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CRUISERS AND BATTLE CRUISERS

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WEAPONS AND WARFARE SERIESSpencer C. Tucker, Series Editor

Air Defense, Shannon A. Brown

Aircraft Carriers, Hedley Paul Wilmott

Ancient Weapons, James T. Chambers

Artillery, Jeff Kinard

Ballistic Missiles, Kev Darling

Battleships, Stanley Sandler

Destroyers, Eric W. Osborne

Helicopters, Stanley S. McGowen

Machine Guns, James H. Willbanks

Medieval Weapons, James T. Chambers

Military Aircraft in the Jet Age, Justin D. Murphy

Military Aircraft, 1919–1945, Justin D. Murphy

Military Aircraft, Origins to 1918, Justin D. Murphy

Pistols, Jeff Kinard

Rifles, David Westwood

Submarines, Hedley Paul Wilmott

Tanks, Spencer C. Tucker

CRUISERS ANDBATTLE CRUISERS

AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THEIR IMPACT

Eric W. Osborne

Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England

Copyright 2004 by Eric W. Osborne

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion

of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataOsborne, Eric W.

Cruisers and battle cruisers : an illustrated history of their impact/ Eric W. Osborne.

p. cm. — (Weapons and warfare series)Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-85109-369-9 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 1-85109-370-2(e-book) 1. Cruisers (Warships)—History. 2. Battle

cruisers—History. I. Title. II. Series.

V820.O83 2004359.8’353—dc22

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C O N T E N T S

Introduction to Weapons and Warfare Series,

Spencer C. Tucker vii

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xiii

chapter one

The Precedents to the Cruiser 1

chapter two

The Development of the Cruiser, 1860–1905 25

chapter three

Cruisers, 1905–1939 71

chapter four

Cruisers, 1939–2004 121

Individual Cruiser and Battle Cruiser Models 167

Glossary 251

Selected Bibliography 255

Index 271

v

I N T R O D U C T I O N T O

W E A P O N S A N D W A R F A R E

S E R I E S

Weapons both fascinate and repel. They are used to kill andmaim individuals and to destroy states and societies, and occasion-ally whole civilizations, and with these the greatest of man’s culturaland artistic accomplishments. Throughout history tools of war havebeen the instruments of conquest, invasion, and enslavement, butthey have also been used to check evil and to maintain peace.

Weapons have evolved over time to become both more lethal andmore complex. For the greater part of man’s existence, combat wasfought at the length of an arm or at such short range as to representno real difference; battle was fought within line of sight and seldomlasted more than the hours of daylight of a single day. Thus individ-ual weapons that began with the rock and the club proceededthrough the sling and boomerang, bow and arrow, sword and axe, togunpowder weapons of the rifle and machine gun of the late nine-teenth century. Study of the evolution of these weapons tells usmuch about human ingenuity, the technology of the time, and thesocieties that produced them. The greater part of technological de-velopment of weaponry has taken part in the last two centuries, es-pecially the twentieth century. In this process, plowshares havebeen beaten into swords; the tank, for example, evolved from theagricultural caterpillar tractor. Occasionally, the process is reversedand military technology has impacted society in a positive way. Thusmodern civilian medicine has greatly benefitted from advances tosave soldiers’ lives, and weapons technology has impacted such ar-eas as civilian transportation or atomic power.

vii

Weapons can have a profound impact on society. Gunpowderweapons, for example, were an important factor in ending the era ofthe armed knight and the Feudal Age. They installed a kind ofrough democracy on the battlefield, making “all men alike tall.” Wecan only wonder what effect weapons of mass destruction (WMD)might have on our own time and civilization.

This series will trace the evolution of a variety of key weapons sys-tems, describe the major changes that occurred in each, and illus-trate and identify the key types. Each volume begins with a descrip-tion of the particular weapons system and traces its evolution, whilediscussing its historical, social, and political contexts. This is fol-lowed by a heavily illustrated section that is arranged more or lessalong chronological lines that provides more precise information onat least 80 key variants of that particular weapons system. Each vol-ume contains a glossary of terms, a bibliography of leading books onthat particular subject, and an index.

We hope that this series will be of wide interest to specialists, re-searchers, and even general readers.

Spencer C. TuckerSeries Editor

viii SERIES INTRODUCTION

P R E F A C E

Cruisers have the most lengthy stories of any class of war-ship in maritime history; only battleships have been around for alonger period. This book is comprehensive and examines the devel-opment of cruisers from the eighteenth century to modern times.Not only is it a study of the technological development of these ves-sels; it also examines the impact of innovation on their use in bothwar and peace. The latter state of world affairs is just as importantas the story of cruisers in combat because they serve in critical rolesmore often in peacetime than in periods of conflict. Finally, thisbook goes beyond the technological and operational history of cruis-ers to include the experiences of the human beings who crew thevessels. Despite great advances in technology, the cruiser is still atool at the command of those that created it. The shipboard life ofindividuals, therefore, is a vital element of the history of cruisers.

These elements collectively form a history of the cruiser that re-veals how its importance cannot be overestimated. During times ofconflict from the eighteenth to the mid–nineteenth centuries, cruis-ers acted as reconnaissance vessels charged with locating an en-emy’s battle fleet and reporting its presence to its own force in orderto initiate battle. Cruisers were also employed to protect traderoutes and to attack enemy maritime commerce. Upon the introduc-tion of steam propulsion, iron (and later steel) as building materials,armor, and the torpedo during the second half of the nineteenthcentury, cruisers became larger, more expensive, and were chargedwith a greater number of duties. These new tasks included protect-ing the battle fleet against torpedo attack and eventually, with theadvent of the battle cruiser, serving as part of the line of battle itself.Technological developments in the mid–twentieth century led totheir also being used to protect aircraft carriers from air assaults andproviding shore bombardment. Today, cruisers are among the

ix

largest, most powerful, most expensive, and most versatile surfacewarships in the navies of the major maritime powers.

Cruisers are equally important through their roles in peace. Inthe absence of a state of hostility between nations, cruisers patrolledmajor trade routes on the oceans. In many cases in history, themaintenance of commercial lanes has been vital to a country’s eco-nomic well-being. Cruisers also serve as tools of global diplomacythrough their ability to project the power of major maritime nationsaround the world.

This book relies on a wealth of resources to detail the duties anddevelopment of cruisers. Among those are works dealing with navaltechnology, warfare, and foreign policies of the major maritime pow-ers. Technical manuals and books that examine design specifica-tions for cruisers are important and numerous. They are, however,not always accurate and must be cross-checked extensively withother works in order to obtain the most accurate data. Books onnaval history are, of course, an absolute necessity. These includethree specific types of works: those that examine the value of cruis-ers in grand strategy in war and peace, others that detail the use ofcruisers in battle, and works that include information on life aboardthe vessels. Information on this last topic includes not only generalhistories of shipboard life but also compilations of personal experi-ences of sailors.

These resources are employed throughout this book in four chap-ters and a reference section. Chapter 1 is a history of the an-tecedents of cruisers. It examines the Age of Fighting Sail and theearly steam era and focuses on the early eighteenth century to themid–nineteenth century. Although cruising duties were attached tomany warships during this period, the focus is on the frigate, themost commonly used vessel for cruising. Here the book details theduties of frigates in war and provides examples of how they fought.It also treats peacetime duties and describes the lives of the sailorsthat manned the vessels. This general history of the duties offrigates includes information on the impact of technological devel-opment. By 1800, the frigate had been altered by innovations inpropulsion, weaponry, and hull construction. These improvementswere the first steps toward the production of the first purpose-builtcruiser by the United States in the mid–nineteenth century.

Chapters 2–4 are devoted to a more detailed discussion of the de-velopment of the cruiser as a weapons system. Each chapter focuseson major technological developments that affected the design ofcruisers and their operational roles. Chapter 2 covers the period

x PREFACE

from the construction of the first cruiser, Wampanoag, in themid–nineteenth century and proceeds to the early twentieth cen-tury. The continued effects of additional improvements in hull con-struction, steam propulsion, armor, and weaponry led to increas-ingly large ships and more numerous types of cruisers suited forspecific tasks. These technological innovations culminated in 1908with the production of a new type of vessel: the battle cruiser. Tech-nological developments and their impacts on cruiser roles and lifeaboard ship were enormous.

By the end of the twentieth century, four general types of cruiserswere tasked with specific duties based on design. Chapter 3 coversthe age between 1908 and 1939, the start of World War II. The firstsection is devoted to the history of the battle cruiser, a vessel that ul-timately confused the roles of cruisers, as it could be deemed both acruiser and a capital ship of the main battle fleet. The second sec-tion in Chapter 3 focuses on conventional cruiser development.This crucial period encompasses the combat history of cruisers inWorld War I and the role they played during the years leading up toWorld War II. After World War I it also saw a debate concerning theusefulness of cruisers that stemmed primarily from the introductionof combat aircraft and postwar international arms agreements thatlimited their construction.

Chapter 4 treats the development of cruisers from 1939 to thepresent day. World War II validated the continued importance ofcruisers to the world’s navies. With the introduction of missile tech-nology and computers in the post–World War II years, cruisers be-came some of the most sophisticated warships in the world; theyproved their importance yet again during the Cold War. Since thecollapse of the Soviet Union, cruisers and their highly trained crewscontinue to operate not only as warships but also as tools in globalpower politics. There is some doubt, however, concerning futureconstruction of cruisers due primarily to their tremendous cost.Smaller warships such as destroyers and frigates have assumedmany of the duties of cruisers and have become the most numeroussurface combatants in major navies.

The reference section is comprised of entries that contain techni-cal information on some of the most important and famous cruisersor classes of cruisers in history. Each entry includes a picture of thevessel and the fate of the warship, or in the case of a class of vessel,all units. Taken together, these sections provide readers a compre-hensive history of cruisers as a modern weapons system.

PREFACE xi

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

I would like to thank several people who aided in the production ofthis book. My wife, Iana, has been a source of encouragement, ashave my parents, Larry and Susan, and my brother Jack. I would alsolike to thank my friend and colleague, Spencer C. Tucker, for the op-portunity to write on this topic and his professional assistance. Fi-nally, I thank the editorial staff of ABC-Clio for their help in the pro-duction of the book.

Eric W. Osborne

xiii

CRUISERS AND BATTLE CRUISERS

C H A P T E R 1

The Precedents to the Cruiser

The contemporary warship that naval scholars and sailors referto as a cruiser is a vessel with defined structural characteristicssuited for certain tasks. These identifying guidelines, however, werenot present during the Age of Fighting Sail from the mid–eighteenthto the early nineteenth centuries from which the cruiser emerged asa warship of the world’s navies. The term “cruiser” at first did notapply to any single type of vessel but rather to a warship capable ofoperating independently from the main battle fleet. Their tasks in-cluded reconnaissance for the ships-of-the-line (the battleships dur-ing the Age of Fighting Sail), commerce protection, and commerceraiding. While relatively small sloops were employed in these tasks,the vessel most commonly used for these functions in the Age ofFighting Sail was the frigate, the ancestor of today’s modern cruiser.By the end of the eighteenth century, these were the workhorses inthe navies of the world’s major maritime powers.

A frigate was defined by a ranking system that gauged the fightingpower of warships. A first rate—those vessels that were the equiva-lent of a modern battleship—mounted 100 guns or upward; secondrate, between 90 and 98 guns; third rate, 64 to 74; fourth rate, 50 to60; fifth rate, 32 to 44; and sixth rate, 20 to 28 guns. Small frigatesnormally carried between 24 and 30 guns, while larger ones mounted50 to 60 cannons. Sloops mounted between eight and 24 guns.

The weapons carried by these vessels were largely cast-iron,smoothbore cannons. The alternative to iron in this age was bronze,

1

which had the advantages of being easier to cast; it also better with-stood the shock of firing due to its greater elasticity. Bronze can-nons, however, fell out of favor due to the immense cost incurred inproducing them. They could be four times as expensive as a piecemade of iron. Naval cannons were capable of firing a variety of pro-jectiles that included solid shot for inflicting damage to the hull ofan enemy vessel, chain shot to strike at the rigging of an enemy shipwith the object of dismasting it, and grapeshot, a short-rangeweapon designed to kill the crew of the opposing ship. All of thesewere fired by inserting a charge of gunpowder into the muzzle alongwith the projectile. Frigates typically mounted their heaviestweaponry on one enclosed gun deck. These guns were placed oncarriages and sighted through ports cut into the sides of the hull.The gun carriage employed in a frigate was the truck carriage (sonamed for its four free-moving wheels that were necessary due tothe recoil of the weapon when fired). In order to prevent the gunsfrom recoiling into crews, they were lashed by heavy ropes, knownas breeching, to the hull. These ropes were also necessary at timesother than combat. The pitching and rolling motion of a frigate inheavy seas necessitated ropes to keep the guns in place. Otherwise,a cannon might roll down the length of a gun deck, wreaking havocon a vessel’s crew. Lighter antipersonnel guns were placed on themain deck, where they were attached to the bulwarks, or rails, ofthe hull.

The size of these weapons varied among the great naval powers asofficials differed over which type of gun could produce the best re-sults in combat. By the outbreak of the French Revolution and theNapoleonic Wars (starting in 1793 to 1815), frigates of the BritishRoyal Navy largely employed 12-pounder guns. In this age, gunswere rated by the weight of the ball they fired rather than the diam-eter of the bore. A 12-pounder gun, consequently, fired a solid shotthat weighed 12 pounds. Vessels in other navies, however, carriedlarger weapons such as the 18-pounder and the 24-pounder, as in thecase of the U.S. frigate U.S.S. Constitution, which mounted the lat-ter type. This vessel mounted 44 of these weapons, which were 10feet long and weighed 5,824 pounds. The 12-pounder by compari-son measured between 9 feet and 6 feet long and weighed some3,800 pounds. In addition to these guns, some frigates of the lateeighteenth century, but especially the early nineteenth century, car-ried a relatively new weapon called the carronade. This weapon wasnamed after the Carron Company of Scotland, which in 1776 pro-duced a prototype model. These were short pieces that had a large

2 CRUISERS AND BATTLE CRUISERS

muzzle bore. They were useful in smaller ships like frigates due totheir lighter weight compared to regular cannons. In the UnitedStates Navy, a 42-pounder carronade weighed only 2,492 pounds,whereas a 42-pounder long gun, mounted in ships-of-the-line,weighed 7,504 pounds. These guns were designed to fire heavy shotat close range in order to smash through the hulls of opposing ves-sels. Their chief drawback in battle was short range. The largest car-ronade, a 68-pounder, could fire up to a maximum range of some450 yards, whereas a 24-pounder long gun could hurl its ball up to1,200 yards.

As a result of the variety of ordnance available, frigates often-times carried a mixed armament. For example, a 32-gun frigate ofthe British Royal Navy at the beginning of the nineteenth centurynormally mounted 26 18-pounder guns and six 6-pounders. Bycontrast, the 32-gun U.S. frigate Essex, launched in 1797, mounted26 12-pounder guns and six 6-pounder pieces. In 1809, this arma-ment was changed to 40 32-pounder carronades and six 12-pounder long guns.

These guns were mounted on an extremely complex weapons sys-tem comprising two major parts: the hull and the rigging. In theeighteenth century, the hulls of these vessels could be up to 175 feetlong and displace as much as 2,000 tons. Some frigates, like U.S.S.Constitution, were larger, with an overall length of 204 feet and adisplacement of 2,200 tons. These ships were constructed entirelyof wood, the dominant material being oak due to its extremestrength and, consequently, its ability to resist cannon fire.

The first step in the construction was to lay down the keel, whichcan best be described as the backbone of a ship. It was the lowestpiece of timber in the hull and extended the length of the hull downthe centerline. Rather than being one piece of wood, the keel wasmade of several pieces that overlapped one another and were at-tached together by joints known as scarphs. Once this constructionprocess was completed, shipbuilders turned to the frame of the ves-sel, which was composed of giant ribs attached to the keel. These,like the keel itself, were made out of several pieces of timber joinedtogether. The decks were then constructed on longitudinal frameswithin the ribs.

These frames, as well as the decks themselves, had to be made ofthe strongest material available to support the ship’s ordnance. Thisprocess was followed by the fitting of hull planks to the outside ofthe hull as the skin of the vessel. The planking was normally thethickest in the area underneath the gun ports given the need for

THE PRECEDENTS TO THE CRUISER 3

added strength to that portion of the hull. To prevent leaking, theseplanks were sealed using a combination of rope and pitch insertedinto the cracks between the planks. In addition to the constructionof purpose-built frigates were the refitting of old ships-of-the-line asfrigates. This process entailed removing one or possibly two decks ofa ship in order to reduce its number of guns. These vessels wereknown as razees. Regardless of whether the ship was a purpose-builtfrigate or a razee, beginning in the 1770s their hulls were fitted witha copper sheathing below the waterline to prevent the wood fromrotting. An equally important use for this sheathing was to curtailthe growth of marine organisms such as barnacles on the hull thatwould create excess drag on the ship and impede its speed.

Coupled with the hull was the rigging. Mounted on giant masts,the sails provided propulsion by harnessing the wind. Frigates suchas the U.S.S. Constitution carried three masts, being the foremast,or mast in the forward part of the hull; the mainmast located amid-ships; and the mizzenmast sited in the stern of the ship. Thesemasts were, like the other parts of a sailing ship, made out of sev-eral pieces joined together and rested on giant blocks of wood in thebottom of the hull. The largest of these was the mainmast, held inplace by rope at first, but in the early nineteenth century this prac-tice gave way to the use of iron bands. Attached to the giant mastswere cross yards from which sails were hung to catch wind. Typi-cally, frigates were square-rigged, the sails being set at right anglesto the hull. The rigging of frigates could sometimes yield speeds of14 knots.

Daily life for sailors was demanding and harsh. These intrepidmen constantly drilled to ensure maximum efficiency in combat.This practice was necessary given the lack of formal training preva-lent among seamen. Although many ordinary sailors during the Ageof Fighting Sail were recruited from merchant service, there werealso many individuals with no experience at sea. These included for-eigners in search of a living in the employ of another country’s navy,prisoners, conscripts (in the case of navies such as that of France),and civilians impressed into service. The work of impressments en-tailed the use of so-called press gangs composed either of sailors al-ready in naval service or men specifically employed for that job. Theunfortunate individuals captured by such groups, as well as allother new seamen, had little or no knowledge of how to operate awarship. Practical experience with drill at sea was also importantfor officers, as there were few naval schools in the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuries. Those that did exist, like Britain’s


Royal Naval College at Portsmouth, founded in 1729, lacked manystudents until the nineteenth century due to the aversion of officersto formal studies.

The conditions under which officers and crew worked and livedoffered little comfort at the end of a trying day. The best-disposed ofthe crew was, of course, the captain, who enjoyed a cabin located inthe stern on the upper deck that spanned the beam of the hull andhad windows that enclosed the rear, sternmost portion of the cabin.High-ranking officers also had their own cabins, which were smalland placed on either side below decks. Aside from such accommo-dations, frigates were cramped vessels, most of the interior spacefilled with guns and stores. In small frigates, lesser officers and menslept in hammocks by the guns on the gun deck. On larger vessels,the crew slept on the lower deck, where they also ate meals. Thelower deck was largely devoid of natural light.

Adding to the discomfort was the state of the vessel itself. Crew-men lived in a damp and dirty environment where rats and verminwere commonplace. Many of these unwelcome passengers revealedthemselves when crew members ate their meals. Oftentimes, bread,stored in casks below decks, was moldy and inundated with weevils.These insects were so prevalent that crews took it as commonplaceto break apart a biscuit at its center, where most of the weevilswere, and simply scrape them out with a knife. Equally poor was themeat, often procured from local slaughterhouses before the ship setsail, stored in casks. Meat became infested with worms over thecourse of a voyage and, though edible, was certainly no comfort tothe crew. Salting the meat before packaging, a common practice tomake it last, could extend its life, but crewmen oftentimes could nottaste the meat as a result of the salt. Indeed, poor diet was a majorreason for illnesses, some potentially fatal. Among these was scurvy,which resulted from a lack of vitamin C in the diet and persistedthrough most of the Age of Fighting Sail. This disease quickly pro-duced bleeding gums and would oftentimes open previously healedwounds.

Hygiene was sometimes a problem during the Age of FightingSail. Toilets, known as heads, were originally made up of planks witha hole in the center that were located at the sides along the bow.Later, heads were placed in the bow belowdecks with sluices thatled out of the ship. Officers and men alike used these facilities,which were uncomfortable as pitching and heavy winds made themdifficult to use. The result was that in periods of heavy seas the bilgeof a frigate, being the lowermost portion of the hull, might be cov-


ered with human excrement, as the men could not relieve them-selves in the heads.

Only the captain, who sometimes had a toilet within his cabin,was better off than the rest. Even he, however, had to endure thefoul stench that sometimes arose from the ship while at sea. Thiswas a problem when frigates, like any other vessel, were in stormyseas and men could not relieve themselves in the head due to thepitching motion. The smell could also be terrible when the ship wasat anchor in a harbor after protracted periods at sea, as in the caseof cruising warships like frigates. Ships that were not well-cleaneddid not benefit from the wind generated from the ship’s movementthrough the seas. Consequently, the odor was not carried away.Bathing amid these conditions offered little comfort. Due to thelack of fresh water aboard, officers and men alike washed with saltwater. The sailors, however, did not bathe frequently, which addedto poor hygiene. When they did bathe, sometimes it was limited tohands and faces. This contributed to the spread of fleas and lice. Aswith the lack of a nutritional diet, this problem could prove deadly,as lice carried typhus.

Some poor conditions were alleviated with the French Revolutionand the Napoleonic Wars. Food became more tolerable owing tobetter storage, and hygiene improved. Medical problems like scurvywere also being addressed, as in the case of the British Royal Navyin 1795 when lemons and oranges became a mandated part of everysailor’s diet (citrus helps prevent scurvy). Even so, conditions incruising warships remained harsh well past the Age of Fighting Sail.

In addition to such hardships, sailors had to endure a rigid systemof discipline, where infractions were often dealt with through a vari-ety of painful, sometimes fatal punishments. Many of these weregiven to officers and men through a court-marital in port, where apanel of officers deliberated the fate of an individual accused ofbreaking the captain’s disciplinary code, in the case of lesser officersand ordinary seamen, or of behaving poorly during battle. One com-mon punishment resulting from a court-marital was flogging, wherean individual was tied down and whipped on his back. In the BritishRoyal Navy at the end of the eighteenth century, convicted peoplecould be sentenced to between 100 and 1,000 lashes. These lash-ings could injure a person to the point of death. This practice wasalso common while at sea, where offenses that warranted floggingincluded drunkenness, sleeping on duty, neglect of duty, disobedi-ence, and theft.

Another punishment at sea was keelhauling, whereby an individ-


ual was tied to a rope, weighted down, and dragged underneath thekeel of the ship from one side to the other. The chances of recoveryfrom keelhauling were poor. In addition to flogging and keelhauling,officers and men alike had to be wary of the death penalty. Suchpunishment followed cowardice in battle and mutiny. The methodof execution varied by rank. Seamen were hanged from the rigging;officers were shot.

Despite the rigid discipline and poor conditions, a well-trainedcrew ensured that the frigate would have the speed and firepower toaccomplish its vital roles. Perhaps the most important role was re-connaissance during time of war. Frigates were deployed ahead ofthe battle fleet to sight the enemy. When a frigate operated as ascout, speed was critical. First, once an opposing force was identi-fied, these ships would rely on their great speed to escape destruc-tion or capture. Second, the speed with which a frigate could sailback to its main battle force was crucial, as the admiral of the fleetneeded to know the enemy’s location and to group ships into combatformation. Fleets employed a tactic called the line of battle, wherebybattleships would group into lines and engage their opposite num-ber in the opposing force. The success of this tactic necessitatedpreparation as the commander attempted to place his vessels to thewindward side of the enemy, known as attaining the weather gauge,and thus gain the advantage to choose when and how to attack.

An example of the usefulness of frigates in the reconnaissancerole is the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar, the decisive naval battle of theNapoleonic period, between the British (under Vice Admiral HoratioNelson) and a combined fleet of French and Spanish ships (com-manded by Vice Admiral Pierre Charles Villeneuve of France). Thecore of each fleet was the ships-of-the-line; Nelson had 27 such ves-sels, Villeneuve 33. Although the Battle of Trafalgar centered onthese vessels, the role of frigates was pivotal. At 6:00 A.M. on 19 Oc-tober 1805, Villeneuve made preparations to sortie from the port ofCádiz, Spain. Sailing within visual range of the harbor were Britishfrigates. One of these, Sirius, signaled that the enemy had topsailshoisted and later communicated that the enemy ships were comingout of port.1 These messages were conveyed from Sirius to otherfrigates and larger ships that formed a chain from Cádiz to Nelson’sfleet that lay over the horizon. These messages forewarned Nelsonof Villeneuve’s movements and thus provided time to deploy vesselsbased on his plan of attack, which ultimately led to a smashing vic-tory that ensured British naval dominance for much of the nine-teenth century. Nelson, whose fleet was numerically inferior, would


have been hard-pressed to secure this triumph had it not been fortimely intelligence provided by the frigates outside Cádiz.

Frigates were also useful as raiders in time of war. Frigates wereroutinely employed by most navies to prey on enemy merchant ship-ping and thus subject it to economic hardship that might damage itswar effort materially or sap its population’s will to fight. An exampleis the cruise of the U.S. frigate Essex during the War of 1812 againstGreat Britain. Under the command of Captain David Porter, Essexraided British shipping in the South Atlantic and off the PacificCoast of South America. From 12 December 1812 to 13 July 1813,Porter captured 15 vessels of varying types that were primarily partof the British Pacific whaling fleet.2 He used his superior speed tooverhaul his prey and then force surrender through superior fire-power. The economic distress that resulted from Porter’s actionsforced the British to hunt him down and capture his ship on 28March 1814.

A corollary to commerce raiding was the imposition of blockades.During the Age of Fighting Sail, some naval powers deployed a cor-don of warships around the coastline of an enemy power in an at-tempt to prevent the entrance or exit of merchantmen carrying sup-plies. Great Britain was the principal user of this tactic and firstemployed a systematic blockade in the 1756–1763 Seven Years’ War.Certainly by the outbreak of the French Revolution and theNapoleonic Wars, the blockade was the key strategy of the BritishRoyal Navy. During this period, the British attempted to denyFrance and its allies the use of the sea through a blockade of the en-tire coastline of those parts of Europe under the control of Frenchrevolutionary forces and later Napoleon. The objectives of the oper-ation were to attempt to starve France’s war effort, and thereby pro-duce hardship for the people under French rule, as well as preventthe warships of France and its allies from leaving port to prey onBritish shipping. At the opening of the conflict in 1793, the Britishemployed frigates in an open blockade strategy. While Britain’s ships-of-the-line remained in port in a state of readiness, a squadron offrigates sailed within visual range of French ports. Frigates on block-ade duty, like raiders, would overhaul any merchantman encoun-tered to ascertain the destination and nature of the cargo. If thecargo was contraband—meaning any goods that could be used formilitary purposes by the French—both ship and cargo could beseized. In the case of enemy warships leaving port, frigates were or-dered to dispatch the information to the battle fleet, which wouldsortie and attempt to destroy the enemy at sea. This latter duty was


later altered by the adoption of a close blockade strategy wherebyBritain’s ships-of-the-line sailed at a distance farther out fromFrench ports than the frigates; the objectives remained the same.

Although this tactic did produce economic hardships for France,it did not force it to surrender. Nevertheless, the blockade had out-standing results, as it led Napoleon in late 1807 to establish hisContinental System as a reprisal to the British action. This systemwas an embargo of British goods entering Europe. The ContinentalSystem created economic hardship for Europeans under the controlof Napoleon and ultimately led to the rebellion of Russia in 1810.Napoleon’s 1812 invasion of Russia to force compliance led to acrushing defeat for the French emperor. The blockade role wouldbecome a primary duty for cruisers well into the modern age, withdramatic economic results.

Frigates were also deployed to protect commerce. A prime exam-ple of the importance of this task is evident in the events that led tothe establishment of the United States Navy in 1794. In the lateeighteenth century, Barbary corsairs from North Africa frequentlyattacked U.S. merchantmen; French ships also preyed on them forviolating trade restrictions while France was at war with GreatBritain and continental powers. On 27 March 1794, the U.S. Con-gress responded by passing an act that called for the construction offour 44-gun frigates and two that mounted 36 guns. These vesselsproved their worth during the 1798–1800 Quasi-War with France,an undeclared war that resulted from the French practice of preyingon neutral shipping during the French Revolution. While Frenchcommerce raiders had succeeded in seizing more than 300 U.S.merchantmen in the Caribbean Sea in the summer of 1797, theirfortune declined drastically upon the outbreak of conflict. U.S.overseas trade increased until the end of the war in 1801 as thesefrigates, combined with a collection of lightly armed vessels, es-corted merchant convoys in the West Indies and engaged Frenchraiders. Ten significant naval battles took place, the most notablebeing 9 February 1799, with the capture of the 40-gun Frenchfrigate L’Insurgente by the 38-gun frigate U.S.S. Constellation. Bythe end of the conflict, U.S. naval forces had captured more than 80French vessels of varying types.3 Frigates in this capacity used highspeed and moderate armament to hunt down raiders.

The lives of sailors in battle while employed in these roles bor-dered on the horrific. Solid shot damaged a ship and killed andbadly wounded crew members. The wooden sides and fittings of aship, when hit by solid shot, would splinter, thus creating a hail of


additional projectiles. A direct hit on a human being by such shotwas almost always fatal.

An example from the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar is the mortalwounding of the Spanish Commodore Cosme Damián Churruca,whose right leg was nearly severed when a cannonball swept him offhis feet as he directed action. Other examples are equally as horrid.In the same engagement, a British sailor manning a gun was struckin the head by a cannonball, which decapitated him. Along with thisform of destruction was added the effect of grapeshot. This antiper-sonnel weapon was composed of several iron balls that were smallerthan solid shot; oftentimes it swept a ship’s main deck of personnel,some being almost obliterated by the multiple shot. Sailors alsofaced chain shot, two balls connected by a chain designed to slicethrough masts. If fired too low, chain shot could slice several men inhalf rather than the masts that they were intended to destroy. In thecase that it did slice through a mast, the crew had to contend withhuge pieces of wood plummeting to the main deck that could crushthem.

Adding to these threats was the possibility of fire, as shot could beheated before being fired. The potential effect on a wooden warshipwas devastating. Not only could the crew be incinerated; the ship’smagazine—the area where the powder and shot were stored—couldblow up and obliterate everything aboard. All told, the decks of afrigate in the Age of Fighting Sail might literally have blood runningon the decks as a result of combat. The experience is best summedup by Samuel Leech, a seaman who was on board the British frigateMacedonian when it engaged the U.S. frigate United States in theWar of 1812:

The whole scene grew indescribably confused and horrible; it waslike some awfully tremendous thunderstorm, whose deafening roar isattended by incessant streaks of lightening, carrying death in everyflash and strewing the ground with the victims of its wrath: only, inour case, the scene was rendered more horrible than that, by thepresence of torrents of blood which dyed our decks.4

Even if they survived, many still had to face the possibility of be-ing permanently crippled or eventually dying from wounds sufferedin the line of duty. Wounded personnel were taken to the ship’s or-lop deck, being below the waterline and the lowest in a vessel’s hull.Surgeons labored in the relatively dark, dank surroundings of thisarea to save as many lives as possible. Procedures included extract-


ing splinters, setting broken bones, and amputation. In many cases,the impact of an object would so mangle the limbs of a sailor thatamputation was the only way to provide any chance for survival.Aside from such horrors, seamen had to contend with the fact thatmedical science had not progressed far enough to effectively fightinfection; many died as a result of common infections.

Sailors, of course, also suffered if their ship sank. Sinkings wererare, as the buoyancy of wood permitted a large amount of floodingbefore a warship was in danger of foundering. When sinking did oc-cur, many never made it off the vessel, trapped belowdecks. Othersdied in the water through exposure to the elements.

The 1793–1815 period of the French Revolution and theNapoleonic Wars as well as other conflicts like the 1798–1800Quasi War and the War of 1812, are testimony to the grisly natureof naval combat during the Age of Fighting Sail. They also exhibitthe importance of the frigate to naval warfare. The high use offrigates is evident from the numbers lost in this period. GreatBritain, which emerged as the great naval power after theNapoleonic Wars, suffered the loss of 16 frigates while its enemiessuffered the loss of 172 frigates. France alone lost 154 frigates, and22 Spanish frigates were either captured or destroyed. The Nether-lands lost 16 frigates from all causes, and Denmark’s navy countednine frigates as destroyed at sea or captured. The United StatesNavy lost three vessels, all captured in battle.5

The conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars ushered in a phase ofenormous technological innovation in naval warfare that eventuallyended the age of the sailing frigate and led ultimately to the con-struction of the earliest modern cruisers. The first innovation wasthe advent of steam propulsion. The potential advantage of a vesselequipped with steam engines rather than sails was enormous. A war-ship that possessed steam power would no longer be a slave to thewinds and could maneuver freely in combat. Steam propulsion wasnot a new innovation in the early 1800s. British innovator JamesWatt invented the first moderately efficient steam engine in 1769.Even so, the steps toward harnessing this power for ships were im-peded by technological problems. The early steam engines provedtoo heavy to fit into a vessel. Such a weighty power plant potentiallyleft little for guns, stores, and crew. If the weight of all of these ex-ceeded the buoyancy provided by the hull, the vessel would sink. Inaddition, the adoption of steam engines was also impeded by someof the more conservative-minded naval officials of the day, whomaintained a steadfast faith in sails over steam. Consequently, the


first use of a steam engine in a vessel was 1783, when the MarquisJouffroy d’Abbans, a French nobleman, sponsored an unarmedsteamer named Pyroscaphe in a trip up the River Sâone.

Others followed d’Abbans by launching steam-powered merchantvessels and, occasionally, warships. One of the earliest steam-enginewarships was developed in Great Britain in 1793 when the Earl ofStanhope envisioned a vessel using steam-driven paddles. Stan-hope’s invention attracted interest in the British Admiralty, but theinventor was forced to use his own funds to construct the ship. Thisexperimental craft, Kent, proved a failure. By 1797 the ship’s enginehad been removed owing to repeated breakdowns and poor perfor-mance. Additional attempts to incorporate steam propulsion in war-ships also resulted in failure. In 1813, U.S. inventor Robert Fultonsubmitted plans to President James Madison for a steam-poweredwarship. With the authorization of Congress in 1814, Fulton over-saw construction of Demologos. Launched in late October 1814 andcommissioned into the United States Navy in June 1815, the hullmeasured 153 feet, 2 inches by 56 feet and displaced 2,475 tons.This warship was technically the first steam-powered frigate in theworld, although its construction was that of a catamaran, being twoseparate hulls joined together, rather than one hull. The armamentof Demologos consisted of 24 32-pounder guns. It was fitted with asteam engine in one of its hulls, while the other housed a boiler.This system delivered a maximum speed of 5 knots through the useof a large paddle wheel housed between the two hulls. The lowspeed rendered the ship unfit for the duties of frigates, which reliedon speed. Indeed, Fulton envisioned his creation as a floating har-bor battery rather than a frigate. The vessel was ultimately nevercompleted for service and probably never went to sea after trials.

The early experiments with steam power made its use in warshipsa dubious proposition. Aside from the mechanical unreliability ofthe first steam engines and the inability to produce high speeds,fuel consumption was another problem. Early steam-powered shipsrequired a tremendous amount of fuel—at that time coal—to steameven relatively short distances. This problem was illustrated byRhadamanthus, laid down in 1831 as one of the British RoyalNavy’s early steamers. This vessel displaced only 813 tons and useda steam engine as well as sails for propulsion. On 21 April 1833,Rhadamanthus left Plymouth and became the first Britishsteamship to cross the Atlantic. While the vessel steamed across theBay of Biscay, it soon switched to sails. By the time the ship reachedthe island of Madeira to recoal, it had consumed 320 tons of fuel.6


The high consumption of coal is more evident through calculationsmade over a period of time while the ship was under steam power.The Rhadamanthus required 188 tons of coal in order to steam for10 days.7 In addition, early boilers were not well machined andwere consequently subject to blowing up if too much steam pres-sure was built up within them. As boilers were seated to the bottomof a ship’s hull, the explosion of a boiler at sea could have disastrousconsequences, as this could either cripple or sink the ship. Thedanger to the engineers and stokers who worked the engines andboilers is evident.

Another problem with early steam vessels was how to transfer thepower of the engines to the water to propel the ship. The earliestmachinery to accomplish this task was the paddle wheel, giantwheels containing blades much like those of a water mill and con-nected to the engine plant and dipped into the sea. Normally twowere mounted onto a vessel to provide a measure of even propul-sion: one for each side mounted amidships. The paddle wheel hadweaknesses when applied to warships. Foremost was the general in-efficiency of the wheel, as the action of the large blades hitting thewater while the wheel turned expended power that could otherwisebe used to propel the ship. There were attempts to correct this prob-lem, such as the invention of the cycloidal wheel in 1833 that re-placed the large blades of the wheel with narrower, staggered ones.Such innovations proved unable to fully surmount the problem.

In addition, a paddle wheeler in stormy, rough seas had the ten-dency to pitch and roll, and one of these wheels might consequentlybe far out of the water while the other was far more deeply sub-merged than normal. Such a situation would put enormous strainon machinery as one wheel encountered far more drag than theother. Finally, the paddle wheel had drawbacks in battle. As warshipsof that age still mounted weaponry on the sides, the large area of thepaddle wheel decreased the number of guns that could be mounted.One of the largest paddle wheel frigates of the British Royal Navy,Terrible, was able to mount a total of only 19 guns. Although manyof these were heavy weapons, the number pales in comparison tofrigates during the Age of Fighting Sail. The paddle wheels alsoproved vulnerable to enemy fire. Although most naval powers at-tempted to provide protection by encasing the upper halves in ar-mored boxes, they could still be shot away and result in a disabledvessel.

Despite the drawbacks of steam propulsion, the major naval pow-ers could not afford to ignore the steam engine. The British warship


Rhadamanthus and others like it were invaluable despite their prob-lems, as the potential of steam power was great. In 1832, the yearbefore its voyage across the Atlantic, Rhadamanthus had proved thevalue of steam power in a blockade of the Netherlands coast in sup-port of French operations to expel Dutch troops from Belgium. Thevessel was able to stay on station regardless of changing wind pat-terns. Aside from this practical consideration, it was better in thelong run to embrace the new system rather than be left behind. Be-fore 1840, most steamers were small dispatch boats. British vesselssuch as Rhadamanthus were the order of the day. Indeed, Francehad set the precedent in 1829 with the launch of Sphinx, its firststeam-powered warship, at Brest. The hull of the Sphinx measured151 feet, 6 inches by 26 feet, 4 inches and displaced 777 tons. Itsengine, produced in Great Britain as the French did not start build-ing their own steam plants until 1848, was capable of a maximumspeed of 7 knots. The vessel also was equipped with sails. Frenchshipyards over the next 10 years launched 23 warships that mirroredthe design of Sphinx. Other naval powers, such as Russia, the thirdlargest naval power of the early nineteenth century, were slow toadopt steam power despite the recognized potential.

The British paddle-wheel frigate Gorgon broke with the practiceof building small steam-powered warships and represented a techno-logical step toward the development of the cruiser. Entering servicein 1837, Gorgon was a wooden-hulled warship whose frames camefrom Tigris, an age of sail frigate that had been dismantled before itwas launched. The hull measured 178 feet by 37.5 feet and dis-placed 1,111 tons. The ship mounted two 10-inch smoothbore can-nons, the size being the diameter of the gun barrel, and four 32-pounder cannons. Its steam engines and paddle wheels produced aspeed of 10 knots. The portion of the paddle wheels that was abovewater was enclosed in lightly armored boxes to protect against en-emy fire. Typical of all steam-powered frigates of the age, Gorgonwas also equipped with sails because of the tremendous amount ofcoal needed to fuel the engines. This vessel was praised by officers,and the British Admiralty responded with orders for additionalsteam-powered frigates. By 1846, Great Britain had constructed 18vessels of the Gorgon class and six units of the Cyclops class. TheCyclops was similar to Gorgon, although its hull was a little over 12feet longer. Subsequent vessels were larger still, with Terrible,launched in 1845, being 226 feet long and displacing 3,189 tons.

Other maritime nations also built steam-powered frigates withthe same general design characteristics as Gorgon. France built


some paddle-wheel frigates in the 1840s to counter Great Britain.The United States also produced steam-driven frigates. In 1841, itlaunched the two paddle-wheel frigates Mississippi and Missouri, thefirst successful steam-powered warships in the United States Navy.The Mississippi measured 229 feet by 40 feet and displaced 3,200tons. The vessel mounted two 10-inch guns and eight 8-inch gunson its sides. Its steam engine produced a maximum speed of 11knots. By the early 1850s, the United States had placed orders forthe construction of three more paddle-wheel frigates. Other powers,such as Russia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, also builtsuch ships in smaller numbers.

While construction of paddle-wheel steam frigates continued, an-other innovation in propulsion began to have an impact on warshipdesign. The invention of the screw propeller as a viable means ofpropulsion greatly offset the disadvantages inherent in the steam-powered paddle wheel. The idea for using a screw was certainly notnew in the early nineteenth century, as inventors had advancedtechnical plans in the late 1700s. In 1800, English inventor EdwardShorter patented a two-blade propeller attached to a shaft. The de-vice was fitted into a transport ship in 1802, with the shaft beingcranked by some 10 seamen. The top speed attained was only 1.5knots, but the test did show the viability of screw propulsion.Shorter’s work was taken farther by Englishman Francis Petit Smithand Swede John Erickson. In 1836, they independently produceddesigns for steam propulsion plants that used screw propellers.Smith’s design led to the construction of Francis Smith, equippedwith a single screw propeller. The hull of this diminutive vesselmeasured 31 feet, 11 inches by 5 feet, 6 inches and displaced 6tons. Due to its size, the vessel spent most of its successful careerafter launching in late 1836 on the canal system that ran throughthe British Isles. Erickson’s design produced Francis B. Ogden, onlyslightly larger than Smith’s craft. Launched in 1837, the vesselmeasured 45 feet by 8 feet, which classified it as a launch. It pos-sessed two screw propellers each measuring 5 feet, 2 inches in di-ameter. Upon its first trial, Francis B. Ogden attained a speed of 10knots.

Larger ships soon followed. Smith’s work attracted considerableattention among the British Admiralty, although the administrativeboard of the Royal Navy was not completely ready to render a deci-sion on whether to adopt the screw propeller for warships. In 1838,the Admiralty called for a further demonstration of the screw pro-peller in a larger vessel. This led to the construction of Archimedes.


Launched in October 1838, it measured 125 feet by 22 feet, 6inches and displaced 237 tons. It shipped a steam engine and pro-peller along with a sailing rig in case the engine broke down. Be-tween April and May 1840, Archimedes proved the superiority of thepropeller over the paddle wheel in a series of races across the En-glish Channel against paddle wheelers. Despite the fact that onepaddle wheeler was faster than Archimedes under certain weatherconditions, the naval officer in charge of the races attributed this tothe larger size and greater weight of the screw-propelled ship versusits paddle-wheeled competitor. His conclusion was that the pro-peller was in fact equal if not superior to the paddle wheel in termsof speed and performance. On 3 April 1845, reinforcement for thisconclusion was provided by a test between the screw-propelledsteamship Rattler and the paddle wheeler Alecto. The two vesselswere lashed together stern to stern and engaged in a tug of war. TheAlecto first dragged Rattler along at a speed of 2 knots, but this oc-currence was only due to the fact that Rattler had not started its en-gine. Once it did, Rattler was soon towing Alecto at a speed of 2.8knots despite Alecto’s propulsion plant being pushed to its opera-tional limit. This experiment became much more famous than thetrials of Archimedes, but in truth the Royal Navy and others had al-ready made the decision to use the propeller. Paddle wheelers re-mained in service as frigates well after the Archimedes tests. Indeed,the United States Navy commissioned several in the early 1850s,and the Royal Navy did not dispense with the last vessel of this typeuntil 1891. Even so, the British, along with other naval powers,turned away from paddle wheels in favor of screw-propelled war-ships.

Besides proven superiority in speed, the propeller had other ad-vantages. First, the propeller obviated the problem of reduced fire-power inherent to paddle wheelers. As the propeller was mountedunder the stern, ships had an unobstructed broadside and couldthus mount more weaponry than paddle wheelers. Second, the pro-peller was far less vulnerable to enemy fire. In practical terms, thepropeller also had the distinct advantage of being able to be fitted topreexisting sailing warships.

The major maritime powers thus embarked on programs of ac-quiring steam-powered, screw-propelled warships. One path to at-taining this goal was to convert vessels of the Age of Fighting Sail tosteam and propeller. Many of these early screw-propelled fightingships were frigates. Excelling at this process were Great Britain andFrance. The British embarked on such a program in September


1845 when it ordered the conversion of four frigates; France insti-tuted a similar policy near the same time. All these vessels carried asteam propulsion system with their old sailing rigs, as engines werestill not reliable for extended frigate operations.

Many world naval powers also constructed new steam-powered,screw-propelled, wooden-hulled frigates. In 1842, France author-ized the construction of its first, Pomone, although it was intendedas an experimental ship. By 1845, the French had decided to con-struct a larger screw-propelled frigate as the first in a series of simi-larly equipped vessels. The Royal Navy, which had been reticentabout the propeller till further tests in 1843, followed suit in 1846with the launching of Amphion. This vessel was actually an uncom-pleted frigate from the Age of Fighting Sail that had been laid downin Chatham Dockyard in 1830. In 1844, the hull was altered to ac-commodate a steam propulsion system.

Perhaps some of the finest of the early propeller-driven frigateswere those of the Merrimack class of the United States Navy. Theunits of this six-ship class, authorized in 1854, were considered bymany to be the most powerful frigates in the world at the time oftheir commission. Merrimack is a good example of a propeller-driven frigate. Its hull was 301 feet long and displaced 4,650 tons.The vessel mounted 40 guns and had a maximum speed of 16 knotsunder a combination of steam power and sails. Owing to the contin-ued fuel consumption problems of early steam engines, steamaboard the Merrimack was used only as auxiliary power to the sails.

By the late 1850s, the technological evolution of the frigate was infull swing. In 1858 Great Britain possessed a total of 421 paddle andscrew warships; France had 219. By 1860, the United States had sixmodern screw-propelled frigates and a collection of paddle wheelers.

All were hybrid warships that could not fully dispense with sailsowing to the poor output of the engines, which produced relativelylow speeds compared to some of the older, but still faster, frigates. Aswith Merrimack, engines consumed too much fuel for extended oper-ations at sea under steam power. Nevertheless, the steam-poweredfrigates, in particular the screw-propelled type, represented a techno-logical step toward the modern cruiser.

While the naval powers struggled to incorporate the new ad-vances in propulsion into battle fleets, another innovation would beof equal importance: the advent of iron-hulled vessels. The idea ofusing iron instead of wood for ship construction was not new. Ironcanal boats had been in use since the late 1700s, as many involvedin maritime affairs recognized its superior strength over wood and


its ability to weather better over time. The first oceangoing ironship was the British-built Aaron Manby, which entered service in1822. Constructed in sections through attaching iron plates withrivets to its iron frame, this paddle-wheel steamer was relativelysmall, measuring only 106 feet, 9 inches by 17 feet, 2 inches, anddisplaced 116 tons. Its size allowed for commercial travel betweenLondon and Paris, as it could steam laden with goods across theEnglish Channel and travel via the Thames River to London andthe Seine River to Paris. The vessel’s career is a testimony to theadvantages of iron construction. Its hull suffered little damage de-spite numerous groundings in shallow waters that would havecaused great damage to wooden ships. The hull also required littlemaintenance.

Given these advantages, iron was subsequently applied to warshipconstruction following these early craft as naval officials took noteof the strength of iron and its potential to withstand enemy fire. Thefirst application of iron to warship construction was the British gun-boat Nemesis. Laid down in 1839 and completed in January 1840,the iron hull of the Nemesis measured 184 feet by 29 feet and dis-placed 660 tons. This structure was revolutionary for its composi-tion and for the fact that it incorporated watertight compartments,making it the first warship fitted with this innovation. The means ofpropulsion consisted of a steam engine connected to paddle wheelson each side of the ship and a sail rig of two masts. It armamentoriginally consisted of two 32-pounder cannons and four 6-pounders. A crew of between 60 and 90 officers and men mannedthe ship. This vessel was not designed as an ocean-going craft butrather one capable of shore and river operations. The Nemesisproved its worth in these capacities during the 1841–1843 FirstChina War, a British imperial conflict. The vessel was hit numeroustimes by enemy fire, but shots simply ricocheted off the hull. In oneengagement, Nemesis was hit 14 times without significant damage.

Yet there was a major problem with ships built solely of iron thathampered its use in larger warships. Iron proved brittle, especially incold weather, which meant that it could be more of a liability thanan advantage in war. It had a tendency to crack upon the impact oflarger projectiles.

Despite this difficulty, experimentation continued with iron-hulled warships between 1840 and 1860, with several of the vesselsproduced being frigates. Indeed, frigates were at the forefront ofiron construction in warships. One of the first significant attemptscame from U.S. inventor Robert L. Stevens, who in 1842 contracted


with Congress to produce the world’s first seagoing ironclad. Thiseffort, the Stevens Battery, was never completed, but other powersfollowed in his footsteps. The world’s first significant iron warshipwas the British-built paddle wheel steam frigate Guadeloupe built in1842 that had been ordered by Mexico. The hull of Guadeloupemeasured 175 feet by 30 feet and displaced 878 tons. The originalarmament consisted of two 68-pounder guns and two 24-pounders.Its engine was capable of a maximum speed of 9 knots. A two-masted sailing rig was also carried owing to the continuing mechan-ical problems and fuel consumption of early engines. Between 1845and 1846, Britain commissioned for its own navy one iron-hulledpaddle-wheel frigate and began construction on four additionalscrew-propeller iron-hulled vessels. These warships displaced be-tween 1,391 and 1,953 tons. France also began to move toward theconstruction of iron-hulled frigates.

Even so, the fears of naval officers over the brittle nature of ironcould not be overcome, and most nations temporarily halted the cre-ation of new designs for iron-hulled warships in the early 1850s.This cessation did not last long, however, due to two threats posed towooden-walled vessels. The first threat was the new gun that firedshells rather than solid shot. Indeed, the danger posed by shells towooden walls had spurred the first use of iron hulls. Possibly usedfor the first time in 1376 by the Venetians, shells were much moredestructive to wooden vessels than shot. Round, solid shot had thetendency to produce a clean hole in a wooden hull that could be eas-ily patched. A shell was designed to lodge in the hull of a ship andthen explode, creating an irregularly sized hole that could be patchedonly with great difficulty. Subsequent tests of this ordnance wereconducted by the British and the French from the middle to lateeighteenth century. The continued interest of naval powers in shellguns necessitated the use of iron in the construction of warships.

Iron was also necessary given the rise of another threat towooden-hulled ships: the rifled gun. This innovation consisted ofcutting grooves inside the barrel of a cannon to produce spin on theprojectile once it was fired and left the muzzle. In 1742 EnglishmanBenjamin Robins pioneered work in rifled guns. By the 1850s, rifledguns had gained favor due to their longer range and greater accu-racy, although production remained low due to the higher pressurecreated by rifled guns when fired versus that of smoothbore cannon.This extra stress was the result of the gun tubes of rifled guns beingslightly smaller than the smoothbore variety in order to help pro-duce the spin on the projectile.


The 1853–1856 Crimean War provided reinforcement of theneed for iron in ship construction versus the power of the shell gunand potential of more destructive weapons like rifled guns. It alsowas the first large-scale conflict that tested in battle the new navaltechnology that had appeared since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.This war pitted Great Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, andSardinia against Russia. The fundamental cause was the Russian ef-fort to expand into the Ottoman Empire’s European possessions,generally opposed by European powers, as it upset the balance ofpower. The naval Battle of Sinope that occurred on 30 November1853 provided proof of the value of shell guns against wooden-hulled ships, as all of the warships involved were constructed ofwood. A Russian force that employed both solid shot and shells vir-tually annihilated an Ottoman squadron that was equipped withonly solid shot. This battle renewed world interest in iron-hulledvessels. The power of the shell gun also generated interest in ironarmor. France was the first to develop viable armored vessels when itbuilt floating batteries for use in the Crimean War. These batterieswere wooden-hulled vessels with iron bolted to their sides. On 17October 1855, three of these ships were used in the bombardmentof Russian forts in the Black Sea. The iron resisted most of the hitsregistered on the floating batteries.

The Crimean War ultimately led to a resurgence in the use of ironin hull construction. It also generated greater interest in the use ofiron as armor. As in the age before the Crimean War, the design offrigates was modified in accordance with the new naval technology.France maintained its lead in the use of iron armor when it built thescrew frigate Gloire. Construction commenced in May 1858 andwas completed in August 1860. The Gloire was a wooden-hulledvessel with iron bolted to its sides in the same manner as the float-ing batteries. Its hull measured 254 feet, 5 inches by 55 feet, 6inches and displaced 5,618 tons. Like the previous steam-drivenfrigates, it retained sails, as the engines were meant for auxiliarypower. Its maximum speed was 13.5 knots.

Great Britain followed with the iron-hulled screw frigate Warriorlaunched in December 1860. This vessel was the first iron-hulledwarship that sought to negate the brittleness inherent in ships ofthis type. Warrior’s hull measured 380 feet by 58 feet, 6 inches anddisplaced 9,210 tons. The vessel was equipped with sails and asteam engine, the latter being able to produce 13.75 knots. The ar-mament consisted of ten 110-pounder guns, four 70-pounder rifledguns, and twenty-six 68-pounders. Its armor consisted of a combina-


tion of wood, which could absorb the impact of projectiles more eas-ily, and iron plating. The production of Gloire and especially Warriorsounded the death knell for wooden-hulled vessels and renderedmost of the world’s warships obsolete.

By 1860, the frigate—the world’s primary cruising warship of theAge of Fighting Sail—had been radically transformed. Although allfrigates built after the Napoleonic Wars retained older devices suchas sails, other aspects of their design were a departure from the past.World interest in modern vessels was evident in the construction offrigates that incorporated technological developments such as steampropulsion and iron. Between 1840 and 1860, Great Britain pro-duced 16 paddle-wheel frigates and 28 screw frigates; France built19 paddle wheelers and 16 screw frigates; the United States pos-sessed three paddle-wheel frigates and seven screw frigates. Russia,slow to embrace the new technology despite being a significantnaval power, operated nine screw frigates. Other powers also pro-duced frigates that carried technological innovations. Italy pos-sessed nine screw frigates; Prussia (with four) and Austria (three)operated the same type.8

Warships once again exhibited technological innovations in com-bat during the 1861–1865 American Civil War. Among other opera-tions, frigates were employed in three of the duties attached tocruising warships. One was blockade. On 19 April 1861 PresidentAbraham Lincoln declared a blockade of the coastline of the Con-federate States of America to deny the South supplies from over-seas. Among the vessels employed in this task were screw frigates. Inthe first year of the conflict, 800 vessels arrived near Southern portscompared to 6,000 in the last year of peace.9 While the blockade didnot defeat the Confederacy, it did produce hardship, shortages inequipment and supplies such as artillery and medicines. The Con-federacy also employed screw warships as commerce raiders. Themost celebrated example was CSS Alabama. Although classified bymany as a sloop, it was employed as a cruiser. Built in England andlaunched in May 1862, the hull measured 220 feet by 31 feet, 9inches and displaced 1,050 tons. It was armed with six 32-pounderguns, one 7-inch rifled weapon, and one 68-pounder. Through acombination of sail and steam, Alabama was capable of 13 knots.Between August 1862 and June 1864, Alabama took 66 Union mer-chantmen and sank one enemy warship. The exploits of this cruisingwarship led to an example of the role of commerce protection. On19 June 1864, Alabama engaged the Union steam sloop Kearsargeoutside the port of Cherbourg, France. This Union warship was one


of many searching for the Confederate raider; Alabama was sunk inthe battle.

The U.S. Civil War served as a defining event for the history ofthe cruiser. The experience of commerce raiding against Unionvessels during the war and the effort to protect against the prac-tice led the U.S. government to draw up plans for a vessel capableof guarding against raiders in future wars. This vessel, U.S.S.Wampanoag, had an enormous impact on the construction offrigates; many historians view it as the first purpose-built cruiser.It was specifically designed to fulfill the classic frigate duty ofcommerce protection. The ship was made entirely of iron andmounted the most modern weapons and steam engines. Althoughnot completed until 1868, well after the Civil War, this vessel ledother nations to follow suit with similar ships. The Britishlaunched Inconstant in July 1869 as a response. France would alsoconstruct cruisers in keeping with its Jeune École (young school)ofnaval thought, which placed greater emphasis on cruisers over bat-tleships in order to wage a war on commerce, known as guerre decourse. Russia, Italy, and eventually Japan would also embark onnew cruiser construction.

These naval units signified a break with the past. The duties ofcruising warships, which had been attached to vessels of greatly dif-fering attributes, were now being given to a type of ship with cleardesign characteristics. Subsequent development of vessels contin-ued on this basis and incorporated increasingly advanced technol-ogy that would further transform ships and crews. The age of thecruiser as a specific type of warship had begun.

NOTES

1. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare(New York: Viking, 1989), p. 53.

2. Paul Silverstone, The Sailing Navy, 1775–1854 (Annapolis, MD:Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 34.

3. Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Mili-tary History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.102.

4. Dean King and John Hattendorf, eds., Every Man Will Do His Duty:An Anthology of Firsthand Accounts from the Age of Nelson, 1792–1815(New York: Henry Holt, 1997), p. 307.


5. David K. Brown, Before the Ironclad: Development of Ship Design,Propulsion, and Armament in the Royal Navy, 1815–1860 (London: Con-way Maritime Press, 1990), p. 8.

6. Ibid., p. 53.7. Spencer Tucker, Handbook of 19th Century Naval Warfare (Thrupp,

Stroud, Gloucestershire, England: Sutton Publishing, 2000), p. 53.8. James L. George, History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the

Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 65.9. Spencer Tucker, A Short History of the Civil War at Sea (Wilmington,

DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002), p. 19.


C H A P T E R 2

The Development of the Cruiser, 1860–1905

During the Age of Fighting Sail, the prime example of the cruis-ing warship was the frigate. But in truth a cruiser could be any shippossessing the speed necessary to act as a commerce raider, as acommerce protector, or as a reconnaissance vessel for the mainfleets in a general engagement. Speed was always the most vitalfactor that governed their effectiveness. These vessels were com-posed of materials and equipment that had remained largely un-changed for centuries, and practices and life aboard them wereequally as old.

The year 1860 marked a watershed in the development of war-ships, a process where the old conception of a cruiser, and all hu-man factors associated with the ship, would eventually be replacedby modern warships with crews trained in the latest technologicaladvances. These technological changes would lead to the genesis ofthe cruiser as a purpose-built warship rather than as an amorphouscollection of vessels of differing attributes.

The two greatest forces that propelled this process were the intro-duction of steam and iron armor (see Chapter 1). These technologi-cal advances, already in existence before 1860, were slowly being in-corporated into the largest warships of the day. The Frenchironclads of the Crimean War, the launch of the French ironcladGloire in 1858, and the launch of the British iron-hulled Warrior in1860 were portents of change. The subsequent period proved along, torturous experiment. All of the major maritime powers en-

25

deavored to incorporate iron and steam into cruising warships whileadding a host of new technological advances as well. Throughoutthis period, the old roles of cruising ships remained and were aug-mented by new ones that were a consequence of new weapons andshipbuilding technology. By 1900, the Age of Fighting Sail was com-pletely gone and the cruiser was accepted as a purpose-built vesselvital to operations in both war and peace.

The catalyst for design change was the experience gleanedthrough the U.S. Civil War. That conflict showcased the roles ofcruisers in modern naval warfare and exhibited the potential of thenew technologies that were already in use in the battleships of theworld’s navies. The first of these tasks was the use of cruisers in theUnion blockade of the major ports of the Confederacy. This opera-tion was designed to deny the South any overseas supply in war ma-terial. The effectiveness of this endeavor is still debated by histori-ans, but the contemporary naval officers of the day did take note ofthe use of Union cruisers in this duty. Throughout the war, Unionsteamships cruised off the Confederate coast and were able to rundown and capture many neutral and Confederate blockade runnersbound for the South. These same officials also observed the greatsuccesses of Confederate steam-powered frigates in commerceraids on the Union merchant fleet. During the war, Confederateraiders destroyed 257 Union merchantmen.1 Although this onlyamounted to 5 percent of the North’s overseas carrying trade anddid not affect the outcome of the war, the economic dislocationthat the raiders caused forced the Union to employ some of itssteam-powered frigates in the role of commerce protection as theyhunted down Confederate vessels.

While the Civil War raged, Union naval officials sought to aug-ment the forces that hunted the Confederate commerce raidersthrough the construction of new warships. These vessels were thefive-ship Wampanoag class. Specifically designed for the traditionalcruiser role of commerce protection, these vessels are commonlyseen as the first purpose-built cruisers. Construction began on allfive in 1863, and although the hulls were constructed entirely ofwood reminiscent of the high point of the Age of Fighting Sail, theships were all equipped with a steam engine whose design called fora maximum speed of 17 knots. The Wampanoag’s hull measured 335feet by 44 feet and displaced 4,215 tons. The ship’s weaponry wasmounted on a single gun deck in broadside, as in the Age of FightingSail, and consisted of three 5.3-inch muzzle-loading, rifled guns and10 9-inch smoothbore weapons.


The Wampanoag and its sister ships, following their commission-ing in 1867 and 1868, were found to be a poor design. The para-mount problem was the limitations of technology concerning theearly steam engines. The steam power of the Wampanoag was af-forded by a gigantic, single-expansion, reciprocating engine. Thisplant consisted of one huge piston that compressed steam, providedby the ship’s eight boilers, that drove the single propeller and pro-duced a maximum speed of 17.75 knots, making Wampanoag thefastest ship in the world at the time. Producing such speed, how-ever, meant that a huge amount of coal was necessary. The coalbunkers of the ship held 700 tons of ore, enough for three days ofcruising.2 This drawback plagued all early cruisers and necessitatedthe retention of sails, which were used in place of engines in situa-tions that did not call for high speed. The steam power plant alsoconsumed much of the vessel’s interior, amounting to 30 percent ofthe total displacement; there was little room for ship’s stores andeven the crew.3 The lack of space was such a problem thatWampanoag was condemned in 1869 for naval purposes. Despitethe vessel’s importance as the first purpose-built cruiser, its careerand those of its sister ships were handicapped from the start bytechnological limitations of the day.

Nevertheless, these ships made a deep impression across the At-lantic. The first nation to react was Great Britain, at the time thegreatest naval power. Although the United States had designedWampanoag for commerce protection in the context of the CivilWar, it was also suitable for commerce raiding. Indeed, the Ameri-can emphasis on cruising ships for this latter purpose had existedsince the birth of the United States Navy in the late eighteenth cen-tury. The British viewed with alarm the potential these ships had ascommerce raiders. This reaction is certainly not surprising whenone considers that in 1860 the total tonnage of the British merchantfleet, 5.7 million tons, was equal to all the rest of the world’s com-mercial fleets combined.4 Sailing frigates had been used to policethe routes over which this huge armada traversed, but the introduc-tion of Wampanoag, with its high speed, demanded a ship that wascapable of catching and destroying it in the event that it was used asa commerce raider in a war between the United States and GreatBritain.

The British consequently seized on the innovation of the UnitedStates and eventually became the leader in cruiser design for muchof the late nineteenth century. This process began with the con-struction of the three ships of the Inconstant class. The lead ship,

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRUISER, 1860–1905 27

Inconstant, was commissioned in 1869 and proved a much betterdesign than that of Wampanoag. The Inconstant measured 337 feet,4 inches by 50 feet, 3 inches and displaced 5,780 tons. The greatweight difference between this ship and its U.S. predecessor waslargely due to the use of iron, which could better withstand enemyfire, rather than wood to construct the hull. The main battery,mounted in broadside, consisted of 10 9-inch muzzle-loading riflesand six 7-inch muzzleloaders. This weaponry was far greater thanthat of Wampanoag. The ship’s single-expansion engine, however,could produce only 16.2 knots. Although this speed was still fast bystandards of the day, it was not enough to match the threat that hadnecessitated the construction of this ship. The Inconstant’s speedwas supplemented by its full sailing rig, retained partially from theentrenchment of sails in the naval circles of Britain. They were alsoabsolutely necessary, however, as the ship’s range was limited. Al-though the ship’s radius under steam was 1,170 miles, a great im-provement over Wampanoag, sails had to be used whenever possiblebecause of the lack of overseas refueling facilities. At this time, theBritish had few coaling stations overseas, and the shortage wasacute in the Pacific.

