SHIELD OF EMPIRE: RACE, MEMORY, AND THE “CULT · PDF fileSHIELD OF EMPIRE: RACE, MEMORY ... the outbreak of hostilities with Germany at the ... battle cruisers, eight armored cruisers,

SHIELDOFEMPIRE:RACE,MEMORY,ANDTHE“CULTOFTHENAVY”

INFINDESIÉCLEBRITAIN

By

LEWISJAMESPATTERSON

Athesissubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof

MASTEROFARTSINHISTORY

WASHINGTONSTATEUNIVERSITYDepartmentofHistory

AUGUST2009

ii

TotheFacultyofWashingtonStateUniversity:

ThemembersoftheCommitteeappointedtoexaminethe

thesisofLEWISJAMESPATTERSONfinditsatisfactoryandrecommendthat

itbeaccepted.

___________________________________ HeatherE.Streets,Ph.D.,Chair ___________________________________ RaymondSun,Ph.D.

___________________________________ JesseSpohnholz,Ph.D.

iii

SHIELDOFEMPIRE:RACE,MEMORY,ANDTHE“CULTOFTHENAVY”

INFINDESIÉCLEBRITAIN

Abstract

byLewisJamesPattersonWashingtonStateUniversity

August2009

Chair:HeatherE.Streets

ThisthesisarguesthatthevariousculturalmanifestationsoftheRoyalNavyduringthe

periodfrom1880to1914wereindicativeofasenseofracialdeclineinGreatBritain,andthat

theRoyalNavyasaninstitutionwasusedtocompensateforthatsenseofdecline.

Specifically,thisthesisprovidesanarrativeofthearmsrace,ananalysisoftheBritish

caricatureoftheGermansasthe“target”oftheirnavalbuilding,andastudyofpopular

memoryofNelsonandTrafalgarandtherepulsionoftheSpanishArmada.Itthenexamines

themeaningoffleetreviewsasmanifestationsofcurrentnavalstrengthandasameansof

reassuringthepublicabouttheirfuturesecurity.Finally,itstudiesthepublicreactionstothe

BattleofJutlandin1916,andhowthesereactionsindicatethedegreetowhichpublic

expectationsofoverwhelmingnavalvictorieshadbecomeunrealistic.

Thisthesisthencloseswithabriefcomparativeanalysisbetweenearlytwentieth

centuryBritainandtheearlytwenty‐firstcenturyUnitedStates,inthattheysharethesame

senseofshockandfearofdecline,andfoundthemselvesincreasinglyinclinedtousetheir

militariesasreassuringculturalinstitutions.

iv

TABLEOFCONTENTS

PageABSTRACT..................................................................................................................................iiiDEDICATION...............................................................................................................................vLISTOFFIGURES.........................................................................................................................viINTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1CHAPTER

1. THEBRITISHNAVALBUILDUP,1887‐1914……………………………………………………………..12

2. THERESTLESSCHILD………………………………………………………………………………………………65

3. AHEROICTRADITION……………………………………………………………………………………………103

4. SHIELDOFEMPIRE………………………………………………………………………………………………..135EPILOGUE:“WHEREISOURNELSON?”………………………………………………………………………………..157CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….173BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................179

v

Dedication

ThisthesisisdedicatedtoLieutenantAllisonM.Oubre,UnitedStatesNavy,wholostherlifeon

May19th,2009whenherSH‐60Seahawkhelicoptercrashedduringatrainingexerciseinbad

weatheroffofCoronadoIsland,California,alittleoveramonthbeforeshewasscheduledtobe

married.

TheworldisalesserplaceandtheNavyisalesserinstitutionwithouther.

Iamgratefultohavebeenherfriend.

vi

LISTOFFIGURES

1. Punch,April5th,1905,“OnTour”………………………………………………………………...…………..96

2. Punch,August2nd,1905,“MelodramaintheBaltic”…………………………………………………973. Punch,May10th,1890,“L’EnfantTerrible”……………………………………………………………….984. Punch,February1st,1896,“TheStoryofFidgetyWilhelm”……………………………………….995. Punch,November11th,1908,“AnUnrehearsedEffect”…………………………………………...1006. Punch,September6th,1911,“Misunderstood”………………………………………………………...1017. Punch,September23rd,1908,“Isolation”…………………………………………………………..….…1028. TrafalgarSquareduringtheTrafalgarCentenary,1905………………………………………..…..1319. Punch,October18th,1905,“1805‐1905”………………………………………………………….……...13210. Punch,July15th,1908,“EnglandExpects‐”……………………………………………………………....13311. CoverPage,TrafalgarCentenaryProgram,NewZealand………………………………….…..….13412. FleetReviewPlans,1887and1914…………………………………………..…………………….…...…..15113. Advertisement,Chocolates,NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview……………...……15214. Advertisement,PaintandGlue,NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview………………15315. Advertisement,WineandTobacco,NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview………..15416. AdvertisementforTailoring,NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview……………………15517. “DreadnoughtProgram,”NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview………………………..156

1

INTRODUCTION

OnAugust5th,1914,asmall,humble,55‐year‐oldmantookcommandofthemost

powerfulassemblageofnavalpowerevercreated.1HisnamewasAdmiralJohnJellicoe,and

upontheoutbreakofhostilitieswithGermanyatthestartofWorldWarOnehewasorderedto

replacehisoldmentor,AdmiralSirGeorgeCallaghan,astheCommander‐in‐ChiefoftheBritish

GrandFleet.JellicoegotthejobbecauseCallaghanwasconsideredbyFirstLordofthe

AdmiraltySirWinstonChurchilltobetoooldandinflexibleforthedauntingtaskathand.2

WhenLordJellicoehoistedhisadmiral’sflagonthedreadnoughtbattleshipHMSIronDuke,he

hadunderhisimmediatecommandalmostonehundredships,notcountingnumeroussupport

vessels.Theseincludedtwenty‐oneDreadnoughtbattleships,eightolderbattleships,four

smallerbattlecruisers,eightarmoredcruisers,fourlightcruisers,andforty‐twodestroyers.3

ThisonemanwasentrustedwithGreatBritain’smostpowerfulweapon,aweaponthatwasfor

theBritishpeopletheirmostsacreddefensiveinstitution:thefrontlineforceoftheRoyalNavy.

HisappointmentinevitablycamewithgreatresponsibilityandhighexpectationsasBritainwent

towarwithGermanyinaconflictthatwouldalterEuropeancivilizationforever,andhelpshape

thetwentiethcentury.

ThisthesisisaculturalstudyofthepublicperceptionoftheinstitutionentrustedtoLord

Jellicoein1914.Theperiodfrom1880to1914wasoneoftroublingdestabilizationforthe

British.Thenewly‐unifiedGermanywasprovingitselftobeaneconomicandmilitary

juggernaut.InanincreasinglyunstableConcertofEurope,theBritishhadconsiderablereason

1A.TemplePatterson,Jellicoe:ABiography(Southampton:St.Martin’sPress,1969),59.2JohnWinton,Jellicoe(London:MichaelJoseph,1981),143.3Winton,147.

2

tofeelthattheBritisheconomicandmilitarysuperiorityenjoyedinthenineteenthcentury

wouldnotlastintothetwentiethcentury.TheGreatDepressionthatbeganinthe1870sasa

consequenceofthe“SecondIndustrialRevolution”compoundedthissenseofinstability,and

workedtoerodeBritishfaithintheirfuture.Intheirdesiretoseekrefuge,theBritishpeople

comfortedthemselvesbylookingtoinstitutionsandfiguresthatweresymbolsofstrength,and

thisresultedinasortofnavalrebirthandreawakeninginthelatenineteenthandearly

twentiethcenturies.Britishuneasewascompoundedbythemachinationsofthevolatile

GermanEmperor,WilhelmII,whouponhisascensiontotheGermanthroneengagedinan

aggressiveGermanforeignpolicyknownasWeltpolitik.ThisnewGermanforeignpolicy

includedtheconstructionofalargenavy,whichtheBritishviewedasadirectthreattotheir

sacrednavalhegemony.

Thisthesiswillthematicallyexaminethisperiodinfourchaptersandanepilogue.

ChapterOnewillprovideanarrativeoftheeconomic,political,technological,andnaval

doctrinalchangesfrom1880to1914,andwilldemonstratetheperiod’sfundamental

dynamism.ThissenseofwhirlwindchangefedtheBritishdesireforculturallyconstructed

sourcesofstrengthandstability.

ChapterTwoexaminesBritishperceptionsoftheirGermancousins.TheBritish

caricatureoftheGermansprovidesaportraitoftheBritons’principalmilitaryandeconomic

rivals,andalsorevealsinsightsabouthowtheBritishviewedthemselves.Thislatterelementof

Britishself‐perceptioncontributestothethesis’smainthemeofconstructingtheBritishsense

oftheirowndecline.

3

ChapterThreeilluminatesthesignificanceofBritishpopularmemoryoftheheroicnaval

traditionsofTrafalgarandtheSpanishArmada.Celebrationsofoldnavalvictoriesreminded

theBritishofwhattheyhadaccomplished,andimpliedwhattheycouldaccomplishagain.The

oldBritishnavalheroes,particularlyHoratioNelson,werecanonizedandcelebratedas

representingthefundamentalpowerandvirtueoftheBritishrace.

ChapterFourexamineshowmanifestationsofcontemporarystrengthintheformof

fleetreviewsassuredtheBritishpeoplethattheirfleetwaspowerfulenoughtohandle

anythingthatanyconceivableenemycouldthrowatthem.Thesespectaclesattracted

thousandsofBritonsfromallovertheempire,andallowedtheexpandingmass‐marketculture

toparticipateinthe“cultofthenavy”throughconsumingnavalliteratureandproductswith

navalthemes.

TheEpilogueprovidesabriefrecountoftheBattleofJutlandin1916,whichsawthe

onlysignificantengagementbetweenJellicoe’sarmadaandhisGermanopponent.Thefailure

toachieveadecisivevictory,definednarrowlyasthecompleteannihilationoftheGerman

fleet,provokedafirestormofcriticism.ThereactionstotheoutcomeatJutlanddemonstrated

howearnestlytheBritishpublicandmilitaryelitesyearnedfornewgloriousvictories.This

passioncooledovertime,allowingforamorerationalanalysisoftheengagement,which

highlightstheferocityoftheearlier,morepartisanmaterial.

Thisthesisengageswithseveralexistinghistoriographies.Itlinksmilitaryhistory,

evolvingconceptsof“race,”theemergenceoflatenineteenth‐centurymassmarketculture,

theriseofnavaltheater,andmemory,inasinglestudy.Muchofearliermilitaryhistorywas

4

concernedwiththetechnocraticdetailsofwarsandbattles–troopmovements,individual

leadershipdecisions,weaponry,andtwistsoffatethathaveresultedinsuccessorfailureof

militaryendeavors.

Studiesof“martialraces”inBritainhavebeenexclusivelyfocusedontheBritisharmy.

SirGeorgeMacMunn’sTheMartialRacesofIndia(1933)wasanearlystudyoftheemployment

of“naturallywarlike”ethnicgroupsintheimperialforcesofGreatBritain.Laterworksinclude

CynthiaEnloe’sEthnicSoldiers(1982),LionelCaplan’sWarriorGentlemen:“Gurkhas”inthe

WesternImagination(1995),MrinaliniSinha’sColonialMasculinity:The‘ManlyEnglishman’and

the‘EffeminateBengali’intheLateNineteenthCentury(1995),andmostrecentlyHeather

Streets’sMartialRaces:TheMilitary,RaceandMasculinityinBritishImperialCulture(2004).

StudiesofpopularsupportforthemilitaryinVictorianBritainhavealsobeenorientedtoward

thearmyratherthanthenavy.ThemostnotableoftheseareJohnMacKenzie’seditedworks

ImperialismandPopularCulture(1989)andPopularImperialismandtheMilitary:1850‐1950

(1992).

TheriseofEuropeanmass‐marketcultureasitappliestothisthesis’ssubjectincludes

theproliferationofnewspapersasprintingbecamemoreaffordable,andtheincreasing

availabilityofproductswithnavalthemesmarketedforcommonconsumption.Thefirstis

dealtwithinStephenKoss’sTheRiseandFallofthePoliticalPressinBritain:TheNineteenth

Century(1981)andMarkHampton’sVisionsofthePress(2004).Thesecondismostably

coveredinJanRuger’sTheGreatNavalGame:BritainandGermanyintheAgeofEmpire(2007).

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Memorystudieshaveanextensivebodyofworkdevotedtothem.Warmemoryasa

subsetofgeneralmemorystudiesincludesawealthofbooks,manyofwhichareparticularly

focusedonthememoryoftheGreatWar.TheearliestoftheseisPaulFussell’sTheGreatWar

andModernMemory(1977).Morerecently,JayWinterhasproducedthemorewidelyknown

studiesSitesofMemory,SitesofMourning:TheGreatWarinEuropeanCulturalHistory(1995)

andRememberingWar(2006).Inadditiontothesebooksthatprimarilyconcernthemselves

withmemorytheory,therehavebeencasestudiesdoneofspecificinstancesof

memorialization,aswithEdwardLinenthal’sHistoryWars:TheEnolaGayandOtherBattlesfor

theAmericanPast(1996).

Intyingthesehistoriographiestogether,thisthesisisabletodofouruniquethings.

First,andmostimportantly,itshiftsthecenterofgravityofBritishpopularenthusiasmforthe

militarytothenavyratherthanthearmy,whichprovidesforamorefruitfulstudy.Thenavy

wasamuchmorecentrally‐locatedculturalinstitutionthanthearmy.Thenavywasmuch

closertothecentralconceptof“Britishness,”inthatitwasperceivedbytheBritishpublictobe

apurelydefensivearm.Itwasseenasatruly“national”institution,whereasthearmywas

moreofaregionalonewithindividualregimentscomingfromdifferentpartsoftheUnited

Kingdom.Finally,thenavaltriumphsenjoyedbytheBritishreachedbackfarther(to1588)than

thoseofthearmy,andsoaculturalstudyofthenavyhasarichertraditiontodrawuponthan

similarstudiesofthearmy.

Second,itplacesanewspinonthestudyof“martialraces.”WhereastheBritish

conceptof“martialraces”ofteninvolvedplacingforeignersinspecialregard(aswithSikhsand

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Gurkhas),4theBritishNavywasconstitutedentirelyby“Britons.”ThoughtheBritishregarded

certainforeignracesasbeingnaturallybettersoldiersthanBritons,theybelievedthatthere

wasnosailorornavalofficeranywherethatcouldmatchtheBritishTarortheBritishAdmiral.

Withinthenavalcontext,theBritonswerethemselvesa“martialrace,”thenaturalmastersof

theseas.Thereforecelebrationsofthenavywereexercisesinself‐congratulation.Theracial

healthofthenavywastheracialhealthoftheBritishpeople.

Third,itallowsforthesynthesisofasinglecultural“moment,”inthatthepast,present,

andfutureoftheBritishpeopleareexaminedinasingleplacewithinthecontextofthe“cultof

thenavy.”Britishmemoriesoftheirheroicnavaltraditionswereusedtoinspirethem,

representationsoftheirexistingnavalpowerwereusedtoreassurethem,andthediscourses

generatedbybothwereusedtospurthemtoactionsothattheirfuturemightbesafeguarded.

Thisprovidesanilluminatingexampleofpast,present,andfuturecoexistingsimultaneouslyin

themindsofnavalenthusiastsandspurringthemtoactionandsacrifice.

Finally,thisthesislinksaspecificaspectofBritishculturewiththewiderEuropean

culturallandscapeofthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,commonlyreferredto

as“findesiècle.”Widespreaddisillusionmentwithmodernityandliberalismcoincidedwiththe

riseofsuchthinkersasFriedrichNietzscheandSigmundFreud,whobetweenthemstudiedand

wroteaboutcertainirrationalaspectsofthehumancondition,includingsexuality,the

subconscious,andthe“overman,”whowoulddestroyandthenrebuildsociety.This

disillusionmentcreatedaculturalmoodofpessimismconcerningthehealthofEuropean

4HeatherStreets,MartialRaces:TheMilitary,RaceandMasculinityinBritishImperialCulture(NewYork:ManchesterUniversityPress,2004),2.

7

societies,andcreatedthesensethattheworldwasspinningoutofcontrolduetoitsincreasing

complexity.ThiswastrueinBritainaselsewhere.Thebestexampleofaworkthatcaptures

thisculturalmoodisCarlE.Schorske’sFin‐De‐SiècleVienna:PoliticsandCulture(1980).The

uniquelinkbetweenmemory,race,andthenavyforgedinthisthesisillustrateshowBritish

navalenthusiaststriedtocompensateforthissenseofuneaseandbewilderinglyrapidchange.

Thisthesiscontributestoeachofthesehistoriographiesaswellasmakinga

fundamentallyuniquecontributionofitsown,butitalsoisreinforcedbycertain“supporting

historiographies,”whichareusedtofleshoutthethesis’sarguments.Aseachofthechaptersis

inmanywaysitsownstory,itwouldbemostusefultoconsiderhoweachchapterinteracts

withthesevarioussupportingbodiesofhistoricalscholarship.ChapterOne,theretellingofthe

narrativeofthenavalarmsrace,sharesspacewithseveralexistingsecondarystudies.Arthur

Marder’sworks,TheAnatomyofBritishSeaPower:AHistoryofBritishNavalPolicyinthePre‐

DreadnoughtEra(1940)andFromtheDreadnoughttoScapaFlow:TheRoyalNavyintheFisher

Era(1961)providesomewhatdatedbutexhaustivelyresearchedaccountsofthe

transformationoftheinstitutionoftheRoyalNavyintheperiodcoveredbythisthesis.More

recently,PaulKennedy’smasterfulworkTheRiseoftheAnglo‐GermanAntagonism1860‐1914

(1980)tracestheadventoftheFirstWorldWartoeconomicirreconcilabilitiesbetweenthe

expandingGermanyandthestagnantBritain,whilepointingtothenavalquestionitselfas

beingthemanifestationofthatirreconcilability.RobertMassie’swork,Dreadnought:Britain,

Germany,andtheComingoftheGreatWar(1991)providessomeadditionalusefuldetailsand

ingeneralalengthieraccountofthenarrative,butdoesnotfundamentallyimproveonMarder

orKennedy.JonSumida’swork,InDefenseofNavalSupremacy:Finance,Technology,and

8

BritishNavalPolicy,1889‐1914(1989)providesanintensiveanalysisofwheretheBritishpolicy

makerswentwronginpreparingtheirfleet,withanexcruciatinglydetaileddescriptionofthe

intricaciesoffirecontrolandrangefinding,corditeexplosives,andotherscientifictopics,that

helpthereaderbetterunderstandtheoutcomeofJutlandfromamaterialandscientific

standpoint.

ThegoaloftheChapterTwoistoconstructaportraitofBritishperceptionsofaforeign

people(inthiscase,theGermans).Severalrecentworkshaveattemptedtobuildsimilar

portraits.MichaelNolan’sTheInvertedMirror:MythologizingtheEnemyinFranceand

Germany,1889‐1914(2005)deconstructstheFrenchmythologyabouttheGermans,andvice

versa,inthewakeoftheFranco‐PrussianWarof1871.RobertTombs’sThatSweetEnemy:The

FrenchandtheBritishfromtheSunKingtothePresent(2007)constructsaportraitofBritish

perceptionsoftheFrench,throughperiodsofstrifeandquasi‐alliance.Tomyknowledge,mine

isthefirstattempttoconstructaBritishcaricatureoftheGermansinthisperiod,andsothe

secondchapterprovidesanoriginalcontributiontothisstrandofhistoriography,thoughthisis

notthethesis’smainfocus.Thisportraitiscreatedentirelyfromprimarysources,including

newspaperarticlesandeditorialsfromTheTimesofLondon,politicalcartoonsfromPunch,

speechesfromHansard’sParliamentaryDebates,andcorrespondencebetweenForeignOffice

officialspulledfromthecollectionBritishDocumentsontheOriginsofWar,1898‐1914.

ThestudyofcommemorationsconductedinChapterThreeoverlapswithone

monographandonecollectionofessays.DavidShannon’sworkNelsonRemembered:The

NelsonCentenary1905(2007)recountsthestoryoftheceremonyofthecentenaryitself,as

9

wellasprovidingusefulinsightsfromShannon’sexperienceasatourguideattheNelson

Memorial.HolgerHoocke’seditedcollectionHistory,Commemoration,andNational

Preoccupation:Trafalgar1805‐2005(2007)tracestheevolutionofthememoryofTrafalgar,

andintheessaycoveringtheCentenaryin1905commentsontheattemptstoreconcilethe

celebrationofacrushingvictoryovertheFrenchwiththethenrecentlyconcludedEntente

Cordial.ChapterThreeisaugmentedbythesesecondarysources,butisprimarilyconstructed

frompublishedpoems,speeches,andsermons,andalsobookspublishedbytheNavyLeague

ofGreatBritainontheoccasionofthesecelebrations.

Thestudyoffleetreviewsasrepresentationsofcurrentstrength,whichisthefocusof

ChapterFour,hasbeenablydonebyJanRugerinhisrecentworkTheGreatNavalGame:

BritainandGermanyintheAgeofEmpire(2007).Ruger’sworkdetailstheriseofnavaltheater

inbothGreatBritainandGermanyintheleaduptoWorldWarOne,andarguesthatthisrealm

ofnavaltheaterdevelopedamomentumandlifeallofitsown,anargumentthatthisthesis

echoes.Inexpoundinguponfurtherexamplesofhownavalcultureseepeditswayinto

householdsintheformofhomegames,thereisnomoreexhaustiveworkthanDonaldF.

Featherstone’sNavalWarGames:FightingSeaBattleswithModelShips(1965).Featherstone’s

work,whilelightlytouchingonthehistoryofnavalgaming,spendsmostofitspages

reconstructingtherulesofthegames.Thisgivesitthefeelofagamer’shandbookthatwould

allowthereadertoplaythesegameshimself,anotionthathassubsequentlybeenrendered

obsoletebythemercifularrivaloftheXBOX360,ofwhichthisthesis’sauthorisanaviddisciple.

Primarysourcesusedincreatingthisstudyofrepresentationsofexistingnavalstrengthinclude

officialprogramsforcoronationreviewsandotherfleetreviews,articlesinTheNavyandArmy

10

IllustratedandDailyExpress,andcertainotherdocumentspublishedontheoccasionofthe

DiamondJubileethatcelebratedtheprogressmadeoverthereignofQueenVictoria.

ThereareextensiveworksontheBattleofJutland,andananalysisoftheevolving

coverageofthatbattleisthesubjectofthebulkoftheepilogue.Secondarysourcesthat

attemptedtoreconciletheexpectationsofwhatJutlandshouldhavebeenwithwhatitactually

waswerepublishedinthe1930s(theonespriortotheseweresofiercelypartisanthatIclassify

themasprimarysources).NotableamongthesewasViceAdmiralHarper’sandLanghorne

Gibson’sTheRiddleofJutland:AnAuthenticHistory(1934).Inadditiontorecountingthe

battle,thisworkalsotriedtoredeembothJellicoeandBeattybyheftingpraiseequallyonboth

ofthem.Other,morerecent,worksontheBattleofJutlandincludeKeithYates’sFlawed

Victory:Jutland1916(2000),NigelSteel’sandPeterHart’sJutland1916:DeathintheGrey

Wastes(2003),andDanielButler’sDistantVictory:TheBattleofJutlandandtheAlliedTriumph

intheFirstWorldWar(2006),andthereareundoubtedlymanyothers.TheonethatIfound

themostusefulinproducingmyownretellingofthebattlewasHolgerHerwig’sLuxuryFleet:

TheImperialGermanNavy1888‐1918(1980).Herwig’sworkanalyzesthesocialstructureof

thevariousofficerandenlistedranksonWilhelminewarships,theirinteractionswitheach

other,andthesocialbackgroundsfromwhicheachclasswasdrawn.Inadditiontohismain

effort,heprovidesaparticularlycrispandconciseaccountoftheBattleofJutland,whichisto

datethemosteasilyunderstandableaccountIhaveyetread,thoughitisnotasdetailedasin

theotherworksthatIlistedabove.

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Thisthesistellsthestoryofapeoplewithaheroicpastandanuncertainfuture.The

Britishstiffupperliphadstartedtotwitch,andtheBritishpeoplewerecompelledtodrown

themselvesinthereassuranceprovidedbytheirmostpowerful,mostsacred,mostculturally

significant,mostversatile,andmostvibrantandcolorfulmilitaryarm,thatwouldensurethe

survivaloftheBritishraceintoeternity,andthatwouldbethefinalwordonandproofofthe

excellenceoftheBritishracewhenconflictcame.TheRoyalNavydiditsbesttofulfillthis

utterlyimpossibleexpectation,andthedisappointmentfollowingtheBattleofJutland

illustratedtowhatextentthatexpectationhadbecomefantastic.

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CHAPTERONE

THEBRITISHNAVALBUILDUP,1887‐1914

Thischapterhastwopurposes.First,forthelaymannotfamiliarwiththetopic,it

providesthebasicnarrativeoftheBritishnavalarmsraceitself,fromthe“NavalScare”of1887

totheoutbreakoftheFirstWorldWar.Thoughthededicatedscholaroftheperiodwillnot

findnewrevelationsinthisrendering,thischapterwillprovidereadyaccesstothenarrative,

alongwithsomeofthebasicfactsandfiguresassociatedwithshipbuildingandbudget

allocations,aswellastechnicaldetails.Second,theconfluenceofvaryingelementsthatIhave

tiedtogetherinthischapterisdesignedtodemonstratethedynamismoftheperiod.Public

apprehensionroseandfell,economicprosperityfluctuated,andtechnologicalinnovations

aboundedandwerefirst,orincreasingly,implementedinthisperiod.Thenavalinstitution’s

leadershipasawholeinBritainaskeditselffundamentalquestionsabouttheNavy’smakeup,

itsorganization,itsmethodsofpreparation,andagainstwhichenemiesitmightbedeployed.

Thelastquestioninparticularseemedtoansweritselffairlyclearlybytheendoftheperiod

coveredhere,buttheotherswerelargelyconjecture,educatedguessesthattookontheforce

ofideologywiththeirpractitioners.Eventselsewhereintheworldservedtoreinforcecertainof

therevolutionarychangestakingplacewithintheRoyalNavy,butthesereformswerealso

sparedthepotentiallyrudeawakeningofactualcombattesting,whichallowedcertainideas

thatwouldeventuallybedebunkedtoflourishtemporarily.Inanycase,theRoyalNavyof1914

wasunrecognizableinsize,philosophy,strategy,equipment,deployment,composition,and

capabilityfromthenavythatconductedtheshellingofAlexandriain1882.Thischapter

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synthesizesanaccountofhowsuchradicalchangeoccurred,andillustratestheextenttowhich

thenavalinstitutionwasaffectedbythisdynamicperiod.

Thechapterisdividedintothreesections,eachanindependentnarrativeofpoliticsand

foreignpolicy,technology,anddoctrineasthesechangedovertheperiod.Theyaretoldas

separatestories,thoughtheyoccasionallyrefertooneanother.Mypresentationofeachof

thesesectionsseparatefromeachotherisnotintendedtoconveythattheyoperatedina

vacuum,butrathertogivethereaderaseriesofdiscretethematicstrandstoponder,whichI

willtietogetherattheconclusionofthechapter.

PoliticsandForeignPolicy

Throughmostofthenineteenthcentury,duringthehightideofVictorianliberalism,

GreatBritainhadbeencontenttoallowa30%marginofsuperiorityinnumbersofnavalvessels

overherprincipalrival,France.Noothernavieswereconsideredsignificantlystrongenoughin

thisperiodtowarrantBritain’sattention,andcertainlynotenoughtoprovokeadditional

buildingtosupplementthemargin.5Bythe1880sthisquietconfidencehadbeeneroded.

Inthe1870s,theperiodoftheGreatDepressionofthenineteenthcentury,Britain

curbeditsdefensespendingontheNavyandallowedittostagnate.TheDepressionsappedtax

revenuesfromthegovernment,anddomesticconcernsweremoreprevalentandimmediate

thanfearsofforeignaggression.Thisfalsesenseofsecuritywasfedbythetemporary

diminutionofFrenchmilitarypowerduringtheFranco‐PrussianWarof1870‐1871,which

5ArthurMarder,TheAnatomyofBritishSeapower:AHistoryofBritishNavalPolicyinthePre‐DreadnoughtEra,1880‐1905(NewYork:Knopf,1940),105.

14

immediatelyledtofranticeffortsbytheFrenchgovernmenttoreorganizeitsarmyandcorrect

demonstrateddeficiency.Bytheendofthe1870s,Francehadagaindivertedresourcesto

rebuildingandexpandingitsnavy,andthiscaughttheBritishunawareastheFrenchclosedthe

gap.PressarticlesbegantoappearinBritainin1884thatcalledattentiontonewFrenchnaval

expansion,asdidthisarticlethatappearedinthePallMallGazetteonSeptember18th:

Thetruthaboutourironcladsisthatwhilewearesuperior,immenselysuperiortoanyotherpowerinfirst‐classironclads,wearenotirresistiblysuperiortoacoalitionoftwoormorenavalpowerseveninfirst‐classironclads…TheactualstateoftheNavymaybeunsatisfactory,butyoumayask,Are[sic]wenotmakinguplostground?Onthecontrary,wearelosingground.Itistruethatwearebuildingmorethanwedid;[sic]buttheFrencharestillaheadofusintheshipswhichtheyhaveonthestocks.6

Thissituationignitedapublicoutcry.Parliamentrespondedwithincreasednavalexpenditures

forthenexttwoyears,andthenthespendingpacewasslackenedasthepanicsubsided.Inthe

late1880stheFrenchbuildingprogramacceleratedagain,resultinginanotherpublicpanic.7

ThiswasexacerbatedbyamemorandumpostedtothePallMallGazettebythen‐CaptainLord

CharlesBeresfordinOctober1887,whichcalledattentiontotheclosinggapbetweenFrench

andBritishnavalstrength.8Followingtheappearanceofthisarticle,pressattentionwas

naturallydivertedtomonitortheFrenchnavalbuildup,includinganarticleintheLondon

StandardinJanuary1888thatspokeoftheflurryofactivityattheFrenchnavalbaseatToulon.9

ThefearsofashrinkingmarginofnavalsuperiorityoverFranceweremademoreurgent

byincreasedagitationinFranceforanalliancewithRussia,whichreachedapeakin1888,and

6UnknownAuthor,“The‘TruthAbouttheNavy’,1884,”inBritishNavalDocuments,ed.JohnB.Hattendorfetal.(Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1986),606.7Marder,Anatomy,119‐123.8Marder,Anatomy,133.9Marder,Anatomy,126.

15

whichwouldoverridetheRoyalNavy’ssanctifiedsuperiorityifitcametofruition.10Traditional

Britishcapacityforblockadingenemyportswouldbeunsustainableagainstsuchanalliance,

andwouldbeillegalunderthetenetsoftheDeclarationofParisof1856,whichBritainhad

signed.Specifically,thisdeclarationhadstipulatedthatinorderforblockadestobelegal,they

mustbeeffective,andsothroughBritain’sinabilitytocounterboththeRussiansandtheFrench

simultaneously,theywouldfindthemselvescontrarytointernationallawiftheyimposedan

ineffectiveblockade.

InadditiontonewresourcesallocatedtotheFrenchnavy,therehadbeenan

institutionalreawakeningofthenavalschoolofthoughtadvocatingguerredecourse,or

commercedestruction,inthe1880sinFrance.Severalhigh‐rankingFrenchadmirals

spearheadedthisinstitutionalshiftinstrategicthinking,andtheyandtheirintellectual

followerswerecalledtheJeuneEcole,or“YoungSchool.”11Britainhadneverinitshistorybeen

morevulnerabletodebilitatingeconomicconsequencesathomeresultingfromeffective

commercewarfare.TheIndustrialRevolutionhadleftBritainbereftofitspreviouslyself‐

sufficientagriculturalcapacitythroughthereallocationofitsarablelandtourbanizationand

industrialization.By1886,Britainimportedanunprecedentedtwo‐thirdsofitswheat.12Thus

theJeuneEcole,theexpandingFrenchnavy,theadventofthetorpedoboatasablockade

breaker,fearsofaFranco‐Russianalliance,andrevelationsofBritishvulnerabilitytocommerce

destructionallcombinedtocreateapowerfulcatalystfordramaticpublicnavalactivismand

governmentactioninthelate1880s.

10Marder,Anatomy,131.11Marder,Anatomy,86.12Marder,Anatomy,85.

