openness between Taiwan and the Mainland.

Aside from relatively cordial economic relations, the Taipei-Beijing-Washington

triangular relationship’s political and security issues remain difficult to tackle. In December

2008, after the landslide victory of the KMT, PRC President Hu Jintao announced the “Six-Point

Proposal for Future Cross-Strait Relations” at the 17th Party Congress in Beijing. The Proposal

included goals of greater confidence building, informal dialogue through ARATS and SEF, and

continued economic cooperation. What the Proposal signaled to Taipei and East Asia as whole

46 Weixing, “Taiwan Strait Détente and the Changing Role of the United States,” 14. 47 Weixing, “Taiwan Strait Détente and the Changing Role of the United States,” 14-16.

19

however was that “Beijing was not looking for immediate reunification,” and was content to

continue a gradual dialogue over sensitive political issues while broadening the already

developed economic relationship.48This affirmation of a gradualist approach toward the security

and political dimensions of Cross-Strait relations suggests that Beijing may have learned a

valuable lesson after its military exercises and intimidation tactics of the 1990s and early 2000s

helped encourage the Taiwanese public to vote in pro-independence political leaders. Indeed, the

hope for greater exchanges and confidence building through political dialogue is that Beijing can

win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese. Yet despite this enthusiasm from the Mainland, its

moves to undermine the democratic institutions governing the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region in Hong Kong damaged it’s the credibility of its argument for an eventual

peaceful and respectful reintegration of Taiwan.49

Taipei, particularly since the inauguration of President Ma Ying-Jeou in 2008, remains

even more ambiguous than the Mainland regarding the discussion of political integration. As has

been the case since the early 1990s, the government’s stance reflects public opinion on the island

that leans neither toward separation from the Mainland nor toward a clear path for reunification

with the Mainland. What has changed since 2008 on the Taiwan side of Cross-Strait dialogue has

been Taipei’s return to the One-China Policy of the 1992 Consensus.50 A marked change that

heralded the reopening of dialogue between Taipei and Beijing was Ma’s insistence that such

dialogue was not state-to-state but rather between two regions within a state, a clear signal of

assurance to his counterparts on the Mainland. What has become the theme of Cross-Strait policy

48 Weixing, “Taiwan Strait Détente and the Changing Role of the United States,” 19. 49 Tok, Sow Keat, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan, (2013).

50 Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” 22.

20

for the Ma administration since 2008 is the Three No’s: no unification, no independence, no use

of force.51 In other words, Taipei, like Beijing, wishes to tackle easier issues like economic

cooperation before moving to the more sensitive issues of political integration or separation that

dominated events during the Chen years.

Beneath a mutual agreement to hold off on the more sensitive issues however, is the

reality of a growing asymmetric relationship that may prove detrimental for Taiwan. Beijing is

clearly becoming more assertive in East Asia on subjects such as territorial disputes in the East

and South China Seas as well as the U.S. “pivot” toward East Asia. This assertiveness is a

product of the Mainland’s growing economic power and expanding interests, as well as a new

nationalism. The latter cause is believed to have developed rigorously since the early 1990s as

the PRC sees itself to be reclaiming its place as a great power in the international community.

What’s more, increased national pride amongst the citizenry on the Mainland is reflected in

Beijing’s behavior toward maritime disputes and the continuity of U.S. power in East Asia52. For

Cross-Strait relations, it means that greater moves on Taiwan’s part for separation from the

Mainland will result in greater mass support on the Mainland for a strong response. The public’s

views have been reflected in discussions in Beijing in 2013 to raise the Taiwan issue to the level

of “core interest” a status already given to the East China Sea dispute. If Taiwan were to become

a “core interest,” it could mean consequences like military action, if the island moves toward

independence or at least refuses reunification.53 Backing the Mainland’s ever more fervent claims

to Taiwan is its nascent military development, which includes greater strike capabilities across

the Taiwan Strait. Such capabilities translate to the Mainland’s ability to successfully cripple

51 Weixing, “Taiwan Strait Détente and the Changing Role of the United States,” 19.52 Zheng Yongnian, “China’s New Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relations,” 6. 53 Zheng Yongnian, “China’s New Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relations,” 15.