Ultimately, the limitations of these first purpose-built cruiserswould not be surmounted for decades after their construction. Atfirst naval constructors in all the major maritime nations could notproduce a system of propulsion that negated the need for sails. Earlycruisers were thus hybrids of the old and new ages of naval warfare.The great weight of the machinery also made it impossible to pro-vide a balance between armor protection and speed. Indeed, thegreat weight of armor meant that it could be effectively mountedonly on large hulls like the French Gloire and the British Warrior.Therefore, most early cruisers were either all wood or iron-hulledwith no protection. Even so, the first step had been taken towardthe growth of the cruiser as a class unto its own. All maritime na-tions eventually had to build cruisers that incorporated new technol-ogy or risk the possibility that their fleets would become obsoleteand ineffective in war at sea.

This fact does not mean that the other great naval powers of themid-1800s were quick to follow the British lead against the Ameri-cans. Technological revolutions rarely transformed naval architec-ture and warfare overnight. The introduction of Wampanoag and In-constant were no exceptions. Each nation had specific reasons forlagging behind. France, the second largest naval power of this age,needed cruisers as much as the British in order to police its overseas


empire, which amounted to some 4.2 million square miles with apopulation of 43 million.5 The French, however, employed vesselsthat were slower because of the existing trend in the French Navyfor endurance over speed. The two classes of vessels built that werebilled as cruising vessels were, consequently, wholly unsuited to thetasks of cruising warships, as they could not possibly catch ships asfast as Wampanoag and Inconstant if used as commerce raiders intime of war. Indeed, the French ships were little more than scaled-down versions of the French ironclad Gloire and reflected little inthe way of innovation. An example is the seven ships of the Almaclass, laid down in 1865 and completed between 1867 and 1869.These ships were ironclads whose weaponry of six 7.6-inch muzzle-loading guns and four 4.7-inch of the same design was far weakerthan the new U.S. and British vessels. Their top speed was alsomuch less than their competitors, being only 11.9 knots. TheFrench also constructed a number of wooden-hulled steam frigates,but these were equally deficient in speed. It would take some timebefore this design trend would change.

France’s limited production of cruising ships represented thegreatest effort to reply to the U.S. and British vessels. The reactionof the rest of the preeminent naval powers was practically nonexist-ent. In most cases, this was the result of the struggle of naval offi-cials to both accept and incorporate iron and steam power into theirships. Russia, in 1860 the third most powerful maritime power, pro-vides the best example. This country had been slow to embrace thetechnological changes that arose before 1860, so much so that by theCrimean War the Russian fleet numbered only 30 steam-poweredwarships. Naval limitation clauses in the Treaty of Paris that endedthat war further retarded construction. Although the 1862 Battle ofHampton Roads during the U.S. Civil War—the first ironclad battlein history—generated a great deal of interest in more modern ships,from 1863 to 1867 only one cruiser was built. Most of Russia’s con-struction centered on protection of the Baltic coast more than oncruising vessels.

The only other power that attempted to incorporate the new tech-nology into cruising vessels was the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardiniain the Mediterranean Sea. The exertions of that navy minister,Count Camillo di Cavour, led to the launching of Maria Adelaide,the country’s first steam-powered frigate built in Italy. At the time oflaunching in 1859, the vessel was the fastest and most powerful ofthe period. These initial steps, however, produced little because ofthe navy’s performance in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War. Piedmont-


Sardinia took part in that conflict in a bid for the unification—at theexpense of the Austrian Empire—of the many Italian states into onenation whose core would be Piedmont-Sardinia. The performanceof the Italian Navy at the 1866 Battle of Lissa against the Austrianswas poor and led to a large reduction in naval expenditures. Cruiserconstruction and naval building in general stagnated as a result.

The same lack of growth that existed in cruiser construction wasalso present in shipboard life on those new cruising vessels that didexist. In truth, little had changed from the days of the Age of Fight-ing Sail. The great exception was that there was far less spaceaboard the new cruising ships due to the great size of the earlysteam engines and boilers and the space consumed by the coalbunkers. The crew still slept on one large, open gun deck inside thehulls in hammocks hung from the roof, but they now had to live inconditions where stores were crammed into every available space.The food was the same as in the Age of Fighting Sail—worm-riddenmeat and molding bread. Only France provided better food, butFrench sailors were more poorly housed aboard ship compared toothers. Poor sanitation and the ever-present threat of disease werealso hallmarks of life at sea. An example is the toilet facilitiesaboard, divided into those for crew and officers. The toilet itself wassimply a wooden plank with a hole in the middle that extended overthe side of the ship. This was no doubt uncomfortable, particularlyfor the crew, whose toilets were mounted in the bow, where the menwere exposed to the salt spray and pitching motion of their ship inthe sea. The officers’ facilities were somewhat different, as rank hadits privileges; they were placed in the stern of the ship away from theelements. These old conditions, combined with the added decreasein habitability that resulted from the loss of space in the hull to thesteam engines, boilers, and coal, would exist until the advent ofmuch larger vessels in the late nineteenth century.

Another aspect of life aboard cruisers that remained was the edu-cation of the officers and crews that manned them. The schoolingmethod of Great Britain, the great naval power, remained largely asit had been a century before. Officers still learned most of the tradethrough experience gleaned at sea rather than in classrooms. Regu-lar crewmen, many of whom were impressed into service, usuallylearned skills through this method. The training that the officers didreceive before going to sea was the same as during the Age of Fight-ing Sail and did not reflect the revolution in propulsion. The core ofthis program consisted of a knowledge of sailing and the art of navi-gation learned aboard the school ship Britannia.


The education of the officers and men of the French Navy alsoremained largely unchanged. Throughout the nineteenth and theearly twentieth centuries, France relied on a pool of men that hadsome prior experience at sea. The process that produced this man-power was the Inscription Maritime that had been introduced in theseventeenth century. This method required that all Frenchmen asso-ciated in some way with the sea enroll for service in the navy.French officers proved to be better-educated than their Britishcounterparts, receiving the most advanced scientific training in Eu-rope as they entered a school ship at the age of sixteen and studiedfor five years the technical aspects of the navy, which included arough knowledge of steam power. The other naval powers copied thesystems of the two most powerful countries.

The training system in the United States for regular crewmen du-plicated that in Great Britain; officers received education in mainlythe same subjects as their British counterparts through the UnitedStates Naval Academy, established in 1850. Other naval powers,such as the Italians, Austrians, and Spanish, copied the French sys-tem. The position of all of these navies on education would changelittle until the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when thegrowth of technology made it absolutely essential to efficiency.

The beginning of the history of the cruiser as a purpose-built war-ship that incorporated new naval technology was slow, and the U.S.and British ships that had begun it had little chance to justify theirexistence or prove their worth. There were no major naval wars, asthe period between 1860 and 1870 was part of the Pax Britannia,when England still ruled the waves uncontested and other navalpowers were in the process of rebuilding following the French Revo-lution and Napoleonic Wars. Even so, other naval powers would fol-low suit and begin to build new cruisers that mirrored the hybridvessels of the Wampanoag and Inconstant classes. Over the nextdecade, cruiser development would begin worldwide in earnest asnaval powers around the world sought to augment fleets with thenewest technology available.

The next watershed in cruiser development was also the result ofadvances in technology between 1870 and 1881. In particular, therace between the size of naval guns and armor of sufficientstrength to withstand fire from those weapons was the catalyst forgroundbreaking vessels. The increase in the size of naval ordnancewas enormous and led naval authorities to believe that some meas-ure of protection for vessels other than battleships was absolutelynecessary.


In 1860, one of the largest guns in standard use was the 8-inchgun that fired a 68-pound solid shot, but by 1884 guns could be aslarge as 16.25 inches and fire an exploding shell that weighed 1,800pounds.6 This latter weapon could penetrate up to 34 inches ofwrought iron, the earliest form of armor. These guns were mademore destructive through the reintroduction of breech-loading gunsthat could be more quickly reloaded than muzzle-firing weapons.Breechloaders had been in existence for centuries and were firsttried at sea aboard the French battleship Gloire in 1858, but theFrench and other navies had reverted to the use of muzzleloadersowing to the poor seal between the gun and the breech, which al-lowed gases to escape while firing that could lead to the bursting ofthe gun. Advances in breechloaders in the 1870s led to the readop-tion of the weapon. Although a cruiser probably would not face thelargest caliber guns used on battleships, and many navies commonlyused smaller weapons as they withstood continued firing longer, theimplication was clear: Cruisers needed to have some form of protec-tion or risk being ripped to pieces.

Advances in armor protection made the possibility of withstand-ing an attack from these new guns viable. By 1865, wrought iron ar-mor had been replaced by rolled iron fastened to double layers ofwood on the hull. This type was in turn superseded in 1870 by sand-wich armor, which consisted of several layers of rolled iron armorplaced in alternating layers between wood. The first power to takeadvantage of armor through its use on a cruiser was not GreatBritain or France but Russia. The Russians by 1870 were planningto rebuild their fleet and in 1871 repudiated the naval arms limita-tions of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Crimean War. Their an-swer to the problem posed by the great guns of the day proved to bethe first of a new type of cruiser.

This vessel was General Admiral—the world’s first armoredcruiser. This designation, however, does not mean that the ship wasfully armored, only that it had a narrow armored belt. Thus describ-ing it as a belted cruiser is therefore more accurate.

Construction on this ship began in 1870 and was completed in1875. The hull, made entirely of iron, measured 285 feet, 10 inchesby 48 feet and displaced 5,031 tons. Its armament consisted of six8-inch guns, two 6-inch weapons, and four 3.4-inch cannons inbroadside on one gun deck. The speed was certainly not adequatefor the roles of a cruiser, having only a maximum of 12.3 knots un-der steam, with a limited range, owing to high coal consumption,which still necessitated the use of a full sailing rig. Its armor, how-


ever, gave it a great reputation around the world as the first cruiserto carry protection. Attached to the hull was a belt of old wrought-iron armor with a maximum thickness of 6 inches that ran the entirelength. It extended from 2 feet above to 5 feet below the waterline.The race between gun size and armor thickness, already in fullswing in the construction of battleships, had reached the develop-ment of cruisers.

This ship, however, exhibited a design flaw that afflicted all of theearly armored, or belted, cruisers. The weight of the armor causedthe ship to sit so low in the water that the belt was largely sub-merged, meaning that the value of the protection was greatly de-creased. The fact that the belt was narrow meant that the areasabove it were unprotected. Indeed, the thickest and widest armorbelts, owing to weight, could be applied only to the largest battle-ships of the day, and even then the coverage could not be complete.In those areas that were unprotected aboard General Admiral, theemphasis lay on damage limitation through a system of subdividingthe hull into watertight compartments. A corollary to the problem ofweight was the fact that greater armor would generally decrease thespeed of the ship, the key element necessary for a cruiser to performits duties. In all the early cruisers, naval constructors would have toseek a compromise between speed and armor. The poor speed ofGeneral Admiral showcased this problem, as these vessels could beused only as station ships rather than true cruisers.

Nevertheless, Great Britain responded to the threat posed byGeneral Admiral. Despite the Russian vessel’s poor speed, theBritish were keenly aware of any vessel that might endanger theiroverseas commerce. Not only did Britain still retain the largest com-mercial fleet in the world; by this time half of the food that was con-sumed domestically was imported from the empire. This potentialweakness was largely the result of the 1846 abolition of the CornLaws, which subsidized British grain in the face of cheaper foreign-grown products. The vast reduction in home-grown sustenancemeant that, in time of war, an enemy could try to use cruisers to de-stroy shipping laden with food for Britain and thereby starve thecountry into submission.

The need to protect this trade against vessels like General Admi-ral led to the construction of Shannon. Completed in 1877, Shan-non was a belted cruiser much like General Admiral. Designed tooperate from distant stations around the empire to engage any iron-clad vessel, the ship displaced 5,670 tons; the hull measured 260feet by 54 feet and mounted two 10-inch muzzle-loading guns,


seven 9-inch weapons of the same type, and six 20-pounderbreechloaders on the upper deck rather than on an enclosed gundeck. The ship also had an armored belt with a maximum thicknessof 9 inches, much greater than General Admiral. This belt, however,did not extend for the entire length of the hull because of weight.

The British, unlike the Russians, sought a compromise to offsetthe weight problem: The armored belt tapered off near both theends of the ship. Past the belt, the British installed a protective deckas the deepest one in the hull. This deck had a maximum thicknessof 3 inches to guard against plunging fire that could penetrate to themagazines and machinery, which are collectively referred to as thevitals, of the ship that lay in the bottom of the hull. The space abovethis deck was subdivided into coal bunkers and storerooms. Thesedepositories served a dual purpose. The coal bunkers served as addi-tional protection against shells penetrating too deeply into the hullbecause 2 feet of coal was equivalent to 1 inch of steel.7 In addition,the contents of both these spaces would aid the buoyancy of the ves-sel if these areas were flooded from damage sustained in battle. TheShannon proved to be much more than another belted cruiser be-cause of this form of protection. This ship was the first of anothernew type of warship: the protected cruiser.

Like General Admiral, Shannon was not a successful design be-cause of the problems of the belt being submerged by the weight ofthe armor and the sacrifice of speed that obviated the ship’s use as acruiser. Nevertheless, the Russians and the British had paved theway in the compromise between speed and armor. They created thebelted cruiser, the earliest armored cruiser, and the protectedcruiser.

The British continued construction along the same lines as Shan-non as experimentation with new technology ruled the day. The con-tinuation of hybrid vessels that incorporated armored belts and pro-tective decks was not a sign of muddled thinking in the Royal Navybut simply a product of the times, when all naval powers sought thebest design given the technological limitations.8 Additional develop-ment in Britain was necessary in this period because the countrywas in a naval arms race with France. Most of this competition cen-tered on the construction of battleships, but the British did produceone more group of cruisers, the Nelson-class, completed between1878 and 1881.

Few of Britain’s rivals built cruisers to counter the Royal Navy.France, the chief rival, was on the cutting edge of warship design,but French innovation did not extend to cruisers. Throughout the


1870s, cruiser warfare was largely ignored in favor of battleships tocounter the British fleet. French cruisers, such as they were, con-sisted mostly of slow station battleships based throughout the em-pire that could not perform the tasks of cruisers. The exception tothis trend lay in two classes of armored cruisers, four ships in all,that represented little innovation. The majority of the French cruis-ers of this age that could actually perform the tasks of their typewere small unarmored frigates that resembled those of the 1850s.An example of this latter type was the LaPerousse-class, whose hullswere wooden and supported with iron beams. Laid down between1875 and 1877, the last of these were not commissioned until1882. Although they were fast and fairly well armed, their lack ofarmor meant that they could be easily destroyed if they faced ar-mored warships.

The response of other naval powers mirrored that of the French.The Russians launched only two more armored cruisers of unre-markable design, as the majority of their resources went to the con-struction of battleships. Italy, now a united country, pursued thesame path as the Russians. The Italians, although they experienceda revival of the navy in the 1870s that would eventually producegreat experimentation in cruiser design, concentrated on buildingbattleships owing to poor economic conditions that allowed the con-struction of only a few high-quality ships. Throughout the 1870s,they built only three cruising warships that were constructed en-tirely of wood and mounted light guns. These vessels were not effec-tive. One ship, Vettor Pisani, possessed a top speed of only 9.76knots. Another of the three, Christoforo Colombo, was the first truecruiser of the Italian Navy because it possessed a maximum speed of16 knots. This great speed suited its purpose of being deployed onforeign missions.

The United States, although it built the first purpose-builtcruiser, was also not a factor in this decade of development. Thiswas in large part the result of problems arising from the Civil War.The soaring national debt that the war had produced meant that fewadditional ships could be constructed in the years following the con-flict, with the exception of those that were already being built. Gen-erally, the great human toll of the conflict also led to a lack of publicenthusiasm for new military spending.

Another nation, Japan, suffered from monetary difficulties aswell. That nation was newly formed as a modern state after its expo-sure to the West in the 1850s. The Japanese, as part of their drive toadopt Western technology, desired a navy to project power outside


their borders, but internal problems that resulted from political re-forms in the second half of the nineteenth century led to littlemoney being available to build a navy. Consequently, a naval pro-gram in 1873 that called for the construction of 70 warships had tobe dropped.

Germany, which like Italy was a newly unified country, was one ofthe few nations that sought the acquisition of new warships. Ger-many, which had previously been a collection of several states thatwere predominantly land powers, had experimented with steam war-ships as early as the mid-1860s, when the German state of Prussiabought steamships and gunboats from foreign contractors. In the1870s, Germans built their first iron-hulled cruisers, the Leipzig-class and the Bismarck-class. The masted ships of these two classeswere similar in design and built primarily for coastal defense and theprotection of overseas trade in the North Sea owing to the fact thatGermany was a land power and had no coaling stations abroad. Ves-sels similar to these would be built into the early 1890s after mostnations had discarded masts and were in the midst of producing in-finitely more powerful cruisers. In the German mindset, cruiserssuch as Leipzig continued to be worthwhile for coastal defense.

The general lack of construction of large cruisers by navies otherthan Great Britain did not hold true for innovations in the designsof smaller cruising vessels. The introduction of the self-propelledtorpedo in 1868 heralded a wave of experimentation with smallercruisers that mounted it as their principle armament. This weaponespecially found favor in nations with limited means to build a largefleet of battleships. The torpedo held the potential of destroying themost powerful and costly naval units of an enemy through the use ofrelatively cheap warships. Germans, whose defense spending wasdevoted largely to the army, were among the first to introduce thetorpedo cruiser. Not only did the Germans prize such a ship on thebasis of economy; it also fit into their plan for a navy capable largelyof coastal defense. It could also scout for invasion forces approach-ing from the sea and, if necessary, conduct commerce warfare.

The German ship that filled all these tasks was the British-builtZieten, which carried only two torpedo tubes on a hull that dis-placed 1,152 tons and measured 260 feet, 8 inches by 28 feet,1 inch and had no protection. When completed in 1876, this shippresented a viable threat to larger warships through the combina-tion of armament and 16-knot maximum speed. The Italians, withfinancial difficulties that precluded the construction of a large fleet,also built a torpedo cruiser, the experimental Pietro Micca.


Launched in 1877, this ship was made of iron but displaced only598 tons due to the fact that it was smaller than Zieten, carried noside armor at all, and had only a partial protective deck with a maxi-mum thickness of .75 inches. The hull itself measured 203 feet by19 feet, 7 inches and mounted only one 16-inch torpedo tube thatwas augmented by small arms. The Pietro Micca was a failure be-cause its maximum speed was only 13 knots, too slow to catch manyof the battleships it was designed to hunt. Even so, other naval pow-ers had to take note of this ship and of Zieten.

Another innovation in this period was the use of steel hulls. Steelas a building material had been used for centuries in weapons andsome tools. It was stronger and lighter than iron. The drawback toits use in large projects such as ships was that the process of smelt-ing was prohibitively expensive. A step forward in reducing the costcame in 1856 when Henry Bessemer devised a new furnace to pro-duce steel from iron. By the early 1860s, the price of steel haddropped to the point that it was being used in limited quantities onwarships.

Variations in the quality of the steel produced from Bessemer’sprocess, however, hindered its widespread employment. In 1865,this problem was surmounted by a new smelting process developedby the Frenchman Pierre Martin, who created a furnace based onan 1857 design by German inventor Siemens for a gas furnace. Thequality of the steel from Martin’s furnace was better and furtherlowered costs. In 1878, steel became still cheaper through anotheradvance by inventors Thomas and Gilchrist. These improved meth-ods collectively led to a greater use of steel in warship construction.

The French had initially led the way in the use of cheaper steelwhen they completed the world’s first steel-hulled battleship,Redoutable, in 1878. Britain, however, was the first power to usesteel in the hulls of cruisers. These ships were Iris and Mercury,completed in 1879 as Britain’s first warships constructed of steel.They displaced 3,730 tons on hulls that measured 300 feet by 46feet and mounted 13 5-inch breech-loading guns on the sides of theship. These warships collectively led to a virtual end to hull con-struction using iron. By the early 1880s, most naval powers wouldshift to steel hulls.

The Iris and Mercury were also significant as the fastest vessels ofthe day, with a maximum speed of 17 knots. This was the result of anew propeller design, but more important was the use of it in tan-dem with their engines. The compound engine was a great improve-ment over past models. Instead of one large reciprocating piston,


the engine consisted of one high-pressure and two low-pressurecylinders that greatly increased the power generated by the burningof coal in the boilers while requiring less coal to produce it. The firstviable version of this invention had been patented in 1853 andmounted in some ships as experiments, but these had been largelyunsuccessful because the engines were still made of iron, whichcould not withstand the pressures produced by the new process.The use of steel in the engines of Iris and Mercury obviated thisproblem and signaled a step toward more powerful, fuel-efficientengines that would eventually make the retention of sails an unnec-essary feature on warships.

The British also advanced the use of steel hulls and compoundengines in combination through their use in protected cruisers. TheComus-class was the first class of less than 3,000 tons displacementto be given metal hulls. These were also the first small cruisers thatcarried a partial protective deck. The lighter weight of steel versusiron made both these advances possible. The British followed up onthis success when they laid down the four ships of the Leander-class. These vessels were virtual repeats of Iris and Mercury, butthey were far larger protected cruisers that displaced 4,300 tons.The hulls measured 315 feet by 46 feet and carried 10 6-inchbreech-loading guns as the primary armament. These guns were allmounted broadside on the main deck, but the endmost weapons ofthe battery proved to be an experiment. These were placed on pivot-ing mounts that had small shields to protect the gun crews from en-emy fire. This trend to provide shields over gun emplacementswould rise in the years after 1881.

Cruisers had continued to develop quickly in tandem with thepace of technological development in hull construction, guns, ar-mor, and engines. The desire to incorporate the best mixture ofthese aspects of warships came at the continued cost of habitability.Despite the changes in design, living conditions still remainedlargely unimproved. Once compartmentalization of hulls becamestandard practice, the crew was separated into several large, sepa-rate mess decks. The living and eating conditions of the Age ofFighting Sail persisted in an environment where fresh air belowdecks was minimal. There were some improvements, such as the in-troduction of electricity in the mid-1870s that led to ventilation sys-tems below decks, but these were of poor quality and remained sofor years after their introduction. This equipment could not dissi-pate the tremendous heat and soot that arose from the engines andboilers in the bottom of the hull. The only truly positive aspect of


the introduction of electricity was the use of electric lighting from1880 forward in some ships, which pierced the relative darknessthat had pervaded the lower decks of warships throughout the Ageof Fighting Sail. It also greatly increased the efficiency of vessels be-cause they could now operate at night as well as by day.

Education of the crew and officers also retained many of thesame aspects and did not change significantly until the early twenti-eth century. The practices of Britain and France were in the processof being duplicated, and in one case improved, by other nations.The Japanese embraced Britain’s educational system for its officercorps in 1871 when they founded a naval academy in Tokyo. Ger-many also moved to embrace a preexisting form of education, onlythey adopted and improved on the French system. Overall, the needwas still underappreciated for more fundamental training in the ma-chinery, which was in a state of continuous flux from technologicalinnovation.

This trend, however, did not mean that there were no steps toimprove education, mostly for the sake of officers rather than crew.It was evident to British naval officials by 1873 that education hadnot kept up with advances in naval technology. The establishment ofthe Royal Naval College at Greenwich that year was the conse-quence of this realization. This school, solely for officers at first,presented classes in a host of subjects that included naval architec-ture, naval history, and engineering. Those sailors who wished topursue engineering were accommodated by the foundation in 1876of a school specializing in the subject. An additional school, knownas HMS Vernon, also became an independent institution for torpedotraining. These halting steps toward greater education were mir-rored by many of the other naval powers and were only the begin-ning of a much more concerted effort to train the officers and menthat manned the warships of the new machine era.

The age of experimentation unfolded in an environment wherethere was little chance to test the power and efficiency of the newvessels in war at sea. Given the fact that none were tested designs,this may have been a boon for crews. As in the years before, thesevessels were used only in peacetime duties such as policing traderoutes, which was particularly important for Great Britain, and forshowing the flag around the world. Cruisers in this latter task oper-ated as a tool to project national power overseas and served as a re-minder to any that might wish to challenge it. These duties wouldremain the bedrock of cruisers for the coming years.

Cruiser development from 1883 to 1898 produced ships that


showcased new technology in battle. The first five years proved to beof the last experimental stage as cruisers were built to accepted de-sign standards based on the task. This era opened with the construc-tion of Esmeralda, which many historians view as the world’s firstmodern cruiser. This ship was constructed for Chile, then in themidst of a naval arms race with Argentina and Brazil, by Sir WilliamArmstrong at his shipyard on Tyne River in Great Britain. Its steelhull, measuring 270 feet by 42 feet, was propelled by a compoundengine that produced an impressive maximum speed of 18.3 knots.The weight savings of the steel hull and the fuel-efficient engines al-lowed Armstrong to dispense with sails for the first time aboard acruiser of such size.

The Esmeralda was also the world’s first completely protectedcruiser. It relied on only a protective deck that extended the lengthof the ship rather than the combination of belt armor and a partialdeck that was common in previous cruisers. Complementing thespeed and protection of the ship was an impressive armament thatreflected the cutting edge of naval technology. The ship’s largestweapons were two 10-inch guns mounted in two barbettes, one eachin the forward and stern portions of the ship. (A barbette is a largeturntable on which guns are placed that could swivel, first by handand later by steam power, and thus provide a large arc of fire.) Thebarbette extended several decks below the guns and encased theloading machinery for them and the magazines, the latter being wellbelow the waterline for the sake of protection from enemy fire.

Ammunition and powder were passed from the lowest levels ofthe barbette via hoists to the top of the barbette, where the crewsloaded and fired it. This arrangement offered little protection fromenemy fire, as the barbette had only a short armored shield aroundthe guns. But it did have the advantage of being lightweight, mean-ing that the savings could be applied to protection. The barbette hadbeen in use aboard several battleships before 1883, France beingthe innovator in 1867 with the inclusion of the barbette in theAlma-class ironclads, but its inclusion in cruisers was a new devel-opment. In the case of Esmeralda, this arrangement and the ship’ssix 6-inch guns mounted on the broadside were impressive arma-ment for a ship of its size.

The launching of this ship inaugurated the period of the fully pro-tected cruiser. Several nations ordered cruisers from Armstrong’sfirm after Esmeralda, and most of the great naval powers believedthat the design offered a viable alternative to armored cruisers andan answer to their many faults. Construction between 1883 and


1898 would slowly turn to the production of protected cruisers overarmored ones. Naval officials around the world did not wholly aban-don the idea of armored cruisers, as many were still ensconced inthe race between the size of guns and the thickness of armor. Evenso, construction did tilt toward smaller, more lightly protected cruis-ers, as few nations had the financial resources to devote to armoredcruisers in addition to battleships.

The exception to this trend was Great Britain. It had the re-sources available to devote to battleships, armored cruisers, and pro-tected cruisers. From 1883 to 1888, the British generally built twotypes of cruisers that were dedicated either to commerce protection,duty with the battle fleet that was generally the role of reconnais-sance, or a combination of the two. The first of Britain’s armoredcruisers was the Imperieuse-class, an example of a cruiser designedto offset a strategic imperial threat. A war scare in 1878 that had re-sulted from imperial tensions with the Russians over the control ofAfghanistan had been averted by diplomacy, but the perceived threatto trade in the region, particularly around the British colony of In-dia, led to the construction of these ships.

The two vessels of the group, laid down in 1881 and completed in1886 and 1888, are prime examples of armored cruiser developmentin the context of the race between guns and armor. The protectionof these vessels, a 10-inch compound armor belt with a partial pro-tective deck that had a maximum thickness of 4 inches, was enor-mous. This armor contributed greatly to the ships’ displacements of8,500 tons on hulls that measured 315 feet by 62 feet with enginesthat could produce a maximum speed of 16 knots. Armament wasequally as impressive as armor, the primary guns being four 9.2-inchbreechloaders mounted in four barbettes. One barbette each wasplaced forward and in the rear of the ship, while the other two werepositioned one each on the sides. The ship also had 10 6-inch gunsmounted on the sides. Both vessels had a good steaming radiusthanks to compound engines that allowed the removal of all sail rig-ging. In its place was a single mast used to post lookouts and directfire in the age before fire-control and radar.

These ships exhibited the problems of cruisers that carried armorbelts. Nevertheless, the British continued development with thecompletion in 1888 of the first two ships of the Orlando-class. Theymounted an armored belt that was of little use, but they were someof the first cruisers to carry the triple-expansion engine—the latestadvancement in propulsion technology. This reciprocating engineproduced steam in three stages and thereby improved fuel effi-


ciency. Instead of compound engines that produced steam pressuresbetween 25 and 30 pounds per square inch, the triple-expansion en-gine was able to generate 60 pounds per square inch. The result wasthat a ship so equipped could steam much greater distances withoutthe need to recoal. This advance sounded the death knell of sailsaboard cruisers and warships in general. On the whole, cruiserswould now develop solely as a creature of the mechanical age.

Only two other naval powers launched large, belted cruisers inthis period, although other nations like the United States were inthe process of constructing their own. These were the chief rivals ofGreat Britain, which were France and Russia. The French launchedonly two classes of armored cruisers owing to a continued stress onbattleships, and both marked little innovation over past models. In-deed, the Bayard-class was constructed of wood with a wrought ironarmor belt. Upon completion in 1882, the ships were obsolete ow-ing to poor protection and slow speed. More modern vessels of theVauban-class were simply steel-hulled copies of the Bayard. Theinattention to cruiser design exhibited by these ships lasted only afew more years after their completion. Cruisers would receive muchgreater attention after 1886 with the rise to prominence of the Je-une École school of naval thought. This belief began in 1869 whenCaptain Baron Louis-Antoine-Richild Grivel wrote a book titled Dela Guerre Maritime Avant et Depuis les Nouvelles Inventions (NavalWar Before and After the New Inventions). Grivel believed thatthere were three categories to naval warfare: wars waged betweenlarge battle fleets for control of the seas, coast warfare, and theguerre de course (war on commerce). Grivel believed that in theevent of war with Great Britain, France could not hope to gain com-mand of the sea versus the substantially larger British fleet. The so-lution, in his mind, was to attack the British commercial fleetrather than engage Britain’s main battle fleet. The resulting eco-nomic damage would force the British to capitulate. This train ofthought gradually gained acceptance in the French Navy. One ofthese believers was Admiral Theophile Aube, who became ministerof marine in 1886. Aube’s naval program, dominated by the JeuneÉcole, centered on the fact that the torpedo had made the battle-ship obsolete. It consequently called for fast torpedo boats to attackslower battleships and the construction of cruisers to make war onBritain’s commerce if the need arose. This train of thought woulddominate French naval construction throughout the 1880s into themid-1890s.

While French construction of cruisers stagnated and policy was


changing as a result of the Jeune École, Russia strove to build morearmored cruisers in keeping with the country’s naval revival. Al-though battleships remained the priority, the Russians did build fournew belted cruisers, three being variations on the design of GeneralAdmiral. The one exception was Admiral Nakhimov, a vessel thatwas laid down in 1884 and completed in 1888. This ship repre-sented a step forward in Russian design, but it was the result ofplans obtained by the Russian government of the British Imperieuse-class cruisers. In effect, the ship was largely like those of the British.As with all military and naval secrets throughout the ages, AdmiralNakhimov is an example that the act of espionage for cruisers was afactor in development.

The same general lack of cruiser construction can be seen in thearea of protected cruisers from 1883 to 1888, although there was agreater proliferation of this type and smaller cruising vessels. Thefact that these ships had less or no armor made them cheaper tobuild. The growth in protected cruisers also resulted from the grow-ing belief in naval circles that the thickness of armor could not keepup with the destructive power of the newest guns. Many believedthat the protected cruiser was a good compromise as its protecteddeck, in combination with guns of relatively long range, could allowit to fight at long ranges and be protected from plunging fire by itsdeck.

The British continued to augment their cruiser fleet when theylaid down another two protected cruiser classes for a total of ninewarships. The first of these two groups, the Mersey-class, were typi-cal of British protected cruiser design during this age. In effect, theywere the British Admiralty’s version of Esmeralda, being much likethat ship in terms of hull construction, motive power, and disposi-tion of the guns. They differed in some respects. The size of arma-ment consisted of two 8-inch guns and 10 6-inch weapons. Al-though this battery was lighter than that of Esmeralda, these gunswere still large in comparison to the relatively small 4,050-ton dis-placement. The ships highlighted the case of Esmeralda where sailswere replaced by one or two signal masts. They also, like Esmeralda,were some of the first cruisers fitted with an armored conning tower.This consisted of an armored box that enclosed the controls of theship. It would become a standard feature on all cruisers up to themid-1900s. This design was important as it marked a standardiza-tion of the construction of this type of ship. In the years to come,the Merseys served as the template for all future designs of pro-tected cruisers in Britain.


Great Britain also pushed forward, along the path already takenby the Italians and Germans, in the construction of torpedo cruis-ers. The British Admiralty desired vessels that possessed high speedand endurance that could protect the main battle fleet from attackby enemy torpedo boats as well as launch attacks against enemyfleets. The result was the two-ship Scout-class, being commis-sioned in 1885 and 1887. These vessels had a light protective deckand resembled the Italian and German designs of the past. TheBritish belief in the power of the torpedo led to another group com-prising eight torpedo cruisers. Britain, like all other maritime na-tions, was in the process of trying to incorporate the torpedo intonaval warfare.

France and Russia, the second and third most powerful navies re-spectively, continued to be the primary sources of cruiser construc-tion behind Great Britain. The Russian program consisted of onlytwo ships, one being built in a French shipyard; that of the Frenchwas virtually nonexistent in the late 1880s. Plans for a type of pro-tected cruiser had been approved in 1878, but by 1881 the plan hadbeen amended and produced four new sail-rigged wooden cruisersthat resembled the steam frigates of the 1850s more than modernwarships. Extreme concern in French naval circles about the Britishprotected cruisers finally resulted in the construction of Sfax,France’s first ship of the type and its first modern cruiser since1876. Completed in 1887, this vessel embodied features that hadlargely been discontinued in other navies, such as a hull composedof iron rather than steel and a full sailing rig. Nevertheless, its pro-tective deck provided adequate protection, and its maximum speedof 16.7 knots allowed it to function effectively as a cruiser, wherethe poor motive power of past French designs had ruled out thispossibility.

The Sfax represented the beginning of French naval productionin cruisers that was dominated by the Jeune École. This ship hadbeen slow to materialize, as French naval policy was in a state oftransformation from the traditionalist view, where large fleets of bat-tleships fought against opposing forces of relatively equal strength,to that of the Jeune École, which was in ascendancy and called forcommerce warfare dominated by cruisers rather than battleships.Indeed, the number of French battleships in 1886 almost equaledthat of Great Britain at a time when commerce raiding had eclipsedthe standing of the battleship as the naval weapon of choice inFrance. This state of affairs would soon reverse itself in favor ofcruiser designs.


The United States was also slow to embrace the protected cruiser,but the need for new vessels was entirely evident to naval officialsafter about 20 years of stagnation. Indeed, before the 1880s AdmiralGeorge Dewey wrote that the navy was the “laughing stock of na-tions.”9 Steps were subsequently taken to address this problem andresulted in three protected cruisers that were the lead ships of themodern United States Navy. These were the two-ship Atlanta-classand Chicago. None was a good design, probably the result of yearsof inaction on the part of warship constructors in the United States.Although they were all constructed of steel, none possessed a speedhigh enough to perform the duties of cruisers, and all three still re-tained the increasingly obsolete sailing rig of the Age of FightingSail. The ships of the Atlanta-class could manage only 13 knots, andChicago had a maximum speed of 15.4 knots. In addition, protec-tion was relatively poor, the armored deck being only 1.5 inchesthick and covering the machinery and magazines rather than thelength of the vessels. Even so, the United States had taken the firststep in the race to build new cruisers.

The cruiser was also an integral part of the foundation of themodern Japanese Navy. In 1882, the First Navy Expansion Bill waspassed into law and called for the construction of 48 warships overthe next eight years, many being cruisers. The Japanese werestrongly influenced by France’s Jeune École and looked to the ship-yards of Britain and France for their first ships, as builders in Japanlacked experience in modern shipbuilding. The first protected cruis-ers built for the Japanese Navy were the two-ship Naniwa-classcompleted in 1885 and 1886 by Armstrong’s shipyard in GreatBritain. Essentially, these ships were an improved version of Esmer-alda, the great difference being a thicker armored deck. The Japa-nese also received another cruiser, Unebi, from a French shipyard.This vessel was more heavily armed than the Naniwa-class butproved to be a poor design as the heavier guns made the ship unsta-ble at sea. Japan’s first protected cruisers can best be seen as experi-mental ships. These ships served as vehicles for Japan to learn howto produce its own cruisers.

This experimental nature also existed in Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Italy. German construction of cruisers con-tinued, but at a vastly scaled down rate in comparison to the greatnaval powers, as the Germans still saw little need for a large navy.Nevertheless, the size of their vessels increased, evident in Ger-many’s first protected cruisers, the Irene II-class. These vessels werelarge for ships of the day. Their hulls measured 340 feet, 2 inches by


46 feet, 7 inches and mounted a compound engine that could pro-duce a good speed of 18 knots. The Austro-Hungarian fleet did notpossess its first protected cruiser until 1885. These vessels, the two-ship Panther-class, were ordered from Great Britain to gain experi-ence in modern shipbuilding and completed in 1885 and 1886 re-spectively. Another enlarged and improved version of this class, theTiger, was the first protected cruiser built in an Austro-Hungarianshipyard. By 1888, knowledge of protected cruiser construction wassufficiently advanced to begin the construction of larger protectedcruisers that more closely resembled those of British and Frenchdesign.

Italy also experimented with modern protected cruiser designsand followed a path similar to the Austro-Hungarians when it or-dered the first of its protected cruisers from British shipyards fol-lowing the craze created by Esmeralda. Italy also moved forward inthe production of small, protected cruisers based on indigenous de-signs. These ships were the Goito-class, considered entirely experi-mental. Although constructed of steel and possessing high speed,they were too lightly armed to be a real threat to an opposing cruiserfrom a more well-established naval power. It would take severalmore years before the Italian cruiser program blossomed into onethat produced effective cruisers.

Despite the slow growth of its cruiser program overall, Italy re-mained an innovator in the construction of smaller cruising vessels.Indeed, much of Italian naval construction in the late 1880s cen-tered on the idea that large cruisers were not necessary in the con-fines of the Mediterranean. Instead, the Italians believed that a fewships of high quality and destructive power could offset the numeri-cal advantage of other nations. They were consequently receptive tonew technology that could increase either the efficiency or the de-structive power of Italian ships. An example of this tendency is theBritish-built small cruiser Piemonte in 1887, the first cruiser fittedwith the quick-firing gun. This weapon vastly increased the destruc-tive potential of a warship. The concept stemmed from an 1881British Admiralty advertisement for a gun that could fire an un-precedented 12 shots per minute.

Rapid-firing guns of various small calibers were already in use,but the concept had not translated to larger naval guns. By 1887, a4.7-inch quick-firing gun had been created and successfully testedaboard Piemonte. This weapon functioned in much the same way assmall arms on land that fired cartridges. Both the propellant and theshell were encased in one body rather than the past method of load-


ing shells and propellant separately into guns, meaning that the re-load time for the weapon was much less than in the past. The ad-vent of this weapon greatly increased the destructive power of war-ships and was particularly useful aboard smaller ships such ascruisers. These guns could riddle the unprotected areas of enemywarships and cause great damage in a short amount of time. Theywould become standard weapons in warships around the world andwould grow progressively larger as technology allowed. The Italianswere also at the forefront in the continued production of torpedocruisers. One year before the launching of Piemonte, the Italians in-troduced Tripoli, a steel-hulled duplicate of Pietro Giola.

The French also pressed forward with construction of Milan,commissioned in 1885. On a steel hull that measured 302 feet by32 feet, 9 inches the French were able to mount two 14-inch tor-pedo tubes and four 3.9-inch guns. It had incredible speed for itsday, being a maximum of 18.4 knots. This great power was not theproduct of a new advance in engine design but rather boilers thatburned the coal that fed the engine. This innovation, the water-tubeboiler, was invented by the French in the 1860s, but tests of it hadbeen previously unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the French had per-sisted in its development, and by the launch of Milan it was a viabledesign. Instead of the old boilers that burned coal to heat air in cop-per tubing that subsequently heated water and produced steam thatdrove the engines, the water-tube boiler reversed the process. Theseboilers contained water within the copper tubing itself that passedthrough the fires of the boiler. Steam pressure was consequentlycontained in the tubing rather than outside and minimized the riskof a boiler explosion. The results were twofold: The thickness of theboiler shell could be reduced and thus save considerable weight,and steam pressure could be increased more rapidly. Thus a shipcould raise steam much faster and increase speed in a much shortertime, a positive aspect that greatly increased the effectiveness ofcruisers, which depended on high speed. France excelled in the pro-duction of water-tube boilers. Owing to the interests of boilermakersin Great Britain, the Royal Navy would not use them in their vesselson a regular basis until 1898.

These innovations and the evolution of cruiser design as a wholeled to much larger, more effective, and more destructive ships from1889 to 1898. Cruisers by the dawn of this age had finally devel-oped clear design characteristics that resulted in classifications thatwere universally recognized. Some of the largest cruisers were sopowerful that naval officials viewed them as second-class battleships


that could operate in the regular battle line rather than solely performthe tasks of cruisers. Armored (or belted) and protected cruisers be-came accepted worldwide as established types of cruiser, but othersalso made their appearance. The torpedo cruiser was now acceptedas another type in the genre.

This standardization did not mean, however, that design hadreached its apex. In many countries, it was still in a state of flux. Anexample was the cruiser of Great Britain. In 1888, because of thelarge number of cruisers in their navy with differing attributes, theBritish further subdivided their cruisers into three classes based onsize: first, second, and third class. They were defined by their maxi-mum tonnage displacements: 14,200; 6,000; and 3,000 tons respec-tively. Innovations in engines, armor, and guns culminated in thisperiod to produce a huge variety of modern cruisers. Most of these,until the late 1890s, were protected cruisers and smaller cruisingvessels.

The chief reason for the general move away from armored cruis-ers was that the breaking point had been reached in the competitionbetween guns and armor. This was the result of the increased size ofguns plus great advances in the accuracy of naval gunfire. Until theearly 1890s, the method of aiming a naval weapon was a simple tan-gent sight that was not much different than those used in the Age ofFighting Sail. By the end of the period, new range-finding devices incombination with new machinery to rapidly elevate and train navalguns onto their target resulted in an astonishing increase in accu-racy. In 1898, the British cruiser Scylla scored 56 hits out of 70shots while on gunnery exercises, six times better than the previousyear.10 This result and others led many naval officials to believe thatarmor, whose value had been questionable, was now completely un-able to sustain multiple hits at long range. Reinforcing the generalmove away from armored cruisers was the fact that protected cruis-ers were cheaper to build.

One of the foremost powers in cruiser development amid thistechnological change was France. Its Jeune École school of thoughtthat had come into vogue in 1886 and called for a cruiser war oncommerce finally bore fruit. Although many French designs wereunsuccessful, the program was innovative and dictated the con-struction programs of the other great naval powers, particularlyGreat Britain. At first, French cruiser construction went forward inall types, as gunnery improvements had not yet eclipsed armoredcruisers. This led to the armored cruiser Dupuy de Lôme, a vesselthat created great concern in Great Britain. Laid down in 1888 and


completed in 1895, the vessel displaced 6,676 tons with a hull thatmeasured 364 feet, 2 inches by 51 feet, 6 inches and was driven bytwo triple-expansion engines that could produce a maximum speedof 19.7 knots. Mounted on this hull were two 7.6-inch guns, oneeach in turrets located in the forward and rear of the ship. An addi-tional six 6.4-inch guns were housed on the sides of the ship insmaller turrets.

Dupuy de Lôme was among the first modern cruisers to be com-missioned with a battery completely encased in turrets. These ar-mored boxes sat atop the barbettes and encased the guns to protectcrews. The turret itself was certainly not a technological innovation.The turret as a successful weapons system had been in existencesince the early 1860s aboard the Union ironclad Monitor during theU.S. Civil War. The weight of the extra armor, however, had obvi-ated their use on any but the largest hulls. Steel armor, with itslighter weight, made their use on cruisers possible. Until the late1880s, steel could not be used as armor because of its tendency tocrack under fire. This problem was solved by the French Schneiderworks, which discovered that adding nickel to steel made it far moreresilient. The Dupuy de Lôme, consequently, was one of the first cruis-ers to employ steel armor and was the first true armored cruiser. Itsprotection partly consisted of a 4-inch belt of side armor, but it alsohad a protective deck that covered all of its machinery and ammuni-tion spaces. In those areas with no armor, Dupuy de Lôme carriedcompartments filled with a cellulose material that, if flooded, wouldprovide buoyancy to help keep the ship afloat. Finally, the conningtower of the ship was also armored.

The combination of armor and cellulose compartments madeDupuy de Lôme one of the most well-protected armored cruisers inthe history of development up to that time. Other naval powers, par-ticularly Great Britain, were forced to take note. As a commerceraider, the protection, speed, and armament of Dupuy de Lômecould easily overcome the majority of British cruisers assigned tocommerce protection, which were largely protected cruisers. Al-though the ship was originally designed for commerce warfare inkeeping with the Jeune École, it could also be used to great effect asa scout for larger fleet engagements. Its armor and high speedmeant that it could penetrate British cruiser screens of protectedcruisers. Two other classes of smaller armored cruisers that totaledfive ships also carried the same potential threats.

The number of these ships was dwarfed by the French productionof protected cruisers. Throughout this period, the French con-


structed 22 ships of that type. Many of these were constructed un-der the Jeune École school that touted commerce raiding, but therising struggle with traditionalists in France, who believed in fleetsof battleships as the core of the navy, also meant that the ships bythe late 1890s were billed as scouts for larger warships. The largenumber built was not only the result of naval programs under boththe Jeune École and the traditionalists; it also reflected the turnaway from armored cruisers in general. These ships represented thecore of the French cruising fleet. Construction of still smaller cruis-ers had ceased in the mid-1890s over the controversy surroundingtheir use. The Jeune École believed that these vessels were unneces-sary because their sole use—scouting for battle fleets—was incom-patible with the use of the fleet in a war on commerce and won theissue over the protests of the traditionalists in France. Larger cruis-ers ruled the day in an atmosphere where French naval officials in-creasingly struggled over the proper use of their navy.

Great Britain was forced to respond to the threat posed byFrance. By 1889, Great Britain already had a large cruiser force,comprising 11 first-class vessels (armored cruisers), 12 second-class(protected cruisers with smaller displacements than those of theprevious type), and 16 third-class (small protected and unprotectedships). Even so, the threat of France combined with a few prioryears where naval spending was kept low for political reasons led toa popular outcry for increased warship construction. This agitationled to the 1889 First Naval Defense Act that called for 70 new ships,of which 42 were cruisers. This legislation was in keeping with anew naval policy that also arose from the alarm created by the stateof the navy and the growth of competitors. The new strategic goalwas known as the Two Power Standard, which called for a navy pow-erful enough to match a combination of any two navies of theworld’s other maritime powers. The designs that arose from the de-bate that had spawned the First Naval Defense Act and the TwoPower Standard varied widely based on their specific task. Thelargest ships, those of the first class, were designed largely to act asscouts and as a fast wing of the battle fleet, whereas smaller vesselsin the other two classes were devoted largely to trade protection.

All of the largest vessels commissioned in this period—and in-deed all of Britain’s cruisers in general—were protected cruisers inkeeping with the general move away from armored ships. This movetook place under Naval Constructor William White, who drew upplans for the earliest first-class cruiser in the Royal Navy that hadno side armor. The two ships of the Blake-class were laid down in


1888 and launched in 1892 and 1894. They set the pattern forBritish first-class cruisers over the next decade. The Blake measured399 feet, 9 inches by 65 feet with a displacement of 9,150 tons. Theship’s primary armament, two 9.2-inch guns, was located forwardand in the stern on barbettes. The secondary armament was an im-pressive 10 6-inch quick-firing guns mounted on the sides and en-closed by armored casemates. Their triple-expansion engines pro-duced a maximum 20 knots, and armor protection consisted solelyof a protective deck that ran the entire length. This class and the fol-lowing eight ships of the Edgar-class, which were slightly smallerversions of Blake, provided a new group of vessels that could help tooffset the naval potential of France and Russia.

These ships also signaled a move in Great Britain, as well as else-where, to provide armor protection for all the guns aboard cruisers ifpossible. The culmination of this effort in Britain was the Powerful-class. They were principally built as a response to Russia’s construc-tion of two large cruisers. These two protected cruisers were mam-moths, being the largest cruisers and longest warships in the worldupon completion. Both were laid down in 1894 and completed in1897 and 1898. Their hulls measured 538 feet by 71 feet and dis-placed a huge 14,200 tons. All of the weaponry, almost a copy of thetwo previous classes, was protected by armor. The two 9.2-inch gunswere housed in one turret each located in the bow and stern. The 106-inch quick-firing guns were housed in armored casemates on thesides. The turrets, the armor around the casemates, and the protec-tion afforded to the conning tower by 12 inches of armor were partof the reason for the huge increase in size and displacement. It wasalso the result of a full-length protective deck that had a maximumthickness of 6 inches. These ships were Britain’s first cruisers to usethe water-tube boilers pioneered by the French, which aided in theproduction of a maximum speed of 22 knots.

The Powerful-class was followed by only one more group of eightprotected cruisers, scaled-back versions of their predecessor. All ofthese first-class cruisers were capable of scouting with the main bat-tle fleet, but Britain chiefly intended that they be used as commerceprotection in the face of the French and Russian threats. Thoseships of the second class, being slightly smaller protected cruisers,were designed with the same thoughts in mind. In all, Britainlaunched 36 protected cruisers amid its naval arms race with Franceand Russia.

British efforts in this age did not revolve solely around large ships.The British also sought to augment their cruiser force with much


smaller vessels. These third-class cruisers were mainly designed ascommerce protection of overseas stations and the approaches to theBritish Isles. From 1888 to 1898, Britain constructed a total of 15of these small vessels. An example is the Pearl-class designed to pa-trol waters in the Pacific. Their hulls measured 278 feet by 41 feetand displaced 2,575 tons. They had limited hull protection and gunshields that partially protected the eight 4.7-inch quick-firing guns.Clearly, these vessels could be used only in a limited role for com-merce protection, as many of the cruisers that they might have facedwere far larger and better-armed.

Britain’s large cruiser program, and the Two Power Standard ingeneral, were aimed primarily at the threat to trade posed by theFrench Navy, but it was also increasingly directed at Russia. Be-tween 1889 and 1893, Russian naval expenditures increased 64 per-cent.11 On the whole, Russia devoted its resources to the construc-tion of battleships. The Russians persisted in the construction ofarmored cruisers rather than protected ones, but these ships num-bered only three in this period. Two, Rurik and Rossiya, were largeand commissioned in 1895 and 1897 respectively. The Rossiya wasthe larger, displacing 13,675 tons with a hull that measured 480feet, 6 inches by 68 feet, and mounted four 8-inch guns and 16 6-inch weapons on the broadside below the upper deck. This ship andRurik were the impetus for the British construction of the Powerful-class for fear of the potential damage that the Russian ships mightcause to British commerce in time of war. In truth, the British hadlittle to fear from these ships. Neither were very good designs, beingpoor steamers, and the disposition of the guns was so badly arrangedthat French officials believed it “had been stuck on as an after-thought.” 12 These rather poor ships were only augmented by oneprotected cruiser. Russian naval officials simply believed in the su-periority of the battleship over all else.

The production of cruisers was also slight in three other coun-tries. The Austro-Hungarian Empire launched only one class of pro-tected cruiser, as most of its attention was focused on militaryspending on land. Italy built only one armored and one protectedcruiser, focusing instead on battleship construction. The exceptionto the stagnation in Italian cruiser construction was in small torpedocruisers, which the Italians continued to support as viable shipswithin the confines of the Mediterranean. The last power, Japan,wanted a larger navy, but expansion was still in its early period in1888. Although a naval construction program had been approved in1882 and the Japanese had learned a great deal about modern ship-


building by 1888, production was slow. The country still reliedchiefly on those vessels that had been previously bought from GreatBritain and France, and it secured five more protected cruisers thatwere designed by those two countries between 1891 and 1894.

This dependence was partly the product of a lack of proper re-sources to build many cruisers in Japan, but it was also necessary inorder to quickly procure vessels. These protected cruisers werebadly needed by the Japanese due to deteriorating relations with theChinese over Korea, a bone of contention for centuries. By the early1890s, the prospect of war was looming. Examples of these muchneeded vessels were the three ships of the Matsushima-class, com-missioned between 1891 and 1894. These ships mounted one huge12.6-inch gun in a turret positioned in the bow. They also had a sec-ondary armament of 11 4.7-inch guns positioned on the sides be-hind small gun shields. These cruisers were augmented by fourprotected cruisers between 1894 and 1898. The Suma-class was im-portant, as it showed the state of Japanese shipbuilding by 1898.Suma, launched in 1896, was an unsuccessful design, but it was thefirst ship planned completely by the Japanese and built using theirown materials. From this point forward, Japan would continue on apath of fleet expansion increasingly through its own devices.

The United States also did not build many cruisers of any type,but unlike the Japanese it did move forward in the late 1880s withindigenous designs constructed in U.S. shipyards. There was littleinnovation, however, in the United States because of the popularbelief in the 1880s that in a future war, like the War of 1812 againstGreat Britain, the United States would be blockaded by an enemyfleet. In the minds of U.S. naval officials, cruisers were not powerfulenough to permanently break up such a force.

In their view battleships were more important. This view did noteliminate the construction of cruisers, but it did retard it. In 1890the secretary of the navy had agreed in theory with a needed ratio of3:1 for cruisers versus battleships out of the desire for a balancednaval force. This admission was hardly acted upon. Not only werebattleships the warship of choice; the need was not present forcruisers to protect trade. The only acknowledged purpose for cruis-ers was in the role of commerce raiding, a bedrock principle of theU.S. Navy since its birth in the late 1700s. From 1883 to 1904,Congress authorized the construction of 17 armored cruisers, 19protected ships, two more to be purchased from Great Britain, andthree unprotected ships. Few were ever completed. Those that wereproved to be poor designs. An exception was the first armored


cruiser of the modern United States Navy, New York, launched in1889 and completed in 1893. The second and last armored cruiserbefore 1898, Brooklyn, was not as successful. It was too poorly pro-tected to withstand gunfire from weapons comparable to the ones itmounted.

Many of the 13 protected cruisers built in this age also sufferedfrom a variety of drawbacks, being either too slow, too lightly armed,or poorly protected. One ship, however, proved a successful design.This ship was the protected cruiser Olympia, launched in 1892 andcompleted in 1895. It displaced 5,865 tons with a hull that meas-ured 344 feet, 1 inches by 53 feet and originally mounted four 8-inch guns in two turrets, one in the bow and one in the stern. Therest of the original armament, 10 5-inch guns, were mounted in thesuperstructure of the ship.

Despite the relative success of the design, Olympia was certainlynot a groundbreaking vessel. The same cannot be said for the oneU.S. innovation in cruiser design in this period. This ship was thedynamite gun cruiser Vesuvius. The vessel itself was unremarkable,but its weaponry was unique. The ship’s battery consisted of three15-inch dynamite guns. This weapon was first patented by AmericanD. M. Mefford in 1882 and was designed to fire projectiles filledwith dynamite through the use of compressed air. By 1890 the U.S.government purchased a number for coastal defense and for experi-ments aboard Vesuvius. The weapon proved a failure due to its rela-tively short range, but the attempt was an indication that the UnitedStates was not opposed to innovation in cruiser design.

The last naval power of this age that produced cruisers was in theprocess of becoming one of the greatest threats to Britain’s navalpower since the Napoleonic Wars. This was Germany, whose grandstrategy in the 1890s experienced a profound change from thatmaintained since the unification of the country in 1871. Since thattime, the navy had been a coastal force that supported land-basedoperations, protected the German shore from enemy forces, and wasunder the command of generals rather than admirals. This rolechanged in 1888 when Kaiser Wilhelm II assumed the imperialthrone of Germany. He was interested in the use of naval might toincrease Germany’s global power and prestige. In 1888 he appointedan admiral to command the navy and called for a larger surfacefleet. This initiative resulted in the construction of four battleshipsthat represented the beginning of Germany’s blue-water navy.

Cruiser development also rose with the new stress on world navalpower. Unlike the British, whose many vessels were specifically de-


signed for either commerce protection or fleet duties, the Germanssought a standard design that could fulfill both tasks. In general,this policy resulted initially in vessels that were bigger, slower, andless maneuverable owing to the design compromises necessary fordifferent duties. The principal large ships of this age were protectedcruisers in keeping with the trend around the world. They proved,however, to be among the least battle-worthy ships of the new fleet.Only two classes were produced before 1898. The largest was theVictoria Louise-class that comprised five ships commissioned be-tween 1898 and 1899. These ships were lightly protected and pos-sessed a maximum speed of 18.5 knots, a full 1.5 knots slower thanmany protected cruisers in other countries.

The smaller cruisers of the early German Navy were more suc-cessful and represented steps in evolution that began with the tor-pedo cruiser Zieten. By 1898, experimentation with small torpedocruisers had resulted in the launching of the Meteor-class, whoseprincipal armament consisted of torpedo tubes. Design experimen-tation with torpedo cruisers had also led to the beginning of con-struction on the Gazelle-class in 1897, which proved to be an off-shoot of the torpedo cruisers.

The introduction of oceangoing destroyers, small warships armedwith self-propelled torpedoes, in the early twentieth century pro-duced a need for a cruiser fast enough to operate with destroyerflotillas in battle and to defend against enemy torpedo attacks on themajor units of the battle fleet. The Gazelle-class represented thefirst light cruisers, designed for military purposes rather than peace-time roles such as policing trade routes. They were small, sturdyvessels armed with many light weapons combined with torpedotubes that could fulfill the roles that resulted from the introductionof the destroyer and harass enemy battle fleets. The hull of theGazelle measured 345 feet, 1 inch by 40 feet, 1 inch and displaced3,033 tons. The ship was armed with 10 4.1-inch guns, three 17.5inches torpedo tubes, and machine guns. Protection consistedmainly of an armored deck only 2 inches deep that covered theamidships section of the hull that housed the machinery and maga-zines. The engines produced a maximum speed of 22 knots. Thelight cruisers of the Gazelle-class established a trend for future shipsof this general design. Light cruisers carried little or no armor, thechief asset being speed. This type of ship would come into its own inthe years leading up to World War I.

By 1898 the Germans had already made a mark on the navalscene, as a new arms race between them and Great Britain was in


full swing. The 1898 First Naval Law provided for 19 battleships, 12large cruisers, and 30 light cruisers by 1903, an indication of Ger-man resolve to become a great naval power. The cruisers, and espe-cially the battleships produced by this program, would contribute totensions between the two nations that contributed to the outbreakof World War I.

The tremendous growth in the size of cruisers between 1888 and1898 combined with advances in technology led to a general im-provement in shipboard life. This was also the product of greater ex-perience in cruiser designs in many of the naval powers that re-sulted from the increase in the number built through the navalcompetition of the day. Better ventilation systems allowed for agreater circulation of air belowdecks that helped to dissipate some,but not all, of the heat that built up in the steel hulls with the com-bination of sun and the ship’s boilers, engines, and sundry machin-ery. Most of these ships were also equipped with bathrooms for bothseamen and officers, and electric lighting had passed from a noveltyin early cruisers to a general rule. Advances in medicine and the riseof a general concern for the health of those at sea also led to the in-troduction of sick bays on most ships. Finally, many of the largervessels, such as the British first-class cruiser Powerful, sported suchamenities as a library and a barber shop. Sleeping conditions werestill mostly in hammocks slung from the ceilings of various compart-ments; the food, which in the Royal Navy remained basically un-changed from 1860 to 1907, only marginally improved. Neverthe-less, life aboard ship was not nearly as onerous as it had been in1860.

These improvements, however, did not eliminate poor health con-ditions aboard cruisers. Indeed, one problem was potentially deadly.All vessels were fueled by coal in an age when little attention waspaid to environmental hazards that the plumes of smoke issuingfrom these cruisers caused. In many cases, despite better ventilationsystems, a thick layer of coal dust would coat all the surfaces of thehull while under steam. Many crew members, particularly those thatstoked the boilers, would succumb to clouds of dust and contractblack lung and tuberculosis from constant inhalation of the noxiousair. The crew also suffered from loss of body fluids due to the heatthat still remained high despite ventilation systems. This problemcaused dizziness and nausea.

Discipline remained strict amid this environment spawned by theindustrial age. A sailor’s day was meticulously planned out on dutyand at leisure. There were specific times even for such mundane


tasks as exercising, where a portion of the crew would be assembledon the stern for aerobics. While on duty, a sailor was required tomaintain the utmost respect for officers and observe every mundanedetail of the regulations of service or risk punishment. Althoughphysical punishment such as flogging was largely a thing of the pastby 1898, penalties for breaking rules could include a loss of shoreleave, time in the brig, or a loss of alcohol rations (which remained apart of life aboard the ships in some navies until the late twentiethcentury). This strict environment changed little in the years beforeWorld War I. One seaman of the Royal Navy probably gave the bestdescription of life under these rules when he asserted that “thebiggest job in life is keeping clear of trouble. You were being chasedall the time.”13

The strict discipline that prevailed aboard cruisers was due to thefact that most enlisted men in the world’s navies, like those in theAge of Fighting Sail, were from desperate backgrounds and caredlittle for authority or routine. In addition to the continuation ofharsh discipline was the relative stagnation of education, still in astate of flux that revolved around the question of how best to traincrews and officers. Some advances had been realized, but little morewas done for the crews in general, and the curriculum for officerswas not greatly altered. This state of affairs would change onlythrough experience gleaned from officers and crews in combat. Thefirst of this would be provided in the last decade of the nineteenthcentury; the final catalyst for change would occur in the first yearsof the twentieth century.

The period from 1888 to 1898 was one where cruisers continuedto serve peacetime roles. These included their use as protection forworldwide commerce, particularly in the case of imperial powerslike Great Britain, and showing the flag around the world to projectinfluence. Many nations used cruisers in this latter capacity as flag-ships on various imperial posts around the world. An example was theFrench wooden sailing cruiser Dubourdieu, completed in 1889 withspacious quarters for an admiral as the flagship of France’s Pacificstation. Other nations used cruisers to convey state dignitaries topoints around the globe. An instance of this duty was the Russianprotected cruiser Svietlana, completed in 1897. This vessel was fit-ted out as a royal yacht for the grand duke in command of the Rus-sian Navy. A final peacetime role fulfilled by cruisers in this age wasunique in the history of this ship type. The Austro-Hungarian Em-pire, as it possessed no overseas empire to police, employed many ofits smaller cruisers as ships of worldwide exploration. Over the


course of the late nineteenth century, Austro-Hungarian cruiserscollected a huge amount of cultural, topographical, and hydrograph-ical information around the globe.

This period, rather than one where peace was the order of theday, was the first in which naval officials could truly evaluate the ef-fectiveness of the cruiser as a weapons system in time of war. Thefirst opportunity was the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Thisconflict was the product of the Japanese desire by the end of thenineteenth century to embark on a program of imperial expansion.Their goal was Korea, a kingdom under the nominal control ofChina that was forced to pay tribute to the larger country. On 20July 1894, after 10 years of vying with China for control of the area,Japan seized control of the Korean government. On 1 August, bothsides declared war.

Naval forces were extremely important in this conflict, as bothsides used the sea to transfer troops to Korea. In this atmosphere,the country that controlled the sea would cut off the supply effortsof the other. The fleet action that decided this issue was the 17 Sep-tember 1894 Battle of the Yalu River. The Japanese fleet, under thecommand of Admiral Ito Yuko, consisted almost entirely of moderncruisers: his flagship, the protected cruiser Matsushima, two of itssister ships, four smaller cruisers, and six torpedo boats. The Chi-nese fleet under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch’ang was un-suited to oppose this force. This problem was largely the result ofthe failure of the Chinese to fully embrace modern technologies.Ting’s fleet comprised two ironclad battleships, four small wooden-hulled cruisers, and six torpedo boats. Superior Japanese maneuver-ing and the use of quick-firing guns decided the issue as Ito’s shipsencircled the Chinese vessels. Although the Chinese fought untilsundown, by the end of the day they had lost four or five ships whilethe Japanese suffered serious damage to only one.

This battle, almost completely fought by cruisers, was a large partof the overall Japanese victory in the war. Korea was recognized asan independent country, a step toward its absorption by Japan, whilethe Japanese were also given the Chinese possessions of Formosa(Taiwan) and southern Manchuria. Japan was subsequently forcedto give up its claims on the Asian mainland by a consortium of Euro-pean nations led by the Russians, who also had plans to expand theirpresence in the area. Nevertheless, cruisers showed their worth intheir first large trial in battle.