16

TheHouseofCommons,inresponsetothepublicoutcryin1888,tookuptheissueby

commissioninganinvestigationofthereadinessofthefleet.13Asofthesummerof1888,in

spiteoftheaforementionedcausesforconcernaboutBritain’snavalsituation,themembersof

theBoardofAdmiraltystilldidnotfeeltheneedforincreasednavalexpenditure.AdmiralSir

HoraceHood,theFirstNavalLord,testifiedtotheHouseofCommonsthattheadmiraltywas

satisfiedwiththestrengthoftheRoyalNavy.Contradictingthis,earlierinthatyearthe

DirectorofNavalConstruction,WilliamWhite,hadtestifiedthat72vesselsneededtobe

retiredin1892andreplacedwithmoretechnologicallyup‐to‐datevesselsinordertokeepthe

fleetviable.Giventhisdisparity,theHouseofCommonspressedforaconfidentialreporton

therequirementsofthenavyintheeventofwarwithFrance.Theensuing“Reportofthe

ThreeAdmirals,”writtenbyAdmiralSirWilliamDowell,AdmiralSirRichardVeseyHamilton,

andViceAdmiralSirFrederickRichards,calledforadditionalexpenditure:

Thetotal[strengthoftheRoyalNavy]ismanifestlyaltogetherinadequateforinsuringaspeedyandsuccessfulresulttoawarwithFrancealone;[sic]andshouldthefleetsofoneotherpower–sayofthatgreatpower(Russia)whoseimperialinterestsmaybesaidtoclashmostwiththoseoftheBritishEmpire–havebeenjoinedtoFranceagainstGreatBritainatthattime,thebalanceofmaritimestrengthwouldhavebeenmostdecidedlyagainsther…Werecommendaresumptionandasteadycontinuanceofironcladbuilding…England…takesherrankamongthegreatpowersoftheworldinvirtueofthenavalpositionshehasacquiredinthepast,andwhichhasneverbeenseriouslychallengedsincethecloseofthelastgreatwar.ThedefeatofherNavymeanstoherthelossofIndiaandhercolonies,andofherplaceamongthenations.14

Followingtheirdeliberationsonthisreport,theNavalLordsrequestedfromtheHouseof

Commonsafive‐yearbuildingprogramthatwouldadd10battleships,37cruisers,andother

13Marder,Anatomy,132.14WilliamDowell,RichardHamilton,andFrederickRichards,“TheReportoftheThreeAdmirals,1888”inBritishNavalDocuments,614.

17

smallerunits.TheFirstLordoftheAdmiraltyconcurredandaddedtheseexpenditurestothe

navalestimatesof1889‐1890.15

ThisbuildingprogramwasdraftedastheNavalDefenceAct,andreflectedthe

recommendationsoftheNavalLords.Thefundstopayforthisexpenditurewerefreedupby

reductionsinservicecostsforthenationaldebt,andsothebillwaspassedwithlight

modificationsonMay31st,1889.16Concurrentwiththisbill,theTwoPowerStandard

recommendedbythe“ReportoftheThreeAdmirals”wasofficiallyarticulatedinitslastingform

bytheFirstLordoftheAdmiraltytotheHouseofCommons.17ItrequiredthatBritainshould

alwayshaveanavyequaltothetwonextlargestnavalpowers(inthiscaseFranceandRussia)

andstatedthatthisrequirementrepresentedabareminimumstrength.Itwouldremain

unchallengedasthebaselinerequisiteBritishnavalstrengthuntil1904.18

Theoriginal£21.5millionallowedforinthebillwouldnotsurviveimplementation,as

thenewexpandednavalprogramcoincidedwithincreasedshipbuildingcostsduetoexpanded

shipcapabilitiesanddisplacement.Merchantshippingwasonanupswing,andsomarket

forcesdroveupthecostoflaborandshipyardresourcesduetoscarcity.Additionalallotments

weremadetosupplementtheoriginalbillin1893,allocatinganadditional£1.35million.19The

NavalDefenceActdoubledthesizeoftheRoyalNavyinmodernwarshipsandinauguratedthe

15JonSumida,InDefenseofNavalSupremacy:Finance,Technology,andBritishNavalPolicy,1889‐1914(London:UnwinHymanLtd,1989),13‐15.16Sumida,13‐15.17ArthurMarder,FromtheDreadnoughttoScapaFlow:TheRoyalNavyintheFisherEra,VolumeI:TheRoadtoWar,1904‐1914(London,OxfordUniversityPress,1961),123.18Marder,Anatomy,106.19Sumida,15.

18

RoyalSovereignclassbattleship,atthetimeconsideredthemostformidablecapitalshipofany

navy.20Thebuildingprogramprovidedforeightofthesenewpremierwarships.21

TheNavalDefenceActof1889wasawatershedinnavalprocurementpolicy,becauseit

setaprecedentformultiyearbuildingprogramsthatwouldincreasinglycharacterizenaval

finance.Theadoptionofcoherentbuildingprogramsratherthanyear‐by‐yearexpenditures

vastlyincreasedtheeffectivenessofthenavy,bymodelingitalongpremeditatedbuilding

strategies.Italsovastlyincreasedthescopeandvolumeofbuilding,andexpenditureswithit.

Between1889and1897,navyestimatesrosefrom£15,888,502to£23,790,835,anincreaseof

65%.Thisdidnotcausesignificantinternalstrainwithinthegovernmentbecausethesewere

yearsofstrongeconomicgrowth.TheendoftheGreatDepressionin1896increasedtaxation

revenue,sothenewnavalexpenditureswereeasilyabsorbedbythelargergovernment

budget.InfrequentGreatPowerconfrontationsandarelativelackofcolonialmilitaryactivity

meantthatotherformsofmilitaryexpenditurewereataminimum.However,subsequentto

the1890s,procurementcostsincreaseddramaticallyaswarshipsbecamemorecomplicated

andpowerful,andtheexpendituresmadeinfightingtheBoerWarledtoincreasingdeficits.

TheyearsleadinguptotheFirstWorldWarwerecharacterizedbyoscillatingperiodsofdeficit

andsurplus,andthiscreatedrecurrentstrainsonnavalfinances.22Thesestrainsonnaval

financeswerecompoundedbycontinuingpublicpressuretoexpandthenavy,whichwasitself

fueledbytheincreasingtensionsthatBritainexperiencedwithFranceinthe1890s.

20Sumida,16.21Marder,Anatomy,143.22Sumida,18.

19

In1893tensionswithFranceandRussiaseemedtobeapproachingapeak,withthe

RussianadvanceintoPamirs(amountainousregioninCentralAsia,onthemodernborderof

AfghanistanandPakistan),chronictroublewithFranceoverthepursuitofhegemonyinEgypt,

andconflictoverSiam.InadebateintheHouseofCommonsonAugust28th,1893,Lord

Hamilton(theaforementionedFirstLordoftheAdmiralty)pointedoutthatthecombined

Franco‐Russiannavalstrengthamountedto25battleships,comparedtoBritain’s22.Hamilton

arguedforabilltoclosethegap.AFranco‐Russianallianceseemedallthemorelikely,

especiallyinnavalcircles,bytheannouncementthattheTsarhadagreedtosendasquadronto

visitToulon,andsubsequenttothatestablishapermanentbaseintheMediterranean.23The

Franco‐RussianAlliancewasconcludedin1894,andtheAdmiralty’sfearsbecameareality.24

Thespringandsummerof1896wasaperiodofrelativecalmforBritishforeignpolicy.

RelationswithGermanywererelativelygood.25TheFrenchnavyestimateswereheldinplace

in1895and1896.ThefreezingofFrenchspendingontheirnavalassetsreflectedtheir

realizationthattheycouldnothopetocounterboththeBritishnavyandtheGermanarmy.

TheyhaddecidedthattheGermanarmywasthegreaterthreattotheirsecurityanddemanded

greaterinvestmentinFrenchlandforces.Asaresult,theFrenchshiftedbacktoanemphasis

onguerredecourse,reflectedinitscurrentincarnationbytheJeuneEcole,andceasedironclad

constructioninfavorofsmallswiftcommercedestroyers.26Frenchnavalexpenditureswere

increasedagainin1897toaddressnewrevelationsinFranceabouttheirownnaval

23Marder,Anatomy,174‐175.24WalterArnstein,BritainYesterdayandToday:1830tothePresent,EighthEdition(Boston:HoughtonMifflinCompany,2001),245.25Marder,Anatomy,266.26Marder,Anatomy,274‐275.

20

deficiencies,whichpredictablypromptedyetanotherroundofagitationinBritain.27Thisnew

waveofFrenchnavalspendingwasaimedatmodernizingtheirmeansofcommercedestruction

throughtheconstructionofarmoredcruisers.Thesearmoredcruisersweredesignedtoallow

FrancetochokeoffBritishcommerceintheMediterranean,therebydenyingBritain’saccessto

IndiaviatheSuezCanal.28

TensionsbetweenFranceandBritaingrew,withonlybriefinterruptions,forthelast

thirtyyearsofthenineteenthcentury.Thisanimositycametoaheaddramaticallyandalmost

kineticallyasaresultofBritishandFrenchattemptstocolonizeandcontroldifferentportions

ofAfrica,whichBritainhadhadeconomicinterestsinsincetheSuezCanalhadbeenopenedin

1869.29ThisintersectionofcompetingimperialinterestsclashedintheSudanin1898.A

BritishCommander,LordKitchener,hadenteredKhartouminSudanattheorderofColonial

SecretaryJosephChamberlain,defeatedaforceof60,000Dervishes,andwassubsequently

orderedtoproceedupriverandstationagarrisonatthefortofFashoda.Whenhearrived,he

foundasmallFrenchforceunderColonelJean‐BaptisteMarchand,whichhadalready

establishedafootholdontheareathatKitchenerwasassignedtoacquire.30Astandoffensued,

whichreacheditsmostpivotalmomentonOctober17th,1898whenwordreachedLondonthat

theToulonfleethadbeenmobilized.ThenavalsuperiorityofBritainhadmadethestandoff

untenablefortheFrench,andtheywereforcedtobackdown.Shouldtheyhavepursuedwar

withtheBritish,theFrenchnavywouldhavefounditselfoutnumberedandoutclassed.The

27Marder,Anatomy,275‐276.28Marder,Anatomy,286.29RobertK.Massie,Dreadnought:Britain,Germany,andtheComingoftheGreatWar(NewYork:RandomHouse,1991),248.30Arnstein,186.

21

frontlineBritishfleethad18battleshipstoFrance’s15,andtheformerhadasignificant

advantageindisplacementandbroadside.TheEnglishhadasubstantialnavalreservetocall

upon,andtheFrenchdidnot.Becauseofthisdisadvantageinnavalpower,theFrench

capitulatedatFashodainexchangeforconcessionsinSub‐SaharanAfrica,andBritishcontrolof

EgyptandSudanwaspreserved.31

FortheBritishpro‐navalexpansionfaction,thisseemedtoprovethewisdomoftheTwo

PowerStandard,andprovidedargumentativefuelforadditionalnavalexpendituresbecause

thereturnsonsuchaninvestmenthadbeensodramaticallydemonstrated.Admiraltyrequests

hadaddedweightinthe1899estimatedebates,andfundingfortwoadditionalbattleshipswas

approved.32FortheFrench,theeventwasanawakening,anditleftthemlookingfornew

allies.ItevencompelledthemtocontemplateapproachingGermanyaboutjoiningtheTriple

Alliance,butthisprovedunworkablegiventheimmovablestanceonbothsidesoverthe

GermanseizureofAlsace‐Lorrainein1871.33

FashodawasthelastsignificantinternationalincidentinvolvingAnglo‐French

antagonism.Increasinglyotherpowerswouldbegintotakethespotlight.Theprocessthat

wouldeventuallypolarizetheBritishagainstGermanybeganitsterminalphasein1898with

thepassageofthefirstGermanNavyLaw.

AdmiralAlfredvonTirpitz,headoftheGermannavy,hadmanagedtoconvincethe

Kaiserinthelate1890sthatapowerfulnavywasaprerequisitetotheKaiser’srealizationof

31Marder,Anatomy,320‐332.32Marder,Anatomy,345.33Marder,Anatomy,336.

22

Weltpolitik.Thepresenceofalargebattlefleetwasanessentialtrappingofaworldpower,

anditwouldallowthefulfillmentofGermany’s“placeinthesun”‐‐anotiongivenprominence

bytherecentworkoftheAmericannavalhistorianandtheoristAlfredThayerMahan,inwhom

WilhelmIIwasanavidbeliever.AdmiralTirpitz’s“RiskTheory,”thatformedtherational

justificationforbuildinganunprecedentedGermanbattlefleet,statedthateventhestrongest

navalpower(Britain)wouldnotbeabletoengageGermany’sbattlefleetwithoutsignificant

riskofcasualties.Thisrisk,intheory,woulddetertheBritishfromchallengingGermany,lest

theybereducedinstrengththemselvesandsubsequentlybecomevulnerabletocombinations

ofotherpowersarrayedagainstthem.34

ThisnewGermanbuildingprogramwasfirstinitiatedbythepassageofthe1898Navy

Lawandasubsequentlyexpanded1900NavyLaw,whichcollectivelyinitiatedabuilding

programdesignedtocreateaGermanfleetthatby1920wouldconsistof34battleships,32

cruisers,anda“Foreign”andReservefleetofseveralothers.35Theinitialpassingofthe1900

NavyLawdidnotprovokeareactioninBritain.BritishattentionwasfocusedontheBoerWar,

andthetwocountrieshadrelativelyquietrelationsuntil1901,withthenotableexception

beingtheKrugerTelegramof1896.36WiththeincreasinglynegativeattentionleviedonBritain

bytheGermanpressovertheBoerWar,andwiththedeathofQueenVictoriain1901,thetwo

nationsbegantodriftapart.Asrelationssoured,theBritishpublicandpressbecamemore

34Marder,Anatomy,457.35Marder,Dreadnought,106.36TheKrugerTelegramwasacongratulatorytelegramsentbyKaiserWilhelmIItoPresidentKrugeroftheTransvaalin1896afterthelatterhadsuccessfullythrownoffanunofficialattemptbytheCapeColony’sgovernor,CecilRhodes,toinvadeandannextheTransvaal.ThetelegramwasseenasadefiantactagainstBritain,andservedtospiketensionsbetweenBritainandGermany.

23

immediatelyawareoftheGermannavalbuilding,andincreasinglyalarmedaboutitsintended

purpose.37

Between1900and1905,theGermansbeganconstructionon12battleships.In1901,

BritishadmiraltyofficialsprojectedthatGermanywouldhavethesecondlargestnavyinthe

worldby1906.TheAdmiraltythusbegancirculatingmemorandathatraisedthespecterof

GermanyclosingthegapbetweenitselfandBritain,whichwouldallowGermanytopresenta

decisivechallengeshouldBritainfinditselfatwarwithbothFranceandRussia.38Evidence

suggestedthatthenewGermanfleetwasbeingbuiltforNorthSeaoperations.Thisevidence

includedlimitedoperatingrangeandcrampedcrewquartersoftheGermanships,bothof

whichundercuttheplausibilityoflongoverseasdeployments.39AninspectionoftheGerman

fleetbyKingEdwardin1904ledtoincreasedanxietyinBritishgoverningcirclesoverGerman

effectivenessincreatingaworld‐classnavy.Theking’sglancestohisministersduringthevisit

indicatedthathewasconcernedathowquicklyandeffectivelyGermanyhadadvanceditsnaval

capabilities.40

TheperceptionthatGermanyhadsinisterforeignintentionsbecamesolidifiedinthe

mindsofBritishgovernmentelitesbytheirinteractionwiththeGermansduringtheVenezuelan

Crisisof1902,apoliceactionagainstthedictatorofVenezuelawhohaddefaultedondebtsto

bothpowers.Duringtheaction,theGermannavalcommanderindependentlybombardeda

37Marder,Dreadnought,458‐459.38Marder,Dreadnought,106‐107.39Marder,Dreadnought,107.40Marder,Dreadnought,108.

24

Venezuelanfort,violatingtheMonroeDoctrineoftheUnitedStatesandendangeringBritish

relationswiththeAmericans.41

InadditiontoGermany’supstartnavyanditsnewlyaggressivebehaviorontheworld

stage,theBritishsoonfoundanewcauseforunease:theaforementionedBoerWarof1899‐

1902foughtbetweenBritishforcesinSouthAfricaandtheneighboringrepublicofTransvaal.

TheBoersinTransvaalwerefarmersofDutchdescentwhohadsettledonparticularly

lucrativegoldanddiamonddepositsinasettlementadjacenttotheBritishCapeColonyin

SouthAfrica.Uponthediscoveryofthesedepositsinthelatenineteenthcentury,foreigners

flockedtotheareaforprospecting.TheBoersallowedthisinfluxofminersandtaxedtheir

revenue,butrefusedtograntthemcitizenshipprotections.Thisledtoincreasedtensions

betweentheBoersandthetenantminers,andthesetensionswereencouragedand

exacerbatedbycertainofficialsoftheneighboringBritishCapeColony.Thiswasespeciallytrue

oftheimpetuousPrimeMinisterofCapeColony,CecilRhodes.Heactivelyencouragedthe

minerstorevoltin1895,pledgingafollowupbyanarmedincursionofSouthAfricaCompany

personneltoassisttherebels.Therevoltwasputdownin1895,buttheCapeColonypersonnel

invadedanyway,andwerequicklydefeatedandcaptured.TheBritishgovernmentdenied

involvement,andRhodeswasforcedtoresign.Thecongratulatorytelegramin1896senttothe

BoerPresidentbytheGermanKaiser,knownafterwardsastheKrugerTelegram,sparked

outrageinBritainandadulationinGermany.

41Marder,Anatomy,465.

25

Thoughtheconflictsubsided,tensionsbetweentheBritishandtheBoersonlygrew

worseafter1896.HarshtreatmentofBritishcitizensinTransvaalsparkedpublicoutrage.

BritishgovernmentattemptstoprotecttheircitizensfrommistreatmentprovokedBoer

resentment.InOctober1899TransvaalPresidentKrugerissuedanultimatumtotheBritish

government,demandingthatalloftheirforceswithdrawfromtheBoerstate.TheBritish

refusedtheultimatum,andTransvaaldeclaredwar.42

TheBritishbeganthewarconfidentofaquickandeasyvictory.TheBoersinitially

frustratedthisexpectation,invadingtheCapeColonyandinflictinghumiliatingdefeatsonthe

Britishgarrisonthere.TheBoersoutnumberedtheBritishtwotoone,andwerecarrying

modernGermanweapons,butinBritaintherewasstillapublicreactionofshockthattheir

armycouldbeso“easily”defeated.43Publicoutcrywascompoundedagainbyafreshinvasion

scarefueledbytheNavyLeagueandotherpressuregroups.ThesegroupsarguedthatBritain

wasperilouslyundefended,asthearmyandnavywerebothdispersed.Theypointedoutthat

thearmywasbusyinSouthAfrica,andthatthenavywasbusyferryingsoldiersbackandforth

whileprovidinglogisticalsupporttothedeployedBritisharmy.TheAdmiraltypaidlittle

attentiontotheinvasionscare,butthepublicpaniccontinued.44

In1900thewarturnedinfavoroftheBritishwithafreshinfusionoftroopsand

commanders,andtheBoerswerenominallydefeatedinthatsameyear.45Thesettlers

continuedguerillaattacksagainstoccupyingBritishforces,andfrustratedattemptstoquellthe

42Arnstein,186‐188.43Marder,Anatomy,372.44Marder,Anatomy,372‐380.45Arnstein,189.

26

insurgencyledtotheuseofunorthodoxtactics,includingcropdestructionandconcentration

camps.46ThesepracticesprovokedwidespreadindignationinEurope.47Thesuppressionofthe

insurgencywascompleteby1902,andTransvaalwasaddedtotheBritishEmpire.

TheBritishvictoryinTransvaalhadcomeatgreatcost,andprovedtobeaculturally

destabilizingevent.TheBritishpublicnolongerhadfaithinthearmy(rightlyorwrongly

becauseoflosingbattlesagainstnumericallylargerforces).TheindignationofEuropehadled

toanoverwhelmingrealizationofBritishisolationandthepossibilityofanallianceagainsther.

Theinvasionscareof1900hadledpeopletoquestionthereadinessofthenavyonalevelnot

seensince1889.Itwaspossibleinthepublicimaginationthatthenavycouldfinditselfas

easilydefeatedasitsarmyhadbeen.AsPaulKennedyargues:“[t]heperiod1895‐1901had

beenmarkedbyBritain’sglobalembarrassmentattheadvanceswhichtheotherpowers(inter

alia,Germany)weremakingincolonial,naval,andeconomicterms,andbytheGerman

government’sconfidenthopethat…navalexpansionism[was]alreadylayingthefoundationfor

thecountry’sdrivetowardsanincreasinglysuccessfulWeltpolitik.ThenadirofBritish

weaknessandisolationismwasreachedintheearlystagesoftheBoerWar.”48Collectively,

theseculturalthematicelementscreatedsufficientdestabilizationanduneasetoallowfora

navalrevolutionthatwouldbeginin1904withtheappointmentofSirJohnFisherasFirstSea

Lord.ItwouldalsoresultinachangedattitudeonthepartofBritishpoliticianswithregardto

theneedfornewBritishallies.

46Massie,553‐554.47Massie,307.48PaulKennedy,TheRiseoftheAnglo‐GermanAntagonism1860‐1914(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1980),265.

27

TheremedytoBritishisolationbeganwithanalliancewithJapanin1902.Thealliance

treatystatedthatintheeventthateitherofthetwosignatorieswasengagedinawarwith

anotherpower,theotherwouldremainneutral.Ifonepowerwerejoinedinwarbyanally,the

othersignatorywouldfightfortheirally.ThisalliancewasaimedatRussia,owingtoincreased

tensionsbetweenBritainandRussiaoverAsian(andparticularlyIndian)matters,andthetreaty

essentiallyfreedBritainfromthepossibilityofahostilesuperiorallianceinthePacificresulting

fromRussiaandJapancombiningnavies.49ThetreatywaspraisedbyleadersinGermany,but

infactitremovedincentiveforBritishcourtingofGermansupport,andmadeanalliance

betweenthemlesslikely.TheprospectsofanAnglo‐Germantreatybecamelesslikelybecause

theBritishnowhadtheflexibilitytorelaxtheirdeploymentofforcesintheFarEast,because

theirnewJapanesealliescouldpoliceandsafeguardthosewatersforthem.Thisallowedthe

BritishtofocusinsteadontheirhomewatersandtheMediterranean.Thetreatysolidified

Britain’snavalsituationinthePacific,andallowedBritaintoremainmoreisolatedfromthe

Continentthanwouldhavebeenotherwisepossible.50ThisalliancewithJapanwasfollowed

shortlybytheEntentewithBritain’soldenemy,France,in1904.Frenchopennessto

reconciliationwithBritainwasfueledbyFrance’sdisillusionmentovertheirabilitytocompete

withtheBritishnavy.

AsingularlyincompetentFrenchnavaladministrationunderMinisterofMarineCamille

Pelletanthatbeganin1902wouldhavefarreachingconsequencesforAnglo‐Frenchrelations.

TheblundersandmismanagementthatcharacterizedhisadministrationensuredthatFrance

49Marder,Anatomy,427‐429.50Kennedy,249‐250.

28

was,inacoupleofyears,onitswaytobecominghopelesslysecondrateasanavalpower

comparedtoGreatBritain.51WiththelesseningofthenavalrivalrybetweenFranceand

Britain,theirforeignrelationsimprovedandpavedthewayfortheEntenteCordialof1904.

TheEntentewasasettlingofexistingcolonialdisputesthatovertheremainderoftheyears

leadinguptotheFirstWorldWarwouldtakeonmoreandmoreofthecharacterofan

alliance.52TheEntenteallowedBritishnavalplannerstoconcentrateontheNorthSeaand

ignoretheMediterranean,controlofwhichwouldonlybenecessaryinawarwiththeFrench,

andthisnewrealitywouldbereflectedinAdmiralFisher’sfleetredistribution.53

FollowingtheEntentewithFrance,mattersalmostimmediatelybecameworsewith

Germany.TheRusso‐JapaneseWarof1904‐1905sharpenedAnglo‐Germanrelations.Because

theFrenchwerealliedwiththeRussiansandtheBritishwerealliedwiththeJapanese,some

BritishgoverningelitesconvincedthemselvesoftherumorthattheGermanswerebehindthe

confrontationinanattempttoembroiltheBritishwiththeFrenchthroughadirectwar

betweentheirrespectiveallies.54TheGermanjitterinessthatensuedbecauseofthe

heightenedtensionstemmingfromthediplomaticunionbetweenFranceandBritain

contributedtotheirorchestrationoftheMoroccanCrisisin1905.

OneoftheconcessionslaidoutintheEntenteitselfwascessionofcontrolover

MoroccototheFrench,inexchangeforanagreementoverBritishcontrolofEgypt.Following

thekidnappingofanAmericanhostagein1904,theFrenchgovernmentofferedtohelpthe

51Marder,Anatomy,469‐470.52Marder,Anatomy,475.53Marder,Anatomy,475.54Marder,Dreadnought,111.

29

sultanofMoroccoreorganizehisarmyandinstituteotherreforms.Thesultanrefused.55As

theFrenchwereincreasingtheirlevelofinterventioninMorocco,andindoingsoattemptingto

ratifyineffectMorocco’sstatusasaFrenchprotectorate,theKaiserattheurgingofhis

ministers(especiallyChancellorvonBulow)travelledtoMoroccotoantagonizetheFrenchand

hopefullyshowtheuselessnessofBritishfriendship.56HedeliveredaspeechatTangierson

March31st,1905,upholdingtheindependenceofMorocco,whichwasadirectsnubaimedat

theFrenchandtheirclaimsofdominionoverthatcountry.Followingthisincident,theGerman

governmentdemandedaninternationalconferencebeheldonthestatusofMorocco,which

theFrenchwereforcedtoacceptbyinternationalpressure.TheGermangovernmentbelieved

thattheywouldbeabletousethisconferencetosplittheBritishandtheFrench,andnullifythe

Entente.

TheensuingAlgericasConferencedelayedtheestablishmentofMoroccoasaFrench

protectorate,butgainedFrancetheunwaveringdiplomaticsupportofGreatBritain,becauseit

showedtheBritishthattheGermansweremoreantagonisticandaggressivethantheirFrench

partners.RatherthansplittingtheEntenteapart,thecrisishaddrawnBritainandFrancecloser

together,andhadpolarizedtheintentoftheEntenteagainstGermany.Followingthecrisisthe

FrenchandBritishgeneralstaffsbegansecrettalkstoplanforthecontingencyofwarwith

Germany.57NewBritishnavalbuildingasaresultofAdmiralFisher’sreformsalsoprompted

theGermanstoacceleratetheirownnavalbuildingprograminresponse.

55Massie,351‐352.56Massie,356‐362.57Marder,Dreadnought,114‐116.

30

InresponsetotheBritishlaunchingofHMSDreadnoughtonFebruary10th,1906,

Tirpitz’sReichsmarineAmtbeganplanningitsownclassofshipstocounterit.Thefirsttwo

GermanDreadnoughtswereauthorizedin1906,andthreemorein1907.58In1906the

ReichstagpassedanamendmenttotheNavyLawthataddedsixmorecruiserstotheGerman

fleet.59In1907theypassedanotheramendmentfollowingthefailureoftheHagueConference

ofthesameyeartocurtailbuildingrates,whichreducedthereplacementlifeoftheir

dreadnoughtsfrom25to20years,effectivelyincreasingtheirproductionratesfromthreeto

fourperyear.60

InthesamewaythatincreasesinFrenchnavalexpenditurehadraisedalarmsinBritain

beforetheEntente,thesenewincreasesinGermannavalshipbuildingprovokedpublicpanic

anddemandforaction.ThustheGermannavalexpenditureandprocurementincreasesof

1906and1907promptedtheNavyScareof1909.TheScarebeganinDecember1908,when

FirstLordoftheAdmiraltyReginaldMcKennaannouncedthatmoredreadnoughtswereneeded

inordertomaintainanadequatemarginofsuperiorityoverGermany.TheGermanswere

projectedtohave13dreadnoughtsby1912,comparedtoBritain’s16,andthiswasnot

consideredanadequatemargin.61ShouldthemaximumcapacityofGermany’ssevenviable

shipyardsbeimplemented,thisnumbercouldbeincreasedto21.62OnceMcKenna’sworries

overGermancapacityandbuildingincreasesreachedthepress,ascareensued.63InJanuary

1909theAdmiraltyincreaseditsrecommendationfromsixtoeightDreadnoughtsforthe

58Marder,Dreadnought,152.59Marder,Dreadnought,127.60Marder,Dreadnought,136.61Massie,612.62Massie,612.63Massie,613.

31

comingyear.Thecabinetwasdeadlockedoverthisissue,andPrimeMinisterAsquith

conceivedofthecompromisethatsavedit.Theywouldapprovefourdreadnoughtsin1909,

andreservetheoptionofbuildingfourmoreifscrutinyofGermanbuildingindicatedthatthey

werefurtherexpandingtheirbattleshipfleet.64

Ironically,thebuildingofthefinalfourallowedbycontingencyinthe1909billwas

promptedbydreadnoughtbuildingin1912byAustriaandItaly,notGermany,whowerein

realitybuildingagainsteachotherthoughtheyweretechnicallyallies.TheItalianandAustrian

governmentseachannouncedthattheywouldbuildfournewdreadnoughts,andasaresultthe

Britishadmiraltywonitsfighttohavealleightshipsbuilt.65

TheNavyScareof1909wasnottheendofthetumultcausedbythefightbetweenpro‐

expansionandfiscalrestraintfactionswithinthegovernment.Theestimatesproposedby

McKennatoParliamentinthefollowingyear,1910,calledforsixnewdreadnoughts.The

Cabinetagainfellintocrisisovertherequestedexpansion.Theadmiraltyacquiescedby

reducingtheirestimatestofive.ThiswouldgiveBritain25dreadnoughtstoGermany’s17plus

twoAustrianships(theotherAustrianandItalianshipswerestillintheearlystagesof

construction).Thesubsequentrealizationthatthiswouldconcentratethethreatmoreheavily

intheMediterraneanledtoanotherroundofradicalfleetredistributionin1912,followingon

topofFisher’sredistributionof1904‐1905.66ThisnewredistributionwouldincreaseBritish

strengthintheMediterranean,inordertocountertheAustrians.

64Massie,614‐615.65Massie,623.66Marder,Dreadnought,214.

32

Thenewestimatesbeforethe1912Germanamendmentcalledforfivenew

dreadnoughtstobelaiddowninsteadofsix.Theestimateshadnowreachedan

unprecedented£40,000,000,andMcKennapledgedthattheestimateswouldgodownin

ensuingyearsifGermanyengagedinnofurtherexpansionofitsbuildingprogram.67The

Germansdidexpandtheirprogramin1912,andtheirprincipaljustificationfordoingsowas

anotherincidentinMoroccothatoccurredin1911.

InspiteoftheActofAlgericas,whichhadgivenFrancetheprimarypoliticalrolein

developingMorocco,tensionsbetweenGermanyandFrancepersistedoverFrance’scontrolof

thatcountry.OverthrowsofvarioussultansandinfightingbankruptedtheMoroccantreasury

andledthegovernmenttoseeknewsourcesofcapital.Highlocaltaxesincreasedcivilunrest,

andthisledtoviolence,particularlytowardforeigners.AFrenchofficerwaskilledin1911,and

theFrenchannouncedthattheywouldbesendingmilitaryforcestoMoroccotorestore

order.68

Unchastenedbytheirexperiencein1905,theKaiser’sministersrespondedby

convincinghimtodispatchasmallgunboat,thePanther,totheMoroccanportofAgadirto

lendassistancetoallegedlyendangeredGermansthere.Theplanwastoencourageanother

standoffwithFrancethatwouldleadtothecessionofportionsofFrenchCongotoGermanyor

partsofMoroccoitself,whichwasadjacenttotheGermancolonyoftheCameroons.Asingle

GermancitizenwasdispatchedtomeettheGermanwarship,inordertoprovideapretextfor

Germanintervention.HearrivedthreedaysafterthePanther,andwasfinallytakenaboardthe

67Marder,Dreadnought,218‐219.68Massie,719‐720.

33

Germanwarshipforprotection.TheGermanactioninrecoveringhimledtoaprompt

Europeanresponse.69

TheGermansandFrenchsubsequentlybeganalongroundofnegotiations.TheFrench

absolutelyrefusedtogiveupanypartofMorocco,andtheGermansrespondedbydemanding

alloftheCongo.Thefinalagreementhammeredoutwasathirty‐yearguaranteeofthe“Open

Door”policyinMorocco,andthecessionofamere100,000squaremilesoftheCongolese

jungletoGermany.ThiswasaterriblediplomaticdefeatforGermany,havingriskedagreat

dealandgottenverylittle.70TheBritishCabinetinterpretedtheeventasanotherindicatorof

Germany’sillaims,andoftheirdesiretosplittheEntente.71

TheGermanNavyLeaguemadethemostoftheopportunitypresentedbyGermany’s

diplomaticdefeat,claimingthatGermanyneededastilllargerfleetinordertosecureits

interestsabroad.ThiswasreflectedintheamendmenttotheNavyLawin1911,theNovelle.72

InthewakeoftheAgadirCrisis,Tirpitzencouragedthepassageofanewsupplementary

navalbill,theNovelle,toestablisha2:3ratioofcapitalshipswithBritain.73Thebilladded

threeDreadnoughts,athirdbattlesquadron,andincreasedthereadinessofalldreadnought

classvessels,whichputthemallonamoreimmediatewarfooting.74TheBritishdelegates

informedtheGermanForeignMinisterMetternichthatthenewbillwouldbemetbyafresh

roundofshipbuildinginBritain,andwouldresultinthelayingdownoftwokeelstoGermany’s

69Massie,723‐727.70Massie,739‐741.71Marder,Dreadnought,240.72Marder,Dreadnought,245.73Marder,Dreadnought,272‐273.74Marder,Dreadnought,279.

34

oneinadditiontobuildingthathadalreadybeenapproved.75TheresponsebyChurchillin

Parliamentwastoassertthe“60%Standard,”andtodeclareopenlythatGermanywastheonly

powerthatBritainwasbuildingagainst.76ThisfirmlyreplacedtheTwoPowerStandardof

1889,thoughithadbeenshowingsomecrackssince1904.