21

Taiwanese defenses and infrastructure before the U.S. Seventh Fleet has the chance to intervene

on Taiwan’s behalf.54

While Taiwan may not be able to expand its military to the scale and cost of the

Mainland’s, it continues to purchase arms from the United States with the goal of providing a

sufficient deterrent against possible future strikes. The ultimate hope is that, through a sufficient

deterrent, a military option in the Taiwan Strait can be ruled out as too costly. Arms sales from

the U.S. have continued even after the end of formal diplomatic recognition of the ROC and

despite repeated protests from Beijing. As the subject of arms sales to Taiwan has continued to

be of great sensitivity to Sino-American relations, the sales often take place when political

backlash from Beijing is less costly. Often such sales occur during the second half of an

administration such as the Bush Administration’s 2008 arms sale and, more recently, the Naval

Vessel Transfer Act signed by President Obama in December of 2014 that granted the sale of

four Perry-class guided missile frigates to Taiwan.55 For the Mainland, arms-sales to Taiwan are

an unfortunate reality, as spelled out in the Sino-American 1982 bi-lateral agreement wherein it

was understood that the U.S. might continue to sell arms to Taiwan with a gradual phase-out as

Cross-Strait relations improved.56 Nevertheless, with nationalism ever more fervent, Beijing

evermore assertive, and its military growing stronger, arms sales to Taiwan continue to be an

activity with political consequences that Washington must continues to carefully calculate.

As Washington sells arms to Taiwan and guarantees the island’s security, it also operates

a useful facilitator of Cross-Strait dialogue. In addition to providing a credible deterrent against a

possible invasion, it is argued that arms sales to Taiwan provide the island with greater

confidence in negotiations with the Mainland. On the other hand, Washington also helped to

54 Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement” 3. 55 Chen Weihua, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Protested.”56 Chen Weihua, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Protested.”

22

maintain the improved relationship across the Taiwan Strait through its warnings and diplomatic

distance from the pro-independence Chen administration, actions that sent a message to the

Taiwanese that continued assistance from the U.S. was dependent upon continued dialogue with

the Mainland. Indeed, the landslide victory of Ma Ying-jeou and his popular Three No’s policy

further demonstrates the fear of alienating Washington.57

Yet the U.S. role in Cross-Strait relations is changing and not necessarily to the benefit of

U.S. interests. Once again, growing Chinese assertiveness and its increased ability to project

regional power has resulted in less trust and patience for the U.S. over the Taiwan issue. Political

leaders in Beijing have more frequently referred to Taiwan as a core interest and framed U.S.

relations with Taiwan in the context of a broader belief that the U.S. seeks to contain waxing

Chinese power. Yet, this increasing fervor over the Taiwan issue has not stopped the U.S. from

remarking on the economic political consequences for U.S. power in Asia that would accompany

“loss” of Taiwan, as officials in the Bush Administration did in 2008.58 It also did not stop

members of Congress in 2008 from requesting a review of Washington’s Taiwan policy, with

attention paid to upgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations.

As the Ma administration on Taipei continues to foster calmer relations with the

Mainland, it is important that all three parties involved in Cross-Strait relations take steps to

continue to improve the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Of all of three parties, the Mainland’s

position in the Taiwan Strait is becoming more imposing and thus its decisions regarding its

relationship with Taiwan are more significantly defining the island’s political future. If Beijing

wishes to continue to bring Taiwan closer through peaceful means, as President Hu Jintao stated

in 2008, then it must become more reticent to the nuances of Taiwanese politics. The Mainland’s

57 Wang, “The United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relationship,” 8. 58 Weixing, “Taiwan Strait Détente and the Changing Role of the United States.”

