Political Culture and Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations of Chinese and Taiwanese International

Students in Manila

Emil L. Samaniego MA Political Science Major in Global Politics

Department of Political ScienceAteneo de Manila University

Abstract

This paper comparatively describes the political culture of Chinese and Taiwanese

international students in Manila and their perspectives on cross-strait relations and

conflict. Using the framework devised by Almond and Verba, Political Culture is measured

using the following indicators: interest in politics, support for liberal democratic/socialist

and communist values and attitudes, and satisfaction with the status of the present form of

government and trust in institutions. Based on these indicators, the respondents are

categorized whether they fall under Parochial, Subject and Participant Political Culture.

Lastly, the study devised and offered a theoretical framework which argues that national

(ethnic) identities as intervened by political culture can determine the present and future

political attiudes and behaviour of Chinese and Taiwanese with regards to cross-strait

relations and conflict.

Introduction

“It is time to redress the balance in social analysis.”- Ronald Inglehart, The Renaissance of

Political Culture, 1988-

In retrospect, these are powerful words quoted from 2011 Johan Skyte Winner in

Political Science Ronald Inglehart, which lamented the popularity of Rational Choice theory

as a mode of analysis in explaining political phenomena thereby ‘deemphasizing cultural

factors to unrealistic degree’ (Inglehart, 1988). These words from Inglehart have also

challenged generations of budding and seasoned researchers to revive their interest in the

field of political culture as championed by Almond and Verba since the 1960’s after the

publication of their pioneering study- The Civic Culture. Since then, the field has continually

witnessed its re-emergence or as what Gabriel Almond, ‘the dean of contemporary culture

theory’ (Crothers and Lockhart, 2000), puts it, ‘the return to political culture’ (Diamond,

1993).

Russel Dalton, during the first year of this century, observed what he called “the

renaissance to political culture” (Dalton, 2000). He argued that cultural studies “have been

especially important in the study of democratization, as analysts tried to identify cultural

requisites of democracy” (Dalton, 2000) during and before the third wave of

democratization. He cited Inglehart’s 1981 World Value Study which “demonstrated the

congruence between broad political attitudes and democratic stability for 22 nations

(Dalton, 2000), Putnam’s (1993) research on regional governments in Italty, lastly, he also

referred the works of Inglehart, 1997; Jackman & Miller, 1996; Reisinger, 1995; Tarrow,

1996 as indicators of what he called “the general renaissance in cultural studies” (Dalton.

2000).

The previous decade also hosted several important researches on political culture in

the 21st century; some of them have drawn their analyses from exactly the same model

devised by Almond and Verba in 1963. Gaiser, Gille, Rijke and Sardei-Beimann’s (2007)

research on the variation of political culture of young East and West Germans between

1992 and 2003, and Gvozdanovic’s (2010) research on the political culture of university

students in Croatia both employed the following indicators of political culture that were

derived from Almond and Verba’s theoretical framework: interest in formal politics and

political involvement, attitudes in political order/support for democratic values and

attitudes, and trust in institutions. (See also, Moten, 2011; Omodia, 2011, Ilišin, 2007,

Betarlanic, 2006; Welzel and Inglehart, 2005)

This study is yet another response to the challenge posed by Ronald Inglehart on the

utility of political culture in mediating our understanding of certain political phenomena- in

our case the perspectives of Chinese and Taiwanese international students on cross-strait

relations and conflict. Political culture in this sense is a “crucial intervening variable”

(Inglehart, 1990). This treatment to political culture can be traced back to the works of

Lipset (1981), Inkeles and Diamond (1980) as well as Inglehart (1990) who empirically

demonstrated political culture as an “important intervening variable between economic

development and democracy” (Bertalanic, 2011).

In this paper, I argue that national (ethnic) identity as intervened by political culture

shapes the present and future political behaviors and attitudes of Chinese and Taiwanese

respondents with regards to cross-strait relations and conflict. This function of political

culture to determine expected behavior of individuals in a possible conflictual situation is

in fact a foundation of a well-known theory of “democratic peace” which postulates that

democracies never go to war with each other- an essentially political-culturalist

proposition (Molchanov, 2002: 11). Though this paper is not in any way aimed at

discounting and disproving rationalist assumptions on cross-strait relations and conflict, it

wishes to offer and highlight a political-cultural approach on this seemingly unresolvable

issue which haunts cross-strait scholars and policy makers for decades now.

We are living in a rapidly changing world; globalization increases cross-cultural

contacts that continually shapes and reshapes the identities, cultural and political

orientations of Chinese and Taiwanese youth. Globalization or the opening of national

boarders has also brought greater mobility of (Chinese and Taiwanese) international

students (Levin, 2006); this has opened opportunities for comparativist researchers to

study in micro scale the impact of their ethnic and national identities to their perception on

Cross-Strait relations as mediated by their political culture. This perception takes the form

of political attitudes and behavior. In a more general sense, the present study is drawing

on the variation and interrelationship of identities, culture, values, attitudes and behavior

of Chinese and Taiwanese international students in Metro Manila.

Statement of the Problems

The study endeavors to examine the relationship among the respondents’ national and

ethnic identification as explanatory variable, political culture as intervening variable and

the respondents’ perspectives on cross-strait relations and conflict as outcome variable.