Cruisers were also the principal warship used in the 1898 Span-ish-American War. In 1897, a Republican Congress enacted a puni-


tive tariff on overseas trade that proved so high that the politicianssought a popular issue to divert the attention of citizens from it.This proved to be the Spanish colony of Cuba, which had risen inrevolt over the economic hardship caused by the U.S. tariff that hadslapped high duties on the import of sugar, Cuba’s greatest cashcrop. Increasing U.S. involvement in Spanish affairs in Cuba, theresult of reports in the popular press of Spanish atrocities commit-ted against Cubans, culminated in the dispatch of the battleshipMaine to Havana, where it blew up at its moorings on 15 February1898. The charge of Spanish sabotage led to a U.S. declaration ofwar on Spain a little more than two months later. The resulting warstretched over the breadth of the Spanish overseas empire, particu-larly in the Pacific.

The principal Spanish possession in this area was the Philippines,where forty naval vessels lay at anchor in and around Manila Bayunder Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasaron. Most of these weresmall, obsolete warships and largely inconsequential. The corps ofhis force was a squadron that comprised two large but aging cruis-ers, one being constructed of wood, and four small cruisers. On 1May 1898, a U.S. squadron under the command of CommodoreGeorge Dewey arrived at Manila Bay to fight the Spanish. Dewey’sforce consisted of the new protected cruiser Olympia, three othermodern protected cruisers, and two gunboats. The U.S. commanderfound Montojo’s ships, which were more weakly armed, anchorednear a fortified naval yard for support from land batteries. Dewey’sships simply closed to a range of 3,000 yards and steamed up anddown the Spanish line of warships while pouring gunfire into them.By the afternoon, the contest was over. None of the Spanish vesselssurvived the battle, while the American ships were largely undam-aged owing to the small size and inaccuracy of the Spanish guns.Dewey subsequently used cruisers in the traditional role of a block-ade of Manila to deny any re-supply of the city. On 13 August,Manila fell to an amphibious assault by U.S. troops. Dewey’s cruis-ers had in large part wrecked Spanish naval power and wrested con-trol of Spain’s Pacific empire from them. American occupation ofthe Philippines made the United States an imperial power in its ownright.

Cruisers were also employed by the United States as a blockadingfleet around Santiago, Cuba, where the majority of Spain’s remain-ing naval strength lay at anchor in desperate need of coal to refuel.The blockade made the procurement of enough coal impossible, andthe Spanish fleet was destroyed on 3 July 1898, in the Battle of San-


tiago Bay, when it attempted to escape. American success was againdue to the poor quality of the Spanish ships combined with bad gun-nery. This victory and that at Manila Bay forced the Spanish to suefor peace. The great success of the United States Navy, where cruis-ers played a huge role, would lead to a rise in popular support fornaval construction. By 1917, the United States would have the thirdlargest navy in the world.

These naval battles and the Sino-Japanese War were critical tothe future growth of cruiser construction, as they showcased theabilities of the modern ships in warfare. The opportunities for obser-vation, however, did not provide many instances of the use of cruis-ers in traditional roles, like reconnaissance, but as warships in theline of battle. The only exception was their use as blockading shipsin the Spanish-American War. True examples of cruiser warfarewould not be present for over another decade.

The proven worth of cruisers in battle led to a continuation oftheir development by all the naval powers of the world. Between1899 and 1905, every type of cruiser that had been created in theprevious 40 years was improved through advances in shipbuilding.This period also witnessed a resurgence of the armored cruiser. Thisvessel had previously fallen out of favor in most navies because ofthe belief that the maximum thickness of armor could not withstandfire from the newest and largest guns that were more accurate as aresult of better range-finding devices.

The technological innovation that made the return of the ar-mored cruiser possible was steel armor. One of its first uses on acruiser was in Dupuy de Lôme. Improved methods of steel manufac-turing in the 1890s increased the quality of steel armor and conse-quently led to an expansion of its use. This largely took place in the1890s, the first move forward being that of the American H. A. Har-vey in 1890 followed by an improvement in 1895 by the Krupp ar-mament factory in Germany.

The new steel armor was much stronger than the old compoundarmor. Less was required to repel gunfire, and there was a great sav-ings in weight, the chief factor that had proven a problem for ar-mored cruisers since their inception. The advent of steel armormade its application over large portions of a ship possible withoutreducing speed or armament, the result of compromises over weightin past armored cruisers. Once again, it appeared that armor couldcompete with guns. Many of the great naval powers in the late1890s subsequently turned back to the production of armoredcruisers.


The return of armored cruisers also seemed like a favorable oneto naval officials in many maritime powers owing to the ideas onnaval warfare advanced by the U.S. naval strategist Alfred ThayerMahan. His book, The Influence of Sea Power on History, was pub-lished in 1890. Mahan asserted that, contrary to the French policyof war on commerce as the chief function of a navy, a country musthave a strong oceangoing fleet to win control of the sea. This object,known as command of the sea, could be won only in battles whereone fleet destroyed the opposing force of another. Once that goalwas attained, the power whose fleet controlled the sea-lanes couldproject its strength around the world. The fleet of that nation couldalso protect worldwide trade and guarantee its place as a worldpower. Armored cruisers, despite the fact that Mahan called for aforce of battleships at the expense of all smaller ships, still fit intothis dogma. They and the largest protected cruisers were increas-ingly viewed, because of the large growth in size, protection, and ar-mament, as second-class battleships rather than traditional cruisers.

The prime example of the return to the armored cruiser was GreatBritain. Faced with the threat of France, Russia, and to an ever-growing extent Germany, the British completed a tremendous num-ber of cruisers. The vast majority were large armored cruisers; theconstruction of second-class protected ships was discontinued. TheCressy-class comprised six ships completed between 1901 and 1904.These ships were a response to the French Dupuy de Lôme and weredesigned to act as fleet reconnaissance and as a fast battle wing ifnecessary. This latter role was partially the product of the impres-sion made by cruisers in the line of battle during the Sino-Japaneseand Spanish-American wars.

The advantage of steel armor was obvious in these ships. Insteadof a narrow armored belt, the new steel extended from the maindeck to a depth of 5 feet below the waterline and covered the centerof the hull, where the ammunition, barbettes, and engines werehoused. This belt had a maximum thickness of 6 inches. Comple-menting this armor was a limited protective deck. They also hadsteel bulkheads, essentially walls that separated the compartmentsof the ship, which added strength to the hull. Finally, the vessel hadarmor of the same maximum thickness as the belt on its turrets andthe barbettes underneath them, while the conning tower had 12inches of armor. In all respects, this ship was an armored cruiser inthe literal sense of the term rather than past ships with limited beltand deck protection.

These ships were only the beginning of Great Britain’s return to


the armored cruiser. From 1899 to 1905, the British either com-pleted or began construction on seven new classes for a total of 35ships. These cruisers formed one part of the British shipbuildingprogram to counter the growing threat of Germany. By the turn ofthe century, the German Navy proved a greater challenge to Britishnaval supremacy than France and Russia. The culmination of theBritish drive for as many armored cruisers as possible occurred in1905 when production began on some of the most powerful ar-mored cruisers ever constructed: the Minotaur-class. These threeships provide a fine example of the zenith of armored cruiser con-struction. Each displaced 14,600 tons on hulls that measured 519feet by 74 feet; the engines were capable of a maximum speed of 23knots. Guns reflected the assortment of armament carried by alltypes of ships in the pre-dreadnought era, the period that precededthat where ships carried batteries of a uniform caliber. The mainbattery was four 9.2-inch guns carried in two twin turrets locatedfore and aft in the hull. The secondary armament of ten 7.5-inchguns was totally protected, as single turrets housed each gun. Therewere five of these turrets mounted on the main deck on each side ofthe vessel. The placement of these guns is only one example of thetendency by the early twentieth century to group all large guns ofthe biggest cruisers in turrets rather than affording protection by ar-mored shields. By the time these ships were commissioned, GreatBritain had the largest armored cruiser force in the world.

Protected cruisers were completely eliminated due to the hugeconcentration of wealth on those of the armored type. The onlyother vessels retained were small cruisers that increasingly becameknown as scouts. Britain built four classes of these ships in this pe-riod that totaled eight ships. Generally, they were small cruisers thatdisplaced between 2,600 tons and 2,900 tons. They were fast,lightly armed ships designed for a purpose similar to that of the Ger-man light cruisers. The scouts were meant to both counter and tolead flotillas of destroyers, a new type of vessel that made use of thetorpedo as its greatest weapon and appeared on the scene in theearly twentieth century. These small ships were oceangoing versionsof the torpedo boats that preceded them, which did not possess theendurance necessary to operate for extended periods at sea. TheBritish, as the Germans had done with light cruisers, realized theneed for vessels that were fast enough to operate with destroyerflotillas in battle and to defend against enemy torpedo attacks on themajor units of the battle fleet.

France followed much the same course as Great Britain in the


years leading to 1905. Although the French built seven protectedcruisers, the emphasis turned to armored cruisers. France had al-ready been the forerunner with steel armor when its naval construc-tors built Dupuy de Lôme, but attention was paid to reviving thistype because of the British building program. It was also partiallythe result of a continued emphasis on the commerce-raiding ideasof the Jeune École, although the power of the school had declined aseach minister of marine that succeeded Admiral Théophile Aubepursued their own policy on the best course to strengthen the navy.Indeed, the chaos that ensued from this situation led in many in-stances to cruisers built solely for the reason that others were doingthe same. From 1899 to 1905, France commissioned 15 armoredcruisers. In general terms, these vessels had good speed and suffi-cient protection, but they suffered greatly as a result of light arma-ment. Some of the last of France’s armored cruisers, the Leon Gam-betta-class, were large ships that displaced 12,351 tons on a hullthat measured 480 feet, 6 inches by 70 feet, 3 inches, but theymounted only four 7.6-inch guns as primary armament. This defi-ciency was offset a bit by a secondary armament of 16 6.4-inchquick-firing guns. These weapons, however, were shorter-range onesand could not all train on a target at once, as they were mounted onthe sides of the ship. In a long-range battle, cruisers such as thesewould be severely hampered if they faced enemy armored cruisers,whose weaponry was generally larger.

These cruisers formed the bulk of the modern French Navy be-cause by 1906 the battleships that existed were obsolete as a resultof stagnation in their construction. Indeed, the French Navy as earlyas 1898 was no longer a threat to British naval power. This problemresulted from the disastrous effects of the Jeune École, which cre-ated a state of flux in French grand naval strategy, and consequentlythe building programs, as debates continued to break out betweenproponents of that school and traditionalists. Lack of clear navalpolicy hampered the standardization of design, so the fleet com-prised a collection of test ships by the turn of the century. Francewas still a powerful force, but it was no longer number two in theworld. By 1905, French weakness and the fear of Germany had ledto the Entente Cordiale, a loose defensive understanding withBritain, the year before. Part of this agreement was rough navalplans for use in case of a common war with Germany.

The German Navy had expanded from a force that was virtuallynonexistent into one of the mightiest in the early twentieth century.The industrial strength of the country by this time had surpassed


that of Great Britain. Germany had also become an imperial powerthrough the acquisition of several islands in the Pacific, formallypart of the Spanish Empire, and areas in Africa. The growingstrength and prestige of Germany were used to further the cause ofa large navy by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. In 1897 Tirpitz becamestate secretary of the navy. He shared the kaiser’s enthusiasm for aforce that could project German influence outside continental Eu-rope and worked diligently to that end. By 1905, Tirpitz had createdthe second most powerful navy in the world.

Cruisers formed a large part of this new fleet through the firstGerman Naval Law, and the second German Naval Law in 1900that called for an additional 20 armored cruisers and 38 light cruis-ers by 1920. In this period, the Germans launched five armoredcruisers as ships intended for fleet action and reconnaissance if nec-essary. Essentially, each was a follow-on of the preceding type andnot exceptional. Much of the German cruiser threat at this timecentered on the light cruiser program. Between 1899 and 1905, theGermans launched 15 as naval officials were convinced of their po-tential worth in battle. These lightly armed and protected shipsproved to be a satisfactory design.

One of them, Lübeck, stood out as an innovative vessel, one ofthe first warships to use turbine engines. This engine was first intro-duced in 1897 in Great Britain aboard the Royal Navy yachtTurbina. It consisted of steam being passed from the boilers througha series of nozzles, where it gained velocity as it pushed through.This steam then passed through a series of blades attached to a ro-tor, which turned it and subsequently the propeller shaft to producemotive power. This engine was far more reliable that the old recipro-cating engines of the triple-expansion type, whose huge pistons gen-erally shook themselves apart after extended use. It was also fasterthan the old engines. Eventually, the turbine would become thecommon power plant in all warships.

The German navy’s expansion was closely followed by that of theUnited States Navy. Much of its growth, however, was not in cruis-ers. Since the 1880s, cruiser construction of all sorts had been gen-erally low. Even the success of the navy in the Spanish-AmericanWar had not altered this trend, despite the vigorous call for a biggernavy that the conflict had produced among the populace. Naval offi-cials in the United States still held to the belief, now greatly bol-stered by the writings of Mahan, that the construction of battleshipswas of the highest priority. In October 1904 the General Board ofthe Navy strengthened this view when it asserted that only battle-


ships could effectively fight in an era of increased gunnery ranges.Large naval guns would tear apart cruisers, with smaller weaponsthat could only fight at closer ranges, before they could close to adistance where their guns would be effective. All of the U.S. ar-mored cruisers that were launched before 1908 were accepted bymany naval officials, as by their counterparts in other countries at thistime, as second-class battleships capable of fighting with the mainbattle fleet rather than ships that would perform cruiser functions.

Between 1899 and 1905, the Americans commissioned five ar-mored cruisers in two different classes. Neither was an effective de-sign. Each was significantly undergunned for the size. Those smallercruisers that were launched between 1899 and 1905 were laid downbefore the pronouncement of the General Board. These six pro-tected cruisers of the Denver-class were also unsatisfactory, beingtoo slow to act as cruisers. Indeed, no ships like the German lightcruisers or the scouts in Great Britain existed in the United StatesNavy until over a decade later. This fact may seem rather surprising,as the need for scouts in the fleet actions touted by Mahanian doc-trine, the base of U.S. strategic thinking, was apparent. Withoutthem, the fleet would be blind to an approaching enemy force. In1904 the General Board asserted the need for scout cruisers. Thename of these ships suggests their function. In terms of design theywere extremely small warships that relied on high speed to escapeadversaries, most of which were better-armed. The General Boardsuggested that an ideal ratio for scout cruisers was one per battle-ship, but the idea of constructing such vessels fell on deaf ears.

From 1904 to 1914, no navy secretary suggested to Congress theconstruction of scout cruisers despite the pleas of naval officers.The battleship, for political reasons and popular sentiment, and dueto the large construction costs, meant that there was little left forthe construction of other ships; the big ships ruled the day in theU.S. fleet. By 1906, the United States Navy was lopsided as a result.It consisted of 26 battleships, seven armored cruisers (with anothereight under construction) and 23 other cruisers. Most of the cruis-ers below the armored ones were obsolete and virtually useless inmodern warfare.

Cruiser production in the rest of the naval powers was equal to orless than that of the United States. The Austro-Hungarian Empirebuilt none, preferring to concentrate on the production of battle-ships; Italy built one three-ship class of armored cruiser. TheseGaribaldi-class vessels continued the Italian trend toward buildingsmall cruiser hulls and were by far the most successful that they


built. The ships had a fine combination of speed, protection, andfirepower.

The Japanese program was greater than both the Austro-Hungari-ans and the Italians combined, but much of it, as in the past, wasproduced by other naval powers. The eight Japanese armored cruis-ers were built by either Great Britain, which by 1902 had concludedan alliance with Japan in order to concentrate its naval forces athome against Germany rather than in Pacific waters, France, orItaly on proven designs from those countries. Japanese naval offi-cials envisioned that these ships would stand in the line of battle.Beneath them were three smaller protected cruisers that could servein the role of fleet reconnaissance.

The continued reliance of the Japanese on foreign shipbuilderswas no longer the result of a lack of shipbuilding knowledge. Thereal reason was that they could not wait for construction in theirown country. The Japanese needed cruisers quickly to offset thenaval power of Russia. By early 1904, Russia sought a warm-waterport in the Far East and eyed Manchuria and Korea as possible sites.Russian interference in the region infuriated the Japanese, since theRussians had forced them out of the same areas after the Sino-Japa-nese War on the pretext of protecting the peoples that populatedthem. The tensions this created would lead to war and the largestmodern naval battle up to that time.

Russia’s fleet in 1904 was still powerful, but this fact was, as al-ways, the product of its strength in battleships rather than cruisers.Only two armored cruisers were launched between 1899 and 1904,and both were rather unremarkable designs. One was simply an im-proved version of Rossiya. Unlike in most navies of this period, themajority of Russian construction was in protected cruisers, totaling11 in all. A principle reason was the savings in cost over armoredcruisers, as the Russians did not have the money to spare for a largearmored cruiser program after all the battleships. These ships andtheir older counterparts were completely inadequate for a fleet thesize of Russia’s. There were few ships in the fleet that could performthe duty of reconnaissance for the battle fleet in time of war. Thisproblem would lead to disaster when tensions with Japan over Asiaexploded into war.

The war between Russia and Japan was the last of a series of con-flicts that occurred between 1899 and 1905 that involved cruisers.Many were imperial conflicts, one of the larger ones being the 1899Boer War that pitted Dutch-descended South Africans against GreatBritain, which claimed the majority of South Africa as part of the


British Empire. British cruisers proved indispensable in this conflictas tools to project British military power overseas. In 1899, whilethe British stronghold of Ladysmith was under siege by the Boersand in danger of being conquered, the British cruisers Powerful andTerrible arrived with naval brigades to strengthen the fighting menashore. The ships also served as floating artillery batteries to repelBoer attacks. These efforts proved successful and contributed to theultimate surrender of the Boers in 1902.

Cruisers were also used to project the power of maritime nationsin imperial struggles in the Far East. Throughout much of the nine-teenth century, China had remained in isolation from Western pow-ers in the belief that any European or U.S. presence would upset thegovernment’s absolute control of the populace. Increasing Westerninterference at the end of the nineteenth century in the name offree trade in China, as opposed to Chinese restrictions to preventdependence on foreign goods, were actually bids by imperial powersto subjugate the country by using economic might as the engine forcontrol. By 1900, the Dowager Empress sought to curb Western in-fluence in her country and allied herself with the Boxers, a group ofxenophobic Chinese who hated all Europeans and all things West-ern. Troops of this alliance laid siege to foreign embassies in Peking(Beijing) as a result. This act led to an international expedition ofBritish, German, Russian, Japanese, and U.S. warships to the areato relieve the embassies. Many of these ships were cruisers, whichused their guns to cover the landing of troops on the Chinese main-land. By August 1900, Peking lay in Western hands and the Chinesehad to accept humiliating terms that allowed the exploitation oftheir markets by Western powers.

These actions paled in comparison to the experience gleanedfrom the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, where cruisers formedthe backbone of the war at sea. Imperial tensions between Russiaand Japan on the Asian mainland resulted in the Japanese launchinga preemptive strike on 8 February 1904 at the Russian naval base ofPort Arthur, Manchuria. The struggle for control of the Far East the-ater revolved largely around naval battles, as each side struggled forcommand of the sea, knowing that the survival of troops fighting forcontrol of the mainland depended on the safe arrival of overseassupplies. This fact led the Russians to use some cruisers as com-merce raiders while the Japanese instituted a blockade of PortArthur where the Russian fleet lay.

This latter act led to several battles between the Russian and Japa-nese fleets, each using cruisers as warships in the general battle line,


that resulted from attempts by the Russians to break the blockade.The greatest example of cruisers in action, however, was the 27 May1905 Battle of Tsushima. By this point in the war, the Russian landeffort was in serious jeopardy, as Port Arthur had surrendered and thewarships of the Russian fleet that were stationed there were eitherdestroyed or interned in neutral ports. The fate of the Russians hungon one last battle for command of the sea. The Russian Baltic Fleet,following the destruction of the Russian force at Port Arthur, washurried to the Pacific to turn the tide. The core of this force, underRear Admiral Zinovi Petrovitch Rozhdestvenski, comprised eight bat-tleships, one armored cruiser, five protected cruisers, and a collec-tion of old ironclads. The Japanese force that met it in the TsushimaStraits on 27 May was commanded by Vice Admiral Togo Heihachiroand included four battleships and eight armored cruisers.

The disparity disguised the fact that most of the Russian fleet wasobsolete, whereas Togo’s force was comprised of some of the mostmodern warships available. The Japanese commander also enjoyedsuperior speed through both his cruisers and battleships as well asbetter gunnery from his crews. In terms of gunnery, the Japanesehad a particular advantage owing to a type of projectile that theywere using. Not only did the Japanese have armor-piercing (AP)shells that were common in navies worldwide; they also had a typeof destructive high-explosive (HE) shell. This type of projectile wasdesigned to devastate lightly armored areas of an enemy ship such asthe superstructure. The collective result of these Japanese advan-tages was disaster for the Russians. Small picket boats of Togo’s fleetsighted the Russians early and used for the first time in war at sea anew innovation, the radio, to communicate the position to the mainfleet. After overhauling the Russian fleet and crossing over the pathof the lead ship to provide broadside fire, Togo used his superiorspeed to steam in a circle around the increasingly disorganized Rus-sian fleet. Superior Japanese gunnery won the day. Russian lossesincluded three modern battleships, five older ones, and four cruis-ers. The Japanese lost only three small torpedo boats.

This humiliating loss forced the Russians to ask for terms, andpeace was concluded by September 1905. The capitulation of theRussians after Tsushima, where most of the Japanese fleet com-prised cruisers, was the first military defeat in modern times of aEuropean power by an Asian power. In the course of one day, Russiaceased to be a significant naval power and found that it was now thesixth most powerful navy, not the third.


This battle was important for the cruiser as a weapons system. Al-though the ships that fought in this struggle were not used as tradi-tional cruisers, but rather in the line of battle, the technology thatthey incorporated had now been fully tested and was proven suc-cessful. After 45 years of development, the cruiser had gone frombeing a warship of experimentation to one that had clear and provendesign characteristics attached to different classifications of cruis-ers. The repercussions of the battle would dominate development asthe great naval powers incorporated experience into naval and edu-cational programs. They would also reevaluate the traditional tasksof cruisers in light of the experience gleaned during the war. The re-sults in many cases would be a furtherance of previous designs withadded improvements, but one consequence of the battle aided inthe progression of a new design of cruiser that would turn upsidedown some of the views concerning the purpose of the weapons sys-tem. In the next few years, this newcomer and its more establishedcounterparts would have the opportunity to showcase their abilitiesthrough service in one of the greatest naval struggles the world hasever seen.

NOTES

1. Spencer Tucker, A Short History of the Civil War at Sea (Wilmington,DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002), p. 135.

2. David K. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development,1860–1905 (London: Chatham Publishing, 1997), p. 18.

3. Roger Chesneau and Eugene M. Kolesnik, eds., All the World’s Fight-ing Ships, 1860–1905 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1979), p. 118.

4. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875–1914 (New York: VintageBooks, 1989), p. 150.

5. Chesneau and Kolesnik, All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1860–1905,p. 282.

6. Spencer Tucker, A Handbook of 19th Century Naval Warfare (Thrupp,Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton, 2000), p. 158.

7. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought, p. 134.8. Ibid., p. 110.9. George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy,

1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 20.10. Ronald H. Spector, At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the

Twentieth Century (New York: Viking, 2001), p. 27.


11. Ibid., p. 25.12. Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval

Policy, 1871–1904 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 241.13. Spector, At War at Sea, p. 55.


C H A P T E R 3

Cruisers, 1905–1939

The 1905 Battle of Tsushima demonstrated that the cruiser, re-gardless of the fact that the educations of officers and crewmenwere very slowly advancing, had quickly become an advanced andcomplex weapons system. The use of cruisers in the Russo-Japa-nese War also proved the worth of the cruiser as an integral part ofthe world’s battle fleets that could alter not only the outcome ofwar at sea but any conflict. Japanese Admiral Togo’s fleet, com-prised partly of armored cruisers, annihilated the Russian force ofAdmiral Rozhdestvenski and produced ultimate victory. Deprivedany possibility, due to the loss of their battle fleet, of asserting com-mand of the sea, the Russians were incapable after Tsushima ofpreventing the Japanese from resupplying troops in mainland Asia.The result was the defeat of Russia in the war. This loss shockedthe governments of the Western world, as it was the first time inmodern warfare that a major European power had been defeated byan Asian nation.

Not only did the Russo-Japanese War herald a new age in worldpolitics with the ascendancy of Japan as a major power; it alsomarked a watershed in warship development, particularly cruisers.The modern weapons systems—principally larger guns and torpe-does—were now proven commodities in naval warfare, although thefaith in the latter was still largely theoretical (they were ineffectiveat Tsushima). These weapons necessitated a drive for the greater ed-ucation of those who manned warships. The need to effectively em-ploy them was apparent through the horrors experienced by crew-men if their vessel was sunk due to the enemy’s better use of itsweapons. Gun crews who were poorly protected by small gun shields

71

oftentimes had their feet cut off by splinters from shells that ex-ploded against the shields and flew underneath. Others within en-gine rooms were mangled by machinery as sinking ships listed ontheir way to the bottom. The loss of electrical power in badly dam-aged vessels contributed to the terror felt by those belowdecks asthey struggled to find their way topside to escape. Failure to do someant death in the darkness for many as they were entombed intheir ships. The Battle of Tsushima also showcased the importanceof new technology in communications through early radio, known aswireless. Increasingly, the duties of officers and crewmen reflectedthe desire of all modern naval powers to produce the best cruiserspossible and the best people to man them through greater special-ization of tasks.

In terms of cruiser development, the Battle of Tsushima directlyinfluenced all construction in the years prior to 1908. The use ofscouts as reconnaissance craft was proven, and the battle heralded areturn of the armored cruiser to the world’s battle fleets after mostnations had shifted to the construction of smaller cruisers. Althoughmany nations undertook production of armored cruisers before1905, interest followed the Japanese successes within the battle linein the Battle of Tsushima. For many naval officials, the armoredcruiser was once again seen as a vessel that could fulfill the tradi-tional roles of the cruiser and serve as a capital ship in battle. An ex-ample of both the continuation of this ship type as well as innova-tion in design is Sweden’s Fylgia. Not only was the warship theworld’s smallest armored cruiser; the Swedes were the first to suc-cessfully incorporate side armor of a maximum thickness of 4 incheson such a small hull, which displaced only 4,310 tons.

After Tsushima, increasingly complex cruiser designs in theworld’s navies were based on the technological innovations of thelate nineteenth century. Rifled breech-loading guns were still the or-der of the day and progressively became larger as the result of im-provements in construction. Projectiles were shells, including AProunds to penetrate a warship’s hull and HE rounds to cause dam-age to superstructures. Steel armor became thicker as a conse-quence of the continued race between the size of ordnance and theneed for protection. Propulsion also remained unchanged and con-tinued in a period of transition between the triple-expansion engineand turbine. The early twentieth century was therefore marked notby mass innovation as in the past but by how preexisting technolo-gies were combined to produce cruisers best suited for certain tasks.

Japan’s cruiser construction program was based on the experience


gained at Tsushima. In light of the performance of their armoredcruisers in battle, the Japanese laid down four armored cruisers be-tween 1905 and 1908 that mounted heavy armament. Two werecompleted before 1908, being the warships of the Tsukuba-class.The hulls measured 450 feet by 75 feet, 5 inches, displaced 13,750tons, and were protected by belt and turret armor of a maximumthickness of 8 inches as well as 3-inch thick deck armor. Mountedon the vessels was a primary armament of four 12-inch guns posi-tioned in two turrets, one each fore and aft. They also carried 12 6-inch and 12 4.7-inch guns. Their engines could produce a maximumspeed of 20.5 knots. The Tsukubas were designed to replace agingbattleships in the fleet and as such represented the Japanese decisionto continue to employ cruisers in the line of battle as they did atTsushima. In addition, the Japanese also built three light cruisers.

Indeed, the first cruisers laid down after the war were light cruis-ers designed as scouts and to lead destroyer flotillas. Unlike most ofthe ships of the pre–World War I fleet, these vessels were built inJapanese shipyards, which reflects the growing capabilities of theJapanese in warship construction. The initial class of ships, theYodo-class, comprising two vessels, was laid down in 1906 and 1907and completed in 1908. Their hulls were small, measuring only 305feet, 5 inches by 32 feet, 1 inch with a displacement of 1,250 tons;they mounted two 4.7-inch and four 3.1-inch guns protected by gunshields. They were also armed with two 18-inch torpedo tubes andcould steam at a maximum speed of 22 knots. These vessels wereimportant in the sense that they reflected the value that the Japa-nese attached to torpedo attacks and a growing emphasis on nightattacks using this weapon. One of the vessels, Mogami, also show-cased the use of new technology by the Japanese, as it was the firstvessel in the fleet equipped with turbine engines.

The construction of light cruisers was the order of the day inGreat Britain, although the decision to construct them extendedpast the experience gleaned from Tsushima. The British cruiser pro-gram was greatly curtailed as a result of the 1904 appointment ofAdmiral John Fisher as first sea lord of the Admiralty. Fisher, due inpart to his drive to economize naval expenditures in an age wherethe financial burden of maintaining British naval supremacy was ris-ing through competition with the old naval powers and Germany,scrapped 72 older cruisers and authorized few new units. This deci-sion was also the result of his belief that past cruiser designs werelargely outmoded. Only one class of scout cruiser was consequentlyapproved in the years before 1908, largely the product of the per-

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 73

ceived need of cruisers to act as leaders for destroyer flotillas. Thesevessels of the two-ship Bodicea-class proved unsatisfactory. Theirhulls measured 405 feet by 41 feet, displaced 3,300 tons, and werescantily protected by an armored deck of only 1-inch thickness. Theships’ weaponry consisted of six 4-inch guns and two 18-inch tor-pedo tubes. The maximum speed was a respectable 25 knots, butthis capability was not enough to allow them to lead modern de-stroyers, which averaged a top speed of 29 knots. This speed wasdue to their use of oil-fired boilers to power the engines, a techno-logical innovation that had not yet extended to cruiser construction.In addition, the small size of the Bodicea-class cruisers precludedtheir use in oceangoing missions, as they could not ship enough coalto operate over long distances.

In contrast to British competitors, the Germans continued to ex-pand their cruiser force in part from their continued faith in ar-mored cruisers, which was reinforced by the Japanese success in theRusso-Japanese War. These two vessels of the Scharnhorst-class,laid down between 1904 and 1905 and launched in 1907 and 1908respectively, measured 474 feet, 9 inches by 71 feet and displaced12,781 tons. Each ship carried a primary armament of eight 8.2-inch guns; four were mounted in two two-gunned turrets locatedfore and aft, while the others were mounted in broadside withincasemates located amidships. They were also armed with six 6-inchguns and four 18-inch torpedo tubes. The ships’ armor, which con-sisted of a belt with a maximum thickness of 6 inches and deck pro-tection of 2 inches, was much the same as the Roon-class launchedearlier. Their engines could produce a maximum speed of 23.5knots. The country’s cruiser program also continued to producelight cruisers as a result of the German belief that arose at the turnof the twentieth century in light cruisers as multipurpose warshipsthat could serve both with the fleet and as commerce raiders. Ger-many completed the construction of the last two Bremen-class lightcruisers in 1906 and 1907 respectively. They also laid down fourships of the Königsburg-class and two Dresden-class light cruisersbetween 1905 and 1908. These vessels were essentially larger andfaster versions of the Bremen-class that incorporated the same ar-mament as their predecessors but with less deck armor.

The remainder of the world’s naval powers produced cruisers inthe years before 1908, but their programs were slight. The UnitedStates, although possessing a powerful navy, continued to producemostly battleships rather than cruisers and destroyers. American


naval officials believed that the strategic requirements of protectingthe Philippines, taken in the 1898 Spanish-American War, and themaintenance of trade with China were best served through a fleetcomprising the most powerful warships afloat.

Armored cruiser construction thus came to an end as a result ofthe faith placed in battleships but also because of the belief withinU.S. naval circles that the ship type was obsolete after 1906 whenGreat Britain launched Dreadnought. That famous battleship wasthe vision of Admiral John Fisher and boasted uniform, big-gun ar-mament, relatively high speed, and good armor protection.

U.S. officials believed that the nation’s money would best bespent in the production of similar ships in order to keep the fleet onpar technologically with Great Britain and to boost the destructivepower of the fleet. The importance attached to the battleship alsopractically extinguished any construction of smaller cruisers. Thethree ships of the Chester-class were the exception to the trend inbattleship construction. These vessels, authorized under the NavyAct of 1904, were laid down in 1905 and completed in 1908. Theywere lightly armed and protected, but two of the vessels representeda step forward in U.S. cruiser design, as they were the first warshipsof the U.S. Navy equipped with turbines.

France also produced few cruisers in the years leading up to 1908,although the reason for the stagnation in construction was not the re-sult of perceived strategic requirements. The decline of the Frenchcruiser program was the result of the confusion in strategic thoughtthat stemmed from the ideological conflict of the late nineteenth cen-tury between the Jeune École, which held to a navy of smaller ships nolarger than cruisers, and traditionalists, who believed in a navy cen-tered on battleships. It was also a product of the frequent changes ofministers of marine, each with a program that differed from the previ-ous administration. Cruiser construction and the French Navy as awhole consequently experienced a period of decline.

Between 1896 and 1911, the French Navy slipped from the sec-ond most powerful to fourth place. Even so, five armored cruiserswere laid down between 1905 and 1908. Only one, Jules Michelet,was completed before the end of 1908. This 13,105-ton ship was es-sentially a larger version of the Leon-Gambetta-class. This vesseland those that remained on the stocks by the end of this periodwould be the last French cruisers built until 1922. Although theFrench Navy would experience a revival after 1909 with the ap-pointment of Vice Admiral Augustin Boué de Lapeyrère as minister

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 75

of marine, his program did not yield cruisers. The building scheduleset out by Lapeyrère called for the completion of 10 scout cruisersby 1920, but this plan was greatly disrupted due to the onset ofWorld War I in 1914.

Budgetary problems that stemmed from a weak economy plaguedItaly’s naval construction. Despite this problem, the Italians contin-ued to place great importance on building a powerful modern navy.The Italians did not launch any new cruisers between 1905 and1908 as a result of a weak economy and industrial base, whichslowed construction. They did, however, lay down four armoredcruisers and one protected cruiser, the latter being a contract placedby the Ottoman Empire.

Italy’s and France’s slight programs appeared enormous in com-parison to cruiser production in imperial Russia. The country hadceased to be a major naval power with its defeat at Tsushima, slip-ping from the third most powerful naval force to sixth place. Subse-quent naval construction was slow as a result of the strain placed onRussia’s economy by the war and the diversion of the government’sattention to deal with internal social and political unrest producedby the hardships of the conflict. Russia, consequently, producedonly one cruiser before 1908. This vessel, the armored cruiserRurik, was one of the best ships of its type ever built and a tribute tothe ability of Russian shipyards. Completed in 1908, the warship’shull measured 529 feet by 75 feet and displaced 15,190 tons. Itmounted four 10-inch guns in two two-gunned turrets located foreand aft that were supplemented by a secondary battery of eight 8-inch guns, mounted on the ship’s sides, and two 18-inch torpedotubes. The Rurik was well-armored with a belt of a maximum thick-ness of 6 inches and 8-inch armor on the turrets and conning tower.In addition, there were two armored decks—the main deck andlower deck—that protected against plunging shellfire. Its triple-expansion engines could produce a maximum speed of 21 knots.The Rurik served as one of the newest units of a fleet that was onlya shadow of its former strength in 1904. Russia would not regain aposition of prominence at sea for the next 50 years.

The Rurik and the large Japanese armored cruisers exhibited atrend toward increasingly large vessels with more powerful batteries.They represented the continuation of a type of warship that ap-peared after Tsushima to be the penultimate cruiser design in termsof potency. These vessels, however, and others that were still underconstruction in the shipyards of several other world naval powers,were rendered obsolete in 1908 when a new type of warship burst


onto the naval scene that represented the zenith of the quest to cre-ate the most powerful and versatile cruiser possible.

The genesis of this new cruiser type stemmed from a 1903 articlewritten by Italian Naval Constructor Colonel Vittorio Cuniberti thatwas published in the British naval journal Fighting Ships. This jour-nal was the creation of naval author and illustrator Fred T. Jane in1897 and remains in circulation as Jane’s Fighting Ships, one of themost respected works on world naval technology. Cuniberti’s viewscentered on the concept of the “ideal warship”: a vessel that pos-sessed a combination of armor of such thickness as to resist the fireof the largest naval guns in existence, speed greater than any enemywarship, and an armament comprising only one size of heavy guns.In Cuniberti’s mind, this weapon was the 12-inch gun, at the timethe largest piece of naval ordnance in common use. The Italianspursued this concept in battleship design, while the Japanese at-tempted to approach the standard through the construction of theTsukuba-class of armored cruisers.

The first naval power to fully embrace Cuniberti’s ideas, however,was Great Britain under the direction of First Sea Lord AdmiralFisher. He was convinced that Cuniberti’s ideal warship was thequintessential warship design for the future that could assume theroles of battleships and cruisers. His argument, however, for thecessation of battleship construction in favor of a ship based on Cu-niberti’s conception was rejected by the Admiralty as being toocostly. Fisher’s superiors also balked at the idea of an end to the bat-tleship, which had been the capital ship of the world’s navies sincethe Age of Fighting Sail. Fisher’s superior, First Lord of the Admi-ralty Lord Selbourne, embodied this reaction through his writing onthe subject of ending battleship construction: “Indeed not! The bat-tle ship is essential, just as much as 100 years ago.”1 In 1904, Fisherconsequently compromised and called for a committee of designs todraw up plans for both a battleship and a cruiser that possessed allbig-gun armament and high speed. This led to the construction ofDreadnought, the battleship launched in 1906, as well as the first“dreadnought armored cruiser.”

The committee of designs produced a warship that was plaguedwith weaknesses as a result of practical considerations and Fisher’sideas pertaining to the ideal warship. The members of the board re-alized that a cruiser that possessed the armament of a battleship,the high speed of a cruiser, and moderate armor protection would betoo large to fit the existing dry docks in Great Britain. Fisher’s solu-tion was the elimination of some armor protection in order to re-

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 77

duce the beam, or the width, of the warship’s hull. The reduction inbeam would allow the new ship to fit into Britain’s existing drydocks. In the first sea lord’s mind, this decision did not constitute adesign weakness. In his view, high speed was the equivalent of ar-mor protection; whatever the new ship could not outfight, it couldoutrun by virtue of superior speed. Others, however, were not con-vinced, and their comments predicted a future problem for the newtype of ship. One of Fisher’s colleagues noted that speed being theequivalent of armor was an illusion; in the event of war, a great dif-ference in speed would not exist between Fisher’s ships and those ofthe enemy. The reason was that the other maritime nations often-times followed Great Britain’s lead in ship design and construction.2

Nevertheless, the result of the committee’s work and AdmiralFisher’s influence was the Invincible-class of dreadnought armoredcruisers. The three ships of this class were all laid down in 1906,two being completed in 1908, the third the following year. Theywere the world’s first armored cruisers that incorporated all big-gunbattleship armament with the speed of a cruiser. Their hulls meas-ured 567 feet by 78 feet, 6 inches and displaced 17,373 tons.These vessels mounted a primary armament of eight 12-inch gunsin four two-gunned turrets. One each was located fore and aft,while the other two were mounted on either side of the hull amid-ships. The cruisers also mounted a secondary armament of 16 4-inch guns and five 18-inch torpedo tubes. The high speed soughtby Fisher was achieved; their turbines could produce 25.5 knots.They were protected by an armored belt with a maximum thicknessof 6 inches combined with an armored deck whose thicknessranged from 2.5 inches over vital areas such as the machinery andmagazines to .75 inch over nonvital areas. The turrets were af-forded 7 inches of armor.

The armor protection was light in comparison to battleships andposed a problem for British naval officials when they considered thebest use for this class of ship. Admiral Fisher intended that they beused as capital ships within the main battle line. Naval officials,however, realized that the cruisers would be at extreme risk if theywere employed in this role. The Dreadnought battleship, whichmounted 12-inch guns, carried an armored belt as thick as 12inches, which exceeded the qualification of British naval officialsthat ships had to have armor at least 11 inches thick to withstandgunfire of the same size as that carried by the warship. The Invincible-class of cruisers shipped a belt only half as great. The disparity inarmor was also noticeable in the armored decks; the battleship pos-


sessed a deck that was half an inch thicker. Naval officials realizedthat cruisers, if they were used in the line of battle, would not beable to take advantage of superior speed and would be subjected togunfire that they could not withstand. In addition, Fisher’s toutedexample of the Battle of Tsushima as proof that armored cruiserscould be used in this capacity was flawed. British intelligence re-ports of the conflict stated that Russian shooting had been ex-tremely poor and that the Japanese cruisers engaged the Russianbattleships only after they had already been damaged by the heavierships in Togo’s force. The prospect of cruiser deployment as regularcombatants seemed dubious.

British naval officials also had reservations about the use of theInvincible-class cruisers in traditional roles. The duties of com-merce protection and blockade—the principle usages of Britishcruisers—were problematic, as both entailed the employment oflarge numbers of cruisers. The cost of the new armored cruisers,which Fisher believed should be the only class of cruiser, precludedconstruction in the large numbers necessary. The average cost of theMinotaur-class armored cruiser, the last class of this type before thenew warships, was £1.4 million, while the Invincible cost more than£1.6 million.3 In time of war, the loss of any of these expensive ves-sels would be a great blow to the finances and effectiveness of theRoyal Navy. In the eyes of many, the only viable use for these shipswas reconnaissance.

Nevertheless, the dynamic Admiral Fisher had set a precedentthat would endure through his tenure as first sea lord and would af-fect future cruiser designs in Great Britain. The new dreadnoughtarmored cruisers, despite questions surrounding their use, had ren-dered their predecessors obsolete. Between 1908 and August 1914,the outbreak of World War I, British dockyards completed ninemore dreadnought armored cruisers in addition to the Invincible-class, and an additional unit was under construction. By 1912, theclumsy designation dreadnought armored cruiser was dropped in fa-vor of battle cruiser. The sense of power denoted by this term wasapt considering that each successive class of the new ships had be-come progressively larger, more heavily armed, and technologicallyadvanced.

One of the last classes of battle cruisers completed before thewar, the Lion-class, was a design that produced huge vessels. TheLion, completed in 1912, measured 700 feet by 88 feet, 6 inchesand displaced a staggering 26,270 tons. Its primary armament con-sisted of eight 13.5-inch guns and its engines produced a maximum

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speed of 27 knots. This vessel’s hull dwarfed its battleship equiva-lent, which measured 581 feet by 88 feet, 6 inches, and the warshipoverall was more costly. The Lion required an expenditure of morethan £2 million, while its battleship counterpart cost slightly morethan £1.9 million. The difference in price was largely the result ofthe larger hulls of the battle cruisers. In order to produce the highspeed called for in the design, it was necessary to build a larger hullto house more powerful engines and more boilers. Despite the sizeand cost, however, British battle cruisers continued to be gravely de-ficient in armor protection. The maximum thickness of Lion’s beltarmor was 9 inches, while its armored deck was no greater than theoriginal battle cruisers of the Invincible-class. This design flawwould exact a high price in World War I.

Several of the world’s great naval powers turned to the productionof battle cruisers in order to remain on par with Great Britain. Theonly other country to construct them in large numbers was Ger-many, which by 1908 was locked in a naval arms race with GreatBritain and was the greatest threat to Britain’s mastery of the seas.The Germans, however, did not immediately shift to the construc-tion of battle cruisers, as they were not aware of the full designspecifications of the British Invincible-class ships. Throughout con-struction, Admiral Fisher had maintained publicly that the primaryarmament of the vessels was eight 9.2-inch guns rather than the 12-inch weapons actually mounted. This deception was motivated bypolitical factors, as Fisher desired to catch the Germans by surprise.He knew that if the Germans did not anticipate the new design, theywould automatically fall behind in construction of the newest war-ships and in the naval arms race overall. As a result of Fisher’s mis-information, the Germans designed and constructed an armoredcruiser to counter Invincible that was based on the old specifica-tions governing cruisers of the type. This vessel, Blücher, was an im-provement on the previous Scharnhorst-class and was laid down in1907 but not completed until 1910. Its hull measured 530 feet, 6inches by 80 feet, 3 inches and displaced 15,590 tons; its enginescould produce a maximum speed of 24.25 knots. The ship mounted12 8.2-inch guns in six two-gunned turrets as well as eight 5.9-inchweapons and four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. This cruiser was pro-tected by an armor belt up to 7 inches thick. Although it was a pow-erful ship by the standards of previous armored cruiser construc-tion, Blücher was obsolete before it was completed owing to theadvent of the battle cruiser.

Germany rectified this situation soon afterward when it began


construction of the country’s first battle cruiser in 1908 upon fullylearning of the British design. The Von der Tann, completed in1911, was in all respects a superior design to the first six British bat-tle cruisers. Its hull measured 563 feet, 4 inches by 26 feet, 6.75inches, displaced 19,064 tons, and was propelled by engines thatcould produce a maximum speed of 24.75 knots. The ship mountedeight 11.1-inch guns, 10 5.9-inch weapons, and four 17.7-inch tor-pedo tubes. Although slower than the British battle cruisers, Von derTann was a better-balanced design, as the slight reduction in speedallowed for greater armor protection. Unlike Admiral Fisher, theGermans did not believe that speed was a substitute for armor. Theywere able to produce vessels with greater protection because theyhad built new dockyards, as those that existed could not support thenewest dreadnoughts. This allowed them to construct wider hulls toallow for more armor. As a result, the belt of the ship had a maxi-mum thickness of 10 inches, much better suited to withstandingfire from large naval guns. The wider beam also produced a muchmore stable ship than the British equivalent that aided in the properaiming of guns during battle.

Germany subsequently laid down another six battle cruisers andcompleted three before the outbreak of World War I. On the whole,they were better designs than the British ones as a result of armorprotection and better subdivision of the hull. German battle cruiserswere consequently able to withstand a much greater degree of pun-ishment in battle. Their only design flaw was the tendency to allowfor fewer watertight compartments in the bow sections that poten-tially posed the threat of mass flooding if the hull was penetrated byfire in that area. Nevertheless, the German battle cruisers served asan imposing answer to British rivals.

The other naval power to launch battle cruisers was Japan. Al-though the Tsukuba-class armored cruisers had been a leap forward,these ships were rendered obsolete by the battle cruiser due to theirhybrid armament and slow speed. The introduction of the battlecruiser also rendered the proceeding group of armored cruiser, theIbuki-class, completed between 1909 and 1911, relatively uselessfor the same reasons. Japan’s response, however, to the new Euro-pean cruisers was impressive. In 1911 and 1912, the Japanese laiddown the four ships of the Kongo-class. The first, Kongo, was com-pleted in 1913. It measured 704 feet by 92 feet, displaced 27,500tons, and was powered by turbines that produced a maximum speedof 27.5 knots. The ship was the first in the world to mount a 14-inchgun, having a primary armament of eight such pieces and a second-

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 81

ary armament of 16 6-inch weapons. The large 14-inch gun was areflection of the continued race between the size of naval weaponryand armor. The Japanese emphasis on the torpedo also led to the in-clusion of eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. Protection was afforded byan armored belt and a protective deck that had maximum thick-nesses of 8 inches and 2.25 inches respectively. The completion ofKongo, the most powerful battle cruiser in the world in the years be-fore World War I, signified the continued growth of Japan as a navalpower.

The remaining maritime powers did not construct battle cruisers.France did not produce them for two reasons, the first being thatthe country continued to lack a concrete naval construction policy.The French had begun construction of three armored cruisers in theyears between 1904 and 1906, but long-standing economic prob-lems and continuous alterations to their designs delayed comple-tion. The first of these ships, Ernest Renan, was ready for service in1909; the two armored cruisers of the Edgar Quinet-class did notjoin the fleet until 1911. These last two vessels were the most pow-erful French armored cruisers ever built. The hull of the EdgarQuinet measured 521 feet, 7 inches by 27 feet, 5 inches, displaced13,847 tons, and was protected by an armored belt as much as 6inches thick. It mounted 14 7.6-inch guns and could steam at amaximum speed of 23 knots. This ship, its sister, and Ernest Renanwere all obsolete before completion because of the advent of thebattle cruiser. The second factor behind the absence of battlecruiser development in France was an emphasis placed on the con-struction of battleships after 1909 as the central tenet of plans to re-build the French Navy under Minister of Marine Admiral Boué deLapeyrère.

The low naval budgets that resulted from persistently weak eco-nomic conditions prevented the construction of battle cruisers inItaly. In a bid to build a strong navy, the Italians continued to focuson the construction of powerful battleships that incorporated Cu-niberti’s ideas on the ideal warship. Their large cruisers, as in thepast, were few in number but continued to exhibit Italian ingenuityin warship design. Construction on two classes of armored cruiserswas begun in 1905, three of the four ships being laid down that yearand one more two years later. As in France, poor economic condi-tions delayed completion of the first units until 1909; the remainingtwo were not ready for service until 1910 and 1911. Like their Ger-man, Japanese, and French competitors, the Italians were facedwith these ships being rendered obsolete by the battle cruiser, but


construction had progressed too far to cancel. Nevertheless, one ofthe vessels of the second class of armored cruiser, the San Giorgio-class, represented several technological innovations.

The San Marco was a powerful ship by the old standards of ar-mored cruiser construction. Its hull measured 462 feet, 2 inches by68 feet, 11 inches and displaced 10,167 tons; its engines could pro-duce a maximum speed of 23.75 knots. An armored belt 7.87 inchesthick and a deck 2 inches thick protected the ship; it mounted four10-inch guns and eight 7.5-inch guns. This mixed armament andthe slow speed of the ship, in relation to the battle cruiser, doomedthe vessel to obsolescence immediately upon launch, but it incorpo-rated technological improvements that included a gyroscopic com-pass. This device was much more reliable than past methods used tofix the position of a ship, which included dead-reckoning bycrewmembers based on the positions of the stars. The vessel wasalso the first fitted with antirolling water tanks. These were locatedon the sides of the ship and could be filled with water in order tostabilize the vessel in heavy seas and thus allow for better range-finding for the guns in battle. Another innovation that aided maneu-verability was the addition of four screws (propellers) instead of themore traditional two; this allowed for a tighter turning radius at sea.This ship and its sister ship were also the first equipped with electricgun mounting machinery. In the past, gun turrets were turned andthe guns themselves were elevated by either steam or hydraulicpower. Finally, the Italians totally eliminated wood fittings from thevessel in order to decrease the risk of harm to the crew by woodsplinters in battle. Indeed, even the furniture was made of metal.Despite the fact that San Marco and its counterpart were largelyuseless in modern naval warfare, the Italians continued to strive for-ward in the race to improve cruiser design.

The United States did not construct battle cruisers in part be-cause the U.S. Navy was hampered in its general construction pro-gram by financial constraints. Naval officials also viewed the newship type as a poor investment of limited funds. Like the Germans,the Americans did not believe that high speed in battle was a substi-tute for armor protection. Naval programs of this period conse-quently remained centered on battleship construction. Indeed, afterthe completion of the Invincible-class battle cruisers, the UnitedStates halted cruiser construction altogether.

American experimentation with new technologies, however,would come to have a great impact on the development of cruisersand naval warfare as a whole. The United States led the world in the

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 83

development of naval aviation. In 1898 Assistant Secretary of theNavy Theodore Roosevelt had advocated a study on the possible mil-itary uses of U.S. inventor Samuel P. Langley’s flying machine, theAerodrome. The military’s interest in airplanes for reconnaissanceand observation grew after 1903 when the Wright brothers testedtheir airplane at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. After that, naval offi-cials pondered the use of the new machine in naval warfare, and by1910 Captain Washington Chambers, an officer put in charge ofaviation in the navy, arranged for tests of aircraft at sea. The forwardsection of the light cruiser Birmingham was fitted under Chambers’sdirection with a wooden launch platform that measured 83 feet by24 feet and extended from the bridge to the stem of the bow at adownward angle. On 14 November 1910, Eugene B. Ely flew a 50-horsepower Curtis biplane off the launching platform of the cruiser.Although the plane initially plunged toward the ocean after clearingthe bow, Ely managed to keep the plane aloft and set a precedent forthe use of aircraft aboard warships. Progressively, the airplane wouldbecome an integral part of the cruiser and would spawn the birth ofthe aircraft carrier.

The genesis of the battle cruiser not only had an impact on largecruiser construction, but also on that of smaller ships of the type.The old protected cruiser, which relied solely on an armored deckfor protection, had been viewed as obsolete since the turn of thecentury due to the ever-increasing size of naval ordnance that couldeasily penetrate the scant amount of armor and destroy it. Manynaval powers, with the notable exceptions of Great Britain and Ger-many, had turned away from small cruiser construction altogether.Indeed, France and the United States halted cruiser constructioncompletely after the introduction of the battle cruiser. The launch ofthese ships, however, led some to pursue light cruiser designs thatresembled those of Germany, as the new type of cruiser proved tooexpensive to build in large numbers and naval officials still believedthat cruisers were necessary to fulfill the traditional roles.

Germany continued to lead the way in light cruiser construction;the country launched 16 such ships that were improvements on pre-vious classes. The four ships of the Magdeburg-class representedGerman innovation in a bid for cruisers capable of both commercewarfare and regular fleet duties. These ships measured 455 feet by43 feet, 11 inches, displaced 4,570 tons, and were capable of a max-imum speed of 27.5 to 28.2 knots. The variation was the result ofexperimentation with different types of turbine engines. Their pro-tection, aside from armor decks, marked a leap forward: For the first


time in light cruiser construction they possessed an armored beltthat had a maximum thickness of 2.25 inches and covered 80 per-cent of the hull. In order to save weight in favor of this increase inarmor, the protection was incorporated as part of the hull itselfrather than being bolted to the sides, the traditional practice. Theseships, although far more cramped in terms of habitability, weremuch more capable in combat because of the new armor distribu-tion. Armament of 12 4.1-inch guns and two torpedo tubes renderedthem capable of both roles envisioned for the ship, but the additionof 120 mines meant that they could also be used in the role ofminelayer.

The Magdeburg-class was among the first to incorporate mines aspart of the weaponry. The naval mine—which is loosely defined as astationary underwater weapon designed to destroy ships—was cer-tainly not a new device. In 1776, David Bushnell, an American in-ventor, developed a mine for use as the weapon of Turtle, his one-man submersible. The device was a wooden keg filled withgunpowder that was fitted with a contact fuse. Experiments contin-ued during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars whenU.S. inventor Robert Fulton developed new mines. His mines wereemployed by Great Britain, with little success. By the 1861–1865U.S. Civil War, a contact mine being used by the Confederacy wasmoored in shallow bodies of water through the use of a rope. It con-tained a 60-pound charge of gunpowder, an air chamber to givebuoyancy, and a firing device that would set off the charge if themine was jarred. Similar mines were used in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. They progressively became more destructive and alsomore effective. From the early twentieth century forward, new andbetter firing devices included magnetic and acoustic detonators.The first is triggered by the magnetic field produced by the metalhull of a nearby ship, whereas the latter depends on the sound ofthe machinery of a nearby vessel. All told, the versatility of theMagdeburg-class light cruisers, provided in part through the mine,produced a navy for Germany that rivaled that of Great Britain interms of quality and capability.

Great Britain did not pursue a light cruiser program in the yearsbetween 1906 and 1909 due largely to Admiral John Fisher. His in-sistence on battle cruisers as a vessel that could accomplish all theroles of battleships and cruisers stymied efforts by many in the Ad-miralty to construct smaller ships. Nevertheless, by 1909 Fisher wascompelled to give way on his opposition because of the alarm pro-duced by Germany’s light cruisers. The British, locked in a naval

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 85

arms race with the Germans, could not afford to ignore these vesselsas long as their rival continued to produce them. British naval offi-cials also called for these ships in light of the threat posed to theempire’s commerce by German ships. The subsequent four classesof light cruisers became known collectively as the “Town” classes,being named for British towns. Fourteen of these vessels were com-pleted before the war and differed from the German light cruisersthrough heavier armament.

The rest of the world’s naval powers constructing light cruisersbefore World War I did not have programs that approached the sizeof Germany’s or Great Britain’s. The Japanese produced only threesuch vessels that were unremarkable in design. Italy built only onesuch ship as a cadet training vessel. Russia, in a bid to rebuild itsnavy after the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, contracted for fourships. None of these were ready at the outbreak of World War I.

The relative paucity in the numbers of new light cruisers seemedlarge in comparison to that of smaller ships of the type. The con-struction of scout cruisers lagged in most nations as some, like Ger-many, turned completely to light cruisers while others, like theUnited States and France, continued to build no cruisers at all.Great Britain marked the general exception by producing scoutcruisers to lead destroyer flotillas in battle. Thirteen scouts werelaunched before World War I, all being small vessels whose armorprotection was so scant that it was of little worth. The last Britishscouts of the Active-class displaced only 3,400 tons and were pro-tected by an armored deck one inch thick.

Other powers produced small cruisers that served as experimentalwarships. An Italian scout cruiser once again showcased the Italiangift for technological innovation. The Quarto, laid down in 1909and completed in 1913, exhibited a trend in cruiser constructionthat would become the order of the day. This ship relied largely onoil as fuel for its turbines rather than the coal that most cruisers stillemployed. The Austro-Hungarian Navy in 1910 also turned to thescout cruiser, after not having built a cruiser of any type for eightyears, as a ship to experiment with the newest naval technology. TheAdmiral Spaun, however, was an example of the fact that experimen-tation is not always successful. It was the first vessel in the Austro-Hungarian Navy powered by turbine engines. The ship proved agreat disappointment, as its engines frequently broke down and ren-dered the ship largely inactive for much of World War I.

The age that spanned from the Battle of Tsushima to the dawn ofWorld War I in 1914 heralded a precipitous rise in the numbers of


one more type of small cruiser: auxiliary or armed merchant cruisers,civilian-owned passenger and commercial vessels that were pressedinto service for use in time of war. Although it was not a purpose-built warship, the armed merchant cruiser became an integral partof the navies of some naval powers. The concept was certainly notnew, as nations with small navies in the eighteenth and early nine-teenth centuries had used such ships against powers with superiornaval strength. Their use, however, expanded greatly beginning inthe latter half of the nineteenth century.

Several naval powers were forced to rely on armed merchantcruisers because the cost of building true cruisers had greatly in-creased as they became more technologically complex. In 1870, theGermans announced their intention to use merchant ships as a vol-unteer defense force. Protests from France and Great Britain, how-ever, over their potential use as commerce raiders in time of war ledthe Germans to scrap the idea in order not to antagonize Europeanneighbors. Even so, the idea persisted and resurfaced when imperialtensions between Great Britain and Russia in 1877 over Afghanistanled to the Russian employment of three commercial steamers armedwith light guns to prey on British shipping in war. Although diplo-macy prevented a conflict, the British followed the Russian course.

After 1877, the British Admiralty became involved with commer-cial shipping lines in order to influence the design of the ships sothat they could support naval guns if necessary. This step was thebeginning of a policy that ultimately made Britain the principal em-ployer of armed merchant cruisers in the years leading up to WorldWar I. The Royal Navy lacked a sufficient number of cruisers to pro-tect the trade routes of the British Empire. The wisdom of this pol-icy was reinforced in light of the fact that both Russia and Japanemployed armed merchant cruisers as commerce raiders during the1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. It was also a prudent course be-cause Germany, in the last months leading up to World War I,pressed ships into service to serve as commerce raiders againstGreat Britain.

Armed merchant cruisers underwent a conversion process oncethey were requisitioned by the government in which light guns weremounted on the main deck. The Germans also placed torpedo tubeson their vessels, as the weapon was seen as a good tool for com-merce raiding. Due to the fact that these ships possessed no armor,steps were taken to provide some protection through the use ofcompartments filled with coal or another buoyant material. By theoutbreak of World War I, all of the major naval powers included

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 87

armed merchant cruisers in their fleet strength: Great Britain main-tained 26, Italy 21, Germany 13, France nine, the United States six,and Japan and Russia four each.4 Other vessels were convertedthroughout the course of the war in most of these countries. In thecase of Great Britain, armed merchant cruisers played a critical rolein the war at sea during World War I.

By August 1914, armed merchant cruisers represented a smallportion of the world’s cruisers. The naval powers had producedcruisers in such numbers that they formed the largest class of war-ship with the exception of destroyers. The fewest but most powerfuland expensive were battle cruisers: Great Britain operated nine bat-tle cruisers, Germany five, and Japan two. The numbers of older ar-mored, protected, and light cruisers built in the pre-dreadnought erawas staggering. Britain led the world with 94, Germany and Francehad 36 each, the United States 34, Japan 19, Russia 18, Italy 13,and the Austro-Hungarian Empire had 11 vessels. In terms of mod-ern cruiser construction of all types, Great Britain operated 30, Ger-many 20, Japan six, Italy four, the United States and Austria-Hun-gary three each, and Russia one.5 All told, the world’s naviesoperated 343 cruisers that would serve a vital role in World War I.

Life aboard these vessels remained much as it had been in thelate nineteenth century. Indeed, many aspects of daily life would gounchanged until the end of World War II. The regular crewmenwere either volunteers, in the case of the United States and GreatBritain, who were trying to flee from poor conditions at home, orconscripts, the German practice. Living spaces, with the exceptionof the larger battle cruisers, were still cramped. The crewmen werehoused in compartments belowdecks that were located in the for-ward portion of the ship; officers’ quarters were in the stern. Life inthe lower decks was uncomfortable through a combination of heatcreated by the engines and the steel hull if the vessel was operatingin tropical areas. These conditions were compounded by poor venti-lation and coal dust from the engine compartments. Food was alsolittle changed and would remain so until the end of World War II.An example was the retention of rum rations in the Royal Navy, apart of life at sea since the Age of Fighting Sail. Discipline also re-mained largely a holdover from past days. In the Royal Navy as lateas the 1930s, crewmen were subjected to beatings for the most mi-nor offenses.

Some improvements, however, were a product of the increasingrefinement of ships that incorporated the latest technology. Theseincluded bathrooms, normally small tiled rooms, for all the ship’s


men; they were certainly an improvement from the wooden plankfitted to the side of a ship’s hull that had remained in use (in somewarships) until the late nineteenth century. In addition, the largerships increasingly incorporated amenities such as libraries thatcould provide diversions for crewmen who became bored with themonotony of daily operations.

One area of life at sea that changed more notably in the yearsleading up to World War I was the growth of education aboard shipin the hope of improving performance in battle, although many ofthe courses remained like those of the past. In 1909, the British es-tablished the Naval War College, which emphasized the art of navi-gation and the development of leadership skills before training inthe newest technological developments. The true advance in educa-tion during this period was in training regular sailors rather than theofficers, although some of the latter were trained to lead teams de-voted to certain tasks.

Specialization of tasks within warships had reached a point by1914 where each sailor had a specific duty that was largely learnedthrough experience at sea. The most basic division was between aship’s propulsion crew and the rest of the complement, but withinthe latter there were a host of other groups. These included ammu-nition crews that fed projectiles and powder charges from the maga-zines and powder rooms to the gun houses encased by the turrets.Gunnery officers were in charge of aiming the ship’s battery in bat-tle. Other divisions of labor included teams devoted to damage con-trol, navigation, electrical systems, and administration. These divi-sions of labor had surfaced in the late nineteenth century, but by1910 they were far more pronounced, and would continue to growin number in successive years.

The development of cruisers as a weapons system in the firstyears of the twentieth century, both in human and technologicalterms, took place in the context of a naval arms race between GreatBritain and Germany. This competition was only one source of ten-sion between the European powers. Since the unification of Ger-many in 1871, the great powers had polarized into two alliances thatvied with one another for European and global hegemony: the TripleAlliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; and the Triple En-tente of Great Britain, France, and Russia. On 1 August 1914, anassassination in the Balkans precipitated a chain of events that pit-ted these coalitions, with the exception of Italy, which declared neu-trality, against one another in war.

All of the roles envisioned in the prewar years were accomplished

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 89

by cruisers during the conflict. The first use of cruisers, however,was political rather than in combat. In August 1914, two Germanwarships, the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau,under the command of Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, escaped Britishpursuers in the Mediterranean and were eventually sold to the Ot-toman Empire. These vessels increased the political clout of thepro-German faction of Turkish politicians who advocated war on theside of the Central Powers, the two powers of the Triple Alliancethat were embroiled in war. The two ships would eventually changethe course of World War I. While retaining their German crews withSouchon in command, these warships preyed on Russian merchantshipping in the Black Sea and eventually bombarded Russian navalbases. These actions led to a Russian declaration of war on the Ot-toman Empire and the subsequent entry of the Turks in November1914 into World War I on the side of the Central Powers. Turkey’sdeclaration of war effectively shut off the supply route to Russia thatran through the Mediterranean, the Bosporus, and into the BlackSea. The consequent dearth in war material that this produced wasa major strain on Russia’s war effort.