RumorsofanattemptbyTirpitztopushthroughtheNovellewerewidespreadinBritain,

owingtoactivepressagitationinGermanyforalargerfleettopreventdiplomaticdisasterslike

theonethatGermanyhadjustsuffered.InJanuaryof1912,ChancellorBethmannHollweg

providedaroughoutlineofthenewlawtotheBritishgovernment.TheAdmiraltyassessed

thatthenewGermanLawwouldrequireBritaintobuildanadditionaltwoshipsforeveryone

oftheGermans’inordertomaintaintheexisting60%marginofsuperiority.77

Inordertocometoanagreementandforestallanotherwaveofshipbuilding,the

CabinetdispatchedLordHaldanetoGermanytoexplorethepossibilityofabuildingslowdown

orreduction.HisconversationswiththeEmperor,Chancellor,andNavySecretarytookplace

fromFebruary8thtothe10th.Theseamountedtolittle,asGermanywasonlywillingtoslowits

navalbuildingifBritainagreedtoneutralityintheeventthatGermanyandFrancewenttowar.

HaldanecounteredthatitwouldbepossibletosecureanagreementifFranceattacked

Germanybutnottheotherwayaround.Haldanebroughtbackwithhimamoredetailedcopy

75Marder,Dreadnought,280.76Marder,Dreadnought,283.77Marder,Dreadnought,276.

35

oftheNovelle,anditwasevenmorealarmingthantheroughsketchprovidedbyBethmann

Hollweg.78

TheHaldanemissionfailedbecausetheBritishcouldnotagreetoneutralityinanother

Franco‐Germanconflict.However,itdidyieldsomepositiveresults,asitopenedthedoorto

lesspressingagreementsoncolonialdisputesbetweenBritainandGermany.Italsoledtoa

temporarythawinginrelations.79TheagreementsthatcameoutoftheHaldanemission

includedaBritishacknowledgementoftheGermanrighttoproceedwithconstructionofthe

Baghdadrailway,whichhadbeenapetprojectoftheGermangovernmentforyears.Thisand

certainotheroutstandingcolonialdisputeswerereadyforsignaturebybothgovernments

whenwarbrokeoutin1914.

Thesparkthatledtotheultimateconflagrationoriginatedinthepoliticallyturbulent

Balkans.ArchdukeFranzFerdinand,theheirtothethroneoftheAustro‐HungarianEmpire,

wasassassinatedonJune28th,1914inSarajevobyaSerbiannationalistbelongingtoaSerbian‐

backedorganizationcalledtheBlackHand.Austriausedthiscrisistojustifystartingawarwith

Serbia.Russiarespondedwithapartialandthenafullmobilizationalongitswesternborder.

GermanythenlaunchedtheSchlieffenPlan,violatingBelgianneutralityinanattackintoFrance.

ThegovernmentinLondonpleadedwiththeGermanstoattendaconferencetosettlethe

disputebetweenAustriaandSerbia,buttheydeclinedtheinvitation.80

78Marder,Dreadnought,277‐280.79Marder,Dreadnought,286.80Arnstein,255‐256.

36

AlthoughtheBritishcabinetwasdividedoverthechoiceofinterventiononFrance’s

side,theGermanviolationofBelgianneutralitysettledtheissue.TheBritishgovernmentthen

mobilizeditsarmyandnavyandenteredthewarwithasignificantsenseofmoraljustification,

andaunifiedpopulace.81

Thisperiodwasoneofconstantpoliticalanddiplomaticturmoil,notablycharacterized

bythedestabilizingeffectsoftheBoerWar,whichlooselyledtotheJapaneseallianceand

contributedtotheEntentewithFrance,andalsoallowedforapoliticalandcultural

environmentinwhichafarreachingtransformationlikeFisher’snavalrevolutioncouldbe

enacted.AsdynamicastheforeignpolicysituationwasinBritain’sattempttorespondtoand

curbGermany’sbrinkmanship,theperiodwasalsocharacterizedbyrapidadvancesin

technologythatbothcatalyzedandmadefeasibleFisher’stransformationoftheRoyalNavy.In

thenextsectionIwillsketchsomeofthemoresalientadvancements,howtheywereappliedto

newclassesofships,andtheeffectthattheyhadonnavalcapabilities.

Materiel

AnadmiraltycommitteeappointedbyAdmiralFisherin1905investigatedthe

improvementstospeedandfirepowerthatcouldbemadebyincorporatingturbinetechnology

intopropulsionplants,andreplacingmixedcaliberweaponswithlarger,singlecaliberweapons.

Whatresultedfromtheseeffortswasaphilosophyofwarshipdesignthatwouldmakeobsolete

allcapitalshipsintheworld,anditwasrealizedinthebuildingofthebattleshipHMS

DreadnoughtandthebattlecruiserHMSInvincible.Theoriginalprogramhadcalledforone

81Arnstein,257‐258.

37

battleshipandthreebattlecruisers,andFisherhadalwaysintendedbattlecruisersto

outnumberbattleships.However,becausetheDreadnoughtwascompletedfirst,itcaptured

thepublicimagination,andsubsequentbuildingprogramsfocusedonbattleships.82The

propulsionplantadvancementsincorporatedintothesewarshipsallowedforunprecedented

speed,andtheuseofuniformcaliberweaponsremovedcertainobstaclestoaccuratelong

rangetargeting.83Dreadnoughthadaddedprotectionbelowthewaterlineintheformof

increasedwatertightcompartmentalization—anodtotheincreasingeffectivenessofthe

locomotivetorpedo.Thefurnacesinthepropulsionplantweredesignedtocarryandconsume

bothcoalandoilforaddedflexibility.84Dreadnought’smainbatteryconsistedoften12inguns,

firing850lbprojectiles.Thegunsweremountedinpairsonfiveturrets.Onewaslocatedon

theforedeck,twoonthewings,andtwoontheaftdeck.Thismeantthateightgunscouldbe

firedinabroadside,sixgunscouldbefiredforward,andsixgunscouldbefiredaftwithout

beinglimitedsignificantlybyconflictingfieldsoffire.85Theshipinstantlybecamethestandard

forwarshipdesigninthisperiod,andbecamethequantifiablebenchmarkbywhichallnations

measuredtheirnavalstrength.Wewillnowlookateachoftheadvancementsthatmadethe

Dreadnoughtpossible,asitsnoveltywasnotassociatedwithanyparticularinvention,but

ratherthecombinationofcuttingedgetechnologiesinnewways,specificallyintheareasof

armor,propulsion,navalgunnery,andfirecontrol.

Inthewakeoftheironcladrevolutionofthe1850s,andthenafterthefirstcombat

testingofironcladsduringtheAmericanCivilWar,armorbecameincreasinglythickerand

82Sumida,37‐38.83Marder,Anatomy,526.84Marder,Anatomy,534.85Massie,468,472‐473.

38

strongerinresponsetoadvancementsinshellprojectiletechnology.Compoundarmor(iron

coreswithanexternalsteelcladding)ofthe1870shadgivenwaytoall‐steelarmor,which

slowlyincreasedinthicknessasprojectileeffectivenessincreased.Inthe1890stheHarvey

processwasdeveloped,whichallowedforfurtherhardeningofsteelbyheatingthesteelplate

indirectcontactwithcharcoal,whichincreasedtheamountofcarbonatomsthatdiffusedinto

theironlatticestructure.Thishardenedthesteeldowntooneinchfromthediffusionsurface,

andthisallowedforlighterbeltsofarmor.Nickelwaslateralloyedwithsteeltoimproveits

strengthandcorrosionresistance.By1897theKruppCompanyinGermanyhaddevelopeda

newprocessthatprovedsuperiortotheHarveyprocess,whichaddedtrivalentchromiumto

theexistingblendofnickelalloysteel,andalsousedamoresophisticatedmethodofdiffusing

carbon.86

Thestateofarmortechnologyhadremainedessentiallyunchangedfromtheendofthe

1890suntilthebuildingoftheDreadnought.TheoriginalDreadnoughtbattleshipcarriedfive

thousandtonsofarmorofthenickelalloytype,concentratedbelowthewaterlinefortorpedo

protection.Turretarmorwasrelativelythin,basedonthebeliefbyplannersattheAdmiralty

thatadirecthittotheturretwouldrenderitunusableregardlessofwhethertheshell

penetrateditsarmor.87

PerhapsthemostimpressivefeatureofthenewDreadnoughtwasitsradicallyadvanced

propulsionsystem.AdmiralFisherhadlongbeenconvincedoftheimportanceofship’sspeed

ingrantinganavalcommanderoperationalflexibility.In1881Fisherhadbeengivencommand

86Marder,Anatomy,6.87Massie,475‐476.

39

ofHMSInflexible(anironicnamegiventhetemperamentofitscommander),andhadbeen

struckbyhowslowhisshipwas,andhowmuchthislimitedhisship’seffectivenessinexercises.

Helateroversawearlyadvancementsinsteamenginetechnologywhileservingatthe

AdmiraltyastheControllerin1893.Whileinthatpost,heoversawthetransitionfromshell‐

typetotube‐typeboilers,whichallowedforincreasedtopspeedofpropulsionplantsdueto

thehighersurfaceareaforheattransferbetweentheboilerwaterandfurnaceexhaust

gasses.88

Fisher’searlyopinionsontheimportanceofwarshipspeedwereunalteredwhenhe

articulatedthedesignparametersfortheDreadnought.Fisher’sdesiredspeedcapabilityof21

knotswasunachievablewithexistingsteam‐poweredreciprocatingengines.Heavyrepetitive

motioncyclesofsteamliftingpistonsinsequencemeantthatbearingadjustmentswere

frequent,andshipswiththesepropulsionsystemsafterashorttimeofrunningatflankspeed

almostalwayshadtoputbackintoportforrepairs.Topspeedswerealsolimitedbythe

wastedefficiencyofmomentumlossinevitablewithpiston‐drivencrankshafts,whichhadtobe

startedandstoppedastheycompletedtheirupanddownstrokes.Therelativelynewsteam

turbinesystemwasadoptedinstead.Thissteadyflow,unidirectionalrotationmachinewas

quieter,cleaner,anddidnothaveanyofthecyclicstressandensuingfatiguefailureexhibited

bytheearlierengines.89Bycontrasttoearlierdesigns,duringitsseatrialstheDreadnought

wasabletosteamatfullspeedforeighthourswithoutbreakdownsoradjustments.90

88Sumida,38‐40.89Massie,474‐475.90Massie,482.

40

HMSDreadnoughtwasalsothebenefactoroftwentyyearsofBritishgunnery

advancements.Inthelate1880stheBritishAdmiraltydevelopedcorditeasapropellant,which

wasamixtureofnitrocellulose,nitroglycerine,andpetroleumjelly.Itwassignificantlymore

powerfulthanblackpowder,andwasmoresuitedtoweaponswithhighermuzzlevelocities

duetoitsslow,evenburningcharacteristics.Inordertoaccommodateshellprojectilesof

increasingpower,gunbarrelsbecamelonger,andwereincreasinglyconstructedwithwire

wrappingmethods.Wirewrappingincreasedthehardnessandtoughnessofthegunbarrels

andmadethemmoreshockresistant.91Overthecourseofthe1890s,rateoffirewas

improvedsignificantlyon12inguns,andby1900therateoffirewasoneshellperminute,

doublethefiringratethatlargegunshadin1889.92

Dreadnought’sheavymainbatteryof12ingunsincludedthecapabilityoffiringeither

highexplosiveorarmorpiercingshells,usingcorditepropellant.Thearmorpiercingshellsof

theearlytwentiethcenturywereoriginallydesignedtopenetratetargetarmoralongastraight

flightpath,whichreflectedtheshortengagementrangesthathadcharacterizedbattle

practicesuptothatpoint.In1910AdmiralJellicoe,astheController(ThirdSeaLord),noted

thattheprojectilesflyingtowardtheirtargetsonparabolicarcsatgreaterrangesstruckthe

enemyatadownwardangle,anddidnotpenetrate.Heaskedfordevelopmentofaprojectile

thatwouldalleviatethisdeficiencyandperformproperlywhenfiredfromlongrange.In1911

theFirstSeaLord(AdmiralA.K.Wilson)andtheDirectorofNavalOrdnanceconcludedthat

highexplosiveshellswouldbeusedtowreckanenemy’sfirecontrolsystematlongranges,and

91Sumida,46.92Sumida,47.

41

thatarmorpiercingshellsshouldbesavedforsubsequentclose‐inworkaftertheenemy’s

weaponsystemshadbeendisabled.Thisisonepossibleexplanationforwhytheerrorwas

neverfixed,93butitalsoexplainswhytheBritishshellswerelargelyineffectiveatJutland

againstGermanbattleships.Theflawhadbeenpreviouslyidentifiedandthendisregarded.94

Theseadvancedgunssufferedfromalackofaimingequipmentthatcouldtake

advantageoftheirincreasedrange.Maximumeffectivenavalfightingrangesupuntil1900

wereabout2,000yards,andthesehadnotsignificantlyimprovedfromtheNapoleonicWars.

Thiswaspartiallycausedbytheconservatismofolderadmirals,whonostalgicallycelebrated

pastvictoriesbypreservingtheirassociatedtacticsascurrentdogma,longafterthestateof

technologyhadantiquatedthem.However,theintroductionofcorditeinthelate1880s

removedthevision‐obscuringimpedimenttolongerrangeengagements,andsubsequentto

thiscertainpioneeringindividualsbegantoworktowardenablingthefleettoengageatlonger

ranges.95

In1898CaptainPercyScottadoptedtelescopicsightsforindividualguns,whichgreatly

increasedtheireffectiveaccuraterange.Healsotrainedhisgunnersin“continuousaim”

techniquesthateliminatedtheeffectofshiprollandyawongunlaying.96TheBarr&Stroud

rangefinderwasanopticalcoincidenceinstrumentthatwasadoptedin1893andentered

widespreadservicein1899.Itwaslimitedinitseffectivenesstorangesofabout4,000yards.

93Sumida,207.94Sumida,308.95Marder,Anatomy,519‐520.96Sumida,47.

42

Errorsgrewexponentiallybeyondthatrange.97In1899and1900officersintheMediterranean

fleet(includingFisher)developedthesalvomethodofgaugingaccuracyoffire.Thisinvolved

firingseveralgunsatonceandobservingthespreadpatternofthesplashes.Ifthesplashes

wereevenlyspacedbeforeandbeyondthetarget,thenthecomputedrangewasaccurate.

Thissimultaneousfiringofweaponsrequiredamethodofguncoordination,andthisattemptat

coordinationwasthegenesisoffirecontrol.98Thiswasasignificantstepforwardfromthe

traditionalpracticeofallowingeveryguncontrollertooperateindependently.99In1903,the

fightingrangeoftheBritishfleetwasabout3,000yards.100Inthewakeoftherevelationsof

theJeuneEcole,therewasconsiderableincentivetoincreasetheeffectivefightingrangeand

thusrendertheenemy’storpedoesuseless,asthesetorpedoeswerealwaysincreasingin

effectiverangeandreliability.101

ArthurPollenwasthesalientinventorwhoattemptedtotackletheproblemofaccurate

fireatincreasedrange,buthisdesignswentlargelyignoredbytheAdmiralty.In1901he

devisedabearingtelemetrysystemthatwouldestimatetherangeofatargetthrough

triangulation.102Thisincreasedthemaximumtheoreticalrangebeyondthatwhichwaspossible

withtheBarr&Stroudrangefinder,whichusedreflectivesurfacesandwasnoteffectiveinlow

light,orpasttheaforementionedbearingaccuracylimitof4,000yards.

97Sumida,72.98Sumida,48.99Marder,Anatomy,521.100Marder,Anatomy,521.101Marder,Anatomy,524.102Sumida,79.

43

In1904Pollendevelopedamethodofplottingthetruecourseofafiringshiprelativeto

itstarget,whichifimplementedwouldhaveprovidedthefirecontrollerwithrealtimetarget

solutionsandrangedata.103Duelargelytobureaucraticinertiaandexcessiveconservatismby

certainmembersoftheAdmiralty,thesystemwasrejectedmultipletimes,inspiteof

improvementsandmodificationsmadetofurthersatiatetheSeaLords.

InadevelopmentthatcouldhavecomplementedPollen’sfirecontrolsystem,Percy

Scott(of“continuousaim”fame)developedthedirectorfiringsystemin1905,designedto

slaveallgunsinabroadsidetoasingleoperator’sstationaloft,andpermitaccuratefireoutto

anadvertised8,000yards.104Theobserverwouldcalculatearangeandbearingtothetarget,

andallgunswouldbeautomaticallytrainedtofireontheappropriatecoordinates.The

directorsystemalsohadamaster‐firingswitchthatallowedasingleoperatortofireanentire

broadside.Trialswereconductedupthrough1910.Duetoinadequatesetupthesetrialswere

ineffectiveandtheprogramwasstalled,dueinnosmallparttobureaucraticobstructionby

AdmiralWilson.105Whentheywerefinallyadoptedin1912,theywereslowtobe

implemented,andonlyonethirdofthebattleshipshadbeenfittedwithdirectorsin1914.106

Pollen’ssystemwasneveradoptedatall,andinsteadthenavydecidedtoadoptan

inferiorinvention,whichpiratedthefeaturesofthePollensystemandtheArgoClock(itsmost

importantconstituentcomponent),calledtheDreyerTable.DreyerTableswereintroducedin

1912,andthoughtheywerenotaseffectiveasthePollensystem,theystillrepresenteda

103Sumida,81.104Sumida,153.105Sumida,207.106Sumida,251.

44

significantleapforwardfromexistingrangefinders.Evenso,only15frontlinewarshipswere

fittedwithnewfirecontrolgearin1914,fullytwoyearsafterithadbeenofficiallyadopted.107

Thissectionhasillustratedthedynamic,radicallyhighpaceoftechnologicalchangethat

constantlyraisedthebaronnavalcapabilities,destructivepotential,andexpense.Rapidly

advancingtechnologygaveacompellingincentiveforone‐upmanship,evenastheconservative

elementsoftheBritishAdmiraltystalledchangeateveryturn.AsArthurMarderargues,

Thebewilderinglyrapidprogressinnavalconstructionhadfar‐reachingconsequenceswhichlayattherootofmuchofthenavalexpansionafterthe1880s.Itwasinlargepartresponsibleforthenervousnessandfeelingofinsecurityamongpeoplesandstatesmen.Ifonepowerintroducedmilitaryornavalimprovements,theothershadtofollow,for,asonewriterputit,‘failuretokeepupwiththescientificdevelopmentsofasingleyearmightveryconceivablyruinagreatempire[italicsadded].’108

Thisrapidchangecontributedtounease,andaconstantrestlesssenseofrushingtocatchup

withcompetingpowers,orofrushingtostayaheadoftheminBritain’scase.Havingillustrated

thedynamismofthepoliticalsceneandtherapidityofchangeonthetechnologicalscene,this

chapterwillnowexplorechangesinnavaldoctrineandmeasurementsofsuperiority.

Standardsofsuperiorityandminimumacceptablenavalstrengthchangedwiththeshiftingof

Britain’slikelyforeignenemiesfromRussiaandFrancetoGermany.Shipdesignand

employmentchangesoccurredinthislargerpoliticalcontext.Doctrinesreflectingincreased

navalcapabilitiesinturnreflectedtheadvancementsintechnologythatmadethempossible.

Prevailingschoolsofthoughtonnavalwarfareinfluencedprioritiesofprocurementandforce

composition.Thislastsectionisasurveyoftheseelements.

107Sumida,251.108Marder,Anatomy,8.

45

Doctrine

TheverbalizationoftheTwoPowerStandardwasthefirsttimethatadiscretenaval

powerstandardhadbeenlaiddowninBritainsincetheeighteenthcentury.109Thisstandard

wasreiteratedbytheGladstonegovernmentin1893,andwouldcontinueunchallengedand

unchangeduntil1904.110Thegovernmentappliedthisstandardtonumbersofbattleships,and

inpracticeextendedittonumbersoflargecruisers.111Noregardwasmadetoquality.The

idealespousedbythebignavyadvocateswasa5:3ratioofBritishnavalvesselsoverthoseof

FranceandRussiacombined.112Theaforementioned“ReportoftheThreeAdmirals”(1888)

backedupthisratio,whichstatedthatsuchamarginwasneededinordertoestablishan

effectiveblockadetoaccountforcasualtiesandrotationsoffstation.TheBritishadmiraltystill

consideredblockadingtobethebestsolutionforBritaininanavalwarwithacontinental

power.113AlfredMahan’sworkin1890espousedtheprominenceofthebattleshipandwas

overwhelminglyacceptedbytheEuropeannavies,andthiscoincidedwithatemporarylossof

confidenceinthetorpedoboatatthattime.ThismeantthattheTwoPowerStandardwas

permanentlylinkedtothebattleshipasthelogicalprimaryrecipientofresourcesinbuildinga

frontlinenavy.114

Britain’srivalsinthelatenineteenthcentury,especiallyFrance,adoptedtheirown

doctrinesfornullifyingtheBritishbattleshipfleets.Asmentionedinthefirstsection,bythe

109Marder,Anatomy,105.110Marder,Anatomy,106.111Marder,Anatomy,106.112Marder,Anatomy,107.113Marder,Anatomy,109.114Marder,Anatomy,113.

46

latenineteenthcenturyBritainhadbecomeentirelyreliantonseacommerceforitssurvival.

Denialofthiscommercebyahostilepowerwastheconstantfearofnavalpolicymakersand

navalexpansionistagitatorsthroughouttheperiod.Linkedwiththiswasfearofthelossofthe

basisoftheEnglisheconomy–foreigntradeandrawmaterialimportsforsupportingEngland’s

industrialmanufacturing.115

GuerredeCoursewasreawakenedinthemindsofnavalthinkersasaviablestrategyin

Franceinthe1880s,andwasparticularlyspearheadedbyAdmiralsAubeandBourgeois.It

outlinedmethodsfortheneutralizationofBritain’sadvantageincapitalshipsuperiorityby

usingtorpedoboatstosinkblockadingships,andforusingthesenewweaponstodestroy

Britishcommerceonanunprecedentedscale.116TheBritishresponsevariedfromarming

merchantvesselstorelyingontheDeclarationofParisof1856,whichessentiallyforbade

guerredecourseinitsclassicformofindividualprivateers.117Anotherreactionwasthe

commissioningof“torpedoboatdestroyers,”theetymologicalgenesisofthe“Destroyer”of

present‐daynavies,ascalledforinthefollowingexcerptfromarecommendationtotheFirst

NavalLordbytheDirectorofNavalIntelligencein1893:

Itisabsolutelynecessarytomakesomeprovisionstomeetpossibleattacksmadebythenumericallystrongandelaboratelyorganizedtorpedo‐boatestablishmentsontheothersideoftheChannel.Alargeportionoftheforeigntorpedoboatsareincontinuouscommissionandarealmostdailyexercisedatallseasons…Itissubmittedthatitisabsolutelynecessarythatarespectablenucleusoftheseanti‐torpedoboatcraftshouldbekeptincontinuouscommission,sothat–whentheemergencyarrives–weshouldhaveatleastsomeofficersand

115Marder,Anatomy,84‐85.116Marder,Anatomy,84‐88.117Marder,Anatomy,89.

47

menaspracticallyexperiencedinhandlingthemasourpossibleadversariesareinhandlingtheirtorpedoboats.118

The1880smanifestationofguerredecoursewastheJeuneEcoleSchool.The

fundamentalnotionofJeuneEcolewasthatblockadescouldbebrokenbymodernweapons,

andsoblockadescouldbeinstantlyvoidedbycleveraccumulationoftorpedoboatsandfast

armoredcruisers.Italsorecognizedthatsteamshipsemployedinblockadedutyalsosuffered

fromrelianceonsupportinfrastructurethatsailpoweredshipshadnotbeenconstrainedby,

andsoablockadingpowercouldnotreliablykeepshipsonstationindefinitely.119

Themorenuanced,directlyintendedeffectofJeuneEcoleinFranceasawarplanwas

notthemassstarvationofBritain,buttheeconomiccripplingofBritainthroughanexorbitant

riseininsuranceratesforshipping.ThesewerefirstpublishedinarticlesinFrancebyGabriel

Charmes,includingonecalled“LaReformeMaritime”in1884.120Thesehigherinsurancerates

wouldhopefullyhamstringBritain’sotherwareffortsbyreducingtheavailableresourcesthat

couldbeallocatedtothem.121Pro‐navyadvocatesarguedthatexpendituresonadecisively

powerfulnavythatcouldprotectshippingrouteswereinthelongrunaneconomicinvestment

thatwouldbecheaperthantheexpendituresrequiredtoreplenishthemerchantfleetinthe

eventofsuccessfulimplementationofmodernguerredecourse.122Theguerredecoursescare

evaporatedwiththeEntentewithFrance,andprotectionoftradeagainstGermanyseemedlike

118C.A.G.Bridge,“CounteringFrenchTorpedoAttacks,1893”inBritishNavalDocuments,621‐622.RearAdmiralBridgewastheDirectorofNavalIntelligencewhenthiswaswritten.119Marder,Anatomy,107.120BernardSemmel,LiberalismandNavalStrategy:Ideology,Interest,andSeaPowerduringthePaxBritannica(Boston:Allen&Unwin,1986),89.121Marder,Anatomy,91.122Marder,Anatomy,92.

48

amuchlessproblematictask.123Consequently,concernsovertheJeuneEcoledisappeared

fromdiscussionafter1904.ThoughiteventuallybecameirrelevantasaresultoftheAnglo‐

FrenchEntente,navalthinkersandstrategistshadsoughttocountertheclaimsoftheJeune

Ecolesincethe1880s,andnonemoreeffectivelythantheAmericanstrategistAlfredMahan.

CaptainAlfredThayerMahan’sTheInfluenceofSeaPowerUponHistory,1660‐1783,

writtenin1890,wasinmanywaysaresponsetothestrategicdoctrineoftheJeuneEcole.He

assertedthatBritain’scommandoftheseaswasitsgreatestasset,andthatbyholdingonto

thatsupremacy,Britainhadnothingtofearfromalessernavalpowerattackingitsshipping.He

wrotethatcommercedestructioncouldbeanuisancetoastrongnavalpower,butcouldnever

provedecisive.Mahanqualifiedthisthesisinhislaterworkpublishedin1892aboutthe

NapoleonicWars.Hedidnotretreatfromhisbeliefinlargefleetsofbattleships,buthedid

characterizenavalstruggleintermsofprotectingseacommunicationsanddenyingittoothers.

Therefore,heassertedthatthestrongernavalpowerwouldadvanceitscauseinawarmore

effectivelyifitengagedinguerredecourseagainstweakerpowersasasupplementary

strategy.124Mahan’sinitialworkreceivedunbridledattentioninEurope,withdelayed

attentioninAmerica,andprovidedtheintellectualunderpinningforthenavalarmsracethat

ensuedbetweenGermanyandGreatBritain.HiswasthefirstattemptatexplainingGreat

Britain’seconomicandpoliticaldominance,andheattributedthemtoBritain’smasteryofthe

seas.125Helaidouttheprerequisitesforanationachievingthestatusofagreatpower

(specificallytargetedtowardhowtheUnitedStatescouldachievesuchastatus),andthese

123Marder,Anatomy,104.124Semmel,92‐94.125AlfredThayerMahan,TheInfluenceofSeaPowerUponHistory,1660‐1783(Boston:Little,Brown,1890),33.

49

prerequisiteswerefoundedonanoverarchingnavalsuperiorityoverothers.126Hisfirstbook

wastranslatedintoJapanese,German,andFrench.AtaBritishstatebanquetinhishonorin

1894,GeneralLordRobertstoastedMahan’ssuccess,andpubliclystatedthathehopedthat

Mahanwouldwriteasimilarbookforthearmy.127OnthatsamevisittoLondon,Mahanwas

half‐jokinglytoldby“manynavalofficers”thathisbookwasthereasonfortherecentincreases

innavalexpenditures.128Thatsameyear,KaiserWilhelmIIsentatelegramtooneofhis

ministersannouncingthathewas“devouring”Mahan’sbook,and“hopedtolearnitby

heart.”129TheKaiserhadcopiesofthebooksenttothewardroomsonallofhiswarships,and

hadapersonalcopywithinreachofhisarmchairinhisprivatestudyatSansSouci,with

extensivehandwrittennotesinthemargins.130

TheSino‐JapaneseWarof1894‐1895andespeciallytheSpanishAmericanWarof1898,

thelatterofwhichresultedinthecompletedestructionoftheSpanishfleetbymodern

Americanbattleships,cementedthealreadyconsiderablebeliefinthevalidityofMahan’s

thesis.ThiswidespreadacceptanceofMahanwouldbereflectedinBritishandGermannaval

policiesasthearmsracedeveloped.131

SirJulianCorbett,anEnglishbarristerturnedjournalistturnedhistorian,wrote

alongsideMahan,andnuancedsomeaspectsofhisarguments.In1906Corbetthadpublished

aworkabouttheprudenceofadefensivewaragainstaweakernavalpower(Germany)arguing

126Mahan,36.127W.D.Puleston,TheLifeandWorkofCaptainAlfredThayerMahan,USN(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1939),155.128Puleston,154.129Puleston,159.130Puleston,159.131Marder,Anatomy,48.

50

thattheBritishfleet’spurposeshouldbetosafeguardherownseacommunications,andonly

forceadecisionontheenemyfleetifBritain’sseacommunicationswerethreatened.Thiswas

notinkeepingwithMahan’snotionoftheprimacyofoffensivestrategy,andCorbettwas

forcedtoarticulatehisdefense.Indoingso,hepointedtoClausewitz,borrowingthelatter’s

cloutandinsistingthatdefensewasnotalwaysheretical.132Corbett’sthesiswasmorenuanced

andflexiblethanMahan’s.Itassertedthenotionthatstrategiescouldchangewithchanging

enemies,whereasMahan’sthesiswasmorecentrallytiedtotheunyieldingnotionthattotal

masteryoftheseasshouldbetheultimateaimofanyaspiringgreatpower.

Corbettmadeotherspecificcontributionstothestudyofnavalstrategy.Hecoinedthe

phrase“commerceprevention”in1911asopposedtothesingularactsofguerredecoursethat

hadcharacterizedeighteenthcenturywars.133HeadvocatedraidsonGermany’scoastsand

occupationofGermany’souterislandsinanattempttodrawouttheGermanfleetfora

decisiveaction.Thiswould,heargued,short‐circuitthelongandpainfulprocessofwaitingfor

theeconomicforcesunleashedbydenialofcommunicationoftheseastoanenemytotake

effect.134Thesevaryinginterpretationsofhownaviesshouldbeproperlyconstitutedand

employedaffectedtheoutlookofgovernmentsinbothcountries.InGreatBritainthestrategic

outlookofthegovernmentandAdmiraltywasalsoaffectedbythechangingforeignpolicy

situation.

In1904,RussiaandFrancewerenolongeradirectnavalthreattoGreatBritain,andso

theinitialbasisfortheTwoPowerStandardhaddisappeared.TheTwoPowerStandardnow

132Semmel,141‐142.133Semmel,97‐98.134Semmel,144.

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seemedobsoleteandinadequatewiththeincreasinglyvolatilesituationofchangingalliances

andemergingnavalpowers.Thus,theTwoPowerStandard“withagoodmargin”was

announcedbyPrimeMinisterBalfourin1904intheHouseofCommons.Thisnavalpower

standardwouldnotberevisedagainuntil1908.135

In1908,theTwoPowerStandardwasoverriddenbythe“OnePowerStandardPlusSixty

Percent,”whichwasfirstpresentedtotheAdmiraltyCommitteeonManningRequirementsin

1908.TheriseofGermanyastheprimarynavalthreattoGreatBritainhadresultedinthis

changeofnavalpowerstandards,andin1909theadmiraltydraftedanestimatefor

shipbuildingnecessaryinordertomaintainthatmarginoverGermany.Thiswasdoneagainat

FirstLordoftheAdmiraltyChurchill’srequestin1911,andhedecidedthatitshouldbe

formalizedandbecomethenewofficialstandard.Churchillspokeofthenewstandardina

speechtotheHouseofCommonsinMarchof1912.136Inadditiontothechangingattitudesby

theBritishgovernmenttowardwhichmarginsofsuperioritywereacceptable,theRoyalNavy

alsoexperiencedrevolutionarychangesinorganization,deployment,andequipmentduringthe

firstdecadeofthetwentiethcentury.Mostofthesechangesweretheresultofthereforms

enactedbytheheadstrongFirstSeaLord,SirJohnArbuthnotFisher,whoenteredthatofficein

1904.HisnotionsabouthowtheRoyalNavyneededtobereformedwereshapedoverhislong

career,andfocusedprimarilyontheimportanceofspeed.

In1900,therewasareturntotheold“formallineofbattleschool”thathad

characterizedthepre‐NelsonRoyalNavy.Duetotheincreasingviabilityofsteampower,

135Marder,Anatomy,509.136Sumida,191.

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Nelson’suniquemethodsofenvelopinganenemyandconcentratingfireonasingleportionof

theenemy’slinehadbecomeobsolete,andsosubdivisionoffleetsseemedpointless.Single

lineswerefavoredbecausetheyallowedunimpededfireandmaximumutilizationofall

broadsides(whichwasthereasonthatthelineofbattlewasintroducedin1660inthefirst

place).137

Mahan’sthesisandtheAmericanexperienceoftheSpanish‐AmericanWarindicated

thatthegunwasthemostimportantelementofabattlefleet.Fisheracknowledgedthisinthe

formofgreaterarmamentswhilesimultaneouslyshiftinghisultimateprioritytogreaterspeed.