Reference is also made to respondents’ age, gender, religion, level of religiosity and years of

stay in the Philippines as confounding or extraneous variables. Specifically, below are the

puzzles that the study attempts to unravel:

1. What are the classifications of the respondents based on their demographic profiles,

ethnic and national identification, political culture and their perspectives on Cross-

Strait relations and conflict?

2. Is there a significant difference or similarity on respondents’ political culture in

reference to their ethnic and national identification?

3. Is there a significant difference or similarity on respondents’ perspectives on Cross-

Strait relations and conflict in reference to their ethnic and national identification?

Null Hypothesis:

There is no significant similarity between the respondents National and Ethnic

Identification, Political Culture and Perspectives on Cross-strait relations and

conflict.

ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

POLITICAL CULTURE

PERSPECTIVE ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS AND CONFLICT

(-)NEGATIVE/PESSIMISTIC POSITIVE/OPTIMISTIC (+)

Conceptual Framework

AGE GENDER YEARS OF STAY IN RPRELIGION & LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY

TAIWANESECHINESE

LOW INTEREST IN FORMAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT HIGH

LOW SUPPORT FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND ATTITUDES HIGH

HIGH SUPPORT FOR SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST VALUES AND ATTITUDES LOW

PAROCHIAL SUBJECT PARTICIPANT

LOW SATISFACTION IN GOVERNMENT AND TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS HIGH

INCREASE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERDEPEND-ENCE

ONE CHINA, TWO SYSTEMS

MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO, UNIFICATION IN THE FUTURE

MILITARY SOLUTION

MEDIATION BY USA OR OTHER STATES

MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO, INDEPENDENCE IN THE FUTURE TW

O C

HIN

A TW

O

SYST

EMS

MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO FOREVER

MED

IATI

ON

BY

UN

ITED

NAT

ION

AN

D O

THER

IN

TERN

ATIO

NAL

O

RGAN

IZAT

ION

S

MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO, DECIDE WHETHER UNIFICATION OR INDEPENDENCE LATER

Theoretical Framework

The history of culture as a political concept is a bittersweet tale of emergence,

decline and re-emergence. It was hailed and celebrated during the 1960’s, attacked in all

fronts during the 80-70’s but has gradually reemerged since the 90’s until today.

Its modern conception can be traced back from Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba’s

seminal work, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963).

The study contended that the institutions and patterns of action in a political system are

closely linked to the political culture of the nation (Dalton, 2000). Traditionally, the term

‘political culture’ includes subjective relatedness to politics (interest, information,

communication), attitudes towards different models of political order (democracy,

socialism) and, finally, the evaluation of what politics achieve (satisfaction with democracy,

trust in institutions) (Gaiser et. al., 2007: 288). Hence, political culture is defined as

“people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about

the political system of its country, and the role of the self in the system” (Diamond, 1993:

7).

The components of political culture which can be classified into three pyscho-social

orientations are cognitive orientation, involving knowledge of and beliefs about the

political system; affective orientation, consisting of feelings about the political system; and

an evaluational orientation, including commitment to political values and judgments

(making use of information and feelings) about the performance of the political system

relative to those values (Almond and Verba, 1963: 15).

“According to Zver (2002) political culture cannot be measured through everyday

expressions of public opinion. He adopts an operational model that emphasizes culture as a

sum of values and behaviors that can be empirically measured. Through the application of

this approach we can measure political culture on three distinctive levels of expression:

- Declarative level: opinions regarding the political system, structure and

processes;

- Implicit value level: choices among (opposite) sets of values;

- Behavioral or participative level: measuring levels of political participation

or abstinence.” (Bertalanic, 2006)

Political Culture can also be empirically measured using the following indicators

derived from Almond and Verba’s theoretical framework: interest in formal politics and

political involvement, support for Liberal Democratic values and attitudes/Socialist and

Communist values and attitudes, and trust in institutions and satisfaction with the present

form of government.

“Interest in formal politics is considered to be an essential part in the input

dimension of the political system” (Gaiser et. al, 2007: 288). It involves the assessment of

the individual about the importance of politics among other areas of life (Religion, Culture,

Family etc.), his “willingness to take at least a cognitive approach to politics and to obtain

political information and knowledge” (Gaiser et. al, 2007: 288), and his active involvement

in political activities.

Support for Liberal Democratic values and attitudes/Socialist and Communist

values and attitudes belongs to the system dimension of political culture. “Values are ideas

or beliefs regarding desirable goals and behaviors that can be organized in systems”

(Gvazdanovic, 2010: 468). “Also, they direct our attitudes and behaviors” (Ferić and

Kamenov, 2007).

The output dimension of political system is analyzed using the command indicator

‘trust in institution and satisfaction in the present form of government’. This indicator is

part of the evaluative orientation of political culture. “Political evaluations are addressed

concerning the way citizens see themselves as active and influential participants in the

political process (internal efficacy) and the conviction that political leadership is open and

responds to the population (external efficacy)” (Gabriel, 1994, p. 118).