Combat roles for cruisers unfolded in the North Sea, the princi-ple theater of the naval war, at the same time as Souchon’s dash tothe Ottoman Empire and preceded any action between battleshipsof opposing sides. The first of these proved as important as Germanactions in the Mediterranean in terms of altering the course of thewar. Upon the outbreak of the war, British naval leaders resolved tolaunch an operation against the German outpost of Helgoland Is-land in the North Sea. On 28 August 1914, a British force compris-ing two destroyer flotillas of 16 ships, in addition to their flotillaleaders, the light cruisers Fearless and Arethusa, and supported bybattle cruisers, attacked German naval forces guarding HelgolandIsland. The German squadron under the command of AdmiralLeberecht Maas included nine destroyers, four light cruisers, andseven additional cruisers as supporting ships. German light warshipspatrolled off this island in order to guard the principle anchorage ofthe German High Seas Fleet in Helgoland Bight that lay to thesouth and provide advance warning of any attack by the BritishGrand Fleet. Maas’s squadron also provided protection to Ger-many’s principle naval base at Kiel.

Fought in the early morning under misty conditions that pro-duced confusion, the Battle of Helgoland Bight was a victory for theBritish: One German destroyer and three light cruisers were sunkwhile the British lost none. The damage inflicted on the Germans


was slight and paled in comparison to the strategic effect the battleproduced. Fearful of the loss of more warships in similar engage-ments, Kaiser Wilhelm II mandated that in the future the com-mander in chief of the High Seas Fleet must ask for the kaiser’s con-sent before committing to a full-scale battle. Prior to thisengagement, both the British and the Germans believed that thewar at sea would be decided by a decisive battle of battleships. Thekaiser’s order, however, greatly limited offensive operations of theHigh Seas Fleet and changed the course of the war at sea. With twomajor exceptions, the war at sea became a contest that involvedsmaller surface units, particularly cruisers.

Cruisers were also among the first warships to engage in battleoutside the North Sea theater. Upon the outbreak of war, the Ger-man East Asia Squadron under the command of Admiral Maximilianvon Spee relocated from the Far East to Easter Island in the SouthAtlantic. The British feared that Spee would use his force, compris-ing the armored cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as well as threelight cruisers, to attack the naval base in the Falkland Islands andother coaling bases in the region.

The first effort to track down and destroy Spee’s force led to aBritish disaster in the 1 November 1914 Battle of Coronel. BritishAdmiral Sir Christopher Cradock’s force of two old armored cruisersand one light cruiser was annihilated by Spee’s more modern ships.This humiliation prompted the British to send another force of twobattle cruisers, five light cruisers, and one armed merchant cruiserto hunt for Spee. In the 8 December 1914 Battle of the Falklands,the battle cruisers of this force destroyed Spee’s armored cruisers.The German vessels were outmatched by the British battle cruisers.The main armament of both the German armored cruisers was eight8.2-inch guns, while the British battle cruisers each carried eight12-inch pieces. The British vessels also had a superiority of 2.5knots over their enemies.

The British used their advantages by maintaining a distance thatwas outside the range of German gunnery while well within theirown. The speed difference also made escape impossible for Spee.The British light cruisers meanwhile destroyed two of the Germanlight cruisers. The last was finally hunted down in March 1915.This battle seemingly confirmed the dictum that speed was armor inbattle cruisers, as Fisher’s ships triumphed in exactly the mannerthat he had predicted when he first advocated the construction ofthe ship type. The destruction of Spee’s squadron removed the onesignificant naval threat to the Triple Entente that lay outside the

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North Sea. It also allowed the British to concentrate resources inthe North Sea against Germany.

The additional German cruisers that remained at sea at the out-break of World War I performed the role of commerce warfare, whileBritish efforts to destroy them showcased that of commerce protec-tion. The most celebrated case was that of the German light cruiserEmden under the command of Captain Karl von Müller. This vesselhad been detached from Spee’s East Asia Squadron days after thecommencement of hostilities. The Emden soon became a legend andsource of pride to the German people. Over a period that spanned alittle over two months, Müller steamed 30,000 miles and engaged incommerce warfare in the Indian Ocean, destroying 23 merchantships, a Russian cruiser, and a French destroyer. On 9 November1914, the Australian light cruiser Sydney, a “Town” class light cruiserbuilt by the British for Australia, intercepted the German ship at theCocos Islands in the Indian Ocean. The Sydney was more than amatch for Emden, as the Australian warship mounted eight 6-inchguns against the German ship’s 10 4.1-inch pieces. The Sydney wasalso a little over 2 knots faster. As a result, Sydney bombarded theEmden with shells while staying out of the range of the Germans,who could neither close the distance between the two ships to usetheir guns nor run away. Müller’s vessel was reduced to a wreck, andhe subsequently beached it. Despite its destruction, Emden had ac-complished its mission. Not only had it inflicted commercial damageon the shipping of the Triple Entente, but Emden had also tied downvaluable resources, as 80 warships had been involved in the hunt forthe commerce raider. The Emden was not the only light cruiser thatpreyed on British shipping. The light cruiser Karlsruhe sank 16 mer-chant ships in the South Atlantic between August and November1914 before being destroyed by an accidental magazine explosion.Two more German light cruisers caused lesser damage before they,too, were hunted down and destroyed by cruisers.

Germany also used armed merchant cruisers by 1915, in combi-nation with submarines, to hunt down British merchant shipping inthe North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean in order to sever overseassupply lines to the island and thus starve the British into submis-sion. The best example of this role was the armed merchant cruiserMöwe. Originally a freighter intended to serve in Germany’s prewarcolonial banana trade, the vessel was fitted with four 5.9-inch guns,one 4.1-inch gun, and two torpedo tubes. This vessel, and those likeit, relied on disguise for success. Great care was taken to ensure thatit appeared as an unassuming merchantman rather than a warship.


Guns were hidden by the use of a false superstructure while theship plied the seas in the guise of a vessel under the ownership of aneutral power. Only at the last minute, when it was too late for anintended victim to run away, would the guns be brought out to com-mence their work of destruction. The Möwe destroyed 40 merchantvessels between 1915 and 1917 and was never caught. The Ger-mans commissioned numerous vessels like the Möwe in hopes ofduplicating its success.

The Germans also excelled at employing armed merchantmen forcommerce warfare by equipping them to lay mines. This practicewas a new duty assigned to cruisers as well as smaller vessels. Berlinis the best example of an armed merchant cruiser used as aminelayer. This vessel was a passenger liner built in 1908 that wasconverted to carry two 4.1-inch guns in addition to mines. On thenight of 22–23 October 1914, Captain Hans Pfundheller of Berlinlaid down 200 mines off Tory Island near the northwestern tip ofIreland. These weapons sank a merchantman on 26 October, but farmore devastating to the Allied cause—and rather unexpected by theGermans—was the sinking the British battleship Audacious one daylater. This dreadnought was brand-new, having only been commis-sioned in late 1913, and was among the most powerful vessels in theRoyal Navy. Its loss was a source of alarm for the British and proofthat even the most lightly armed cruisers could destroy the mighti-est warships afloat in an age of ever-more destructive weapons.

While cruisers continued to perform their individual tasks bothold and new in various operations throughout the war, the 1916 Bat-tle of Jutland—the only engagement where the entire battle fleets ofthe opposing sides fought one another—exhibited the general en-gagement roles in a fleet battle envisioned for cruisers in the prewaryears. This contest was precipitated by the policy of the commanderin chief of the German High Seas Fleet, Admiral Reinhard Scheer.The admiral envisioned using the fleet in a series of surprise attacksagainst small portions of the British Grand Fleet. The ultimate objectwas to reduce British numerical superiority. In late May 1916,Scheer sortied the High Seas Fleet into the North Sea. Forty milesahead of Scheer’s battleships, which he commanded, was a scoutingforce of battle cruisers, cruisers, and destroyers under the commandof Admiral Franz von Hipper. The mission of this force was to lure aportion of the British Grand Fleet and lead them into Scheer’s battle-ships, which would destroy them. Unknown to the Germans, Britishintelligence was aware of the plan, and consequently the entireBritish Grand Fleet had sortied against the Germans.

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The first and most prominent examples of cruisers in this actionwere battle cruisers. As the two fleets steamed toward one anotheracross the North Sea on 31 May 1916, six British battle cruisers un-der the command of Admiral David Beatty, with four fast battleshipsand smaller cruisers in support, steamed ahead of the bulk of theGrand Fleet in reconnaissance. Contact between this squadron andthat of Admiral Franz von Hipper’s scouting force of five Germanbattle cruisers, an assortment of smaller cruisers, and destroyersopened the Battle of Jutland. At 3:45 P.M. on 31 May 1916, the twosides opened fire at a range of about 9 miles. The battle cruiserswere the largest vessels involved for most of the conflict, as the fastbattleships of Beatty’s squadron failed to respond to the admiral’ssignal to engage the enemy.

The ensuing combat exhibited the wisdom of the German designof battle cruisers, which emphasized the value of armor as much asspeed. Conversely, it also demonstrated the flaw of Admiral Fisher’sbelief that speed was as good as armor in combat. The advantage ofspeed held by the British ships through their ability to disengageslower enemy units when necessary was negated by the German ves-sels, which were only 1 or 2 knots slower. The scant armor of theBritish battle cruisers was now exposed to gunnery that could easilypenetrate it. Beatty’s flagship, Lion, was hit on its Q turret that layamidships. The shell penetrated the roof of the turret and only theorder of a mortally wounded seaman to flood the turret’s magazineprevented detonation, which would have destroyed the ship.

Other British battle cruisers were not as lucky. The battle cruisersIndefatigable and Queen Mary were destroyed when German firepenetrated their thinly armored decks or turrets. Poor safeguardswithin the turrets of the British ships contributed to the spread offire to the magazines, but this weakness would have been renderedmoot if not for the thin armor. The Indefatigable was lost first whenGerman fire produced a heavy explosion in its stern. Settling in thewater, the vessel turned away from the Germans but was subse-quently hit near the forward turrets. A second explosion resulted;Indefatigable capsized and sank. The Queen Mary suffered a similarfate when German shellfire penetrated its magazines and detonatedthem, creating a huge hole in the vessel’s starboard side. A minuteand a half after the explosion, the only visible portion of QueenMary was its keel and slowly revolving propeller; the ship had cap-sized.

Such losses were costly and showed the weaknesses of Britishbattle cruiser design. By contrast, none of the German battle cruis-


ers were sunk in this initial engagement despite enduring heavy firefrom the British battle cruisers and, later, from the fast battleshipsof Beatty’s force. Their thicker armor and better subdivision en-sured their survival. Indeed, by the end of the battle, only one Ger-man battle cruiser was lost, which was the result of flooding in thelarge, open spaces in the bow, the only defect of the German de-sign. This vessel, Lutzow, remained afloat despite its bow beingcompletely submerged due to the flooding. The Germans had toscuttle the ship.

Smaller cruisers were also employed in this first phase, as bothsides utilized light cruisers to lead destroyer flotillas in torpedo at-tacks against opposing battle cruisers. British light cruisers also con-tinued to act as reconnaissance vessels—when Commodore WilliamGoodenough’s Squadron sighted the main German fleet of battle-ships approaching Beatty’s position. Beatty subsequently alteredcourse toward the battleships of the British Grand Fleet under thecommand of Admiral John Jellicoe in hopes of luring the Germanvessels toward them.

This tactic was successful and resulted in the next phase of thebattle, in which battleships predominated, but cruisers continued toplay a role. Engagements between the battle cruisers continued andresulted in the destruction of the British Invincible through a maga-zine explosion similar to its sister ships. It was hit on one of itsamidships turrets, and the colossal explosion that followed tore theship into two pieces. The bow and the stern of this ship remainedpartially afloat after the battle, a grim reminder of the defects ofBritish battle cruisers. It also prompted the famous remark by Admi-ral Beatty to one of his flag captains: “Chatfield, there seems to besomething wrong with our bloody ships today.”6

Smaller cruisers on both sides also participated as scouts, as lead-ers of destroyer flotillas, and in general combat. Many came underintense fire. The British light cruiser Chester, acting as a scout, hadall but one of its guns disabled in five minutes by German shellfire.The German light cruiser Wiesbaden, involved in the general action,was reduced to a wreck and subsequently sank. Engagements con-tinued into the night hours of 31 May, the third and final phase ofthe battle. By the morning of 1 June 1916, Scheer had managed toelude the British following his decision to withdraw due to heavydamage and the numerical superiority of the Grand Fleet.

These examples of material destruction at the Battle of Jutlandaboard battle cruisers and cruisers were eclipsed by the loss of lifethat resulted from it. The British battle cruisers provided the most

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poignant examples of this grisly fact. There were only two survivorsfrom Indefatigable’s crew of 1,000. The same occurrence on boardQueen Mary resulted in only 20 survivors out of 58 officers and1,228 sailors.7 The battle cruiser Invincible suffered a similar ap-palling loss of life. Of its crew of 1,031 officers and crew, only fivemen survived.8

Many of those that were killed in the destruction of these battlecruisers probably fell in the initial colossal explosion of the maga-zines, but many would have also suffered horrible deaths, entombedin the shattered hulls of sinking ships. In addition to the relativelyslow process of drowning as water filled compartments in whichmen were trapped was also the carnage wrought in the machineryspaces. This latter problem was experienced in ships equipped withreciprocating engines. The huge pistons probably dislodged andmangled crewmen as the ship listed or capsized. Any lucky enoughto escape the wrecks succumbed to the icy waters of the North Sea.

Crewmen in other cruisers that sank during the battle were ex-posed to the same dangers. The British armored cruiser Defenseblew up with heavy loss of life. On the German side, the lightcruiser Wiesbaden was disabled early by gunfire, pummeled for theremainder of the battle, and sank as a blazing wreck with the loss of589 officers and men.9 Aside from losses incurred in battle and inthe sinking of a vessel, the wounded must also be included in thehuman toll of Jutland. Many, like their predecessors in the Age ofFighting Sail, were maimed by shellfire and splinters. A poignant ex-ample is that of Chester. Most of the crew who manned the gunswere casualties, and many suffered wounds below the knees fromshell splinters that passed underneath the gun shields that protectedthem. Some of these unfortunate individuals required a limb be am-putated in order to survive.

The cruiser losses and human toll by the end of the battle aretributes to the heavy involvement of cruisers in the Battle of Jutland.No fewer than 45 cruisers had participated in the conflict. TheBritish Grand Fleet had lost three battle cruisers and three lightcruisers; the Germans lost one and four respectively. These made upthe majority of the larger vessels sunk in the action. Although theGermans could claim a tactical victory, since they inflicted moredamage than they received, the British could argue a strategic victory,as their fleet remained at sea while the Germans were forced to re-treat due to heavy damage to most of the battleships and battlecruisers of the High Seas Fleet. The British also achieved a psycho-logical victory, as the memory of the battle haunted German naval


officials well after. Increasingly, the major units of the High SeasFleet remained in port rather than sortie and risk destruction at thehands of the numerically superior British.

The Battle of Jutland ultimately did little to decide the war at seaor the overall conflict. Another duty, however, performed entirely byBritish cruisers, had a tremendous impact on the outcome of thewar. This operation was the naval blockade of Germany. During theprewar years, British naval officials believed that the implementa-tion of a blockade that sealed the North Sea to German commercecould starve Germany of supplies and thus force it to surrender.While a minefield and a force known as the Dover Patrol guardedthe English Channel, the principal force involved in the blockadewas the 10th Cruiser Squadron.

Upon institution in 1914, the 10th Cruiser Squadron, comprisingprimarily eight aging cruisers, patrolled an area between the OrkneyIslands and the coast of Norway. Its mission was to block merchantvessels supplying Germany, most owned by companies in neutralcountries, from entering or exiting the North Sea. Ultimately, theseold ships were deemed too slow to catch modern merchant vessels,and the force was reconstituted with 23 armed merchant cruisers.Life aboard these ships was often tedious, as much of the time spenton patrol consisted of little action. It revolved around running downand stopping any merchant vessel that crossed the squadron’s pathand searching it for contraband of war, which was defined as any-thing construed as having a military purpose. If the boarding crew ofthe British cruiser could prove that these goods were destined forGermany, the offending ship was seized and sent to a prize court inone of the ports of Britain. These judicial bodies decided the fate ofthe vessel and its cargo.

During the course of the war, the 10th Cruiser Squadron lost ninearmed merchant cruisers from bad weather, mines, submarines, andcombat with German raiders. Even so, by the time it was abolishedin December 1917, the squadron had intercepted and boarded12,979 vessels; another 2,039 ships reported voluntarily to Britishports for inspection of cargo. The British cruisers failed to interceptonly 642 ships.10 The effectiveness of the squadron was augmentedby diplomatic efforts to force neutral powers to cease supplying Ger-many. The ultimate result: The blockade was one of the greatestcauses of Germany’s defeat in World War I once the lack of supplies,primarily food, led to a collapse of the German home front and theGerman armies in Europe.

The cruisers that existed at the dawn of World War I and per-

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formed these roles were augmented by construction during the war.Most of the designs that surfaced were continuations of past cruiserdevelopment, with only a few notable exceptions that were the re-sult of experience gained in conflict. Great Britain completed sixnew battle cruisers in keeping with Admiral Fisher’s belief thatspeed equaled armor. These ships proved to be white elephants, astheir armor protection was more inadequate than those ships thathad been previously completed. One example is the two ships of theCourageous-class.

Designed for operations in the Baltic Sea as part of an amphibi-ous invasion of Germany, their hulls measured an enormous 786feet, 3 inches by 81 feet and displaced 19,230 tons. Armament con-sisted of four 15-inch guns and 18 4-inch guns. Their engines couldproduce a maximum speed of 32 knots and were an example of con-tinued technological innovation in cruiser design. These ships werefueled with oil rather than coal, which was a practice that would beadopted by all naval powers both during and after the war. Their ar-mor protection consisted primarily of a belt with a maximum thick-ness of 3 inches that could not even stand up to small-caliberweapons. They proved so unsatisfactory that they were converted toaircraft carriers after the war.

The conversion of the Courageous-class ships followed the sistership Furious. This vessel marked a technological innovation that re-sulted from the rise in the use of airplanes and lighter-than-air ves-sels in war. The ship was designed to mount two colossal 18-inchguns, but the scheme was altered to deal with the increasing threatof the bombing of British cities by German zeppelins. Upon its com-pletion in 1917, Furious mounted only one of its 18-inch guns onthe stern, while the forward section mounted a sloped flight deckand an aircraft hanger that could hold 10 planes. A subsequent con-version in October 1917 removed the aft turret and replaced it withanother flight deck. As such, Furious became the world’s first air-craft carrier and heralded an age in which the destructive power ofair attack would prove deadly to cruisers and all other surface war-ships. In July 1918, the vessel initiated the first air strike launchedfrom the sea in history when its planes attacked German zeppelinbases in Tondern.

The advent of the airplane and its destructive potential againstwarships also led to innovation in the construction of British lightcruisers. Britain built 36 light cruisers during the war that reliedlargely on prewar designs, but the Arethusa-class of eight ships,completed between 1914 and 1915, mounted antiaircraft guns to


protect against air attacks. These light weapons were installed on allBritish cruisers after Arethusa and became part of warship designfor all naval powers. The wisdom of their inclusion was seen by Al-lied naval officers between 1917 and 1918 because of four ships lostto air attack.

Germany also continued its construction programs during thewar and produced two more battle cruisers. The last one, Hinden-burg, proved such a well-balanced design that British naval con-structors examined it following the surrender of the German fleet atthe end of the war. The Germans also launched 10 more light cruis-ers whose designs largely mirrored that of the Magdeburg-class ofprewar years. They also seized two more light cruisers being con-structed for Russia in German shipyards. Finally, the Germans builttwo additional cruisers that resulted from the perceived value of themine in naval warfare. These ships of the Brummer-class could carry400 mines each.

The cruiser programs of Great Britain and Germany representedalmost all of the construction that occurred during the war. Onlyone other naval power, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, laid downnew cruisers. The United States, although neutral until 1917, whenit joined the Entente powers, drafted a naval bill in 1916 that calledfor six battle cruisers and 10 scout cruisers. This plan was largelythe result of popular alarm created by the sinking of the British pas-senger liner Lusitania in 1915, in which at least 124 Americans losttheir lives. None of the ships authorized by this bill were completedby the end of the war; construction on many was never even initi-ated. The program was delayed largely by the need to make room inU.S. shipyards for the production of destroyers and merchant ves-sels to combat Germany’s submarine war against Britain, whichthreatened to starve the British. The Japanese planned two lightcruisers, but these were not completed by the end of the war.

These vessels comprised only a small part of the total number ofcruisers employed in World War I. By the time of the Germanarmistice in November 1918 that initiated peace talks to end thewar, cruisers had proven their worth in all the roles envisioned forthem by naval officials. Cruisers were the workhorses in this con-flict. In terms of daily operations, they were arguably more impor-tant than the great dreadnoughts that receive most of the attentionin books that cover naval warfare in World War I. The accomplish-ment of these duties had come at a great price, as their high degreeof use was evident in the large number of cruiser losses. GreatBritain lost 31 cruisers; 25 German cruisers were sunk. The French

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and Japanese navies lost five each, the Italians four, and the UnitedStates and Russia three each.11 Only destroyers suffered heavierlosses among surface warships.

Naval officials faced a world that was totally changed by WorldWar I. The old rivalry between Great Britain and Germany waswiped away by the terms of peace. Under the Treaty of Versailles,Germany was forced to surrender the bulk of its giant battle fleet,and new building programs were restricted. Austria-Hungary alsoceased to be a naval force, as the peace agreement deprived the em-pire of its ports and required the surrender of its fleet. Finally, Rus-sia was removed from the naval scene in the years immediately fol-lowing 1918 because the Bolshevik Revolution had toppled thegovernment and the country was largely in chaos as imperial forcesfought communists for political control.

Future cruiser construction was, consequently, in a state of fluxwhile naval officials evaluated the strategic requirements of thepostwar world. In addition, cruiser construction in the immediatepostwar years took place in an environment of war-weariness, inwhich few politicians wished to consider new armaments and thevalue of cruisers was deemed dubious. The advent of the airplane as areconnaissance tool rendered the cruiser redundant in its role ofreconnaissance for battle fleets, a role that had been its primary tasksince the Age of Fighting Sail. Russia provided an example in WorldWar I of the value of planes for reconnaissance when it converted sixarmed merchant cruisers into aviation cruisers. These ships werefitted with small flight decks on the rear half of the hull. The largestcould carry between seven and nine seaplanes. Cruisers in the naviesof other world powers, like Great Britain, were also fitted with one ortwo planes for reconnaissance in recognition of their importance.

Nevertheless, the naval powers quickly appreciated the fact thatcruisers were still necessary for protection of trade routes, convoyescort, commerce raiding, surface action, and shore bombardmentfor amphibious operations, which occurred during the allies’ at-tempt to invade the Dardanelles Strait in the Ottoman Empire in1915. New cruisers completed in the first four years after the warwere largely begun during the conflict. All but one were light cruis-ers or smaller vessels, as the battle cruiser had fallen out of favorfollowing the heavy British losses in the 1916 Battle of Jutland. Re-inforcing the move away from battle cruiser construction was theirprohibitive cost that outweighed their usefulness in duties otherthan fleet engagements. No power could construct enough to prop-erly fulfill traditional cruiser roles such as commerce protection.


The cruiser program of Great Britain exemplified this trend andalso that of technological innovation that was the result of the war.Chiefly, the lessons of World War I were the need to incorporate air-planes into warship design and the necessity of better protection forthe guns of ships in order to better safeguard the crew. This latterproblem had become evident in the conflict when gun shields didnot fully protect against the effects of splinters produced by the ex-plosion of shells. Increasingly, the great naval powers incorporatedgreater gun protection into cruisers. Although the small hulls oflight cruisers did not allow for heavy turrets, most naval powers nowbelieved that a way must be found to incorporate them into allcruiser designs.

From 1919 to 1922, the British completed 16 cruisers. Thelargest of these was the battle cruiser Hood, which would becomethe symbol of British naval power in the years before World WarII. The ship was originally one of four laid down in 1916 and1917, but work on three was cancelled at the end of the war. TheHood was the most powerful battle cruiser ever built. Its hullmeasured a gigantic 860 feet by 104 feet and displaced 42,670tons. The ship was driven by oil-burning turbine engines thatcould produce a speed of 31 knots. Its belt armor, a product ofthe lessons learned at Jutland, was a maximum of 12 inches thick,but its deck armor was paltry and consisted of only a maximum of3 inches. As a result, the Hood suffered from the same weaknessas it predecessors. Its reputation as a powerful ship lay with itssize and armament, consisting of eight 15-inch guns, 12 5.5-inchweapons, and six torpedo tubes. In addition to this goliath, theBritish built 15 light cruisers comprising three classes, and an-other two ships remained under construction. The importance ofthe airplane in naval warfare was evident, as most of these ships,in keeping with the practice during the war, shipped an airplanefor reconnaissance.

Whereas France did not complete any cruisers before 1922 as thecountry experienced severe economic problems that resulted fromthe strain placed on the economy by World War I, the cruiser pro-grams of Japan and the United States reflected that of Great Britainin light cruiser design. The Japanese completed a class of four lightcruisers. The last, launched in 1922, also made use of the airplanethrough a one-craft hanger built under the bridge structure. Thestrategic requirements of the war had driven the United States to be-gin the construction of the 10-ship Omaha-class, the first cruisersauthorized by the U.S. government since 1904. None of these ships

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were fully ready for service by 1922, but they, too, incorporated theaircraft into the design via two catapults located on the quarterdecks.

Despite authorizing new cruiser construction, the United Stateswas engaged in preliminary discussions that eventually produced awatershed in the history of the cruiser. American politicians envi-sioned holding a disarmament conference that would place limits onthe design of new capital ships and the numbers that the majornaval powers could build. The United States desired such a meetingin order to address strategic concerns that had arisen after WorldWar I. Diplomatic relations with Great Britain had deteriorated asthe two countries began to vie for naval supremacy in the postwarworld. The Americans also took note of the rising naval threat posedby Japan in the Pacific, where their island possessions could bethreatened in time of war by a belligerent Japan.

Politicians in Washington did not want a naval arms race becausethe United States would have to incur the large cost of building aforce sufficient to rival both Great Britain and Japan. Such a planwould not only be necessary purely for the sake of countering eachindividual nation, but also since Great Britain and Japan had en-tered into a naval alliance, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in 1902 thatremained in effect. In the view of U.S. politicians, the combinedstrength of the navies of both powers could be deployed against theUnited States in time of war with either power. The consequentU.S. call for a conference found favor with the other great navalpowers because of the popularly held belief that the naval arms racebetween Great Britain and Germany had been a leading cause ofWorld War I. In addition, the British were unwilling to engage in anew naval arms race because of the worldwide economic depressionof 1920 and the strain that the war had produced on the Britisheconomy. The renewal of such a contest, in their view, would placean intolerable burden on British taxpayers.

The Washington Naval Conference met from 12 November 1921to 6 February 1922 and included the United States, Great Britain,Japan, France, and Italy in naval arms reduction talks. The effortscentered mostly on capital ship construction—battleships and thenew ship type of the aircraft carrier—as the delegates agreed to en-act tonnage limits that governed future construction. Ultimately, theUnited States and Great Britain were allowed to maintain a navywith 525,000 tons of capital ships. Japan could have 315,000 tons,while the French and Italian totals were fixed at 175,000 tons each.The ratios of the five powers in capital ship tonnage was therefore5:5:3:1.75:1.75 respectively.


Cruiser construction was directly affected by the tonnage restric-tions of the Washington Treaty. Each naval power had to decidewhich ships they would retain and which they would scrap in orderto adhere to the agreement. In order to comply with the treaty,Great Britain eventually scrapped 657 warships that included all ofthe old armored cruisers still in operation. Other nations followedsuit.

The Washington Treaty served particularly to decrease the num-ber of battle cruisers in the world’s navies and to discourage futureconstruction. The scrapping of subpar vessels seemed logical tonaval officials because their retention seemed a waste of tonnageunder the arms limitation treaty. Great Britain sold five of its 12 bat-tle cruisers for scrap, while a sixth unit, Australia, was scuttled offthe coast of Sydney as an artificial reef.

The process of scrapping was the last role played by a cruiser inits life and served as a contribution to the peacetime economies ofthe naval powers. Ships were sold by governments to private firms,where they were dismantled over the course of several months andtheir steel and machinery sold on the open market. The fittings ofthe vessels were first removed, which included machinery and itemsas small as sinks and faucets. Guns and superstructures were thendismantled, and scrapping crews would then cut the hulls of thevessels down deck by deck until reaching the keel. Profits from thisendeavor varied based on fluctuations in the price of steel, but thematerials garnered from these vessels were not the only profit thatthey provided. One scrap yard at Rosyth, England scrapped severalbattle cruisers of the former German High Seas Fleet. One of these,Hindenburg, was opened to tours for civilians and generated £100for local hospitals and charities.12

The agreement also discouraged the future construction of battlecruisers. The British cancelled plans for four new battle cruisers withimproved armor protection. Finally, the treaty also had an impact onbattle cruisers under construction and on those that had escaped thescrap yards. Incomplete battle cruisers and some of those in servicewere converted into warships of a perceived greater value. In order torealize the most value for its tonnage, the United States Navy haltedconstruction of the six battle cruisers of the Lexington-class andscrapped four incomplete hulls. The other two units were completedas aircraft carriers in 1927 as a reflection of the increasing impor-tance attached to the airplane by naval officials. Between 1924 and1930, another two of Britain’s remaining seven battle cruisers, of theCourageous-class, were also converted into aircraft carriers.

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The tonnage stipulation of the Washington Treaty was not themost important aspect of the agreement in terms of influencingcruiser development, as it affected only battle cruisers and obsoletearmored cruisers. The treaty also included a 10-year naval buildingholiday that prohibited the construction of any ship over 10,000tons displacement with an armament larger than 8-inch guns. Thiscessation was set to terminate in November 1931. Warships built upto the limit of the restrictions would be included as part of the ton-nage restriction. Despite this, navies scrambled to build warshipswith a 10,000-ton displacement and 8-inch guns because it was themost powerful ship allowed. These were specifications of a largecruiser. A final consequence of the Washington Conference waswhat the agreement omitted. Smaller ships were not included in thetonnage or armament restrictions. The U.S. delegation at the con-ference had suggested such an extension, but it was opposed by theFrench. In their mind, the high cost of the French Army madecheaper vessels that included smaller cruisers essential to nationaldefense.

The great naval powers thus committed themselves to a newnaval arms race for cruisers rather than battleships. Competitionwas high given the fact that the Washington Treaty had leveled theplaying field in warships through tonnage restrictions that ended theage of British naval supremacy. All nations were now free to com-pete within the confines of their tonnage restrictions in terms ofbattleships and aircraft carriers while greatly augmenting their fleetstrengths through the construction of a few large cruisers that dis-placed 10,000 tons and mounted 8-inch guns. They also sought tobuild as many smaller cruisers as possible, as they fell outside theterms of the building holiday imposed by the Washington Treaty.

The Japanese were the first to launch a naval construction pro-gram based on the tenets of the Washington Treaty. The first oneswere light cruisers designed to act as destroyer leaders and scouts.Between 1922 and 1925, Japan completed 10 light cruisers. Thelast four of these, the three-ship Sendai-class and Yubari, were com-pleted under the terms of the Washington Treaty and were well-bal-anced designs that incorporated a great deal of weaponry onto smallhulls. The Yubari, completed in 1923, was a fine example of Japanesetechnological ingenuity. The hull of this ship measured only 455feet, 8 inches by 39 feet, 6 inches and displaced 2,890 tons. Evenso, it mounted an impressive armament of six 5.5-inch guns, one 3-inch weapon for use against aircraft, four torpedo tubes, and 34mines. Its engines could produce a speed of 35.5 knots. An armor


belt 2.3 inches thick and a 1-inch armor deck provided slight pro-tection. This armor was shipped inside the hull rather than bolted tothe sides, thereby strengthening the ship and allowing it to mountlarger weaponry.

The use of armor to augment a ship’s structural integrity was alsoemployed in Japan’s larger cruisers. The shift to bigger ships waspartially the result of the termination of the Anglo-Japanese NavalAlliance. Without the naval assistance of Great Britain, Japan per-ceived a greater threat posed by the United States to Japanese hopesfor expansion in Asia and the Pacific. The first large cruisers built tothe specifications of the Washington Treaty were the two ships ofthe Furutaka-class, completed in 1926, which mounted a primaryarmament of six 8-inch guns on a hull that displaced only 7,100tons. Subsequent Japanese designs that produced another six largecruisers by 1929 were equally innovative, but the last four were onlythe first of a series of violations of the Washington Treaty. TheNachi-class appeared to the world as a triumph in engineering.Their hulls measured 668 feet, 6 inches by 56 feet, 11 inches whilemounting 10 8-inch guns, six 4.7-inch weapons that could be usedfor short-range action and as antiaircraft guns, and eight torpedotubes. They were protected principally by an armored belt 3.9inches thick and could reach a maximum speed of 35.5 knots. Thisimpressive combination of armament, armor, and speed produced aship that officially displaced 10,000 tons. In actuality, the vessel dis-placed 10,980 tons.

Naval powers around the world strove to achieve through designsof their own the Japanese success. France followed Japan’s leadwhen in 1922 it laid down three large cruisers of the DuguayTrouin-class. Although they conformed to treaty specifications, theirdesign was already largely planned before the end of the WashingtonConference. The French, consequently, began construction of thefirst treaty cruisers in 1924 as part of a naval reconstruction programthat until 1927 centered on cruisers and smaller craft. These twoships comprised the Duquesne-class and measured 626 feet, 8inches by 62 feet, 4 inches while displacing 10,000 tons. Theymounted eight 8-inch guns in four turrets, two each being locatedfore and aft, with a secondary armament of eight 3-inch guns and anassortment of antiaircraft weapons. Their engines could propelthem at a top speed of 33.75 knots.

These cruisers exhibited a design weakness that was a trait of allof the large cruisers produced under the stipulations of the Wash-ington Treaty and are an indication of why the Japanese violated the

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terms with their large cruiser designs. The armor belt was only 1inch thick and the hull lacked an armored deck altogether. The rea-son for this serious lack of protection stemmed from the treaty. Inorder to produce vessels that mounted the greatest weapons possibleand possessed high speed, armor had to be sacrificed to remain un-der the 10,000-ton displacement limit. These vessels, and all othersbuilt under the treaty, became derisively known as “tin-clads,” easilydamaged or destroyed by naval guns of the smallest caliber. Thestruggle to incorporate more armor into the cruisers, and the sacri-fice it entailed in other areas of design, was evident in the proceed-ing Suffren-class; the primary battery of eight 8-inch guns was re-tained, and the armor belt was increased to a maximum thickness of2.25 inches. The French also incorporated an armor deck up to 1inch thick, but the weight of both the belt and the deck meant thatspeed had to be sacrificed. The four vessels of this type, completedbetween 1930 and 1932, could achieve a maximum speed of 31knots, being 2.75 knots slower than the Duquesne-class vessels. Inaddition to these large cruisers, the French continued to experimentwith cruiser designs when in 1928 they laid down a mine-layingcruiser. This vessel was totally unarmored. The last one built before1930 consisted of a cruiser to serve as a training ship, which re-flected the drive for greater education in the French Navy.

Great Britain was slower to begin a cruiser construction programbased on the Washington Treaty, but continued to place value oncruisers to guard shipping lanes and maintain the Royal Navy as oneof the greatest in the world. Construction during the eighteenmonths after the conference centered on finishing five light cruisersthat had been laid down before the close of World War I. In 1924,the British initiated a program that comprised solely cruisers thatwere built up to the design limits imposed by the treaty. The first 13ships, the Kent, London, and Norfolk-classes, were completed by1930 and were generally similar in design. The Norfolk measured635 feet, 5 inches by 66 feet and displaced 9,975 tons. It was armedwith eight 8-inch guns, four 4-inch weapons, and eight torpedotubes. The ship’s engines could produce a maximum speed of 32.3knots. The British, like the French, also struggled to incorporatesufficient armor without a significant decrease in speed or arma-ment. The result, however, was the same as the French ships. All 13of the first large treaty cruisers mounted an armor belt 1-inch thickwith no deck protection. The last two vessels laid down before 1930,York and Exeter, were experimental vessels that tried to surmountthe problem of armor. The British chose to sacrifice a portion of the


cruisers’ weaponry rather than to decrease speed. Both of theseships retained a top speed a little over 32 knots and incorporated 3-inch armor. The savings in weight necessary to mount this armorand still remain under the 10,000-ton displacement limit came atthe cost of two 8-inch guns. This solution was no better than that ofthe French. Rather than sacrificing speed, the British decreased thefighting potential of their cruisers.

Almost four years after the Washington Conference the UnitedStates initiated a new cruiser program. The 10 ships of the Omaha-class, all completed by 1925, were a prewar design. The reason forthe delay was that President Warren Harding and Secretary of StateCharles Evans Hughes, in keeping with the spirit of the WashingtonTreaty, believed that disarmament rather than rearmament was thebest course to avoid a future war. President Calvin Coolidge contin-ued the trend, as he believed in the strength of international treatiesrather than naval power to exert world influence. Naval spending by1926, consequently, was at its lowest level since World War I.

Nevertheless, growing alarm in Washington over the rising powerof Japan in the Pacific prompted a return to naval construction withcruisers that pressed the limits of the Washington Treaty. Americannaval officials desired a cruiser that possessed the greatest firepowerpossible and high endurance to operate over the vast expanse of thePacific Ocean. Their principal duties were earmarked as trade pro-tection and keeping the lines of communication open between theUnited States and its territorial possessions in the Pacific. Between1926 and 1930, the United States laid down four classes that com-prised 11 treaty cruisers and completed five during this period.

The Americans also labored under the design restrictions of theWashington Treaty. The first treaty cruisers of the Pensacola-class,completed in 1929 and 1930, mounted 10 8-inch guns and couldsteam at 32.5 knots, but their armor protection consisted primarilyof a belt 2.5 inches thick and a deck whose maximum thickness was1.75 inches over the magazines. Although better than British andFrench counterparts, this protection could not stop 8-inch shellsfrom penetrating the hull. The last class of cruiser in this period, theNew Orleans-class, had much better protection with an armored beltup to 5 inches thick. This vessel measured 588 feet by 61 feet, 9inches and mounted nine 8-inch guns and eight 5-inch weapons. Itsengines could produce a maximum speed of 32.7 knots. Theachievement of greater armor was possible partly through the use oftriple-gunned turrets rather than the double-gunned ones employedby the French and British. This turret arrangement allowed U.S.

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cruisers to mount comparable weaponry while dispensing with oneturret, which saved weight. Even so, the displacement pressed thelimits of the Washington Treaty. Indeed, the New Orleans-class, al-though not designed intentionally to violate the treaty, displaced10,136 tons.

The other signatory to the Washington Treaty, Italy, began newcruiser construction with the old belief that powerful cruisers couldbe used in the battle line as well as in traditional roles. Its cruisersemphasized speed to counter the vessels of France, Italy’s rival inthe Mediterranean. In the years after World War I, the two powersbecame locked in a new naval arms race for control. The first Italiantreaty cruisers were two large vessels of the Trento-class laid down in1925 and completed over the next four years. Like all other treatycruisers, they were heavily armed with eight 8-inch guns; theirspeed reached an extremely fast 36 knots, but their armor consistedonly of a belt 2.75 inches thick with an armored belt 2 inches deep.This protection certainly could not stand up to gunfire from largernaval weapons. Indeed, even this amount of armor contributed tothe ship being in violation of the Washington Treaty, with a displace-ment of a little over 10,339 tons.

As with the U.S. experience, the Italians had not intended tobreak the terms of the agreement, but designers encountered diffi-culty in balancing the required specifications. The design of theZara-class, however, was a clear breach of the Washington Treaty.These four ships, laid down between 1929 and 1931 and completedby 1932, were the Italian answer to insufficient armor. These vesselsmeasured 557 feet, 2 inches by 62 feet, 10 inches and mounted anarmament of eight 8-inch guns and 16 3.9-inch weapons. Their topspeed was a much-reduced 32 knots, but the sacrifice was justifiedby the inclusion of far more armor protection. These vesselsmounted side armor of a maximum thickness of 5.5 inches and anarmor deck up to 2 inches thick. Despite the reduction in speed, thelarge increase in armor led to a displacement of 11,680 tons. In or-der to avoid international scrutiny, the Italians maintained thatthese vessels displaced 10,000 tons and conducted trials—testingthe ship’s machinery—without the main turrets and guns installedin order to stay below the weight limit. A final large cruiser was laiddown in 1930 and constituted an amalgamation of the designs ofthe two previous classes. Unlike most of the other navies in thepost–Washington Treaty years, the Italians augmented their newforce of large cruisers with six light cruisers. These vessels were de-signed to act as scouts and to hunt down enemy destroyers, but they


proved to be a poor design. Although they were capable of a highspeed of 36.5 knots, the hulls were lightly built and possessed ar-mored belts and decks no thicker than 1 inch.

Cruiser construction proceeded in some naval powers that werenot signatories of the Washington Treaty and therefore not handi-capped by its restrictions. In the wake of the 1917 Bolshevik Revo-lution that ended the long history of czarist Russia, the communistgovernment of the Soviet Union was in the process of consolidatingpower amid poor economic conditions that resulted partly from theimplementation of communist doctrine. Naval construction stag-nated as the maintenance of sea power was at first a low priority forthe government. Following the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924 andthe seizure of power by Josef Stalin, the Soviets concentrated on re-building the navy. Even so, Russia’s industrial base was weak andstill in the process of recovering from World War I.

The result was that the first cruisers completed after World War Iwere those that had been laid down in 1913 and languished duringthe war and subsequent revolution. These three vessels were totallyobsolete upon being completed. The last of them, Krasnyi Kavkaz,was not completed until 1932 and could only steam at a maximumspeed of 29 knots, which was appreciably slower than most moderncruisers. Its armament of four 7.1-inch guns and 12 4-inch weaponswas also far inferior to the newest cruisers. The Soviet commitmentto resurrecting the navy would not bear fruit until the completion in1938 of the first Soviet cruiser based on a modern design.

Germany, one of the great naval powers before World War I,could not entertain hopes of rebuilding its navy. The Treaty of Ver-sailles had required that Germany surrender its newest and mostpowerful warships, which left the country with a collection of obso-lete vessels useful only as a coast-defense force. The terms providedfor the replacement of obsolete vessels when necessary, but Ger-many was allowed to possess only eight light cruisers that could notexceed 6,000 tons; capital ships could not exceed 10,000 tons ofdisplacement with 11-inch guns. Between 1921 and 1928, theWeimar government exercised its option to replace some of its oldvessels when it laid down five new light cruisers. The first of these,Emden, was merely a ship built to the specifications of the country’sWorld War I era vessels. The next three warships of the K-class,however, were built using a totally new and innovative design.

The K-class ships were completed in 1929 and 1930, measured570 feet, 10 inches by 50 feet, 2 inches, and mounted an armamentof nine 5.9-inch guns and six 3.5-inch weapons. The turret arrange-

CRUISERS, 1905–1939 109

ment for these cruisers was interesting, as there was one placed inthe fore section and two mounted aft in a staggered fashion ratherthan in the center of the ship. The constructors believed that thislatter arrangement could produce a better arc of fire. The enginesutilized a combination of steam and diesel power, the latter beingemployed for the first time in a cruiser. The two types could not beused in combination with one another. Using diesel engines, theships could travel at 10 knots, while the steam turbines could pro-duce a maximum 32 knots. The hulls were protected by an armorbelt up to 2.75 inches thick and a deck with a maximum depth of1.5 inches. Although these ships represented the return of Germanyas an innovative naval power, they also symbolized German willing-ness to violate the Treaty of Versailles. Each vessel displaced 6,650tons; the last light cruiser laid down before 1930, Leipzig, was also aviolation. These vessels were the first of a series of warships built inthe next years that broke the terms of the peace agreement.

The majority of cruisers built in the wake of the WashingtonTreaty had been unsatisfactory to all those who had signed theagreement. With the exception of cruisers built by Japan and Italy,which were clear violations, each power had been forced to sacrificefirepower or speed in order to incorporate more than scant protec-tion into the designs. Even so, the majority of cruisers built werevulnerable to gunfire. The defect was serious in this age of navalwarfare. By 1930, the accuracy of fire had increased through a newmethod of aiming. Known as direct control, this method placed arange-finding center high up in the ship’s superstructure thathoused electronic and mechanical equipment to calculate an enemyvessel’s range, course, and speed. Crewmen from this central pointcould continuously aim the guns of the ship’s batteries. The concepthad been pioneered by the British in the years leading up to WorldWar I, although only eight ships of the Royal Navy were equippedwith it at the outbreak. This system became a proven method incombat. It was installed on all capital ships and, increasingly, cruis-ers in the postwar era. Cruisers and all other warships consequentlybecame vulnerable to long-range gunnery.

The Washington Treaty had proven a general failure. It had pre-vented a global naval arms race in battleships, but had encouragedone in cruisers and smaller craft. Diplomats and naval officials real-ized this problem after 1922 and sought to limit the number ofcruisers allowed to each naval power. The new League of Nations,the forerunner of the United Nations, tried to address the cruiserarms race through the 1927 Geneva Disarmament Conference.


Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France,and Italy tried to fix cruiser numbers at the meeting, which met inGeneva from 20 June 1927 to 24 August 1927. From the start,hopes for agreement were slim. The French declined to join in thediscussions, as they refused to consider any restrictive agreementthat might mean parity with Italy in cruisers. The Italians alsoturned down the opportunity, as they feared an agreement might up-set the balance with France in the Mediterranean.

Those nations that did participate, the United States, Britain, andJapan, deadlocked over the numbers of cruisers that would be al-lowed, as well as design restrictions. The United States wanted alow figure, whereas the British maintained that they needed largenumbers of cruisers to police their overseas empire. Thus, themonthlong talks resulted in failure and produced a more acrimo-nious climate for the cruiser race.

Even so, the Geneva Disarmament Conference had shown thegreat naval powers that some kind of agreement was necessary toaddress the cruiser arms race and to reduce tensions. Politiciansrepresenting the five signatory powers of the Washington Treatyconsequently persevered in an effort to reduce the construction ofcruisers. Between 21 January 1930 and 22 April 1930, diplomats ofthese countries met at the First London Conference. The UnitedStates and Great Britain resolved their differences on cruisers whenthe British agreed to a reduction of their force. The Japanese, how-ever, presented a new problem. They were against the proposal toextend to all cruisers the 5:5:3 ratio on capital ships, set at theWashington Naval Conference, that governed construction in theUnited States, Great Britain, and Japan.

The powers eventually compromised. Cruiser designs were di-vided into two types: those that mounted 8-inch guns and those thatcarried 6-inch weapons. The Japanese were allowed a 10:10:7 ratioin ships of the latter type, but the 5:5:3 ratio was retained for vesselswith 8-inch guns. Each nation could transfer tonnage from one typeto the other provided they stayed within tonnage limits and the de-sign specifications set for cruisers at the Washington Naval Confer-ence. New stipulations designed to foster further disarmament werealso included in the agreement, and the building holiday on capitalships was extended to 1937.

Only three of the five powers signed the treaty, which greatly re-duced its effectiveness. France and Italy refused because of the re-strictions on smaller warships. Those two countries, which had lessoverall tonnage allotted under the Washington terms and less money

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for naval construction, did not want to place limits on ships thatformed such a large part of their fleet strength.

Even so, cruiser construction was governed in the years after theFirst London Conference by a new set of criteria that had createdtwo types that defined all cruisers until the end of World War II(those with 8-inch guns and those with 6-inch guns). The three sig-natories moved forward in the production of vessels that did not dis-place more than 10,000 tons and adhered to the overall tonnage re-strictions. As battleship construction was still hampered by thebuilding holiday, the majority of larger naval vessels built after thenew agreement were cruisers. These new conditions altered the de-sign of cruisers, as had the Washington Treaty, but their roles andperceived importance remained the same.

The production of cruisers with 8-inch guns in the years after1930 was slight. The United States was the only signatory to buildone, the reason being that most of the great naval powers alreadyhad their maximum tonnage of 8-inch cruisers in operation. Thenew U.S. cruiser, Wichita, was laid down in 1935 and completedfour years later. This vessel was similar in armament and speed tothe New Orleans-class. The only difference was the strengthening ofthe armor by an extra inch at the belt. This design feat, however,produced a ship that displaced 10,589 tons, a violation of the Wash-ington Treaty. American naval officials considered that this was agreat enough problem to send the ship to sea without a portion of itssecondary battery of guns in order to get the displacement withinthe mandated range. The Witchita, like all treaty cruisers, repre-sented the continuing challenge to naval constructors to produce aneffective weapons system that conformed to international treatiesgoverning design.

France in the years after 1930 produced the best treaty cruiserthat defied the tinclad label. Although it had not entered the Lon-don Treaty, France remained true to the Washington Treaty. Thisvessel was Algerie, built in reaction to the Italian Zara-class heavycruisers. It was laid down in 1931 and completed three years later.The hull measured 610 feet, 11 inches by 65 feet, 7 inches and dis-placed 10,000 tons. Its armament consisted of eight 8-inch guns, 123.9-inch weapons, six torpedo tubes, and an assortment of antiair-craft weaponry. The ship’s turbines could produce a maximum speedof 31 knots; protection consisted of an armor belt of a respectablethickness of 4.75 inches and a deck up to 3 inches thick.

The restrictions of treaties were not regarded as a great hindranceto Germany, which was the greatest producer of heavy cruisers after


1930 through its bid to resurrect its armed forces in general. Upontheir election to power in 1933, Adolf Hitler and his Nazi partysought to undermine the Treaty of Versailles to return Germany toworld power status. The first step, already initiated before 1933,shocked the world and was based on the cruiser. The Treaty of Ver-sailles had stipulated a limit of 10,000 tons and a maximum arma-ment of 11-inch weapons for any new German capital ship. Theframers of the treaty believed that these strictures would limit fu-ture construction only to ships capable of coast defense. German in-genuity and willingness to violate these terms, however, producedmuch more capable vessels that were in essence large cruisers.These were the three ships of the Deutschland-class that were laiddown between 1929 and 1932 and completed by 1936. Their hullsmeasured 610 feet, 3 inches by 70 feet, 10 inches; each mounted aprimary armament of six 11-inch guns positioned in two three-gunned turrets located fore and aft. Each vessel also carried eight5.9-inch guns, eight torpedo tubes, and 24 antiaircraft guns of vary-ing sizes. Their engines were diesel and could produce a maximumspeed of 28 knots. The importance of the vessels was great not onlymilitarily but also politically for Hitler. The lead ship, Deutschland,was named after the nation itself and symbolized the rebirth of Ger-man naval power and an erosion of the Treaty of Versailles. Al-though they were publicly touted as displacing 10,000 tons, theiractual displacement was 11,700 tons.

The other Western powers viewed these vessels with alarm be-cause of their fighting power and subsequently labeled them pocketbattleships. In reality, they were large armored cruisers whose pro-tection, consisting largely of an armored belt with a maximum thick-ness of 3 inches, was wholly inadequate to prevent damage fromguns of a caliber equal to its own. Indeed, the protection could notwithstand the fire of much smaller weapons. Nevertheless, the otherEuropean powers were concerned with their potential as commerceraiders in time of war. This view was justified, as it was exactly therole that Hitler envisioned for these vessels.

Heavy cruisers constituted a small portion of the warships thatwere built after 1930, as most of the world’s naval powers turned tothe production of light cruisers. Japan pursued solely cruisers of thistype after the First London Conference because its 12 heavy cruis-ers were the maximum allowable under the treaty’s tonnage require-ments. The Mogami-class comprised four units that were laid downbetween 1931 and 1934. Two were completed by 1935, and the oth-ers were in service two years later. Their hulls measured 661 feet,

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1 inch by 59 feet, 1 inch and displaced 8,500 tons. The armor beltwas a modest 3.9 inches thick, while the deck was a maximum of2.4 inches deep. These vessels mounted an armament of 15 6.1-inch guns, eight 5-inch weapons, 12 torpedo tubes, and antiaircraftguns. The large number of guns and degree of protection on a hullof rather light displacement was the result of Japanese willingnessto employ the relatively new technology of spot-welding hull platestogether. This method took the place of the use of rivets that weredrilled into the plates to attach them to the beams, or frame, of thehull. The vessels were popularly viewed as impressive examples ofnaval technology, but the spot-welding method resulted in such poorstructural integrity that some of the hull plates separated during tri-als. The hulls also warped to the point where the turret could not re-volve. These serious problems resulted in the vessels being placed indry docks while the hulls were strengthened.

Great Britain also moved to the construction of light cruisers. Be-tween 1931 and 1936, the British completed 11 such ships in fourclasses, each succeeding group being a variation of the previousone. The large number was viewed as necessary to police the traderoutes of the empire. They were a response to German constructionand the Japanese Mogami-class. The British, with commitments inthe Pacific and Indian Oceans, could not afford to ignore Japanesenaval expansion and the threat that its cruisers could pose to com-merce in time of war. They were all armed with 6-inch guns and in-corporated scant armor protection into their designs. The firstgroup, the Leander-class, mounted a belt of 3 inches with a thin ar-mor deck and mounted a primary armament of eight 6-inch guns.

The French committed to light cruiser construction because theywanted ships that approximated those of Great Britain. Their vesselswere well-designed and proved to be more capable than Britishcounterparts. Between 1931 and 1933, the French laid down theGalissonnière-class that comprised six ships. The first was com-pleted in 1935; the others were ready for service two years later. Thehulls measured 588 feet, 11 inches by 57 feet, 4 inches and dis-placed 7,600 tons. Armament consisted of nine 6-inch guns, eight3.5-inch guns, and antiaircraft weaponry. They could steam at amaximum speed of 31 knots, while their armor belt of 4 inches andprotected deck of 1.5 inches offered a better degree of protectionthan the British ships. The French also continued to experimentwith warship design through the construction of the minelayerEmile Bertin. This ship, completed in 1934, was essentially a lightcruiser modified to carry 200 mines.


The French vessels were built because of the continued navalarms race in cruisers between France and Italy in the Mediter-ranean. Italy was in the process of building six light cruisers thatcomprised three generally similar designs. The last of these, thetwo-ship Duca D’Aosta-class, was a good example of Italian vessels.Duca D’ Aosta, laid down in 1932 and completed in 1935, measured613 feet, 2 inches by 57 feet, 5 inches and displaced 8,317 tons. Itmounted eight 6-inch guns and six 3.9-inch pieces, and was pro-tected by an armor belt 3 inches thick. Its engines could produce amaximum speed of 36.5 knots in keeping with the Italian emphasison high speed.

The large number of light cruisers built between 1931 and 1936by the naval powers and those of the heavy cruiser type were not theonly examples of this weapons system that were either in process orconstructed. The first of these other versions was the revival of thebattle cruiser. The arrival of the German Deutschland-class vesselshad produced the popularly held belief in other countries that theonly vessels capable of catching and destroying them were the re-maining British battle cruisers. Alarmed at this prospect, Franceproduced its first and only vessels of this type, as the country hadnot signed the London Treaty and was therefore not bound by theextension of the building holiday. The first unit of the two-shipDunkerque-class was laid down in 1932 and completed in 1937; thesecond vessel was ready for service one year later.

The Dunkerque’s hull measured 703 feet, 9 inches by 102 feetand displaced 26,500 tons. Its primary armament consisted of eight13-inch guns housed in two, four-gunned turrets mounted in thefore section. It also carried 16 5.1-inch guns and an antiaircraft bat-tery. Protection was afforded by an armor belt up to 9.75 inchesthick and a protective deck with a maximum depth of 5 inches. Itsengines could produce a maximum speed of 29.5 knots. These pow-erful vessels represented half of the French Navy’s construction incapital ships in the years before World War II.

In addition to these cruisers, less powerful nations were con-structing cruisers. In 1933 Sweden produced an entirely new type ofcruiser when it launched Gotland. Not only did it mount guns as intraditional ships of its type; its stern was fitted with a hanger and aflight deck for use by six aircraft. This vessel was the first purpose-built hybrid cruiser (the British Furious was originally planned as abattle cruiser). This design was quickly made redundant by increas-ing numbers of aircraft carriers, but the concept would resurface al-most 40 years later in the Soviet Navy.

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By 1936 it was becoming apparent to the politicians of the greatpowers that the cruisers built since the end of World War I might becalled upon to assume wartime roles. European diplomacy, whichhad sanctioned Hitler’s violations of the Treaty of Versailles and at-tempted to appease his territorial ambitions, was proving a failure.Further tensions around the world included the Italian invasion ofEthiopia and the Japanese conquest of the province of Manchuria inChina. One of the efforts to ease these tensions was yet anotherconference for the purpose of naval disarmament.

This endeavor was the Second London Conference between thefive signatory powers of the Washington Treaty that convened be-tween November 1935 and March 1936. This meeting was renderedimpotent even before its inception, as the Japanese had announcedin 1934 that they were withdrawing from the Washington Treaty inorder to pursue expansionist policies in the Far East. Further, whenthe Japanese delegation walked out of the talks in January 1936, theremaining powers could not realistically honor any new naval agree-ments while another country armed freely. Even so, the conferenceproduced an agreement for a six-year building holiday for heavycruisers and an 8,000-ton weight limit for light cruisers. The UnitedStates, Great Britain, and France signed the treaty, as politicians inthese countries still had some faith in the value of internationalagreements. The treaty, however, had numerous escape clauses thatall the powers eventually invoked. The Second London Conferenceserved as one more example of a world spiraling into war. Upon theexpiration of the 1930 London Treaty on 31 December 1936, theage of arms limitation was effectively over; the united internationalfront that it relied on was gone. Some powers continued to adhereto the spirit of the defunct agreement, but the age of global armslimitation was finished. A new age of conquest, violence, and worldcompetition would soon take its place.

From 1936 to 1939, the need to build cruisers and other warshipsseemed more urgent given the diplomatic environment. In hopes ofstarting future disarmament talks, the British continued to buildwarships generally within the limits of international law. Elevenmore light cruisers were completed by late 1939 that were largerand better-armored than their predecessors. The last of these, thetwo-ship Edinburgh-class, measured 613 feet, 6 inches by 63 feet, 4inches and violated the Washington Treaty with displacement of10,550 tons. They were armed with 12 6-inch guns and 12 4-inchweapons. Armor protection consisted of a belt 4.5 inches thick, andthe engines could produce a maximum speed of 32.5 knots. Another


class of 11 light cruisers, smaller versions of the Edinburgh-class,was under construction by the end of 1939.

The British strove to incorporate new technology into cruisersthat would produce great gains in the coming world conflict. Thefirst of these innovations was radar, pioneered by the British. In1936, an experimental version was fitted to a minelayer, but the firstsuccessful model was placed in August 1938 aboard the cruiserSheffield.

Radar consists of machinery that transmits sound waves overgreat distances that are intended to bounce off objects. These wavestravel back to the radar set and could reveal the position and dis-tance of an enemy warship. This innovation represented a great im-provement over the past system of director control. It could also beused to locate vessels at night, which was a deficiency of the existingrange-finding systems. In addition, the British in 1937 laid downthe first of a new type of light cruiser in the 11-ship Dido-class. Theprimary armament was 10 5.25-inch guns mounted in dual-purposeturrets. Not only could they fire at surface targets; the guns could beelevated to 70 degrees for use against airplanes. The Dido-class andothers of similar design became known as antiaircraft cruisers thatwere for use in a new role for the ship type: protection of battleshipsand aircraft carriers against enemy air attacks.

The United States also continued to comply with the terms ofpast naval agreements. From 1938 to September 1939, the Ameri-cans launched seven of the nine ships of the Brooklyn-class. Theselight cruisers were intended as an answer to the Japanese Mogami-class vessels in an atmosphere of rising tensions in the Pacific.

Japan—now unfettered by the terms of any naval agreement—augmented its cruiser force through the addition of new vessels andthe reconstruction of existing units. Two more heavy cruisers wereready for service by mid–1939, and two more light cruisers were un-der construction. The Japanese also began to refit the Mogami-classcruisers with 10 8-inch guns.

Germany also continued to arm for war with the completion ofnew units that were openly in contravention of Versailles, althoughthey were built in an atmosphere of partial legitimacy because of thediplomatic actions of Great Britain. In 1935, as part of its policy ofappeasement to avoid war, the British openly violated the Treaty ofVersailles by signing a naval pact that allowed for a German fleetthat was 35 percent the size of the Royal Navy. The cruisers werepart of Germany’s larger plan for naval rearmament. The largestunits completed in 1938 and 1939 were the two battle cruisers of

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the Scharnhorst-class that measured 753 feet, 11 inches by 98 feet,5 inches and displaced 34,841 tons. They were armed with nine 11-inch guns and 12 5.9-inch weapons and could steam at a maximumspeed of 32 knots. An armor belt of 13.75 inches maximum and adeck 3 inches thick provided protection. Six cruisers of the AdmiralHipper-class with 8-inch guns were also being produced; two wereready for service by late 1939. In many respects, these ships mir-rored those of the British, Americans, and French.

Italy built more cruisers in keeping with dictator Benito Mus-solini’s drive to produce a navy that could both project influenceoverseas and act as the status symbol of a great power. Two lightcruisers were completed in 1937; work on another class of 12 war-ships commenced in April 1939. These were designed primarily tocounter large French destroyers then under production.

While the victorious powers of World War I and the newly resur-gent Germany vied for naval supremacy, an old naval power re-mained in the process of rebuilding its force. The Soviet Union re-turned to the cruiser arena with the production in 1938 of its firstship since World War I that was built to a new design. The first ofthe two-ship Kirov-class was heavily influenced by Italian construc-tion. It measured 626 feet, 8 inches by 57 feet, 11 inches, displaced7,880 tons, and mounted an armament of nine 7.1-inch guns andeight 4-inch weapons. The vessel’s engines could produce a maxi-mum speed of 36 knots. In addition to this new vessel, the otherunit of the class remained under construction, and the Soviets werealso building four more cruisers similar in design to the first twounits. As a response to the German Scharnhorst-class battle cruisers,Stalin’s government had also ordered three battle cruisers that werelaid down in 1939 and were designed to mount nine 16-inch guns.

The cruisers that were completed or under construction in theperiod between 1936 and 1939 were only a small portion of a largenumber of ships that signified the general failure of the principle ofpeace through naval disarmament. By the opening of 1940, thenumber of cruisers in operation in the world’s navies was almost asgreat as before World War I: Britain maintained three battle cruis-ers, 18 heavy cruisers, and 50 light cruisers; the United States had18 heavy and 19 light cruisers; Japan operated four battle cruisers,18 heavy cruisers, and 38 light cruisers; Italy had seven heavy cruis-ers and 12 light cruisers; France maintained two battle cruisers, 10heavy cruisers, and seven light cruisers; Germany operated two bat-tle cruisers, five heavy cruisers, and six light cruisers; and the SovietUnion possessed nine light cruisers.13 These vessels and those com-


pleted over the next five years would serve in roles equally as impor-tant as in World War I. On 1 September 1939, a new war erupted inEurope that would eventually engulf the world in a conflict on bothsea and land.

NOTES

1. P. K. Kemp, ed., The Papers of the Admiral Sir John Fisher, vol. 1,Navy Records Society Series, vol. 102 (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantine,1964), p. 41.

2. Ibid., pp. 377–378.3. Oscar Parkes, British Battleships “Warrior” to “Vanguard”: A History of

Design, Construction, and Armament (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972),p. 492. See also John Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I (NewYork: Military Press, 1990), p. 54.

4. Paul Schmalenbach, German Raiders: A History of Auxiliary Cruisersof the German Navy, 1895–1945 (Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens,1979), p. 14.

5. James George, History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), pp. 99, 118.

6. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 2 (London: Odham’s Press,1938), p. 124.

7. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare(New York: Viking, 1989), p. 136.

8. Parkes, British Battleships “Warrior” to “Vanguard,” p. 456.9. Erich Gröner, German Warships, 1815–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval

Institute Press, 1990), p. 112.10. Reginald Tupper, Reminiscences (London: Jarrold’s, 1920), p. 267.11. Anthony Preston, Cruisers (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,

1980), pp. 62–67.12. Ian Buxton, Metal Industries: Shipbreaking at Rosyth and

Charlestown (Kendal, UK: World Ships Society, 1992), p. 20.13. George, History of Warships, p. 125.