Hecalleditthe“weathergage”138ofthemodernera,becauseitwouldallowfleetstoengageat

atimeoftheirownchoosing,andtofleefromasuperiorenemy.

TheRusso‐JapaneseWarof1904seemedtoconfirmFisher’sbeliefintheimportanceof

speed,towhichheattributedtheJapanesevictory.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthegenesisofthe

Dreadnoughtconceptcamefromthatwar,butonlythatitschampionswereencouragedbythe

results.139

ArthurMarderpointsoutseveralconsiderationsthatwentintothedesignofthe

Dreadnought.Theseincludedthenewlyviabletorpedoboat,advancementsinrangefinding

technology,theadventofsalvofiring,theincreasedrangeandpoweroflargecaliberweapons,

andFisher’sbeliefthatspeedwasthemosteffectivewayofmaximizingflexibilityincombat.140

Collectivelythesedesignconsiderationswentintocreatingthefastestbattleshipeverfloated,

137Marder,Anatomy,516‐517.138Marder,Anatomy,517.139Marder,Anatomy,530.140Marder,Dreadnought,58‐59.

53

whichalsohadlarge,powerfulguns.Thisnewbattleshipcoulddecidewhentoattackbecause

ofitsgreatspeed,andcouldtheoreticallyengageaccuratelyfromlongrange.However,this

theoreticalmaximumgunneryrangewouldnotpanoutinpracticeduetothelackofan

effectivelongrangefirecontrolsystemofthetypethatArthurPollenhadofferedthe

Admiralty.

AlsowiththeconstructionoftheHMSDreadnoughtcamethefirstofthreearmored

cruisers,theInvincibleclass,capableofevengreaterspeedsofupto25knots.Theywere

designedtoharassanenemyfleetalreadyengagingbattleships,andtochasedownmerchant

hunters.Theseshipshadminimalarmorprotection,butitwasbelievedtobeenoughto

outmatchanyvesselexceptaDreadnoughtbattleship.141By1904Fisherhadbecome

convincedthattorpedoeshadmadelargebattleshipsobsolete.142Hewentontoarguewith

FirstLordoftheAdmiraltySelbornethatbattleshipswerenolongernecessarybutthatarmored

cruiserswere,andhewasrebuked.HeacquiescedonthispointinOctober1904,

acknowledgingthathisideasinthisinstanceweretooradicaltobefeasiblyacceptabletothe

navalestablishment,andthatitwasunreasonableforthenavytoabandonbattleships

especiallygiventheentrenchedbeliefinMahan’sthesis.143However,through1905he

repeatedlyarguedtotheCommitteeonDesignsthatthearmoredcruiserwasjustaseffective

asthebattleship,becauseadvancesinarmorpiercingprojectileshadmadeheavyarmor

obsolete.144

141Marder,Anatomy,534‐535.142Sumida,51.143Sumida,53.144Sumida,56.

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Fisher’sfaithinthepromiseofthePollenfirecontrolsystemin1906ledhimto

reinforcehisbeliefintheprimacyofthebattlecruiser,whichwhenproperlyequippedcould

shellenemybattleshipsoutsidetheireffectiveweaponsrange.145Withthedecisiontoreject

thePollensystem,thecaseforarmoredcruiserslostitsmomentum.146Whentheadmiralty

agreedtore‐reviewthePollensystemin1909,Fisheragaingothishopesupaboutbeingable

toretirethebattleshipinfuturebuilding.147Heneverstoppedagitatingformorebattle

cruisers,evenafterhisretirement.Theywerethedesiredendstateofhisreforms.Fisher’s

continueddriveforgreaternumbersofarmoredcruisersattheexpenseofbattleshipswas

blockedbytheAdmiralty,andtheresultingforcein1914wasmoreheavilyrepresentedby

battleshipsthanbybattlecruisers.Thisturnedouttobeablessing,asbattlecruiserswould

provemorevulnerablethantheirheavier,morewellprotectedbattleshipcousinsattheBattle

ofJutlandin1916.

NoteveryoneembracedFisher’snewshipswithenthusiasm.Atthetimethatthe

Dreadnoughtwasbuilt,theBritishnavyhada3:1ratioofsuperiorityoverGermanyintermsof

numbersofbattleships,whichwaseffectivelynullifiedbytheintroductionofthe

Dreadnought.148ByintroducingtheDreadnought,theBritisheffectivelyresetthenavalarms

racewithGermanytothestartingline,andthisprovidedfodderforFisher’scritics.Whenthe

Dreadnoughtbecameknowntothepublic,itscriticsimmediatelybeganvocallyquestioningthe

logicofthisradicalshiftinprocurement.Theycriticizedthepracticeofconcentratingtheir

resourcesinsofewlargebutvulnerableunits,whichinevitablymeantthatBritainwouldbe

145Sumida,100.146Sumida,115.147Sumida,162.148Marder,Dreadnought,56.

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abletoaffordfewerofthem.Themostsalientcriticismwasthatitresettheclockonthearms

race.ItvoidedBritain’soverwhelmingsuperiorityinnumbersofbattleshipsbecauseallother

battleshipswereinstantlyrenderedobsolete,andBritain’senemieswerenowbuildingagainst

themfromthesamestartingposition.149

CriticsalsoclaimedthatFisherhadsacrificedoffensivepowerforspeed,andsohad

violatedthedictatesofMahan,whosethesisemphasizedoffensiveratherthandefensive

power.FishersidesteppedMahanbyarguingtheself‐evidenceoftheimportanceofspeed,and

claimedthathehadnotexorbitantlysacrificedoffensivepower,havingstillplacedthemost

powerfulgunsavailableontheDreadnought.150AnothercriticismwasthattheDreadnought

gaveuparmorprotectioninfavorofspeed,towhichFisherrepliedthatDreadnoughtwasstill

moreheavilyprotectedthananyofthepre‐Dreadnoughts.151Yetanothercriticism,particularly

advancedbySirWilliamWhite,DirectorofNavalConstructionfrom1885to1902,arguedthata

seriesofsmallerbattleshipswerepreferabletoafewlargeones,becausetheconsequencesof

losingoneofthemwerenotascatastrophic.Thiswascounteredbyclaimingthatmore

powerfulbattleshipswerelesslikelytobesunk,andbytheargumentthatincreasingthe

numberofsmallshipswouldincreasethechanceofaccidentalloss.152Thefinalandmost

persistentargumentconcerningthetechnicaldesignchoicesmadeforthenewshipclasswas

againstthenormalizationofsinglecaliberofmainbattery.CriticssaidthattheRusso‐Japanese

Warhadbeenwonbythesix‐inchshellsoftheJapanese,andthatahighervolumeofsmall

projectileswasmoreeffectivethanafewlargeones.Theadmiraltycounteredwiththe

149Marder,Anatomy,536.150Marder,Dreadnought,60‐61.151Marder,Dreadnought,62.152Marder,Dreadnought,62‐63.

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confidentialresultsofthebattlepracticesthatdemonstratedtheviabilityoflong‐rangefire,

whichwasespeciallysuitedtolargecaliberweapons.153Theramificationofeffectivelong‐

rangefirewasthatafleetcouldengageanenemyoutsideoftheirrangetoreturnfire,which

wouldmaketheBritishfleetinvincible.Thiscouldonlywork,however,withlargecaliber

weapons.

Criticsofthebattlecruiserfollowedthesamepathofargumentastheyhadforthe

Dreadnought,butspecificallywonderediftherewasanywartimeutilitytothebattlecruiserat

all.Theyarguedthatcheapervesselscoulddothescoutingjobequallywell,astheywouldnot

requireasmucharmororoffensivepower,andthefleetbeingscoutedcouldamassenough

firepowertodriveoffthescoutregardlessoftheirarmamentorarmor.154Thereforethebattle

cruiserwasarguedtobeasingularlywastefulconcentrationofresourcesthatofferednoreal

advantages.

ThemostardentcriticofFisher’sreformswasLordCharlesBeresford.LordBeresford

hadservedasvicefleetcommanderunderFisherintheMediterraneanFleetuntil1902.While

underhischarge,hewasconsistentlyrebukedbyFisher,merelyasaresultofFisher’s

personalityandstyleofcommand,andBeresfordcametotakethesecausticencounters

personally.HetookcommandoftheChannelFleetin1903andthenoftheMediterranean

Fleetin1905,whileFisherwasredistributingthefleetsasapartofhisearlyreforms.This

meantthatBeresford’sfleetwasshrinkingjustashewastakingcommand,andhebelievedthat

thisredistributionwaspersonallytargetedagainsthim.Heblewtheseeventsupintoa

153Marder,Dreadnought,66.154Marder,Dreadnought,70.

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personalandpublicgrudgethatwouldcharacterizehisbehaviorfortherestofFisher’stenure.

TheensuingriftbetweenFisherandBeresfordledtothepolarizationoftheofficercorps,with

thetwosectslininguptosupportoneadmiralortheother.Thisriftwouldproveinjuriousto

theprofessionalunityofthenavy.155

BeresfordresumedcommandoftheChannelFleetin1906,andcommenced

underminingFisherandtheadmiraltyateveryturn,whichonlyentrenchedthedislikebetween

thetwo.156AfterrotatingoffofhiscommandinMarch1909,Beresfordcontinuedhis

antagonism,andtheintensityofthefeudonlyincreased.Asaresultoftherelentlessattacksby

BeresfordonFisher’sreforms,andmountingpressurefromFisher’sothercritics,Fisherwas

forcedtoresignearlyin1910.Followingthis,BeresfordwonaseatintheHouseofCommons

andcontinuedhisagitationfromParliament.However,hisinfluencewanedashisagitations

continued.HewasdeniedpromotiontoAdmiraloftheFleetbyFirstLordMcKenna,andhe

diedin1919.Massiearguesthathecamealongatthewrongtime,andrepresented

unsustainableconservatisminaperiodofradicalchange.HeandFisherbothhad“colossal

egos,butoveralifetimeofservice,Beresford’segotendedtofocusonhimself,whileFisher’s

wasdevotedtotheadvancementoftheService.”157Beresford’sstoryisindicativeofhow

dynamicthisperiodwas,andtheextenttowhichitwassetapartfromtheperiodthat

precededit.Beresfordwasasymboloftheconservativepast,andwasunabletoadapttothe

changingrealitiesoftheearlytwentiethcentury.

155Massie,511‐516.156Massie,516‐527.157Massie,542.

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Fisherhadintroducedtworevolutionaryshiptypesthathadthepotentialto

fundamentallychangethecapabilitiesoftheRoyalNavy.Theseradicalshiptypesdrewfire

fromcriticswhosawthemasexpensiveandoverreaching.Criticsfearedthatthesevessels

wouldprovokeidenticalbuildingfromGermany,whichwouldnegateBritain’snavalnumerical

advantage.InspiteofthecriticismsgeneratedbyDreadnought,Fisher’sreformsoftheRoyal

Navycontinuedinotherareasoftheinstitution,andtheremainderofthissectionwillexamine

these.Fisher’sremainingreformswerefocusedontheNucleusCrewconcept,thescrappingof

obsoletevessels,andredeployingtheRoyalNavytoreflectnewforeignpolicyrealities.These

allreflectedtherapidlychangingnavalsituationandcontributedtoadizzyinglevelof

institutionalchange.

PriortoFisher’sposting,theshipslaidupintheFleetReservehadonlyskeletoncrews

onboardforbasicupkeepandsecurity.Uponmobilization,thecrewswerehastilyassembled

fromshoredetachments,andthesenewcrewswouldgotoseacompletelyunfamiliarwiththe

uniqueeccentricitiesoftheirships.Toalleviatethisproblem,Fishercreatedthenucleuscrew

system,whichmannedeachshipwithatwo‐fifthsnominalcrewcomplementinavarietyof

ratesandofficers.Theylivedandworkedonboardasactivedutystewardsoftheirvessels,and

participatedinregularexercises.Thismitigatedtheeffectsoftheremainingthree‐fifthsofthe

crewsthatweremadeupfromshoredetachments.Thismeantthattheeffectivefighting

strengthofthenavyincludedcombatviablereserves,andthatadmiralswouldnothaveto

accountforthereservesasaliability.Theextrapersonnelneededforthisexpansionwere

59

providedbythenewmanpowersurpluscreatedbyshipscrapping,whichFishersimultaneously

enacted.158

WhenFishertookofficein1904,thereweresmallobsoletegunboats,sloops,andlesser

rankcruisersdeployedthroughouttheworldonpoliceduty,whichcontributedtoBritain’s

forwarddeployedpresencethroughoutitsextensiveempire.Theywereofalmostnovaluein

modernwar,andasaresultFisherdecidedtoscrapmostofthem.Thisfreeduptheircrews

fromstagnantdutyandcontributedtothemenavailableforthenucleuscrewsystem.Italso

reducedannualestimatesbycuttingmaintenancecosts.Fisher’sinitialestimateupon

removing154vesselsfromtheactivelistwas£845,000peryear.159Withtheleaner,more

effectivefleetleftbehindafterthescrappingofobsoletevessels,theFirstSeaLordcompletely

reorganizedandreshuffledhowthatfleetwastobeemployed.

Fisherhadfirstfloatedtheneedforredistributingthefleetwithregardtochanging

geopoliticalrealitieswhenheadvocatedthatthevesselsdeployedoffthecoastoftheUnited

Statesbereducedin1902whilehewasincommandoftheMediterraneanFleet.160Bythetime

hebecameFirstSeaLordtwoyearslater,theforeignpolicysituationhadchangedsignificantly

again(withtheEntente),andsoFisherfurtherrevisedtheexistingsystem.Theolddeployment

schemewasaholdoverfromtheageofsail,whenaforwarddeployedpresencewasnecessary

inordertoprotectfar‐flungpartsoftheBritishEmpire.Sailingshipswereslowandtookalong

timetobedeployedfromcentrallylocatedports,andnewstravelledslowly,increasingthe

actualresponsetimeinacrisis.Thiswasnolongertruewiththesteam‐poweredvesselsand

158Marder,Dreadnought,36‐38.159Marder,Dreadnought,38‐40.160SirJohnFisher,“TheDistributionoftheFleet,1902”inBritishNavalDocuments,751‐752.

60

telegraphnetworksthatexistedin1904.ItalsoreflectedanhistoricalenmitywithFrancethat

wasnolongervalid,anddidnotreflecttherelativelynewalliancewithJapan.The

redistributioneffectivelyplacedthreequartersofBritain’sfrontlineunitsinpositionsthat

madethemavailabletobedeployedagainstGermanyupontheoutbreakofwar.Thiswas

donebyheavilyreinforcingtheChannelandAtlanticFleetsattheexpenseoffleetsintheFar

EastandSouthAfrica.TheNorthAmericasquadronswerealsoreduced,asFisherhad

requestedin1902.161

StateoftheFleetsin1914

TherewerealimitednumberofflagofficersofanyrealabilitybytheoutbreakofWorld

WarOne.Thiswasduetotheirlackofhavingbeentestedincombat,andduetothetransition

fromsailtosteampropulsionduringtheirlifetimes.Bureaucraticstagnationplaguedmanyof

them,andmostwerenotinclinedtoseekcounselfromsubordinates.However,therewerea

fewstandouts.ArthurMarderarguesthatthemajorityofthetalentlayinthejuniorranks,the

captainsandrearadmirals.162Inspiteofthedrawbacksofinstitutionalstagnationand

bureaucraticinertia,oneadvantagethattheBritishhadconsistentlyovertheirGermancousins

wasconfidence.TheyembodiedthelongtraditionofBritishnavalsuperiority,andtheyfaced

anupstartenemywithnorealnavaltraditionsoftheirown.163

Bycomparison,theGermanNavywasplaguedbythesameproblemsastheRoyalNavy,

andtheirservicelengthsofthreeyearsincreasedturnoverandtraining.Theydidmostoftheir

161Marder,Dreadnought,40‐43.162Marder,Dreadnought,405‐412.163Marder,Dreadnought,412.

61

traininginprotectedwaters,andthispreventedthemfromattainingthesamelevelof

proficiencyastheBritish.164TheBritishprimarilyconductedtrainingoperationsintheNorth

SeaandtheAtlantic,wheretheywereabletotackletheconsiderablechallengesofhighsea

statesandopen‐oceanmaneuvering.Bycontrast,theGermansconductedmostoftheir

trainingintheprotectedharboratWilhelmshaven,andtherelativelycalmwatersthatguarded

itsapproaches.Theywerethereforenotashighlyskilledinopen‐oceanwarfare.

TheBritishandGermangovernmentsalsobuiltdifferentcapabilitiesintotheirwarships.

Forexample,theQueenElizabethandtheKronprinzWilhelm,laiddownin1912,haddifferent

calibersoftheirmainbatteries.TheBritishshiphadfour15inguns,withabroadsideof15,600

lbs,comparedtotheGermanship,whichhadten12inguns,withabroadsideof8,600lbs.The

Germansclaimedparitybecausetheirgunshadahighermuzzlevelocityandsopreservedtheir

penetrationpowerrelativetotheheavierBritishguns.ArthurMarderarguesthattheheavier

gunsweresuperior,becausetheypreservedtheiraccuracyatlongerranges,andsohadgreater

effectivefiringrange.165

Intermsofmateriel,theGermanbattleshipsweremoreheavilyarmoredthantheir

Britishcounterparts,with11.75ininthefirstroundofshipsand13.75inthelaterbattleships,

comparedto11,12,and13infortheevolvingBritishclasses.Thecruiserswerealsomore

lightlyarmoredontheBritishside.TheGermanheavyarmorwasduetotheheaviergunson

theBritishships,andtheGermanswerenotatanadvantageconsideringtheweaponsofthe

enemythattheywerebuildingagainst.TheBritishhadmadeaconsciouschoicetosacrifice

164Marder,Dreadnought,412‐413.165Marder,Dreadnought,413‐414.

62

armorforweaponweight,andthisincludedallowingvulnerablespotsintheBritisharmor,that

wasnotascontinuousorashighasthatoftheirGermancounterparts.166

ThearmorpiercingshellsusedbytheBritishwereineffectiveowingtothepoorchoices

oftheControllersafterJellicoe,andthissparedGermanwarshipsatJutlandin1916.When

strikingatanobliqueangle,theshellswoulddisintegrateorelsefailtofullypenetratethe

armor.Thispartiallydeniedthemtheadvantageoftheirheavierbroadsidewhileexposing

themtotheirchosenweaknessinarmorprotection.TheGermansalsoreapedtheadvantages

ofbuildingnavalworksfromthegroundup,whichpermittedgreaterbeamsandwatertight

protectionduetomoreexpansivedocks.167TheBritishhadtoexpandtheirexistingnaval

infrastructure,whichwasmoredifficultandcostlythanbuildingbrandnewones,andthe

Germanshipyardsweremoremodernowingtotheirmorerecentconstruction.

Intheend,however,numericalsuperioritywasclearlyinfavoroftheBritish.Whenthe

warbrokeout,theBritishhad20battleshipsandninebattlecruisers,toGermany’s13

battleshipsandfivebattlecruisers.168

Conclusion

Fromeverythematicperspectiverelevanttonavalpower,thisperiodwascharacterized

byconstantflux.Threatsandtargets,capabilitiesandvulnerabilities,andahalf‐century‐old

fadedmemoryofthelastsignificantnavalconflict(Crimea)accountedforcontinuouschanges

indoctrine,whichbothreflectedandimpactedchangesonthepoliticalsceneandon

166Marder,Dreadnought,414‐417.167Marder,Dreadnought,417‐419.168Marder,Dreadnought,420.

63

technology.Therapidityofdoctrinalsupersessionreflectedthelackofconcreteevidenceof

theviabilityofonestrategyoremploymenttechniqueoveranother,fueledbythevolatile

changingpoliticalsituationandquicklyadvancingstateofthenavalart.Supplantingoneschool

ofnavalthoughtinfavorofanotherwasatriumphofdiscourseratherthananincorporationof

lessonslearnedthroughcombatexperience.

IntothisgrowingmaelstromtheBritishgovernmentcommittedvastandeverincreasing

resources.Between1889and1914Britishnavalestimatesgrewby£37,906,032,anincreaseof

278%.In1913oneoutofeveryfourpoundsspentbytheBritishgovernmentwasspentonthe

RoyalNavy.169TheBritishpeoplecommittedtheseresourcesunderstandablyunsureof

whetherthenavytheywerepurchasingwascapableoffulfillingitsintendedcharge,andthe

government,newspapers,andpro‐navyadvocateswenttoconsiderablepainstoreassurethe

publicthatthenavywouldnotembarrassitselfthewaythatthearmyhaddoneduringthe

BoerWar.Suchapotentialsetbackwasperceivedtobecompletelyunacceptable,asthenavy

wasBritain’sfirstandlastlineofactualdefensethatguardedBritishphysicalsovereigntyand

ensuredherabilitytokeepherrightfulprosperousplaceintheworldorder.Anyoccurrence

seentobecurtailingthatnavalhegemonyresultedinapanic,ashappenedinnofewerthan

fourfullblown“scares”duringthisperiod.170

Thesubsequentchapterswillexplorevariousaspectsofhowtheseculturalreassurances

wereconstructed,includingconceptualizingthe“Other,”representationsofpaststrength

throughcommemorations,representationsofcurrentstrengththroughcontemporary

169Sumida,Table15.1701889,1901,1909,and1912.Asshowninthischapter,tensionsneverabated,butthese“scares”representedthenadirsofBritishnavalnumericalconfidence.

64

celebrationsofnavalpower,andperceptionsandreactionstotheclimacticbutindecisive

employmentofthismassivelyexpensiveandallimportantfleetattheBattleofJutlandin1916.

65

CHAPTERTWO

THERESTLESSCHILD

ThepeopleofGreatBritainfoundtheirracialcousinsoftheSecondGermanEmpire

puzzling,andtheycreatedacaricatureoftheGermansinordertohelpthemunderstandtheir

behavior.Examiningthiscaricatureisusefulfortworeasons.First,Britons’attemptsto

reconcilethepeculiaritytheysawrevealsasignificantamountabouthowtheBritishviewed

themselves,andsotheyareawindowintothesenseofracialdeclinethatcharacterizedBritish

cultureduringthisperiod.Second,therepresentationsoftheGermansthatwerepresentedto

theBritishpeoplemythologizedthethreatthattheGermansrepresented,andhelpedthe

Britishgovernmentjustifyexpendingresourcesforthecommondefense.Thus,thiscaricature

directlyfueledthenavalarmsrace.ThischapterwillreconstructthisportraitoftheGermansas

viewedbytheBritishinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,andwillthenpoint

outthedeepersignificanceofthisportraittotheremainingthemesofstudyinthisthesis.

HavingestablishedthebasicsequenceofeventsfortheperiodinChapterOne‐‐thepolitical,

technological,anddoctrinalnarrative—thischapterwillfocusonthetargetagainstwhichthe

Britishwerearmingthemselves‐‐theGermanEmpire.Forpracticalreasons,Ihavechosento

considertheportraitstaticthroughouttheperiod,withoutaccountingspecificallyforchanges

inBritishattitudesbetween1896and1914.Thisissomewhatproblematicbecauseitsimplifies

thecaricatureinawaythatamoredetailedstudywouldnot,butitallowsforabriefsynthesis

oftheoverallportraitthatwouldotherwisebeimpractical.Eveninsuchabriefstudy,the

portraityieldedbythisanalysisofthedocumentaryevidenceisstilleffectiveandilluminating.

Thereaderwillnoticeanintensificationofthelanguageastheperiodprogressed

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commensuratewiththeintensificationofthenavalarmsrace,withoutnecessarilynoticingany

changesintheperceptionofbasicGermanqualities.Inconstructingthisportrait,Ihavechosen

selectionsfromTheTimesofLondon,Punch,Hansard’sParliamentaryDebates,andForeign

Officecorrespondencefromtheperiod,withfocusedscrutinyonperiodsofparticularfriction

betweenthetwocountries,aseditorializingabouttheGermansincreasedinperiodsofgreater

strife.Narrowingthesearchinthiswayhasallowedforafocusedcollectionatmomentsof

effervescenceofdiscourse,whencommentaryaboutGermaneccentricities,faults,andvirtues

wasatitshighestpitch.Thiscollectionofdocumentscomposeaneffectivecrosssectionof

contemporaryopinion,asitcontainsdocumentsforpopularconsumption(TheTimesand

Punch),officialspeechesdesignedtoaffectgovernmentpolicy(TheParliamentaryDebates),

andthefrequentlyconfidentialcorrespondencebetweenofficialsattheForeignOffice,in

whichthemostintenselanguageandlongestpontificationsoftenoccurred,withoutfearof

publicorforeignbacklashbecauseoftheirsecrecy.

Intermsofpopularconsumption,newspapershadthemostwidespreadreadership

relativetotheothersourcesusedinconstructingthisportrait.Inthesecondhalfofthe

nineteenthcenturynewspapersalesexplodedinGreatBritain.Thiswasinitiallysetoffby

repealsofpapertaxesin1855and1861,butnewspaperreadershipcontinuedtoexpandlong

afterthisinitialboost.Newspapercirculationstagnatedinthe1870s,andpickedupagainin

the1880s.Circulationcontinuedtoexpandfromthe1880sintothetwentiethcentury.171In

1860,therewere32dailynewspapersinGreatBritain.Thatnumberhadgrownto150bythe

1890s.Eighty‐fivemillionnewspapersweresoldinEnglandin1851.By1920,salesexceeded

171LucyBrown,VictorianNewsandNewspapers(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1985),31.

67

5.6billion.Percapitaconsumptionalsoincreasedfromsixnewspapersperyearin1851to182

in1920.172Thesefiguresindicatetheextenttowhichthemassconsumermarketwas

expandingduringthisperiod,andtheextenttowhichthenewspaperexcerptscitedinthis

chapterenjoyedalargeswathofpublicexposure.

Thischapterwillnotproceedchronologically,butthematically.Itwillfocusonthree

mainsubjectsofstudy:thepersonoftheEmperor,whoformanyexemplifiedtheworst

qualitiesoftheGermanrace,thestructuraldefectsofGermansociety,andthelargerGerman

caricatureasawhole,whichexpandsuponthesingularBritishperceptionoftheEmperor,but

doesnotsignificantlybreakfromthecharacteristicsascribedtoWilhelm.

KaiserWilhelmwastheprimaryfocalpointofBritishculturalcontactwiththeGermans.

HewasthemostvisibleGerman,andthroughtheforceofhispersonalitymadesurethathe

remainedso.Inaddition,healsopossessedahighdegreeofpersonalcontrolovertheforeign

affairsofGermany.Inkeepingwithhisgreatinstitutionalimportanceandvisibility,theBritish

publicidentifiedhimasthearchetypeoftheGermanrace.Ashecametoembodytheworst

aspectsofthatrace,BritishviewsoftheGermanraceasawholesoured.Thiswasexplicitly

statedin1906bySirFrankLascelles,theBritishAmbassadortoGermanyfrom1895‐1908:“In

onerespecttheEmperormayperhapsbeconsideredasatypicalGerman…They[are]themost

sensitivepeopleintheworld,andatthesametimeitwouldneverenterintotheirheadsthat

theycouldbyanypossibilitybeoffensivethemselves,althoughinrealitytheyveryoftenwere.

ItwasnotlongbeforeIrealizedthattheEmperorhimselfsharedtoaverylargeextentthe

172MarkHampton,VisionsofthePressinBritain,1850‐1950(Chicago:UniversityofIllinoisPress,2004),28.

68

sensitivenesswhich[is]consideredacharacteristicoftheGermanpeoplegenerally.”173The

specificaspectsofhischaracterexploredherewerehisperceivedimpetuousshowmanship,

instability,bellicosity,narrowmindedness,andimmaturity.174Ontheoccasionofthe

Emperor’svisittoTangierin1905,Punchpublishedadrawingportrayinghisimpetuousnature

andtendencytograndstand(seeFigure1175).Inthatimage,hewasportrayedastheMoorof

Potsdam,dressedconspicuouslyinhismilitaryuniformanddecorations,strikingatheatrical

pose.ThisreflectedthebeliefthattheEmperorwasmainlyinterestedindrawingattentionto

himselfratherthanlookingafterthelegitimateforeigninterestsofGermany.Laterinthesame

year,PunchpublishedadrawingofameetingbetweenWilhelmandtheCzar(seeFigure2176).

FoiledagainsttherelativelydiscreteNicholasII,huncheddownsoastonotbenoticedand

speaking“anxiously,”theKaiserwassittingerect,defiantlyunashamedofhispresence,inthe

faceofthenavalactivityinthebackground,withthecaptionindicatingthathewas

unconcernedwiththestirsthathemighthavecaused.ThisalsoportrayedtheEmperorasthe

impetuousshowman,whorecklesslycauseddisruptionontheinternationalpoliticalscene

wheneverhewasable.Themanportrayedinthisdrawingwasconfidenttoafault,anddared

therestofEuropetochallengehim.

173SirFrankLascelles,“ExtractfromGeneralReportonGermanyfor1906,”inBritishDocumentsontheOriginsofWar,1898‐1914,ed.G.P.GoochandHaroldTemperley(London:HisMajesty’sStationaryOffice,1927),Volume3,436.SirFrankLascellesservedasambassadoratBerlinfrom1895‐1908,andwrotethisreportonMay24th,1907(hisbiographicalinformationislocatedonp.454ofthesamevolume).174Thesequalitieswerenotunrelated,andthosewritingaboutthepersonoftheEmperorfrequentlymadereferencetomanyofthesetraitssimultaneously.Forthepurposeofillustratingthemostpowerfulexamplesofthevoicingoftheseperceptions,Ihavechosenselectionswhichpredominantlyfocusononethemeoranother,butthatmaycontainpassingreferencestoadditionalthemes.175UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume128,237.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonApril5th,1905.176UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume129,83.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonAugust2nd,1905.

69

ReportsfromtheforeignofficesupportedthegeneralinterpretationsofPunch

cartoons.TheyfrequentlyindicatedthattheKaiserlovedtotalkandpontificate,andthe

understatedjibesatthiscaricaturewereoftenlessthansubtle:“AsisoftenHisMajesty’shabit

whenhebeginsaconversationwithoneperson,[He]continuedtotalktometilltheEmpress

sentwordtohimthatitwastimetogohome.”177Theselongtalksturnedtorantsor

“tirades,”178perceivedtobetheoccasionalboilingoverofpentupenergyandemotiononthe

partoftheEmperor,andnotworthyofseriousconcern:“ItistheEmperor’shabittoindulge

fromtimetotimeinpublicexpressionofhispersonalsentiments;andtoextemporaneous

utterancesofthatkindseriouspoliticalimportancedoesnotnecessarilyattach.”179These

passagesportraytheEmperorasamanwhowasunabletokeephismouthshut,andwhowas

pronetoviolentoutburstsofemotionthatwereimmediatelyexpressed.InadispatchtoSir

EdwardGreyin1913theBritishAmbassadortoItaly,SirJ.RennellRodd,revealedhowthis

showmanshiphaddysfunctionalconsequencesfortheEmperor’sgoverningstyle:

[AmemberoftheEmperor’sentourage]saidthathefoundnodifficultywhenanopportunitywasofferedofseeingHisMajestyalone.TheEmperorwasthenasympatheticandreceptivelistener,andacceptedadifferenceofopinioninverygoodpart.Itwasbynomeanshowevereasywhenanumberofotherpersonswerepresent.TheEmperorhadaquicknessandbrilliancyofreparteewhichputhisinterlocutoratadisadvantage,asthelatterhadtotakeintoaccounttheobligationsnottoputHisMajestyatadisadvantagebeforewitnesses.180

177“MemorandumbyLordGranville,”inBritishDocuments,Volume9Part2,p.503.TheauthorwastheSecondEarlofGranville,andservedasSecretaryattheBritishEmbassyatBerlin,1904‐1905,as1stSecretaryatBerlin,1905‐1908,atBrussels,1908‐1911,andagainatBerlinfrom1911‐1913(Biographicalinformationlocatedonp.1087).ThiswaswrittenonFebruary18th,1913.178“LtColJMGriersontoSirF.Lascelles,”inBritishDocuments,Volume1,42.J.M.GriersonwastheBritishMilitaryAttacheatBerlinfrom1896to1900(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.340).ThiswaswrittenonJanuary19th,1898.179UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,January4th,1896,p.9col.3.180“SirR.RoddtoSirEdwardGrey,January6th,1913,”inBritishDocuments,Volume10,662.SirJ.RenellRoddwasSecretaryoftheBritishEmbassyatRomefrom1901‐1903,CouncillorofEmbassy1904,MinisteratStockholm,1904‐1908,andAmbassadoratRome,1908‐1921(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.854).SirEdwardGrey

70

ThereforetheEmperorhadmultiplefacesandpersonalities,aqualitywhichwasreferredto

consistentlythroughoutthisperiod,andthatwouldalsobeprojectedontotheGermanpeople

asawhole.