Table 1.1 Dimension of Political Orientation (Almond and Verba, 1963: 15)

1. System as General Object

2. Input objects

3. Output objects

4. Self as object

CognitionAffectEvaluationTable 2.1 tells us that the political orientation of an individual can be tapped systematically if we explore the following: 1. What knowledge does he have of his nation and of his political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power, “constitutional characteristics, and the like? What are his feelings towards these systematic

characteristics? What are his more or less considered opinions and judgments of them? 2. What knowledge does he have of the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making? What are his feelings and opinions about these structures, leaders and policy proposals? 3. What knowledge does he have of the downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals and decisions involved in these processes? What are his feelings and opinions of them? 4. How does he perceive himself as a member of his political system? What knowledge does he have of his rights, powers, obligations and of strategies of access to influence? How does he feel about his capabilities? What norms of participation or of performance does he acknowledge and employ in formulating political judgments, or in arriving a opinions? (Almond and Verba, 1963: 15-16)

Political Culture based on the evaluation of its indicators can be classified into three

major categories: Parochial, Subject and Participant. Individuals with Parochial Political

Culture are characterized by very low cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations

towards the political system. “A parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence

of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The parochial expects nothing

from the political system” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 17). Furthermore, the government is

seen as the enforcer of its own rules and consequently, the realm of politics is seen as one

to be avoided whenever possible (Lecture 4_politicalcuture.pdf: 17). The second major type

of political culture is the Subject Political Culture. “Here there is a high frequency of

orientation towards a differentiated political system and towards the output aspects of the

system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active

participant, approach zero” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 17). This tends to be manifested in a

citizenry that expects positive action from government, but that does not tend to be

politically active themselves. They, too, see politics as an elite domain only to be engaged in

by those with power and influence (Lecture 4_politicalcuture.pdf: 18). The third model of

political culture is the Participant Political Culture wherein individuals have high cognitive,

affective and evaluative orientation towards the political system. It is “one in which the

members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both

the political ad administrative structures and processes; in other words, to both the input

and output aspects of the political system” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 18). Societies which

possess this type of political culture tend to have citizens with high expectations of

government and of personally participating in politics, if at no other time than voting in an

election (Lecture 4_politicalcuture.pdf: 19).

Table 2 Types of political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963: 16)

1. System as General Object

2. Input objects

3. Output objects

4. Self as object

Parochial 0 0 0 0Subject 1 0 1 0Participant 1 1 1 1

Political Culture is passed on from one generation to the next through the process of

political socialization. Political identity is formed through the political socialization process

and the influence of social and political institutions like the family, education system, mass

media, religion, the government and other states’ institutions. This political identity in turn

determines our political values, attitudes and behavior.

Political identity takes the form of national [ethnic] identity. According to

Kholocharova (2011) political and national identity are quite tightly interwoven, and it is

not always possible to decide precisely where the boundary between them run. However,

when nation is interpreted as a political community, the concepts of national and political

identity intersects only partially because not every national (ethnic) community can be

called political, and not every political entity assumes a commonality of an organic and

cultural character. Molchanov (2002) observed that political culture and national identity

of a country are mutually complimentary aspects of the same phenomena. Since nationality

is politically shaped and reflects the national traditions of governance, political culture

must be seen as an important aspect of national identity. Reciprocally the process whereby

national identities are formed also lays the groundwork for political development along

nationally specific lines, hence for political culture defined on a national basis. Political

culture can be seen as a form of historical memory of a nation which organizes political

behavior according to the lessons drawn by the nation from its earlier experience.

Springboard (2003) postulated that national political identities are fluid and reflect shifts

in power relations between social groups and the dynamics of political institutions to

include specific groups and exclude others.

Empirical Basis

The quantitative data used in this study were collected by the researcher in the

period of February to March, 2012. The number of samples collected are N=24 (10 Chinese

and 14 Taiwanese respondents), these were stratified according to respondents’ national

(ethnic) identification, demographic attributes (age, gender, years of stay in the

Philippines, religion, level of religiosity), political culture and perspectives on cross-strait

relations. Political culture was measured through the following indicators: interest in

formal politics and political involvement, support for Liberal Democratic values and

attitudes/Socialist and Communist values and attitudes, and trust in institutions and

satisfaction with the present form of government. Univariate and bivariate data analyses

were employed. The first was used to determine the answer distribution and the latter for

calculating the significance of differences/similarities by using the 2 test and correlationχ

using r.

Demographic Profiles

Table 3: Demographic Profile

Gender F P

Male

Female

10

14

41.7

58.3

Total 24 100.0

Age F P

17-20

21-24

25-28

11

7

6

45.8

29.2

25.1

Total 24 100

Years of Stay in the Philippines

F P

1-5 13 54.2

6-1010-20

7

4

29.2

16.6

Total 24 100

Religion F P

ConfucianismBuddhismCatholicismProtestantismNo religion

15549

4.220.820.816.737.5

Total 24 100.0Level of Religiosity F PReligious 9 37.5No Answer 12 50Less religious 2 8.3Extremely less religious 1 4.2Total 24 100.

Out of N=24 respondents surveyed, there are a total of 10 males and 14 females.

Their ages range from 17-28. Majority of respondents (54%) have stayed in the Philippines

for a period of 1-5 years, 45.9% have stayed for a period of 6-20 years. Majority of

respondents (37.5) have no religion, Catholicism and Buddhism tie at 20.8%, followed by

Proiotestantism (16.7%) and Confucianism at 4.2%. In summary, western religions

(Catholicism and Protestantism) account for a total of 37.5%, significantly higher than

eastern religions (Buddhism and Confucianism) which account for 25% of the respondents.

Accordingly, half of the respondents surveyed have no answer on the question “how

religious are you”, 37.5% are religious, 8.3% are less religious and 4.2% are extremely less

religious.