23

first experiences with Taiwanese democracy in the 1990s were damaging to Cross-Strait

relations, as Taiwanese reacted to Beijing’s missile tests in the Taiwan Strait with anger.

Ultimately, the Mainland’s bullying in order to force certain political outcomes in Taipei resulted

in a pro-independence government led by Chen Shui-bian.59 Leaders in Beijing however did

show progress in the 1990s when President Jiang Zemin declared that all Taiwanese political

factions were welcome to participate in Cross-Strait dialogue with the Mainland, albeit with the

stipulation that the DPP and other parties denounce their aspirations for independence. Further

progress was made to “win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people,” and to court

Taiwanese political leaders when, in 2005, Lien Chan’s KMT delegation met with leaders in

Beijing for a summit that called for warmer relations. More recently, the 18th CCP Congress

called for “the two sides to ‘jointly explore political relaions’” and subsequently invited scholars

from numerous political factions in Taiwan to take part in discussions on how to establish better

political relations.60 What was even more encouraging was that scholars from the KMT and the

DPP accepted the invitation and began an open debate on both sides of the Taiwan Strait about

the possibility of a peace agreement. Another signal that Beijing is learning to catch flies with

honey came in January 2014 when President Xi Jinping met with KMT Chairman Wu Poh-

hsiung. Chairman Wu openly admitted that Taiwan must seriously consider Beijing’s One-China

Framework when exploring its political future, a break even from the KMT who traditionally

refer to the 1992 Consensus on the subject of unity with the Mainland.61

It is clear that Beijing’s recent success with warmer Cross-Strait relations came not from

political threats and military demonstrations, but rather through initiating dialogue, inviting

discussion, and welcoming Taiwanese leaders of all stripes to discuss Cross-Strait relations. The

59 Sheng “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations.” 60 Wang, “The United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” 19. 61 Wang, “The United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” 20.

24

Mainland’s ability to influence Taiwan’s political future is already strong thanks to the island’s

growing economic dependence and asymmetric military power. In addition to these frightening

realities, continued reassurance signaling through initiating dialogue and can further convince the

Taiwanese of closer relations with the Mainland as well as prevent future rifts.

While Beijing continues to take a more dialogue-friendly approach to Cross-Strait

Relations, Taipei must proceed cautiously. As is the case for the Mainland, the biggest lessons

for the Taiwanese moving forward should be taken from the degeneration of Cross-Strait

relations during the Chen Shui-bian administration between 2000-2008. Although President

Chen did not openly call for independence from the Mainland during his time in office, he did

initiate a number of actions that suggested independence, and alienated both the Mainland and

the United States. One of the first suggestions that Taipei was interested in political separation

from the Mainland came in the language used by Chen and other members of his

administration。 They described themselves as Huaren（华人), just as ethnic Chinese in

Singapore and other diaspora communities do, rather than Zhongguoren (中国人).62 This

behavior continued throughout the 2000s, and included Chen’s remark on Cross-Strait relations

as equivalent to relations between two states as well as his insistence that Cross-Strait dialogue

follow UN Charter guidelines for relations between two states.63 Additionally, Chen’s

government sought to gain greater international space for Taiwan through membership in the

World Health Organization and an application to be admitted as a member state, in the United

Nations. Domestically, a “defensive referendum” was called in 2004 that asked the Taiwanese

public how they believed Cross-Strait relations and a military build-up in the Taiwan Strait

62 Sheng, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross Strait Relations.” 63 Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement.”

25

should proceed.64 As relations improved through more open dialogue and Ma Ying Jeou’s Three

No’s, Taiwan must continue to proceed with caution. Given domestic politics, it is clear to

leaders in Taipei that the status quo regarding political issues with the Mainland is popular

amongst many Taiwanese who fear the consequences of either reunification or independence.