ThebulkofthesourcesexplainingthepersonalityoftheEmperoridentifiedhis

instabilityasbeinghismostprominentfeature.SirFrankLascelles’sanalysisoftheEmperor

wastelling:

Itisnoeasymatter…toattemptadescriptionofHisMajesty’spersonality,whichiscomposedofvariousandsometimescontradictoryqualities…TheEmperorcertainlypossessesagreatandvariedknowledge,andisveryquickingraspingthemeaningofwhatissaidtohim,butthisquicknessisnotanunmixedadvantage,asitnotunfrequentlycausesHisMajestytojumpataconclusionwithoutgivingsufficientconsiderationtoalltheconditionsofthecase.IthasbeenpointedouttomethatwhenaquestionissubmittedtoHisMajestyheisapttoatonceexpressanopinion,andwhenthesamequestionisagainsubmittedfromadifferentpointofviewheveryprobablymaypronounceaverydifferentopinion…ThewellknownimpulsivenessoftheEmperor’scharacter,coupledwiththeexaggerationinwhichheisinthehabitofindulginginconversation,havegivenrisetoanimpression[thathe]constitutesadangerforthepeaceofEurope.181

SirFrank’sanalysisoftheEmperorpaintedhimasapersonwhowassodizzyinglyactive,in

mindandbody,thathecouldnotcontrolhimself.Hespokeandactedwithoutthought,and

wasapttotrytoimpressthosearoundhimwithhisaggressiveness.Thisinstabilityalsogave

theEmperorthequalityofanunwelcomeguest,andindealingwithhisallies,accordingtoSir

HaroldRumbold,theBritishAmbassadortotheAustro‐HungarianEmpirefrom1896to1900,

“EmperorWilliamisheldrathertohavethrusthimselfoflateyearsundulyuponhisImperial

neighbor,and…hisvisits[totheAustro‐HungarianEmpire]havebeenmorefrequentthan

wastheBritishSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairs,fromDec11th,1905toDec11th,1916(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.847).181“ExtractfromGeneralReportonGermanyfor1906SirF.LascellesMay24th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,434.

71

welcome.”182ThisqualityoftheEmperorcontrastedwiththeBritishperceptionoftheirown

king,andthisperceiveddifferenceinthepersonalitiesofthetwomonarchswasreportedonby

Mr.FairfaxCartwright,aCouncilorattheBritishEmbassyatMadridfrom1905‐1906,ina

ForeignOfficereport:

[CertainGermannewspapers]attributetheerraticandsomewhatchangeableforeignpolicyoftheEmpiretothepeculiarlyimpulsiveandromantictemperamentoftheEmperor,anditdrawsattentiontotheimportanceofappreciating,indealingwithpublicaffairs,thecoolanddeterminedcharacterofKingEdward,whosetenacityofpurpose,especiallyinforeignaffairs,makeshimadangerousantagonist.ThemisunderstandingbetweenthetwocountriesisingreatpartduetothedifferenceoftemperamentoftheirSovereigns,forinEnglandthechangeablecharacterofGermanforeignpolicyisattributedbythepublictoduplicity,whereasthetenacityofpurposeofGreatBritainmakestheGermansfearthattheywillbeworstedbytheirneighborsistheyarenotcarefulandthisrendersthemsuspiciousandgivesrisetonumerousarticlesinthepressentitled‘PerfidiousAlbion.’183

Therefore,Mr.CartwrightwasaccusingtheGermannewspapersofbeingjealousoftheBritish,

becausetheBritishkingwascapableofcontrollinghimselfinwaysthattheGermanEmperor

couldnot.Thisputthetwomonarchsonanunevenplayingfield,andtheBritishhadthe

advantage.Hewasalsopraisingthisqualityinhisking.

ThisthemeofWilhelm’sinstabilityrecurredinshorterpassages,andwasusedto

explaintheerraticandcounterproductivenatureofGermanpolicy,aswithFrankLascelles’s

reportpublishedin1906:“His[Majesty’s]informationisoftennotcompleteenoughtoenable

182“SirH.RumboldtotheMarquessofSalisbury,September19th,1898,”inBritishDocuments,Volume1,280.HoraceRumboldwastheBritishAmbassadoratViennafrom1896to1900(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.344).TheMarquessofSalisburywastheBritishSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairsfromJune29th,1895toNovember12th,1900,andPrimeMinisterfromJune19th,1895toJuly12th,1902(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.417ofVolume2).183“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,August20th,1906.”BritishDocuments,Volume3,371.Mr.FairfaxCartwrightwasBritishCouncilloroftheEmbassyatMadridfrom1905to1906,andtheMinisteratMunichandStuttgartfrom1906to1908(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.445).

72

himtoformacorrectopinion,”184[but]“Hereallyisanimatedbythemostpacific

sentiments.”185Referencestothisqualityalsooccasionallyhintatadmirationfor“Therestless

spiritandfeverishenergyoftheGermanEmperor,”186attributedtohimbySirCharlesHardinge

in1905,whichalsoincludeda“loveofideas,versatility,[and]buoyancyofspirits,nowprobably

lessthaninhisearlierdays,…realgenerosityoftemperamentandvividimagination,tendto

makehimfeelsympathetictowardsastateofmindwhichmaybedescribedasthatofa

mystic,”187whichFairfaxCartwrightusedtodescribetheEmperorin1907.However

personallycharmingthisqualitymayhavemadetheEmperor,thereferencetothe

consequenceofthisqualityonGermanforeignpolicywasmorecharacteristicallyexpressedby

thefollowingeditorialofTheTimes:“TheEmperor,infact,issoimpulsiveandpassessorapidly

fromonemoodtoanotherthatheishimselfoftenapttoforgetinalatermoodwhathehad

doneandthoughtinanearliermood.AgainsteveryutterancefriendlytoEnglandother

utterancesequallyunfriendlycouldbequoted,butbothatthemomentareequallysincere.”188

ThisreinforcedthenotionoftheEmperorasachaoticelement,andtheimplicationsofthis

author’scommentswerethattheBritishgovernmentcouldnotbejustlyblamedforfailingto

effectivelyengagewiththeGermanEmperor.Insuchanimpossiblesituation,Britainwas

insteadworthyofpraisefortakingonthechallengeofbringingordertothesituation.

184SirFrankLascelles,“ExtractfromGeneralReportonGermanyfor1906,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,436.ThiswaswrittenonMay24th,1907.185“ExtractfromGeneralReportonGermanyfor1906SirF.Lascelles,May24th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,438.186“SirC.HardingetotheMarquessofLandsdowne,June13th,1905,”BritishDocuments,Volume4,197.SirCharlesHardingwasBritishAssistantUnder‐SecretaryofStateforForeignAffairsfrom1903to1904,AmbassadoratSt.Petersburgfrom1904to1906,andPermanentUnder‐SecretaryofStateforForeignAffairsfrom1906to1910(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.631).TheMarquessofLansdowneservedasForeignSecretaryfromNovember11th,1900toDecember11th,1905(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.xiiiofVolume1).187“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,Jan12th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,8.188UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,October29th,1908,p.5col.3.

73

ThiscaricatureoftheEmperorwaslongstanding.Punchpublishedadrawingofhimin

1890,shortlyafterhisaccessiontothethroneofGermany(seeFigure3189).TheKaiserinthis

drawingwasunsteady,andunsureofhimself.Hehadtheclumsinessofanadolescent,andhis

highenergyandimmaturitywereadisruptiveforcetotheConcertofEurope.Theolder,wiser

rulersweresensiblyseatedintheboatthatWilhelmwasrocking,andtheywereimploringhim

tostop.Sixyearslater,inthewakeoftheKrugerTelegram,expressionsofthisinstabilitywere

mademoreexplicit(seeFigure4190).Here,Wilhelmwasagainportrayedasanadolescent.In

additiontodisruptingtheConcertofEurope,Wilhelmwascausingconcerneventohisallies,

theItalianandAustro‐Hungariangovernments.Whileherockedbackunstablyinhischair,he

lookedconfusedandconcernedashethreatenedtoripthemapofEuropeoffofthetable,and

hisalliesyelledforhimtostop.

ThisnotionofWilhelmasanunstablefiguredidnotsoftenastheEmperoraged.In

1908,PunchpublishedadrawingcommentingontheDailyTelegraphfiascoofthatyear(see

Figure5191).Inthisdrawing,anadultWilhelmstillincompetentlyfailedtoproducehisintended

result,ashisinterviewwiththeDailyTelegraphproducedapublicoutcryinGreatBritain.Upon

realizingthis,theWilhelminthedrawinglookedsurprised,reinforcingthenotionofWilhelmas

aclumsy,unstableforceinEuropeanpolitics.192

189UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume147,Supplement3.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonMay10th,1890.190UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume110,50.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonFebruary1st,1896.191UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume135,353.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonNovember11th,1908.192Wilhelm’sfamousinterviewwiththeDailyTelegraphin1908wasostensiblyintendedtoimproveAnglo‐Germanrelations,butasaresultoftheEmperor’svolatilepersonalityanddiplomaticincompetence,heendedupinfuriatingboththeBritishandhisownpopulationinGermanythroughaseriesofinflammatoryremarkshemadeduringtheinterview.

74

TheEmperorwasfrequentlyaccusedofbellicosityandathunderingbombastthatwas

relatedtohisshowmanship.Theinterconnectednessofhisbellicosenatureandhistendency

tograndstandwaswellillustratedbyareportsentbyLieutenantColonelGriersontoSirFrank

Lascelles:“[IsaidtotheEmperorthat]wedidnotdesiretoembroilourselveswithanybody,

wewerestrongenoughtoholdourownagainsteithergroup[ofpotentialadversaries],andit

wasunlikelythatbothwouldcombineagainstus.Tothishereplied:‘Youaremistaken,they

cancombine,andtheyshallcombine.’(Thislatterwithgreatemphasis.)”193Twoyearslater

thisinclinationtowardexpressingaggressiveattitudesagainappearedinareportbySirFrank

Lascelles.ThisreportalsohintedattheduplicityoftheEmperor’smotives,whileagain

reinforcingthenotionofhimasanimpetuousshowman:“ThespeecheswhichtheEmperorhad

recentlydelivered…breathedaverywarlikespirit.CountBulowsaidIwassowellacquainted

withtheEmperorthatheneednotexplainHisMajesty’scharactertome,andhecouldassure

methat,whilstHisMajestywasdeliveringthesewarlikeutterances,hewasatthesametime

givingcommandstohisMinisterstoissueinstructionsinthemostmoderateandconciliatory

spirit.”194ThereforethereweretwofacesofWilhelm.ThepublicWilhelmhadanexcitable

temperament,andwaspronetoviolentverbaloutburst.TheprivateWilhelmwasmore

thoughtful,rational,andcalm.

JuxtaposedwithcharacterizationsoftheunstableWilhelm,pronetochangehisopinion

onawhim,orbecauseofachangeinthetoneofinformationpresentedtohim,wereaccounts

ofhisnarrow‐mindedness,richexamplesofwhichappearintheForeignOfficedocumentsof

193“LtColJMGriersontoSirF.Lascelles,Jan19th,1898,”inBritishDocuments,Volume1,42‐43.194“SirF.LascellestotheMarquessofSalisbury,Aug9th,1900,”inBritishDocuments,Volume2,6.

75

1907,justasthenavalarmsracewasaccelerating.InJanuary,Mr.CartwrightwrotetoSir

EdwardGrey,theSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairsfrom1905to1916,that“Oneofthe

mostseriousevilswhichaffectGermanyatpresentistheabsenceofmenofcharacteratthe

helmofaffairs.LittlebylittleMinistershaveeffacedthemselvesbeforetheKaiserandhave

beenreducedtothepositionofseniorClerksofDepartments…HisMajesty’spersonalityismore

andmoredominatingeverybranchofpubliclife.TheeffectofthisonGermandiplomacyis

verymarkedandshouldnotbelostsightof.”195Laterinthesamedocumenthewentontosay

that“[at]moments[theEmperor]beginstorealizethatthereisdangeraheadandhefeels

disheartened,thoughhisconfidenceinhimselfissogreatthathecannotbringhimselfto

believethathehasreallyengagedonawrongpath;then,indespair,he…denounce[s]allthose

whowereopposedtohimaspessimistsandenemiesofthenation.”196Therefore,Mr.

Cartwright’sassessmentwasthatthestrongforceoftheEmperor’spersonalityhad

emasculatedhissubordinatestothepointthattheywerenolongerabletoeffectivelystandup

tohimorchallengehispolicies.TheEmperorwassosureofhimselfthathecouldnotbe

movedfromhisdecisions,evenwhenhehimselfrecognizedsubsequentlythattheyhadbeen

incorrect.Inbolsteringhisselfconfidence,theEmperorrelieduponsupernaturallegitimacy:“I

havebeentoldongoodauthoritythatheinterpretsthewords‘KingofPrussiabythegraceof

God’inaliteralsense,andregardshimselfasplacedinaveryspecialmannerunderthedirect

protectionoftheAlmighty.”197ThereforeWilhelmbelievedthathewasalwaysright,andthat

195“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,Jan12th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,5.196“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,Jan12th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,7.197SirFrankLascelles,“ExtractfromGeneralReportonGermanyfor1906,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,435.ThiswaswrittenonMay24th,1907.

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Godwasguidinghimandhisnationtogreatness.Asaresult,criticalassessmentofhisown

policieswasunnecessary.

Allofthepersonalitytraitsthusfarexpoundeduponfeedintothelastaspectofthis

portionoftheportrait,whichcanbeseenastheoverridingcharacteristicoftheEmperorand

thefundamentalexplanationforalloftheothers:immaturity.Thisqualitywasalsoprojected

ontothewholeGermannation,asthischapterwillexploreinthefinalsection,buttherewere

severalexamplesofthisbeingdirectedattheEmperorpersonally.FrankLascellessaidofhim

in1899:“[TheEmperorclaimsthatGreatBritainhas]broughtuponherself[illfeeling]bythe

constantdisregardandcontemptwithwhichshetreatedGermaninterests…Hehadconstantly

laboredtobringaboutagoodunderstandingwithEngland,butwheneverheseemedtobeon

thepointofsucceeding,someincidenthadoccurredtofrustratehisdesires.”198“Frustration”

isperhapsthemostimportantwordinthispassage,anditfeedsintotheportraitconstructedof

Wilhelmasfunctionallyadolescent,strainingagainsttheartificialboundsthatheseesas

unfairlycurtailinghisactivities.AchildishexchangebetweenFrankLascellesandtheEmperor

providedanotherexampleofthelatter’sdefiantattitude:“Onmyaskingwhether[the

Emperor]hadanyordersformeasIwasabouttoleaveforEngland,HisMajestyrepliedinthe

negative.Itwasuselessforhimtomakesuggestionswhichweredisregarded,andhewasnot

goingto‘sticktous’anylonger.IventuredtoasktowhomHisMajestyproposedto‘stick’now,

andhepromptlyreplied‘tomyself.’”199Thiswasobviouslyoneofthe“tirades”thatthe

officialsattheforeignofficefrequentlycomplainedof,thatwasbasedonfleetingemotionand

198“SirF.LascellestotheMarquessofSalisbury,May26th,1899,”inBritishDocuments,Volume1,118.199“SirF.LascellestotheMarquessofLansdowne,Nov9th,1901,”inBritishDocuments,Volume1,261.

77

tantrum‐likerhetoricthatdidnotgivetheimpressionofrationalreflectiononthepartof

Wilhelm.

InadditiontothepersonoftheKaiser,thestructureoftheGermanstatethatWilhelm

governedwasalsoasubjectofinteresttoBritishcommentators,andtheserepresentations

portrayedasocietythatwasartificiallyheldincheckbyitsleastsophisticatedelements.The

wholedescriptioncreatedasenseofunbalanceanddisproportion,whichalsocanbe

interpretedassophomoricadolescenceofthestateitself.SirEyreCrowe,aseniorclerkinthe

BritishForeignOffice,publishedamemorandumin1907detailinghisinterpretationof

Germany’sstructuraldefectsandtheirconsequences:

ForpurposesofforeignpolicythemodernGermanEmpiremayberegardedas…thedescendantofPrussia…[Prussia’shistory]hasnotbeenacaseofaKing’sloveofconquestassuch,noroftheabsorptionoflandsregardedgeographicallyorethnicallyasanintegralpartofthetruenationaldomain,norofthemoreorlessunconscioustendencyofapeopletoexpandundertheinfluenceofanexuberantvitality,forthefullerdevelopmentofnationallifeandresources.HerewasratherthecaseoftheSovereignofasmallandweakvassalStatesaying:‘Iwantmycountrytobeindependentandpowerful…Imusthavealargerterritoryandmoreinhabitants,andtothisendImustorganizestrongmilitaryforces.’200

InreconcilingthebestwiththeworstelementsofGermanculturalsociety,theBritishascribed

toPrussiaadisproportionateamountofinfluenceasthefounderoftheEmpire,anddescribed

howthiswassuppressingGermany’sotherwisemoresensiblenature,asFairfaxCartwright

reportedthatsameyear:

ThePrussianExcellenciesaretoooftenengagedintheunfortunateattempttolookdownuponGermanyfromtheirPomeranianflats.Theheartandnervous

200“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,403‐404.SirEyreCrowewasaSeniorClerkintheBritishForeignOfficefrom1906‐1912,AssistantUnder‐SecretaryofStateforForeignAffairs

from1912to1920,andPermanentUnder‐Secretaryfrom1920‐1925,(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.446).

78

centreofthecountryisnottobefoundinthenorthbutinthecentralandsouthernportionsoftheEmpire;fromthem‐nowasinthemiddleages‐cometheartists,thepoetsandthethinkersofGermany,whoexertavibratinginfluenceonTeutoniclife.PrussiaisbutthefistoftheEmpireandtheevolutionwhichitappearstomeisatpresentgoingoninGermany,perhapsslowlybutsurely,isarevoltofthebrainsofthecountryagainsttheirlongsubjectiontothehighlyorganizedmaterialforcesofthenorth.201

Cartwright’sperceptionoftheGermansinthispassagewasofanunbalancednation,withits

bestqualitiessuppressedbyitsmostoutdated,archaicones.Heascribedtothisfundamentally

untenableinternalcontradictionmuchofGerman’serraticbehavior.Inthesamereport,he

statedthatthosenotrepresentedinpowerfulPrussiancircleswererepresentedaschafing

undertheirownconstraintsandagainsttheautocracyoftheKaiser:“IfImaybeallowedto

formanopinionitwouldbethat,inSouthGermanyatleast,thetendencyoftheKaisertoever

increasehisautocraticpowerintheStateisnotappreciatedbythemassofthepeople,neither

hasHisMajestygainedinprestigebydoingsoduringthepastyear,norhastheconfidenceof

thepublicinhisjudgmentbeenaugmented.”202FollowingtheDailyTelegraphInterview,Sir

FrancisBertiedescribedthebacklashagainstWilhelm:“Allthepro‐Germansherehavebeen

shakenandshockedbytheimpulsiveindiscretionoftheEmperor;theydoubthissanity;andas

fortheGermanpeople,theyhavebeenstirredintoagreatersenseofresponsibility,andare

takingtheEmperorinhandforthemselves.”203Thisunrestwouldincreaseastheperiodwent

on:“TheZabernincident204hasbroughtthemilitaryandcivil,orinotherwordsthearistocratic

201“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,Jan12th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,9.202“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,Jan12th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,6.203“SirEdwardGreytoSirF.Bertie,Dec1st,1908,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,225.SirFrancisBertiewasAssistantUnder‐SecretaryofStateforForeignAffairsfrom1894to1903,AmbassadoratRomefrom1903to1905,andAmbassadoratParisfrom1905to1918(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.338ofVol.1).204TheZabernincidentwasapublicoutcryoverracistcommentsmadebyayoungGermanofficerintheprovinceofAlsace‐LorraineinNovemberof1913.Theofficer’scommentsdrewoutlargeprotestcrowds,whichledtosuppressionbythecivilauthoritiesandthemilitary.TheincidentservedtofurtherreducetheKaiser’spopularityasheblindlybackedtheGermanmilitary.

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anddemocraticelementsintheEmpire,intosharpconflict,atthemoment.”205Asthese

passagesdemonstrate,theBritishForeignOfficebelievedthattheGermanpeoplewere

strainingagainstthebondsofautocracy,andthatthestabilityofWilhelm’sstateapparatuswas

becomingincreasinglyimperiled.

Thusfar,thischapterhasexaminedthepersonoftheEmperorandthestructureof

Germansociety.TherewerealsoelementsofthisBritishcaricaturethatappliedtotheGerman

peopleasawhole,andtheremainderofthischapterwillfocusontheseelementsofthe

Germannationalandracialcharacter.TheseselectionsilluminatetheBritishperceptionofthe

Germanmentalitéandculturalmakeup,andhowGermanracialpeculiaritiesexplainedBritain’s

difficultiesindealingwiththem.Allofthesecollectivepersonalitytraitswerealsoattributedto

theEmperor,andthisreinforcestheimportanceofBritishperceptionsofthepersonalityofthe

EmperorbyBritisheliteswhenformulatingdiplomaticpolicytowardGermany.Indescribing

Germany’srestlessnessanduneaseasanationandarace,aqualityalreadyextensively

developedincaricaturesofWilhelm,thelaterForeignOfficedocumentsintensifiedthis

sentiment.In1914SirMauricedeBunsen,theBritishMinisteratLisbonwrote:“[TheGerman

Ambassador]hasmorethanoncedescribedtomethepositionofGermanyasthatofanisland

threatenedtobeswampedwiththerisingtideofrevolutionwhichflowsinuponitfromthe

EastandfromtheWest.InhiseyesGermanystandsforthemaintenanceontheContinentof

theideaoflawandorder.”206ThesingularityofGermanyastheprincipledisruptiveforcein

205“SirV.CorbetttoSirEdwardGrey,Jan13th,1914,”inBritishDocuments,Volume10,730.SirVincentCorbettwastheBritishMinisteratMunichandStuttgartfrom1910to1914(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.844).206“SirM.deBunsentoSirEdwardGrey,Mar13th,1914,”inBritishDocuments,Volume10,764.MauricedeBunsenwastheBritishMinisteratLisbonfrom1905to1906,theAmbassadoratMadridfrom1906to1913,andatViennafrom1913to1914(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.842).

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EuropewasmentionedinaspeechbytheUnderSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairs,Lord

Cranborne,in1902:“GermanyappearedtobetheonedisturbingPowerofEurope.”207The

Times,duringtheNavyScareof1909,wrotethat“Germany…seemstoexactsomethingmore.

They[seemtohave]pretentionstobetreatedasthedominantPowerofEuropeandtotreat

othersas‘subordinateallies.’Thefeelingthereisagainstherinothercountrieshassprung,toa

greatextent,fromhersupposedreluctancetoacceptthispositionofanequalamongst

equals.”208ThisspoketotheperceptionthatGermanywasincapableofbeingsatiatedorof

stabilizingitself,butthatitsrestlessnessandpretentiousnesswassomehowinherenttoits

nationalcharacter.

Expandingonthisrestlessnesswasanextremityoftemperament,commentedonbySir

FrancisLascellesin1906:“[Britons]complainthattheGermantemperamentisattimes–

withoutreason–tooenthusiastic,andatothertimestoocold.”209ThereforetheGerman

peoplefromtheBritishpointofviewsufferedfromthesamebipolartemperamentthat

characterizedtheirEmperor.

AswithWilhelm,themostsalientandpervasivequalityascribedtotheGermanpeople

andGermannationwasitspuerileimmaturity.SirEyreCrowesomewhatsympathetically

narratedtheadventofthisqualityintheGermans:

With‘bloodandiron’PrussiahadforgedherpositioninthecouncilsoftheGreatPowersofEurope…TheyoungempirefoundopenedtoitsenergyawholeworldoutsideEurope,ofwhichithadpreviouslyhardlyhadtheopportunitytobecomemorethandimlyconscious…ThecoloniesandforeignpossessionsofEngland

207“TheUnderSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairs,LordCranborneofRochester,July3rd,1902”inHansard’sParliamentaryPapers,Series4(London:Reuter’sTelegramCo.,1908),Volume110,714.208UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,January9th,1909,p.9col.4.209“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,August20th,1906,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,370.

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moreespeciallywereseentogivetothatcountryarecognizedandenviablestatusinaworldwherethenameofGermany,ifmentionedatall,excitednoparticularinterest.TheeffectofthisdiscoveryupontheGermanmindwascuriousandinstructive…Hereinafieldofportentousmagnitude,dwarfingaltogethertheproportionsofEuropeancountries,others,whohadbeenperhapsratherlookeddownuponascomparativelysmallerfolk,wereathomeandcommanded,whilstGermanywasatbestreceivedbutasanhonouredguest.Herewasdistinctinequality,withaheavybiasinfavourofthemaritimeandcolonizingPowers.SuchastateofthingswasnotwelcometoGermanpatrioticpride.Germanyhadwonherplaceasoneoftheleading,ifnot,infact,theforemostPowerontheEuropeancontinent.ButoverandbeyondtheEuropeanGreatPowersthereseemedtostandthe‘WorldPowers.’ItwasatonceclearthatGermanymustbecomea‘WorldPower.’210

ThispassagerichlydescribedSirEyre’sanalysisofhowtheGermanmentalitéhadbeen

constructed.Thenewempirewasyoungandvibrant,bristlingwithenergyandvigor.The

nation’spotentialforgreaterpowerandinfluencebredambitioninitsnationalleaders.This

hadtheeffectofimmediatelymakingGermanyjealousofwhatits“older”fellownationshad,

andthisespeciallywastrueofthosenationswithcolonialpossessions.Therefore,Germany

was,inadolescentfashion,inafrenziedhurryto“growup.”ThisdemonstrateshowtheBritish

ForeignOfficecouldhaveconvinceditselfthatitwaseffectivelydealingwithanationof

children.ThisGermanfrustrationovernotoccupyingtheirproperplaceasthepremierGreat

PowerwasalsoexpressedbyMr.Cartwrightin1906:“Germaninteresthadtoyieldtothoseof

GreatBritainbecauseGermanywasnotatpresentinapositiontodisputewithherrivalthe

sovereigntyoftheseas.Thisfeelingofimpotency,thoughnotoftenexpressedinofficialcircles,

hassunkdeeplyintotheheartsoftheGermanpeopleandithasbeenablyencouragedbythe

NavyLeagueandothersuchlikepatrioticassociations.”211ThenotionofGermanyasan

210“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,404.211“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,August20th,1906,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,372.

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aimlessstatewasindirectlytoucheduponbyananalysisofGermanpolicybySirEyreCrowein

1907:

Thereisthen,perhaps,anotherwayoflookingattheproblem:ItmightbesuggestedthatthegreatGermandesignisinrealitynomorethantheexpressionofavague,confused,andunpracticalstatesmanship,notfullyrealizingitsowndrift.AmindandtemperamentdistinguishingforgoodorevilthepresentRulerofGermanymaynotimprobablybelargelyresponsiblefortheerratic,domineering,andoftenfranklyaggressivespiritwhichisrecognizableatpresentineverybranchofGermanpubliclife,notmerelyintheregionofforeignpolicy;andthatthisspirithascalledforththosemanifestationsofdiscontentandalarmbothathomeandabroadwithwhichtheworldisbecomingfamiliar;that,infact,Germanydoesnotreallyknowwhatsheisdrivingat,andthatallherexcursionsandalarums,allherunderhandintriguesdonotcontributetothesteadyworkingoutofawellconceivedandrelentlesslyfollowedsystemofpolicy,becausetheydonotreallyformpartofanysuchsystem.212

ThispassageexplicitlyblamedtheheavyhandoftheKaiserforGermany’sforeignpolicy

problems,inthathisownerraticbehaviorcreatedaconstantatmosphereofchaoswithinthe

Germangovernment.ThesequalitieshadtrickleddowntoeveryleveloftheGerman

government,sothatthebureaucraticsystemthattheKaiseroversawhadbecomemoldedby

hispersonality.Therefore,thewholecountrywasbeingcontrolledbyleaderswhohadnowell‐

definedsystemofgovernanceorforeignpolicy.ThiswasindicativeofBritishexasperationin

tryingtodealwithGermany.SirEyrewasessentiallysayingthattherewasnopointintryingto

understandtheGermansandtheirmotivations,becausetheycouldnotbeengagedwithas

rationaladults.Theimageryofachild‐likeracewasmoreexplicitinTheTimesof1896:“Itis

uselesstotell[Germany]thatitisonlyanationbroughtupinliberalinstitutions,individuals

armedwiththespiritofenterprise,perseverance,andself‐reliance,thatwillaccomplishgreat

things,andthatGermany,sadlywantinginthesequalities,mustgrowupandgetripebefore

212“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,415.

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theycanemulatetheEnglish[italicsadded].”213InadditiontotypicalBritishcondescension,

thisstatementimpliedateleologicalfaithinwhathadgottentheBritonssofar,andpreached

totheGermansthattheBritishpathtohegemonycouldnotbeproperlycircumvented.The

Germans,accordingtoTheTimes,wererequiredtotakeamoreconservativepathtonational

greatnessratherthantheirownclumsy,reckless,andirresponsibletrack.Moreover,theBritish

exampleprovidedtheGermanswithanillustrationoftheproperwayofdoingthis.

Evenmoretellingwastheparentalattitudeadoptedbymanyofficialsinhowbestto

dealwiththeGerman“child.”Selectionsstartingin1907illustratethis,especiallythisoneby

SirEyreCrowe,afterthefirstMoroccanCrisis(inwhichtheGermanEmperorattemptedto

assertaGermanstakeinMoroccoattheexpenseofFrenchinterestsin1905)andthe

intensificationofthenavalarmsrace:

Thereisoneroadwhich,ifpastexperienceisanyguidetothefuture,willmostcertainlynotleadtoanypermanentimprovementofrelationswithanyPower,leastofallGermany,andwhichmustthereforebeabandoned:thatistheroadpavedwithgracefulBritishconcessions‐concessionsmadewithoutanyconvictioneitheroftheirjusticeoroftheirbeingsetoffbyequivalentcounter‐services.ThevainhopesthatinthismannerGermanycanbe‘conciliated’andmademorefriendlymustbedefinitelygivenup...TherewillbenosurerorquickerwaytowintherespectoftheGermanGovernmentandoftheGermannation.214

SirEyreCroweinthispassagearguedthattreatingtheGermansaschildrenwouldbethe

quickestandmostpainlesswaytogetthemtobehave.Justaschildrenneededlimits,sodid

theGermans,andattemptsatappeasingeveryGermanwhimwouldonlyleadtomore

demandsfromthatcountry.Mr.M.deC.Findlay,theBritishMinisteratDresden,asserted

duringtheNavyScareof1909thatthispolicyofstandinguptoGermanyhadborneitselfout213UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,January18th,1896,p.9col.6.214“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,419‐420.

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andshouldberelieduponinthefuture:“ItisobviousthatthefearofBritishNavalPowermust

recentlyhavehadaconsiderableeffectinrestrainingGermancombativenesswithincertain

limits…IfeelsurethatyouwillagreethatitisonlywhenGermanyrealizesthatitisimpossible

forhertoattaintoapositionofeventemporaryandaccidentalNavalequalitywithGreat

Britainthatshewillbebroughttoseriouslyconsiderthequestionofalimitationof

armaments.”215YetanotherexcerptbySirEdwardGreyascribedthisqualitytothe“Prussian

mentality,”which“issuchthattobeonreallygoodtermswithitonemustbeabletodealwith

itasanequal.”216ThesethreeexamplesshowhowtheBritishcharacterizationoftheGermans

asinherentlychildishplayedadirectroleintheirattitudestowarddealingwiththem.Children

arenottobeindulged,anddonothaveaclearunderstandingoftheirownbestinterests.This

wholepassageistellingforthecondescensionandsituationalsimplificationshownbythe

British,whichseemedtoprovidejustificationforthemstandingfirmagainsttheGermans“on

principle.”Inthisvein,Punchpublishedacaricatureof“Germany”in1911(seeFigure6217).In

thisdrawing,afully‐grownGermansoldiercriedlikeachild,lamentingtheillusorythreatsall

aroundhim.Thoughhecompletelyout‐sizedhissurroundings,hewasnotsatisfiedthathewas

safeandsecure.Thishighlighted“immaturity”asapartofthenationalcharacterofGermany,

andreflectedthePunchpublisher’sbeliefthatdealingwithGermanycouldonlybeeffectively

donebyconceptualizingtheGermansasachild‐likepeople.Thischildneededlimits,anditwas

thereforeinBritain’sbestintereststostanduptotheirGermancousins.

215“Mr.FindlaytoSirEdwardGrey,March31st,1909,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,259.Mr.FindlaywastheBritishMinisterResidentattheCourtsofSaxonyandSaxe‐Colburg‐GothaatDresden(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.840).216“SirEdwardGreytoSirR.Rodd,Jan13th,1913,”inBritishDocuments,Volume10,663.217UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume141,171.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonSeptember6th,1911.

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LinkedwithGermany’schildishnesswasitsjealousyofwhatothernationshad,andthis

waspresentedasGermany’sprinciplemotive.ThiswasexpressedbySirEyreCrowe:“Itwould

therefore,bebutnaturalthatthepowerofaStatesupremeatseashouldinspireuniversal

jealousyandfear,andbeeverexposedtothedangerofbeingoverthrownbyageneral

combinationoftheworld.”218SirEyrewassweepinglyclaimingthatBritain’senemieswere

simplycovetingwhattheBritishhad,andthatthereforetheirgrievanceswerebaseless.Mr.