National and Ethnic Identifications

41.7% of respondents identified themselves as Chinese and 58.3% identified

themselves as Taiwanese. Majority of Chinese respondents believed that when they say

“our country” it refers to People’s Republic of China (Mainland China and all administrative

regions including Taiwan, Spratly Islands, Tibet and all other territories claimed by PRC).

However, no one referred their country as Communist China. For Taiwanese respondents,

all of them referred their country as simply Taiwan. On the question of territory, majority

of Chinese respondents referred to it as Zhongguo [Mainland China and all administrative

regions (Hong Kong Macau) including Taiwan, Tibet, Group of Islands in South China Sea

(Spratlys etc.) and all other territories claimed by PRC], on the other hand, majority of

Taiwanese respondents referred to their territory as simply Taiwan. On the question

“When we say “people of my country,” to which of the following do you refer?” Majority of

Chinese respondents answered people of Zhongguo (Mainland China, administrative

regions and other territories claimed (Taiwan etc.) by PRC) and majority of Taiwanese

respondents answered simply as people of Taiwan. Lastly, a great majority of Chinese and

Taiwanese respondents identified themselves as ethnically pure Chinese and pure

Taiwanese, respectively. Based on these data, it can be inferred that both of the Chinese

and Taiwanese respondents hold a clear and distinctive understanding of their ethnic and

national identities.

Table 4: National Identification

Frequenc

y PercentChinese 10 41.7

Taiwanese 14 58.3 Total 24 100.0

Table 5: Ethnic Identification

1. Please complete the sentence: I am ____________?

Frequency Percent1. (Pure) Chinese 8 33.3

2. (Pure) Taiwanese 11 45.8 3. Both Chinese and Taiwanese/Taiwanese and Chinese 1 4.2

4. Chinese first then Taiwanese 5. Taiwanese first then Chinese 2 8.3 6. Others 2 8.3 Total 24 100.0

Political Culture

A. Interest in Formal Politics

As an input dimension of Political Culture, interest in formal politics measures the

respondents’ assessment of importance of politics as juxtaposed to other areas of life.

Based on the survey, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents ranked “Family” as the

most important areas of life followed by “Economy”. Politics, though it lags behind other

areas of life is still treated as an “important” area of life with average mean of 2.2 for

Chinese respondents and 1.9 for Taiwanese respondents.

Table 6: How important to you personally is each of these areas of life on this list?

Nationality N Mean t-value SigInterpretati

onFamily Chinese 9 1.0000 -1.170 .255 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 1.1429 -1.472 .165 Reject HoEconomy Chinese 9 1.5556 1.284 .213 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 1.2857 1.251 .229 Reject HoPolitics Chinese 9 2.2222 .733 .472 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 1.9286 .763 .455 Reject HoReligion Chinese 9 3.1111 2.195 .040 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 2.0714 2.079 .056 Reject HoCulture Chinese 9 1.8889 .266 .792 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 1.7857 .264 .795 Reject Ho

Social Values Chinese 9 1.7778 .193 .849 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 1.7143 .203 .841 Reject Ho

Environment Chinese 9 1.7778 .896 .380 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 1.5000 .848 .411 Reject Ho

Science & Tech Chinese 9 1.5556 -.055 .957 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 14 1.5714 -.053 .958 Reject Ho

Table 7:Nationality N Mean t-value sig

Interpretation

How strong is your interest on politics? Chinese9 2.6667 -.799

.433

Reject Ho

Taiwanese

14 3.0000 -.833.41

5Reject Ho

I understand politics pretty well. Chinese10 3.0000 1.236

.229

Reject Ho

Taiwanese

14 2.5714 1.383.18

2Reject Ho

I find politics complicated for a normal person to

Chinese10 2.9000 1.322

.200

Reject Ho

understand. Taiwanese

14 2.4286 1.448.16

2Reject Ho

Both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents exhibit an “intermediate” interest on

politics with an average mean of 2.6 and 3.0, respectively. On their understanding of

politics and their perception of it as complicated for a normal person to understand, both of

the respondents answered “sometimes true” with average mean of 3.0/2.9 for Chinese

respondents and 2.57/2.4 for Taiwanese respondents.

Table 8: How often do you do the following?

Nationality Mean

t-value

p-value

Interpretation

A. Talk about politics with parents at home

Chinese 2.0000

.000 1.000Reject Ho

Taiwanese

2.0000

.000 1.000Reject Ho

B. Talk with friends about politics and society

Chinese 1.8000

-2.359 .028Accept Ho

Taiwanese

2.2143

-2.363 .029Accept Ho

C. Discuss politics in school and the classroom

Chinese 1.9000

-2.075 .050 Accept Ho

Taiwanes 2.428 -1.953 .070 Accept Ho

e 6

D. Read daily and weekly newspapers, news

Chinese 1.9000

-.103 .919Reject Ho

websites and other online news source

Taiwanese

1.9286

-.100 .921Reject Ho

E. Watch local or international (cable) news

Chinese 1.6000

-1.219 .236Reject Ho

Taiwanese

1.9286

-1.291 .210Reject Ho

F. Keep yourself informed and up to date about political issues in Taiwan (For Taiwanese

Chinese2.000

0.731 .473

Reject Ho

respondents) and China (For Chinese Respondents)