In addition to the political risks, the ECFA has raised the economic costs for greater

Taiwanese political distance from the Mainland. Not only would tense relations between Taipei

and Beijing hurt investment opportunities for both Mainland and Taiwanese businesses, but also

inhibit job creation, one of the major benefits of the ECFA for Taiwan.65 Additionally, Beijing’s

adherence to the ECFA means for Taiwan that the Mainland may recognize the legitimacy of

Free Trade Agreements signed between Taipei and other states in East and Southeast Asia, a

move that can help to integrate Taiwan into the global economy. Strained Cross-Strait relations

can upset this arrangement and seriously damage Taiwan’s economic prospects.

Taiwan’s cautious but warm relationship with the Mainland also benefits its special

relationship with the United States. In addition to the strong economic relationship between

Taiwan and the U.S., the need for continued U.S. arms purchases and a U.S. commitment to the

island’s defense means that maintaining a good relationship with Washington is important to

Taiwan’s security and ultimate survival. The Chen years saw Washington join Beijing in stern

warnings against calls for greater international space and separation from the Mainland. Not only

did Chen’s policies lead the U.S. to fear entrapment in its security agreement with Taiwan, but it

also threatened to strain Washington’s relationship with Beijing. Taipei’s Cross-Strait policies

must therefore take into greater account the U.S. reaction. Indeed, this has happened, with

President Ma’s more moderate policies and adherence to the 1992 consensus. The result has been

64 Sheng, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations,” 15-17. 65 Brown “Cross-Strait Investment.” 38.

26

further arms sales to Taiwan in 2008, 2012, and 2014 and no serious change in the U.S. security

commitment to Taiwan.66 Additionally, bolstering its security apparatus gives Taiwan a level of

deterrence that can discourage the Mainland from seeking a military option to reunification.

While Taiwan will never have a military equal to the Mainland’s in size and scope, it can provide

enough deterrence that any military solution to reunification could be deemed too costly.67 Such

deterrence is possible through U.S. arms sales, which in turn is predicated on good relations with

the U.S.

For the United States, its continued position as a party to Cross-Strait relations is ensured

by its security commitment to Taiwan, its economic interests regarding shipping and investment

in the Taiwan Strait and Mainland China, and its larger schemes for regional order in East Asia.

However, as Taipei and Beijing have warmed to one another since 2008, the need for

Washington to intervene as a mediator (as it did during the Chen years) is not as strong.

Additionally, greater assurances for peaceful dialogue from Beijing and Taipei, as well as the

Mainland’s developing military capabilities, might make the U.S. security commitment to

Taiwan less meaningful in Cross-Strait relations.

In regards to the Mainland’s ascendancy as a regional power seeking to help define or

completely revise East Asian regional order, the U.S. must take this into account when

participating in Cross-Strait relations. With China’s new nationalism that has emerged since the

1990s, combined with its nascent political and economic power, it is more important than ever

that Washington convince Beijing that it staunchly opposes greater Taiwanese political distance

from the mainland, let alone independence. Washington accomplished this during the 2000s and

must be prepared to take a strong stance against any similar signals from Taipei in the future.

66 Chen Weihua, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Protested.”

67 Wang, “The United States and Cross-Strait Relations,” 19.

27

This sends assurance signals to Beijing at a time when Chinese political leaders increasingly

refer to Taiwan as one of China’s “core interests.”

In addition, the U.S. must also preserve its relationship with Taiwan, not only for

Taiwan’s sake, but also for the sake of key U.S. allies in East Asia. It is felt by the Obama

administration that Taiwan, like other areas of East Asia, is a key part of U.S. regional

framework. The “loss” of Taiwan, as was remarked by the Bush administration, would be

detrimental to U.S. security and economic interests.68 Of great significance is the importance of

the Taiwan Strait as an artery of global shipping, the loss of which would be economically

disadvantageous to the U.S. and its allies in East Asia such as Japan. Beyond this however, the

future of U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan can set an example for its East Asian allies and

strategic partners. Reinterpreting promises of protection too broadly in order to avoid

entrapment, or ending arms sales, could signal to U.S. allies like South Korea, Japan, and the

Philippines that the U.S. rebalancing in East Asia lacks seriousness. Moreover U.S. relations

with Taiwan and its continued insistence on involvement in Cross-Strait relations can signal that

Washington is a key balancer to growing Chinese regional power.