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C H A P T E R 4

Cruisers, 1939–2004

The cruisers built in the later 1930s were completed in aworld once again becoming embroiled in a conflict that would testthe warships’ abilities. By 1939, Europe, after only 20 years ofpeace, was on the brink of war. Since coming to power in Germanyin 1933, Adolf Hitler had pursued a policy of subverting the terms ofthe Treaty of Versailles that had ended Germany’s participation inWorld War I. He, like many Germans, believed that the restrictionsof that agreement were humiliating to the country and sought toresurrect Germany as a world power through the destruction of thetreaty. In addition, Hitler sought territorial expansion in Europe as ameans to that end. Other powers also embraced expansionist poli-cies that created tensions throughout the world. Italy, which becamethe military ally of Germany with the 1939 Pact of Steel, hadlaunched an imperial campaign in Africa. Japan had created ten-sions when its forces, to the alarm of U.S. officials who perceived aJapanese threat to United States Pacific interests, invaded China. InEurope, Great Britain, and France, the victorious powers of WorldWar I and the enforcing powers of the Treaty of Versailles hadsought compromise with Germany; the treaty was slowly eroded infavor of preventing war. This diplomacy failed as Hitler continued todemand greater concessions that included the expansion of Ger-many’s borders in Europe. On 1 September 1939, the breakingpoint was reached when the German Army invaded Poland. GreatBritain and France, having given a guarantee to the Polish govern-ment to militarily intervene in the event of German aggression, de-clared war on Nazi Germany. The conflict quickly spread outsideEurope and engulfed the world’s nations in another war.

121

The cruisers available at World War II, despite the design limita-tions placed on them through the naval disarmament treaties of theinterwar period that were violated to some degree by Germany,Japan, and Italy, were fast and powerful units of the major surfacefleets. They performed all the tasks as in World War I, with one ex-ception. Tasks included commerce protection and raiding, surfaceactions against forces of comparatively equal strength, and amphibi-ous operations where they provided shore bombardment for groundforces. The exception to the past was the result of technological in-novation. The oldest duty of the cruiser—that of reconnaissance forbattle fleets—was largely supplanted by aircraft. Despite the loss ofthat function, the rise to prominence of the airplane provided thecruiser with a new duty of vast importance: the protection of battle-ships and aircraft carriers from air assaults. The performance ofcruisers in all these roles once again showcased the fact that theywere the workhorses of the world’s navies. This was made far moreevident in World War II, as the conflict involved sustained large-scale operations in several theaters.

The employment of cruisers in the Atlantic Theater was commondue to the composition of the German Navy and its consequentstrategic purpose. The Kriegsmarine (the German Navy) was smallin comparison to the German High Seas Fleet of World War I.Hitler had envisioned in the prewar years a large navy as a compo-nent of Germany’s return to world power, but at the outbreak theKriegsmarine was unprepared for war. In 1939, Germany hadadopted a construction program, known as the Z Plan, that calledfor a large fleet comprising four aircraft carriers, eight battleships,five battle cruisers, eight heavy cruisers, and 13 light cruisers. Theplan, however, had been set for completion in 1948; consequentlythe outbreak of war found the German Navy with only a few shipsof the program ready for service. Germany possessed only two bat-tle cruisers of the Scharnhorst-class, four heavy cruisers of theDeutschland- and Hipper-classes (with an additional unit of the lat-ter group nearing completion), and six light cruisers; two battle-ships of the Bismarck-class were nearing completion. The smallsize of this surface fleet dictated the strategic goals of Germany inits war at sea. Hitler envisioned all German surface forces, in com-bination with submarines, primarily as commerce raiders to starveGreat Britain of overseas supplies, much as in World War I. Britishand French efforts, until the fall of France in 1940, which removedthe French Navy as a factor in the war, focused on the protection ofcommerce, a principal duty of cruisers.


The first major surface engagement of the war consequently in-volved cruisers in the role of commerce raiding and protection. Inthe last days before the outbreak of conflict, Hitler had dispatchedunits of the German fleet to the Atlantic to prey on Allied shipping.One was the German heavy cruiser, or pocket battleship, Graf Spee,dispatched to the South Atlantic. By 7 December 1939, this vessel,under the command of Captain Hans Langsdorff, had sunk 10 mer-chant vessels totaling a little more than 50,000 tons. The Britishdispatched a task force under Commodore Henry Harwood to huntdown and destroy this raider, which led to the 13 December 1939,Battle of the River Plate off the coast of Uruguay and Argentina.

The Graf Spee faced the heavy cruiser Exeter and the light cruis-ers Ajax and Achilles. Although the British held the numerical supe-riority, Graf Spee mounted heavier weaponry, being a primary arma-ment of six 11-inch guns compared to six 8-inch guns aboard Exeterand eight 6-inch guns each on Ajax and Achilles. The German vesselwas consequently able to fire on the British at ranges well in excessof the capability of the British guns. Offsetting this problem for theBritish, however, was the 32-knot maximum speed of their taskforce versus the 28 knots that the German vessel’s engines couldyield. Given his advantage in speed but with smaller guns, Harwoodtried to close as quickly as possible in order to bring his guns withinrange of Graf Spee. While they closed, Langsdorff concentrated fireon Exeter and heavily damaged it. Once the British were in range,they opened fire as Graf Spee continued to fire its primary arma-ment at Exeter while its secondary battery trained on the otherBritish ships. The action ended after an hour and a half whenLangsdorff withdrew. The British had taken heavy damage, theworst being to Exeter, but the light armor of the German warshipwas hit by 20 British shells that caused heavy damage to its super-structure.

Although the weaponry of Graf Spee was undamaged, Langsdorffretreated to the neutral port of Montevideo, Uruguay, for repairs.That move proved fatal, as it allowed the British to concentrate rein-forcements outside the harbor with the arrival of the heavy cruiserCumberland, the fourth cruiser of Harwood’s force. A renewal of theaction never occurred, as the British employed deception that in-volved cruisers. False radio reports from the British BroadcastingCorporation (BBC) stated that part of the British reinforcements in-cluded the battle cruiser Renown. On 17 December 1939, Langs-dorff scuttled Graf Spee in the harbor rather than face this ship andthe other vessels. This was a great victory for the British, and the ef-

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fect of the battle extended beyond the military sphere. Hitler, whoseconfidence in the navy was shaken by the loss of Graf Spee, orderedthat the name of the pocket battleship Deutschland be changed toLutzow in fear of the propaganda blow that would result if that ship,which bore the name of the German nation, were sunk.

This loss and the subsequent decline of Hitler’s confidence in thenavy did not lead to a cessation of commerce warfare by Germancruisers. Throughout the war, British cruisers, functioning as eitherescorts for convoys or as independent forces to hunt down individ-ual vessels, continued to guard merchant shipping against Germanattacks. The continued German emphasis on commerce raiding bysurface warships and the British resolve to stem it led to the mostcelebrated engagement of the war in the Atlantic. On 18 May 1941,the new German battleship Bismarck, one of the most powerful everconstructed, with 15-inch guns, sortied into the Atlantic with theheavy cruiser Prinz Eugen to attack British commerce. Apprised ofthis event, the British immediately began to hunt for the Germanvessels before the powerful battleship could wreak havoc on mer-chantmen. Cruisers were involved early in this effort when Suffolkand Norfolk, acting as reconnaissance ships, encountered the Ger-man force and radioed its position and heading to other British war-ships. As a consequence, the British converged on the German taskforce.

The result was an encounter in the Denmark Strait, subsequentlyknown as the Battle of the Denmark Straits, between the Germanvessels and a British task force that comprised the battleship KingGeorge V and the battle cruiser Hood. In command of these vessels,with his flag flying aboard Hood, was Rear Admiral Lancelot Hol-land. On 24 May 1941, a battle ensued in which Holland tried toclose range with Hood in the lead. Hampering his attack was thefact that he was closing with the bows of his ships toward the en-emy, meaning that only the forward guns could come to bear on theenemy. The Germans, by contrast, were able to train all of theirguns in broadside against the British. Fire opened at 5:53 A.M. at arange of some 26,500 yards. The Germans concentrated on Hol-land’s flagship; Hood was subsequently hit by both ships. One ofBismarck’s 15-inch shells penetrated Hood’s thin armor—a weak-ness of all British battle cruisers—and detonated the aft magazine.Germans and British alike were shocked to see a column of flameleap hundreds of feet into the air as the hull of the Hood broke intwo from the force of the explosion. Minutes later, all that remainedof the ship was a column of smoke marking its grave. Only three of


its crew of 1,419 men survived; Admiral Holland was not among thesurvivors. The German ships subsequently escaped.

As with the Battle of the River Plate, the loss of a cruiser had po-litical ramifications as well as military ones. The Hood, known asthe mighty Hood to the British public, had symbolized the RoyalNavy due chiefly to its size. News of the loss of this ship was ashock to the British people and a propaganda blow to the nation. Asa result of Hood’s loss, Prime Minister Winston Churchill commit-ted the bulk of the Royal Navy to the destruction of Bismarck. TheGerman vessel, without Prinz Eugen (which had left to try and drawoff the British), was hunted down by a collection of cruisers, battle-ships, and aircraft carriers. On 27 May, the German battleship wasdestroyed during a pitched battle in which the cruiser Dorsetshirefired torpedoes that, in combination with British shelling and Ger-man scuttling charges, sank the goliath. This action led to a reduc-tion of commerce raiding by surface units of the German Navy infavor of submarine warfare, but limited sorties continued, and thethreat of the German Navy tied down many British cruisers in com-merce protection.

Aside from these famous actions, cruisers were also involved inthe Atlantic as support ships for amphibious operations. Germancruisers were used in the 1940 invasion of Norway; they steamedinto Norwegian fjords to provide shore bombardment and to act astroop carriers. This operation, although successful, illustrated thevulnerability of all warships when confined to narrow waters. Ger-many lost a significant portion of its fleet that included the heavycruiser Blücher. This vessel was the flagship of a task force chargedwith the invasion of Oslo and had aboard 900 troops and assortedsupplies. On 9 April 1940, Blücher was shelled by shore batteries of11-inch and 5.9-inch guns. The vessel was also hit by two torpedoesfrom shore-based installations. It subsequently sank and remains tothis day in Norwegian waters, where it continues to leak oil that isan environmental hazard. The action also showcased the danger ofair and submarine attack to surface warships since one light cruisereach succumbed to these attacks. An Allied example of cruiser usefor amphibious operations was D-Day, the 1944 invasion of Nazi-occupied France, when the invasion force benefited from the gun-fire of an armada that included cruisers. Indeed, the shore bom-bardment effort at Utah Beach was directed from the U.S. cruiserTuscaloosa. Some historians assert that this effort was the key tobreaking up German resistance in the area and to the ultimate suc-cess of the historic landing.1

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Cruisers in the Atlantic also served in a number of capacities thatextended into the political arena. One of the most well-known exam-ples was the use of the U.S. cruiser Augusta in August 1941 to trans-port President Franklin D. Roosevelt to a conference with PrimeMinister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland. Thisship thus served as the site for the first wartime conference betweenthese two leaders when the United States still remained neutral.The result, known as the Atlantic Charter, had profound results thatshaped the relationship of the two powers in the war; it resolved thatneither country, if the United States entered the war, would seekterritorial aggrandizement at the expense of others. More important,it called for the creation of a world in which people were free tochoose their own government and to live in freedom. In essence, itwas a joint declaration against the aims of Hitler’s Nazi Germanyand a clear indication of U.S. government policy. After the 7 Decem-ber 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Atlantic Charterserved as the basis for future cooperation and wartime planningamong the Allied powers.

Cruisers also performed a multitude of duties in the Mediter-ranean. Emboldened by the German conquest of France in 1940,Italian dictator Benito Mussolini declared war on Great Britain andthus opened the Mediterranean Sea as a new area of operations.This move posed a strategic threat to Great Britain, as Italy’s geo-graphic position threatened British supply lanes providing oil andsupplies from the eastern portion of the British Empire that passedthrough the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean and to the home is-lands. The campaign in the Mediterranean quickly centered onBritish attempts to protect trade and to defend the island base ofMalta that lay astride its shipping lanes. Cruisers formed a large partof this endeavor; Italian attempts to destroy this trade also centeredon their use. In March 1941, these efforts culminated in the Battleof Cape Matapan, where an Italian battleship, eight cruisers, and 17destroyers put to sea to destroy a British convoy at Crete.

Italian fortunes declined when one of the cruisers, Pola, was crip-pled by an aerial torpedo attack. The subsequent effort to salvagethis vessel led to a general engagement on the night of 28 Marchwhen Pola, and two of its sister ships, Zara and Fiume, were de-stroyed by British battleships and cruisers. The Italian vessels, asthey lacked radar, were ill-prepared for the British assault, and theirfire was inaccurate due to the cover of darkness. Indeed, the Britishsuffered no casualties in the engagement. The destruction of thesethree heavy cruisers almost cut in half the number of Italian 8-inch


gunned cruisers. This loss proved so costly that the Italian Navy didnot leave its harbors in force again until December 1941.

With the Battle of Cape Matapan, the Allies had established pri-macy in the Mediterranean. Even so, Allied losses afterward werenot inconsequential. In May 1941, Germany began an airborne in-vasion of the island of Crete, held by Allied forces. The Royal Navywas tasked with preventing any Axis seaborne supply of the effort.The operation proved to be a fine example of the vulnerability ofsurface warships to air attack when lacking air support, as theBritish warships were in range of German land-based airfields. Thelight cruisers Gloucester and Fiji were both sunk by German air-craft. Cruisers also served as shore-bombardment ships for numer-ous Allied amphibious operations that included the 1942 landing inNorth Africa, the invasion of Sicily in the following year, and the ul-timate invasion of Italy in 1944. The magnitude of operations in theMediterranean was great and was spearheaded by the cruisers of theopposing navies. Italy lost 314,298 tons of warships, 82,225 tons ofthis being cruisers. Of the 411,935 tons of warships lost by theRoyal Navy, 95,265 tons were cruisers.2

The war in the Pacific, although aircraft carriers receive the ma-jority of the historical coverage, was also an area of operationswhere the use of cruisers was high. Japan, which after September1940 was an ally of Germany and Italy, faced U.S. efforts to quell itsimperial expansion in China through economic embargoes intendedto starve it of supplies. Tensions between Japan and the UnitedStates resulted in the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 againstthe American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, which brought theUnited States into the war as an Allied power. Japanese strategycalled for the conquest of Far East lands and the islands of the Pa-cific to garner resources for the Japanese war machine, which wasdependent on overseas supplies as the home islands possessed fewraw materials. Japanese strategists then envisioned a defensive waragainst the United States that centered on a perimeter formed byconquered possessions in the Pacific. American attempts to conquerthese areas, in the Japanese view, would eventually cause such lossof life that the U.S. government would be willing to sue for peace.

The first battles in the Far East and Pacific, outside of Pearl Har-bor, involved cruisers. On 8 December 1941, the British battleshipPrince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse, which were deployedto protect the British base of Singapore from Japanese invasion,were sunk by Japanese air attacks that exhibited the value of antiair-craft guns as well as the vulnerability of surface ships to air attack

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when unprotected by air forces of their own. The number of subse-quent surface actions involving cruisers in the Pacific was high. Inthe opening months of the war after Japanese forces had sweptthrough the Pacific and Asia and the Allies were formulating a re-sponse, the principal Allied force comprised cruisers and destroyers.Known as the ABDA Command, this force included American,British, Dutch, and Australian units. Its task was to counter furtherJapanese incursions in southeast Asia.

The ABDA Command was the first attempt by the Allied powersto form a front against the Japanese. Its success was limited and itsoperational life was brief. On 27 February 1942, the ABDA Com-mand, comprising five cruisers and nine destroyers under the com-mand of Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, encountered a Japa-nese invasion force in the Java Sea that was bound for the island ofJava. It was escorted by four cruisers and 14 destroyers under thecommand of Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi. The resulting Battle of theJava Sea led to the loss from gunfire and torpedoes of Doorman withhis flagship, the light cruiser De Ruyter, and two destroyers. Thesurviving three cruisers—the U.S. heavy cruiser Houston, the Aus-tralian light cruiser Perth, and the British heavy cruiser Exeter—were subsequently destroyed. On 28–29 February, Houston andPerth were destroyed by gunfire and torpedoes in the Battle ofSunda Strait when they encountered the Japanese heavy cruisersMogami and Mikuma, one Japanese light cruiser, and destroyers.The Exeter was destroyed on 1 March by naval gunfire and aircraftoff Surabaya.

The majority of subsequent surface actions involved cruisers assupport and bombardment ships for amphibious invasions once theAllies instituted their offensive against the Japanese defensiveperimeter. Japanese cruisers, conversely, attempted to defend the is-land possessions of the Japanese Empire from these assaults. Theseefforts culminated in some of the most intense actions of the war inthe Pacific that did not include aircraft carriers. The best example ofthis trend was the 9 August 1942 Battle of Savo Island during theAllied operation to wrest Guadalcanal from Japanese control.

Two days before this engagement, U.S. Marines had invaded theislands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Part of the Japanese effort toshore up their forces on Guadalcanal in the face of the U.S. attackwas a naval assault to destroy the Allied warships and transports thatlay off the island. With these destroyed, the U.S. invasion forcewould be cut off from resupply and succumb to Japanese forces.The Japanese deployed a force under Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa


for the mission. Mikawa had at his command five heavy cruisers,two light cruisers, and a destroyer. He launched his attack againstAllied warships that lay in the vicinity of Savo Island on the north-ern side of Guadalcanal. Mikawa launched his attack in the earlymorning of 9 August.

The Japanese, who had long relied on the torpedo as a principleweapon for cruisers and were well-trained in nighttime fighting, in-flicted a devastating defeat on the Allies. The British heavy cruiserCanberra quickly suffered two torpedo hits that crippled the ship. Itwas subsequently annihilated by Japanese gunfire. The U.S. heavycruiser Vincennes was also dispatched quickly. Two sister ships ofVincennes sank following the battle from damage sustained by tor-pedoes and gunfire. In only 32 minutes, the Allies had lost fourheavy cruisers and one destroyer and had suffered 1,270 dead andanother 709 wounded. No Japanese ships were sunk, and casualtieswere minimal. This defeat was one of the worst ever inflicted on theUnited States Navy and testified to the destructive power of cruisers.

These actions, however, paled in comparison to the importance ofcruisers in a new duty: protection of battleships, aircraft carriers,and supply convoys against air attacks. Increasingly, U.S. and Japa-nese cruisers were used as screening vessels, their antiaircraft gunsdestroying incoming enemy airplanes before they reached other war-ships. This role was crucial for the United States in the openingmonths of the war, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had ren-dered the battleships of the fleet inoperative. Cruisers necessarilyformed the bulk of the protection in the early aircraft carrier con-frontations between the two powers. In the June 1942 Battle ofMidway, which helped to turn the tide of the Pacific War in favor ofthe United States, cruisers formed the majority of the surface pro-tection for the three U.S. carriers. Allied cruisers continued to pro-vide vital cover in operations across the Pacific, as in the case of the1945 invasion of Okinawa, in which cruisers formed part of the de-fensive screen to prevent Japan’s aerial suicide bombers, thekamikazes, from crashing into U.S. carriers.

As in the Atlantic, cruisers also performed valuable duties outsidetheir principal roles in naval warfare. One of these, supply transport,had ramifications that extended to the political arena. In mid-1945,the U.S. cruiser Indianapolis was chosen to deliver top-secret plansand materials for the atomic bombs that were later dropped on Hi-roshima and Nagasaki. These bombs ultimately led to Japan’s sur-render and the end of World War II.

The World War II cruisers were basically ships whose construc-

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tion and technology mirrored those of World War I. Even so, the ex-perience of World War II led to improvements primarily in weaponrythat were included in newly constructed ships and retrofitted to ves-sels that were already in service at the outbreak of war. The majorityof wartime cruiser production was Allied and primarily U.S. due tothe great industrial strength of the United States, the strained econ-omy of Great Britain, and the fact that the majority of the resourcesof the Soviet Union, which joined the Allied cause after the Germaninvasion of the country in 1941, were directed largely to the landwar. The first of the U.S. ships were those of the Atlanta-class. Thisultimately comprised 11 vessels, the first being completed in Janu-ary 1942. These light cruisers were the product of the increasedneed for vessels to protect aircraft carriers, battleships, and convoysagainst air attacks. Known as antiaircraft cruisers, they were an im-provement of the British Dido-class vessels. Their hulls measured541 feet, 6 inches by 53 feet, 2 inches and displaced 6,718 tons. Ar-mor protection was provided by a belt 3.75 inches thick and an ar-mored deck 1.25 inches in depth; their oil-fueled steam turbine en-gines could produce a maximum speed of 32.5 knots. Their primaryarmament consisted of 16 5-inch guns mounted in six turrets, threeeach being positioned fore and aft. The turrets were dual-purpose,as they could either train the guns against surface targets or elevatethe weapons to an extreme angle to provide antiaircraft fire.

This tendency toward greater protection against air attack wasalso evident in the larger Cleveland-class of light cruisers. Compris-ing 29 ships, this class was one of the most numerous in the historyof cruisers. These vessels measured 610 feet, 1 inch by 66 feet, 4inches and displaced 11,744 tons. Their armor amounted to a beltwith a maximum thickness of 5 inches and an armored deck 2inches thick. The engines produced a maximum speed of 32.5knots. While their primary armament consisted of 12 6-inch gunsmounted in conventional turrets for surface warfare, they alsoshipped a secondary armament of 12 5-inch guns in dual-purposeturrets and a collection of 38 smaller-caliber antiaircraft guns. Inlater vessels of this class, the superstructure was redesigned to allowfor greater arcs of fire for the antiaircraft guns.

The United States also constructed larger cruisers to supplementits light cruiser force. The 18 ships of the Baltimore-class, the firstbeing launched in April 1943 and another 10 being completed be-fore the end of the war, mounted nine 8-inch guns and antiaircraftweapons in keeping with the need for protection against air attack.The largest vessels launched, however, were the two ships of the


Alaska-class that were built because of mistaken intelligence thatthe Japanese were constructing a ship that resembled the GermanDeutchland-class heavy cruisers. Although some accounts define theAlaska-class vessels as heavy cruisers, they are best defined as battlecruisers owing to their size and armament. Completed in 1944,these vessels measured 808 feet, 6 inches by 91 feet, 1 inch and dis-placed 29,779 tons. Protection consisted primarily of an armor beltwith a maximum thickness of 9 inches and a protected deck up to 4inches. Propulsion was afforded by steam turbines that could pro-duce a maximum speed of 33 knots. These vessels mounted an im-pressive armament of nine 12-inch guns in three turrets as well as12 5-inch guns and 90 smaller antiaircraft weapons.

Great Britain did not construct vessels that approached the sizeof the U.S. Alaska-class battle cruisers, nor did they build cruisers inthe numbers produced by the United States. Nevertheless, theBritish, despite a badly strained wartime economy, did producethree classes of cruisers that reflected the same basic trends in U.S.vessels. The 11 light cruisers of the Fiji-class, completed between1940 and 1943, were essentially improved versions of the Edin-burgh-class; the two-ship Swiftsure-class, completed in 1944 and1945, were descendents of the Fijis. All possessed primary arma-ments of 6-inch guns in turrets designed solely for surface action, areflection of the need for protecting commerce. Like U.S. cruisers,they also incorporated secondary armaments that were housed indual-purpose turrets for use against aircraft and lighter guns for thesame use. The third group of cruisers, the Bellona-class built be-tween 1943 and 1944, consisted of antiaircraft cruisers similar tothe Dido-class. The eight 5.25-inch guns were quick-firing weaponsmounted in dual-purpose turrets.

Axis cruisers built during the war were far fewer than their Alliedopponents but largely reflected the same trend toward greater anti-aircraft protection. The majority were Japanese and Italian, as theGermans only completed one more ship, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eu-gen, in August 1940. The seven light cruisers of the Japanese Katori-and Agano-classes represented the lion’s share of Axis construction.The first group was an antiaircraft cruiser design, while the secondmounted 36 guns for antiaircraft defense, although the primary ar-mament was for use only against surface targets. The exceptions tothe tendency toward greater antiaircraft armament were the threeItalian light cruisers of the Capitani Romani-class that were de-signed primarily to combat large French destroyers.

Both the new Allied and Axis cruisers, with the exception of the

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Italian vessels, benefited from improvements in detection equip-ment that greatly augmented their combat effectiveness. Allied ves-sels enjoyed the best of these devices. Radar (radio direction andranging) was one of these advances. By 1942, radar sets were regu-larly employed in Allied vessels. Radar devices emit radio wavesfrom dishes mounted high in a vessel, normally on top of the super-structure, that reflect off a distant target and then return to theship. A seaman within the warship manned a screen in which theobserver’s ship was in the middle and the object revealed by theradar was illuminated relative to it.

Radar was a huge advantage for numerous reasons. It greatly im-proved navigation, as it was relatively unaffected by poor weather.Radar also allowed for exact maneuvering at night around nearby ob-stacles such as shorelines, reefs, and other vessels. Additionally, thedevice provided enough information for a warship’s crew to establishthe range and bearing of an enemy vessel. Although the early radarset itself could not provide this data, as an object was merely illumi-nated on the screen, crewmen had calculations that could establishposition on a giant plot board. Radar proved enormously important,as it allowed for the advanced detection of incoming ships and air-craft. It also enabled Allied vessels to engage in nighttime battleswith far greater gunfire accuracy than their Axis opponents andnegated the night-fighting advantage held by the Japanese early inthe war. Although both Germany and Japan possessed radar equip-ment, the Allies’ equipment proved superior due in part to thegroundbreaking work of British scientists before the outbreak of war.

The newest Allied and Axis cruisers also benefited from the use ofunderwater detection devices. In 1918, experiments overseen by theAllied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee in World WarI had produced an experimental underwater listening device. It firstbecame known as ASDIC (after the committee) but became morepopularly known as sonar. The early equipment fell into two types.The first, active sonar, transmitted sonic impulses through the waterthat bounced off an object and returned to the base ship. Crewmensubsequently established the distance and direction of the objectbased on the reflection. The second, passive sonar, determined thedistance and range of an object based on analysis of sounds emittedfrom the target. Wartime improvements added the capability of es-tablishing a target’s depth. These two types of sonar remain in serv-ice today in improved versions. Sonar enabled cruisers to detectsubmarines that could be launching an attack against a battle fleetor a merchant convoy.


These devices were also installed in older cruisers in combinationwith antiaircraft weaponry. The use of these improvements on ves-sels that were not designed to mount them, however, was not alwayseffective. Many of the older, interwar vessels could not support theweight of the radar equipment, primarily dishes and antennas, andadditional armament without threatening stability at sea. This prob-lem became acute and was apparent in British cruisers. Upon a refitwherein the new systems were installed, the British oftentimes hadto remove primary gun turrets to keep the weight within acceptablelimits.

In essence, the newest cruisers of World War II were hardly dis-tinguishable from the cruisers of the interwar era despite changes inarmament and detection equipment. This extended to life aboardthese vessels, as it, too, remained largely unchanged from WorldWar I. Combat was terrible for those who manned these ships, asthey were subjected to explosions from bombs and shells and thesplinters of wood, steel, and other debris that resulted when the pro-jectiles struck home. Oftentimes, many crewmen were trapped be-lowdecks as the hull filled with water and sank. Some cruisers van-ished so quickly that there were no survivors. One example was theAustralian light cruiser Sydney. In November 1941, this cruiser en-countered a German raider. Although the German ship was badlydamaged, its guns and torpedoes disabled the Australian vessel,which drifted away. The Germans were the last people to see Sydney,as it sank without sending any radio message. No survivors of itscrew of 570 officers and men were ever found.

Doubtless, many aboard cruisers endured hardships, like theircomrades on other doomed vessels, that extended past battle. Thosewho survived the sinking of a cruiser were not assured of rescuewhile they faced the perils of floating in the sea. The first of these,for those crewmen without life rafts, was fuel oil from the sinkingship that floated on the surface of the water. This oil could igniteand produce an inferno, thus burning the crew alive, cover the menand asphyxiate them, or poison them if they ingested it. If the sur-vivors were able to endure, they were then subjected to the dangersof the sea itself. If they were not immediately rescued, a commonproblem was dehydration that resulted from lack of water, the salt inthe sea and in the air, and prolonged exposure to the sun. This couldresult in hallucination and death. In many cases, desperate crew-men drank seawater, which was toxic and could kill them. Anotherproblem in cold climates such as the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans washypothermia.

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Finally, the crews of sunken ships were subjected to the dangersposed by creatures that inhabit the seas. The worst case was theplight of the survivors of the U.S. heavy cruiser Indianapolis. Thisvessel was torpedoed on 28 July 1945 by a Japanese submarine onits return trip from delivering materials for the two atomic bombsthat were later dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The ship wentdown in 12 minutes. Of its crew of 1,119 men, about 900 men,largely without lifeboats, managed to get off the vessel and into thewater. Just after dawn the following day, sharks began attacking thehelpless men. By the time the crew was finally extracted from thewater on 2 August, only 316 had survived. This instance of shark at-tack remains the worst case in recorded history.

The suffering of these men provides only a glimpse of the loss ofhuman life aboard cruisers in World War II, the largest naval war inmodern history. The high use of cruisers in the conflict, and the hu-man toll, are evident from the total losses of cruisers during the war.Japan lost the most, 39 light and heavy cruisers, as its navy waslargely destroyed by the conflict. Great Britain suffered 27 vesselssunk, while Italy and the United States lost 13 and 12 respectively.The German Kriegsmarine lost seven cruisers, the majority beingsunk early in the war while raiding commerce or during the invasionof Norway.3

Despite these large losses in ships, the cruisers sunk in WorldWar II represented only a fraction of the cruiser forces that re-mained at the end of the conflict. The majority of these were U.S.and British vessels. In the first years after the end of the war in1945, cruisers that had been laid down during the conflict joinedthe world’s cruiser forces. Almost all were U.S. vessels, 14 ships thatbelonged to four different classes. The others were five Soviet lightcruisers.

These ships, however, represented an exception to the rule in theimmediate postwar years, as the victorious powers sought to reducethe size of their navies to trim maintenance costs in a peacetimeworld that did not require warships in such large numbers. TheBritish, due to the great financial drain of the war and the govern-ment’s plan to divert resources to the domestic front, viewed the re-duction of the Royal Navy as a lamentable necessity. A massive pro-gram of cuts in the fleet was instituted in 1948 that led to thescrapping of all cruisers older than the Southampton-class. Francewas also in poor economic condition, but it possessed few vessels afterthe war; a large portion of the French fleet was either destroyed bythe British to prevent units falling into the hands of the Germans or


scuttled by the French themselves to prevent the same. What fewships remained were those that had escaped to Allied ports. The So-viet Union, although Stalin desired a large navy, was also in dire eco-nomic straits, as the European portion of the country lay in ruinsfrom the Nazi invasion. The Soviet Navy was both small and devoidof the possibility of receiving new, domestically constructed unitsbecause of this situation.

New cruiser construction was impossible for the defeated Axispowers in the immediate years after World War II. Their economieswere in ruins from physical devastation caused to their lands duringthe war. Another impediment of equal importance to the develop-ment of new cruisers was the peace treaties with each power that re-stricted the possibility of future construction even if theireconomies did improve. The German Kriegsmarine ceased to existas an offensive force. Its few remaining warships were seized by theAllied powers and a new naval organization was created in its place.The new naval arm was primarily responsible for coastal defenseand clearing minefields laid in European waters during the war.

The Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a similar fate during thegeneral disarmament of the country. In May 1948, in place of theold navy, the Maritime Safety Agency was created and charged withduties such as search and rescue. The only former Axis country al-lowed to retain a navy was Italy, but it was severely restricted. Underthe peace agreement with Italy, the total tonnage of Italian warshipswas not to exceed 67,000 tons, while new construction was com-pletely prohibited before 1 January 1950, with the exception of re-placing units that were accidentally lost.

The cruisers that were either deleted from the lists of the victori-ous Allied powers or seized from the defeated Axis powers per-formed two final roles in peacetime navies. Many were scrapped inshipyards, where workers benefited from the wages accrued duringthe process. Other cruisers were used as test vessels in the new ageof atomic warfare that was ushered in by the bomb blasts over Hi-roshima and Nagasaki. Following the war, a debate raged in theUnited States between proponents of naval power and airpower.The latter believed that warships had been rendered irrelevant bythe dawn of atomic war, as the airplane could deliver these weaponsof mass destruction anywhere in the world and warships were ex-tremely vulnerable to them. Naval officials asserted that warshipswere still necessary for sustained operations overseas. The culmi-nation of the debate was the 1946 series of tests at Bikini Atoll inthe Marshall Islands in the Pacific. One of the cruisers employed in

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this endeavor was the German heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Despitesurviving the tests, the ship sank soon afterward from the damageincurred.

Despite the controversy that led to the Bikini tests, U.S. and Eu-ropean naval officials and their governments generally agreed afterthe war that navies were still relevant to project power, to guardoverseas interests in time of peace, and to mount large operations intime of war. This continued emphasis on navies in the postwarworld rested on the belief that the capital ship of the world’s fleetswas now the aircraft carrier, which all viewed as a tool to projectpower around the world. Battleships were no longer seen as cost-effective given the threat of air attacks. Even so, the value of surfacewarships remained and lent itself to the retention of the cruiser. Notonly was gun power still useful for amphibious invasions and theprotection of commerce; the experience of World War II had proventhe value of cruisers as antiaircraft protection for aircraft carriers.The importance attached to aircraft carriers meant that cruiserswould continue to serve as vital components of carrier task forces.

The need for such ships was also made apparent in the years im-mediately following World War II as the world descended into a newworldwide conflict. Diplomatic tensions rose between the UnitedStates, its European allies, and their former wartime ally of the So-viet Union over Soviet dealings in Eastern and Central Europe. TheAmericans and Europeans were alarmed at the rise of communistgovernments in Europe that allied with Moscow and threatenedboth the global balance of power and the freedom of those undercommunist systems. In 1947 amid a communist revolution inGreece that threatened to envelop the country, President Harry Tru-man took the first steps to check the spread of Soviet influencethrough the Truman Doctrine. It stated that the United Stateswould support any free nation threatened by “outside pressures” or“armed minorities.” This policy statement was directed at the SovietUnion.

Subsequent steps like the Marshall Plan, a massive aid programto rebuild the shattered economies of Europe in order that theymight not be unstable in the face of communist insurgency, hard-ened attitudes of both sides. By 1949, the United States and West-ern European nations had founded the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-nization (NATO) as a military alliance against the Soviet Union. TheSoviets in turn directed their military strength against this challengeand would ultimately establish their own alliance, known as theWarsaw Pact. By the end of the 1940s, the world had polarized into


two camps led by two superpowers, the United States and the SovietUnion, that rivaled one another around the world. This conflict,known as the Cold War, was one of massive military buildups, in-cluding a new naval arms race. As most of the maritime powers wereeither impoverished or devastated by World War II, and becausecruisers were expensive vessels, the majority of cruiser constructionin this competition was U.S. and Soviet.

The Soviet Union led the way in the development of new cruisers.In 1950, Stalin, despite enduring economic problems, instituted a10-year construction program that included 40 cruisers, being a col-lection of battle cruisers, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers. His goalwas the restoration of the navy, after it had largely languished duringthe war, in order to match the naval strength of the Western powers.Construction on the first units was already under way as Stalin initi-ated the plan. These were the 14 light cruisers of the Sverdlov class.Production of these imposing vessels began in 1949; the final shipwas not ready for sea until 1955. The Sverdlov-class light cruisersmeasured 689 feet by 72 feet, 2 inches, displaced 16,000 tons, andwere protected by a combination of light belt and deck armor. Theirprimary armament consisted of 12 5.98-inch guns in four triple-gunned turrets, two each located fore and aft. They also mountedsmaller secondary guns and lighter antiaircraft weapons. These bat-teries benefited from radar equipment for calculating ranges to tar-gets. Their engines could produce a maximum 32.5 knots. Between1951 and 1952, work on further ships in the plan began when thekeels of the two battle cruisers of the Stalingrad-class were laiddown. The design called for vessels that measured 836 feet, 8inches by 103 feet and displaced 40,000 tons. Their primary arma-ment was projected as six 12-inch guns.

As production on the Stalingrad-class battle cruisers commenced,the first of the Sverdlov-class light cruisers were appearing on theworld’s oceans. They made a deep impression on naval officials inthe United States and Western Europe, who viewed them as a sig-nificant threat. The United States responded with the last cruiserswhose construction had commenced during the war. Great Britain,owing to economic difficulties that plagued the other Western pow-ers, was the only U.S. ally that built cruisers at the same time as theSoviet ships. These were the three light cruisers of the Tiger-class.Like the U.S. vessels, these ships were based on a wartime design.Owing to economic problems and the need to redesign them fornewer detection systems, the first unit was not ready for service un-til 1959.

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The Soviet vessels and those of the United States that were builtduring the first years of the postwar era were ultimately of limitedvalue, as technological innovations rendered them increasingly ob-solete. As these warships were completed, the United States was inthe midst of experiments with a new weapons system that wouldtransform naval warfare. During World War II, Nazi Germany pio-neered missile technology with the development of the V1 and V2rockets. American naval officials sought to extend this technology tomissiles aboard ships to combat a serious strategic threat. In 1949,the Soviet Union became an atomic power when it detonated itsfirst test weapon. This development, in combination with the adventof jet engines for airplanes, in theory allowed the Soviets to attackthe U.S. mainland using fast aircraft armed with atomic weapons.The speed of planes largely obviated the use of antiaircraft guns onships that might be deployed as a defensive screen in the waters offthe United States. Their rate of fire was slow, as was their aiming,which was controlled by human beings. But missiles could matchand exceed the speed of the new jets. American naval officials alsobelieved in the need for vessels armed with missiles to protect air-craft carriers against assaults by enemy jets.

By the early 1950s, hurried research and development with theaid of German scientists of a missile system that could fulfill theseneeds bore fruit with antiaircraft missiles that became known as the“3-Ts” and were designated as surface to air missiles (SAM). Thesewere the Terrier, Talos, and Tartar missiles. They were the productof the U.S. Bumblebee program, begun in 1944 and committed tothe invention of SAM ordnance that possessed long range. Whilethe Talos SAM missile was in the development stage, engineers builtthe Supersonic Test Vehicle to evaluate the performance of guid-ance systems for the weapon. Due to the success of that device andthe fact that Talos was still years from being perfected as a viablemissile, the United States decided to use the Supersonic Test Vehi-cle to build a SAM that possessed shorter range. Flight tests tookplace in 1951 and led to the production of the SAM-N–7, theTer-rier. Terrier subsequently entered service in late 1955 as the first ofthe three SAM systems.

The vessel chosen to ship this technological innovation inweaponry was the cruiser. Not only was the protection of aircraftcarriers against air attacks already a proven role for cruisers throughthe experience of World War II; the great weight and large size ofthe missile system necessitated the use of large cruiser hulls.

The first of these cruisers, and the first surface vessels armed


with missiles, were Boston and Canberra, two World War II–era ves-sels of the Baltimore-class. In 1954, both ships were removed fromservice to reconstruct them. On 1 November 1955, Boston returnedto service as CAG–1, a guided missile cruiser. The Canberra wasrecommissioned as CAG–2 the following year. These vessels meas-ured 673 feet, 5 inches by 69 feet, 8 inches and displaced 13,589tons. Many of their systems remained the same as they had beenupon the completion of the vessels during World War II. Indeed, the“A” in the designation “CAG” signified only a partial conversion, inwhich the original forward portion of the ship was retained whilethe aft portion was altered. The chief difference as a result was theweaponry, which had originally consisted of a primary armament ofnine 8-inch guns in three triple-gunned turrets. Two were located inthe forward part of the ship; the third was in the stern. They hadalso mounted a secondary armament of 12 5-inch guns. During re-construction, the aft 8-inch turret was removed along with the load-ing machinery in the barbette that fed shells and powder from themagazines in the bottom of the hull to the guns. Instead, the vesselsmounted the new Terrier antiaircraft missile system.

The firing equipment consisted of two, twin-armed, Mark 10launchers. Each launcher consisted of two rails, on which the mis-siles rested, positioned on either side of a swivel post that could betrained on the target. Once the missiles were fired, the arms wereraised to a vertical position for reloading, where more missiles wouldbe mounted via machinery belowdecks that raised ordnance ontothe arms. The new magazines were placed in spaces that originallystored shells and the old loading machinery. Each of the two maga-zines could hold a maximum of 144 missiles.

The Terrier missiles were extremely large, being 27 feet long. Theearly missiles of the type weighed 1,290 pounds, more than a 16-inch shell. They contained a 218-pound warhead and a jet enginefor launching and propulsion to the target that could achieve aspeed of Mach 1.8, or about 1,330 miles per hour. The maximumrange of the first Terrier was 12 miles. Later versions had increasedrange and the ability to carry a 1-kiloton nuclear warhead. The Ter-rier missile was originally a beam-riding weapon in terms of itsguidance, which was provided by machinery in the nose of the mis-sile that received targeting information from radars that wereplaced in the aft portion of the ship in place of the original super-structure. These fire-control stations of the warship emitted a radarbeam that bounced off the target and supplied the necessary data tothe missile. Subsequent models of Terrier incorporated technology

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that gave the ability to use radar as well as beam-riding to home inon a target.

The success of these two conversions led to the reconstruction ofadditional World War II–era cruisers to mount the new weaponry.Cost considerations also lay behind the decision to use older cruis-ers, as the price to construct purpose-built missile cruisers was con-sidered too high by government officials. Six Cleveland-class lightcruisers were taken into the dockyards and emerged between 1958and 1960 as guided missile cruisers. Their hulls measured 610 feetby 65 feet, 8 inches and displaced 11,066 tons following conversion.The maximum speed afforded by their original engines was 32knots. Their weaponry resembled that of Boston and Canberra. Thetwo aft 6-inch turrets and the aft 5-inch, dual-purpose turret wereremoved and replaced in four of the vessels by an improved versionof the Terrier system. The two other vessels received the Talos mis-sile system.

The Talos SAM was the ultimate goal of the United States’ Bum-blebee Program. Development for the Talos system had followed theentry of the Terrier missile into service. In October 1952, the firstTalos SAM flew and successfully destroyed a target. Deployment ofthe system, however, was slowed owing to increasingly high perfor-mance standards placed on the missile by the government. In 1959,Talos, whose first model was SAM-N–6b, entered service. Once op-erational, the missiles were mounted, like the Terrier, on twin-armedlaunchers. The Talos SAM measured 21 feet with a wingspan of 110inches and weighed 3,400 pounds. The warhead weighed 300pounds. Its jet engine produced a maximum speed of Mach 2.5 andcould propel the missile to a maximum range of about 57 miles. Inlater models the range increased and the missile was made capableof carrying a nuclear warhead of 2–5 kilotons.

As with Boston and Canberra, the modified vessels of the Cleve-land-class were reconstructed to allow for the radar systems onwhich the missles, in this case Talos SAMs, relied for guidance.These ships, however, were not considered to be very successful inlarge part due to their small size relative to the previous missile-equipped cruisers.

The last conversions were far more radical than the first two.These were the Baltimore-class Albany, Chicago, and Little Rock.Their reconstruction programs involved completely removing the su-perstructures. All guns, turrets, and loading machinery were re-moved. Indeed, only their steam turbine engines, which produced amaximum speed of 32 knots, remained unchanged. When these ves-


sels reappeared between 1962 and 1964, their appearance was com-pletely altered and represented an entirely new look for cruisers andwarships in general. The forward superstructure, composed mostlyof a light metal alloy rather than steel and armor, housed the bridgeand control systems of the missiles. It was extremely high in order toclear two missile-control radar sets also mounted forward. The pri-mary weaponry was originally composed entirely of missiles, al-though the intervention of President John F. Kennedy led to the in-clusion of two 5-inch guns for the purpose of short-range defense.Two Talos twin-armed launchers were mounted, one fore and aft,with their radar control sets. Each was provided with magazines thatcould hold a maximum of 52 missiles. These long-range weaponswere complemented by two twin-armed launchers located on eitherside of the forward superstructure that mounted the Tartar missile.

Research for the Tartar SAM began in early 1951, and although aprototype was produced in 1958, the weapon was not operationaluntil 1962 due to testing problems. Designated at first as MissileMK 15, Tartar was a short-range weapon. The missile contained a130-pound warhead, measured 15 feet, 6 inches long with awingspan 24 inches across, and weighed 1,280 pounds. Its jet en-gine was capable of a speed of Mach 1.8 and could propel the mis-sile to a maximum range of about 8.5 miles. In the Baltimore-classconversions, Tartar was designed to destroy any incoming aircraftthat penetrated the outer screen of protection afforded by the Talossystem and that closed with the task force.

Unlike the previous guided missile cruisers, the usefulness ofthese ships extended past antiaircraft defense owing to secondaryweaponry, which consisted of a new technological innovation thatwas the product of the missile age. This system was the ASROClauncher and was first deployed by the United States in 1960. It wasdesigned as an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapon. Still in usetoday by the United States Navy and several U.S. allies, it originallyfired rockets equipped with homing torpedoes from an eight-missilebox launcher that could destroy submerged targets at a range be-tween 900 and 10,000 yards. The system was later improvedthrough the introduction of a vertical launch system that increasedrange to 15,000 yards. Augmenting this innovation were torpedolaunchers that fired homing torpedoes for use against submarines.The combination of these ASW systems and those of the missilesproduced ships that were ideally suited for the missions envisionedby U.S. naval officials for warships in the postwar age. Not onlycould they defend the United States against Soviet jet planes armed

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with atomic weapons; they could also provide protection for aircraftcarriers against air attacks and submarine assaults.

The only system in these vessels that had remained unaltered wasthe steam turbine engines, but U.S. research in propulsion systemshad already produced a technological innovation that would revolu-tionize the construction of cruisers and surface warships. This wasthe introduction of nuclear-powered turbine engines in place of thosepowered by steam created by oil-fed boilers. The first use of nuclearpower occurred in the late 1940s when the United States built land-based reactors. The success of these plants spurred research anddevelopment in the United States Navy for nuclear-powered propul-sion in submarines and ships, overseen by Rear Admiral HymanRickover. In 1954, this effort led to success when the United Statessubmarine Nautilus was commissioned for service as the world’sfirst nuclear-powered vessel.

The propulsion system of this submarine and all other warshipsthat utilize nuclear power is complex. The entire plant is containedin a section of a ship known as the reactor compartment. Each nu-clear reactor plant contains more than 100 tons of lead shieldingto protect the crew from radiation. The reactor generates heatthrough the process of fission of nuclear material in water. Thisheat energy is transferred to a generator that produces steam thatis then directed to turbine engines for propulsion. Steam is alsoused to power other turbines that supply electricity for shipboardoperations.

While Nautilus was the first submarine to employ nuclear powerand the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise was still in theprocess of completion, the first surface ship that went to sea with areactor for propulsion was a cruiser. This vessel was the guided mis-sile cruiser Long Beach, completed in 1961 while Albany, Boston,and Chicago were still undergoing reconstruction. The two turbinesof the vessel were each powered by one nuclear reactor. These reac-tors were of the C1W model. The letters and numbers of the desig-nation indicated the ship type for which the reactor was designed,the version of the reactor, and the designer of the plant respectively.In the case of Long Beach the designation signified a first-genera-tion reactor designed for a cruiser by Westinghouse Electric Corpo-ration. The two reactor compartments of Long Beach were in theshape of a square; each measured 37 feet by 38 feet by 42 feet andweighed 2,250 tons. The combination of these reactor plants andthe turbine engines provided a maximum speed of 30 knots.

There were several advantages to nuclear power. Power for the


engines was available immediately upon orders being received in theengine room from the bridge. In the past, steam power had to buildup gradually for a cruiser to reach maximum speed, which tooktime. In addition, warships equipped with nuclear-powered engineswere no longer hampered by the need to steam to a port and refuel.The only limiting factor to the endurance of a nuclear-powered war-ship was the amount of supplies that could be shipped onboard. In-deed, the original nuclear cores of Long Beach’s reactors enabledthe ship to steam a distance of 167,000 miles before new nuclearfuel material was needed.4 This incredible endurance offered a po-tential strategic advantage against naval powers that operated con-ventionally powered ships, as Long Beach could remain at station in-definitely, whereas steam-powered ships had to withdraw when fuelbunkers ran low. In case of a failure of the nuclear reactors that ne-cessitated their being shut down, Long Beach also shipped diesel en-gines that could allow for propulsion, but at a lower speed.

The possibility of a nuclear failure was a constant threat. Draw-backs are many and have had far-reaching consequences that en-compass both the military and civilian sectors. Expenses to maintainthe reactors are high, but vitally necessary. A reactor failure can leadto a nuclear meltdown that would destroy the ship and poison theentire crew with deadly radiation. In such a situation, nuclear coreswould also contaminate the environment for miles around thedoomed vessel. In addition, the spent fuel cores of nuclear-poweredships such as Long Beach remain deadly for decades after removalfrom reactors. Proper storage of such material is costly and threat-ens the environment with radiation if safety measures at storage fa-cilities fail.

Even so, the reactors of Long Beach signaled an enormous leapforward in cruiser construction. The vessel’s nuclear power, how-ever, was only one aspect of its design that was in all respects a wa-tershed in the development of cruisers. The Long Beach was thefirst purpose-built missile cruiser. It measured 721 feet, 3 inches by73 feet, 4 inches and displaced 15,111 tons. The vessel was also thefirst modern cruiser that carried no armor protection of any kind, atrend that continued in cruiser construction for decades. Naval offi-cials believed that the vessel could rely completely on its antiaircraftand ASW systems to destroy enemy planes and submarines beforethey could threaten the ship. Unlike the other missile cruisers, LongBeach was designed around its weapons systems. Its superstructurewas the best example, being a large blockhouse structure seven deckshigh that housed the electronic control centers for the missiles,

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which relied partially on radar systems mounted vertically on thesides of the superstructure.

The missile systems comprised both Talos and Terrier launchers.The Talos system was mounted aft and was supplied by a magazinethat could hold a maximum of 52 missiles. Two twin-armed Terrierlaunchers were located forward. One was supplied by a magazinethat contained 40 missiles, while the other was supplied by a maga-zine that stored 80 weapons. Like Albany, Boston, and Chicago,Long Beach also mounted an ASROC launcher, for use against sub-marines, and two homing torpedo launchers. These weapons, incombination with the nuclear-powered engines, produced a vesselthat was the most technologically advanced and one of the mostpowerful warships in the world.

In the years prior to 1962, few U.S. allies constructed purpose-built cruisers that were armed with missiles. None produced war-ships equipped with nuclear-powered engines, as only the SovietUnion was pursuing a nuclear program at the time and the technol-ogy was closely guarded by both powers for the sake of national se-curity. Missile technology was also a matter of security, but theUnited States did share it with NATO allies, which led to the con-version of some World War II–era cruisers. The first of these wasthe Dutch cruiser De Zeven Provincien. This light cruiser belongedto a two-ship class. Like the U.S. conversions, the two aft turretsthat housed part of its primary armament were removed and re-placed by a Terrier missile system. Italy, despite being one of the de-feated Axis powers of World War II, became a member of NATO in1949 to face the threat of the Soviet Union in Europe and also re-ceived U.S. missile technology. As a result, the Italians recon-structed the World War II–era light cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi be-tween 1957 and 1961 to mount Terrier missile systems.

These vessels, however, represented the extent of missile cruiserconstruction outside the United States. The economic conditions ofNATO allies were still poor owing to the hardships of World War IIand prevented large-scale naval construction. This problem alsohampered research and development of missile systems, althoughsome powers, particularly Great Britain and France, experimentedwith missile technology of their own. Great Britain produced threegun-armed cruiser designs in 1960, but none reached fruition. TheBritish also envisioned a missile cruiser in the same year that wasprojected to mount the Seaslug SAM system, but it never reachedproduction. Development for the missile had begun in 1949, but itwas not ready for service until 1962. By that time, Great Britain had


abandoned plans for a cruiser to carry the Seaslug in preference formounting the SAM system in smaller destroyers. The result was thatthe Royal Navy, after being one of the greatest cruiser powers in theworld, was reduced to 33 World War II–era gun-armed cruisers. Themost modern of these were the three ships of the Tiger-class com-pleted between 1959 and 1961, but these were only slightly up-graded vessels based on the same World War II designs as the earlierships. Owing to financial restrictions, the British increasingly reliedon warships smaller than cruisers for national defense.

France was in the same position regarding cruiser constructionthat incorporated the new missile technology and construction ingeneral. Following the war, the French relied on gun-armed cruisersand destroyers for the protection of aircraft carriers, which were for-mer British and U.S. ships. Two of these cruisers were former Ital-ian vessels surrendered to the French after World War II as warreparations. The others were newly constructed vessels. These wereDe Grasse and Colbert, completed in 1956 and 1959 respectively.The De Grasse had been laid down in 1939; Colbert, although con-struction began in 1953, was a design that derived from De Grasse.Both vessels mounted primary weaponry that consisted of 16 5-inchguns in eight dual-purpose turrets for use against surface targetsand aircraft. These vessels represented the limit of French cruiserconstruction as they focused much of their resources on small es-corts for NATO forces.

The relatively small number of missile cruisers built immediatelyupon the advent of missile technology was the beginning of a world-wide trend. One of the reasons behind this course was their greatcost; even the United States, with its strong economy and giant in-dustrial base, could not build them in large quantities. The LongBeach demonstrated this problem, as it cost almost $333 million toconstruct. Increasingly, naval powers relied more on smaller surfacecombatants and submarines.5

Initially, the lack of missile cruisers was not a keenly felt defi-ciency for the United States or its NATO allies. Vessels such as LongBeach suffered from the fact that their missile systems offered nooffensive capability. They were designed as defensive systems to pro-tect aircraft carriers at sea and to guard against Soviet jets armedwith nuclear weapons. This deficiency meant that gun cruisers stillhad some worth, exhibited in the 1950–1953 Korean War. In thisfirst armed conflict of the Cold War, the old gun-armed cruisers ofthe NATO powers provided valuable shore bombardment supportfor Western forces.

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The continued justification for gun cruisers, however, wasnegated by further technological innovation in the Soviet Union be-tween 1962 and 1969 that challenged the U.S. lead in guided mis-sile cruiser design. Following World War II, Stalin had concentratedon constructing a navy that could defend the coasts of the SovietUnion and a few large vessels that could project power further over-seas. These larger vessels were armed solely with guns. UponStalin’s death in 1953, successor Nikita Khrushchev shifted the pri-orities of the Soviet surface navy toward the incorporation of mis-siles. He recognized that the advent of the missile cruiser would ul-timately lead to the gun cruiser’s obsolescence. Indeed, he believedthat the sole priority of the Soviet Union should be the productionof nuclear missile technology. A reflection of Khrushchev’s beliefswas the decision to end construction of the Stalingrad-class battlecruisers. He also characterized the units of the Sverdlov-class, al-though production continued, as “floating coffins.” New cruiser de-signs were subsequently drawn up under the direction of SergeiGorshkov, commander in chief of the navy since 1956, and relied onthe Soviet missile program for their armament.

The Soviet program, like that of the United States, had begun inearnest in the months following the end of World War II with theacquisition of German rocket technology. Soviet experiments withGerman equipment eventually produced missiles in the mid–1950sthat alarmed Western powers; increasingly the Soviet Navy posed agreater strategic threat through missile deployment. In September1955, the Soviet Union became the first nation to fire a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a weapon that could carry a nu-clear warhead and deliver it to a target hundreds of miles away. TheSoviets also produced the first conventionally powered ballistic mis-sile submarine in 1958. At the same time, the Soviets were in theprocess of developing missile systems for surface ships. In the late1950s, the Sverdlov-class cruiser Dzerzhinski was refitted to test thefirst-generation Soviet SAM batteries.

Experiments were also under way for the world’s first surface-to-surface missile (SSM) for use against other vessels. This latter typewas the result of the need for an offensive capability against NATOaircraft carriers owing to the fact that the Soviet Union had no sea-based airpower. Soviet officials viewed Western aircraft carriers as athreat to the Soviet Union itself, as they could launch aircraft armedwith nuclear weapons against Soviet military sites and cities. An-other Sverdlov-class cruiser, Admiral Nakhimov, was refitted to testthe first of the SSM systems, SS-N–1, in the late 1950s.


Although this missile was not successful, the third version, theSS-N–3, known as the Shaddock to the Western powers, producedgood results and was ready for service by 1962. This missile, thecruiser version being designated SS-N–3B, was housed in a boxlauncher. The weapon itself measured 33 feet and contained eitherconventional or nuclear explosive material, a guidance system thattransmitted a radar signature back to the control station locatedfrom its firing position for target data, and fuel. Its engines pro-duced a maximum speed of Mach 1.4 and its maximum range was279 miles. Subsequent versions increased the range of the weapon.

The development of the SS-N–3B led to the world’s first cruisersdesigned with offensive missile batteries as their primary armament.These were the four ships of the Kynda-class. Completed between1962 and 1965, their hulls measured 464 feet, 9 inches by 51 feet,10 inches, displaced 4,400 tons, and were powered by steam tur-bines that produced a maximum speed of 34 knots. Armament con-sisted of two SS-N–3B missile launchers that each held four mis-siles. These box structures were separated into compartments forindividual missiles and were mounted on swivel stalks to train theweapons in the direction necessary for firing. One launcher was po-sitioned forward while the other was in the rear. They also mountedan SA-N–1 antiaircraft missile launcher, the product of research inSAM technology. Augmenting this weapons array was an ASWrocket launcher. Known as RBU–6000, it was similar to the U.S.ASROC system and introduced between 1960 and 1961. Thisweapon, still in use in the Russian Navy, contains 12 rockets thatcan be fired to a maximum range of almost 5,500 yards. Finally,these vessels mounted four small guns for use at close range.

Despite the inclusion of ASW weapons, the vessels of the Kynda-class were designed primarily for offensive operations against West-ern warships, particularly aircraft carriers. The four ships of theKresta I-class, completed between 1967 and 1968, were built prima-rily as antiaircraft and ASW cruisers. These ships measured 508feet, 6 inches by 55 feet, 9 inches, displaced 6,000 tons, and werepowered by steam turbines that produced a maximum speed of 34knots. Their missile battery included two SS-N–3B SSM batteries,one each located fore and aft, but the launcher boxes held only twoweapons each compared to the four each of the Kynda-class launch-ers. The primary armament comprised two SA-N–1 SAM launcherswhose magazines held a total of 44 missiles, two RBU–6000 ASWlaunchers, two more ASW launchers that were a variant of theRBU–6000 type, and two torpedo tubes that fired homing torpe-

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does. These vessels also shipped one helicopter in a hanger locatedin the aft portion of the ship, which was the first time that such anarrangement was employed aboard a warship. This helicopter wasused to search for enemy submarines through the use of sonar.

In truth, the Kynda- and Kresta I-classes were not successful de-signs. Both had limited offensive value against warships because theSS-N–3B launcher did not incorporate a reloading system. Indeed,this continued to be a problem in most Soviet cruisers. The Kresta I-class vessels shipped no reloads at all. In the Kynda-class, the fewmissiles that were stored outside the launcher itself were housed inthe superstructure on the main deck. The spaces allotted for thispurpose could contain a total of only eight missiles. Added to thisdeficiency was the fact that manual labor, rather than loading ma-chinery, was used to remove missiles from storage and place them inlaunchers. Not only was this process time-consuming; it was ex-tremely difficult to perform in even moderately rough seas due topitching and rolling. As the warships of the Soviet Navy operatedpartly in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, rough conditions were therule rather than the exception. In addition to this limited offensivecapability, the Kynda-class vessels shipped poor sonar and radar sys-tems that hampered the use of antiaircraft and ASW systems. Nev-ertheless, Western naval officials viewed these ships with great con-cern. Not only did U.S. missile cruisers possess no offensive missilecapability to combat the Soviet cruisers; the advent of Soviet missiletechnology also created a blue-water navy that could shoot downWestern aircraft.

The alarm was heightened by the fact that the Soviet Union con-tinued experimentation in cruiser design that produced two addi-tional vessels. These were the Moskva-class helicopter cruisers.Completed in 1967 and 1968, these ships were envisioned for anti-aircraft or for ASW. Their hulls measured 620 feet, 1 inch by 85feet, 4 inches and displaced 14,400 tons. Steam turbines produceda maximum speed of 30 knots. Their design was novel, a hybrid air-craft carrier–cruiser design. A flight deck spanned the entire rearhalf of the hulls. Two elevators transported helicopters from thehanger deck below, which held a maximum of 14 helicopters. Usingsonar these could be used to detect enemy submarines to coordinatean attack mounted by the array of ASW systems aboard the ships.This armament, housed entirely in the forward section, consisted ofthree rocket launchers and two torpedo tubes that launched homingtorpedoes. The helicopters themselves could also attack submarinesthrough the use of homing torpedoes mounted to their undersides.


In addition to this role, Moskva-class vessels also mounted twoSAN–3 antiaircraft systems, again in the forward section, with mag-azines that held a total of 44 missiles.

Western cruiser construction between 1962 and 1969 was slightand continued to primarily follow the doctrine of protecting aircraftcarriers against attack and guarding against Soviet jets armed withnuclear weapons. The chief naval power of the NATO alliance, theUnited States, shifted to the production of smaller surface warshipsbecause of the tremendous cost of missile cruisers. There were,however, notable exceptions. Chief among these was Italian cruiserconstruction. In an effort to produce vessels that could accomplishthe largest number of roles possible, and thus save money in navalconstruction by producing fewer ships, the Italians built the twovessels of the Andrea Doria-class.

These ships, completed in 1964, were helicopter cruisers thatpredated the Soviet Moskva-class, thus making them the first in theworld. The hull of Andrea Doria measured 489 feet, 9 inches by 56feet, 5 inches, displaced 5,000 tons, and mounted steam turbinesthat produced a maximum speed of 30 knots. Italy was a member ofNATO and an ally of the United States; thus the primary armamentconsisted of one twin-armed Terrier SAM battery and its fire-controland radar equipment, located in the bow. Complementing this sys-tem were eight 3-inch guns in single mounts arrayed around the su-perstructure to provide for short-range antiaircraft defense. This ad-dition became a common practice in all modern Italian warships.The Andrea Doria’s weaponry also allowed deployment as an ASWship. This ability was afforded by six torpedo tubes that fired homingtorpedoes, as well as four helicopters operated from the aft section,where a flight deck that measured almost 100 feet was serviced by ahanger contained in the rear portion of the superstructure. Thesehelicopters were equipped with sonar and torpedoes for the detec-tion and destruction of enemy submarines. Although hanger spaceproved cramped and was not considered a success, the Italians, as intheir cruiser designs of the past, had created an innovative vessel.

Five years later, another helicopter cruiser, Vittorio Veneto, wascompleted. Its armament was basically the same as the precedingvessels, although by this time the Terrier system had been upgradedto fire both SAMs and ASROC weapons. The chief difference wasthe size of the hull, which measured 589 feet, 3 inches by 63 feet, 7inches and displaced 7,500 tons. This increase was the result of anattempt to remedy the cramped hanger that plagued the Andrea Do-ria-class. The flight deck was consequently enlarged to a length of

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131 feet, 3 inches while the hull accommodated a hanger deck un-derneath it. Serviced by a single elevator, this hanger could holdnine ASW helicopters. This design alteration was considered a suc-cess on the surface, but all three of Italy’s helicopter cruisers werehampered by narrow hulls, which allowed the ships to roll and thusdisrupt helicopter operations on the flight deck. The installment ofstabilization devices to prevent this proved moderately successful.

France also constructed a cruiser in this age, although unlike theItalians its vessel was not designed as a warship whose primary ar-mament was missiles. Unlike other members of the NATO alliance,the French had not relied on U.S. missile technology to outfit theirvessels. The ships and weapons of the French Navy have tradition-ally been of domestic design, but another factor that influenced thisstate of affairs was the increasingly strained relations betweenFrance and the United States. In 1958, General Charles De Gaullebecame the leader of France and criticized the command structureof the NATO alliance. In his view, France deserved greater influencein the alliance. By 1966, U.S. intransigence over French demandshad led to a worsening of relations that resulted in France leavingthe military portion of the NATO alliance while remaining a nomi-nal member of the organization.

The French began experimenting with missile technology in themid–1950s and succeeded in producing both submarine-launchedmissiles and surface missiles by the time of the diplomatic split, butthe development of these missiles was in its infancy when Francebegan construction of Jeanne d’Arc, a helicopter cruiser, in 1960.Completed in 1964, a few months after the first of the Italian An-drea Doria-class, its large hull measured 597 feet by 73 feet and dis-placed 10,000 tons. The vessel was built for antiaircraft duties,ASW, and as a command ship and troop transport for amphibiousinvasions. Its shipborne armament consisted of only four 3.9-inchguns in single mounts. Two were located on either side of the shipforward of the superstructure, while the other two were mounted inthe extreme end of the stern. The design did allow for the installa-tion of the French Masurca SAM, the equivalent of the U.S. Ter-rier, but this weapon was not ready for service and was never fitted.Instead, Jeanne d’Arc’s principle weaponry was its air complementof eight ASW helicopters, which operated on a massive, 203-footflight deck in the rear. The hanger deck was located below andcould store aircraft or transport up to 700 men. As with the Italianhelicopter cruisers, the French had moved with Jeanne d’Arc towardcruisers capable of performing past roles as well as new ones in an


age of high costs for warship construction. The French economy,like that of the other European members of NATO, made this patha necessity.