Taiwanese

1.8333

.745 .465Reject Ho

G. Follow local politics in the Philippines Chinese 2.1000

.103 .919Reject Ho

Taiwanese

2.0714

.100 .921Reject Ho

H. Follow the development of the conflict Chinese 2.1000

2.380 .026 Accept

Ho between China and Taiwan Taiwanes

e1.571

42.339 .031

Accept Ho

I. Follow other international issues that concern

Chinese 2.0000

1.163 .257Reject Ho

China or Taiwan (eg. News on Foreign Policy)

Taiwanese

1.7857

1.143 .268Reject Ho

Total Mean Chinese 1.93 Reject Ho

Taiwanese

1.96Reject Ho

Based on the above table, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents exhibits

intermediate scores and no general significant difference on how they talk, discuss, garner

information and follow news about politics. However, there slight variation on how Chinese

and Taiwanese respondents follow the development on conflict between China and Taiwan,

the latter put more interest on it than the former.

Table 9: What are the current issues in Taiwan (for Taiwanese Respondents) and in

China (for Chinese Respondents) that for you is the most important down from the

least important (rank the following based on their degree of importance for you, 1-

highest 6-lowest)

Nationality Mean t-value sigDECISION

Economy, trade and business Chinese 3.5556 1.527 .142 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 2.3077 1.450 .169 Reject Ho

Government and politics, corruption,

Chinese3.5556 .265 .794

Reject Ho

Taiwanese 3.3333 .268 .792 Reject Ho

Foreign policy; Taiwan’s independence from

Chinese3.7778 .029 .977

Reject Ho

China or China’s claim to Taiwan etc.

Taiwanese3.7500 .028 .978

Reject Ho

Environment, global warming, climate change

Chinese4.4444 2.817 .011

Accept Ho

Taiwanese2.3333 2.864 .010

Accept Ho

Society, poverty, crime, social divides

Chinese2.8889 -.612 .548

Reject Ho

Taiwanese 3.3333 -.615 .546 Reject Ho

Culture, art, lifestyle and leisure Chinese 3.5556 .070 .945 Reject Ho

Taiwanese 3.5000 .071 .944 Reject Ho

Based on the table above, Taiwanese respondents ranked economy, trade and

business as the most important issue in Taiwan today, closely followed by Environment,

global warming and climate change. Government, politics and corruption and Society,

Poverty and Social Divides tied with the same average mean of 3.33. Foreign policy issues

particularly cross-strait conflict ranked the lowest with 3.7 average mean. On the other

hand, Chinese respodents ranked Socieym poverty, crime and social divided as the most

pressing issue on China today, closely followed by Economy, Trade and Business and

Government, Politics and Corruption with the same average mean of 3.5. Foreign policy

(cross-strait conflict and realtions) ranked as second to the very least important issue

which is Environment Global Warming and Climate Change for Chinese respondents. In

summary, there is yet again no significant difference on the data derived from both of the

respondents.

Table 10: In China and Philippines foreign relations (for Chinese Respondents) and Taiwan and Philippines foreign relations (for Taiwanese respondents), which do you think is the most down to the least important areas of cooperation that shall be addressed by both countries? (Rank the following, 1- most important 5- least important)

Nationality N Meant-

value SigDECISION

Trades, Business and Investment Chinese10

2.3000

-1.076

.297Reject Ho

Taiwanese9

3.0000

-1.076

.297Reject Ho

Human Rights, Democracy. Chinese9

3.1111

.667 .514Reject Ho

Taiwanese10

2.6000

.672 .510Reject Ho

Foreign policy Security Issue; Spratly Issues, One

Chinese10

2.6000

-.126 .901Reject Ho

China Policy etc Taiwanese10

2.7000

-.126 .901Reject Ho

Environment, global warming, climate change

Chinese9

4.0000

.725 .479Reject Ho

Taiwanese9

3.4444

.725 .479Reject Ho

Labor Migration (ei. OFW, Chinese/Taiwanese

Chinese9

3.3333

-1.408

.178Reject Ho

expats etc.) Taiwanese9

4.5556

-1.408

.180Reject Ho

Cultural cooperation Chinese9

2.7778

-1.414

.176Reject Ho

Taiwanese9

3.8889

-1.414

.177Reject Ho

Based on the table, Chinese respondents ranked Trade, Business and Investment

as the most important area of cooperation between their respective country and the

Philippines while Taiwanese respondents ranked Human Rights and Democracy. For

Chinese respondents Trade, Business and Investment is closely followed by Foreign Policy

and Security issues, Cultural Cooperation, Human Rights and Democracy, Cultural

Cooperation, Labor Migration and lastly Environment, Global Warming and Climate

Change, while for Taiwanese respodents, Human Rights and Democracy is closely followed

by Foreign Policy and Security issues (same to Chinese), Trade, Business and Investment,

Environment and Global Warming, Cultural Cooperation and lastly, Labor Migration. It is

important to note that both of the Chinese and Taiwanese respondents ranked Labor

Migration as a least important area of cooperation between their respective county and the

Philippines.

Interestingly, Table 11 reveals that there is great propensity for both Chinese and

Taiwanese respondents to engage in political actions.