As with other major issues in East Asia, Cross-Strait relations are subject to changing

factors like growing Chinese power, U.S. rebalancing, and Taiwan’s domestic politics. The

character of relations across the Taiwan Strait have also transformed since 1986 from silence to

tentative dialogue, to military posturing, to reopened dialogue and economic interdependence.

The relationships amongst the Taiwan Strait’s three parties, the U.S., Mainland China, and

Taiwan, have gone through tumultuous change. Taiwan, faced with international isolation at the

end of 1970s, reinvented itself through democratization and a new economic relationship with

the Mainland. The Mainland also took part in opening dialogue with Taiwan in the 1980s while

68 Weixing, “Taiwan Strait Détente and the Changing Role of the United States.”

28

it underwent significant economic reform to become a rapidly developing regional power. The

United States has been present s as a mediator whose security guarantees for Taiwan and official

relationship with the Mainland leave it, sometimes precariously, in the middle of disputes and

dialogue between both sides of the Strait. As these three parties continue to define Cross-Strait

relations, their roles will certainly transform. Nevertheless, each party has a role to play, whether

through greater dialogue over sensitive political issues on the part of Taipei and Beijing, or

through continued commitments to the Taiwan Strait’s stability on the part of the U.S. as it

rebalances to East Asia.

29

Bibliography

"Taiwan Strait (Cross-Strait Relations)." Berkshire Encyclopedia of China: Modern and Historic Views of the World's Newest and Oldest Global Power. N.p.: Berkshire Group, 2009. Credo Reference. 6 Apr. 2011. Web. 1 Oct. 2014. <https://login.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login?url=http://literati.credoreference.com/content/entry/berkchina/taiwan_strait_cross_strait_relations/0>.

Nina Halpern and Samuel P.S. Ho, “Introduction: Cross-Strait Relations,” Pacific Affairs, Winter 1999-2000.

Jianwei Wang, “United States and Evolving Cross-Strait Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, October 2010.

Yongnian Zheng and Lye Liang Fook, “China’s New Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relations,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 2007.

Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations,” The China Journal, January 2005.

Lu Jifeng and Lian Furong, “Development of Cross-Strait Relations from Building the Peace Agreement,” Cross Cultural Communication, October 2012.

Sheng Lijun, “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2001.

Peter Hays Gries and Jenny Su, “Taiwanese Views of China and the World: Party Identification, Ethnicity, and Cross-Strait Relations,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, 2013.

Richard Weixing Hu, “Taiwan Strait détente and the changing role of the United States in cross-Strait relations,” China Information, 2013.

Kerry Brown, Justin Hempson-Jones, and Jessica Pennisi, “Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 2010.

Robert Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006.

Joel Brinkley, “Conflicting Claims: China, Japan, Taiwan on the Edge,” World Affairs, January/February 2014.

Michael Cole, “Was Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement Successful?” The Diplomat, July 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/was-taiwans-sunflower-movement-successful/

Bush, Richard C. Uncharted Strait, Brookings Institute Press, 2013.

30

Lindemann Bjorn Alexander, Cross-Strait Relations and International Organizations, Springer Fachmedian Wiesbaden, (2014).

Tok, Sow Keat, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan, (2013).

Pakula, Hanna. The Last Empress. Simon & Schuster (2009).

Rowe, William, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing, President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2009.

David Brown, “Building Trust Across the Taiwan Strait,” Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations,” 2012.

Chen Weihua, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Protested.” China Daily: December 2014.

31