The last of the NATO powers that augmented the cruiser forcesof the world between 1962 and 1969 was Great Britain, although itsprogram rested on the conversion of old cruisers for the sake ofeconomy. Unlike France, the British benefited from U.S. nuclearand missile technology that aided in the creation of their first SAMsystem. Known as Seaslug, development of this missile began in1949, but it did not enter service until 1962. Even so, the Britishchose not to equip its newest cruisers of the Tiger-class with the de-vice. Instead, the British refitted two of these ships as helicoptercruisers. The first conversion was completed between 1965 and1969; the aft 6-inch turret and superstructure were replaced by alarge, boxy hangar and small flight deck that could operate fourASW helicopters.

Both the missile cruisers and the conventional cruisers of thepost–World War II era were used extensively between 1962 and1969 in operations that stemmed from the Cold War. Chief amongthese was the use of Western cruisers in the 1964–1975 VietnamWar. United States guided missile cruisers were used in their de-signed role of antiaircraft defense. In 1968, Long Beach became thefirst warship to successfully employ SAMs in combat when it shotdown two enemy jet fighters. This success was only the first of sev-eral that proved the effectiveness of the new weapons system. Overthe course of the conflict, Chicago was responsible for the destruc-tion of 21 enemy jets.6 The Vietnam War also showcased the contin-ued need for an offensive capability for cruisers, decidedly lacking inthe new Western missile systems. The remaining guns of the con-verted U.S. missile cruisers and numerous aging World War II–eragun cruisers of several countries were used for shore bombardmentof communist installations deep within Vietnam. The glaring defi-ciency in offensive capability for U.S. missile cruisers was clearthrough the experience of Vietnam. This problem became more evi-dent with a demonstration of the Soviet Union’s antiship missiles. In1967, Egyptian land-based forces, armed with the Soviet SS-N–2missile, became the first to successfully use an SSM in combatwhen they sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat. In addition to thesewartime duties, cruisers also served the important function duringthe Cold War of projecting power around the world. Associated withthis role was the use of cruisers for diplomatic affairs. An exampleoccurred in the mid-1960s when the French cruiser Jeanne d’Arc

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transported President Charles De Gaulle to the West Indies. De-spite fewer numbers in relation to smaller warships, cruisers contin-ued to function as an integral part of navies in war and peace.

The continued increase in the production of smaller warshipsover cruisers, however, continued to affect the world’s cruiser force.By 1969, it had become evident to officials in most major maritimepowers that the smaller missile systems could be carried on smallerships known as destroyers and frigates. Even the smallest of thesewarships could mount short-range systems such as the Tartar SAM.The United States had shifted construction to these vessels overcruisers for the sake of economy, but this affected only new con-struction. In the 1970s, the converted cruisers Boston, Albany, andCanberra as well as the rebuilt chips of the Cleveland-class were de-commissioned as a further step toward smaller ships that weredeemed as effective as cruisers. In 1975, as a measure to offset thereduction of cruisers, the United States chose to redesignate thefrigates of the fleet as cruisers. This decision changed the designa-tion of 20 frigates that comprised four classes.

This move also affected the status of frigates that were still underconstruction, as they were also redesignated as cruisers. These shipssignaled a new drive for U.S. cruiser construction in the 1970s thatcentered on nuclear-powered vessels. Two months after the comple-tion of Long Beach in 1961, the United States completed the world’sfirst nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. This ship, the Enterprise, re-flected the continued emphasis on a navy based on carrier-borneaircraft. The need for more nuclear-powered surface warships toprovide antiaircraft and ASW defense was clear, as only two of thefrigates, now known as cruisers, possessed this propulsion system.In order to take full advantage of the high endurance offered by thenuclear Enterprise, the United States embarked on the constructionof new frigates with the same capability. The first of these was thetwo-ship California-class.

Completed in 1974 and 1975 and redesignated as cruisers, theirhulls measured 596 feet by 61 feet and displaced 10,150 tons.Their turbine engines were powered by two nuclear reactors of theD2G type, which were originally designed for destroyers and man-ufactured by the General Electric Corporation. Each reactor com-partment was cylindrical, measured 37 feet high and 31 feet wide,and weighed 1,400 tons. The top speed produced by this propul-sion system was 30 knots. These ships represented a step forwardin missile technology. In place of the older SAM batteries, thesevessels mounted two twin-armed Standard SAM launchers with


magazines that could each hold 40 missiles. One each was locatedfore and aft.

The Standard missile represented a great improvement over thoseof the “3Ts” and is still in use in the United States Navy. Researchand development for this weapon began in 1963 with the object ofreplacing Terrier and Tartar. First entering service in 1967 and des-ignated RIM–66, this missile measures 15 feet, 6 inches, weighs1,370 pounds, and possesses a maximum range of 104 miles thanksto its jet engine that can produce a Mach 3.5 velocity. The guidancesystem is greatly enhanced and allows for better accuracy throughfaster course corrections in flight. As a result, it can be used againstaircraft and helicopters and for defense versus cruise missiles. Thislatter capability was important at the time given the inability of the“3T” missile systems to effectively combat Soviet antiship missiles.Finally, the Standard missile can also be used against surface tar-gets, which represented the first move toward addressing thepaucity of offensive power against enemy vessels that plagued thefirst U.S. missile cruisers.

In addition to this system and its enhanced fire control and radararray, the California-class also shipped an ASROC launcher and fourMark 32 torpedo launchers for ASW along with sonar. These vesselswere also armed with two 5-inch guns in single mounts for the pur-pose of close-range defense. Unlike guns of the past, these were fullyautomated, computer-controlled weapons. Each gun possessed amagazine that held 475–500 rounds and could fire 16–20 per minuteto a maximum range of almost 15 miles. This gun remains in use inthe United States Navy. Four similar frigates of the Virginia-class werecompleted between 1976 and 1980, redesignated as cruisers at thesame time as the California-class. The hull of Virginia measured 585feet by 63 feet and displaced 11,000 tons. Its propulsion system andarmament were identical to the previous vessels. The chief differencewas the absence of an ASROC launcher in favor of a Standard missilesystem that could fire SAMs and ASROC missiles.

The remainder of cruiser construction in the 1970s was a contin-uation of the Soviet Union’s program. Being the Cold War opponentof the United States, the Soviets continued to construct cruisersthat could function as antiaircraft, ASW, and as surface combatantsto destroy NATO aircraft carriers. Between 1970 and 1978, 10Kresta II-class cruisers, essentially a variant of the preceding classthat emphasized ASW, were completed. Another seven vessels of theKara-class were completed between 1973 and 1980, also designedprimarily for ASW. The Kara measured 570 feet by 60 feet, displaced

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8,200 tons, and could achieve a maximum speed of 34 knots throughthe use of its gasoline-fueled turbine engines. The Kara and the otherships of the class were the first cruisers in the world to use this typeof propulsion. The need for boilers to produce steam is obviated, asengines consume gasoline that was fed directly into the engine. Inaddition to this propulsion, radar, sonar, and missile systems weremuch improved. The Kresta II- and Kara-classes owed their existenceto the extreme threat that the Soviets attached to Western ballisticmissile submarines, which could launch nuclear weapons into theheartland of the Soviet Union.

In addition to these vessels, the Soviets constructed another classof cruiser that represented the Soviet Union’s first true step towarda sea-based air force. These were the Kiev-class cruisers, the firsttwo units being completed in 1975 and 1979. Their large hullsmeasured 902 feet by 108 feet, displaced 36,000 tons, and werepowered by steam turbines that produced a maximum speed of 32knots. In addition to missile batteries, these vessels were equippedwith a flight deck that spanned about two-thirds the length of thehull. Below that was a hangar that could accommodate 31 vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft.

Cruiser development was also present in NATO nations otherthan the United States in a drive to counter the threat posed by theSoviets to national security, but these nations relied on upgradingexisting vessels with the newest weaponry and sensors. The programof France, being a nominal member of NATO despite withdrawingin 1966 from the military portion of the alliance, was certainly themost significant, as they introduced the first successful purpose-built antiship missile designed outside the Soviet Union. Thisweapon, Exocet, was introduced in 1968 and has proven so effectivethat it is still in use in more than 20 countries. Stored in a boxlauncher, it is guided when first fired by onboard radar systems, butas it nears the target vessel it switches to internal radar control. Thisguidance system controls the missile in a descent to an altitude of10–12 feet above the water to hamper detection by enemy radar de-vices and to make it more difficult to shoot down. It can travel justbelow the speed of sound and delivers a 160-kilogram warhead. Themissile is designed to penetrate the hull of an enemy warship beforeexploding in order to cause the maximum amount of damage. Exo-cet was installed on the cruiser Colbert between 1970 and 1972;Jeanne d’Arc acquired the system in 1974. In addition, Colbert alsoreceived the Masurca SAM system that had been in development.

The Italians also upgraded their vessels, although their program


benefited from U.S. technology when the Standard SAM systemwas installed on the two ships of the Andrea Doria-class.

The one exception to this trend of upgrades was Great Britain. Al-though the British had designed several types of missiles, they weremounted on smaller warships. These vessels obviated the need forthe Tiger-class cruisers. Two were decommissioned in 1975 and1979, while the other went to the scrap yard in 1981. The removalof these cruisers from service marked a watershed in the history ofthe Royal Navy. With the end of the Tiger-class, Great Britainceased to be a cruiser power.

The end of Great Britain’s cruisers, however, did not signal aworldwide trend in cruiser production. During the 1980s, theUnited States and the Soviet Union continued production and ulti-mately produced some of the most powerful surface warships thathave ever put to sea. In the United States, the penultimate cruiserresulted from a 1973 plan for a vessel known as a strike cruiser.American naval officials envisioned a nuclear-powered vessel thatshipped the latest targeting systems, defensive missiles, antishipmissiles, and cruise missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads aswell as conventional explosives. The latter two systems were deemedimportant. An antiship capability was believed to be necessary giventhat the Standard missile, although it could be fired at a surface tar-get, was too small to cause significant damage to a surface warship,and cruise missiles were needed to offset those of the Soviets. Thecost of such a ship, however, was deemed too high by Congress, andthe plan was consequently cancelled.

Even so, the idea of a vessel equipped with the newest missilecontrol system did not die with the abandoned strike cruiser. TheAEGIS Combat System was designed to not only control and coordi-nate the defense of a ship command the defense of entire task forcesthrough the use of complex computers. First tested in 1973, AEGISrelies on a powerful radar, AN/SPY–1, that can simultaneously con-duct searches and track more than 100 targets. This data is fed tothe command center of a ship (CIC), where a computer evaluateswhich targets pose the greatest threat to the ship or task force anduses the vessel’s weapons accordingly to address the situation.

In order to make the best use of such a system, U.S. naval offi-cials believed that a hull the size of a cruiser’s was necessary. The re-sult was the completion of the 27 ships of the Ticonderoga-class be-tween 1983 and 1994. The Ticonderoga cruisers measure 563 feetby 55 feet and displace 9,600 tons when fully loaded. In order tosave money, these vessels are fitted with gas turbine engines that

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provide a maximum speed of 30 knots. The key feature is the AEGISsystem, housed in the superstructure. Radar panels are mounted onthe sides of the superstructure and provide a 360-degree arc of cov-erage; sonar systems provide underwater coverage. The data fromthese sensors are fed into the command center, which houses mas-sive computer screens on the walls that reveal images of the spacesurrounding the ship and all ships, submarines, and aircraft withinit. This system is directly linked to the weapons of the vessel. Thefirst five ships are equipped with a primary armament of two twin-armed launchers, one each being located fore and aft. Both possessmagazines that hold 88 missiles of varying types. Normally eachmagazine stores 68 Standard SAMs and 20 ASROC missiles. Inships constructed after the first five, the twin-armed missile launch-ers have been replaced by a vertical launch system (VLS) located inthe forward section. This system is comprised of 144 canisters builtinto the hull.

Besides being able to launch SAMs and ASROC missiles, theTiconderoga-class is also equipped with cruise missiles capable ofbeing fired at naval and land targets. This addition greatly enhancesthe offensive capability of U.S. cruisers through the deployment ofSSM systems that are far better than the limited surface ability af-forded by the Standard system, originally intended as a surface-to-airdefense. The smaller of these two weapons is the Harpoon missile.

The naval version of this missile was first deployed in the early1980s and resembles the French Exocet antiship missile. It is still aprimary weapon of the United States Navy and was first deployed onthe Virginia-class cruisers when they were retrofitted. A Harpoonweighs 1,385 pounds and is 15 feet long. It carries a 488-poundwarhead at a speed approaching Mach 1 and has a maximum rangeof almost 70 miles. Like Exocet, its guidance system allows it tohome in on a target while skimming the ocean surface before strik-ing the hull of an enemy vessel and exploding within. In the first fiveTiconderoga-class cruisers, these missiles are mounted in boxlaunchers that each contain four missiles. In later vessels, the Har-poon is shipped in the vertical launch system (VLS).

A larger and more powerful weapon, the Tomahawk cruise missilewas deployed in 1986 and is among the most powerful offensivemissiles in the arsenal of the United States Navy. This weaponweighs 2,900 pounds, but can weigh 3,500 pounds if it is equippedwith a booster rocket for greater distance. It measures 18 feet, 3inches, but length increases to 20 feet, 6 inches when the booster isincluded. The Tomahawk can carry a 1,000-pound conventional


warhead or a nuclear payload out to 1,000 miles. The guidance sys-tem is extremely complex and allows for control that is largely inde-pendent of the ship that fires it. This guidance includes a targetingcomputer equipped with the Terrain Contour Mapping System(TERCOM). This system uses the missile’s radar to examine the to-pography ahead of it in order to match it to a three-dimensional mapstored in the missile’s computer memory. The computer can correctthe course of the weapon based on variations between the two maps.The Tomahawk is also equipped with Global Positioning System(GPS), which improves the reliability of the targeting data. Toma-hawks also use Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC)during the final stages of flight. As the missile nears its target, DS-MAC uses a camera to take a picture of the target, which the com-puter verifies. This equipment provides for great accuracy. The mis-sile is extremely difficult to detect as it flies at a low altitude.

The Ticonderoga-class cruisers ship others weapons that augmentmissile capacity. Other than ASROC missiles, these ships carry twotorpedo launchers that fire homing torpedoes, as well as two heli-copters for use against submarines and surface vessels. They alsocarry two 5-inch fully automated guns in single mounts. One each islocated in the forward and rear section of the ship. Finally, thesevessels carry two Vulcan Phalanx Cannons for short-range defense.This technological innovation was ready for service in 1977 and isstill in use in the United States Navy. This weapon is a 20mmGatling gun that is fed by a magazine that holds 1,000 rounds. Itwas designed as a last measure of defense to destroy incoming mis-siles at close range, but it can also be used against aircraft. The guncan fire 100 rounds per second. It’s computer-controlled trackingsystem is built into the gun mount and can direct effective fire to arange of 500 to 1,500 yards.

The Vulcan Phalanx is viewed as a successful defense weapon,but the defensive measures on board the Ticonderoga-class vesselsextend past the weapons systems to the inclusion of armor. This fea-ture had been discarded in U.S. cruisers since the construction ofLong Beach, but advances in technology have allowed its return asthe lightweight, extremely strong material known as Kevlar. Al-though this armor, mounted primarily on the sides of the hull, can-not completely negate the destructive effects of larger missiles, itcan localize the effects of a blast and thus decrease the damagecaused by a hit.

These cruisers, in light of the computer systems, weapons, and ar-mor, are certainly among the most powerful warships ever built.

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They are challenged, however, by Soviet cruisers, which remain thelargest produced since the end of World War II. In 1980, the SovietUnion completed construction of the first of four Kirov-class cruis-ers. Two more were completed by 1988; the fourth unit was notcommissioned until 1998 due to a lack of funds for construction.Due in part to its size, Kirov is designated by some as a battle cruiser.

The hull measures 826 feet, 9 inches by 93 feet, 6 inches, dis-places 25,860 tons when fully loaded, and is protected by an undis-closed type of armor. The ship relies on propulsion from nuclear-powered turbines that produce a maximum speed of 31 knots, whichmakes it the first Soviet nuclear-powered surface combatant. It isalso sometimes defined as a battle cruiser because of its large arrayof weapons, as the Soviets desired a ship that would fulfill antiair-craft, ASW, and antiship duties. The majority of the missile systemsare located in the forward section. Unlike the other cruisers of theSoviet era, some of these systems are equipped with reloading ma-chinery. The Kirov mounts 12 SA-N–6 SAMs in a vertical launcherwithin the bow that can be reloaded by a magazine that contains 96missiles. These can be fired at aircraft or missiles. It also carries onetwin-tubed SS-N–14 ASW system with between 14 and 16 reloads.The bow section also contains a vertical launcher that holds 20 SS-N–19 SSM weapons, a descendent of the SS-N–3. Like its prede-cessors, the SS-N–19 can carry a conventional or nuclear warhead.Complementing these various missiles are two RBU–6000 ASWrocket launchers, 10 torpedo tubes for use against submarines andsurface vessels, and one helicopter. The ship also carries two fullyautomated guns, 3.9-inch guns in the case of Kirov; the other ves-sels mount 5.1-inch guns. Finally, Kirov ships eight 30mm Gatlingguns that resemble the Vulcan Phalanx for close defense againstmissiles and aircraft.

The Soviet program also produced three more cruiser classes dur-ing the 1980s and early 1990s, the first being the 20-ship Sovre-menny-class designed for antiship warfare. They were followed bythe 13-vessel Udaloy-class, which mounts weapons arrays for useagainst submarines. The final group of vessels that were completedbetween 1983 and 1989 are the two Slava-class cruisers. These ves-sels are a smaller, cheaper version of the Kirov class and are de-signed primarily as surface strike ships. All are conventionally pow-ered. Together with the Kirov-class and two more units of theKiev-class that were completed between 1981 and 1983, they arethe final units produced by the Soviet Union before the collapse ofthe communist regime.


These cruisers and those built by NATO members reveal the ex-tent to which the cruiser has evolved as a modern weapons system.In place of a relatively small but important set of roles that existedsince the Age of Fighting Sail and became attached to the first cruis-ers of the nineteenth century, the newest ships are called upon tocover a myriad of tasks. This change was made possible by techno-logical innovation that allowed for progressively more powerful andadvanced weapons and sensory systems. In the later years of theCold War, the roles of cruisers still included commerce protectionand possibly reconnaissance through the use of radar and sonar, butthe chief duties were antiaircraft and ASW defense. Both of theseroles were important for task forces; the latter specifically was alsovital due to the need in the nuclear age to protect against the launchof nuclear weapons by submarines. Surface warfare, in the case ofcruisers that were armed offensively, also remained a key role. All ofthese roles remain important to the present day.

Despite large offensive and defensive capabilities, the Soviet andNATO missile cruisers built in the 1970s and 1980s were not testedin combat because the Cold War never produced a hot war betweenthe superpowers and their allies. The extent of contact consistedprimarily of projecting power in fleet exercises, where one super-power would closely monitor the activities of the other at sea. In-deed, no naval wars were fought at all in this period, with the no-table exception of the 1982 Falklands War. It resulted from aninvasion by Argentina of the British possession of the Falkland Is-lands in the South Atlantic.

Argentina’s government maintained that a long-standing claim onthe islands was valid and sought to expel the British. In truth, thewar was a bid by the Argentine government, a military junta, to stayin power by playing to nationalism in an atmosphere of massive pop-ular unrest caused primarily by the junta’s cruelty to its people. Thiswar was the first wide-scale engagement that employed the newestmissile technology, but cruisers were largely not a factor. By thistime, the last of the British cruisers had been retired from service infavor of smaller surface warships, although the Argentine Navy pos-sessed a World War II–era U.S.-built cruiser that had been sold assurplus after the war. This vessel, General Belgrano, was the formerBrooklyn-class light cruiser Phoenix and had been little altered sincebeing sold. The warship still retained its full gun armament. Theonly upgrades consisted of a new radar set and two SAM launchers.This cruiser never had the opportunity to engage in the conflict. On2 May 1982, General Belgrano was surprised by the British attack

CRUISERS, 1939–2004 159

submarine Conqueror and sunk by two torpedoes with the loss of321 of its complement of 1,201 officers and crew.

This engagement, however, was the one exception to the rule thatthe age of the 1970s and 1980s was devoid of instances where cruis-ers served in battle. Nevertheless, cruisers did serve important du-ties. One of these was deterrence through the old role of commerceprotection during the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War. The majority ofthis war consisted of a stalemate and spread to the Persian Gulf.Iraqi forces targeted oil tankers departing from Iranian ports, whileIranian forces attacked tankers departing from the depots of Iraq’sArab allies.

These actions posed a threat to the world economy through theinterruption of oil exports. Numerous countries, including theUnited States, consequently became indirectly involved. In 1984,the United States deployed some naval forces that included Ticon-deroga to the Persian Gulf in order to guard tankers from missileslaunched by either combatant. Its AEGIS system allowed the ship’screw to monitor all threats in the area to tankers. By 1987, this U.S.presence was augmented as other nations deployed naval forces tothe region. Not only did U.S. cruisers provide information on possi-ble threats; they also collected valuable intelligence on the militarymovements of both belligerents. This intelligence role surfacedagain in 1986 when U.S. cruisers helped coordinate air attacksagainst Libya.

Both of these duties involved a measure of danger that has alwaysbeen present when warships engage in a military operation. Beyondthe danger to the ship, these operations could sometimes have polit-ical ramifications. The best example is the case of the Ticonderoga-class cruiser Vincennes. On 3 July 1988, while patrolling the PersianGulf during the Iran-Iraq War, the AEGIS system of this ship mis-takenly identified an Iranian passenger jet as an enemy aircraft. Thesystem, under the direction of the crew, destroyed the jet and pre-cipitated an international incident.

The disastrous mistake aboard Vincennes is a prime example ofthe fact that, despite the increasingly sophisticated equipment ofwarships, the role of humans has not diminished. Most aspects oflife aboard cruisers have changed since the dawn of the missile age.These alterations continue to define present-day life aboard cruis-ers. Education for officers and regulars has become much morecomplex as a result of computers, missile systems, and nuclearpower. Officers continue to receive education in naval schools,where many graduate with specialty degrees in shipboard systems.


These include the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis,Maryland, and the Admiral Nakhimov Naval Preparatory School inRussia. Regulars receive more general educations on land andthrough experience at sea. Sailors are recruited as volunteers in thecase of Western nations; even after the fall of communism, the Rus-sian Navy continues the practice of using conscripts in addition tovolunteers.

In some cases, the need for efficiency has led to the abolishmentof time-honored traditions that existed since the Age of FightingSail. One of these is the use of alcohol aboard cruisers and otherwarships. In 1970, the Royal Navy dispensed with the practice ofproviding rum rations to sailors. The Soviet Navy also abolished al-cohol aboard ship, but with less success. Oftentimes, Soviet sailorsprocured alcohol on the black market or distilled it from industrialalcohol used to clean machinery aboard ships. This resulted fromgenerally poor conditions aboard Soviet, and later Russian, shipsthat led the crews to seek comfort through alcohol.

The greater need for well-educated and effective crews has alsoled to a drive in many navies to provide not only for officers and rat-ings, but for their families in order to attract people to service at sea.The Royal Navy has instituted programs, in keeping with the Britishwelfare state, whereby financial allowances are given to assist sailorsin the purchase of housing for families. The British also providemoney for the children of sailors to attend boarding schools. TheUnited States has also followed this course in an effort to attractpeople to naval service. In 1981, the pay of U.S. sailors was in-creased to a level that closely mirrored pay in the civilian sector inorder to allow families to better provide for themselves.

Another change in the life of sailors is seen in the living condi-tions aboard ship. The crew compartments are generally more spa-cious, and bunks have replaced the hammocks of the past that hadbeen shipped in the cruisers of most navies since the Age of Sail.Vessels now contain all the basic amenities in addition to extracur-ricular equipment that includes e-mail access, satellite TV, and gym-nasiums. Food has also improved markedly in many navies. Takentogether, life aboard many of the world’s cruisers, particularly thoseof the United States, is now a much better experience.

Living conditions have been affected, at least in Western navies,by the integration of men and women aboard ship. Although womenserved in Western navies during World War II, their participationwas land-based and noncombat. This situation changed with the in-clusion of women in crews. An example is the United States Navy.

CRUISERS, 1939–2004 161

In 1976, the petitioning of women’s advocacy groups and politicalrepresentatives led to the acceptance of women in the United StatesNaval Academy in an effort to make military service open to all. By1999, women comprised 13 percent of the United States Navy. Of117 combatant ships in service, 57 had integrated crews by thisyear.7

Despite changes, some conditions aboard cruisers remain thesame and probably will never be altered. Life aboard cruisers still in-cludes rigid discipline, constant drilling and training, and periods ofpersonal hardship produced by extended deployments when officersand sailors are separated from their families. These aspects have al-ways been present and define life at sea. They are the price paid tofulfill the strategic requirements that are charged to the world’s war-ships by all maritime powers.

Men and women who operate cruisers do so in an environmentwhere the future of their ships is questionable. The collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War have led to amassive reduction of the world’s cruiser force. Due to financial con-straints that were a contributing factor to the fall of the Soviet sys-tem, Russia has been forced to scrap, decommission, or sell severalof its cruisers. In 1990, three of the Kiev-class cruisers and both ofthe Moskva-class ships were retired from service and sold for scrap.The fate of the additional unit of the Kiev-class, Minsk, is perhapsone of the most unusual in the history of cruisers. Minsk was sold toprivate interests in China in the early 1990s, purportedly for conver-sion into a casino and entertainment complex. Two ships of theKirov-class remain operational; the other two have been placed inreserve. One of these latter vessels, Kirov (now renamed AdmiralUshakov), suffered the nightmare of all crews that serve on nuclear-powered vessels. In 1990, this vessel had a nuclear accident andsubsequently entered a shipyard in 1999 for repairs, but a lack offunds probably will lead to its being scrapped. The other reserve unithas been inoperable since the early 1990s in lieu of needed repairs.Like its sister ship, this vessel will also probably be discarded fromlack of funds to make repairs. The situation is so poor that the Rus-sian Navy is reportedly asking for donations to fund the repair proj-ect. Both units of the Slava-class are still in service. The Sovre-menny-class has been reduced to nine ships. Four of the other unitshave been scrapped, while two others are derelict vessels awaitingdisposal. An additional unit of the class has been hulked as a storageship; another two have been sold to China. Two units were alsoplaced in reserve, but the low budget of the Russian Navy has led to


their deterioration at anchor. One sank while in reserve, and theother is entirely unserviceable. Of the 13 Udaloy-class ships, sevenremain in service. Three were sold for scrap in the mid-1990s; an-other suffered a fire in 1991 and 1995 and is now a derelict. An ad-ditional unit has been in overhaul since 1990 and will probably notbe reactivated owing to budget constraints. Only one Kara-classcruiser remains in service. By 1994, the old cruisers of the Kynda-,Kresta I-, and Kresta II-classes were all sold for scrap, and only oneunit of the Kashin-class remained in service. In 2002, the result ofall these reductions in the former Soviet Navy has led to a 21-shipcruiser force for the Russian Navy.

While Russia has struggled with its flagging economy and theconsequent decline of its navy, the United States has pared down itscruiser force in an effort to reduce spending after the end of theCold War. By 1998, all nuclear cruisers were discarded and strippedfor scrapping. The hulls are in various phases of disassembly at thePuget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington. Their en-during legacy, which showcases the drawbacks of nuclear power, istheir reactors, which continue to emit potentially harmful radiation.In the process of scrapping, the nuclear fuel is removed from the re-actors along with any fluids in the plant. The reactor compartmentis then sealed. Since 1986, reactor compartments from scrappedships have been sent from vessels at the Puget Sound Naval Ship-yard to the Hanford storage facility in Washington. This area occu-pies 586 square miles of desert. Barges transport the compartmentsa distance of 310 miles up the Columbia River from the yard toHanford. The reactor compartments of the cruisers are a small mi-nority of 110 such compartments that had been taken to Hanford byAugust 2003. They will remain in protected storage as the radiationslowly dissipates. In addition to the end of the nuclear cruisers, allother vessels that were classified as cruisers in 1975 have also beendiscarded. The United States continues to operate 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers.

The other maritime powers that have operated cruisers in themissile age have also reduced their forces. France retains onlyJeanne d’Arc as a training ship. The De Grasse, being the least ad-vanced of the French cruisers, was stricken in 1973 during theheight of the Cold War. The Colbert was decommissioned in 1991.This latter vessel, however, was not scrapped and now fulfills apeacetime role as a museum ship at Bordeaux. Italy operates VittorioVeneto; the two Andrea Doria-class cruisers were decommissioned in1991.

CRUISERS, 1939–2004 163

Despite reductions since the end of the Cold War, cruisers arestill important. They continue to project power in time of peace;their offensive and defensive missile batteries remain useful in timeof war. These weapons systems have remained generally the samesince 1991 but are now augmented by a series of technical improve-ments that make them far more effective. The examples of cruisersin wartime operation after the Cold War are almost entirely by theUnited States. In 1991, Ticonderoga-class cruisers fired Tomahawkcruise missiles into Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, which wasprecipitated by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s invasion ofKuwait, as part of an international force to liberate the small nation.Several western governments also believed this war was necessary inorder to prevent destabilization in the Middle East that mightthreaten oil shipments to the industrialized powers. American cruis-ers were once again deployed in 1999 when Ticonderoga-class cruis-ers exhibited their importance through the use of their AEGIS sys-tems to coordinate air attacks against Serbia following its invasionof Kosovo.

Even so, the future of cruisers is in doubt due primarily to the ex-treme construction expenses of the ship type. The cost of construc-tion for a Ticonderoga-class cruiser is about $1 billion, about one-fourth the price of a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, which cruisers aredesigned to protect. The naval powers recognize that smaller, lessexpensive warships can perform the old roles of cruisers but withslightly reduced weapons capacity. Among these are destroyers suchas those of the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class. Each costs about $800 mil-lion. As a result, destroyers and smaller frigates are collectively themost numerous warships in the navies of the world.

Plans for new cruiser construction have been few since the end ofthe Cold War. In the 1990s the Russian Navy produced a design fora new cruiser, but it currently lacks the funds for construction. Onlythe United States currently entertains the idea of building a newclass of cruisers. Little is known about the number of vesselsplanned, but they are slated as replacements for the aging Ticon-deroga-class cruisers. Until recently, this class had not progressedfarther than the design stage because of the decreasing defensebudgets of the 1990s.

The current world climate, however, in which the United Stateshas embarked on a war against terrorism, may lead to higher defensespending and the production of a new class of cruiser for global op-erations. If these vessels are constructed in years to come, the storyof the cruiser will continue even as increasingly effective, deadly,


and smaller weapons threaten to consign the ship to extinction,much like the battleship after World War II.

NOTES

1. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of theUnited States Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963),pp. 396–397.

2. James L. George, The History of Warships: From Ancient Times to theTwenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 127.

3. Ibid.4. Stefan Terzibaschitsch, Cruisers of the U.S. Navy, 1922–1962, trans-

lated by Harold Erenberg (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p.279.

5. Anthony Preston, Cruisers (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books, 1982), p.61.

6. Anthony Preston, Cruisers (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,1980), p. 173.

7. Ronald Spector, At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twen-tieth Century (New York: Viking, 2001), p. 394.

CRUISERS, 1939–2004 165

167

Individual Cruiser and Battle Cruiser Models

The cruisers are arranged alphabetically by country within specific eras. In each countrysubset, the cruisers are listed chronologically according to dates of completion. The dataconcerning each vessel or class are contained in the sections that follow this listing. Whenreferring to a class of ships, the data concerning the attributes of the type are that of thelead ship of the class.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905

Chile: Esmeralda (1883) 172France: Vauban-class (1885–1886) 173France: Sfax (1887) 174France: Dupuy de Lôme (1895) 175Germany: Leipzig-class (1877) 176Germany: Zieten (1876) 176Germany: Bremen-class (1904–1907) 177Great Britain: Inconstant-class (1869–1876) 178Great Britain: Shannon (1877) 179Great Britain: Iris-class (1879) 180Great Britain: Imperieuse-class (1886–1888) 181Great Britain: Powerful-class (1897–1898) 182Italy: Piemonte (1889) 183Japan: Naniwa-class (1885–1886) 184Japan: Suma-class (1896–1899) 185Russia: General Admiral-class (1875–1877) 186Russia: Rossiya (1897) 187

168 INDIVIDUAL CRUISERS AND BATTLE CRUISER MODELS

United States: Wampanoag-class (1867–1868) 188United States: Atlanta-class (1886–1887) 189United States: Olympia (1895) 190


France: Edward Quinet-class (1911) 192France: Duquesne-class (1924–1925) 193France: La Galissonnière-class (1935–1937) 194France: Dunkerque-class (1937–1938) 195Germany: Scharnhorst-class (1907–1908) 196Germany: Dresden-class (1908–1909) 197Germany: Von der Tann (1908–1909) 198Germany: Möwe (1914) 199Germany: Hindenburg (1917) 200Germany: K-class (1929–1930) 201Germany: Deutschland-class (1933–1936) 202Germany: Scharnhorst-class (1938–1939) 203Germany: Admiral Hipper-class (1939–1940) 204Great Britain: Minotaur-class (1908–1909) 205Great Britain: Invincible-class (1908–1909) 206Great Britain: Lion-class (1912) 207Great Britain: Arethusa-class (1914–1915) 208Great Britain: Courageous-class (1917) 209Great Britain: Hood (1920) 210Great Britain: Norfolk-class (1930) 211Great Britain: Edinburgh-class (1939) 212Italy: Quarto (1913) 213Italy: Zara-class (1931–1932) 214Japan: Tsukuba-class (1907–1908) 215Japan: Kongo-class (1913–1915) 216Japan: Yubari (1923) 217Japan: Nachi-class (1928–1929) 218Russia: Pallada-class (1902–1903) 219Russia: Rurik (1908) 220Sweden: Fylgia (1907) 221Sweden: Gotland (1933) 222United States: Chester-class (1908) 223United States: Omaha-class (1923–1925) 224United States: New Orleans-class (1934–1937) 225

INDIVIDUAL CRUISERS AND BATTLE CRUISER MODELS 169


France: Colbert (1959) 228France: Jeanne d’ Arc (1964) 229Great Britain: Dido-class (1940–1942) 230Great Britain: Tiger-class (1959–1961) 231Italy: Andrea Doria-class (1964) 232Italy: Vittorio Veneto (1969) 233Japan: Agano-class (1942–1944) 234Netherlands: De Zeven Provincien (1953) 235Soviet Union: Kirov-class (1938–1940) 236Soviet Union: Sverdlov-class (1951–1955) 237Soviet Union: Kynda-class (1962–1965) 238Soviet Union: Kresta I-class (1967–1968) 239Soviet Union: Moskva-class (1967–1968) 240Soviet Union: Kiev-class (1970–1984) 241Soviet Union: Kara-class (1973–1980) 242Soviet Union: Kirov-class (1973–1998) 243United States: Cleveland-class (1942–1946) 244United States: Alaska-class (1944) 245United States: Boston-class (1955–1956) 246United States: Long Beach (1961) 247United States: California-class (1974–1975) 248United States: Virginia-class (1976–1980) 249United States: Ticonderoga-class (1983–1994) 250

INDIVIDUAL CRUISERS AND BATTLE CRUISER MODELS 169

170 INDIVIDUAL CRUISERS AND BATTLE CRUISER MODELS

SPECIFICATIONS

Units: In the case of a class of ships, all vessels are named.

Type and Significance: A brief statement concerning the type and importance ofthe ship or class of vessel.

Date of Construction: This section includes the dates when construction beganand the dates when a ship or class was either launched or completed.

Hull Dimensions: This data is the measurement of a hull’s length, beam, and draft(when known) in feet and inches.

Displacement: In most cases, the tonnage is the standard displacement, meaningthe weight of the ship when fully equipped but without fuel.

Armor: Side armor, deck armor, barbette armor, and turret protection are listed inmeasurements of inches.

Armament: The types and size of all weaponry and how the pieces were mounted.

Machinery: The propulsion plant.

Speed: The maximum speed in knots of the ship or class.

Complement: The number of officers and sailors that crewed the vessel.

Summary: A brief section that contains comments on the performance and ca-reer(s) of the ship or class.

C R U I S E R S , 1 8 6 8 – 1 9 0 5

171

Type and Significance: Protected cruiser.The Esmeralda is generally regarded asthe world’s first modern cruiser.

Dates of Construction: Launched in1883.

Hull Dimensions: 270’ x 42’ x 18’ 6”Displacement: 2,950 tonsArmor: A protective deck that varied be-

tween two inches and a half inch inthickness which spanned the length ofthe ship.

Armament: Two 10-inch guns on bar-bettes, one each fore and aft, six 6-inchguns carried on the broadside, and three14-inch torpedo tubes. The vessel waslater rearmed with 6-inch quick firingguns in place of the 10-inch pieces, 4.7-inch guns in place of the 6-inchweapons, and 18-inch torpedo tubes inplace of the 14-inch variety.

Machinery: Compound engines whosepower output was 6,803 horsepower thatwas driven by four boilers.

Speed: 18.3 knotsComplement: 296Summary: A British-built cruiser that was

ordered by Chile, the hull of Esmeraldawas made of steel, which saved a signifi-cant amount of weight over vessels thatwere made of iron. This advantage com-bined with the ship’s powerful engine ac-counted for the high maximum speed.The savings in weight also allowed for aprotective deck that spanned the lengthof the hull, making Esmeralda theworld’s first fully protected cruiser. Thisspeed allowed British designers to dis-pense for the first time with sails aboarda ship of Esmeralda’s size. This vesselserved in the navy of Chile until 1894when it was sold to Japan. The vesselserved in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japa-nese War and was finally withdrawnfrom service in 1912.

172 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

CHILE: ESMERALDACourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Vauban, DuguesclinType and Significance: These ships are

indicative of early French cruiser design,which was slow in developing owing tothe priority given by the French to theconstruction of battleships.

Dates of Construction: Vauban andDuguesclin were laid down in 1879 and1878 and completed in 1885 and 1886respectively.

Hull Dimensions: 265’ 9” x 57’ 3” x 25’Displacement: 6,112 tonsArmor: Wrought-iron belt varying between

10 inches and 6 inches in thickness.Armament: Four 9.4-inch guns mounted

on barbettes, one 7.6-inch weapon, six5.5-inch guns, 12 one-pound pieces, andtwo 14-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Compound engine and eightcoal-fired boilers that generated 4,400horsepower; a sailing rig was included.

Speed: 14.5 knotsComplement: 440Summary: These ships were slow for their

day and not well-suited to the duties ofcruisers as a result. The Vauban wastaken out of service in 1905, one year af-ter its sister ship.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 173

FRANCE: VAUBANVauban. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: Sfax was France’sfirst protected cruiser.

Dates of Construction: Laid down in1882 and completed in 1887.

Hull Dimensions: 300’ 5” x 49’ 4” x 25’ 2”Displacement: 4,561 tonsArmor: A protective deck almost two-and-

a-half inches thick.Armament: Six 6.4-inch guns, 10 5.5-inch

guns, two 3-pounder guns, 10 one-pounder pieces, and five 14-inch torpedotubes.

Machinery: Compound engines with 12boilers that generated 6,500 horsepower;a sail rig was included.

Speed: 16.7 knotsComplement: 486Summary: Sfax was a step forward in

France’s cruiser construction program,although its hull was made of iron ratherthan steel. It enjoyed a relatively longlife, being scrapped in 1906.

174 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

FRANCE: SFAXCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: Dupuy de Lômerepresented a significant advance in thedesign of cruisers.


Hull Dimensions: 364’ 2” x 51’ 6” x 24’ 7”Displacement: 6,676 tonsArmor: Side armor 4 inches thick and tur-

ret armor of the same thickness.Armament: Two 7.6-inch guns, one each

mounted fore and aft, six 6.4-inch quick-firing weapons, four 9-pounder pieces,eight 3-pounders, and two 18-inch tor-pedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines thatgenerated 13,000 horsepower throughthe steam provided by 13 coal-firedboilers.

Speed: 19.7 knots

Complement: 526Summary: Dupuy de Lôme incorporated

several advances that made it a water-shed design. The ship was among thefirst to employ steel rather than iron forits armored belt. It also was one of thefirst cruisers with a battery encased com-pletely in armored turrets. The protec-tion afforded to the guns made the vessela true armored cruiser rather than abelted one, which had been a past type.The warship was generally considered asuccess, although it never attained its in-tended top speed of 21 knots. In 1912,Dupuy de Lôme was sold to Peru butnever delivered. It continued to serve aspart of the French Navy until 1920,when it was sold to Belgium and con-verted into a cargo ship.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 175

FRANCE: DUPUY DE LÔMECourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: One the world’sfirst torpedo cruisers.

Dates of Construction: Laid down in1875 and completed in July 1876.

Hull Dimensions: 260’ 8” x 28’ 1” x 15’ 2”Displacement: 1,152 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Two 14.8-inch torpedo tubes.Machinery: Compound engines that gen-

erated 2,000 horsepower; also shipped a

light sailing rigSpeed: 16 knotsComplement: 94Summary: This British-built ship originated

from the German faith in the destructivepower of the new, self-propelled torpedoand the need for a less expensive coastal-defense cruiser. The Germans also de-sired a vessel capable of conductingcommerce warfare.

176 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

GERMANY: ZIETEN

GERMANY: LEIPZIG-CLASSLeipzig. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Leipzig, Sedan (Prinz Adalbert)Type and Significance: These ships are

examples of early German developmentin cruisers and the first in the Germanimperial navy with hulls made of iron.

Dates of Construction: The two vesselswere laid down in 1875 and 1876; bothwere completed in 1877

Hull Dimensions: 287’ x 46’ x 22’ 7”Displacement: 4,553 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Originally, 12 6.6-inch guns

that were later replaced by four im-proved cannons and two torpedo tubes.

Machinery: In addition to sail rigging, asingle-expansion engine generated 6,050horsepower; power plant fueled by coal-fired boilers

Speed: 15.5 knotsComplement: 425Summary: Both ships were employed prim-

arily in defense of Germany’s overseastrade. They were also employed forcoastal-defense duties. The Leipzig washulked in 1894; Prinz Adalbert washulked in 1890. The former was brokenup in 1921, and the latter went to thebreakers in 1907.

(continues on page 177)

Units: Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, Lübeck,Munchen, Leipzig, Danzig

Type and Significance: These vessels arean example of Germany’s light cruiserdesign.

Dates of Construction: The units of theclass were laid down between 1902 and1904 and completed between 1904 and1907.

Hull Dimensions: 364’ 9” x 43’ 8” x 18’ 5”Displacement: 3,756 tonsArmor: A deck with a maximum thickness

of 3.25 inches. Armament: 10 4.1-inch guns, 10 machine

guns, and two 17.5-inch torpedo tubes. Machinery: Triple-expansion engines pow-

ered by coal-fired boilers that generated

11,750 horsepower; Lübeck used two tur-bines that produced 14,400 horsepower.

Speed: 23 knotsComplement: 288Summary: Lübeck was one of the first

cruisers to use turbines for propulsion.All these vessels served in World War I.The Leipzig was sunk on 8 December1914 by enemy cruiser fire in the Battleof the Falkland Islands. The Bremen wassunk on 17 February 1915, by a mine.The Lübeck, Munchen, and Danzig wereall scrapped between 1919 and 1923.The Hamburg and Berlin served in lim-ited capacities in World War II, the for-mer being sunk by aerial bombing in1944. The Berlin was scuttled in 1947.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 177

GERMANY: BREMEN-CLASSHamburg. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

The 16-knot speed was partially the resultof the hull being built with a clipper bowthat enabled it to cut through the waterwith less resistance. Zieten enjoyed along career. By 1899, the ship was rele-

gated to the role of protecting coastalfisheries. In 1914 upon the outbreak ofWorld War I, it was given the task of gen-eral coastal patrol. The Zieten survivedthe war and was broken up in 1921.

(continued from page 176)

Units: Inconstant, Raleigh, ShahType and Significance: These vessels

were the British response to the poten-tial threat that the U.S. Wampanoag-class cruisers posed to British overseascommerce.

Dates of Construction: Inconstant waslaid down in November 1866 and com-pleted in 1869. Construction began onShah and Raleigh in 1870 and 1871 re-spectively. The former was completed in1874; the latter was ready for service in1876.

Hull Dimensions: 337’ 4” x 50’ 3” x 25’ 6” Displacement: 5,780 tons Armor: None Armament: 10 9-inch muzzle-loading rifled

guns and six 7-inch guns of the same typemounted on the sides of the hull in a sin-gle gun deck below the upper deck.

Machinery: Single-expansion engines thatgenerated 7,360 horsepower and weredriven by coal-fired boilers. Sails werealso retained owing to the high coal con-sumption of the engine that made con-tinuous use impossible.

Speed: 16.2 knots

Complement: 600 Summary: These vessels were unarmored,

but they were much more capable ofwithstanding enemy fire than a wooden-hulled warship, as they were constructedof wrought iron. The heavy armament ofthe Inconstant class was intended to al-low the ships to fight at long ranges so asnot to allow an enemy to target the shipand score many hits on its unarmoredhull. Indeed, the weapons battery was sopowerful that at the time of the Incon-stant’s commissioning only two armoredcapital warships of the Royal Navy car-ried a heavier armament.

The design of the Inconstant-classproved successful, despite fears that thehulls might be top-heavy and lead to a riskof capsizing, and all three ships enjoyedlong careers. The Inconstant served bothas a ship of the active fleet and in reserveuntil it was finally broken up in 1956. TheRaleigh, completed in 1874, was not soldto the scrap yard until 1905. The Shah,commissioned in 1876, was taken to thebreakers in 1919.

178 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

GREAT BRITAIN: INCONSTANT-CLASSRaleigh. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This vessel was abelted, or armored, cruiser with a limitedprotective deck. The latter feature madeit the world’s first protected cruiser type.


Hull Dimensions: 260’ x 54’ x 22’ 3”Displacement: 5,670 tonsArmor: A belt between 6 inches and 9

inches in thickness, wood backing with amaximum thickness of 13 inches, and adeck up to 3 inches deep.

Armament: Two 10-inch, muzzle-loadingrifled guns, seven 9-inch guns of thesame type, and six 20-pounder breech-loading weapons.

Machinery: Compound engine fed byeight coal-fired boilers that created 3,370horsepower; a sailing rig was included.

Speed: 12.25 knotsComplement: 452Summary: The protective deck covered the

machinery and the magazines. TheShannon was sold for scrap in 1899.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 179

GREAT BRITAIN: SHANNONCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Iris, MercuryType and Significance: These vessels

were Britain’s first warships whose hullswere constructed of steel.

Dates of Construction: Iris and Mer-cury were laid down in 1877 and 1888respectively, and both were completed in1879.

Hull Dimensions: 333’ x 46’ x 22’Displacement: 3,730 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: 10 64-pounders mounted in

broadside, the bow, and stern as well asfour torpedo carriages from which torpe-does could be lowered into the water.

These weapons were later replaced by 135-inch breech-loading guns and four 3-pounder quick firing guns.

Machinery: Compound engines that pro-duced 6,000 horsepower and were drivenby 12 coal-fired boilers; a light sail rigwas included.

Speed: 17 knotsComplement: 275Summary: Iris was sold for scrap in 1905

and subsequently broken up. The Mer-cury followed in 1919 after being rele-gated to a supply ship at Chatham Dock-yard, England.

180 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

GREAT BRITAIN: IRIS-CLASSIris. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Imperieuse, WarspiteType and Significance: These vessels are

examples of the development of armoredcruisers.

Dates of Construction: Imperieuse andWarspite were laid down in 1881 andcompleted in 1886 and 1888 respec-tively.

Hull Dimensions: 315’ x 62’ x 26’ 9”Displacement: 8,500 tonsArmor: An armor belt 10 inches thick with

a 10-inch backing of wood that was com-plemented by a protective deck that var-ied in thickness between 2 and 4 inches

Armament: Four 9.2-inch breech-loadingguns, 10 6-inch breech-loading pieces,and four 6-pound quick firing gunsmounted in broadside, as well as six 18-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Compound engines that gen-erated 8,000 horsepower and weredriven by 12 coal-fired boilers.

Speed: 16.75 knotsComplement: 555Summary: These ships were originally

equipped with a sailing rig, but it was re-moved as naval officials concluded thatit was a poor means for propulsion. Bothserved as flagships in their careers, theImperieuse being flagship of the ChinaStation; the Warspite served on the Pa-cific Station. The Imperieuse was soldfor scrap in 1913 after being relegated tothe role of supply ship. The Warspite pre-ceded it in 1905.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 181

GREAT BRITAIN: IMPERIEUSE-CLASSImperieuse. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Powerful, TerribleType and Significance: These protected

cruisers were Britain’s first cruisers touse water-tube boilers and the largestwarships of their type in existence at thetime of completion.

Dates of Construction: Both warshipswere laid down in 1894, with Powerfulbeing completed in 1897 and its sistership the following year.

Hull Dimensions: 538’ x 71’ x 27’Displacement: 14,200 tonsArmor: A protective deck between 2 and 6

inches thick with 6-inch turret and bar-bette armor.

Armament: Two 9.2-inch guns, one eachbeing mounted fore and aft in turrets, aswell as 12 6-inch quick-firing guns and16 12-pounder quick-firers in armoredcasemates housed on the sides of theship. The vessel also carried four 18-inchtorpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines with48 boilers that generated 25,000 horse-power.

Speed: 22 knotsComplement: 894Summary: Both vessels were employed in

combat during the 1899–1902 BoerWar, where they transported navalbrigades to aid against the Boers. In ad-dition, their smaller weapons were usedto shore up defenses. Two years later,both ships were in reserve. The Terriblewas employed in World War I, althoughnot as a warship. In 1915, it served as atroop transport. The Powerful became atarget for gunnery practice the sameyear and served in that capacity untilbeing scrapped in 1929. The Terriblewas relegated to duty as an accommo-dation ship before being used as a tar-get ship in 1920; it was finally scrappedin 1932.

182 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

GREAT BRITAIN: POWERFUL-CLASSPowerful. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: The protectedcruiser Piemonte was the first warship inthe world armed with quick-firing guns.


Hull Dimensions: 320’ 11.5” x 38’ 1.5” x15’ 11”

Displacement: 2,443 tonsArmor: An armored deck 3 inches thick.Armament: Six 6-inch quick-firing guns,

six 4.7-inch quick-firing pieces, 10 2.2-inch guns, two 14-inch torpedo tubes,and an assortment of smaller weapons.This weaponry was later changed to 10

4.7-inch guns, two 14-inch torpedo tubes,and some smaller ordnance.

Machinery: One triple-expansion enginepowered by four coal-fired boilers thatgenerated 7,100 horsepower.

Speed: 22.3 knotsComplement: 298–310Summary: Built by Great Britain for Italy,

Piemonte was not considered a success-ful vessel by Italian naval officials. Itserved in minor functions during WorldWar I and was stricken from the ItalianNavy’s list of active warships in 1920.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 183

ITALY: PIEMONTECourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Naniwa, TakachihoType and Significance: These vessels

were the first protected cruisers con-structed for the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Dates of Construction: Both warshipswere laid down in 1885, with Naniwa be-ing completed in 1885 and Takachihoentering service the next year.

Hull Dimensions: 300’ x 46’ x 20’ 3”Displacement: 3,650 tonsArmor: A protective deck varying between

2 and 3 inches in thickness.Armament: Two 10.3-inch guns, one each

being mounted on barbettes fore and aft,six 5.9-inch pieces, two 6-pound guns,four 14-inch torpedo tubes, and an as-sortment of small-caliber weapons.

Machinery: Compound engines driven bycoal-fired boilers that generated 7,000horsepower.

Speed: 18.5 knotsComplement: 325Summary: These vessels were constructed

in Great Britain and were improved ver-sions of Esmerelda. Propulsion was af-forded solely by the vessel’s steam plant,as the masts of the ship were intendedfor range-finding against targets in bat-tle. Both ships saw combat service in theRusso-Japanese War. By 1907, the ves-sels had been withdrawn from regularoperations. The Naniwa was wrecked inthe Kurile Islands in 1912; theTakachiho went on to serve in World WarI as a minelayer. It was torpedoed andsunk by a German submarine on 17 Oc-tober 1914.

184 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

JAPAN: NANIWA-CLASSNaniwa. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Suma, AkashiType and Significance: These protected

cruisers were Japan’s first cruisers builtusing indigenous designs with Japanesematerials.

Dates of Construction: Suma was laiddown in 1892; construction on theAkashi began two years later. The formerwas completed in 1896; the latter en-tered service in 1899.

Hull Dimensions: 306’ 9” x 40’ x 15’ 9”Displacement: 2,657 tonsArmor: An armored deck that varied be-

tween 1 and 2 inches in thickness. Armament: Two 6-inch quick-firing guns,

one each fore and aft, six 4.7-inch quick-

firers, 10 3-pounder guns, varioussmaller-caliber weapons, and two 15-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines thatgenerated 8,500 horsepower and werepowered by coal-fired boilers.

Speed: 20 knotsComplement: 310Summary: The Japanese did not consider

these ships to be a successful design.Both ships served in the 1904–1905Russo-Japanese War and were disarmedin 1922. The Suma was scrapped in1928; its sister ship was sunk as a targetin 1930.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 185

JAPAN: SUMA-CLASS

Units: General Admiral, Gerzog EdinburgskiType and Significance: Armored cruisers.

Upon its launch, the General Admiralwas the first armored cruiser in theworld.

Dates of Construction: General Admi-ral and its sister ship were laid down in1870. The General Admiral was com-pleted in 1875; the other unit was readyfor service in 1877.

Hull Dimensions: 285’ 10” x 48’ x 24’Displacement: 5,031 tonsArmor: A belt that varied in thickness from

5 to 6 inches. It spanned the length ofthe ship on the sides of the hull and ex-tended from 2 feet above to 5 feet belowthe waterline.

Armament: Six 8-inch, two 6-inch, four3.4-inch, and eight 1-pounder guns. Thelargest weapons were housed on the up-per deck; the others were contained in theends of the hull on the main deck below.

Machinery: Compound engine that pro-duced 4,470 horsepower and was fueledby 12 coal-fired boilers; sail rigging wasretained.

Speed: 12.3 knots

Complement: 480Summary: The key feature of the General

Admiral was its wrought-iron armoredbelt that made it the first armored, ormore accurately belted, cruiser in theworld. Although this ship and its sisterattracted much attention around theworld as the first cruisers to carry armor,the design was not entirely successful.The ships proved to be too heavy be-cause of their iron armor, which slowedthem to a point where they were inca-pable of performing the duties of cruis-ers. In addition, the armor’s weight madethe hulls ride low in the water, thus sub-merging the belts to a point where it of-fered little protection, as the portion ofthe hull that was above the water wasmostly unarmored.

Nevertheless, these ships operatedfor a long period of time. In 1909, bothwere converted to minelayers capable ofcarrying 600 mines. The General Admi-ral was not scrapped until 1938, whilethe Gerzog Edinburgski was hulked in1915 and became a derelict supplyship.

186 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

RUSSIA: GENERAL ADMIRAL-CLASSGerzog Edinburgski (Duke of Edinburgh).

Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This armoredcruiser was one of the few such vesselsbuilt for the Russian Navy in the yearsbefore World War I and is indicative ofRussia’s design practices.Dates of Construction: Laid down in

1894 and completed in 1897.Hull Dimensions: 480’ 6” x 68’ 6” x 26’Displacement: 13,675 tonsArmor: A belt that varied between 4 and 8

inches in thickness. Armament: Four 8-inch guns, 16 6-inch

weapons, 12 11-pounder guns, an assort-ment of smaller-caliber pieces, and five15-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines thatgenerated 15,500 horsepower and weredriven by 32 coal-fired boilers.

Speed: 20.2 knotsComplement: 842Summary: At the time of its launch, the

Rossiya was one of the largest cruisers inthe world. Like Russia’s other armoredcruisers in the late nineteenth centurythe vessel was a poor design. It was badlydamaged during service in the1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War andspent World War I in the Baltic Sea as aminelayer capable of carrying 100 mines.The Rossiya was scrapped in 1922.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 187

RUSSIA: ROSSIYACourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Wampanoag, Ammonoosuc,Madawaska, Neshaminy, Pompanoosuc

Type and Significance: Wampanoag andits four sister ships were the first pur-pose-built cruisers in the world. Theywere a product of the U.S. Civil War,specifically the Union’s desire for fastships capable of hunting down Confed-erate commerce raiders.

Dates of Construction: All five vesselswere laid down in 1863. TheWampanoag was commissioned on 7February 1868. The Madawaska and Am-monoosuc were commissioned in 1867and 1868 respectively. The other unitswere never completed.

Hull Dimensions: 335’ x 44’ 4” Displacement: 4,215 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Three 5.3-inch muzzle-loading

rifled guns as well as 10 9-inch smooth-bore cannons in broadside arrangement.

Machinery: Single-expansion engine thatgenerated 4,100 horsepower and wasdriven by eight coal-fired boilers. Sails

were retained due to the high fuel con-sumption of early steam engines andwere used when the vessel was not inbattle.

Speed: 17 knotsComplement: 330Summary: The huge amount of space

taken up by the steam engine at the ex-pense of crew quarters and supply spaceled to these wooden-hulled ships beingconsidered a failure. The result was thatnone had a long or useful career. TheWampanoag was taken out of regularnaval service in 1869 and became a re-ceiving ship for the rest of its career.The vessel was sold for breaking up in1885. The Ammonoosuc was taken outof service immediately after the vessel’strials in mid-1868 and sold to the scrap-pers in 1883. The Madawaska was soldin 1886. The other two vessels werenever completed. The incomplete hullof Neshaminy was sold to the scrap yardin 1874; Pompanoosuc was scrapped in1883.

188 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

UNITED STATES: WAMPANOAG-CLASSWampanoag. Courtesy of Naval Historical Foundation.

Units: Atlanta, BostonType and Significance: These protected

cruisers were the first warships of themodern United States Navy.

Dates of Construction: Both vesselswere laid down in 1883, with Atlanta be-ing ready for service in 1886 and Bostonthe following year.

Hull Dimensions: 283’ x 42’ x 17’Displacement: 3,189 tonsArmor: A protective steel deck 1.5 inches

thick that covered the machinery of thevessel.

Armament: Two 8-inch guns, one each be-ing mounted fore and aft on barbettes,six 6-inch guns, two 6-pounders, two 3-pounders, and two 1-pounders.

Machinery: Compound engines driven by

eight boilers that resulted in 3,500horsepower; a sailing rig was includedbut later removed.

Speed: 13 knotsComplement: 284Summary: Neither vessel proved effective

in the tasks of cruisers, owing chiefly toslow speed. In addition, the protectivedeck provided poor protection fromplunging shellfire. The Atlanta served asan accommodation vessel for the crewsof other warships between 1905 and1912, when it was sold for scrap. TheBoston served far longer through serviceas a supply depot beginning in 1918. By1946, the hull was in a state of decayand the ship was finally scuttled thatyear.

CRUISERS, 1868–1905 189

UNITED STATES: ATLANTA-CLASSBoston. Courtesy of Naval Historical Foundation.

Type and Significance: Olympia was oneof the more successful protected cruiserdesigns for the United States in the latenineteenth century.


Hull Dimensions: 344’ 1” x 53’ x 21’ 6”Displacement: 5,865 tonsArmor: A protective deck with a maximum

thickness of 4.75 inches. Armament: Four 8-inch guns, two each be-

ing housed in a single turret fore and aft,10 5-inch pieces mounted on the sidesof the hull, 14 6-pounders, and six 18-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines thatproduced 13,500 horsepower and weredriven by six coal-fired boilers.

Speed: 20 knotsComplement: 411Summary: Olympia is best known as the

flagship of Commodore George Deweyin the Battle of Manila Bay during the1898 Spanish-American War. Between1912 and 1916, the aging ship was usedto house crews from other vessels. Itserved in World War I in a limited capac-ity and was decommissioned in 1922. Itis one of the few vessels of its type thathas not been scrapped. Today, it is pre-served as a museum ship at Philadelphia,Pennsylvania.

190 CRUISERS, 1868–1905

UNITED STATES: OLYMPIACourtesy of Naval Historical Foundation.

C R U I S E R S , 1 9 0 6 – 1 9 3 9

191

192 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

Units: Edgar Quinet, Waldeck-RousseauType and Significance: These vessels

were the most powerful French armoredcruisers ever built.

Dates of Construction: Edgar Quinetwas laid down in 1905, with the secondunit following the next year. Both werecompleted in 1911.

Hull Dimensions: 521’ 4” x 70’ 7” x 27’ 7”Displacement: 13,847 tons.Armor: A belt between 1.5 inches and 6

inches thick and 8-inch turret armor.Armament: 14 7.6-inch guns, 20 9-pounder

pieces, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines pow-ered by 40 coal-fired boilers. The EdgarQuinet’s plant produced 40,294 horse-power; the Waldeck-Rousseau achieved35,286 horsepower.

Speed: 24 knots (Edgar Quinet); 23 knots(Waldeck-Rousseau)

Complement: 859–892Summary: In 1930 the Edgar Quinet was

wrecked off the coast of Algeria. TheWaldeck-Rousseau was hulked as an ac-commodation ship six years later.

FRANCE: EDWARD QUINET-CLASSEdgar Quinet. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Duquesne, TourvilleType and Significance: These heavy

cruisers were the first French vessels oftheir type built to the restrictions of theWashington Treaty.

Dates of Construction: Duquesne waslaid down in 1924; the Tourville followedthe next year.

Hull Dimensions: 626’ 8” x 62’ 4” x 20’ 9”Displacement: 10,000 tonsArmor: A belt 1 inch thick and 1-inch tur-

ret armor.Armament: Eight 8-inch guns in four twin-

gunned turrets, two each being locatedfore and aft, eight 3-inch antiaircraftpieces, eight 47mm antiaircraft guns, 12

13.2mm antiaircraft guns, six 21.7-inchtorpedo tubes, and two aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines powered by nine oil-fired boilers that produced 120,000horsepower.

Speed: 33.75 knotsComplement: 605Summary: These vessels, like so many of

the treaty-era cruisers, had scanty pro-tection owing to the fact that more ar-mor would push the weight over the ton-nage restrictions of the WashingtonTreaty. Both ships served in World WarII. The Duquesne was scrapped in 1955;the Tourville followed in 1962.

CURISERS, 1906–1939 193

FRANCE: DUQUESNE-CLASS

Units: La Galissonnière, Jenne de Vienne,Marseillaise, Gloire, Montcalm, GeorgesLeygues

Type and Significance: These vesselswere some of France’s last cruisers builtbefore World War II and some of themost successful.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1935 and 1937. Construction wascompleted between December 1935 andDecember 1937.

Hull Dimensions: 588’ 11” x 57’ 4” x 17’7”

Displacement: 7,600 tonsArmor: A belt 4 inches thick, a protective

deck 1.5 inches deep, and turrets withup to 4 inches of protection.

Armament: Nine 6-inch guns in threetriple-gunned turrets, two being locatedforward and one aft. Also three 3.5-inch

pieces, assorted antiaircraft guns, four21.7-inch torpedo tubes, and four air-craft.

Machinery: Turbine driven by four oil-fired boilers that generated 84,000horsepower.

Speed: 31 knotsComplement: 764 Summary: On 27 November 1942, the La

Galissonnière, Jenne de Vienne, and Mar-seillaise were scuttled to prevent theiruse by the Germans. The La Galisson-nière and Jenne de Vienne were raised bythe Italians, but both were bombed byAllied aircraft before they could returnto operation. The remaining units sur-vived World War II. The Gloire was bro-ken up in 1958; the Georges Leygues fol-lowed a year later. The Montcalm wasscrapped in 1970.

194 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

FRANCE: LA GALISSONNIÈRE-CLASSMontcalm. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historic.

Units: Dunkerque, StrasbourgType and Significance: These vessels

were among the few battle cruisers builtafter World War I.

Dates of Construction: Dunkerque waslaid down in 1932; the Strasbourg fol-lowed a year later. The former was com-pleted in 1937; the latter was finished inlate 1938.

Hull Dimensions: 703’ 9” x 102” x 28’ 6”Displacement: 26,500 tonsArmor: A belt that varied in thickness be-

tween 5.75 inches and 9.75 inches, adeck up to 5 inches deep, and a maxi-mum 5-inch armor protection for themain turrets.

Armament: Eight 13-inch guns in twoquadruple-gunned turrets located for-ward. Also 16 5.1-inch pieces, eight37mm antiaircraft guns, 32 13.2-inchantiaircraft guns, and two aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines driven by six oil-fu-eled boilers that produced 112,500horsepower.