Table 11: On the list are some political actions that people engage in, please tell me if you have done, might do or will never do the following nationality Total

Chinesetaiwane

se A. Signing in petition have done 0 2 2

might do 8 7 15 Never 2 3 5

B. Joining in Boycotts have done 0 1 1 might do 5 7 12 Never 5 4 9

C. Attending Lawful Demonstrations

have done0 1 1

might do 7 5 12 Never 3 6 9

D. Joining unofficial strikes have donemight do 4 7 11

Never 6 5 11E. Occupy building or

factorieshave done

1 0 1

might do 6 7 13 Never 3 5 8

Table 12 shows that Democratic Progressive Party garners the most support from

Taiwanese respondents followed closely by the ruling party Kuomintang. Table 13 reveals

that an overwhelming majority of Chinese respondent support the Communist Party of

China.

Table 12: (For Taiwanese respondents) Which of the following political parties do you follow/support?

Frequency Percent

Valid kuomintang

3 12.5

Dpp 5 20.8 Npsu 2 8.3 None 3 12.5 Total 13 54.2Missing System 11 45.8Total 24 100.0

Table 13: (For Chinese Respondents) Do you follow or support the Communist Party of China?

Frequen

cy PercentValid yes 8 33.3 no 2 8.3 i dont

know1 4.2

Total 11 45.8Missing System 13 54.2Total 24 100.0

In summary, under the indicator Interest in Formal Politics, it can be concluded that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents exhibit an average/intermediate interest in actively engaging itself in the political system.

B. Support for Liberal Democratic Values and Attitudes/Socialist and Communist Vales and Attitudes

As a system dimension of political culture, the respondents’ support for Liberal

Democratic/Socialist and Communist values and attitudes are presented by Table 14 and

15 below. Interestingly, Table 14 reveals that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents

have very strong agreement/support for Liberal and Democratic Values. Chinese

respondents very strongly agree to the belief that ‘every person must be given equal access

and equal protection of the law” it was contrasted by their partial agreement on the belief

that “Everyone has the right to express their sentiments and convictions (on the streets or

and other venues) against the government or policies of the government”, meanwhile,

Taiwanese respondents very strongly agree on their beliefs on the importance of

Compromise and Free and Fair elections in a society and county. It was contrasted by their

partial agreement on the belief that a vibrant opposition is good for the country/society.

Table 15 shows a strong (yet not very) agreement of Chinese respondents to Communist

and Socialist values and attitudes as attested by the total mean of 2.14.

Table 14: Please tell me the degree of your agreement or disagreement to the following statements. Encircle the number that corresponds to your answer.

nationality Mean t-valuep-

value Decision1.An individual shall be given freedom

to live his life according to his will Chinese

1.6000 -.142 .888Reject Ho

provided that it does not step on (harm) the rights of the others

taiwanese1.6429 -.144 .887

Reject Ho

2. Every person must be given equal Chinese 1.2000 -1.526 .141 Reject Ho access and equal protection of the law

taiwanese1.6429 -1.693 .106

Reject Ho

3. We must uphold the supremacy of our democratic laws. Every individual must

Chinese1.8000 .300 .767

Reject Ho

follow the law at all times. taiwanese 1.7143 .308 .761 Reject Ho4. Every individual has the right to express

Chinese1.7000 .192 .849

Reject Ho

his opinion. taiwanese 1.6429 .196 .847 Reject Ho5. Everyone has the right to express

their sentiments and convictions (on the streets or and other venues) against the

Chinese

2.3000 .905 .375

Reject Ho

government or policies of the government.

taiwanese2.0000 .946 .354

Reject Ho

6. A vibrant opposition is good for the Chinese 2.2000 -.841 .409 Reject Hocountry/good for society. taiwanese 2.5714 -.935 .361 Reject Ho

7. Every individual has the right to Chinese 2.0000 .209 .836 Reject Ho

follow and exercise their own religious

convictions or the lack of it. taiwanese 1.9286 .210 .836 Reject Ho8. Every citizen has the right to join or

form political parties, civic organizations, labor union and other

Chinese1.9000 .386 .703

Reject Ho

organizations that may oppose or check the abuses of the government.

taiwanese1.7857 .409 .687

Reject Ho

9. Every individual has the right to life, liberty and property. It must be

Chinese1.7000 -.045 .965

Reject Ho

protected at all times. taiwanese 1.7143 -.047 .963 Reject Ho10. Every citizen has the right to elect Chinese 1.8000 .497 .624 Reject Ho their government representative. taiwanese 1.6429 .492 .628 Reject Ho11. Free and fair elections are important.

Chinese1.8000 .717 .481

Reject Ho

It is good for society and the country.

taiwanese1.5714 .754 .459

Reject Ho

12. A free and uncensored press/media is important and is good for society and

Chinese1.8000 -.338 .738

Reject Ho

the country. taiwanese 1.9286 -.368 .716 Reject Ho13. Economic development can be

achieved through opening up our Chinese

1.7000 -.905 .375Reject Ho

market and joining in free trade. taiwanese 2.0000 -1.004 .327 Reject Ho14. A person’s views and preferences

must be respected even though it Chinese

2.0000 -.177 .861Reject Ho

contradicts the opinion of the majority.

taiwanese2.0714 -.193 .849

Reject Ho

15. Even if you are right in a political argument, you should try to achieve a

Chinese2.2000 2.144 .043

Reject Ho

compromise. taiwanese1.5714 2.211 .038

Reject Ho

Total Mean Chinese 1,66

Taiwanese

1.82

Table 15: (For Chinese Respondents Only)

N Mean1. Goods and services must be equally 10 2.1000 distributed in society.2. State’s wealth and resources must be

equally distributed to all people in the 10 1.7000

society.3. Housing ,recreational facilities, health,

education, sport, cultural activities, and 9 1.6667

livable income must be available to all and are equally distributed

4. Every citizen must actively participate in

10 2.1000

the workplace and community assemblies.5. There must be no division between rich

10 2.5000

and the poor.6. Strict discipline must be exercised in

following the rules and policies of the 10 2.3000

Communist Party and National People’s Congress.