Cartwrightwordedthesamesentimentdifferently:“Everythingwhichinanywayredoundsto

thecreditofGreatBritainarousesin[Germany]whatmustappeartomostpersonsa

somewhatpuerilemanifestationofjealousyandenvy.”219Thiswasmostextensivelywrittenof

byeditorialsinTheTimes:

Thecommon‐senseviewofthematterisplainenough.England,bytheintelligence,pluck,andenergyofhersons,hasplantedherflaginthemostdesirablecornersoftheglobe.Hercommerceismatchlessinitsvolumeanduniversality,andherwealthisinconsequencealmostunbounded.Forthelast20yearsGermanyhasbeendreamingofacolonialempireandmadesomeattemptsatit,especiallyinAfrica.ShehadworkedhardtodevelophercommerceinEuropeandbeyondtheseas,andtoattainwealthandprosperity.Buteverywhere,oralmosteverywhere,Englandisinthefield,andbarstheway…IfyouaskmewhatarethecausesofthatGermanhatred,andotherEuropeanhatreds,Iventuretosuggestthatthefirstcauseisjealousy,thesecondcauseisjealousy,andthethirdcauseisjealousy.220

ThisjealousywasperceivedasnotbeingexclusivelyleviedatEngland,butatanynationthat

gainedfavoroverGermany,asreportedonbyaneditorialinTheTimes:“Theoriginofthe

218“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,402.219“Mr.CartwrighttoSirEdwardGrey,March13th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,15.220UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,January11th,1896,p.7col.5.

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presentstormcloud[theFirstMoroccanCrisis]liesnodeeperthanthejealousyandirritationof

GermanyatthefavourablepositionnowoccupiedbyFrance.”221

Compoundingtheseotherdifficulties,butnotbreakingwiththemthematically,the

Germanswerebelievedtobeinsincereintheirforeigndealings.SirEdwardGreywroteabout

thisin1909:“TheGermansareaverydifficultpeople;oneneverknowswithwhomoneis

dealing;sometimesonemindseemstogivetheimpulse,andsometimesanother,andthey

tolerateorencouragemischiefmakersintheirservice…IftheGermanswouldonlydealwithus

aswedealwiththemtherewouldbenodifficulties.”222Hewroteroughlythesamethingin

1913:“OneofourdifficultiesinpastyearshasbeenthatweneverknowwhatGermanyreally

wants.”223PunchtouchedonthisthemeofGermany’sduplicitousnaturein1908(seeFigure

7224).Inthisportrayal,“Peace”imploredtheKaisertobackuphisclaimsofharmonious

intentionswithaction.TheKaiserlookedinsultedbythisresponse,whichintersectswith

themesofGermanchildishness.“Peace”lookedfrustrated,asifshehaddoneallthatshecould

tobringGermanyintothefoldandnowheldherhandsupinbewildermentandexhaustion.

Thesentimentsexpressedinthisdrawingreinforcethesentimentsexpressedbytheearlier

passagesquotedofForeignOfficeofficials,inthattheyexpressedfrustrationoverwhatthey

believedwastheduplicitousnatureofGermanforeignpolicy.

221UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,April8th,1905,p.5col.4.222“SirEdwardGreytoSirE.Goschen,March4th,1909,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,237.SirWilliamE.GoschenwastheBritishAmbassadoratViennafrom1905to1906,andtheAmbassadoratBerlinfrom1908‐1914(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.805).223“SirEdwardGreytoSirR.Rodd,Jan13th,1913,”inBritishDocuments,Volume10,663.224UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume135,227.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonSeptember23rd,1908.

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ContrastedwiththepressinEngland,theperceptionoftheBritishForeignOfficewas

thattheGermanpresswasbeingusedbythestateforfear‐mongeringandtogalvanizeits

naturalmilitaristspirit.AsSirEdwardGreyreportedin1907,“ThePressBureauinBerlinhas

alwaysbeenanobstacletogoodrelationsbetweenus.APressBureauisusedtomake

mischief,andsomeGermanDiplomatistshavedoneagooddealofmischiefmaking.”225As

theyhadwithnumerousotherinstrumentsoftheirpolicy,theGermanshadbungledtheir

attemptsatmanipulation,andwereslowlylosingtheallegianceoftheirpopulace,whichalso

harkenedbacktotheunbalancedstructuralnatureofGermansocietythatfavoredthe

Prussiansandtheirassociatedforcesofblandefficiency.SirFrankLascellescommentedonthe

evolutionofcommonconsumptionofPressarticlesduringhistenureinGermany:

WhenIfirstcametoBerlin,elevenyearsago,IwastoldthattheattitudeofanordinaryGermaninreadinganewspaperwastoaskwhetherthestatementscontainedinitwereofficial.Iftheanswerwasintheaffirmative,hewouldreaditwithattentionandrespect;ifinthenegativehewouldattachbutlittleimportancetowhatheread.Now,anythingpublishedbyauthorityisreceivedwithsuspicionandcloselycriticized,andconstantattackshavebeenmadeinnewspapers,whichmightbeexpectedtosupporttheauthorities,notonlyagainsttheactionoftheGovernment,butalsoagainstthepersonoftheEmperor.ThefirstmanifestationsofthischangecameundermynoticeduringthesittingsoftheconferenceatAlgeciras,whenIwasastonishedtohearpeopleinsociety,towhoseindividualopinionnogreatweightwasattached,openlycriticizingtheactionoftheGovernment.226

ThisfedintothegeneralperceptionthatGermansocietywasapproachingacrisisbetween

parliamentarycosmopolitanforcesandtheforcesofreaction.

LiketheKaiserwhoembodiedthem,theGermanpeoplewerebelievedtobeinherently

imbuedwithafightingspirit,andwereapttobetemptedtouseit.Thisappearedinthe

225“SirEdwardGreytoSirR.Rodd,Jan13th,1913,”inBritishDocuments,Volume10,663.226SirFrankLascelles,“ExtractfromGeneralReportonGermanyfor1906,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,433.ThiswaswrittenonMay24th,1907.

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languageusedtodescribethem:“Theyhaveconstantlyandforsomeyearspastmadeuse

of…threatsandblandishments.”227Theireveryactionwasseenasbeingcaustic:“Itisnotso

muchwhattheydoasthenastywaytheydoitwhichissoannoying.”228SirWilliamE.Goschen

wrotein1910:“Weknowthatthephrase‘BalanceofPower’stinksintheirnostrils.Infactthey

havetoldmeso.TheywanttheHegemonyofEuropeandtoneutralizetheonlythingwhich

haspreventedthemfromgettingit,viz.England’snavalstrength.Theywantanunderstanding

whichwouldhavethateffect.”229ThisalsoreinforcedthenotionofGermanimbalance,again

callingforthimagesoftheaimless,teeteringnationincapableofsettlingdown.Oneofthe

mostinterestingpassageswasretoldfromaconversationhadbetweenSirC.Spring‐Rice,

SecretaryoftheBritishEmbassyatSt.Petersburg,withavisitingAmericanprofessorstudyingin

Germany,whosaidthat:

[AttheBerlinUniversity]itwasnolongertheBismarckiandoctrinethatforcewasstrongerthanjustice,butanewdoctrinethatforcewasjustice…[Theseopinions]aretheopinionsofthatclasswhichhasbeeninthepast,andwhichisstill,dominantinpolitics:andwhatfromhispointofviewisthemostimportantaspectofthisquestion,thebureaucracyhasgainedcompleteascendencyoverthatbodyofprofessorswhoseenlightenmentandindependencehasbeensolongthegloryofGermany...Headdedthatwhatstruckhimmorepainfullywasthefactthatwhereignorancedidnotprevail,hehadoftenfoundinitssteadasortofdullacquiescence.230

Asrepresentedhere,theproblemwasnotthatallGermanswereincapableofcontrollingtheir

martialspirit,butratherthattheywereunwillingtocurtailthemartialspiritofothersintheir

227“MemorandumbyMr.Bertie,Nov9th,1901,”inBritishDocuments,Volume2,73.228“SirE.GoschentoSirC.Hardinge,Jan28th,1910,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,437.229“SirE.GoschentoSirANicolson,October22nd,1910,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,536.SirArthurNicolsonwastheBritishAmbassadoratMadridfrom1905to1906,atSt.Petersburgfrom1906to1910,wastheBritishRepresentativeattheAlgericasConferencein1906,andthePermanentUnder‐SecretaryofStateforForeignAffairsfrom1910to1916(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.814).230“SirC.Spring‐RicetoSirEdwardGrey,June5th,1911,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,639.SirC.Spring‐RicewastheSecretaryofBritishEmbassyatSt.Petersburgfrom1903to1906,theMinisteratTehranfrom1906to1908,andatStockholmfrom1908to1913.

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population,andalsothattheleadershipofthenationwasoverwhelminglyassociatedwiththe

lattertype,asEdwardGoschenwrotein1913:“Thereisstillawarparty,orletuscallita

militarypartywithwhompasteventsstillrankleandwhoareunfortunatelyratherstrongly

representedintheimmediateentourageoftheEmperor.”231Thisalsocontributedtothe

notionthatthePrussianmentalitywasrulingthecountryandsuppressingthemore

sophisticatedelementsofGermansociety.

TherewerealsofantasticqualitiestooccasionalGermanutterances,someofwhich

musthaveparticularlyheightenedfearsamongtheBritishthatgoodrelationswithGermany

wereimpossible,asleastinthewaythatthesewerereportedonandpresentedbythemedia

andtheforeignoffice.SirFrankLascellesin1899wroteofhissuspicionofKaiserWilhelm:

“DuringthecourseoftheeveningHisMajestyhonouredmewithfurtherconversation,inwhich

healludedtothelargesumsofmoneywhichhadbeensentfromEnglandtobribethe

AmericanpresstoattackGermany.IrepliedthatIhadnoknowledgeofthis,butevenifitwere

thecase,IdidnotsupposethatHisMajestyreallyconsideredthatHerMajesty’sGovernment

wereresponsible.”232InalaterMemorandumbyJ.A.C.Tilley,AssistantClerkfortheBritish

ForeignOffice,hewrotethat“thestrongbeliefentertainedbytheGermanEmperorand

GovernmentthatEnglandwasabouttoattackGermany.”233Thisparanoiawasalsousedto

characterizeGermandissatisfactionwiththeirsituation,aswrittenbySirFrankLascellesin

1907:“Thereisnodoubtthatthereisagreatfeelingof‘nervosity’inGermanyjustnow,tobe

explainedperhapsbythefactthattheGermanshaveanuneasyfeelingthattheircountrydoes

231“SirE.GoschentoSirA.Nicolson,Jan24th,1913,”inBritishDocuments,Volume9,Part2,445.232“SirF.LascellestotheMarquessofSalisbury,May26th,1899,”inBritishDocuments,Volume1,118.233“MemorandumbyMr.JACTilley,”inBritishDocuments,Volume1,337.J.A.C.TilleywasanassistantclerkattheBritishForeignOfficefrom1904‐1906(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.346).

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notoccupythepositioninEuropewhichitusedtoandoughttohold,andthisisquitetrue.But

theGerman,asarulecannotadmitthatthiscanbepossiblyduetoanyfaultoftheirown[sic],

butcanonlybetheconsequenceofthemachinationofsomewickedman.”234

InafurtherattempttodiagnosethespecificreasonthatGermanyseemedtoexhibit

thisparanoia,TheTimesaccusedtheGermansofcollectivementalillness:“Thereisawell‐

knownformofmentaldiseasecalledthe‘maniaofpersecutions,’inwhichthesufferer,though

hemaydisplayexceptionalintelligence,andevenexceptionaljudgment,uponallother

subjects,isconvincedthatheisthevictimofimpossibleconspiracies.TheGermanswho

honestlysharesuchapprehensions[aboutEngland’sallegedhostility]mustbesupposedtobe

affectedbyasomewhatsimilarmalady.”235TheauthorofthisTimeseditorialexpressedthe

mostextremeformoffrustrationwiththeGermans.Whereasothershadattemptedto

conceptualizetheGermansaschildrenforthepurposesofdealingwiththem,thisauthorwent

furtherandaccusedthemallofbeingcrazy.

Havingarticulatedtheflaws,oftensevere,attributedtotheGermannationalandracial

characterbytheBritish,itisimportanttoalsolookonthosethingswhichtheBritishadmired

abouttheGermans,whichnuancestheportraitfurther,andwhichcreatedanexacerbated

senseofconfusionanduneaseamongtheBritish.SirEyreCroweadmiredtheGerman

willingnesstoselfsacrifice:“Innoothercountryisthereaconvictionsodeeplyrootedinthe

verybodyandsoulofallclassesofthepopulationthatthepreservationofnationalrightsand

therealizationofnationalidealsrestabsolutelyonthereadinessofeverycitizeninthelast

234“SirF.LascellestoSirEdwardGrey,April19th,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,28.235UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,January9th,1909,p.9col.4.

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resorttostakehimselfandhisStateontheirassertionsandvindication.”236Laterinthesame

documentheascribedtotheGermansa“purityofnationalpurpose,fervorof…patriotism,[a]

depthof…religiousfeeling,[a]highstandardofcompetency,andtheperspicuoushonestyof…

administration,thesuccessfulpursuitofeverybranchofpublicandscientificactivity,andthe

elevatedcharacterof…philosophy,art,andethics.”237HecreditedGermancivilizationas

havingimprovedEuropeancivilizationbyitsveryexistence:

ItcannotforamomentbequestionedthatthemereexistenceandhealthyactivityofapowerfulGermanyisanundoubtedblessingtotheworld.Germanyrepresentsinapre‐eminentdegreethosehighestqualitiesandvirtuesofgoodcitizenship,inthelargestsenseoftheword,whichconstitutethegloryandtriumphofmoderncivilization.TheworldwouldbeimmeasurablypoorerifeverythingthatisspecificallyassociatedwithGermancharacter,Germanideas,andGermanmethodsweretoceasehavingpowerandinfluence.238

ThereforetheGermanshadnationalzeal,agoodworkethic,atirelessquestforefficiency,and

awillingnesstoself‐sacrifice.Allofthesequalitieswerepositive,andtheimplicationofthese

quotedpassageswasthattheBritishcouldfindsomethingtoemulateintheGermanexample.

ParliamentarymembersalsofoundmuchtoadmireinGermancivilization.Theywere

specificallyinterestedinemulatingtheGermaneducationalsysteminorderthatBritainnotfall

behindasasociety,asshownbythisexcerptfromaspeechgivenbyMr.Haldaneof

Haddingtonshirein1902:“YouhaveonlytoturntoGermanytofindhalf‐a‐dozencasesinwhich

thetrainingofexpertsandtheturningoutofyoungexpertshasmadeadifferenceofanequally

strikingcharacterinotherindustries.”239Laterthatyear,theDukeofDevonshireexpressed

236“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,404.237“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,404.238“MemorandumbySirEyreCrowe,Jan1st,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume3,404.239“Mr.HaldaneofHaddingtonshire,May5th,1902,”inParliamentaryPapers,Series4,Volume107,706.Hewasaliberalpoliticianinparliamentfrom1885‐1911,andhelaterservedasSecretaryofStateforWarfrom1905‐1912.

92

similarsentiments:“Itwasnotsurprising,inviewofthese[German]effortsineducation,that

theindustryandcommerceofGermanyshouldbeforgingahead.”240TheTimesechoedsimilar

adulationofGermanefficiencyandeffectiveness,ascribingtothem“painstakingindustryand

thoroughness,”241a“spiritofenterprise,”242andgrantedthem“continuallaudationofthe

thoroughnessof[German]methods.”243

EventheEmperor,theepitomeoftheworstaspectsoftheGermanrace,wasnot

perceivedasbeingbereftofallgoodqualities,asCountdeSalis,CouncilloroftheBritish

EmbassyatBerlin,notedin1907:“Evenintheworstdaysofanti‐Germanfeelingwhenthe

EmperorwaslookeduponinEnglandastheembodimentofallthatwashostile,therewasstill

asubcurrentofadmirationforthemanlinessofhispersonality.”244Asthisquotedemonstrates,

therewasanothersidetotheboundlessenergyexhibitedbytheKaiserandhispeople.While

thissamequalitywastiedinwiththeirerraticbehavior,italsopositivelyplacedtheGerman

peopleinanenviableracialposition.Theirswasavirilepeople,andtheCountdeSalisfound

somethingtoadmireinthat.

HowtheBritishcontrastedthemselveswiththeGermansisnoteworthyinthatit

illustratesthequalitiesthattheBritishaspiredto,andthequalitiesthattheBritishbelieved

thattheypossessed.SirWilliamE.Goschenin1909attributedtheBritishwith“soundgood

sense,tenacityofpurpose,confidentstrengthandeminentachievementsinallspheresoflife

240“DukeofDevonshire,December13th,1902,”inParliamentaryPapers,Series4,Volume116,1082.HewasaliberalunionistpoliticianwhowasaMPfrom1891to1908forWestDerbyshire.241UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,April23rd,1906,p.16col.1.242UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,July10th,1911,p.5col.1.243UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,February8th,1909,p.9col.4.244“CountdeSalistoSirEdwardGrey,November22,1907,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,105.CountJ.F.C.deSaliswastheCouncilloroftheBritishEmbassyatBerlinfrom1906to1911,andtheMinisteratCetinjefrom1911to1916(biographicalinformationlocatedonp.817).

93

theyheartilyandhonestlyadmire.”245SirA.NicolsoncommentedonBritishsteadfastnessina

dispatchtoSirEdwardGreyin1910:“Englandisregardedastheexemplarofsober,moderate,

andsaneprogress,anditwouldhavecausedashocktoherwell‐wishersandadmirershereif

shehadstartedoffonaheadlongcourseofbreakingabruptlywithallhertraditionsandher

past.”246TheTimes,whileexpressingshockovertheJamesonRaidin1896,stilltooktimeto

notethattheBritishwereun‐phasedbythenegativeinternationalreaction:

ThesuddenexplosionofunprovokedhostilityagainstthiscountryintheUnitedStatesandinGermanyhas,weareproudtothink,neitherdisturbedthecomposureoftheBritishnationnordeflectedthepolicyoftheBritishGovernment.OurpeoplehavenotminimizedthegravityofthesemenacesfromtwogreatandkindredPowers…butwehavenotbeenthrownoffourbalancebythedisclosureofunsuspectedjealousyandrancor.247

AttheoutsetoftheBoerWar,TheTimespublishedasimilarodetothestiffBritishupperlip:

“TheEnglishpeople‐being,Iimagine,ratheraproudthanavaingloriousrace,toostrongtobe

hyper‐sensitive,andsuccessfulenoughnottofeeltemptedtoretaliatewithinjustice‐will

patientlyawaitthereturnofyourcountrymentoamoreequitableframeofmind.”248This

TimeseditorialauthorwasessentiallycongratulatingtheBritishpeoplefornotlettingtheir

precariouspositiongettheirhacklesup,andalsoattemptedtoreassurereadersthatthis

qualitywouldseetheBritishpeoplethroughtheirtroubles.

Collectively,thisportrayaloftheGermansisofapeoplepossessinggreatvitality,

intelligence,charm,resolution,andefficiency,butbesetwithaflawedsocietalstructure,akin

toachildinpubertythatinunwieldyfashiontriestocometogripswithitsrapid,

245“SirE.GoschentoSirEdwardGrey,February12th,1909,”inBritishDocuments,Volume6,232.246“SirA.NicolsontoSirEdwardGrey,February9th,1910,”inBritishDocuments,Volume9,Part1,120.247UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,January7th,1896,p.9col.3.248UnknownAuthor,TheTimesofLondon,October16th,1899,p.11col.3.

94

uncomfortablegrowth.ThevocalelementsoftheGermangovernmentalestablishment,the

Prussians,weresmotheringthemorepacificelementsofGermansocietyandsuppressingits

creativeones.Adriftinuncertaintyandwithoutaproperknowledgeoftheirwayintheworld,

theGermansactedrashly,unpredictably,andwithapenchantforbellicositythatwas

characteristicoftheirovertlyoffensiveandparanoidnature.Thekernelofallofthiswasthe

GermanEmperor,whobyvirtueofhispersonalitywasadeptatbrazenlyexhibitingallofthese

characteristics,andwhoalsobyvirtueofhisabsoluteauthoritypreventedacultureofcooler

politicalheadsfromprevailinginGermany.

Therearetwosidesofthiscaricature.ThefaultsthattheBritishascribedtothe

GermanswereindicativeofwhattheBritishbelieveddistinguishedtheirracefromtheGerman

one.TheBritishbelievedthattheydidnotpossessthesamecharacterflaws.TheGermans

wererash;theBritishwerecautious.TheGermansweremilitaristic;theBritishwerepeace‐

lovingandfair‐minded.TheGermanswerepronetooutburstsofemotion;theBritishwere

calmandthoughtful.TherestlessnessofGermanywassomethingtobefeared,butwasalso

somethingtoreassureBritonsabouttheirownrestlessnessandinsecuritybecausetheydidnot

possessittothesameextentastheirGermancousins.Thiswasexpressedexplicitlyinthe

Britishcharacterizationsofthemselves.Besetwithworry,unease,andfeelingsofinsecurity,

theBritishpointedtotheGermansastheextremepersonificationofrestlessness,andthe

subsequentcauseoftheirown.TheyremindedthemselvesofthetimelessBritishvirtuesthat

hadcarriedtheircivilizationtoitshighachievements.Theyappealedtothesestereotypical

virtuestocontinuetocarrythemthroughthecurrentwhirlwindofuncertainty.Britishfears

abouttheirowndeclinealsopromptedthemtotakeactiontodefendthemselves.Whilethey

95

wereaccusingtheirGermanneighborsofdestabilizingthetranquilityofEurope,theywere

rapidlyarmingagainstthem.WhiletheywereconductingthisarmsracewithGermany,they

soughtoutsymbolsofstrengthtoreassurethemabouttheirownsecurity.Theremaining

chapterswillexplorespecificallyhowtheyusedtheNavytodothis,throughremindersofpast

strength,representationsofcurrentstrength,andwhenwarfinallycameandthefleetwas

employed,representationsoftheuseofthatstrength.

96

Figure1KaiserWilhelm(astheMoorofPotsdam)sings:‐

“’UnterDenLinden’–AlwaysatHome,‘UndertheLimelight’WhereverIRoam!”

97

Figure2MelodramaintheBaltic

Czar(anxiously):“Itrustwearenotobserved.”Kaiser(aside):“Itwon’tbemyfaultifwearenot.”

98

Figure3L’EnfantTerrible

ChorusintheStern:“Don’tGoOnLikeThat–You’llUpsetusAll!”Subscript:TheKaiserbeginstoalarmhisfellowRulers.

99

Figure4TheStoryofFidgetyWilhelm

“LetmeseeifWilhelmcanbealittlegentleman;letmeseeifheisabletositstillforonceattable!”“ButFidgetyWillHewon’tsitstill.”Justlikeanybuckinghorse,“Wilhelm!

Wearegettingcross!”

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Figure5GermanKaiser(asConjourer):“Andnowgentlemen,forthebenefitofmyEnglishfriendsintheaudience,Iwill,fromthissimplepaper(theDaily

Telegraphyinterview),producetheDoveofPeace.”“Hallo!Wronganimal.Mymistake.”

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Figure6Misunderstood

Germany:“Nobodylovesme–andtheyallwanttotrampleonme!”

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Figure7“Isolation”

Peace(attendingtheInter‐ParliamentaryCongressatBerlin).“Everybodyelseseemstobemyfriend;whydoyoustandaloof?”GermanKaiser:“Buthaven’tIalwayssaidthatIwasyourfriend?”

Peace:“Yes;butcan’tyoudosomethingtoproveit?”

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CHAPTERTHREE

AHEROICTRADITION

OnOctober21st,1905almostamillionBritonsmadeapilgrimagetoTrafalgarSquareto

honorthememoryofoneoftheirgreatestheroes.249TheTrafalgarCentenarycelebrationhad

beenspearheadedbytheNavyLeague,whousedtheoccasionasanopportunitytobringtothe

forefrontnavalmattersintheaftermathoftheembarrassmentoftheBoerWar,whichsawa

heightenedinterestinheroicemulationasameansofre‐bolsteringbeliefinthestrengthofthe

Britishrace.250Inpreparationforthe100thanniversaryofTrafalgar,Nelson’smonumentin

TrafalgarSquarewasdecoratedonanunprecedentedscale(seeFigure8251).Thesedecorations

includedevergreenropesonNelson’scolumn,andaropeofleavesreachinguptoNelson’s

statueatthetop.252LineswereriggedtothecolumnsothatNelson’slastsignaltohisfleet

couldberaisedattheappropriatetime.253Onthedayofthecelebration,at8am,thesignal

flagswereraised.Wreathswerelaidatthebaseofthemonument,includingonethathad

beenbroughtinfromasfarawayasNewZealand,whichhadbeenrefrigeratedduringitslong

journeyfromthedominioninordertopreserveit.DavidShannondescribesthecolumnof

Nelson’smonumentonTrafalgarDayashavingbeen“transformedintotheveryheartofthe

BritishEmpire,andNelsonstoodproud,aboveitall.Ordinarypeoplehadbeenwhippedup

intoapatrioticfervour–theyjusthadtomakethepilgrimagetoTrafalgarSquare.Andthiswas

249DavidShannon,NelsonRemembered:TheNelsonCentenary1905(Sydney:BroadsideMaritimePublications,2007),19.250BertrandTaithe,“RememberingVictory–CommemoratingDefeat?TheFranco‐BritishTrafalgarCentenaryin1905”inHistory,Commemoration,andNationalPreoccupation:Trafalgar1805‐2005,ed.HolgerHoocke,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),63.251ReprintedfromShannon,18.252Shannon,19.253Shannon,19.

104

despitethepoorweatherprediction.Althoughbrightsunshinewasforecast,sotoowereheavy

showerstowardstheendoftheafternoon,butthisdidnotseemtodampenspiritsor

attendance.”254Themainpartoftheceremonyoccurredintheafternoon,andittooktheform

ofareligiousceremonybyBishopWelldonofWestminsterAbbey,concurrentwiththe

ceremonialloweringtohalf‐mastoftheUnionJack.AttheendoftheBishop’ssemi‐sermon

theUnionJackwasraisedtofullheight,andarecitationofKipling’sRecessionalfollowed,

whichpromptedthecrowdsto“applaud…withtheutmostheartiness.”255Thecrowdslingered

onandwerejoinedbymoreandmoreoftheircountrymenuntilaftermidnight,whenthe

throngsofpeoplebegantodissipate.256Theycollectedfallenleavesfromtheevergreenrope

andkeptthemassouvenirs.Thevastnumbersofpeoplehadtobecontrolledbypolice,who

arrangedapedestriantrafficsystemtoallowthemaximumnumberofpeopletopassbyand

readthewreathsatthecolumn.257

WhiletheTrafalgarCentenaryin1905wastheNavyLeague’sfinestachievementin

grandstandingthusfar,theorganizationhadbeenagitatingforincreasednavalexpenditures

since1894,comingintoexistenceafterahighlypublicizedParliamentarydebateoverthenaval

estimatesthatyear.Initiallyitgrewslowly,asthenavalthreatposedbytheFrenchwasnot

sufficienttocompellargeportionsofthepopulationtojoin.By1901,theNavyLeagueonlyhad

14,000members.258YettherisingspecterofGermannavalpowercauseditsmembershipto

254Shannon,19.255Shannon,20.256Shannon,21.257Shannon,21.258PaulKennedy,TheRiseoftheAnglo‐GermanAntagonism1860‐1914(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1980),370.

105

explode.By1914,itsmembershiprollshadswelledto100,000.259Itwasledby“aristocrats,

bishops,retiredadmiralandothernotables,”andsuchintellectualsasKipling,Spencer

Wilkinson,andArnold‐Fosterlentittheirsupport.260

TheLeaguedrewmostofitssupportfromthemiddleclass.Italsoencouragedits

memberstoproselytizetotheworkingclasses,distributingliteratureandadvertisingtheNavy

Leaguetoworkersastheycommutedbytraintoandfromtheirfactories,261butthese

recruitingdrivesdidnotsignificantlydiversifythesocialdemographicsoftheLeague.262They

alsolobbiedtochildreninschools.Headmasterswereofferedpositionsofprominenceinthe

LeagueinexchangefortherighttohaveLeaguemembersspeaktotheirstudents.Lord

Beresfordwasamongthosenavalofficerstappedforthispurpose.263TheNavyLeaguealso

directlylobbiedParliament,forcingthemtogoonrecordastotheirstanceonnavalexpansion

issues.PaulKennedyarguesthat:“Itwasabravecandidateforparliamentaryelectionwhodid

notsay‘yes’totheNavyLeague’sstandardquestionofwhetherhewasforthemaritime

supremacyofGreatBritain.”Withdramaticincreasesinmembershipandawidescopeof

mandatesthattheNavyLeaguetookon,muchofthematerialassociatedwithnaval

remembrancewaseithergeneratedbyoratleastenhancedbythispressuregroup.264

ChapterTwoexploredtheculturalmeaningbehindwhatwasperceivedtobethemain

foreignthreattoGreatBritaininthisperiod.Thischapterwillnowbegintoexplorethewaysin

259Kennedy,370.260Kennedy,370.261Kennedy,374.262Kennedy,382.263Kennedy,375.264Kennedy,385.

106

whichculturalmanifestationsoftheNavy,fueledbythegrowingresourcesandeffectivenessof

theNavyLeague,servedtoprovideasenseofprideandsecurity,andapathwaytogalvanizing

thepublictowardincreasedeffortsatmilitarypreparedness.Specifically,thischapterwill

explorehowthememoryofagloriousnavalpastaffectedtheBritishpeople.Theactof

rememberingcertainaspectsofBritain’snavaltraditioninvolvedmakingchoicesaboutwhich

thingstorememberandhowtorememberthem.Thosethingsthatweredeemedworthyof

rememberingwerethosethingsthatwereperceivedtobeapplicabletocontemporarysociety.

ElitesandNavyLeaguewriterswhocalledforththesememoriesthroughpopularwritings,

speeches,andotherformsofdiscoursebelievedthemtobeofusetotheirfellowBritons.

Thefocalpointsofnavalmemorythatthischapterwillexplorearetherepulsionofthe

SpanishArmada,theBattleofTrafalgar,andthenavalheroesSirFrancisDrakeandHoratio

Nelson.DrakeandNelsonrespectivelyrepresentedtheoriginandculminationofBritain’snaval

hegemony.Drakewastheaggressive,uncivilizedBritishnavalprototype.Nelsonwasthe

thoughtful,civilizedBritishnavalarchetype,thehighestincarnationofBritishnavalmastery.

ThisisanattempttogetatwhatthememoryofNelson,Drake,andthebattlesthey

wonmeanttotheBritishpeople.WhatdidBritonsthinkofwhentheysawpicturesoftheir

navalheroes?Whatdidthestateandthechurchwantpeopletotakeawayfromthe

experienceofrememberingthesegreatmenandgreatbattles?Theanswerstothese

questionsreinforcethesenseofanxietythattheBritishweredealingwithasasociety,clinging

tobulwarksofBritishvirtueandpowerinordertostrengthentheirownresolveandtoreassure

themselvesabouttheirownsecurity.Inordertoanswerthesequestions,thischapterwill

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examinethehistoriesandpoemsthatwerewritten,drawingsthatwerepublished,and

politicallygalvanizingpropagandathatwasdistributedinconnectionwiththesecelebrations.

ThisanalysisoftheseculturalartifactswillshowhowthelegendsofDrakeandNelson,andthe

SpanishArmadaandTrafalgar,wereusedalternativelytoinspireandshamethepublicto

action.Italsoshowshowthenavywasperceivedasapotentialmeansofsocietalrebirth,that

thenavywasareservoirofidealBritishvirtue,andhowcertainofthesepublicationsusedthis

navalmemoryasantoolforovertlobbyingforincreasednavalexpenditure.

ThememoryoftheSpanishArmadaandtheBattleofTrafalgarwerecloselylinked,

thoughtheeventsthemselvesinrealityhadnothingtodowithoneanother,astheywere

separatedbymorethantwocenturies,werefoughtagainstdifferentenemies,andwere

characterizedbyawidedisparityofactualcontrolovertheflowofeventsonthepartofthe

Englishbelligerents.LordNelsondecisivelycrushedtheopposingFranco‐Spanishfleetin1805

throughhisowntacticalgenius.Bycontrast,LordHowardandFrancisDrakewatchedthe

Spanishfleetin1588destroyitself,whileaidingitalongabit.Inspiteofthesedifferences,the

remanufacturedversionsofbothofthesestorieswerespecificallydesignedtoinspirethe

public,andwerethenpresentedforpopularconsumption.The“informed”publicthen

receivedfurthermoralinstruction,muchofwhichwasquiteovert.Thislinkbetweenthe

SpanishArmadaandtheBattleofTrafalgar,andtheassociatedlinkbetweenthepersonagesof

DrakeandNelson,isdemonstratedbythisexcerptfromtheNavyLeague’spublicationTwelve

BritishAdmirals:“Inthemindofthenation,thoughitmayhaveonlythevaguestideaofhis

deeds,DrakestandssecondtoNelsoninournavalhistory.Hiswasinessencethesamehigh

anddaringspiritasNelson’s,thesamedevotiontoduty,andattimesthesametouchof

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petulance;buthelivedinamoreromanticageandhemovedinanatmosphereoflegendand

marvel.”265FurtherlinksbetweenthepersonageofDrakeandNelsonrecurredintheportrait

ofDrake:“Thevictorywasingreatparthis[Drake’s]winning,anditwasdecisive,ifnot

absolutelycrushing.LikeNelson,Drakedeploredthefactthatmorehadnotbeendone;his

aim,likehisgreatpupil’s,wasnotsuccess,butannihilationofthefoe.”266InRobertAnslow’s

poem“TheDefeatoftheSpanishArmada,”heascribedthedangerpresentedbytheArmadaas

onlyhavingbeenduplicatedtwicemoreinthehistoryofGreatBritainsince1588,whichagain

linkedtheSpanishArmadatoTrafalgar:

NotsincetheNormanConquesthadourshoressuchperilknown./ButthentheNormanswereabsorbed,theConqueror’syokeoutgrown,/TrueAnglo‐SaxonlibertieswereagainoldEngland’spride;/Andtheseoncemoreaforeignpowerwasanxioustoo’erride./SincethenbuttwodangershavethreatenedEngland’sshore;/ThetreasonoftheSecondJames,whichitsownsentencebore,/AndthenNapoleon’sprojecttocrossthesilverstreak,/ByPitt’swiseforethoughtthwarted,byNelsonheldincheck.267

Asre‐illustratedinthisstanza,theSpanishArmadaandtheBattleofTrafalgarwerethetwo

principlestoriesinBritishmiddleandupperclasscultureofmortaldangerandlongoddsbeing

overcomebynavalheroism.Forthisreason,byexploringthememoryofthesetwoevents,and

thediscoursegeneratedintheprocessofrememberingthem,aneffectivesynthesisofthe“cult

ofnavalmemory”canbeconstructed.Fleshingoutthesevariousaspectsofthisnavalmemory

willhelptofleshoutthisconstruction,andthesevariousaspectswilloccupythebulkofthe

remainderofthischapter.