Speed: 29.5 knots Complement: 1,431Summary: These ships were built as a re-

sponse to the perceived threat that theGerman Deutschland-class cruisersposed to French overseas commerce inthe event of war. Neither ship had theopportunity to serve extensively in WorldWar II. They were scuttled on 27 No-vember 1942 at Toulon. The Italians re-paired the Strasbourg and put her intoservice in the Italian Navy, but she wassunk on 18 August 1944 by Allied bomb-ing raids only months after repairs werecomplete. The wreck of the Dunkerquewas sold for scrap in 1958.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 195

FRANCE: DUNKERQUE-CLASSStrasbourg. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

196 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

Units: Scharnhorst, GneisenauType and Significance: These two ar-

mored cruisers were among the last andperhaps the best example of the typebuilt by Germany.

Dates of Construction: Gneisenau waslaid down in 1904; the Scharnhorst fol-lowed a year later. The latter was com-pleted in 1907; construction on the for-mer lasted until 1908.

Hull Dimensions: 474’ 9” x 71’ 27’ 6”Displacement: 12,781 tonsArmor: A belt up to 6 inches thick and a

deck up to 2.5 inches deep. Armament: Eight 8.2-inch guns, four being

housed in twin-gunned turrets, one eachlocated fore and aft. The other four weremounted in single emplacements with

two on each side of the hull. Also six 5.9-inch pieces, 18 3.4-inch weapons, andfour 17.5-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines andcoal-fired boilers that produced 30,000horsepower.

Speed: 23.5 knotsComplement: 764Summary: Both established a reputation as

the best gunnery ships in the ImperialGerman Navy. They served in World WarI, being part of Admiral Maximilian Grafvon Spee’s East Asia Squadron. On 8 De-cember 1914, Scharnhorst, Spee’s flag-ship, and Gneisenau were intercepted byBritish battle cruisers off the Falkland Is-lands in the South Atlantic Ocean. Bothships were subsequently sunk by gunfire.

GERMANY: SCHARNHORST-CLASSScharnhorst. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 197

Units: Dresden, EmdenType and Significance: This class repre-

sents an example of German light cruiserdesign.

Dates of Construction: Constructioncommenced on Emden in 1906; Dresdenfollowed in the next year. They werecompleted in 1909 and 1908 respec-tively.

Hull Dimensions: 386’ 10” x 44’ 4” x 18’Displacement: 3,664 tonsArmor: A deck between .75 and 1.75

inches in thickness.Armament: 10 4.1-inch guns in single

mounts, eight 2-inch pieces, and two17.7-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by 12 coal-fired boilers that generated 15,000horsepower.

Speed: 24 knotsComplement: 361Summary: Both vessels served in World

War I as commerce raiders. Emden be-came one of the most famous com-merce raiders of the conflict at sea. Itwas sunk on 9 November 1914 by theAustralian cruiser Sydney. Dresden wasscuttled on 14 March 1915 off theChilean coast in order to prevent cap-ture by British warships.

GERMANY: DRESDEN-CLASSEmden. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

198 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

Type and Significance: This vessel wasGermany’s first battle cruiser.


Hull Dimensions: 563’ 4” x 87’ 3” x 26’6.75”

Displacement: 19,064 tonsArmor: A belt varying between 3.2 inches

and 10 inches in thickness and armor upto 9 inches thick on the turrets and bar-bettes.

Armament: Eight 11.1-inch weapons infour twin-gunned turrets. One each waslocated fore and aft; the other two werelocated amidships, being mounted oneeach on the sides. In addition, carried 10

5.9-inch guns, 16 3.45-inch weapons,and four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by 18 boil-ers that produced 43,600 horsepower.

Speed: 24.75 knotsComplement: 923Summary: Von der Tann was a much better

design than its British counterpartsthrough a reduction in speed in favor ofgreater armor protection. It served exten-sively in World War I and survived theconflict. The ship was scuttled on 21 June1919 at the British naval base of ScapaFlow in the Orkney Islands north of Scot-land. The wreck was refloated in 1930and broken up between 1931 and 1934.

GERMANY: VON DER TANNCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 199

Type and Significance: Möwe is an ex-ample of an armed merchant cruiser andwas one of the most successful com-merce raiders of World War I.


Hull Dimensions: 405’ 10” x 47’ 3” x 23’7”

Displacement: 9,800 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Four 5.9-inch guns in single

mounts, one 4.1-inch piece, and two19.7-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engine pow-ered by five coal-fired boilers that pro-duced 3,200 horsepower.

Speed: 13.3 knots Complement: 234Summary: The Möwe was originally a cargo

ship. It was armed as a commerce raider

soon after the outbreak of World War Iand commissioned as an armed mer-chant cruiser of the German Navy in late1915. The armament was mounted inconcealed positions in order to disguisethe warship as an unassuming merchant-man. The Möwe could consequentlyboth escape detection and surprise itprey. In World War I, Möwe became aminelayer after making two successfulcommerce raiding sorties. It was turnedover to the British as a war reparationupon the end of the conflict, and in1933 the vessel was sold back to Ger-many and renamed Oldenburg. On 7April 1945, in the midst of World War II,it was torpedoed by a British submarineand beached off the coast of Norway toavoid sinking. The ship was scrapped in1953.

GERMANY: MÖWE

200 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

Type and Significance: This ship was thelast battle cruiser built for imperial Ger-many and is an example of advancedGerman design for the type.


Hull Dimensions: 698’ 2” x 95’ 2” x 27’ 3”Displacement: 26,513 tonsArmor: A armor belt between 4 and 12

inches thick, barbette protection varyingfrom 3.5 to 11.5 inches, and turret ar-mor with a maximum thickness of 12.8inches.

Armament: Eight 12-inch guns in fourtwin-gunned turrets, two each located

fore and aft, as well as 14 5.9-inch guns,four 3.45-inch pieces, and four 23.6-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by 18 boil-ers that produced 90,000 horsepower.

Speed: 27.5 knotsComplement: 1,182Summary: Hindenburg did not serve exten-

sively in World War I. On 21 June 1919,the ship was scuttled at the British navalbase of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Is-lands. The wreck was raised in 1930 andimpressed British naval architects thatstudied the vessel. It was subsequentlyscrapped.

GERMANY: HINDENBURGCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 201

Units: Königsburg, Karlsruhe, KölnType and Significance: These light cruis-

ers showcase German innovation incruiser design in the years before WorldWar II.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1927 and 1928 and completed be-tween 1929 and January 1930.

Hull Dimensions: 570’ 10” x 50’ 2” x 18’ 3”Displacement: 6,650 tonsArmor: A belt between 2 and 2.75 inches

thick, a deck that varied in thickness be-tween 1.5 inches and .75 inches, and1.25-inch protection for the turrets.

Armament: Nine 5.9-inch guns in threetriple-gunned turrets. One was mountedin the bow; the other two were carried

aft. Also was armed with six 3.5-inchweapons, 12 19.5-inch torpedo tubes,and two aircraft.

Machinery: A power plant that had bothdiesel and oil-fired components andcould produce 65,000 horsepower.

Speed: 32 knots Complement: 850Summary: All three units failed to survive

World War II. The Königsburg wasbombed by British aircraft on 10 April1940, and subsequently scrapped in1943. The Karlsruhe was torpedoed by aBritish submarine on 9 April 1940 andscuttled due to the damage sustained.The Köln was sunk by an Allied bombingraid and broken up in 1946.

GERMANY: K-CLASSKöln. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

202 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

Units: Deutchland (Lutzow),Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee

Type and Significance: German heavycruisers that are popularly called pocketbattleships owing to the size of their pri-mary weaponry.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1929 and 1932. All were com-pleted by January 1936.

Hull Dimensions: 610’ 3” x 70’ 10” x 19’Displacement: 11,700 tonsArmor: A belt between 2.25 and 3 inches

thick, a deck 1.5 inches deep, and turretarmor up to 5.5 inches thick.

Armament: Six 11-inch guns in two triple-gunned turrets, one each being locatedfore and aft. Also armed with eight 5.9-inch guns, six 4.1-inch pieces, eight20.8-inch torpedo tubes, an assortmentof antiaircraft guns, and two aircraft.

Machinery: Diesel engines that generated54,000 horsepower.

Speed: 28 knotsComplement: 619–1,150Summary: Although these vessels caused a

great deal of concern in other countriessuch as France due to their armament,the protection was that of a regularcruiser rather than a more powerful ves-sel suggested by the nickname pocketbattleship. None survived World War II.The Admiral Graf Spee was scuttled on17 December 1939 after the Battle ofthe River Plate. The Admiral Scheer wassunk on 9 April 1945 by an Allied bomb-ing raid. The Deutchland, renamed theLutzow, was scuttled on 4 May 1945 af-ter being badly damaged in an Alliedbombing raid.

GERMANY: DEUTSCHLAND-CLASSAdmiral Graf Spee. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 203

Units: Scharnhorst, GneisenauType and Significance: The last German

battle cruisers constructed.Dates of Construction: Both units were

laid down in 1935, with Gneisenau beingcompleted in mid-1938 and Scharnhorstfollowing in early 1939.

Hull Dimensions: 753’ 11” x 98’ 5” x 27’Displacement: 34,841 tonsArmor: A belt that varied in thickness from

6.75 inches to 13.75 inches, a deck 2inches deep, protection up to 14 inchesthick on the main turrets.

Armament: Nine 11-inch guns in threetriple-gunned turrets, two being locatedforward and one aft. Also 12 5.9-inch gunsdisposed in double-gunned turrets locatedon the sides, 14 4.1-inch pieces, 16 1.5-inch antiaircraft weapons, eight .8-inchantiaircraft guns, and three or four air-craft.

Machinery: Turbines fed by 12 oil-firedboilers that generated 165,000 horse-power.

Speed: 32 knotsComplement: 1,669–1,840Summary: These vessels are referred to be

some as battleships, but their armament isthat of a battle cruiser. Adolf Hitler tabledplans for higher-caliber weaponry for fearof angering the enforcing powers of theTreaty of Versailles that placed restrictionson German warship construction. Never-theless, these were powerful vessels andrepresented a significant threat to the Al-lies in World War II. The Gneisenau wasbombed in November 1942 by British air-craft and badly damaged. Plans to repairthe vessel and refit it with heavierweaponry never materialized, and the shiprode at anchor without its bow. Much ofthe ship’s armament was offloaded for useas land batteries. It was scuttled in early1945. The wreck was scrapped between1947 and 1951. Scharnhorst was sunk on26 December 1943 while attempting toraid Allied commerce.

GERMANY: SCHARNHORST-CLASSGneisenau. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

204 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

GERMANY: ADMIRAL HIPPER-CLASSAdmiral Hipper. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Admiral Hipper, Blücher, Prinz EugenType and Significance: These vessels

were among the largest heavy cruisers inthe service of the German Navy in WorldWar II.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1935 and 1936 and completed be-tween 1939 and 1940.

Hull Dimensions: 665’ 8” x 69’ 10.5” x19’ (Admiral Hipper, Blücher); 679’ 1.5”x 70’ 6” x 21’ 8” (Prinz Eugen)

Displacement: 14,050 tons (Admiral Hip-per, Blücher); 16,974 tons (Prinz Eugen)

Armor: A belt between 1.5 inches and3.25 inches thick, a deck up to 1.25inches deep, and a maximum of 6.25inches of protection for the main turrets.

Armament: Eight 8-inch guns in four dual-gunned turrets, two each being locatedfore and aft. Also 12 4.1-inch pieces, 121.5-inch antiaircraft guns, eight .8-inchantiaircraft weapons, 12 20.8-inch tor-pedo tubes, and three aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines that produced132,000 horsepower.

Speed: 32.5 knotsComplement: 1,600Summary: Two of these units did not sur-

vive World War II. The Blücher was sunkon 9 April 1940 by land-based gun andtorpedo installations during the Germaninvasion of Norway. The Admiral Hipperwas scuttled on 2 May 1945 after sus-taining heavy damage from Allied bomb-ing raids. The Prinz Eugen has the dis-tinction of being the only large Germanwarship to survive World War II. It wasused as an experimental ship in theatomic bomb blasts at Bikini Atoll in thePacific Ocean. It sank on 22 December1946 as a result of damage sustained inthe experiments. Two other units werenever completed. In 1942, constructionon one of these, Seydlitz, was nearingcompletion when the decision was madeto convert it to an aircraft carrier. Thisplan was soon cancelled, and the hull re-mained unused for most of the war. On10 April 1945, the vessel was scuttled to

(continued on page 205)

(continued from page 204)prevent its capture by the Russians. Itwas refloated by the Russians andscrapped. The other incomplete ship,

Lutzow, was sold to the Soviet Union inearly 1940. It served as an accommoda-tion ship from 1945 to 1956, when itwas scrapped.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 205

Units: Minotaur, Shannon, DefenseType and Significance: These vessels

were Great Britain’s last and largest ar-mored cruisers.

Dates of Construction: All three werelaid down in 1905. Minotaur and Shan-non were completed in 1908; Defensewas ready for service the following year.

Hull Dimensions: 519’ x 74’ 6” x 26’Displacement: 14,600 tonsArmor: A belt that varied between 3 and 6

inches in thickness and a deck with amaximum depth of 1.5 inches.

Armament: Four 9.2-inch guns in twin-gunned turrets located fore and aft,10 7.5-inch weapons, 16 12-pounderpieces, and five 18-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines pow-

ered by 24 coal-fired boilers that gener-ated 27,000 horsepower.

Speed: 23 knotsComplement: 755Summary: Not only were these the largest

armored cruisers launched by GreatBritain; they were also the most expen-sive and indicative of the rising cost ofcruisers. The Minotaur cost £1.4 million,compared to the £600,000 price tag ofcruisers launched in 1895. All three ves-sels were actively engaged in World WarI. The Defense was sunk on 31 May 1916during the Battle of Jutland. The Mino-taur and Shannon were sold to the scrapyard in 1920 and 1922 respectively.

GREAT BRITAIN: MINOTAUR-CLASSShannon. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

206 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

Units: Invincible, Inflexible, IndomitableType and Significance: These vessels

were the world’s first battle cruisers. Dates of Construction: All three units

were laid down in 1906, with Indomitableand Inflexible being completed in 1908.Invincible followed in early 1909.

Hull Dimensions: 567’ x 78’ 6” x 26’ 2”Displacement: 17,373 tonsArmor: A belt varying between 4 and 6

inches in thickness, a protective deckwith a maximum depth of 2.5 inches,and armor up to 7 inches thick on theturrets and barbettes.

Armament: Eight 12-inch guns in fourtwin-gunned turrets. One each was lo-cated fore and aft; the others were lo-cated on the sides amidships. Also seven

6-inch guns, 16 4-inch pieces, and five18-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbine engines powered by31 coal-fired boilers that produced41,000 horsepower.

Speed: 25.5 knotsComplement: 784Summary: All three vessels served in

World War I. The Invincible was sunkon 31 May 1916 during the Battle ofJutland when German shellfire pene-trated a magazine and blew up the ship.The chief reason for the disaster was in-adequate armor to protect against large-caliber gunfire. The other two units sur-vived the war, both being sold for scrapin 1922 to meet tonnage restrictions setby the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty.

GREAT BRITAIN: INVINCIBLE-CLASSInflexible. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 207

Units: Lion, Princess RoyalType and Significance: These battle

cruisers represent the British trend to-ward large battle cruisers that were big-ger than many battleships.

Dates of Construction: Lion andPrincess Royal were laid down in 1909and 1910 respectively, and both werecompleted in 1912.

Hull Dimensions: 700’ x 88’ 6” x 27’ 8”Displacement: 26,270 tonsArmor: A belt between 4 and 9 inches

thick, an armored deck with a maximumdepth of 2.5 inches, and 9-inch armor onthe turrets and barbettes.

Armament: Eight 13.5-inch guns housedin four twin-gunned turrets. Two ofthese were located forward; one eachwas located amidships and aft. Also car-ried 16 4-inch weapons and two 21-inchtorpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines that produced70,000 horsepower.

Speed: 27 knotsComplement: 997Summary: Both ships served extensively in

World War I, with Lion being the flag-ship of Rear Admiral David Beatty, com-mander of the Grand Fleet’s battlecruiser forces. These vessels, like otherBritish battle cruisers, suffered from in-adequate armor protection. Both shipssurvived World War I, although Lion wasnearly destroyed at the 1916 Battle ofJutland when a German shell penetratedone of its turrets. Both ships were de-commissioned and sold as a result of theWashington Naval Treaty. The PrincessRoyal was scrapped in 1922 and Lionfollowed two years later.

GREAT BRITAIN: LION-CLASSLion. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

208 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

Units: Arethusa, Aurora, Galatea, Incon-stant, Penelope, Phaeton, Royalist, Un-daunted

Type and Significance: This class is in-dicative of British light cruiser designshortly before World War I; the unitswere among the first in the world tocarry antiaircraft guns.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1912 and 1913; all were com-pleted between 1914 and 1915.

Hull Dimensions: 436’ x 39’ x 13’ 5”Displacement: 3,750 tonsArmor: A belt between 1 and 3 inches

thick and a deck 1 inch deep.Armament: Two 6-inch guns, six 4-inch

weapons, and one 3-pounder antiaircraftgun in mounts protected by gun shields;also four 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by eight oil-fired boilers that generated 40,000horsepower.

Speed: 28.5 knotsComplement: 276–282Summary: All units of the class served in

World War I. On 11 February 1916,Arethusa was mined and sunk. The oth-ers were sold for scrap between 1922and 1927.

GREAT BRITAIN: ARETHUSA-CLASSArethusa. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 209

Units: Courageous, GloriousType and Significance: These two battle

cruisers represent extreme design princi-ples for the type.

Dates of Construction: Both units werelaid down in 1915 and completed in1917.

Hull Dimensions: 786’ 3” x 81’ x 23’ 4”Displacement: 19,230 tonsArmor: A belt between 2 and 3 inches

thick, a deck that varied between 1.5 and.75 inches, barbette armor up to 7inches thick, and turret protection with amaximum thickness of 13 inches.

Armament: Four 15-inch guns containedin twin-gunned turrets, one each foreand aft, 18 4-inch weapons, two 3-inchguns, and two 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by 18 oil-fired boilers that produced 90,000horsepower.

Speed: 32 knotsComplement: 828–842Summary: These two vessels were entirely

inadequate. One problem was their lightconstruction. The forward section ofCourageous buckled from the weight ofthe forward gun turret. In addition, thepoor protection made them vulnerable toeven the lightest enemy fire. As a result,after World War I both units were con-verted into aircraft carriers and served inWorld War II. The Courageous was tor-pedoed and sunk by a German subma-rine on 17 September 1939. The Glori-ous was sunk by gunfire on 8 June 1940.

GREAT BRITAIN: COURAGEOUS-CLASSGlorious. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This vessel wasBritain’s last, largest, and most powerfulbattle cruiser.



deep, decks from 1.5 inches to 3 inchesdeep, barbette protection up to 12inches thick, and 15-inch turret armor.

Armament: Eight 15-inch guns in twin-gunned turrets, two each being locatedfore and aft, 12 5.5-inch pieces, four 4-inch weapons, four 3-pound guns, andsix 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by 24 oil-fired boilers that generated 144,000horsepower.

Speed: 31 knots

Complement: 1,477Summary: Hood was originally one unit of

a four-ship class, but the other threeunits were cancelled in 1918 with theend of World War I. Known as the“Mighty Hood” by the British peoplechiefly because of its size, the vessel wasthe symbol of the Royal Navy in the in-terwar years. The ship served in WorldWar II; on 24 May 1941 it was destroyedin action with the German battleshipBismarck. Like British battle cruisers be-fore it, Hood suffered a magazine explo-sion when shellfire penetrated the rela-tively thin armor and detonated amagazine. There were only three sur-vivors of its crew. The loss, announced at9:00 P.M. on 24 May, was treated as a na-tional disaster by the British people.

210 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

GREAT BRITAIN: HOODCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Norfolk, DorsetshireType and Significance: These heavy

cruisers are an example of British designsthat conformed to the Washington Treaty.


Hull Dimensions: 635’ 5” x 66’ x 20’ 11”Displacement: 9,975 tonsArmor: A belt 1 inch thick and 1-inch pro-

tection for the turrets.Armament: Eight 8-inch guns in four twin-

gunned turrets, two each located foreand aft, four 4-inch guns, four 2-poundpom-pom weapons, and eight 21-inchtorpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbine engines driven byeight oil-fired boilers that were capableof 80,000 horsepower.

Speed: 32.3 knotsComplement: 710Summary: These vessels, as with most

other cruisers of the treaty era, were vul-nerable to gunfire of even a light caliberdue to their light armor protection. Bothvessels served in World War II. TheDorsetshire was sunk on 5 April 1942 byaircraft attack. This vessel was one of theunits that helped to sink the Germanbattleship Bismarck. The Norfolk wasscrapped in 1950.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 211

GREAT BRITAIN: NORFOLK-CLASSNorfolk. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Edinburgh, BelfastType and Significance: Light cruisers in-

dicative of British pre–World War II de-sign.

Dates of Construction: Both ships werelaid down and completed in 1939.

Hull Dimensions: 613’ 6” x 63’ 4” x 21’ 3”Displacement: 10,550 tonsArmor: A belt 4.25 inches thick and turret

armor varying between 4 and 2 inches.Armament: 12 6-inch guns in four triple-

gunned turrets, two each being locatedfore and aft. Also 12 4-inch pieces, four3-pounders, 16 2-pounder pom-pom an-tiaircraft guns, six 21-inch torpedotubes, and three aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines fed by four oil-firedboilers that were capable of 80,000horsepower.

Speed: 32.5 knotsComplement: 850Summary: Both vessels served in World

War II. The Edinburgh was torpedoed on30 April 1942 and badly damaged. Twodays later, limping back to port, it was at-tacked by three German destroyers.Damage incurred in the action led to theship being scuttled. The Belfast becamefamous for its participation in the huntfor the German battle cruiser Scharn-horst in 1943. The vessel was preservedas a museum ship in 1971 and is cur-rently anchored in the Thames River.The Belfast is the only surviving unit ofsize of the wartime Royal Navy.

212 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

GREAT BRITAIN: EDINBURGH-CLASSBelfast. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: A scout cruiserthat was one of the first cruisers whoseengines were completely oil-fueledrather than coal-fired.


Hull Dimensions: 439’ 9” x 42’ x 13’ 5”Displacement: 3,271 tonsArmor: A deck 1.5 inches thick.Armament: Six 4.7-inch guns in single, un-

protected mounts, six 3-inch pieces, two17.7-inch torpedo tubes, and 200 mines.

Machinery: Turbines driven by 10 oil-fu-eled boilers that produced 29,215 horse-power

Speed: 28.6 knotsComplement: 247Summary: Quarto was a successful ship

and exceeded the expectations for its de-sign through its engine plant that pro-duced over 4,000 extra horsepower. Theship enjoyed a long career, being strickenfrom service in early 1939.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 213

ITALY: QUARTO

Units: Zara, Fiume, Pola, GoriziaType and Significance: These heavy

cruisers are good examples of Italianbreaches of the Washington Treaty.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1929 and 1931 and completed be-tween late 1931 and late 1932.

Hull Dimensions: 557’ 2” x 62’ x 21’ 11” Displacement: 11, 680 tonsArmor: A belt with a maximum thickness

of 5.5 inches, an armored deck up to 2inches deep, and armor on the turretsthat was 5.5 inches thick.

Armament: Eight 8-inch guns carried infour twin-gunned turrets, two each beinglocated fore and aft. Also carried 16 3.9-inch guns, four 40mm antiaircraftpieces, and eight 13.2mm antiaircraftguns.


Speed: 32 knotsComplement: 841Summary: These ships were a willful viola-

tion of the Washington Treaty. The unitswent on their trials without turrets in-stalled in order to appear well below thetonnage restriction mandated by theagreement. The Zara, Pola, and Fiumewere sunk on 29 March 1941 by a com-bination of gunfire and torpedoes fromBritish warships off Cape Matapan inthe Mediterranean Sea. The Gorizia wascaptured by the Germans upon Italy’ssurrender and was subsequently sunk byItalian saboteurs. It was raised and bro-ken up in 1946.

214 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

ITALY: ZARA-CLASSZara. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Tsukuba, IkomaType and Significance: These vessels

were armored cruisers that marked atechnological advance toward the battlecruiser.

Dates of Construction: Both ships werelaid down in 1905, with Tsukuba beingcompleted in 1907 and Ikoma one yearlater.

Hull Dimensions: 450’ x 75’ 5” x 26’ 1”Displacement: 13,750 tonsArmor: A belt with a maximum thickness

of 7 inches, a protective deck 3 inchesdeep, and 7-inch-thick armor plating onthe turrets.

Armament: Four 12-inch guns in twin-gunned turrets, one each located fore

and aft, 12 6-inch weapons, 12 4.7-inchpieces, four 3.1-inch guns, and three 18-inch torpedo tubes. The Ikoma was laterrearmed with 10 6-inch guns, eight 4.7-inch pieces, and six 3.1-inch weapons.

Machinery: Two triple-expansion enginesfed by 20 coal-fired boilers that gener-ated 20,500 horsepower.

Speed: 20.5 knotsComplement: 879Summary: Tsukuba was destroyed by a

magazine explosion in Yokosuka Bay,Japan, on 14 January 1917 and was laterraised and scrapped. The Ikoma was dis-armed in compliance with the Washing-ton Treaty and scrapped in 1924.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 215

JAPAN: TSUKUBA-CLASS

Units: Kongo, Hiei, Haruna, KirishimaType and Significance: These vessels

were Japan’s only true battle cruisers.Dates of Construction: Kongo and Hiei

were laid down in 1911; the other twounits followed a year later. All were com-pleted between 1913 and 1915.


thick, 10-inch armor on the barbettes,and 9-inch turret protection. Deck ar-mor up to 2.25 inches deep was addedduring a refit.

Armament: Eight 14-inch weaponsmounted in four twin-gunned turrets:two located in the bow, one aft, and the

fourth placed aft amidships. Also 16 6-inch guns, eight 3.1-inch pieces, andeight 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by 36 boil-ers that produced 64,000 horsepower.The number of boilers was reduced to 16during a refit.

Speed: 27.5 knotsComplement: 1,221Summary: These vessels were the first in

the world armed with 14-inch guns. Allfour units were rebuilt in the 1930s withgreater protection and were essentiallyfast battleships as a result. They allserved in World War II. None survivedthe war.

216 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

JAPAN: KONGO-CLASSKongo. Courtesy of National Archives/Naval Historical Foundation.

Type and Significance: This light cruiseris indicative of the Japanese tendencyto incorporate as much armament aspossible onto the hulls of relativelysmall vessels.

Dates of Construction: Laid down in1922 and completed the following year.

Hull Dimensions: 455’ 8” x 39’ 6” x 11’ 9”Displacement: 2,890 tonsArmor: A belt 2.3 inches thick, a deck 1

inch deep, and 1-inch armor on the gunhouses.

Armament: Six 5.5-inch guns, one 3-inchantiaircraft weapon, two machine guns,

four 24-inch torpedo tubes, and 34mines; two 5.5-inch guns were later re-moved.


Speed: 35.5 knotsComplement: 328Summary: Yubari was refitted in the 1920s

and served in World War II. On 28 April1944, the ship was sunk after sustaininga torpedo hit by a U.S. submarine.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 217

JAPAN: YUBARICourtesy of National Archives/Naval Historical Foundation.

Units: Nachi, Myoko, Haguro, AshigaraType and Significance: These heavy

cruisers were the first built by Japan thatconformed to the Washington Treaty.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1924 and 1925, all were com-pleted between 1928 and 1929.

Hull Dimensions: 668’ 6” x 56’ 11” x 19’ 4”Displacement: 10,000 tonsArmor: A belt 3.9 inches thick, a deck 1.4

inches deep, and 1-inch protection onthe turrets.

Armament: 10 8-inch guns in five twin-gunned turrets, three being located for-

ward and two aft, as well as six 4.7-inchantiaircraft guns, two machine guns, 1224-inch torpedo tubes, and two aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines powered by 12 oil-fired boilers that generated 130,000horsepower.

Speed: 35.5 knotsComplement: 773Summary: All units served in World War II,

but only Myoko survived. The other unitswere sunk by aircraft, submarine, andsurface attack. The Myoko was scuttledsoon after the close of hostilities.

218 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

JAPAN: NACHI-CLASSHaguro. Naval Historical Foundation.

Units: Pallada, Diana, AuroraType and Significance: Russian pro-

tected cruisers.Dates of Construction: Laid down be-

tween 1895 and 1897. All three werecompleted between 1902 and 1903.

Hull Dimensions: 415’ 8” x 55’ x 20’ 10”Displacement: 6,823 tonsArmor: A deck up to 3 inches deep.Armament: Eight 6-inch guns, 24 11-

pounders, and three 15-inch torpedotubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines fedby three coal-fueled boilers that created13,000 horsepower.

Speed: 19.3 knotsComplement: 571–581Summary: Diana and Pallada were scrapped

in 1922 and 1923 respectively. The Aurorawas preserved in 1956 as a museum ship.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 219

RUSSIA: PALLADA-CLASSPallada. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This armoredcruiser was one of the most powerfulunits of its type.


Hull Dimensions: 529’ x 75’ x 26’Displacement: 15,190 tonsArmor: A belt that varied between 4 and 6

inches in thickness as well as armor onits turrets that had a maximum thicknessof 8 inches.

Armament: Four 10-inch guns in twin-gunned turrets, one each being locatedfore and aft. It also carried eight 8-inch

pieces in turrets, 20 4.7-inch weapons,and two 18-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion engines fedby 28 coal-fired boilers that produced19,700 horsepower.

Speed: 21 knotsComplement: 899Summary: Rurik served extensively in the

Baltic Sea during World War I, where itwas the flagship of Russia’s cruisersquadron. In addition, it was also used asa minelayer capable of shipping 400mines. It was broken up in 1923.

220 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

RUSSIA: RURIKCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This vessel wasthe world’s smallest armored cruiser.


Hull Dimensions: 396’ 4” x 50’ x 20’ 8”Displacement: 4,310 tonsArmor: A belt 4 inches thick and a deck up

to 1.4 inches deep.Armament: Eight 6-inch guns in four twin-

gunned turrets, 14 2.2-inch pieces, vari-ous antiaircraft weaponry, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: Triple-expansion enginesdriven by coal-fired boilers that pro-duced 12,000 horsepower.

Speed: 22 knotsComplement: 322Summary: Fylgia had a long career and was

refitted between 1939 and 1940. It wasdecommissioned in January 1953, usedas a missile target, and scrapped in1957.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 221

SWEDEN: FYLGIACourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This vessel wasthe world’s first purpose-built hybridcruiser.


Hull Dimensions: 442’ 3” x 50’ 7” x 18’Displacement: 4,700 tonsArmor: A deck 2 inches deep and turret ar-

mor 1 inch thick.Armament: Six 5.9-inch guns housed in

two triple-gunned turrets, one each be-ing located forward and aft of the mainsuperstructure. Also carried four 3-inchantiaircraft pieces, four one-inch antiair-craft weapons, four machine guns, six20.8-inch torpedo tubes, 80–100 mines,and six aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines driven by four oil-fueled boilers that yielded 33,000 horse-power.

Speed: 28 knotsComplement: 467Summary: The Gotland was first envi-

sioned by Swedish naval officials as asmall aircraft carrier. This plan was al-tered to a hybrid vessel in order to realizethe most value for the expense incurredby the construction of the vessel. Thesternmost quarter of the Gotland’s hullwas a flight deck for air operations; therest of the vessel was a conventionalcruiser. Gotland was sold for scrap inearly 1962.

222 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

SWEDEN: GOTLANDCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Chester, Birmingham, SalemType and Significance: Two ships of this

scout cruiser class, Chester and Salem,have the distinction of being the firstturbine-powered vessels in the UnitedStates Navy.

Dates of Construction: All three werelaid down in 1905 and commissioned in1908.

Hull Dimensions: 423’ 2” x 47’ 1” x 16’ 9”Displacement: 3,750 tonsArmor: A partial belt 2 inches thick that

covered machinery spaces and an ar-mored deck 1 inch deep that protectedthe same.

Armament: Two 5-inch guns in single, un-protected mounts, one each being lo-cated fore and aft. Also carried six 3-inchpieces and two 21-inch torpedo tubes.

Machinery: In Birmingham, two triple-expansion engines with 12 coal-firedboilers that generated 16,000 horse-power; the other two vessels used tur-bine engines that produced the samepower.

Speed: 24 knotsComplement: 359 Summary: Being scout cruisers, the protec-

tion for the hulls of the Chester classunits was light. Naval officials generallycriticized the ships for their lack of ar-mament. The Birmingham became fa-mous for being the site of the first take-off of an airplane from a ship when awooden platform was built on its bow asa runway for the plane. All three vesselswere sold for scrap in 1930.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 223

UNITED STATES: CHESTER-CLASSBirmingham. Courtesy of Smithsonian Institution/Naval Historical Foundation.

Units: Omaha, Milwaukee, Cincinnati,Raleigh, Detroit, Richmond, Concord,Trenton, Marblehead, Memphis

Type and Significance: These light cruis-ers were the first cruisers built by theUnited States since 1904.


Hull Dimensions: 555’ 6” x 55’ x 13’ 6”Displacement: 7,050 tonsArmor: A belt 3 inches thick and a deck

1.5 inches deep.Armament: 12 6-inch guns, two 3-inch an-

tiaircraft pieces, and 10 21-inch torpedotubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by eight oil-fired boilers that were capable of 90,000horsepower.

Speed: 34 knotsComplement: 458Summary: U.S. naval officials criticized

these vessels for their relatively light ar-mament. All units of the class served inWorld War II and survived the conflict.The Milwaukee was sold to the SovietUnion in 1944; the other units werescrapped between 1945 and 1947.

224 CRUISERS, 1906–1939

UNITED STATES: OMAHA-CLASSOmaha. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: New Orleans, Astoria, Minneapolis,Tuscaloosa, San Francisco, Quincy, Vin-cennes

Type and Significance: These heavycruisers represent U.S. designs that con-formed to the Washington Treaty.


Hull Dimensions: 588’ x 61’ 9” x 22’ 9”Displacement: 10,136 tonsArmor: A belt between 3.25 inches and 5

inches thick, a deck 2.25 inches deepthat covered the machinery spaces, 5-inch protection on the barbettes, and 6inches of armor on the turrets.

Armament: Nine 8-inch guns mounted inthree triple-gunned turrets, two being lo-

cated forward and one aft, as well aseight 5-inch pieces, eight .5-inch guns,and four aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines driven by eight oil-fired boilers that generated 107,000horsepower.

Speed: 32.7 knotsComplement: 868Summary: These units were designed like

other U.S. cruisers of the age for long-distance operations in the Pacific Ocean.They all served in World War II. The As-toria, Quincy, and Vincennes were sunkon 9 August 1942 by Japanese gunfireand torpedoes in the Battle of Savo Is-land. The remaining units were scrappedbetween 1959 and 1961.

CRUISERS, 1906–1939 225

UNITED STATES: NEW ORLEANS-CLASSNew Orleans. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

C R U I S E R S , 1 9 4 0 – 2 0 0 4

227

Type and Significance: This light cruiserwas among the last cruisers built byFrance.

Dates of Construction: Laid down inlate 1953 and completed in mid-1959.

Hull Dimensions: 593’ x 66’ x 25’Displacement: 8,500 tonsArmor: A belt that varies in thickness be-

tween 3.1 inches and 1.9 inches and adeck 1.9 inches deep.

Armament: 16 5-inch guns and 27 2.2-inch pieces. Rearmed as a missile andgun cruiser that mounted one MascuraSAM system aft, four Exocet SSMs for-

ward, two 3.9-inch guns in single mountsforward, and six 2.2-inch pieces.

Machinery: Turbines driven by four oil-fueled boilers that were capable of86,000 horsepower.

Speed: 31.5 knotsComplement: 977Summary: Colbert was extensively refitted

while in service to carry missile systems.Between April 1970 and October 1972the ship was given a new armament. TheColbert was decommissioned in 1991and is now a museum ship at the port ofBordeaux.

228 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

FRANCE: COLBERTCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This vessel isFrance’s only helicopter cruiser.


Hull Dimensions: 597’ x 73’ x 24’Displacement: 10,000 tonsArmor: None Armament: Four 3.9-inch guns and be-

tween four and eight helicopters. Six Ex-ocet SSM launchers installed in theearly 1970s.

Machinery: Turbines powered by four oil-fired boilers that are capable of 40,000horsepower.

Speed: 26.5 knots Complement: 617Summary: Jeanne d’Arc remains in service

in the French Navy as a training ship. Ithas, however, recently suffered frequentmechanical breakdowns.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 229

FRANCE: JEANNE D’ ARCCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Dido, Argonaut, Bonaventure,Charybdis, Cleopatra, Euryalus, Hermione,Naiad, Phoebe, Scylla, Sirius

Type and Significance: These light cruis-ers were the first antiaircraft cruisers.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1937 and 1939; all were com-pleted between 1940 and 1942.

Hull Dimensions: 512’ x 50’ 6” x 16’ 9”Displacement: 5,600 tonsArmor: A belt 3 inches thick that covered

the machinery spaces and magazines.Armament: 10 5.25-inch dual-purpose

guns mounted in turrets, three being lo-cated forward, two aft. Also carriedsmaller antiaircraft guns and six 21-inchtorpedo tubes.

Machinery: Turbines powered by four oil-fired boilers that generated 62,000horsepower.

Speed: 32.2 knotsComplement: 480–530Summary: The turret used in the Dido-class

vessels was designed to be used againstsurface targets or raised to a 70-degreeelevation for use against enemy aircraft,making it a dual-purpose turret. All unitsserved in World War II. Bonaventure wassunk on 31 March 1941 by a torpedo at-tack from an Italian submarine. The Na-iad and Hermione were sunk on 11March 1942 and 16 June 1942, respec-tively, by German submarines. TheCharybdis was sunk on 23 October 1943by torpedo attack. The other units sur-vived the war and were scrapped be-tween 1950 and 1956.

230 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

GREAT BRITAIN: DIDO-CLASSScylla. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Tiger, Lion, BlakeType and Significance: These light cruis-

ers were the last cruisers built for theRoyal Navy.

Dates of Construction: Tiger was laiddown in 1941; construction on the othertwo units commenced the following year.The Tiger was completed in 1959; Lionand Blake were ready for service in 1960and 1961 respectively.

Hull Dimensions: 555’ 6” x 64’ x 23’Displacement: 9,550 tonsArmor: A belt with a maximum thickness

of 3.5 inches that covered the machineryand magazines and turret protection be-tween 2 inches and 1 inch in thickness.

Armament: Four 6-inch guns in two dual-gunned turrets, one each being locatedfore and aft, and six 3-inch pieces. When

refitted, the battery was changed to two6-inch guns in a dual-gunned turret lo-cated forward, two Sea Cat SAM sys-tems, and four ASW helicopters.

Machinery: Turbines powered by four oil-fueled boilers that were capable of80,000 horsepower.

Speed: 31.5 knotsComplement: 880 Summary: The class was a World War II

design. Tiger and Blake were refittedduring the mid-1960s and early 1970s.Their aft turrets were removed and re-placed by a hanger and flight deck forASW operations. The Lion was removedfrom service in 1975 and used as a spareparts depot for the other two units. TheTiger and Blake followed the Lion in1979 and 1981 respectively.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 231

GREAT BRITAIN: TIGER-CLASSBlake. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

232 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

Units: Andrea Doria, Caio DuilioType and Significance: This class was

the world’s first purpose-built helicoptercruiser.


Hull Dimensions: 489’ 9” x 56’ 5” x 16’ 5”Displacement: 5,000 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: One Terrier SAM launcher

placed forward, eight 3-inch guns, six12.6-inch torpedo tubes, and four heli-copters. Rearmed in the late 1970s. An-

drea Doria then carried one StandardSAM system that replaced the TerrierSAM system, one Otomat SSM launcher,and an Albatross SAM system. CaioDuilio received one Standard SAM sys-tem in place of the Terrier.

Machinery: Turbines powered by four oil-fired boilers that generated 60,000horsepower.

Speed: 30 knotsComplement: 485Summary: Both ships were modernized

over the course of their careers; theywere decommissioned in 1991.

ITALY: ANDREA DORIA-CLASSAndrea Doria. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 233

Type and Significance: The vessel is ahelicopter cruiser that remains in service.


Hull Dimensions: 589’ 3” x 63’ 7” x 19’ 9”Displacement: 7,500 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: One multipurpose, dual-mis-

sile Terrier SAM/ASW/ASROC launcherlocated forward, eight 3-inch guns, six12.6-inch torpedo tubes, and nine heli-copters. The battery has been updated toone MK 20 ASROC/SAM launcher, fourOtomat SSMs, two 12.75-inch torpedotubes, six helicopters, and an assortmentof small-caliber antiaircraft guns.

Machinery: Turbines fed by oil-fueledboilers that created 73,000 horsepower.

Speed: 30.5 knotsComplement: 550Summary: Vittorio Veneto was first planned

as a unit of the Andrea Doria-class, butthe design was modified to address thelack of space that the Andrea Doria classhad for helicopter operation. The Vitto-rio Veneto is consequently a larger ship.It has been extensively modernized overthe course of its career. The vessel cur-rently remains in the service of the Ital-ian Navy and is set to decommissionaround 2005.

ITALY: VITTORIO VENETOCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

234 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

Units: Agano, Noshiro, Yahagi, SakawaType and Significance: These light cruis-

ers represent the majority of Japanesecruiser construction during World WarII.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1940 and 1942; all units werecompleted between 1942 and 1944.

Hull Dimensions: 571’ 2” x 49’ 10” x 18’ 6”Displacement: 6,652 tonsArmor: A belt 2.2 inches thick over the

machinery and 2 inches thick over themagazines, .7-inch deep deck protection,and 1-inch turret armor.

Armament: Six 6-inch guns in three dual-gunned turrets, two being mounted for-ward and one aft. Also four 3-inch anti-

aircraft guns, 32 .98-inch antiaircraftguns, eight 24-inch torpedo tubes, andtwo aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines powered by six oil-fueled boilers that produced 100,000horsepower.

Speed: 35 knotsComplement: 730 Summary: All units saw action in World

War II; the Agano, Noshiro, and Yahagiwere sunk. The first was destroyed byU.S. submarine attack; the last two suc-cumbed to U.S. aerial assault. TheSakawa survived the war and in 1946was used as a test ship for the atomicbomb experiments at Bikini Atoll. It wasdestroyed in the tests.

JAPAN: AGANO-CLASS

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 235

NETHERLANDS: DE ZEVEN PROVINCIENCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Type and Significance: This cruiser isthe first example of the United Statessharing its missile technology with ColdWar allies.


Hull Dimensions: 609’ x 57’ x 22’Displacement: 9,529 tonsArmor: A belt up to 3.9 inches thick and a

deck with a maximum depth of 1 inch. Armament: Eight 5.9-inch guns in four

double-gunned turrets, two each beinglocated fore and aft. Also eight 2.2-inchpieces and eight 1.5-inch weapons forantiaircraft defense. This battery waschanged to one Terrier SAM system witha launcher mounted aft that had 40 mis-

siles at its disposal. The incorporation ofthe Terrier system led to an armamentthat included four 5.9-inch guns in twotwin-gunned turrets located forward andsix 2.2-inch guns.

Machinery: Turbines driven by four oil-fired boilers that produced 85,000horsepower.

Speed: 32 knotsComplement: 926Summary: The two aft 5.9-inch gun turrets

of De Zeven Provincien were removed toaccommodate its Terrier SAM launcherand its radar and guidance systems. Thevessel was sold to Peru in 1976 and de-commissioned in 1999. It was scrappedin 2000.

236 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

Units: Kirov, VoroshilovType and Significance: These heavy

cruisers are representative of Soviet con-struction in the years before World War II.

Dates of Construction: Laid down in1935, with Kirov being completed in1938 and Voroshilov following in mid-1940.

Hull Dimensions: 626’ 8” x 57’ 11” x 23’ 9” Displacement: 7,800 tonsArmor: A belt 2 inches thick, a deck 2

inches deep, turret armor 3 inches thick,and 2-inch protection for the barbettes.

Armament: Nine 7-inch guns in threetriple-gunned turrets, two being located

forward and one aft. Also six 3.9-inchpieces, six 1.8-inch antiaircraft guns, six21-inch torpedo tubes, 100 mines, andtwo aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines fueled by six oil-firedboilers that generated 113,000 horse-power.

Speed: 34 knotsComplement: 734Summary: This class was designed in part

by the Italians. Both ships served exten-sively in World War II. The Voroshilovwas scrapped in the 1960s; Kirov fol-lowed in the 1970s.

SOVIET UNION: KIROV-CLASSKirov. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 237

Units: Sverdlov, Zhdanov, Admiral Lazarev,Admiral Ushakov, Admiral Senyavin,Dmitry Pozharski, Varyag, Ordzhonikidze,Aleksandr Nevski, Aleksander Suvarov,Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya, Murmansk,Dzerzhinski, Admiral Nakhimov, MikhailKutuzov

Type and Significance: These light cruis-ers were among the world’s last vesselswhose armament was composed solely ofguns.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1949 and 1954, with the last be-ing completed in 1955.

Hull Dimensions: 689’ x 72’ 2” x 24’ 7”Displacement: 16,000 tonsArmor: A belt with a maximum thickness

of 5 inches, a deck that varied between 3inches and 1 inch in depth, and 5-inchturret armor.

Armament: 12 5.9-inch guns in four triple-gunned turrets, two each being locatedfore and aft, 12 3.9-inch guns, antiair-

craft weapons, and 10 20.8-inch torpedotubes.

Machinery: Turbines fed by six oil-firedboilers that could produce 110,000horsepower.

Speed: 32.5 knotsComplement: 1,010Summary: These ships engendered alarm

in the naval officials of the Western pow-ers, as they were perceived as significantthreats. Although powerful in appear-ance, however, the Sverdlov-class cruis-ers were rendered largely obsolete by thebeginning of the missile age. The Admi-ral Nakhimov and Dzerzhinski were refit-ted in the late 1950s to test early SovietSSM batteries. The former unit wasscrapped in 1961. The Ordzhonikidzewas sold to Indonesia the following yearand sold for scrap in 1972. All the otherunits except one were scrapped by 1994.The Mikhail Kutuzov was put in reservein 1989 and remains in that status.

SOVIET UNION: SVERDLOV-CLASSAleksander Suvarov. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

238 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

Units: Grozny, Admiral Fokin, AdmiralGolovko, Varyag

Type and Significance: These missilecruisers were the first warships in theworld equipped with offensive missilebatteries as primary armament.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1959 and 1962, with constructionending on the class in early 1965.

Hull Dimensions: 464’ 9” x 51’ 10” x 17’ 5”Displacement: 4,400 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Two SS-N-3 SSM launchers,

each holding four missiles; one launchereach was located fore and aft. Also oneSA-N-1 SAM launcher, two RBU-6000ASW systems, and four 3-inch guns

mounted in two dual-gunned turrets lo-cated aft.

Machinery: Turbines fed by four oil-firedboilers that garnered 100,000 horse-power.

Speed: 34 knotsComplement: 375–390Summary: The chief weakness of these

cruisers was their limited space for re-loads to supply the SSM launchers.Even so, they presented a significantthreat upon completion. All four unitsenjoyed long careers, three being strickenfrom service between 1991 and 1993.The Admiral Golovko began a refit in2001 and is now designated as beinglaid up permanently.

SOVIET UNION: KYNDA-CLASSGrozny. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 239

Units: Vitse Admiral Drozd, Sevastopol, Ad-miral Zozulya, Vladivostok

Type and Significance: Missile cruisersthat are examples of vessels built prima-rily for antiaircraft and ASW.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1964 and 1966, with completionof all four being attained in 1968.

Hull Dimensions: 508’ 6” x 55’ 9” x 18’ 1”Displacement: 6,000 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Two SS-N-3 SSM launchers

containing two missiles each. Also twoSA-N-1 SAM launchers, two RBU-6000ASW systems, two RBU-1000 ASW sys-tems, four 2.2-inch guns, 10 20.8-inchtorpedo tubes, and one helicopter.

Machinery: Turbines powered by fourboilers that generated 100,000 horse-power.

Speed: 34 knotsComplement: 380Summary: All four of these units were

scrapped by 1994.

SOVIET UNION: KRESTA I-CLASSCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

240 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

SOVIET UNION: MOSKVA-CLASSLeningrad. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Moskva, LeningradType and Significance: This class was

among the world’s first purpose-builthelicopter cruisers.

Dates of Construction: Moskva was laiddown in 1962; Leningrad followed twoyears later. The former was completed in1967; the latter was ready for service inlate 1968.

Hull Dimensions: 620’ 1” x 85’ 4” x 25’ 3”Displacement: 14,400 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Two SA-N-3 SAM launchers,

four 2.2-inch guns, one SUW-N-1 ASW

system, two RBU-6000 ASW systems, 1020.8-inch torpedo tubes, and 14 heli-copters.

Machinery: Turbines driven by four oil-fueled boilers capable of 100,000 horse-power.

Speed: 30 knotsComplement: 850Summary: The weapons systems were con-

tained in the forward half of the hull; thestern portion consisted of a flight deck.Both ships were retired from service in1990 and sold for scrapping.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 241

Units: Kiev, Minsk, Novorossiyk, KharkovType and Significance: These were the

Soviet Union’s last hybrid cruisers andamong the last cruisers built by the So-viet Union.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1970 and 1978 and completed by1984.

Hull Dimensions: 902’ x 108’ x 26’ 11”Displacement: 36,000 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Four SS-N-12 launchers, two

SA-N-3 SAM launchers, four 3-inchguns, eight 30mm Gatling pieces, 1020.8-inch torpedo tubes, one SUW-N-1ASW system, two RBU-6000 ASW sys-tems, and 31 aircraft.

Machinery: Turbines powered by oil-firedboilers that generated 140,000 horse-power.

Speed: 32 knotsComplement: 1,700Summary: The majority of the weapons

systems on these vessels were located inthe forward half of the hull, as a flightdeck spanned three-quarters of the over-all length. In 1990, three of these shipswere decommissioned and scrapped. Thesurviving vessel, Minsk, was sold toChina in the early 1990s, reportedly foruse as an entertainment complex andcasino.

SOVIET UNION: KIEV-CLASSKiev. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

242 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

Units: Nikolayev, Ochakov, Kerch, Azov,Petropavlovsk, Tashkent, Tallin

Type and Significance: These were someof the more successful cruisers of theSoviet Navy.

Dates of Construction: The units werelaid down between 1969 and 1976, withthe last one being completed in 1980.

Hull Dimensions: 570’ x 60’ x 20’ 4”Displacement: 8,200 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Two SS-N-14 ASW launchers,

two SA-N-3 SAM launchers, two SA-N-4SAM launchers, four 3-inch guns, four30mm Gatling guns, 10 20.8-inch tor-

pedo tubes, two RBU-6000 ASW sys-tems, two RBU-1000 ASW systems, andone helicopter.

Machinery: Four gas turbines that gener-ated 12,000 horsepower.

Speed: 34 knotsComplement: 520Summary: Nikolayev and Petropavlovsk

were scrapped in 1994 and 1999 respec-tively. Only two of the other units, theKerch and Ochakov, are in service in theRussian Navy. The Kerch, however, maynot be deployable. The Ochakov suffereda fire in 1993 and has not returned toservice.

SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA: KARA-CLASSCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 243

Units: Kirov (Admiral Ushakov), Frunze(Admiral Lazarev), Kalinin (AdmiralNakhimov), Yuri Andropov (Petr Velikiy)

Type and Significance: These vessels areRussia’s only nuclear-powered surfacewarships and are classed by some as bat-tle cruisers owing to their size and de-structive power.

Dates of Construction: The lead ship,Kirov, was laid down in 1973; the othersfollowed beginning in 1978. Kirov wascompleted in 1980; Frunze and Kalininwere completed in 1988. The fourth unitfollowed in 1998.

Hull Dimensions: 826’ 9” x 93’ 6” x 24’ 7”Displacement: 25,860 tonsArmor: Undisclosed amount and type.Armament: 12 SA-N-6 SAMs in a vertical

launcher within the bow, one SS-N-14ASW system, a vertical launcher in the

bow that holds 20 SS-N-19 SSMs, twoRBU-6000 ASW systems, 10 20.8-inchtorpedo tubes, eight 30mm Gatling guns,and one helicopter. Also two fully auto-mated guns, being 3.9-inch guns in thecase of Kirov; the other vessels mount5.1-inch guns.

Machinery: Turbines powered by two nu-clear reactors that create 150,000 horse-power.

Speed: 31 knotsComplement: 800Summary: All units were renamed with the

collapse of the Soviet Union. The Admi-ral Ushakov entered a shipyard in 1999for overhaul, but funds are lacking andthe ship might never return to service.The Admiral Lazarev is in a similar state.The other two units remain in the serv-ice of the Russian Navy.

SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA: KIROV-CLASSCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

244 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

Units: Cleveland, Columbia, Montpelier,Denver, Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile,Vincennes, Pasadena, Springfield, Topeka,Biloxi, Houston, Providence, Manchester,Vicksburg, Duluth, Miami, Astoria, Okla-homa City, Little Rock, Galveston, Ams-terdam, Portsmouth, Wilkes-Barre, At-lanta, Dayton, Fargo, Huntington

Type and Significance: This light cruiserclass is one of the most numerous everbuilt and an example of the importanceplaced on antiaircraft defense.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-tween 1940 and 1944, with the last unitsbeing completed in 1946.

Hull Dimensions: 610’ 1” x 66’ 4” x 24’ 6”Displacement: 11,744 tonsArmor: A belt between 5 and 3.5 inches

thick, a deck 2 inches deep, 6-inch bar-bette armor, and turret protection with amaximum thickness of 6.5 inches.

Armament: 12 6-inch guns in four triple-gunned turrets, two each being fore andaft. Also 12 5-inch dual-purpose guns,assorted antiaircraft weapons, and fouraircraft.

Machinery: Turbines driven by four oil-fueled boilers that produced 100,000horsepower.

Speed: 32.5 knotsComplement: 1,285Summary: Like the British Dido-class

cruisers, these ships mounted dual-pur-pose turrets capable of training on sur-face targets and aircraft. All survivedWorld War II. Many were scrapped inthe late 1950s and early 1960s. The restwere stricken from active duty in the1970s. The last was removed from serv-ice in December 1979.

UNITED STATES: CLEVELAND-CLASSCleveland. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 245

Units: Alaska, GuamType and Significance: These vessels

were classed by the navy as heavy cruis-ers, although they more closely approxi-mate the battle cruiser type and as suchare the only ones ever built by theUnited States Navy.

Dates of Construction: Alaska was laiddown in 1941, with Guam following ayear later. Both were completed in 1944.

Hull Dimensions: 808’ 6” x 91’ 1” x 31’ 10”Displacement: 29,779 tonsArmor: A belt up to 9 inches thick, a deck

with a maximum depth of 3.8 inches,barbette protection between 13 and 11inches thick, and turret armor as muchas 12.8 inches thick.

Armament: Nine 12-inch guns in threetriple-gunned turrets, two being locatedforward, one aft. Also 12 5-inch guns, 56

1.5-inch antiaircraft pieces, and 24 .8-inch antiaircraft guns.

Machinery: Turbines fed by eight oil-firedboilers that were capable of 150,000horsepower.

Speed: 33 knotsComplement: 1,799Summary: These warships were designed

in World War II to counter enemy cruis-ers with 8-inch guns. The two unitsproved expensive to operate and wereboth put in reserve soon after the end ofthe war. Both ships were scrapped in1961. A third unit, Hawaii, waslaunched but never completed. Plans ex-isted to either convert Hawaii into a mis-sile cruiser or a command ship, but thesenever reached fruition. The incompletevessel was scrapped in early 1960.

UNITED STATES: ALASKA-CLASSAlaska. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Boston, CanberraType and Significance: These cruisers

were the first missile-armed ships of theUnited States Navy. They were also thefirst surface vessels in the world thatwere so equipped.

Dates of Construction: Boston was re-constructed and recommissioned by late1955; Canberra reentered service inmid-1956.

Hull Dimensions: 673’ 5” x 69’ 8” x 21’ 11”Displacement: 13,589 tonsArmor: A belt with a maximum thickness of

6 inches, a deck 2.5 inches deep, barbettearmor up to 6.3 inches thick, and 8-inchprotection on portions of the turrets.

Armament: Two Terrier SAM systems thateach had 72-missile magazines; bothlaunchers were located aft. Also six 8-inch guns in two triple-gunned turretslocated forward, 10 5-inch weapons, andeight 3-inch pieces.

Machinery: Turbines driven by four oil-fired boilers that produced 120,000horsepower.

Speed: 33 knotsComplement: 1,544Summary: Both vessels were World War II

Baltimore-class heavy cruisers that be-came hybrid missile/gun cruisers. Theywere withdrawn from service in 1970.

246 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

UNITED STATES: BOSTON-CLASS

Type and Significance: This vessel wasthe world’s first purpose-built missilecruiser. It was also the first surface war-ship in the world that was equipped withnuclear-powered turbine engines.

Dates of Construction: Laid down in1957 and completed in late 1961.

Hull Dimensions: 721’ 3” x 73’ 4” x 23’ 9”Displacement: 15,111 tonsArmor: None (armor 1.75 inches thick was

later added to protect the superstruc-ture).

Armament: One Talos SAM system. Thetwo-armed launcher was mounted aftand supplied by a magazine containing52 missiles. Also two Terrier SAM sys-tems mounted forward. Their twin-armed launchers were supplied by maga-zines that held 120 missiles. In addition,two 5-inch guns, one ASROC ASWlauncher, and six 12.75-inch MK 32 tor-

pedoes. This armament was altered in1979 when the Talos system was re-moved in favor of two Harpoon missilebatteries. Also added was a 20mm Pha-lanx cannon.

Machinery: Two turbines powered by twoC1W nuclear reactors that generated80,000 horsepower.

Speed: 30 knotsComplement: 1,107Summary: The nuclear-powered engines of

Long Beach provided a great advantageover other warships. Not only could theship remain at sea longer than warshipsof the oil-fired type; it could also raisepower immediately, compared to pastwarships that had to work up their en-gines before propulsion was possible.Long Beach was decommissioned on 1May 1995; its hull is currently awaitingfinal disposal.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 247

UNITED STATES: LONG BEACHCourtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: California, South CarolinaType and Significance: Nuclear-powered

missile cruisers.Dates of Construction: Both units were

laid down in 1970, with California beingcompleted in 1974 and South Carolinain early 1975.

Hull Dimensions: 596’ x 61’ x 20’ 6”Displacement: 10,150 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Two dual-missile Standard

SAM launchers, one each being locatedfore and aft, that were supplied by maga-zines that held a total of 80 missiles. Alsoone ASROC ASW system, four 12.75-

inch ASW torpedo tubes, and two 5-inchguns in single mounts located one eachfore and aft.

Machinery: Turbines driven by two D2Gnuclear reactors that generated 60,000horsepower.

Speed: 30 knotsComplement: 553Summary: These warships were designated

as frigates until 1975, when they werereclassed as cruisers. Both were decom-missioned by 1998 and placed in reserve.Since that time, the two ships are in ad-vanced stages of scrapping.

248 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

UNITED STATES: CALIFORNIA-CLASSSouth Carolina. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Virginia, Texas, Mississippi, ArkansasType and Significance: Together with the

California-class, these vessels formedthe bulk of the U.S. cruiser force untilthe early 1980s. They were also the lastnuclear-powered missile cruisers built bythe United States.

Dates of Construction: All units werelaid down between 1972 and 1977, withconstruction ending on the class in late1980.

Hull Dimensions: 585’ x 63’ x 21’Displacement: 11,000 tonsArmor: NoneArmament: Two Standard SAM/ASW

launchers, two 5-inch guns, one each

being located fore and aft, six 12.75-inchASW torpedo tubes, and one helicopter.Eight Harpoon SSMs added later.

Machinery: Turbines powered by twoD2G nuclear reactors that delivered60,000 horsepower.

Speed: 30 knotsComplement: 519Summary: Like the California-class cruis-

ers, these ships were first designated asfrigates until 1975, when they were re-classed as cruisers. All four units weredecommissioned between 1992 and1997 and are in the process of beingscrapped.

CRUISERS, 1940–2004 249

UNITED STATES: VIRGINIA-CLASSMississippi. Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

Units: Ticonderoga, Yorktown, Vincennes,Valley Forge, Thomas S. Gates, BunkerHill, Mobile Bay, Antietam, Leyte Gulf,San Jacinto, Lake Champlain, PhilippineSea, Princeton, Normandy, Monterey,Chancellorsville, Cowpens, Gettysburg,Chosin, Hue City, Shiloh, Anzio, Vicks-burg, Lake Erie, Cape St. George, VellaGulf, Port Royal

Type and Significance: These are the lat-est cruisers of the United States Navy.

Dates of Construction: Laid down be-ginning in 1980, with all units com-pleted by 1994.

Hull Dimensions: 563’ x 55’ x 31’Displacement: 9,600 tons fully loadedArmor:

Armament: First five ships are armed withtwo SAM/ASW twin-armed launchers,eight Harpoon SSMss, six 12.75-inch

ASW torpedo tubes, two 5-inch gunswith one each located fore and aft, andtwo helicopters. Later units differedthrough the use of a vertical missilelaunching system in the forward sectionthat can store SAM, ASW, and SSMweapons.

Machinery: Gas turbines that produce80,000 horsepower.

Speed: 30 knotsComplement: 343Summary: The key feature is the AEGIS

sensory and command system. All vesselsare currently in service, although thefirst five may be nearing the end of theiroperational lives. Plans are currently un-der way for a new class of cruiser to re-place them and the other Ticonderoga-class ships as they age.

250 CRUISERS, 1940–2004

UNITED STATES: TICONDEROGA-CLASSMobile Bay (left) and the Leyte.

Courtesy of Art-Tech\Aerospace\M.A.R.S\TRH\Navy Historical.

G L O S S A R Y

ABDA: World War II designation for a force of U.S., British, Dutch, andAustralian warships

adrift: a vessel is not under control or has come loose from its moorings aft: near or at the rear portion of a ship’s hullAllied Powers: Most commonly used as the collective term for the United

States, Great Britain, France, and Russia in World War II. It can alsobe used as a collective term for those nations arrayed against the Cen-tral Powers in World War I

amidships (midships): center part of a ship that is located between thebow and stern

antiaircraft battery: the weapons aboard a vessel that are used to defendagainst attacking enemy aircraft attacks

AP: armor-piercing; a type of shellASROC: antisubmarine rocketASDIC: Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee, the body

that produced an experimental submarine detection set in 1918; be-came sonar

astern: behind a ship ASW: antisubmarine warfareAxis Powers: The collective term for Germany, Italy, and Japan in World

War IIballast: weight additional to the ship itself that is carried low in a hull to

provide greater stability while at seabattery: a group of guns or missile launchers; collectively, the entire arma-

ment of a vesselbeam: width of the hull of a ship measured at the widest pointbilges: lowest interior portion of a vessel’s hullbow: the forward end of a vesselbridge: main center of control for a vesselbroadside: generally, the sides of a vessel that are above the water; also

used to define a tactic where all of a warship’s guns on one side are firedsimultaneously

251

bulkhead: vertical partition that separates one compartment from anotherin the hull of a vessel

bulwark: side of a ship that rises above the upper deckbuoyancy: ship’s capacity to remain afloatCA: cruiser (oftentimes used to denote a heavy cruiser)CAG: original term for a missile cruisercaliber: internal diameter of a gun; also used to refer to the diameter of

shells and bulletscapital ship: warship of the largest or most powerful typeCG: modern designation used for a missile cruiserCGN: nuclear-powered missile cruiserCL: light cruisercockpit: compartment within ships during the Age of Fighting Sail where

surgeons treated sailors wounded in battlecommissioning: official act through which a warship is made an active

unit of a nation’s navyconning tower: battle station for commanding officers of a battleship, battle

cruiser, or cruiser when in action, normally located forward of the bridgecourse: direction in which a vessel is steaming or sailing; dependent on

the manner of instrument used in the determinationdisplacement: weight of water in tons that is displaced by a ship’s hulldraft: depth of water at which a vessel floatsDSMAC: Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation, a targeting system

used in cruise missilesexecutive officer: second in command of a vessel or squadronflagship: ship carrying the commander of a fleet or squadron fore: toward or near the bowfull displacement: displacement of a ship when fully equipped and fueledgalley: kitchen of a shipgeneral quarters: an order, e.g., to battle stations on a vessel in preparation

for combatGPS: Global Positioning Systemguerre de course: French term for commerce warfaregun deck: in the Age of Fighting Sail, the main deck of a frigate that

houses the battery of the vesselHE: high explosive; a type of shellhead: ship’s toiletheading: direction in which a ship’s bow is pointinghorsepower: measurement of power that is equal to about 750 watts; HP

refers to the horsepower of an enginehull: body of a vessel that includes the keel, frames, bulkheads, side plate

or planking, and deckinternational waters: areas of the world’s oceans that fall outside the wa-

ters within the territorial boundaries of nationskeel: wooden or steel plate that runs down the centerline of a hull at the

lowest point of the structure

252 GLOSSARY

knot: unit of speed at sea that is equal to one nautical mile per hourlaid down: denotes the beginning of construction on a shiplist: when a vessel leans over to one side as a result of flooding or a shifting

of cargo within the hullMach: ratio of the speed of an object to the speed of sound (commonly set

at 769.5 miles per hour)magazine: compartment in a warship that stores projectiles and propellant

for use in its gunsmain battery: group of the biggest guns aboard a warshipmess deck: the deck on a vessel that houses the tables and chairs for eat-

ing and congregatingmoor: the act of fixing a ship to a stationary object by means of a cable nautical mile: unit of measurement at sea that is equal to 6,076 feetoverhaul: extended procedure whereby a warship is taken into a dockyard

and its machinery, weapons, and equipment are examined and repairedif necessary; technological improvements are oftentimes added duringthis process; also refers to the act of one ship overtaking another at sea

portside (port): the left-hand side of a ship when one faces toward the bowQF: quick-firing; a type of naval gunretrofit: in warships, the process of adding new technology that did not ex-

ist or was not included at the time of constructionrigging: originally, referred collectively to all the masts, spars, and sailing

accoutrements of a vessel; later, signal lines and radio wiresround shot: ball of iron used as a projectile in the Age of Fighting Sail; size

dependent on the weapon that fired it; also known as solid shotrudder: device for steering a vessel; normally situated in the sternsalvo: firing several guns at onceSAM: surface-to-air missilescrapping: process of dismantling a shipscuttling: purposely flooding a vessel in order to sink itship-of-the-line (line-of-battle-ship): in the Age of Fighting Sail, referred

to the most powerful vessels of a battle fleet that formed up in a lineagainst an opposing like formation of enemy vessels

SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missilespar: wooden pole (in the Age of Fighting Sail) used for masts and yardsSSM: surface-to-surface missilestandard displacement: displacement of a ship when fully equipped but

without fuelstarboard: the right-hand side of a vessel when one faces the bowstern: the aft end of a shipsuperstructure: structure built on top of the main deck of a ship; in a war-

ship, this area includes the command and control facilitiesyard: unit of measurement equal to 3 feet; in nautical lexicon, refers to a

spar attached lengthways across a mast from which a sail is hung

GLOSSARY 253

S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy,1890–1990. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

This work offers a fine appraisal of the strategic goals of the UnitedStates at sea beginning in the late nineteenth century. These goalsshaped the naval building programs of the country. Baer reveals as a re-sult the reasons why modern cruiser construction lagged in the UnitedStates in comparison to other powers. The book also has a good sectionconcerning naval considerations in the Cold War that provides impor-tant background information.