7. The economy must be governed by a central authority. Decision with regards to

10 2.3000

business and trade must emanate from these central economic planners.

8. There must be strict adherence to the 10 2.1000 norms and culture of the society.9. The collective interest is greater than my.

10 2.5000

own personal want.Total Mean 2.14

In summary, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents score high in the system dimension of political culture.

C. Satisfaction with the Status of the Present Form of Government and Trust in Institutions

This is the last indicator of political culture which comprised of the output dimension of political system.

Table 18 reveals that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents are satisfied with the present status of their respective governments and its forms. Likewise, both of the respondents exhibit a slightly average political efficacy as shown in question number 5, 6, 7.

Table 16:

nationality N Mean t-value sig1. (For Taiwanese

Respondents) Are you satisfied with the present status of

Chinese 0(a) .

Taiwan’s government? taiwanese 14 2.35712. (For Taiwanese respondents): Are you

Chinese0(a) .

satisfied with democracy in Taiwan? taiwanese 14 1.92863. (For Chinese Respondents) Are

you satisfied with the present status of

Chinese 7 1.8571 -3.223 .012

China’s government? taiwanese 3 3.3333 -3.488 .0204. (For Chinese Respondents) Are

you satisfied with the present form of government (Communist/Socialist,

Chinese8 2.1250

State Capitalism etc.) of the People’s Republic of China? taiwanese 0(a) .

5. Nothing I do seems to have any effect upon what happens in Philippine

Chinese 8 2.5000 .000 1.000

politics. taiwanese 8 2.5000 .000 1.0006. I don’t believe that politicians care a

Chinese8 2.6250 .298 .770

lot about what people like me think

taiwanese8 2.5000 .298 .770

7. In our country there are a few powerful people; all the others have

Chinese8 3.0000 1.821 .090

no influence on what the government does.

taiwanese8 2.2500 1.821 .092

Table 17 and 18 indicate the trust rating of Taiwanese and Chinese respondents on

different institutions in their respective country. Both of the respondents ranked Family as

the number one most trusted institution, followed by Army and Police (for Taiwanese) and

People’s Liberation Army (for Chinese). Interestingly, Taiwanese respondents ranked their

President and Chinese ranked state media as their least trusted institution. The level of

trust of Chinese and Taiwanese respondents to their institutions are on the same level with

total means of 2.25 and 2,17, respectively.

Table 17: Please rate the following institutions according to how you trust each of them. For Taiwanese Respondents

NMinimum

Maximum Mean

Interpretation

Rank

1. President 13 1.00 5.00 2.6154 152. Premiere 14 1.00 4.00 2.3571 113. Legislative Yuan 14 1.00 3.00 2.2857 9 4. Political Parties 14 1.00 3.00 2.3571 115. Judicial Yuan 13 1.00 3.00 2.2308 8 6. Control Yuan 14 1.00 3.00 2.2143 4.57. Examination Yuan 14 1.00 4.00 2.2857 13 8. Army 14 1.00 3.00 1.9286 2.59. Police 14 1.00 5.00 1.9286 2.5 10. Media 14 2.00 4.00 2.9286 1611. Labor Unions 14 1.00 3.00 2.3571 14 12. Non-governmental Organizations

14 1.00 3.00 2.14296.5

13. Family 14 1.00 3.00 1.7857 1 14. Church 14 1.00 4.00 2.2143 4.515. Corporations and other

large companies14 1.00 4.00 2.3571

11

16. Religious and charitable institutions 14 1.00 3.00 2.1429

6.5

Total Mean 2.25

Table 18: Please rate the following institutions according to how you trust each of them. For Chinese Respondents

Minimu

mMaxim

um MeanInterpretatio

nRank

1. President 1.00 3.00 1.9000 3.5 2. Communist Party of China 1.00 3.00 2.3000 11.53. Politburo 1.00 3.00 2.2000 7 4. People’s Liberation Army 1.00 3.00 1.7000 25. National People’s Congress 1.00 5.00 2.5000 13 6. State Council 1.00 3.00 2.3000 11.57. Central Military Commission 1.00 3.00 1.9000 3.5 8. Supreme People’s Court 1.00 3.00 2.2000 79. Supreme People’s Procuratorate

1.00 3.00 2.20007

10. Family 1.00 3.00 1.6000 111. Private Corporations and Businesses

1.00 3.00 2.10006

12. State’s Owned Corporations 1.00 3.00 2.0000 513. Non Governmental Organizations

1.00 5.00 2.700014

14. Religious and charitable 1.00 3.00 2.2222 10 Organizations

1.00 5.00 2.800015

15. State’s Media

Total Mean 2.17

In summary, Chinese and Taiwanese respondents both scored high on the output dimension of political culture.

D. Synthesis for Political Culture

Computing their scores based on the three indicators of political culture, it can be said that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents fall under the “Subject” political culture. This kind of political culture rank high for both the system and output dimension but ranks lower to input dimension.

Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations

Among the possible courses of action to resolve cross-strait dispute, Chinese and

Taiwanese respondents diverge on 1) Acceptance of the principle of One China Two

Systems, 2) Two China, Two Systems (or Independent China and Independent Taiwan), 3)

Maintenance of the status quo and move toward independence of Taiwan in the future, 4). Mediation

by United Nation and 5) Mediation by United States of America. On the other hand, they converge on 1)

disagreement on the use of Military Solution, 2) Maintainance of the status quo and move toward

unification of China and Taiwan in the future and 3) Maintainance of the status quo and decide either

unification or independence in the future. Table 19 shows an in depth analysis of the results.

Table 19: Please tell me the degree of your agreement or disagreement to the following proposed course of actions to resolve the dispute between China and Taiwan?

nationality N Mean t-value sig

Interpretation

A. Military Solution Chinese

10 3.5000 -.287 .777

Reject Ho

taiwanese

14 3.6429 -.289 .776

Reject Ho

B. Acceptance of the principle of One China Two Systems or Taiwan will become an autonomous region or

Chinese

10 2.0000 -3.507 .002

Accept Ho

province of China (similar to Hong Kong and Macau)

taiwanese

14 3.3571 -3.637 .001

Accept Ho

C. China is independent. Taiwan is independent. (Acceptance of the principles of Two China. Two

Chinese

10 3.3000 2.811 .010

Accept Ho

systems or China abandoning its claim to Taiwan)

taiwanese14 1.8571 2.745 .013

Accept Ho

D. Maintain the status quo and move toward unification of China and

chinese

10 2.2000 -1.212 .238

Reject Ho

Taiwan in the future taiwanese

14 2.7857 -1.286 .212

Reject Ho

E. Maintain the status quo and move toward independence of Taiwan in the future

Chinese

10 3.5000 3.846 .001

Accept Ho

taiwanese14 1.9286 3.625 .002

Accept Ho

F. Just Maintain the status quo and decide either unification or independence in the future

chinese

10 3.2000 1.383 .180

Reject Ho

taiwanese 14 2.6429 1.459 .159 Reject

Ho

G. Mediation by United Nation and other international organization organizations.

chinese

10 4.0000 4.505 .000

Accept Ho

taiwanese13 2.2308 4.244 .001

Accept Ho

H. Mediation by the United States of America and/or other countries.

chinese10 4.3000 4.767 .000

Accept Ho

taiwanese14 2.3571 4.818 .000

Accept Ho

Table 20 shows that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents perceived the

proposition “an increasing economic dependence of Taiwan to China will eventually lead to

unification of the two countries in the future” with slight uncertainty as attested by their

means, 2.9 and 2.42, respectively. On the other hand, both Chinese and Taiwanese

respondents favor the move to open up the boarders of China and Taiwan for more Chinese

and Taiwanese tourists and visitors thereby increasing cultural ties of the two countries.

However, they are again slightly uncertain when asked if they agree that increasing cultural

and economic ties between China and Taiwan are both beneficial to both countries and will

lead to an improved cross-strait relation. Lastly, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents

exhibit optimism that the future of the conflict between China and Taiwan will get better in the years

to come. However, they differ on their perception that the conflict will be peacefully resolved in the

foreseeable future. Chinese respondents tend to be more optimistic than the Taiwanese respondents, as

attested by their means, 1.4 and 2.4 respectively.

Table 20:

, Nationality N Mean t-value sig

Decision

1. Please indicate the level of your agreement/disagreement to this statement: An increasing economic dependence of Taiwan to

Chinese

10 2.9000 1.083 .291

Reject Ho

China will eventually lead to unification of the two countries in the future?

Taiwanese

14 2.4286 1.068 .299

Reject Ho

2. Do you favor the move to open up the boarders of China and Taiwan for more Chinese and Taiwanese tourists and visitors thereby

chinese

10 2.1000 -.549 .588

Reject Ho

strengthening the social and cultural ties of the taiwanese 14 2.3571 -.527 .605 Reject

two countries? Ho

3. Please indicate the level of agreement and disagreement to this statement: Strengthened economic and cultural ties between China and

chinese

10 2.3000 -.278 .784

Reject Ho

Taiwan are both beneficial and will lead to an improved relation of the two countries.

taiwanese

14 2.4286 -.262 .797

Reject Ho

4. Are you optimistic that the future of the conflict between China and Taiwan will get better in the years to come?

chinese

10 1.6000 -1.194 .245

Reject Ho

taiwanese

14 2.0000 -1.179 .253

Reject Ho

5. Do you think that the conflict between China and Taiwan will be peacefully resolved in the foreseeable future?

chinese

10 1.4000 -2.760 .011

Accept Ho

taiwanese 14 2.4286 -2.811 .011

Conclusion

This paper reveals that although Chinese and Taiwanese international students in

Metro Manila possess distinct national and ethnic identities, they seem to have shared the

same political culture which might explain the convergence and divergence of their

perspectives on cross-strait relations and conflict.

However, the data presented here are only a portion of what are needed to be

discussed and analyzed in order to thoroughly prove the theoretical framework devised by

the researcher. Likewise, the statistical techniques employed are not sufficient to prove

these theoretical claims. Thus, this study is of introductory and exploratory nature.

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