265UnknownAuthor,TwelveBritishAdmirals(London:TheNavyLeague,1904),1.ThiscollectionwasoriginallyprintedintheNavyLeagueJournalin1904,andwasreproducedontheoccasionoftheCentenaryasaseparatevolume.266TwelveBritishAdmirals,6.267RobertAnslow,TheDefeatoftheSpanishArmada:ATercentenaryBallad(London:EliotStock,1888),v‐vi.

109

InlatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturyportraitsofDrake,thevictoroverthe

SpanishArmada,hewasportrayedasaprototype,ratherthananarchetype,oftheidealBriton.

HerepresentedamoreprimitiveversionoftheBritishrace,andinhisportraithewasdescribed

ashaving:

[L]ivedinamoreromanticageandhemovedinanatmosphereoflegendandmarvel.Hebelievedinwitchcraft;hethoughtthattherereallywasalandpeopledwithdemonstobefoundonthisearthofours;whenfogsencompassedhisshipsheputitdowntothemachinationsofSatan;and,likeoneofHomer’sheroes,wasconvincedthatroundhispersonragedacontestbetweenthepowersoflightanddarkness.268

TheDrakeofmemorylackedthenuanceandsophisticationofthefullydevelopedBriton,as

Drakehadlivedinthelongagosixteenthcentury.Nevertheless,theauthorspointedtothe

heartofDrake’scharacterasbeinginlinewithandanticipatingthatofNelson.InDrake’sNavy

Leagueportrait,theauthorwrotethat“[Drake]wasbornofPuritanstock‐thestockfromwhich

somanyofourbestfightingmenhavesprung.”269Hewascalled“oursturdyFrancisDrake”270

inoneofDouglasSladen’spoems.AfullstanzadevotedtohiminanotherofSladen’spoems

abouttheSpanishArmada’sdemisereadasfollows:“AndthenaroseacryofFrancisDrake,/

Andthestaunchestturnedtoflyforhisname’ssake,/WhohadswepttheSpanishmain/Likea

Caribhurricane,/Sincehisfighting‐daybegan;/Andwhofoughtmorelikeadevilthana

man.”271Collectively,andparticularlywiththelastpassage,Drakewasportrayedasahardy,

brave,passionatepatriot,withanexplosivefightingcapability,indicativeofthethenmore

268TwelveBritishAdmirals,1‐2.269TwelveBritishAdmirals,2.270DouglasSladen,TheArmadaOffDevon(NewYork:TheCassellPublishingCompany,1891),17.DouglasSladenwasanAustraliancolonistwhobecameaprofessorofhistoryattheUniversityofSydneyin1879.Inthe1880shemovedtoLondonandbecameawriter.HewroteatleasttwoballadsabouttheSpanishArmada,aneventthathecalled“Britain’sSalamis”(intheprefacetothispoem).271DouglasSladen,TheSpanishArmada:ABalladof1588(Penzance:AlvertonPress,1888),XII.

110

overtpoweroftheBritishspirit,thatwouldsubsequentlybecheckedandcivilized.Drake,and

therepulsionoftheSpanishArmadatowhichhismemorywastied,wasalsorememberedas

animportantturningpointfortheBritishpeople.ItwasthemomentwhenEnglandbecamea

greatseapower.Thatresultingseagoingtraditioncastalongshadowdowntothetwentieth

century,asdemonstratedbythefollowingpassagefromaprogrampublishedforthenaval

reviewinSmolentin1909:

BywhomwastheSpanishArmadamet?‘NotbytheHotspursofmedievalchivalry,…butbyanewraceofmensuchasmedievalEnglandhadnotknown,bytheheroesofbuccaneers,theDrakes,andtheHawkins,whoseliveshadbeenspentintossingaboutthatoceanwhichtotheirfathershadbeenanunexplored,unprofitabledesert.NowforthefirsttimeitmightbesaidofEngland–whatthepopularsongassumestohavebeenalwaystrueofher–that‘hermarchisontheoceanwave.’272

ThereforethenavalcultureandtraditionofGreatBritain“began”withtheSpanishArmada,

andTrafalgarwastheculminatingpointintheprocessofthenavalcomingofage,asanalysisof

Nelson’spersonalitycultshows.ThisfundamentallyalteredthecharacteroftheBritish“race,”

andpermanentlystampedthe“masteryoftheseas”asafixtureofBritishpowerandvirtue.

Forthisreason,theRoyalNavywascentrallylocatedasanall‐importantBritishinstitution.

IncontrasttoDrake,Nelson’sportraitwasthatofthefullydevelopedandarchetypical

Briton,andnumeroussourcesfleshedoutandreinforcedthisconceptofhim.Nelsonwasnot

portrayedasperfect,andmostoftheauthorsacknowledgedhispersonalweaknesses,withone

bishopontheoccasionofthecentenaryofTrafalgarexplicitlychoosingtoignorethemin

incorporatingthelessonsofNelson’sstory.TheNavyLeagueheraldedNelsonas“‘thegreatest

272UnknownAuthor,OfficialProgrammeoftheGreatNavalReviewWestminstertoSouthend17‐24July1909,(London:GaleandPolden,Ltd.,1909),6.

111

sailorsincetheworldbegan.’”273Intellingthestoryofhiscareer,theNavyLeagueauthor

attributedtoNelsona“fieryzeal,”whichwouldbethecornerstoneofasermongivenforhim

atthecentenary.Theauthorwrotethat:“Nelsonlosthisrighteyethroughashotstrikingthe

parapetofoneofthebatteries,dashinggravelintohisfaceandeye.ThatNelsonwasthesoul

oftheattackisundoubted,andthesuccesswasentirelyduetohisfieryzealanddetermination,

whichmadehisreputationasafightingcommander.”274AlfredThayerMahan,towhomso

muchofthedoctrinalunderpinningoftheGermannavalexpansioncanbeattributed,also

chimedinonthisinternationalnavalstarandwassubsequentlyquotedbytheNavyLeague:

AsMahansays:‘ItwascharacteristicofNelsonthathisvaluetranspiredthroughthesimplestintercourse,andamidthecommon‐placeincidentsofservice.LockerandParkereachinturnfeltthis.’Itisremarkablethathisextraordinaryabilitywasuniversallyacknowledgedinspiteofsomeweaknessesandevendeficiencies,thushehadnosenseofhumour,hispassionatepatriotismandhisburningambitiontoattainhonouranddistinctionwouldbelikelytomakeenemies,andtraditiontellsusthatNelson’spurelyseamanlikequalitieswerenotvaluedhighly.275

ThustheNelsonofmemorywasnotamanofbluster,andhisconsistentactionintheday‐to‐

dayexecutionofhisdutywasindicativeofhissincerity,andtothispersonalvigilancethe

authorsattributedhisgreatsuccess.

TheNelsonofmemorypossessedgreatphysicalcourage,andwasunconcernedabout

hisownsafety:“He(Nelson)hadbeenreadytoriskhimself,hisship,evenhissquadron,butall

didnotdependonhissolejudgment,anditwasintheseweightiermatters,whenthedestinyof

thenationwasinhishandsasthetrustedadmiralofthisSeaEmpirethathewastoshowtothe

highestadvantage,shiningforthtofuturegenerationsandthegreatestsailortheworldhas

273TwelveBritishAdmirals,123.274TwelveBritishAdmirals,130.275TwelveBritishAdmirals,126.

112

everseen.”276Hehadunswervingloveofaction,andyearnedtoalwaysbeindecisiveplacesat

decisivemoments,aswiththisretellingfromhisNavyLeaguebiographer:“Nelsonasked[a

colonel]ifhehadbeenattheAdmiralty,thenstartedup,andstretchingouthisunwounded

arm,said:‘IwouldgivethisotherarmtobewithDuncan277[inbattle]atthismoment;’so

unconquerablewasthespiritoftheman,andsointensewashiseagernesstogiveeveryinstant

ofhislifetotheservice.’”278Theseanecdotesweredesignedtoinstructthepopulacethrough

Nelson’sexample,athemethatthechapterwillexplorefurtherinalatersection.

HoratioNelsonhadwellknowncharacterflawsthatcenteredonhisopenandblatant

infidelitytohiswife.InthefinalyearsleadinguptoTrafalgarheabandonedhiswife

altogether,andchosetospendhisshoreleavewithhismistress,LadyHamilton.Indescribing

Nelson’sfaults,hisbiographertreatedthemlightlyandpartiallyexplainedthemaway:

Itisapartofthecareerofourherowhichmaybelegitimatelyabridged,asitdoesnotcontainanyofhismostbrilliantfeatsofarms,whileitshowshisjudgmentwarpedandevenhisenergyattimesslackeningthroughtheenervatinginfluenceofhisenvironment.Thereisnodoubtthatthisperiodofweakness,forsoitmayfairlybecalled,waspartlyphysical,duetohissixyears’strenuouseffort,duringwhichhehadsustainedthreeseverewounds.279

TheauthoralsoapologizedforNelson,andindoingsoascribedtohimthecoreBritishqualities

thatwerebroughtoutinthesourcescitedattheendofthesecondchapterofthisthesis,

especiallytemperanceandmoderation:

Nelson’slifeatMerton[withhismistress]wasnotaltogetherunworthy,and…hisnephew,Mr.Matcham…speaksofhis‘temperatehabits,’his‘warmandgenerousdisposition,’thathe‘neverheardacoarseexpressionissuefromhis

276TwelveBritishAdmirals,136.277Nelsonwasreferringtohiscolleague,AdmiralDuncan,whowasatthetimeengagingNapoleon’sDutchalliesattheBattleofCamperdownin1797.278TwelveBritishAdmirals,141.279TwelveBritishAdmirals,151.

113

lips,’andthathisdemeanourinprivatelifewas‘quiet,sedate,andunobtrusive’;while[others]witness[ed]…acontinuedcourseofcharityandgoodness,settingsuchanexampleofproprietyandregularitythattherearefewwhowouldnotbebenefitedbyfollowingit.’280

ThisprovidedanappropriatefoiltoNelson’s“fieryzeal,”implyingtotheBritonswhowere

readingthesepublicationsthattheyalsohadthepotentialtotransformthemselvesinto

somethingmorecloselyemulatingNelsonandothernavalheroes.

NavypublicationsthroughoutthedominionsechoedtheessentialportraitofNelsonas

theglory‐seekingwarrior,asseeninthisNewZealandCentenarypublication:

ThelifeofHoratioNelsonpresentsoneofthoserareexamplesofthatearlyandardentpassionfortrueglory,whichmayinducementoexcelineverybranchofprofessionaldutyandtopreserve,throughallvicissitudesofpublicservice,asteadfastrelianceonthegratitudeoftheircountry…Byprovinghimselfentirelydevoidofindolence,avariceandenvy,heinspiredhiscountrymenwithsuchconfidenceinhisintegrityandabilitiesthattheyalmostregardedhisexistenceasessentialtotheirownindependenceandtothelibertiesofthecivilizedworld…Nelsonistheonesea‐captainwhohasstampedhisimageimperishablyontheimaginationoftheEnglish‐speakingrace.281

Thisalsobyextensionenforcedtieswiththedominions,inthattheyallsharedthesecommon

Britishqualities,andhadreasontoclaimthenavyastheirownbirthrightjustastheBritishdid.

ThiswasevidentbothfromthefactthatNewZealandcelebratedthememoryofNelson

throughtheproductionanddistributionofthispamphlet,andespeciallyinthelastsentenceof

thepassageabove,whichreferstothe“English‐speakingrace,”whichspannedtheBritish

Empire.

280TwelveBritishAdmirals,167.281UnknownAuthor,TrafalgarCentenaryIssuedbytheNavyLeaguetoMembersandAssociatesGratis(NewZealand:NavyLeagueWellingtonBranch,1905),5.

114

OntheoccasionoftheCentenaryofTrafalgar,asermongivenbytheLordBishopof

StepneyattemptedtopindownNelson’scharacter,andattributedittoanall‐encompassing

enthusiasm:

IntheranksofthathighchivalryofGod,ofthemenwhohaveburnedtheirwaythroughtheworld,therestandsconspicuousthegreatsailorwhomwecommemorateto‐day.ThespiritofNelsonwasessentially‘aflamingfire.’Therewereothergiftsofgreatnesswhichhehadinplenty.Hewascalmandfearlessatdecisivemoments;hethoughtandactedwiththeswiftnessofintuition.Hewasgenerousaliketofriendandtofoe;heasprodigalofhisaffections;aboveall,hewasdevotedtodutyandcountry.282

TheLordBishoprepeatedanddistilledthesefinequalitiesthatwereinherently(orthathe

thoughtshouldbeinherently)British:“HisName,theessentialspiritoftheman,whathewasat

hisbest—itisthiswhichlives.AndthisessentialspiritofNelson,letmerepeat,wastenacityof

purpose,generosityofheart,devotiontodutyandcountry,allglowinginasingleheroic

fire.”283HewentontomodelthreepillarsofNelson’sidentity,whichwouldsegueintoalater

discussionofhowtouseNelson’sexampletocorrecttheflawsofsociety:“First,therewasthe

fireofthefighter284…Secondly,therewasapatriotismofrareintensity.Itwasapatriotism

whichwaslavishofitssacrifice285…Thirdly,blendedwiththisloveofcountrytherewasinthe

Nelsonfireadeeperelementstill–arealfaithinthesovereigntyofGod.”286Therefore,

accordingtotheLordBishop,NelsonprovidedthemodelbywhichtheBritishracecould

rejuvenateitself,centeredonqualitiesofself‐sacrifice,patriotism,andfaithinGod.

282LordBishopofStepney,NelsonaFlamingFire:ASermon(London:S.W.Partridge&Co.,1905),3.283Stepney,3‐4.284Stepney,5.285Stepney,6.286Stepney,7.

115

TheLordBishopexplicitlychosetoignorethosemorallyreprehensibleaspectsof

Nelson,andurgedhislistenerstodothesame,demonstratingtheimportanceofchoiceon

theseconstructedmemories:

WhatwasuniqueinNelsonwasthatallthesequalitieswerekindledwithinhimbyanativewarmthandheatofthesoulintoaheroicfire…ThisistheNelsonwholives.ThereisaNelsonwhoisdead–ourfellowmortal,fretful,self‐conscious,themanwhoinhiswistfulyearningforaffectionyieldedtoapatheticinfatuation.ThisNelsonwasburiedherebeneathourfeet‐wedonotwishtoraisehimfromthetomb.Heisdead;ratherheiswithdrawnfromsightinthehandsofGod,whoinjudgmentremembersmercy.TheNelsonwholivesistheheroicspiritwhichburneditswaythroughandabovethefailingsofhismortalflesh.287

TheLordBishopwasalsoboldenoughtoincludetheFrenchinthecelebration,arguingthatas

theFrenchhadsincebecomeBritain’sally,theFrenchcouldcelebratethefigureofNelson

withoutfeelingitinimicaltotheirhonor:

Nelson[wasnotjust]theembodimentofallthatisdeartothesailorheartofEngland;stilllesstheprotagonistofGreatBritainagainsttheFrench.For,thankGod,hisenemyhasbecomeourfriend.Wecaneven,intheconfidenceoffriendship,askourancientrivalstosharewithustheheritageofourpride;andwhenwesawtheirsailorsstandingbeforeourNelson’sstatueandsalutehiminsilence,wesawthatourrequestwasnotinvain:‘NowNelsontobraveFranceisshown/Aheroafterherownheart.’288

Thiswastheheightofrevisionism,implyingthattheFrenchwere“inspirit”fightingalongside

Nelsonratherthanagainsthim,butthisexampleillustrateshowthesememorieswerealtered

andcraftedformaximumeffectiveness.Theendgoalofrecallingtheseeventswastoevokean

appropriatereaction,ratherthantorememberthingsastheyactuallywere.

ThelegaciesofDrakeandNelsondevelopedabovecouldbeusedforreassurance,to

spurthepublictoaction,orboth.ThelastpassageofTwelveBritishAdmiralsreadsfroman

287Stepney,3.288Stepney,4‐5.

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epitaphonNelson:“Thisonlytributetomymemorygive;/Inallyourstruggles,bothbylandand

sea,/LetNelson’snameinemulationlive,/Andinthehourofdangerthinkonme.”289

SomethingsimilarwaswrittenforDrake:“Itisfabledthatarollupon[Drake’s]drum,whichstill

hangsinthehouseofhisdescendants,willwakehimfromhislastsleep,inthathourwhen

fleetsofEnglandagaingoforthtobattleinthenarrowseas:‘TakemydrumtoEngland,hanget

bytheshore,/Strikeetwhenyourpowder’srunninglow;/IftheDonssightDevon,I’llquitthe

portofHeaven,/An’drumthemuptheChannelaswedrummedthemlongago.’”290Asthis

poemillustrates,therewasgreatefforttakentoensurethatthememoryofDrakeandNelson

tooktheformofsomethingthatcouldbereincarnated,orcalledforthtoactagain.Thegreat

navalheroesofthepastwerenotdead;theyweremerelydormant,waitingtoberesurrected

inthenewBritishrace.ThissentimentwasechoedinadrawinginPunchontheoccasionofthe

TrafalgarCentenary(SeeFigure9291).ThedrawingshowedthespecterofNelsonsurveyingthe

modernincarnationoftheRoyalNavywithsternsatisfaction,sayingthat“MyShipsareGone,

ButtheSpiritofMyMenRemains.”ThereforethemodernincarnationoftheBritishfleetwas

presentedasbeingworthyofNelson’smemory,andthisassertionwasdesignedtoreassure

Punch’sreaders.Punchlaterpublishedadrawingwithadifferentpurpose(seeFigure10292).In

thisdrawing,“Britannia”hoistedNelson’soldsignalthathepublishedashisfinalordertothe

fleetastheBattleofTrafalgarwasbeginning.“Britannia”thenexpresseddisgustoverwhather

admiralswereallowingherfleettocometo.Thisdrawingwasdesignedtoshamethe

AdmiraltyandParliamenttoaction,aswellastoraisepublicawarenessaboutBritain’s

289TwelveBritishAdmirals,190.290TwelveBritishAdmirals,6.291UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume129,281.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonOctober18th,1905.292UnknownArtist,Punch,Volume135,47.ThisdrawingwaspublishedonJuly15th,1908.

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allegedlyinadequatenavalbuildingprogramontheeveofthe1909NavyScare.Thepowerof

theNelsonlegendwascultivatedtohavethiseffect,sothatitcouldsootheoragitate,inspire

ormanipulate.ThecentralityoftheNelsonlegendtotheBritishconsciousnessmeantthatit

wasfrequentlycalleduponandinstantlyrecognizablebytheBritishpublic.

CloselylinkedtothesemythssurroundingBritain’snavalheroesweretheattemptsto

linkthepasttothepresent,avitalpartofthisparticularexerciseinmemory.ANavyLeague

author,drawinguponAlfredMahan,wroteofthecontinuitybetweenNelson’stimeandhis

own:

InMahan’swords:‘Happyhewholivestofinishallhistask.’Thewords‘Ihavedonemyduty’sealedtheclosedbookofNelson’sstorywitha‘truthbroaderanddeeperthanhehimselfcouldsuspect…ThedecisivesupremacyofGreatBritain’sseapower,theestablishmentofwhichbeyondallquestionorcompetitionwasNelson’sgreatachievement,’hasbeenalegacytohisdescendants,andhasnotbeenseriouslydisputedintheninety‐eightyearswhichhavesincepassed.Itisasacredheirloom,andwhileweclingtohismemorywemustseethatourmodernarmsarenotrusty,andunequaltokeepingthatcommandoftheseawhichwehaveinherited…Noonesupposesthatourtoolscanbesimilartothoseofahundredyearsago,butwehavemuchtolearnfromthespirit,thedevotiontocountry,andevenfromthestrategyandtacticsofourgreatnavalhero.293

InthispassagetheauthorwaspullingoutthoseaspectsoftheNelsonstorythatwerestill

consideredtobeapplicable,andwasalsomakingfrequentreferencestolineage(“legacytohis

descendants,sacredheirloom”)andreferencestotheneedforvigilance(“wemustseethatour

modernarmsarenotrusty”).ThefinalpartofNelson’sportrait,whichaddressedthelessons

tobelearnedfromNelson’sexample,expressedsimilarsentimentsofcontinuitybetween

Nelson’squalitiesandtheenduringqualitiesoftheBritishrace:“Hisintuition,hisgeniuswe

maynotpossess,butwecanallendeavourtocopyhispatriotism,hisenergy,his

293TwelveBritishAdmirals,189‐190.

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determination,hisstraightforwardhonesty,hisself‐devotionandconsiderationforothers,and

hiscourage,bothmoralandphysical.Thathewasintenselyhumanisoneofthequalities

whichmostendearedhimtothenation,andmadehimsobeloved,inspiteofmoralfailings

andsomeweaknessesofcharacter.”294Thisisperhapsthebest,mostconcisestatementofthe

sourcesquotedhereofwhattheNelsonofmemorywassupposedtomeantotheBritish

people.ThoughevenNelsonhimselfshowedoccasionalweakness,hewasabletotranscend

thatweaknessandachievesomethinggreat.Hisdescendants,theBritishpeople,werealso

capableofovercomingtheirownshortcomingsandstemmingthetideofracialdegeneration

thattheybelievedwasthreateningtheirsociety.

LikethosewhowroteaboutNelsonandTrafalgar,theauthorsoftheSpanishArmada

balladswereasconcernedaboutwarningofthedangersoftheimmediatefutureaswith

rejoicinginmodernpowerandcelebratingsupremacy,asthefollowingpassagefromSladen’s

“TheArmadaOffDevon”shows:“Sotheyfinishedinfulltheirgame,andto‐daywetreasureits

fame/Midthefeatsoflight‐heartedvalourthathavewonourEnglandhername;/Andwepray

whenitcomesoncemore/ForEnglandtoholdherbreathinthestruggleoflifeanddeath,/

Thatmenmaybemanytodiewiththesmileonthelipandeye,/Whichhasmadethese

Armadaheroesaproverbthewideworldo’er.”295Particularlyimportantarethelines“Andwe

praywhenitcomes[danger]oncemore/ForEnglandtoholdherbreathinthestruggleoflife

anddeath.”TheseemphasizedthatthedangertoGreatBritainwouldneverbeover,andsoit

wasanimplicitcallforvigilanceandpreparedness.ThiswasmoreexplicitinAnslow’spoem:

294TwelveBritishAdmirals,189.295Sladen,TheArmadaOffDevon,III.

119

NotsincetheNormanConquesthadourshoressuchperilknown…SincethenbuttwodangershavethreatenedEngland’sshore;/ThetreasonoftheSecondJames,whichitsownsentencebore,/AndthenNapoleon’sprojecttocrossthesilverstreak,/ByPitt’swiseforethoughtthwarted,byNelsonheldincheck…Andoftheperilswhichhersonswithstoodinbygonedays:/Ataleofwhattheyoncewithstood,andstillmayyetwithstand,/ShouldanypowerofEuropeseekonourshorestoland.296

Thefinallinesarethemostimportanthere:“theperilswhichhersonswithstood…[they]may

stillyetwithstand.”ThisimpliedaresidualhardinessoftheBritishpeoplethatcouldstillbe

calledforthifnecessary.Asaresult,thoughthedangertoGreatBritainwaseternal,its

strengthandqualitywerealsoeternal,andwerecapableofbeingmarshaledtowardthe

protectionoftheBritishpeople.

Inkeepingwiththeanxiousspiritoftheage,thesestoriesweretargetedtoresonate

withtheiraudiencesbyhighlightingaspectsofthosestoriesthattoldofsailorsfacinggrave

dangeroroverwhelmingodds.Thesesailorsofmemorythentriumphedoverthoseodds

throughtheirpossessionofandapplicationofBritishvirtues,manyofwhichwerealso

attributedspecificallytothenavalheroesdiscussedearlierinthechapter.Adescriptionofone

ofNelson’sexpeditionsread:“Thusendedthisill‐starredexpedition;but,failurethoughitwas,

itshowsabrightexampleofthecourageanddeterminationofBritishseameninthefaceof

difficulties,whilethepersonaldevotionandheroismoftheirchiefwentfartowardsrelieving

thebadeffectofthedisasteronhishithertosuccessfulcareer.”297Thesestoriesofovercoming

longoddsalsoappearedintheliteratureonthebattleagainsttheSpanishArmada.James

Wylie’sworkTheHistoryofProtestantismaccentuatedthecriticalturningpointthatthe

repulsionoftheArmadarepresented:“Thehourhadnowcomewhenitwastobedetermined296Anslow,TheDefeatoftheSpanishArmada,v.297TwelveBritishAdmirals,139.

120

whetherEnglandshouldremainanindependentkingdom,orbecomeoneofPhilip’snumerous

satrapies;whetheritwastoretainthelightoftheProtestantfaith,ortofallbackintothe

darknessandserfdomofamedievalsuperstition.”298InrepulsingtheArmada,theBritish

sailorsdemonstratedtheirabilitytotriumphinthefaceofadversity,doubtandanxiety,and

thiswasrecreatedandretoldtoshowtheBritishpeople,byextension,whattheywerecapable

of:

Inthemeantime,anxiousconsultationswerebeingheldonboardtheEnglishfleet.Thebraveandpatrioticmenwholeditdidnotconcealfromthemselvesthegravityofthesituation.TheArmadahadreacheditsappointedrendezvousinspiteofalltheirefforts,anditjoinedbyParma,itwouldbesooverwhelminglypowerfulthattheydidnotseewhatshouldhinderitscrossingoverandlandinginEngland.Theywerewillingtoshedtheirbloodtopreventthis,andsotoowerethebravemenbywhomtheirshipsweremanned.299

ThereforetheBritishforerunnerswhodefeatedtheArmadadidsoinspiteoftheiranxious

misgivingsabouttheirsituation.Thiswasdesignedtoreassurereadersthatthoughtheyhad

theirownfearsandanxieties,theBritishracewouldtriumphinthetwentiethcenturyjustasits

forerunnerfromthesixteenthcenturyhad.

InadditiontonailingdownwhatheconsideredtobetheessentialqualitiesofNelson,

theLordBishopofStepneyusedhispulpitattheCentenarycelebrationforawidercritiqueof

Britishsociety.HesoughttocraftamorallessonfromNelson’sexample:

DonotletthisCentenary[ofTrafalgar]becomeanotherdisplayofourmodernsentimentalemotionalism.Letithaveresultsinthefireofanewservicetoourcountry,runningthroughtheveinsoftheEnglishpeople…Thelessonisthis:Godandourcountrystillwant,stillaskfor,[Nelson’s]serviceofzeal,theministryofaflamingfire.Ineverysphereoflifeatthepresenttimewestandinsoreneedofzeal…Softnessofliving,fullnessofbread,loveofmoneyandcomfort‐thesethingsaremakingthenationalspiritlimpandslack…Menwehaveinplenty,

298JamesA.Wylie,TheHistoryofProtestantism(London:Cassell,Petter,Galpin&Co,187‐?),454.WyliewasaScottishreligioushistorianadPresbyterianminister.299Wylie,455.

121

cultivated,critical,capable;butthesearenotthemenwhokindletheirfellows.Heonlywhoisglowinginhisownsoulwiththefireofconvictioncanbealeaderofhisfellowmen,inspiringtheirenthusiasm.Surelyweneedsomethingtofantheflickeringembersofournationalandpersonalzeal.GodgrantthatsomefreshkindlingofthemmaycomefromthememoryofNelson’sfieryspirit!300

TheBishopofStepney,likemanyothers,sawdecayintheBritishrace,andintheprocessof

findingitswaybacktowardtheextremeexampleofDrake’sfervor,Nelsonprovidedauseful

markerasanexampleofanutterlydevotedpatriotwhodiedforhiscountry.TheLordBishop

wentontopleadthat“[the]Empireneedsthisservice.OnthemorrowofTrafalgarthesun

roseonanewepochinthestoryofourBritishrace.Thebattlehadgivenusthecommandof

theseas;theEmpirebecamepossible.Tousitisnowaheavy,thoughinspiringloadofprivilege

andresponsibility.WeareproudofourEmpire!”301ThiswastheresponsibilitythatNelsonhad

bequeathedtheminallowingtheBritishtoexpandandconsolidateagreatEmpireinaddition

toNelson’ssecuringtheBritishstateagainstNapoleon’sinvasionaims.TheLordBishopthen

seguedintoaccusingtheBritishofnotlivinguptothatresponsibility:

ButalthoughweareproudofourEmpire,thoughweareanxioustodefendit,dowereallyasapeoplesetoveritsomeclearlightofahighandnobleideal?Thedefencewhichweneedmorethananyotherisdefenceagainstthemorallaxityandmaterialismwhichthreatentocorruptus.TheNavywhichweneedforthedefenceofourEmpireisaNavyofseafaringmenwhorememberthatintoeveryporttheybringthehonouroftheircountry,andanexamplewhicheitherhurtsorhelpsthelifeofotherraces.302

TheexampleoftheNavywasnowseenashavingthepowertoreachacrossclasslinesand

reshapethemoralityofsociety.TheBishopwascallingforachangeinwhotheBritishaspired

tobe,andforacheckontheforcesofracialdegeneracy:

300Stepney,8‐9.301Stepney,10.302Stepney,10.

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FarmoreimportantthananyquestionofImperialpolicyisthevitalquestionofanImperialrace,aracefittedforEmpirebycharacter,aracewiththefireofzealwithinit,notchieflytoextenditsdominions,butrathertosinkdeepitsfoundationsintruthandhonourandGod…England,theoldcountry,needsthisserviceofzeal.ThereislittlegaininextendingourEmpire,Iftherebedegenerationinitsheart.Canwe,foramoment,thinkthatourEnglandto‐dayiswhatGodmeantittobe?303

ButafterdenouncingthecurrentstatusofBritishsociety,heassertedthatitwasworthyof

saving:

Itisstillworthhelping,thisoldcountryofours;andhelpitneedsindifficultdayscoming,daysthenitmustsettleitsfuturesocialconditionsandstructure.Thehelpwhichitneedsis,thatasapeopleweshouldsetourfacesagainstlust,gambling,drink,dishonestyintrade,recklessnessinfinance,thegrowthofpauperism,declensioninourbirthrate,thepovertyandsqualorofourtownsandvillages.WeneedtofaceallthesethingswithsomethingofthatspiritwithwhichNelsonfacedthefleetwhenitcamebeforehim,withsomethingofhisfireofcourage,andoffaiththatvictoryisthewillofGod.304

Thiswasthemostpotentexampleoftheattempttomanufactureasocietalfablefromthe

exampleofagreatnavaleventandnavalhero.Britainwasagainintrouble,butitwasbecause

ofinternalthreatsassociatedwithdegenerationoftheBritishraceandsociety.TheLord

BishoptoldhisaudienceofTrafalgarCentenarypatronsthatNelsonheldthekeytorebuilding

andrejuvenatingtheirrace.Therewerealsohintsofthisneedforracialrejuvenationinthe

literatureontheSpanishArmada,withthemostovertcalltoactioncominginSladen’slater

poem:

Butherpulseswithpeacearesluggish,andherarmsarerustywithrest,/Andshe,whohasfoughttheworldover,nolongerisreadytofight/…Wehavemoneyenoughandtospare,wehavemenofthefibreweneed,/Wehaveforgesforworklyingidle,andsmithswhoarestarvingforfood;/Therearewarningstheblindmightstartat,ifourRulerswouldonlyheed;/…Orouseye,ourRulers,andseethatthejointsofherarmouraresure;/Osharpenherswordforthecombat,andhaveagoodsteedinthestall/…Ihavesungyouanoldenstory!St.Paul’s,

303Stepney,11.304Stepney,11‐12.

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wherethebellswererung,/IntheFireofLondonwasswallowedtwohundredautumnsago;Andovertheburntoldministerherveilhathoblivionflung;/Andwe‐areforgettinghowEngland,ofoldwouldhavemetafoe.305

Specifically,thepoetchargedtheBritishpeoplewith“forgettinghowEngland,ofoldwould

havemetafoe,”andimpliedthatBritonsmusttakeconsciousactiontopreparethemselvesto

fightagain,andindoingsoreversetheirowncontinuingslidetowarddegeneration.