Brown, David K. Before the Ironclad: Development of Ship Design, Propul-sion, and Armament in the Royal Navy, 1815–1860. London: ConwayMaritime Press, 1990.

This book offers a good synthesis of technological development andnaval policy that reveals the evolution of warship design in an era wherechanges in naval technology were beginning to transform naval warfare.Although the book deals only with the Royal Navy, it cannot be deemedas being too narrowly focused, as much of the world’s technological de-velopment of this period was British.

_____. Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development, 1860–1905. Lon-don: Chatham Publishing, 1997.

Like his book on the previous era of 1815–1860, Brown provides asynthesis of technological development and naval policy for his historyof warship development up to 1905. This book is crucial for anyonewishing to learn about naval technology in this age and its impact onnaval warfare. Of particular use is the format that Brown chooses,where he covers individual technological developments and then revealstheir effect on individual ship types such as cruisers.

Bruce, Anthony, and William Cogar. An Encyclopedia of Naval History.New York: Facts on File, 1998.

This work is helpful to a reader as a general reference, particularly in-formation on naval terms and certain pivotal battles in naval history.

255

This work, however, should be used in conjunction with other, more de-tailed studies.

Buxton, Ian. Metal Industries: Shipbreaking at Rosyth and Charlestown.Kendal, UK: World Ship Society, 1992.

Despite the fact that this book is devoted only to two centers of ship-breaking, it is an extremely good source of information for those whowish to learn more about the complex process of disposing of a warship.This subject is oftentimes ignored and is important, as it reveals a peace-time contribution of vessels to the economies of the world.

Campbell, N. John M. Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting. Annapolis, MD:Naval Institute Press, 1986.

Campbell’s work on Jutland is among the finest produced; it providesa narrative history of the conflict and examines the events in depththrough the performance of the two fleets and especially that of ships ingeneral. His treatment of the performance of the British battle cruisersand the design flaws that resulted in the destruction of three is impor-tant for readers who wish to learn more about these types of cruisers.

Chant, Christopher. The History of the World’s Warships. Edison, NJ:Chartwell Books, 2000.

This is a good overall history of warships, although in many cases theauthor does not provide enough information on certain vessels that wereimportant in the development of cruisers. This is not particularly adrawback, however, as Chant covers the development of all warshipsover an extremely long period. Its primary value is the general frame-work it provides for the evolution of the cruiser type.

Chesneau, Roger, and Eugene M. Kolesnik, eds. Conway’s All the World’sFighting Ships, 1860–1905. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1979.

In terms of technical data, this book, as well as the series overall, isthe most reliable source for information on cruisers and all other war-ships. Not only does the work provide technical information; it also givesdata on the importance, performance, and fate of each vessel.

Chesneau, Roger, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946.London: Conway Maritime Press, 1980.

This work follows the format of the other volumes of the series and isjust as reliable. It includes technical data, information concerning theoperational histories of ships, and the fates of vessels.

Churchill, Winston. The World Crisis, 1911–1918. 2 vols. London:Odham’s Press, 1938.

Churchill’s account of World War I, although colored by his partici-pation in the conflict and hampered by inaccuracies, is useful as a first-hand account of the Great War.

Cialone, David Jr. “Treaty Cruisers: Conception and Performance.” Mas-ter’s thesis, University of Colorado–Denver, 1999.

Cialone’s work offers a good examination of the diplomatic maneu-verings of the world’s naval powers that took part in the great disarma-

256 SELECTED IBLIOGRAPHY

ment conferences of the 1920s and 1930s. Not only does he coverdiplomacy; he also blends it into strategic considerations.

Colledge, J. J. Ships of the Royal Navy: The Complete Record of All FightingShips of the Royal Navy from the Fifteenth Century to the Present. An-napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987.

This book can best be termed a dictionary of the warships of theRoyal Navy. As such it is general. Its value lies in the descriptions it pro-vides on the service histories of warships and their fates.

Cosentino, Michele, and Ruggero Stanglini. The Italian Navy. Florence,Italy: Edizioni Aeronautiche Italiane, 1994.

This work provides a clear and thorough examination of the history ofthe Italian Navy in the post–World War II years. Although some partsare difficult to read, the factual information is valuable to anyone inter-ested in Italian naval construction. It not only includes a brief history ofthe strategic requirements of the Italians and the designs of their cruis-ers; it also examines the electronic systems of the ships and the trainingthat is necessary for their crews to effectively operate them.

Duffy, James P. Hitler’s Secret Pirate Fleet: The Deadliest Ships of WorldWar II. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

Duffy’s book documents the history of German warships, primarilycruisers, as commerce raiders in World War II. It showcases the value ofcommerce raiding in war through not only causing material damage tothe enemy but also in tying down naval assets of an enemy in the huntfor the raiders that could otherwise be employed in operations else-where.

Fabb, John, and A. P. McGowan. Victorian and Edwardian Navy from OldPhotographs. London: B. T. Batsford, 1976.

This work is nothing more than a compilation of old pictures of theRoyal Navy from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thesephotographs, however, are useful, as they reveal the personal side of lifeaboard ships of this age. The large majority of the prints capture life atsea and the individuals that manned the warships rather than the shipsthemselves.

Friedman, Norman. Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Ageto Net-Centric Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

While the portion of this book on warfare in space is not germane tothe discussion of cruisers, Friedman does provide a good account of theentire missile age that puts it into context in naval warfare.

_____. World Naval Weapons Systems. Annapolis, MD: Naval InstitutePress, 1989.

This book is one of the best technical histories of weapons systems inthe missile age. The author provides the reader with background infor-mation concerning the development of each system, its purpose, andprecise information on the mechanics and electronics that make the sys-tem work. Finally, he reveals how each system functions in combat. In

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 257

an age of increasingly complex weapons and detection equipment,Friedman offers a clear examination that is readable for those in theservice, scholars, and the general populace.

_____. Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons, 1994 Update. An-napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

This work is an update of Friedman’s earlier work. Gardiner, Robert, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1947–1982,

Part 1: The Western Powers. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1983.As with other works in this series, this volume is important for those

who seek technical information on the world’s warships. It is helpful asit deals with the transition from the age of the gun to that of missiles.The book also details the operational capabilities of the vessels of theWestern powers in the era of the Cold War.

Gates, P. J. Surface Warships: An Introduction to Design Principles. Lon-don: Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1987.

Gates offers general readers and scholars alike insight into the mostdetailed aspects of ship construction in the modern day. Oftentimes,this information is discarded by general naval histories and is, indeed,somewhat justified in order to avoid a work becoming a technical jour-nal rather than a history. Nevertheless, readers must be aware of designprinciples in order to recognize the extreme complexity of warships andthe effort that is put into their construction before the first materials areever assembled in a shipyard.

George, James L. The History of Warships: From Ancient Times to theTwenty-First Century. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

George presents a discussion of the development of cruisers that canserve as the foundation for future study. Not only does he provide back-ground history surrounding the evolution of the type; he also gives sometechnical information and analysis of the importance of each advance intechnology. Finally, George covers the uses and performance of cruisersin the wars of the modern age.

Gray, Randal, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921.London: Conway Maritime Press, 1985.

In terms of technical data, this book, as well as the series overall, isthe most reliable source for information on cruisers and all other war-ships. Not only does the work provide technical information; it also givesdata on the importance, performance, and fates of each vessel.

Gray, Randal, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1947–1982, Part2: The Warsaw Pact and Non-Aligned Nations. London: Conway Mar-itime Press, 1983.

As with the previous work, this volume of the series is important forthose who seek technical information on the world’s warships. This vol-ume is helpful as it deals with the transition from the age of the gun tothat of missiles. It also details the operational capabilities of the vesselsof the Warsaw Pact powers in the era of the Cold War. This informationis important given that the cruisers of the Warsaw Pact were in many


cases more powerful and capable of a greater number of duties thantheir Western counterparts. The work also gives a good deal of data onthe navies of nonaligned powers that are frequently omitted from workson navies in the Cold War.

Green, Michael. Cruisers. Mankato, MN: Capstone Press, 1998.Green’s book is designed specifically for a juvenile audience and thus

offers little analysis of cruisers. It is, however, a fine starting point foryounger individuals who want to learn about cruisers as well as thosewho possess little knowledge on the subject.

Gröner, Erich. German Warships, 1815–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-tute Press, 1990.

This work focuses almost exclusively on technical data. Even so, ithas strengths that commend it as a good source for information oncruisers. First, it details warships of the Prussian Navy in the years be-fore the unification of Germany in 1871. Some of these designs wereimportant for the overall development of certain types of cruisers. Thebook also is a good source for detailed information on cruisers thatserved in the world wars.

Halpern, Paul. A Naval History of World War I. Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-tute Press, 1994.

World War I was one of the first conflicts in which the new technol-ogy built into cruisers since the 1860s was tested in combat. Halpern’swork covers both grand strategy and the course of the war at sea inWorld War I. His discussion reveals the use of cruisers and battle cruis-ers in the naval warfare of the early twentieth century.

Hampshire, Cecil A. The Blockaders. London: William Kimber, 1980.Hamphire’s book is useful for its devotion to armed merchant cruis-

ers and their deployment as blockading vessels in time of war. Armedmerchant cruisers are oftentimes given short shrift or no coverage at allin works on cruisers, a glaring deficiency. Readers can work toward cor-recting this knowledge gap through this work.

Harding, Richard. Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650–1830. Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

Harding’s book has little bearing on the history of cruisers as amodern weapons system. It does, however, reveal the uses of thefrigate, the cruiser’s predecessor, in warfare during the Age of FightingSail. The work, consequently, is important as a tool to reveal the dutiesof frigates in naval warfare, as many were the initial ones for moderncruisers.

Harland, John. Seamanship in the Age of Sail: An Account of the Shiphan-dling of the Sailing Man-of-War, 1600–1860, Based on ContemporarySources. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1984.

Harland’s work offers a fine appraisal of the intricacies of handling aship during the Age of Fighting Sail. This subject can be a complex onefor both the initiated and general reader alike and is absolutely vital for aclear understanding of how crewman operated the sailing frigates.


Hayward, Roger. Cruisers in Camera. Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire,UK: Sutton, 2000.

Although primarily a work devoted to pictures of individual warships,Hayward’s book contains a good overview of the advent of direct or firecontrol and radar in cruisers.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Empire, 1875–1914. New York: VintageBooks, 1989.

Hobsbawm, through his discussion of the scope and importance ofempire to the major maritime powers between 1875 and 1914, revealswhy the commerce protection role of the cruiser was extremely impor-tant to the economic well-being of many countries.

Hovgaard, W. Modern History of Warships. London: U.S. Naval Institute,1920.

This work is dated and should be used sparingly by those interestedin the history of cruisers. Its chief use is to highlight the contemporaryanalysis of the combat performance of cruisers in World War I in thewake of the conflict.

Howarth, Stephen. The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun: The Drama of theImperial Japanese Navy, 1895–1945. New York: Atheneum, 1983.

The cruiser designs of the Japanese by the outbreak of World War IIwere among the most innovative in the world. These vessels were de-signed to accomplish a multitude of tasks as part of Japan’s greaterstrategic goals. Howarth’s book illuminates the construction program ofthe Japanese, as well as their overall naval strategy. He also provides acogent narrative history of the performance of the Japanese Navy inWorld War II.

Humble, Richard. United States Fleet Carriers of World War II. New York:Blandford, 1984.

Although devoted to aircraft carriers rather than cruisers, Humble’sbook provides a fine account of the first flight of an airplane from thedeck of a warship, being a cruiser.

Jenkins, E. H. A History of the French Navy: From Its Beginnings to the Pre-sent Day. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973.

Jenkins provides only limited technical data on warships, as thestrength of his book rests on the history of the navy itself rather thanonly warship construction. His book offers a good appraisal of thegrowth of the administration of the French Navy, the changing strategicgoals of the navy, its combat history, and to some degree a social history.This book is strong in its discussion of the Jeune École and its impactboth on French strategy and naval construction.

Jentchura, Hansgeorg, Dieter Jung, and Peter Mickel. Warships of the Im-perial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945. Trans. Anthony Preston and J. D.Brown. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977.

Like Groener’s book for the German Navy, Jentchura’s work is a tech-nical manual of warships. It is not only useful for merely providing


technical information on Japan’s cruisers; it also reveals some designhistory.

Keegan, John. The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare. NewYork: Viking, 1989.

John Keegan’s book is a treatment of naval warfare through the exami-nation of three different battles taking place in different eras. Two ofthese, the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of Jutland, are useful. His cov-erage of Trafalgar exhibits the nature of battle in the Age of Fighting Sailand the human element of it. The section on the Battle of Jutland providesinformation on conditions in naval warfare during the early twentieth cen-tury in World War I. It also serves as a valuable source for information con-cerning the battle performance of battle cruisers and cruisers alike.

Kemp, Peter K. The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck. Lon-don: Aldine Press, 1970.

Kemp’s work spans the Age of Sail from the sixteenth century to themid–nineteenth century. Among the topics are daily life aboard ship, re-cruitment, the education of officers and seamen, and technologicalchanges. The examination of this latter topic is a strong portion of thebook.

_____, ed. The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, vol. 1. Navy Records Soci-ety Series, vol. 102. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantine, 1964.

This resource is a collection of primary documents written and re-ceived by British Admiral Sir John Fisher. Portions of this book are im-portant, as they document Fisher’s vision of the battle cruiser and thedeliberations of the design committee that produced the plans for theprototype of the vessel.

King, Dean, and John Hattendorf, eds. Every Man Will Do His Duty: AnAnthology of First Hand Accounts from the Age of Nelson. New York:Henry Holt, 1997.

This work is invaluable for anyone that wishes to read and learn fromfirsthand accounts about the Age of Fighting Sail. It derives its materialfrom the age of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Among theaccounts are those of seamen and officers at the 1805 Battle of Trafal-gar. In addition to information concerning the experience of battle inthis period, a reader also benefits from accounts that detail everyday lifeaboard ships in the Age of Fighting Sail.

Lambert, Andrew D. Steam, Steel, and Shellfire: The Steam Warship,1815–1905. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992.

Lambert’s book is an excellent resource that examines the technolog-ical innovations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries andtheir collective effect on warship construction. It also provides informa-tion on the tactical changes in naval warfare that resulted from the de-velopment of the modern warship.

Lavery, Brian. Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation,1793–1815. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1989.


Lavery conveys a wealth of information in a book that extends pasttechnological issues. He also devotes a great deal of attention to life atsea, including subjects such as food, hygiene, discipline, and training.

_____. The Ship of the Line, Volume 1: The Development of the Battlefleet,1650–1850. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983.

This work provides a detailed history of the design evolution of thefrigate during the Age of Fighting Sail. It also includes a narrative his-tory of these ships that is useful in detailing the operations of frigates intime of war.

Layman, R. D., and Stephen McLaughlin. The Hybrid Warship: The Amal-gamation of Big Guns and Aircraft. London: Conway Maritime Press,1991.

This book deals only partially with the history of the cruiser. Never-theless, the examination offers a good look into the design history of hy-brid cruisers capable not only of the original duties of their type, butalso capable of air operations owing to the inclusion of hangars andflight decks. This information has a direct bearing on modern-daycruiser design, as many cruisers currently in service are hybrid vessels.

Lee, Eric C. B. The Cruiser Experience: Life Aboard Royal Navy CruisersDuring World War Two. The Manse, Fleet Hargate, Lincolnshire, UK:Arcturus Books, 2000.

This work provides a fine picture of life aboard cruisers in the WorldWar II era through reminiscences of sailors who served in the RoyalNavy. Such information is oftentimes overlooked when discussing thehistory of warships, but it is vital for understanding the weapons systemof the cruiser overall. Without its crew, the cruiser, as any other weapon,is of little use. In addition, such factors as morale aboard ship can di-rectly affect the performance of the system overall.

Lenton, H. T. British and Empire Warships of the Second World War. An-napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

This work is largely a technical history of the ships of the Royal Navy.It is a valuable resource, highly detailed, offering information that manybooks generally ignore. It is also of great use given the fact that it coversnaval units of the Commonwealth and empire. Despite the fact thatthese resources paled in comparison to those of Britain itself, they werestill valuable assets in time of war.

Lochner, R. K. The Last Gentleman-of-War: The Raider Exploits of theCruiser Emden. Trans. Thea Lindauer and Harry Lindauer. Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

This book offers one of the best examples of the commerce-raidingrole of cruisers through the history of the light cruiser Emden in WorldWar I.

Marshall, Ian. Armored Ships: The Ships, Their Settings, and the Ascen-dancy That They Sustained for Eighty Years. Charlottesville, VA: HowellPress, 1993.


Marshall’s work provides a general overview to readers on the rise ofarmored vessels in general. While readable, it should be used as an in-troduction to the topic rather than a chief resource.

Martin, Tyrone. A Most Fortunate Ship: A Narrative History of Old Iron-sides. Chester, CT: Globe Pequot Press, 1980.

Tyrone provides information on the design and career of the frigateUSS Constitution, which is one of the most famous vessels of its typeand era. Of particular use are the sections that detail the engagementsbetween Constitution and enemy frigates.

Miller, Nathan. Broadsides: The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775–1815. NewYork: J. Wiley, 2000.

Miller’s book offers good insight into both the everyday operation ofsailing men-of-war, such as frigates, and their use in war.

Millett, Allan, and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A MilitaryHistory of the United States of America. New York: Free Press, 1994.

This book provides good background information on the strategic re-quirements of the United States throughout its history and the conse-quent growth of the Navy and Army to meet these goals. There is also asignificant amount of coverage of wars.

Moore, John, ed. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I. New York: MilitaryPress, 1990.

This work contains reprinted information from editions of FightingShips, a technical journal, that were released in the years before WorldWar I. As such, some of the information is incorrect owing partly to thedesire of governments not to publicize the design specifications of theirnewest warships. The work should be used with caution and its informa-tion cross-checked with newer sources. Nevertheless, it is a good re-source for those who do not have much background in the warships ofthe era.

Moore, John, ed. Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. New York: CrescentBooks, 1992.

As with the previous work, this book contains technical informationon warships by providing reprints from editions of Fighting Ships thatwere released in the years prior to World War II.

Morison, Samuel. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United StatesNavy in the Second World War. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1963.

Morison’s work remains among the best for its coverage of the war atsea in World War II. Cruisers in battle and their importance to wartimeoperations are portrayed.

Musicant, Ivan. U.S. Armored Cruisers: A Design and Operational History.Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985.

Musicant’s work offers both design histories and technical specifica-tions of the armored cruisers of the United States Navy. The examina-tion provides insight into design principles and the overall duties envi-sioned for cruisers that affected their construction.


Osborne, Eric W. “Great Britain’s World War I Economic Blockade of Ger-many, 1914–1919.” Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian University, 2000.

Cruisers in the role of blockade, their impact on international politicsas a result of this duty in time of war, and their effect during World WarI are examined.

Paine, Lincoln P. Warships of the World to 1900. Boston: Houghton Mif-flin, 2000.

This book is largely devoted to the operational histories of individualwarships and does not contain much information on technological de-velopment. Its chief strength is coverage of the use of warships in differ-ent ages of naval warfare.

Parkes, Oscar. British Battleships “Warrior” to “Vanguard”: A History of De-sign, Construction, and Armament. Hamden: Archon Books, 1972.

This book remains one of the most informative examinations ofBritish battleships and, significantly for a work on cruisers, the battlecruisers of the Royal Navy. Information on the design process surround-ing the battle cruiser in Great Britain is important given that the Britishwere the first to launch vessels of this type.

Polmar, Norman. Guide to the Soviet Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval InstitutePress, 1986.

Although not all the information is accurate owing to the secrecy sur-rounding units of the Soviet Navy during the Cold War, Polmar’s book isa good treatment of the units of the fleet. This work is important, asmany units of the former Soviet Navy are currently still in operation.

Poolman, Kenneth. Armed Merchant Cruisers. Wiltshire, Trowbridge, UK:Redwood Burn, 1985.

Poolman’s work is one of the precious few that examines the strategicconsiderations that dictated the creation of the armed merchant cruisertype. His book partly examines their use in time of war. An extremelygood resource for coverage of an often overlooked type of cruiser.

Pope, Dudley. Life in Nelson’s Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,1981.

Life afloat in the Age of Fighting Sail is best illustrated through theperiod of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815).Pope not only discusses conditions aboard in both war and peace; healso covers information on recruitment, punishment, and the chain ofcommand.

Preston, Anthony. Cruisers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980.Anthony Preston’s book is a scholarly, extremely detailed examination

of world cruiser construction from the mid–nineteenth to the late twen-tieth centuries. It serves as a perfect foundation for study into the devel-opment of the weapon’s system.

____. Cruisers. Greenwich, CT: Bison Books, 1982.This work is a reduced version of Preston’s original book. For the gen-

eral reader, it is a faster read than the first printing.


_____. History of the Royal Navy. Greenwich, CT: Bison Books, 1983.Preston’s book is a readable account that tackles the daunting task

of providing a manageable history of the Royal Navy from 1588 to thepresent.

Raven, Alan, and John Roberts. British Cruisers of World War Two. Annapo-lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980.

Raven’s book focuses on the design history of British cruisers builtduring the interwar era. It is extremely detailed and useful for a re-searcher in need of specific technical information.

Rawlinson, Jonathan. Cruisers. Vero Beach, FL: Rourke Publications, 1989. This work offers an effective examination of modern cruisers in the

United States Navy. It also provides general information on offensiveand defensive weapons systems employed aboard them.

Richard, Newcomb F. U.S. Cruisers: A Century of Service. Paducah, KY:Turner Publishing, 1994.

Newcomb’s book does not contain much information on U.S. cruiserdevelopment or the strategic requirements that produced them. Nordoes his description of U.S. cruisers in this age stand out from otherworks. Its strength is coverage of the individual operations in which U.S.cruisers took part in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

Roberts, John. Battlecruisers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.This is a detailed work about the development of the battle cruiser in

Great Britain. A helpful section for those who are technically inclinedare the plans for the first battle cruisers.

Roberts, Stephen S. The Introduction of Steam Technology in the FrenchNavy, 1818–1852. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

This book is useful for its insight into technological innovation in theFrench Navy in the first half of the nineteenth century. At that time,France was a leading power in the application of new technology tonaval warfare. On a wider scale, this book shows how new technologyled to the end of the Age of Fighting Sail and the beginning of the mod-ern era that spawned the cruiser.

Rodger, N. A. M. “The First Light Cruisers.” Mariner’s Mirror 65, no. 3(August 1979).

Rodger’s piece is a good starting point for anyone wishing to know thedesign history of the light cruiser and the tactical requirements that dic-tated the specifications of the type.

Rohwer, Jurgen. Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy andShipbuilding Programs, 1922–1953. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

This book benefits from the release of information following the ColdWar and is therefore a much more detailed and reliable source on thestrategy of the Soviet Navy and the cruisers that were developed to meetits strategic goals.

Ropp, Theodore. The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy,1871–1904. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987.


This work is one of the best for individuals seeking knowledge ofFrance’s cruiser construction in the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies. Ropp details the impact of the Jeune École on France’s navalconstruction, describes the roles of cruisers in French naval grand strat-egy, and discusses the technology of France’s cruisers.

Schmalenbach, Paul. German Raiders: A History of Auxiliary Cruisers of theGerman Navy, 1895–1945. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1979.

This work shows the use of armed merchant cruisers in time of war.In the case of the German Navy, these duties were primarily those ofcommerce raiding and mine-laying. It is detailed and offers insight intoa type of cruiser that many works do not adequately address.

Silverstone, Paul. H. The Sailing Navy, 1775–1854. Annapolis, MD: NavalInstitute Press, 2001.

Silverstone’s book provides technical data concerning warships of theAge of Fighting Sail. Frigates form a portion of the discussion, makingthe work important for readers who wish to garner a firm knowledge ofthe antecedents of cruisers.

_____. Warships of the Civil War Navies. Annapolis, MD: Naval InstitutePress, 1989.

This work is essentially an encyclopedia of vessels in the navies of theUnion and the Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War. Although not de-tailed in histories of individual units and lacking information on the de-velopment of warships, the work provides technical data on almost allunits participating in the combatant navies of a war where records,mostly for the Confederacy, are lacking.

Smith, Peter C., and John R. Dominy. Cruisers in Action, 1939–1945. An-napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

This work is devoted solely to British cruiser development from the1920s to the end of World War II. The authors provide a detailed analy-sis of British strategic requirements, the technical limitations imposedby the arms limitation treaties of the 1920s and 1930s, and consequentcruiser design. Of equal importance is the structure of the book, whichexamines the operational history of British cruisers in all their tradi-tional roles and those, such as antiaircraft protection, that emerged dur-ing the war.

Spector, Ronald H. At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twenti-eth Century. New York: Viking, 2001.

The chief value of Spector’s book is his detailed information on theexperience of sailors aboard the world’s fighting ships. This aspect is of-ten overlooked in naval works, as they focus primarily on the shipsthemselves. The examination includes living conditions, everyday lifeaboard, and the experience of combat.

Straten, Robert H. van. “The Unwanted Ships: The Cruiser in the UnitedStates Navy, 1900–1931.” M.A. thesis, Brigham Young University,1979.


Straten’s thesis provides a succinct appraisal of the political andstrategic considerations in the United States that hampered the con-struction of cruisers in the early twentieth century. This informationcarries great weight, as it highlights to general readers that the UnitedStates was not always at the forefront of naval development.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology,and British Naval Policy, 1889–1914. Boston: Unwin, Hyman, 1989.

A great deal of Sumida’s work falls outside the scope of the discus-sion on cruisers, but he does have good information on the battlecruiser. This body of knowledge includes the economic and strategicconsiderations that led to the conceptualization of the design.

Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. Cruisers of the U.S. Navy, 1922–1962. Trans.Harold Erenberg. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

This work has a good overview of the U.S. cruiser construction pro-gram from 1922 to 1962, particularly factors that influenced decisionsto build ships with certain specifications. It also contains thorough en-tries on each class of cruiser launched and includes design specifica-tions and operational histories.

Thrower, William Rayner. Life at Sea in the Age of Sail. London:Phillimore, 1972.

Thrower’s work concentrates largely on life aboard merchant shipsduring the Age of Fighting Sail. It still serves a useful purpose, however,as many of the daily experiences of sailors aboard these vessels was sim-ilar to life aboard the warships of the world.

Tindall, George Brown, and David E. Shi. America: A Narrative History, vol.2. New York: Norton, 1996.

This book has little bearing on the scope of a work on cruisers. Itsonly use is to offer a concise appraisal of U.S. strategic goals that sur-rounded the construction of a navy in which cruisers assumed criticalimportance.

Tomblin, Barbara. From Sail to Steam: The Development of Steam Technol-ogy in the United States Navy. Rutgers, NJ: University of New Jersey,1988.

The United States, despite ultimately lagging behind in the design,development, and construction of cruisers in the nineteenth century,was the pioneering power for the type. The creation of the first cruiserwas due in large part to the advent of the technological innovation ofsteam propulsion. The United States was a leading innovator in the de-velopment of this technology. General readers and scholars alike canbenefit from Tomblin’s appraisal.

Tucker, Spencer C. A Handbook of 19th Century Naval Warfare. Thrupp,Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton, 2000.

Spencer Tucker excels in writing books that are densely packed withfactual data and analysis. This work offers all readers a readable, thor-ough presentation of naval warfare in the Age of Fighting Sail, which in-


cludes the frigate, the technological innovations of the nineteenth cen-tury that transformed naval warfare, and the impact of the new technol-ogy on naval conflict leading into the twentieth century.

_____. Arming the Fleet: U.S. Navy Ordnance in the Muzzle-Loading Era.Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989.

Tucker’s book is useful for information on naval ordnance in the Ageof Fighting Sail and U.S. Civil War era. Readers are exposed to a host ofsubjects that include methods of production for the guns themselves, in-formation concerning the carriages on which they were mounted, theranges of naval cannon, and technological innovations that include thecarronade and shell gun.

_____. A Short History of the Civil War at Sea. Wilmington, DE: ScholarlyResources, 2002.

One of the early testing grounds for elements of the naval technolog-ical revolution of the nineteenth century was the U.S. Civil War. Tuckerreveals how technological innovation was used on both sides to good ef-fect. His discussion also examines the end of the Age of Fighting Sail.

Tunstall, Brian. Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail: The Evolution of FightingTactics, 1650–1815. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1990.

Tunstall’s book is dedicated mostly to tactics for line-of-battle shipsin the Age of Fighting Sail and consequently offers little on smallerwarships such as frigates. Even so, it does provide a limited treatmentof the role of frigates through the tactics that governed naval warfare inthe age.

Tupper, Reginald. Reminiscences. London: Jarrold’s, 1920.Reginald Tupper was the second and last commander of the 10th

Cruiser Squadron that blockaded Germany during World War I. Hiswork provides good information on the use of armed merchant cruisersin war.

Van der Vat, Dan. The Last Corsair: The Story of the Emden. London: Hod-der and Stoughton, 1983.

This work reveals the value of cruisers in commerce raiding throughdetailing the wartime career of the most successful raider of WorldWar I.

Vego, Milan. The Soviet Navy Today. London: Arms and Armour Press,1986.

Vego’s book, written during the Cold War, is sometimes incorrect inits information. Nevertheless, it is still a good resource for revealing thestrategic goals of the Soviet Navy and the role that cruisers played in theforce, as the Soviet Navy, unlike the Untied States, depended on cruis-ers with offensive capabilities.

Wells, John. The Royal Navy: An Illustrated Social History, 1870–1982.Thrupp, Stoud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton, 1994.

This work is invaluable as a resource for information on the life of asailor in one of the world’s greatest navies. It shows aspects of life that


change over time due to technology and societal views as well as seem-ingly immutable characteristics of life at sea. The coverage is balancedbetween life aboard in peace and war.

Whitley, M. J. Cruisers of World War Two: An International Encyclopedia.London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995.

This work offers a fine appraisal of the world’s cruiser designs fromthe middle nineteenth century through the end of World War II. Whit-ley also includes a description of the duties of cruisers and their employ-ment in the two world wars. Although his appraisal of the cruisers of themajor world powers is impressive, the chief value of this work is the sec-tions that detail the design characteristics of cruisers in the navies of thelesser powers.

Young, Filson. With the Battle Cruisers. London: Cassell, 1926.Young reveals life at sea aboard battle cruisers.


I N D E X

271

Aaron Manby (U.K.), 18Achilles (U.K.), 123Admiral Fokin (Soviet Union), 238Admiral Golovko (Soviet Union),

238Admiral Graf Spee (Germany), 202Admiral Hipper (Germany), 204Admiral Hipper-class (Germany),

118, 122, 168, 204–5Admiral Lazarev (Soviet Union),

237, 243Admiral Nakhimov (Soviet Union),

146, 237, 243Admiral Nakhimov Naval

Preparatory School, 161Admiral Scheer (Germany), 202Admiral Senyavin (Soviet Union),

237Admiral Spaun (Austro-Hungary),

86Admiral Ushakov (Soviet Union),

162, 237, 243Admiral Zozulya (Soviet Union),

239AEGIS Combat System, 155–56,

160, 164Aerodrome, 84Afghanistan, 87Agano (Japan), 169, 234Age of Fighting Sail, 1, 4, 5, 8, 10,

11, 16, 17, 21, 25, 26, 38, 39,48, 57, 77, 89, 96

aircraft carriers, ix, 136airplanes

invention of, 84reconnaissance and, 100WWI and, 98–99, 100, 101WWII and, 122

Ajax (U.K.), 123Akashi (Japan), 185Alabama, CSS, 21–22Alaska (U.S.), 245Alaska-class (U.S.), 131, 169, 245Albany (U.S.), 140, 142, 144, 152Alecto (U.K.), 16Aleksander Suvarov (Soviet Union),

237Aleksandr Nevski (Soviet Union),

237Algerie (France), 112Allied Submarine Detection

Investigation Committee(ASDIC), 132

Alma-class (France), 29, 40Ammonoosuc (U.S.), 188Amphion (France), 17Amsterdam (U.S.), 244Andrea Doria (Italy), 232Andrea Doria-class (Italy), 149,

155, 163, 169, 232Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 102, 105Antietam (U.S.), 250antisubmarine warfare (ASW)

weapons, 141–43

Anzio (U.S.), 250Archimedes (U.K.), 15–16Arethusa (U.K.), 90, 99, 208Arethusa-class (U.K.), 98–99, 168,

208Argentina, 40, 159–60Argonaut (U.K.), 230Arkansas (U.S.), 249armor, ix

battleships and, 78–79early cruiser development and,

32–33iron and, 25, 32iron as, 20sandwich, 32speed and, 28, 34, 78, 83, 94steel and, 60weaponry and, 41, 48

armor-piercing (AP) shells, 68, 72Armstrong, Sir William, 40ASDIC. See Allied Submarine

Detection InvestigationCommittee

Ashigara (Japan), 218Astoria (U.S.), 225, 244Atlanta (U.S.), 188, 244Atlanta-class (U.S.), 45, 130, 168,

189Atlantic Charter, 126atomic bomb, 129, 134, 135Aube, Theophile, 42Audacious (U.K.), 93Augusta (U.S.), 126Aurora (Russia), 219Aurora (U.K.), 208Australia, 92, 133Australia (U.K.), 103Austria, 21, 31, 45Austro-Prussian War (1866), 29Azov (Soviet Union), 242

Baltimore-class (U.S.), 140Battle of Trafalgar (1805), 7–8, 10battleships

armor and, 78–79

commerce protection and, 44cruisers vs., 104early cruiser development and,

34–35, 44, 53interwar development of, 113pocket, 113

Bayard-class (France), 42BBC. See British Broadcasting

CorporationBeatty, David, 94, 95Belfast (U.K.), 212Berlin (Germany), 93, 177Bessemer, Henry, 37Biloxi (U.S.), 244Birmingham (U.S.), 84, 223, 244Bismarck (Germany), 124, 125Bismarck-class (Germany), 36, 122Blücher (Germany), 80, 125, 204Blake (U.K.), 231Blake-class (U.K.), 50–51blockades, 8–9, 21, 97Bodicea-class (U.K.), 74Boer War (1899), 66–67Bolshevik Revolution, 100, 109Bonaventure (U.K.), 230Boston (U.S.), 139, 140, 142, 144,

152, 188, 246Boston-class (U.S.), 169, 246Boué de Lapeyrère, Augustin,

75–76, 82Bremen-class (Germany), 167, 177Breslau (Germany), 90Britain. See Great BritainBritannia (U.K.), 30British Broadcasting Corporation

(BBC), 123bronze, 1–2Brooklyn-class (U.S.), 117, 159–60Bunker Hill (U.S.), 250Bushnell, David, 85

Caio Duilio (Italy), 232California (U.S.), 248California-class (U.S.), 152, 169,

248

272 INDEX

Canberra (U.S.), 139, 140, 152,246

Cape Matapan, Battle of, 126–27Cape St. George (U.S.), 250Carron Company, 3Cavour, Camillo di, 29–30Chambers, Washington, 84Chancellorsville (U.S.), 250Charybdis (U.K.), 230Chester (U.K.), 95Chester (U.S.), 96, 223Chester-class (U.S.), 75, 168, 223Chicago (U.S.), 45, 140, 142, 144,

151Chile, 167, 172China, 53, 58, 67, 116, 121Chosin (U.S.), 250Christoforo Columbo (Italy), 35Churchill, Winston, 125, 126Churruca, Cosme Damián, 10Cincinnati (U.S.), 224Cleopatra (U.K.), 230Cleveland (U.S.), 244Cleveland-class (U.S.), 130, 140,

152, 169, 244Colbert (France), 145, 154, 163,

169, 228Cold War

cruiser development during,136–64, 169, 228–29,231–33, 235, 237–43, 246–50

end of, 162–64Falklands War (1982), 159–60Korean War (1950–1953), 145shipboard life during, 160–62Vietnam War (1964–1975), 151

Columbia (U.S.), 244commerce protection, ix, 1

early cruiser development and,33, 44, 51, 57–58

frigates and, 9speed and, 25U.S. Civil War and, 21–22, 26WWI and, 92, 101

commerce raiding, 1blockades, 21blockades and, 8frigates and, 8speed and, 25U.S. Civil War and, 21–22, 26WWI and, 92

communication, 72Comus-class (U.K.), 38Concord (U.S.), 224Constellation, U.S.S., 9Constitution, U.S.S., 3, 4Continental System, 9Coolidge, Calvin, 107Corn Laws, 33Coronel, Battle of, 91Courageous (U.K.), 209Courageous-class (U.K.), 98, 168,

209Cowpens (U.S.), 250Cradock, Sir Christopher, 91Cressy-class (U.K.), 61Crete, 126Crimean War (1853–1856), 20, 25,

29, 32cruisers

antiaircraft, 117, 130armed merchant (auxiliary),

87–88, 92–93armored, 32–35, 40–43, 61–65,

72–75battle, ix, 79–84belted, 32–34, 42Cold War development of,

136–64, 169disarmament treaties and,

102–16dreadnought armored, 79early development of, 25–69,

167, 172–90helicopter, 148–49“ideal”, 77–78interwar development of, 101–19light, 55, 73–74, 84–87, 95missile, 138–59

INDEX 273

modern, 40in peace, ix, x, 57–58post-WWII development of,

134–36precedents to, 1–22pre-WWI development of,

71–89pre-WWII development of, 168,

192–225protected, 40–54, 62–63scouts, 62, 65, 72–74, 76, 86,

108–9striker, 155torpedo, ix, 36–37, 44, 47, 55WWI development of, 90–100WWII development of, 121–34,

169See also frigates; shipboard life

Cuba, 59Cumberland (U.K.), 123Cuniberti, Vittorio, 77Cyclops (U.K.), 14

Danzig (Germany), 177Dayton (U.S.), 244Defense (U.K.), 96, 205De Gaulle, Charles, 151–52De Grasse (France), 145, 163De la Guerre Maritime Avant et

Depuis les Nouvelles Inventions(Grivel), 42

Denmark, 11, 15Denmark Straits, Battle of, 124–25Denver (U.S.), 244Denver-class, 65Detroit (U.S.), 224Deutschland (Lutzow) (Germany),

113, 124, 202Deutschland-class (Germany), 113,

115, 122, 131, 168, 202Dewey, George, 45, 59De Zeven Provincien (Netherlands),

144, 169Diana (Russia), 219Dido (U.K.), 230

Dido-class (U.K.), 117, 130, 131,169, 230

Digital Scene Matching AreaCorrelation (DSMAC), 157

Dmitry Pozharski (Soviet Union),237

Doorman, Karel, 128Dorsetshire (U.K.), 125, 211Dreadnought (U.K.), 75, 77, 78Dresden (Germany), 197Dresden-class (Germany), 74, 168,

197DSMAC. See Digital Scene

Matching Area CorrelationDubourdieu (France), 57Duca D’Aosta (Italy), 115Duca D’Aosta-class (Italy), 115Duguesne (France), 173, 193Duluth (U.S.), 244Dunkerque (France), 195Dunkerque-class (France), 115,

168, 195Dupuy de Lôme (France), 48–49,

60, 61, 63, 167, 175Duquesne-class (France), 105–6,

168, 193Dzerzhinski (Soviet Union), 146,

237

Edgar-class (U.K.), 51Edgar Quintet (France), 192Edgar Quintet-class (France), 82Edinburgh (U.K.), 212Edinburgh-class (U.K.), 116–17,

168, 212education, shipboard life and,

30–31, 39, 57, 89, 160–62Edward Quintet-class (France),

168, 192Eilat (Israel), 151electricity, 38–39, 72Ely, Eugene B., 84Emden (Germany), 92, 109,

197Emile Bertin (France), 114

274 INDEX

enginesnuclear-powered turbine, 142steam, 11–17, 25–27triple-expansion, 41–42, 72turbine, 72, 84

England. See Great BritainEntente Cordiale, 63Erickson, John, 15Ernest Renan (France), 82Esmeralda (Chile), 40, 43, 45, 46,

167, 172, 184Essex (U.S.), 3, 8Ethiopia, 116Euryalus (U.K.), 230Exeter (U.K.), 106, 123, 128

Falklands, Battle of, 91Falklands War (1982), 159–60Fargo (U.S.), 244Fearless (U.K.), 90Fighting Ships, 77First China War (1841–1843), 18First London Conference, 111–12,

113, 115First Naval Defense Act (1889),

50First Naval Law (1898), 56First Navy Expansion Bill,

Japanese, 45Fisher, John, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80,

81, 85, 91, 98Fiume (Italy), 126, 214France

Cold War cruiser developmentin, 145, 150–52, 154, 163,169, 228–29

early cruiser development in, 22,25, 28–29, 30, 31, 32, 34–35,37, 39–43, 44, 45, 47–50, 53,57, 61–63, 167, 173–75

interwar cruiser development in,101, 105, 108, 112, 114–15,118, 168, 192–95

post-WWII cruiser developmentin, 134–35

precedents to cruisers in, 8, 9,11, 14–17, 19–21

pre-WWI cruiser development in,75–76, 82

Francis B. Ogden (U.K.), 15Francis Smith (U.K.), 15French Revolution, 3, 6, 9, 11, 31,

85frigates

commerce protection and, 9commerce raiding and, 8conversion of, 16–17importance of, 11iron and, 17–21reconnaissance and, 7screw propellers and, 15–16shipboard life on, 4–7, 9–11sloops vs., 1steam propulsion and, 11, 11–17structure of, 3–4weaponry of, 1–3, 19–20See also cruisers

Frunze (Soviet Union), 243Fulton, Robert, 85Furious (U.K.), 98, 115Furutaka-class (Japan), 105Fylgia (Sweden), 72, 168, 221

Galatea (U.K.), 208Galissonnière-class (France), 114Galveston (U.S.), 244Gazelle-class (Germany), 55General Admiral (Russia), 32–34,

167, 186General Belgrano (Argentina),

159–60General Electric Corporation, 152Geneva Disarmament Conference,

110–11Georges Leygues (France), 194German Naval Laws, 64Germany

early cruiser development in,36–37, 44–46, 54–56, 61,63–64, 167, 176–77

INDEX 275

interwar cruiser development in,109–10, 112–13, 117–18,168, 196–204

pre-WWI cruiser development in,74, 80–81, 84–88

WWI cruiser development in,90–100

WWII cruiser development in,121–25

Gerzog Edinburgski (Russia), 186Gettysburg (U.S.), 250Giuseppe Garibaldi (Italy), 144Global Positioning System (GPS),

157Gloire (France), 20–21, 25, 28, 32,

194Glorious (U.K.), 209Gneisenau (Germany), 91, 196,

203Goeben (Germany), 90Goito-class (Italy), 46Goodenough, William, 95Gorgon (U.K.), 14Gorizia (Italy), 214Gorshkov, Sergei, 146Gotland (Sweden), 115, 168, 222GPS. See Global Positioning

SystemGraf Spee (Germany), 123–24Great Britain, 123–25

battle cruisers and, 41Cold War cruiser development

in, 144–45, 151, 155, 169,231

early cruiser development in, 22,25, 27–28, 30, 32–39, 40–44,46, 48, 50–56, 61–62, 66–67,167, 178–82

interwar cruiser development in,106–7, 114, 116–18, 205–12

precedents to cruisers in, 3–21pre-WWI cruiser development in,

73–75, 77–80, 85–86pre-WWII cruiser development

in, 168

WWI cruiser development in,90–101

WWII cruiser development in,131, 169, 230

Grivel, Louis-Antoine-Richild, 42Grozny (Soviet Union), 238Guadeloupe (U.S.), 19Guam (U.S.), 245guns. See weaponry

Haguro (Japan), 218Hamburg (Germany), 177Hampton Roads, Battle of, 29Harding, Warren, 107Haruna (Japan), 216Harvey, H. A., 60Harwood, Henry, 123Heihachiro, Togo, 68, 71, 79Helgoland Bight, Battle of, 90–91Hermione (U.K.), 230Hiei (Japan), 216high-explosive (HE) shells, 68, 72Hindenburg (Germany), 99, 103,

168, 200Hipper, Franz von, 93, 94Hiroshima, Japan, 129, 134, 135Hitler, Adolf, 113, 116, 121–23, 126Holland, Lancelot, 124–25Hood (U.K.), 101, 124, 125, 168,

210Houston (U.S.), 244Hue City (U.S.), 250Hughes, Charles Evans, 107Huntington (U.S.), 244Hussein, Saddam, 164

Ibuki-class (Japan), 81Ikoma (Japan), 215Imperieuse (U.K.), 181Imperieuse-class (U.K.), 41, 167,

181Inconstant (U.K.), 22, 28, 29, 178,

208Inconstant-class (Great Britain),

27–28, 31, 167, 178

276 INDEX

Indefatigable (U.K.), 94, 96Indianapolis (U.S.), 129, 134Indomitable (U.K.), 206Inflexible (U.K.), 206The Influence of Sea Power on

History (Mahan), 61Inscription Maritime, 31Invincible (U.K.), 95, 96, 206Invincible-class (U.K.), 78, 79, 80,

83, 168, 206Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 160Irene II-class (Germany), 45–46Iris (U.K.), 37–38, 167, 180iron

armor and, 20, 25, 32early cruiser development and,

25precedents to cruisers and,

17–21Israel, 151Italy

Cold War cruiser developmentin, 144, 149–50, 154–55, 163,169, 232–33

early cruiser development in, 22,29–31, 35–37, 44–47, 52,65–66, 167, 183

interwar cruiser development in,108–9, 112, 115, 118, 168,213–14

precedents to cruisers in, 21pre-WWI cruiser development in,

76–77, 82–83, 86WWII cruiser development in,

121, 126–27, 132

Jane, Fred T., 77Jane’s Fighting Ships, 77Japan

early cruiser development in, 22,35–36, 39, 45, 52, 53, 58,66–69, 167, 184–85

interwar cruiser development in,86, 104–6, 113–14, 117, 118,168, 215–18

pre-WWI cruiser development in,72–73, 76, 81–82

WWII cruiser development in,127–29, 169, 234

Java Sea, Battle of, 128Jeanne d’Arc (France), 151–52,

154, 163, 169, 229Jellicoe, John, 95Jenne de Vienne (France), 194Jeune École, 22, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50,

63, 75Ju-ch’ang, Ting, 58Jules Michelet (France), 75Jutland, Battle of, 93–97, 100

Köln (Germany), 201Königsburg (Germany), 201Königsburg-class (Germany), 74Kalinin (Soviet Union), 243Kara-class (Soviet Union), 153–54,

163, 169, 242Karlsruhe (Germany), 201K-class (Germany), 109–10, 168,

201Kearsarge (U.S.), 21–22Kennedy, John F., 141Kent-class (U.K.), 106Kerch (Soviet Union), 242Kharkov (Soviet Union), 241Khrushchev, Nikita, 146Kiev (Soviet Union), 241Kiev-class (Soviet Union), 154,

158, 162, 169, 241King George V (U.K.), 124Kirishima (Japan), 216Kirov (Soviet Union), 158, 236,

243Kirov-class (Soviet Union), 118,

162, 169, 236, 243Kongo (Japan), 81–82, 216Kongo-class (Japan), 81, 168, 216Korea, 53, 58, 66Korean War (1950–1953), 145Kosovo, 164Krasnyi Kavkaz (Soviet Union), 109

INDEX 277

Kresta I-class (Soviet Union),147–48, 163, 169, 239

Kresta II-class (Soviet Union),153–54, 163

Kynda-class (Soviet Union),147–48, 163, 169, 238

L’Insurgente (France), 9Lübeck (Germany), 64, 177La Galissonnière (France), 168, 194Lake Champlain (U.S.), 250Lake Erie (U.S.), 250Langley, Samuel P., 84Langsdorff, Hans, 123LaPerousse-class (France), 35League of Nations, 110Leander-class (U.K.), 38Leech, Samuel, 10Leipzig (Germany), 110, 176, 177Leipzig-class (Germany), 36, 167,

176Lenin, Vladimir, 109Leningrad (Soviet Union), 240Leon Gambetta-class (France), 63,

75Lexington-class (U.S.), 103Leyte Gulf (U.S.), 250Lincoln, Abraham, 21Lion (U.K.), 79–80, 94, 207, 231Lion-class (U.K.), 79, 168, 207Little Rock (U.S.), 140, 244London-class (U.K.), 106Long Beach (U.S.), 142–44, 145,

151, 152, 157, 169, 247Lusitania, 99Lutzow (Germany), 95

Möwe (Germany), 92–93, 168, 199Müller, Karl von, 92Macedonia (U.K.), 10Madawaska (U.S.), 188Magdeburg-class (Germany), 84–85Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 61, 64Maine (U.S.), 59Manchester (U.S.), 244

Manchuria, 66, 67, 116Marblehead (U.S.), 224Maria Adelaide (Piedmont-

Sardinia), 29Marseillaise (France), 194Marshall Plan, 136Martin, Pierre, 37Matsushima-class (Japan), 53, 58Memphis (U.S.), 224Mercury (U.K.), 37–38, 180Merrimack (U.S.), 17Mersey-class (U.K.), 43Meteor-class (Germany), 55Miami (U.S.), 244Midway, Battle of, 129Mikawa, Gunichi, 128–29Mikhail Kutuzov (Soviet Union),

237Mikuma (Japan), 128Milan (France), 47Milwaukee (U.S.), 224Minneapolis (U.S.), 225Minotaur (U.K.), 205Minotaur-class (U.K.), 62, 79, 168,

205Minsk (Soviet Union), 162, 241Mississippi (U.S.), 15, 249Missouri (U.S.), 15Mobile (U.S.), 244Mobile Bay (U.S.), 250Mogami (Japan), 73, 128Mogami-class (Japan), 113, 114,

117Monitor (U.S.), 49Montcalm (France), 194Monterey (U.S.), 250Montojo y Pasaron, Patricio, 59Montpelier (U.S.), 244Moskva (Soviet Union), 240Moskva-class (Soviet Union),

148–49, 162, 169, 240Munchen (Germany), 177Murmansk (Soviet Union), 237Mussolini, Benito, 118, 126Myoko (Japan), 218

278 INDEX

Nachi (Japan), 218Nachi-class (Japan), 105, 168, 218Nagasaki, Japan, 129, 134, 135Naiad (U.K.), 230Naniwa (Japan), 184Naniwa-class (Japan), 45, 167, 184Napoleon, 9Napoleonic Wars, 3, 6, 8, 11, 20,

21, 31, 54, 85NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty

OrganizationNaval War College, British, 89Navy Act of 1904, U.S., 75Nelson, Horatio, 7–8Nelson-class (U.K.), 34Nemesis (U.K.), 18Neshaminy (U.S.), 188Netherlands

Cold War cruiser developmentin, 144, 169, 235

precedents to cruisers in, 11, 14,15

New Orleans (U.S.), 225New Orleans-class (U.S.), 107–8,

112, 168, 225New York (U.S.), 54Nikolayev (Soviet Union), 242Norfolk (U.K.), 211Norfolk-class (U.K.), 106, 168, 211Normandy (U.S.), 250North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 136, 149Norway, 125Noshiro (Japan), 234Novorossiyk (Soviet Union), 241nuclear power, 142–43

Ochakov (Soviet Union), 242Oklahoma City (U.S.), 244Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya (Soviet

Union), 237Olympia (U.S.), 54, 59, 168, 190Omaha (U.S.), 224Omaha-class (U.S.), 101–2, 107,

168, 224

Ordshonikidze (Soviet Union), 237Orlando-class (U.K.), 41Ottoman Empire, 76, 90

Pact of Steel (1939), 121Pallada (Russia), 168, 219Panther-class (Austria), 46Pasadena (U.S.), 244Pax Britannia, 31Pearl-class (U.K.), 52Pearl Harbor, 126, 129Penelope (U.K.), 208Persian Gulf War, 164Petropavlovsk (Soviet Union), 242Petr Velikiy (Soviet Union), 243Pfundheller, Hans, 93Phaeton (U.K.), 208Philippines, 59, 75Philippine Sea (U.S.), 250Phoebe (U.K.), 230Phoenix (U.S.), 159Piedmont-Sardinia, 29–30Piemonte (Italy), 46–47, 167, 183Pietro Giola (Italy), 47Pietro Micca (Italy), 36–37Pola (Italy), 126, 214Pomone (France), 17Pompanoosuc (U.S.), 188Porter, David, 8Port Royal (U.S.), 250Portsmouth (U.S.), 244Powerful (U.K.), 56, 67, 182Powerful-class (U.K.), 51, 167, 182Prince of Wales (U.K.), 126Princess Royal (U.K.), 207Princeton (U.S.), 250Prinz Adalbert (Sedan) (Germany),

176Prinz Eugen (Germany), 124, 131,

136, 204Providence (U.S.), 244Prussia, 21, 36

Quarto (Italy), 86, 168, 213Quasi-War (1798–1800), 9, 11

INDEX 279

Queen Mary (U.K.), 94, 96Quincy (U.S.), 225

radar, 132radio, 72Raleigh (U.K.), 178Raleigh (U.S.), 224Rattler (U.K.), 16reconnaissance, ix, 1, 7, 25, 72,

100Redoutable (France), 37Renown (U.K.), 123Rhadamanthus (U.K.), 12–14Richmond (U.S.), 224Rickover, Hyman, 142River Plate, Battle of, 123, 125Robins, Benjamin, 19Roon-class (Germany), 74Roosevelt, Franklin D., 126Roosevelt, Theodore, 84Rossiya (Russia), 52, 66, 167, 187Royalist (U.K.), 208Royal Naval College, British, 5, 39Rozhdestvenski, Zinovi Petrovitch,

68, 71Rurik (Russia), 52, 76, 168, 220Russia, 44

early cruiser development in, 22,29, 32–35, 42, 52, 57, 66–69,167, 186–87

interwar cruiser development in,168, 219–20

precedents to cruisers in, 15, 20,21

pre-WWI cruiser development in,76

WWI cruiser development in, 90See also Soviet Union

Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905),67–69, 71–74, 85–87

Sakawa (Japan), 234Salem (U.S.), 223SAM. See surface to air missilesSan Francisco (U.S.), 225

San Giorgio-class (Italy), 83San Jacinto (U.S.), 250San Marco (Italy), 83Santa Fe (U.S.), 244Santiago Bay, Battle of, 59–60Savo Island, Battle of, 128Scharnhorst (Germany), 91, 196,

203Scharnhorst-class (Germany), 74,

80, 118, 122, 168, 196, 203Scheer, Reinhard, 93, 95Scotland, 3Scout-class (U.K.), 44scouts, 62, 65, 72–74, 76, 86,

108–9Scylla (U.K.), 48, 230Second London Conference, 116Sedan (Prinz Adalbert) (Germany),

176Selbourne, Lord, 77Sendai-class (Japan), 104Serbia, 164Sevastopol (Soviet Union), 239Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), 8Sfax (France), 44, 167, 174Shah (U.K.), 178Shannon (U.K.), 33, 167, 179, 205Sheffield (U.K.), 117Shiloh (U.S.), 250shipboard life

Cold War cruiser developmentand, 160–62

early cruiser development and,30–31, 38–39, 56–57

early cruisers and, 25education and, 30–31, 39, 57,

89, 160–62on frigates, 4–7, 9–11interwar cruiser development

and, 88–89pre-WWI cruiser development

and, 71in war, 9–11WWI cruiser development and,

97

280 INDEX

Shorter, Edward, 15Siemens, 37Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895),

58, 60, 61, 66Sirius (U.K.), 7, 230SLBMs. See submarine-launched

ballistic missilesSmith, Francis Petit, 15sonar, 132Souchon, Wilhelm, 90South Carolina (U.S.), 248Soviet Union

Cold War cruiser developmentin, 136–38, 144, 146–50,153–54, 157–59, 169, 237–43

collapse of, 162–63interwar cruiser development in,

109, 118nuclear program of, 144post-WWII cruiser development

in, 135WWII cruiser development in,

169, 236See also Russia

Sovremenny-class (Soviet Union),158, 162

Spain, 11, 31, 58–60Spanish-American War (1989),

58–60, 61, 64, 75Spee, Maximilian von, 91–92speed

armor and, 28, 34, 78, 83, 94commerce protection and, 25commerce raiding and, 25reconnaissance and, 25steam propulsion and, 12

Sphinx (France), 14Springfield (U.S.), 244SSMs. See surface-to-surface

missilesStalin, Josef, 109, 118, 135, 137,

146Stalingrad-class (Soviet Union),

137, 146

steam propulsion, ixdisadvantages of, 12–13early cruiser development and,

25–27early experiments with, 11–17frigates and, 11–17speed and, 12

steel, ix, 37–38, 60Stevens, Robert L., 18–19Stevens Battery, 19Strasbourg (France), 195submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs), 146Suffren-class (France), 106Suma (Japan), 185Suma-class (Japan), 53, 167, 185surface to air missiles (SAM),

138–41surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs),

146Sverdlov (Soviet Union), 237Sverdlov-class (Soviet Union), 137,

146, 169, 237Svietlana (Russia), 57Sweden

interwar cruiser development in,115, 168, 221–22

precedents to cruisers in, 15pre-WWI cruiser development

and, 72Sydney (Australia), 92, 133

Takachiho (Japan), 184Takagi, Takeo, 128Tallin (Soviet Union), 242Talos SAM, 138, 140Tartar SAM, 138, 141Tashkent (Soviet Union), 242TERCOM. See Terrain Contour

Mapping SystemTerrain Contour Mapping System

(TERCOM), 157Terrible (U.K.), 13, 14, 67, 182Terrier SAM, 138–39Texas (U.S.), 249

INDEX 281

Thomas S. Gates (U.S.), 250Ticonderoga (U.S.), 155–56, 250Ticonderoga-class (U.S.), 155–57,

164, 169, 250Tiger (U.K.), 46, 231Tiger-class (U.K.), 151, 155, 169,

231Tigris (U.K.), 14Tirpitz, Alfred von, 64Topeka (U.S.), 244torpedoes, ix

early cruiser development and,36, 44, 47, 55

self-propelled, 36Tourville (France), 193Treaty of Paris, 29, 32Treaty of Versailles, 100, 109, 110,

113, 116, 117, 121Trenton (U.S.), 224Tripoli (Italy), 47Truman, Harry, 136Truman Doctrine, 136Tsukuba (Japan), 215Tsukuba-class (Japan), 73, 77, 81,

168, 215Tsushima, Battle of, 68, 71–73, 76,

79, 86Turbina (U.K.), 64Turkey, 90Turtle, 85Tuscaloosa (U.S.), 125, 225Two Power Standard, 50, 52

U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), 85commerce protection and, 26commerce raiding and, 21–22,

26early cruiser development and,

26, 35, 49Hampton Roads, Battle of, 29precedents to cruisers and, 21

U.S. Navyestablishment of, 9, 27women in, 161–62

UN. See United Nations

Undaunted (U.K.), 208Unebi (Japan), 45United Kingdom (U.K.). See Great

BritainUnited Nations (UN), 110United States

Cold War cruiser developmentin, 136–44, 149–53, 155–57,169, 246–50

early cruiser development in, 22,27–28, 31, 35, 45, 53–54,58–60, 64–65, 168, 188–90

interwar cruiser development in,101–5, 107–8, 117, 118, 168,223–25

post-WWII cruiser developmentin, 136

precedents to cruisers in, 2–4, 8,11, 15–19, 21

pre-WWI cruiser development in,74–75, 83–84

war against terrorism of, 164–65WWII cruiser development in,

125–26, 130–31, 169, 244–45United States Naval Academy, 31,

161, 162

Valley Forge (U.S.), 250Varyag (Soviet Union), 237, 238Vauban (France), 173Vauban-class (France), 167, 173Vella Gulf (U.S.), 250Vernon, HMS, 39vertical launch system (VLS), 156Vesusvius (U.S.), 54Vettor Pisani (Italy), 35Vicksburg (U.S.), 244, 250Victoria-Louise-class (Germany), 55Vietnam War (1964–1975), 151Villeneuve, Pierre Charles, 7–8Vincennes (U.S.), 129, 225, 244,

250Virginia (U.S.), 153, 169, 249Vitse Admiral Drozd (Soviet Union),

239

282 INDEX

Vittorio Veneto (Italy), 149–50, 163,169, 233

Vladivostok (Soviet Union), 239Von der Tann (Germany), 81, 168,

198Voroshilov (Soviet Union), 236

Waldeck-Rousseau (France), 192Wampanoag (U.S.), 22, 26–27, 28,

29, 188Wampanoag-class (U.S.), 26–27,

31, 168, 188War of 1812, 8, 10, 11, 53Warrior (U.K.), 20–21, 25, 28Warsaw Pact, 136Warspite (U.K.), 181Washington Naval Conference,

102Washington Treaty, 102–12, 116Watt, James, 11weaponry

armor and, 41, 48early cruiser development and,

26–27, 31–32, 46–47of frigates, 1–3, 19–20of sloops, 1WWII cruiser development and,

130Westinghouse Electric Corporation,

142White, William, 50Wichita (U.S.), 112Wiesbaden (Germany), 95, 96Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 54, 91Wilkes-Barre (U.S.), 244wireless, 72women, in U.S. Navy, 161–62World War I, 56, 57

airplanes and, 98–99, 100, 101blockades and, 97commerce warfare in, 92, 101Coronel, Battle of, 91

cruiser development during,90–100, 168

cruiser development prior to,71–89

Falklands, Battle of, 91Helgoland Bight, Battle of,

90–91Jutland, Battle of, 93–97, 100Treaty of Versailles, 100, 109,

110, 113, 116, 117, 121World War II

airplanes and, 122atomic bomb and, 129, 134, 135Cape Matapan, Battle of,

126–27cruiser development during,

121–34, 169, 230, 234,244–45

Denmark Straits, Battle of,124–25

Guadalcanal, Battle of, 128–29Java Sea, Battle of, 128Midway, Battle of, 129Pearl Harbor, 126, 129River Plate, Battle of, 123, 125Savo Island, Battle of, 128

Wright brothers, 84

Yahagi (Japan), 234Yalu River, Battle of, 58Yodo-class (Japan), 73York (U.K.), 106Yorktown (U.S.), 250Yubari (Japan), 104, 168, 217Yuko, Ito, 58Yuri Andropov (Soviet Union), 243

Zara (Italy), 126, 214Zara-class (Italy), 108, 112, 168,

214Zieten (Germany), 36–37, 55, 167,

176–77

INDEX 283

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