ReferencestomoraldepravityalsoappearedintheTercentenaryliterature(referringtothe

300thanniversaryoftheSpanishArmada,in1888),asthispassagefromRobertAnslow’spoem

illustrates:

Nowhereinliesalessonplain,andhethatreadsshouldrun,/Inthesamepatrioticwaysbywhichourfatherswon/Thatfreedomandsecurityfromwhichhaveslowlygrown/ThetripleBritishdiademofEmpire,Faith,andThrone./TrueKnights,FairDanes,Associates,whileyoursisthedefence/Ofthese,shouldforeignfoesagainuponthemwarcommence,/‘TisalsoyourstocrushandfoilallhomebredTreason’ssnares/AndAtheistandSeparatisttochasefromsowingtares.306

AtheistsandSeparatistswerereferencedinthiswarningastargetsinthenextgreatstruggleof

theBritishrace,whichshouldbeusedasanopportunitytopurgethedisreputableelementsof

Britishsocietythatweredraggingitdownintoimmoralityandthusintodecline.Returningto

oldBritishvirtuewastheonlywaytostoptheslideintodegeneracy,andNelsonwasashining

examplethattheBritishcouldemulateastheyreinvigoratedtheirsociety.

Inadditiontoasenseoffearofdeclineduetoracialimpurityandimmorality,there

weresomewhofeltthatBritishsociety,whilesuccumbingtomaterialisticforces,hadalso

alloweditselftobecomestagnantandunyielding.JustastheBritishconceptionsofthe

GermansreflectedBritishanxietiesovertheirlackofracialenergyandzeal,oneNavyLeague

305Sladen,TheSpanishArmada:ABalladof1588,14.306Anslow,TheDefeatoftheSpanishArmada:ATercentenaryBallad,39‐40.

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author’sjibesagainsttheSpanishinasummaryatthebeginningofDrake’sbiographywere

indicativeoffearsaboutBritishstagnationandinflexibility.Thisauthorhidthisfear,orrather

triedtocompensateforit,byaccusingtheSpanishofbeingworsethantheBritish:

TheSpaniards[ofPhillipII’sera]stilltoagreatextenttrustedobsoletecraft,andtoantiquatedtactics;theybelievedinvesselspropelledbyoars,andinboarding;theyneglectedgunnery,andimaginedthatbattlescouldbewonwithoutit.Thiswillexplainingreatmeasurethedefeatswhichtheysuffered.Inthesixteenthcentury,asin1898[thelatterofwhichsawtheirfleetannihilatedduringtheSpanish‐AmericanWar],theyhadfailedtograsptheimportanceofnewideas,andclungtoroutine.307

ThecautionaryhintgivenbytheauthorofNelson’scareerstoryreproducedinthispassage

gavevoicetothisfearofstagnation:

ThereisonelessontobedrawnfromNelson’slifewhichshouldnotbeoverlookedbymybrotherofficers,thoughitmayappeartrivialtothoseoutsidetheservice.ItisthatthroughoutNelson’scareerandinhisvoluminouscorrespondence,whiledutyanddisciplinearefreelyreferredtoasindispensable,uniformisnevermentioned,andtheveryideaofwhatwenowcallroutinewasabsent!Doesthisnotshowthatuniformandroutinearemeremeanstoanend,andthatinthesedaysweareinclinedtoattachtoomuchvaluetothem?308

InyetanotherapplicationoftheNelsonlegend,theauthorwasusinghimtolobbyforgreater

institutionaldynamism,perhapsinsupportofLordFisher’sreforms,whichwerejustbeginning

whenthiscollectionwaspublished.

ThischapterwillnowturntothemoreovertagitationsmadebytheNavyLeaguefor

increasednavalexpenditure.BeyondsentimentalargumentsthattheNavyand“Britishness”

wereinherentlylinked,agitationovertheneedforanexpandedfleettookonamorerational

tone.TheNavyLeaguearguedthatthenavywasthemostimportantpublicarmoftheempire,

307TwelveBritishAdmirals,2.308TwelveBritishAdmirals,189‐190.

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andthatBritainoweditsexistencetoit.Whilesimultaneouslyusingtheculturalthemes

developedearlierinthechapter,typicalmiddleclassBritonswouldhavebeenmorereceptive

tosuchargumentsbecauseoftheiralreadyestablishedsentimentalitytowardtheNavy.The

NavyLeaguewastheprincipleprotagonistinthisperiodforpublishingtheseargumentsfor

navalexpansion,andencouragedthecelebrationofpastvictories,navalheroes,andthenaval

culture,inordertomaketheirlobbyingmoreeffective.Thissectionofthechapterlaysout

examplesofNavyLeaguepropaganda,andparticularlyexaminesaTrafalgarcentenary

pamphletfromtheTrafalgarcelebrationheldinNewZealandinOctober1905.Thispamphlet

indicatesthewidereachofnavalenthusiasm,andshowshowBritishdominionsalsocelebrated

theirnavaltraditionalongsidethepeopleoftheUnitedKingdom.Onthetitlepageofthe

pamphlet(SeeFigure11309)theartistremindedtheNewZealandreadersoftheirsharednaval

heritagewithGreatBritain,byplacingNelson’sportraitinthecenter,alongwiththecaption

“EnglandExpectsThatEveryManWillDoHisDuty”—Nelson’slastsignaltohisfleetbefore

Trafalgar.Inthiscase,“England”referstothegreaterEngland,thatoftheBritishrace,ofwhich

NewZealandersreadingthispamphletwouldhavebeenencouragedtoconsiderthemselvesa

part.Alongwiththemainmessagesandiconographyofthepamphlet,standardcommercial

additionswereincluded.Theseweredesignedtocapitalizeonthemassmarketforproducts

withnavalthemes,whichservedtoincreasetheinfiltrationofthenavalcultintothelarger

populaceandincreaseitsimmediacyineverydaylife.

Injustifyingthenavalexpansionitself,highrankingpoliticiansandeliteswerequotedin

themainbodyofthetext,asfollowed:“’ItisontheNavy,inthegoodprovidenceofGod,that

309TrafalgarCentenary,1.

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thehonourandsafetyofthislanddepend…TheNavymeansforyouyourexistenceasan

Empire;itmeansforyouthefactthatyouarefreefrominvasion;itmeansforyouyourdaily

foodanddailyemployment…TheNavyisallinallandeverything;therefore,thoughthecostis

great,itislittlecomparedwithwhatitbringsbacktoyou,”310andimmediatelythereafter:

“’Theproperdefenceofourshoresliesinpromptandresoluteattackontheenemy’snaval

power,whereveritmaybe.’”311Byincorporatingquotesfrompoliticiansandotherelites,the

Leagueattemptedtolenditsownargumentsgreaterweight.

Inintroducingthemselves,theNavyLeagueauthorslaidouttheirmissionstatement

andargumentsforexpansion:“Itwasrealizedthatallclassesshouldbebroughttofully

appreciatethevitalfactthatthemaintenanceofBritain’sundisputedSupremacyoftheSeais

essentialnotonlytotheprosperityoftheindividual,butalsototheactualexistenceofthe

NationasaworldPower.”312ThisNavyLeaguewriterarguedthatsuddenincreasesinnaval

powerwerecostlyandineffective,andinsteadthat“continuityofpreparation”wastheonly

waytoensureBritain’scontinuednavalsuperiority.313Furtherpassagescontinuedthislineof

argument,witheachhittingonadifferentaspectoftheneedfornavalexpansion,oratleast

restatingtheargumentsindifferentways,asinthisarticleentitled“TheNationandtheNavy

League,byanEnglishwoman:”

ThetwogreatobjectsforwhichtheNavyLeagueisworkingmaybedescribedinthewordsoftheTimes,asan‘invincibleNavyandaninstructednation.’Thefirstcannotbehadwithoutthesecond.TheneedofaninvincibleNavyhasnever,perhaps,beenplainerthanatthepresenttime,wheneveryonefeelshowsuddenlythequickflameofwarmayspringupoutofapparentpeace.British

310LordSelborne,TrafalgarCentenary,9.HewastheFirstLordoftheAdmiraltywhenthiswasproduced.311SirF.Pollock,TrafalgarCentenary,9.HewasanEnglishjuristandlawprofessoratOxford.312TrafalgarCentenary,10.313TrafalgarCentenary,10.

127

confidenceintheNavyisamplyjustified‐butonlybecauseofthemenwhohavetoiled,andarestilltoilinginthefaceofcontemptandabuse,toexposeandremedynavalweaknesses.Theattitudeofmindtypifiedinthesongthatsays‘We’vegottheships,we’vegotthemen,we’vegotthemoney,too’issomewhatsuperficial,anddoesnotpausetoconsiderhowitisthatwe’vegottheshipsandthemen.314

TheLeaguewritersusedexplicitreferencestonavalmemoryinthispassageasaprefacefor

statingtheirmainpurpose:“ThemainworkoftheLeaguehasbeen[witha]viewofbringing

hometothemindsofallBritishthroughouttheworldthefactthatourNavalSupremacyisa

sacredheritagehandeddowntousbygenerationsofBritishseamen.”315Thereforethese

elementswerealllinked:theBritishNavywastheeternalprotectorandbirthrightoftheBritish

people,theNavycouldnotbeneglectedwithoutendangeringBritain,thehistoryofBritain

reinforcedthisconclusion,andtheNavyLeaguehadsetouttoensurethatthesetruthswere

disseminatedaswidelyaspossible.Thisdifferedfromthemoresentimentalaccountsof

battlesandheroes,butitstilldrewuponmemoryofheroismasajustificationforinvestingin

thetoolstoallowforfutureheroism.

Thepamphletwentontoidentifytheevilsofthrift,comparedwiththenoblesacrifice

offeredupbytheBritishTar,andemphasizedtheLeague’sroleinamelioratingthisinjustice:

Britishnavalofficersandbluejacketsarealwayspreparedtofulfilltheirsideofthebargainwiththeutmostgallantry,butundertheconditionsofmodernwartheirpersonalbraveryandskillcanavaillittleunlessprovidedwithefficientweapons,withfastandwell‐armouredwarships.Butthesethingscostmoney‐agreatdealofmoney‐andtheTreasuryisalwaysanxioustoeconomise.Therefore,whentherehasbeennoimmediateprospectofwar,navalexpenseshavebeenpareddown…Nowthiskindofthingwasbothwastefulandperilous,andtheNavyLeaguewasfoundedtocreatesuchastrongcurrentofinstructedpublicopinionthattheNavymightneverbeneglectedand[navalscaresbemade]impossible.[TheLeague’s]paramountaimistodrivehomeafactso

314TrafalgarCentenary,9.315TrafalgarCentenary,10.

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simpleandplain…thattheNavyisallthatstandsbetweenusandnationalannihilation…ShouldthetridentslipfromtheslackhandofBritannia,othercountriesarewaitingwithterribleeagernesstoseizeit.Butwearenotgoingtoletthetridentslip–wemeantoholditandwieldit.316

Rhetoricalflourishaside,thispassagerestatedargumentsthatwerefrequentlyrepeatedin

otherliterature‐Britainwasperpetuallyinmortaldanger,andtheNavywastheonlythingthat

compensatedforthisperil,whichmeantthattheNavydeservedtheunswervingfinancial

supportoftheBritonswhobenefitedfromitsprotection.Thiscouldonlybeachievedby

continuousratherthanoccasionalnavalexpenditure,andthemembersoftheNavyLeague

weredoingtheirpatrioticdutytoensurethatthispolicyofcontinuousexpenditurewouldbe

adoptedandsustainedbyParliament.

TheLeague’swritersthentookpainstoemphasizetheuniversalnatureofthenavyand

itsimportancetoBritishidentity,againblendingrationalargumentwithsentimentality:“The

efficiencyoftheNavyisthepersonalconcernofeachEnglishmanandwoman,foriftheNavy

everbrokedownthereisnotonepersonintheBritishEmpirewhowouldnotsufferfromthat

unthinkablecalamity.Ithasbeentrulysaid,‘TheNavyofEngland,whenitnolongerreignsin

theheartsofpeople,willsoonceasetoreignonthewavesoftheocean.’”317TheLeague’s

sacreddutywastocorrectthis:“Therearethousandsofourpeoplewhoareutterlyoutof

touchwiththeNavy,anditisthesepeoplewewanttogetholdof,toshowthemthattheNavy

belongstothem,istheirprotection,andshouldbetheirpride.”318Itfinallymovedfrom

proselytizingtorecruiting,sothatthereaderofthepamphletcouldbeapartofthisgreat

cause:

316TrafalgarCentenary,10.317TrafalgarCentenary,10.318TrafalgarCentenary,10.

129

TheNavyLeaguehasdonemuchduringthepasttenyearsinrousingpublicopinionastotheparamountimportanceofaninvincibleNavy;butifmuchhasbeendone,muchremainstodo.Itisnottothepastthatwelook,buttothefuture.Thisisnotimeinwhichtorelaxourefforts;themostefficientAdmiraltyisbetterforoutsidepressure.TheyearofthecentenaryofTrafalgarwillsurelyseeagreatstirringofthenationalspiritonthesubjectoftheNavy.Withsuchapastbehindus,suchafuturetoworkfor,wecannothesitateinourdeterminationthat,costwhatitmay,wewillneverwillinglyyieldup‘ourheritagethesea.’319

Thiswasacalltoaction.Itlinkedthegloryofthepastwiththepromiseofanequallyglorious

future.But,itremindedreadersthatsuchagloriousfuturecouldonlybeguaranteedifthe

BritishpeopleensuredthattheirNavywasnotneglectedthroughfiscalrestraint.

Collectively,thesespeeches,sermons,andpamphletsillustratehowtheBritish,

particularlythemiddleandupperclasses,rememberedtheseeventsandthepeopleinvolved,

andwhatthosememoriesmeanttothem.DrakewasaprototypicalBriton,possessingallof

thecoarsezealthatwouldlaterbebroughtintocheckthroughevolutionandsophisticationof

theBritishraceandsociety.Nelsonwastheendresultofthatdevelopment,thenation’sfinest

achievement,andareminderofwhattheBritishwerecapableof.Nelsonwasalsoa

transformationalfigure.Whilehesufferedfrommoralfailings,hewasabletoredeemhimself

throughhispatrioticfervor,andthiszealanddevotion,alongwithself‐sacrifice,hadsavedthe

Britishnationfromconquest.Inbothinstances,thesecommemoratedeventswereclimactic

watershedsthatallowedforthecontinuedsurvivalofBritishsociety.Theserichlegends

providedamplematerialwithwhichtocreatemoralinstructionforthepopulation.Itwasthe

dutyofallBritonstoemulateNelson’sexample,totransformthemselvesandadoptthe“fiery

zeal”thathadmadeNelsonsoeffective.Theywerealsorequired,aspartoftheirpatriotic

319TrafalgarCentenary,10.

130

duty,tosupportthenavypoliticallyandfinancially,whichwasBritain’sfirstandlastlineof

defense,andwhichwascentraltoBritishidentity.

131

Trafalgar Square. Top; cts dec'orated in norntttl .years; below; in 1905

l uFigure8

PhototakenoftheNelsonMemorialonTrafalgarDay,1905.ThesmallerinsetphotoisofthemonumentduringatypicalTrafalgarDay.

132

Figure9ShadeofNelson:“MyShipsareGone,ButtheSpiritofMyMenRemains.”

133

Figure10ShadeofNelson:“Iseeyou’rehoistingmyoldsignal.”

Britannia:“Yes.Oneortwoofmyadmiralsseemtohaveforgottenit.”

134

Figure11

Nelson’spictureisinthetopcenter,with“EnglandExpectsthatEveryManWillDoHisDuty”writtenbelowhisportrait.

135

CHAPTERFOUR

SHIELDOFEMPIRE

HavingexploredthemeaningofnavalcommemorationsinGreatBritaininthelate

nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,andthemeaningofthesacredmemoryofnaval

eventsandnavalheroesthattheBritishpeopledevotedconsiderableresourcestodeveloping,

thischapterwillexplorethenatureofandsignificanceofrepresentationsofexistingstrength,

aswellasthediscoursethatsurroundedtheserepresentations.Inparticular,thischapterwill

exploretheformstheserepresentationstook(particularlyfleetreviews),thecontributions

thesereviewsmadetofleshingoutapopularBritishsenseofnavalownership,andthe

increasingcommercializationofnavaleventsduringthisperiod.Itwillthendiscusstheuseof

theseoccasionsofcelebrationtourgefurtheractionandvigilancebytheBritishpeople,the

constructionofteleologies(specificallyrelatingtotheDiamondJubileeof1897),andtherole

theseoccasionsplayedincompensatingforagrowingsenseofuneaseamongtheBritish

people.

Thischapterwillproceedthematicallyratherthanchronologically.Whereasthe

discoursegeneratedbythecommemorationsexploredinChapterThreewasusuallyassociated

withtheinspiringmemoryofpastevents,andthedesirabilityofemulatingheroesofthepast,

thediscoursediscussedherewasmainlyaboutreassuranceandcelebration,self‐congratulation

andtheunassailablevirtuesofBritishidentity.TheBritishpublichadbeencompelledtodevote

increasingfinancialresourcestowardbuildingastrongnavy,andthefleetreviewsweretheir

reward.TheyweredesignedtoshowtheBritishpublichowpowerfulandimpressivetheirfleet

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was,andthustoshowthemthattheirfinancialsacrificewasnotinvain.Theywere“spectacles

ofpowerandpride,withhundredsofthousandsregularlyturningouttowatch.”320

FleetreviewsandinspectionsdatebackatleasttothereignofGeorgeIIIinthelate

eighteenthcentury.321Originallytheseritualswerestrictlyfunctional,astheyhadallowedthe

monarchtoassessthereadinessofhisnavalforces.Betweentheeighteenthcenturyandthe

outbreakofWorldWarOne,however,theygrewbothincomplexityandinfrequency.

Between1773andtheoccasionofQueenVictoria’sGoldenJubileein1887,therehadbeen

eightRoyalNavyfleetreviews.From1887to1914,therewereeleven.322Moreover,the

reviewofthefleetin1887involvedapaltry128ships,arrangedintworows.BytheDiamond

Jubileetenyearslaterthereviewcontingenthadgrownto165shipsthatrequiredsixrowsto

accommodatethemall.Thereviewin1907numbered173ships,andthereviewin1914

includedastaggering205ships,arrangedinelevenrows.323Figure12324comparesthesizeof

thefleetreviewin1887andtheonein1914,takenfromAdmiraltyrecordsontheplanningof

thefestivities.

JanRuger’sdescriptionofthe1909fleetreviewprovidesaglimpseofthespectaclethat

Britishpatronswouldhavebeenprivyto:

On17July1909Britanniacametotown.TheThameswas‘throngedwithexpectantpeople’whenthebasculesofTowerBridgeopenedat1pmtolettheprocessionofwarshipsenter.SmallcruisersanddestroyersanchoredoppositetheTowerofLondonandatLondonBridge.Alineofblacktorpedoboatswent

320JanRuger,TheGreatNavalGame:BritainandGermanyintheAgeofEmpire(London:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),1.321Ruger,16.322Ruger,20‐21.323Ruger,21.324ReprintedfromRuger,22‐23.

137

furtheruptheriver…Thenthemostmodernandintriguingvesselsofthefleetfollowed,thesubmarines…watchedbythecrowdswith‘awe’and‘quietfascination’…Atthesametimethefleet’sbigbattleships,includingthelatestDreadnoughts,anchoreddowntheriveratSouthendintwolonglines…Theywerereportedlygreetedby‘apressing,eagermobofsightseers.’By3pmagrandtotalof150warships,almosttheentireHomeFleet,hadassembledintheThames,stretchingfromtheveryheartofthecapitaleastwardstowardsthesea,afloatingchainoffortymiles.325

Thiselaborateblendoffrontlinevesselsandsupportcraftofallsizesandfunctionswas

carefullyorchestratedinordertomaximizepublicexposuretotheshipsthattheBritishpeople

hadindirectlypurchasedthroughtaxation.In1909thefleetremainedintheThamesRiverfora

fullweek.326Theactivitiesduringthefleet’sstayincluded“mock‐fights,illuminations,/

fireworksandsearchlightdisplays.Navalmarchesandparadespassedthroughthestreetsof

London,themostspectacularon21July,when1,200menand40officersmarchedfromthe

EmbankmenttotheGuildhall,dragginganartilleryof12‐pounderfieldgunsbehindthem.”327

Alloftheshipswereopentopublicvisitors,exceptforthesubmarines.328Eventhe

dreadnoughtsthemselveswereavailablefortoursonthreeseparateafternoons,forfourhours

eachday.329NewspapersreportedthatfourmillionpeoplehadvisitedtheBritishfleetand

engagedinthespectacleduringtheweekofJuly17thtothe24th,1909.330Thenumberof

peopleattendingtheseeventshadincreaseddramaticallysincethelateeighteenthcentury,

andthosepeoplewereincreasinglywilling(andable,becauseofexpandingrailroadnetworks)

totravellongdistancestoparticipate.Patronsoffleetreviewsinthelateeighteenthcentury

325Ruger,12.326Ruger,12.327Ruger,12‐13.328UnknownAuthor,NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,17thto24thJuly1909,(London:TheNavyLeague,1909),48.329NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,47.330Ruger,13.

138

couldbeexpectedtotraveluptoafewmilestoattendthespectacle.Bytheearlytwentieth

century,thespectaclesweredrawingpeoplefromhundredsofmilesaway.331

TheapexofthenavalvisittotheThameswastheroyalreviewitself,whichinvolvedthe

passingoftheRoyalYachtbetweentherowsofwarships,metbythrongsofcheeringsailors

andthefiringofsalutegunstothesovereign.Onceithadpassedthroughthelinesofwarships

theyachtwouldanchor,andthemonarchwouldhostthecommandingofficersoftheshipsthat

hadparticipated.332JanRugerarguesthat:“thiselaboratemaritimeprocessionshowedthat

thefunctionofthefleetreviewshadchangedfundamentally.Thiswasclearlynolongeran

‘inspection’intheoriginalsenseoftheword.Thedistanceatwhichtheroyalyachtpassedthe

warshipsduringtheprocessionprecludedanymeaningfulappreciationofthestatematerial

andpersonnelwerein.”333Theendresultofthe“inspection”wasalwaysthesame.Thekingor

queenwouldreporttothefleetthat“His[orHer]Majestyisgreatlypleasedwiththeefficient

conditionoftheHomefleet,”littlemorethananacknowledgementthatthereviewhadbeena

successfulspectacle.334AdmiralReginaldBacon,inhis1925workontheBattleofJutland,

notedthatthesereviewshadbecomeendsuntothemselves,andhadlittletodowithshowing

offthefightingproficiencyofthefleet:

OfallourpublicservicestheRoyalNavyisprobablytheonethatforthelasthundredyearshasbeenthemosthonouredbytheconfidencereposedinitbythepeopleofthiscountry;butatthesametimeithasbeenthroughoutthisperiodtheleastunderstood.Banishedfromviewtothesea,whereitslifeisspentinconstantmaneuversandtraining,ourfleetisonlyconspicuousonthespecialoccasionsofofficialparadesandfunctions,whentheworkofafighting

331Ruger,57.332Ruger,18.333Ruger,18.334Ruger,18‐19.

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serviceisparalysed,andtheessentiallifeofanavyishiddenunderacloakofartificiality.335

AsAdmiralBaconpointedoutattheendofthispassage,theNavyandtheGovernmenthad

consciouslycreatedafictionforpublicconsumption.Thepublic’sincreasingthirstforthis

fictioncompelledtheNavytoputonevenmoreelaborateandimpressivespectacles.This

increasingpublicinterestinnavalspectaclesalsofueledincreasednavalexpenditure,whichin

turnprovidedthenavywiththeresourcestoprovideforthegreaterspectaclesthatthepublic

desired.

Swellingparticipationinnavalspectaclesattheendofthenineteenthcenturyandthe

increasingscopeofattendancefromallcornersofthecountrybothencouragedandwere

reinforcedby“theunfoldingofthepoliticalandculturalmassmarket.”336TheBritishpublic

increasinglyconsumed“naval”products,andadvertisersincreasinglyusedthenavyasameans

ofsellingtheirproducts.337Thefleetreviewsincluded,alongwiththeshowsthemselves,

“advertisementsforchocolates[intheofficialprogramsthat]employedthethemeof‘naval

manoeuvers,’showingasailortalkingtoanofficerwhileslippingtheofficer’swifeabarof

chocolatebehindhisback”(alsoseeFigure13338).ThereweremodelDreadnoughtsfashioned

aschildren’stoys.Biscuitsandotherfoodswithnavalthemeswereavailableatthesereviews.

Spectatorscouldridein“DreadnoughtTrams,”whichweredecoratedtolooklikebattleships,

andincludedimitationgunsonthesides.Localvendorsalsocapitalizedonthesymbology.One

335ReginaldBacon,TheJutlandScandal(London:Hutchinson&Co,1925),1.336Ruger,9.337Ruger,50.338NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,backcover.

140

tailorshop’sadvertisementread“DreadnoughtandWearBritishClothing.”339Otheritemssold

bothatthesitesofreviewsthemselvesandasapartofthegeneralmassmarketincluded“rum,

soap,sweets,perfume,clothesandmen’sgroomingproducts.Picturebooks,guides,charts,

postcardsandothermemorabiliaweresold…alloverthecountry.”340Intheofficialprogramfor

the1909Thamesreview,theadvertisementsincludedenamelpaint(seeFigure14341),wine,

spirits,andtobacco(SeeFigure15342),andclothing(seeFigure16343),allwithnavalthemes.

ThisallowedthepublictoincreasinglyassociatetheirdailyliveswiththeNavy.Theywereable

tobringlittlepiecesofthefleethomewiththem,whethertheywereintheformofmodelsand

toys,foodproducts,smokingtobacco,orothermoreindirectlyassociateditems.Ineffect,

Britonscelebratedtheirnavalheritagethroughthisconsumptionofthefleetineffigy.

Thenavalmarketfoundanicheforhomeversionsofwargamessets,withextremely

elaboraterules.MostnotableofthesewasthegamedevelopedbyFredT.Jane,whichallowed

childrenofallagestoengageinmocknavalbattleswiththeirsiblingsandfriends,familiarizing

themselveswith“armourprotection,endurance,[and]layoutofenginesandmagazines”ofthe

variousfightingunitsintheirgames.344Thepositiveimpactthatthesegameshadonchildren

wasexpoundeduponinanarticleinthejournalTheEngineerinDecember1898:

Mr.JanewasnotthefirstpersontoinventanavalKriegspiel,andhewillnotbethelast.Butwithhimliesthehonouroffirstachievingsuccess…Inthefirstplace…wemustremindourreadersthatthenavalKriegspielisagameonlyinname.Inrealityitisamostinstructivelessoninthecapabilitiesofdifferent

339Ruger,13‐14.340Ruger,58.341NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,xxxiv.342NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,16.343NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,ix.344DonaldF.Featherstone,NavalWarGames:FightingSeaBattleswithModelShips,(London:StanleyPaul,1965),22‐23.

141

typesofshipstowithstandorcarryonattacks;inthepracticabilityofevolutionandoftheirusefulness;inthevalueofgunfire,andofthevulnerabilityofships.Inshort,itputsveryfairlybeforetheplayerstheactualproblemswhichwouldfacethemweretheycommandingsquadronsintimesofwar,andifplayedinseriousnesscannotfailtoinstructthem.345

Accordingtotheauthor,thesegamescouldhavepositivesocietalbenefits,intermsof

educatingBritain’syouthandgivingthemtheinclinationtowardstrategicandtacticalthought.

Thesegameswouldalsohavebeenseenasfamiliarizingchildrenwiththenavyasaninstitution

andasaculturalartifact,perhapsmakingthemmoreinclinedtoaspiretoacareerasasailor.

Attheveryleast,thesegameswouldhavetaughtchildrentoadmirethosewhodidserve,and

tothinkofthenavyasbeingsomethingthatbelongedtothemastheirBritishbirthright.

ThegrowingBritishconsumptionofnavalspectaclesanddemandforproductswith

navalthemesindicatedthedesireoftheBritishpeopletoidentifywiththenavy.Thesedesires

wereencouragedandcultivatedbytheNavyLeagueandtheAdmiralty.Sentimentsassociated

withtheneedforBritishpeopletakingownershipoftheirnavywereexpressedintheofficial

programsofthenavalreviewsandinnewspapers.Apowerfulexampleofthisisapassageby

RudyardKipling,printedintheIllustratedLondonNewsinJuly1909,onthefirstdayofthe

fleet’svisittotheThames:

Andthewholethingwasmyveryown(thatistosayyours);minetomebymyrightofbirth.Minewerethespeedandpowerofthehulls,nothereonlybuttheworldover;theheartsandbrainsandlivesofthetrainedmen;suchstrengthandsuchpowerasweandtheWorlddarehardlyguessat.Andholdingthispowerinthehollowofmyhand;ableatthewordtoexploittheearthtomyownadvantage;togathermetreasureandhonour,asmenreckonhonour,I(anda

345Featherstone,145‐146.

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fewmillionfriendsofmine)forborebecausewewerewhitemen.Anyotherbreedwiththisengineattheirdisposalwouldhaveuseditsavagelylongago.346

Withthissentimentalityoverthesacredvirtueofthemostpowerfulnavyevercreated,Kipling

tiedthepoweroftheNavytothecontinuedvitalityandvirtueoftheBritishrace.He

congratulatedtheBritishonmaintainingsuchapowerfulforce,andforusingthatpower

towardjustends.Inadditiontosentimentalviewsofwhatthenavymeantasanessentialpart

ofbeingBritish,theofficialprogramofthesamenavalreviewpointedtothefundamental

differenceinpublicperceptionofthearmyandnavy,andtheroleofeach:

Itisclear,then,toholdcommandoftheseaEnglandmusthaveaNavyfarlargerthananyothernation.Notanequality,butasuperioritysogreatthatothernationswillthinktwicebeforedisturbingthepeaceandprosperitywhichwenowenjoy.WehavesofarmadenomentionoftheBritishArmy.ThereasonofthisisthatwehavebeendealingsolelywithblowsstruckattheheartoftheBritishEmpire,andinencountersofthiskindaNavy,andaNavyonly,canprotectus.NonationcandispensewithanArmy.EvenanavalnationliketheBritishhasweakpointsinherempire,suchasfrontiersinAsia,Africa,andAmerica,whichanArmyonlycandefend.Butwehavetriedtomakeitclearthattosaveusfromamortalwoundwemustrelyonoursea‐serviceonly.347

Thisreinforcedthenotion,expressedearlier,thattheNavywasBritain’strulydefensivearm,

andcouldonlybeproperlyenvisionedasaprotectoroftheBritishpeople.Thenavywasthe

“shield”oftheirempire,andabirthrighttowhichtheyowedtheirprosperity.Thiswasnota

newsentiment,butthefrequencyofexpressingitincreasedwiththerisingintensityofthe

navalarmsrace.Tobeworthyofthisdebt,theBritishpeoplewereobligatedtosustainthe

navalinstitutionthroughfurtherfinancialandpatrioticsupport.Thiswastheironlypathto

sustainablesecurity.

346RudyardKipling,“AFleetinBeing:NotesofTwoTripswiththeChannelSquadron,”inIllustratedLondonNews,July17th,1909.347UnknownAuthor,OfficialProgrammeoftheGreatNavalReviewWestminstertoSouthendJuly17to24,1909:ContainingPlanoftheFleetandtheStoryoftheRoyalNavy,(London:GaleandPolden,Ltd.,1909),16.

143

Critiquesofthenavalsituationalsocoincidedwiththesenavalreviews,justascritiques

hadbeengeneratedinconjunctionwiththecommemorationsexaminedintheprevious

chapter.ThesecritiquesappearedinallmannerofNavyLeaguepublications,aswellas

publicationsliketheNavyandArmyIllustrated.Characteristicoftheseargumentswasa

passagepublishedintheNavyandArmyIllustratedin1897bythealwaysoutspokenandcritical

LordCharlesBeresfordontheoccasionoftheDiamondJubileeReview:“Itisperhapsjustas

wellthatsuchaspectacleasthatofJune26th,affordingasitdoesevidenceofpastactivity,

shouldnotbeallowedtolullthecountryintofalseideasofwhatyetremainstobedone.It

cannotbetooclearlyrealizedthatdefencewhichisimperfectinanyimportantparticularsis

almostasuselessasnodefenceatall.”348Inthesamepassagehewentontorailagainstsuch

injusticesasthecreepinglyslowpromotionsystemintheRoyalNavywhichproducedolder

admiralswhoat“64or65[lacked]thatenergy,dash,nerve,andquicknessofdecisionwhich

meansthewholedifferencebetweenwinningandlosingacampaign.Statesmenmaybe

different,butaBritishadmiralneedsapersonalvigourofbodyandpowerofactionwhicha

CabinetMinisterneednotnecessarilypossess,”349andagainstwhatheassertedwasa

widespreadignoranceoftheBritishpublicabouttheNavy.Thelatterheproposedtocorrect

byincreasingthevisibilityoftheNavy,specificallybycreating“aRoyalbody‐guardofMarines”

andbyarrangingvisits“bytorpedodestroyersandothersmallcraft”toLondon.350For

Beresford,theconsequencesofpublicdetachmentfromthenavyhadcreated“apathythat

existedbeforetheNavyLeaguecommenceditswork,and…thewantofrepresentationofthe

348LordCharlesBeresford,“SomeNavalNeedsoftheNation,”inTheNavyandArmyIllustrated,Friday,25June,1897(London,Kearns,1897),85.349Beresford,85.350Beresford,86.

144

Navygenerally,that[caused]thedeplorableconditionwewereinin1887.”351Whetherornot

theincreaseinthesizeandfrequencyoffleetreviewswasduetoLordBeresford’sagitation,

theseincreasinglycomplexspectaclessurelydidmaketheBritishpublicmorefamiliarwiththeir

fleet,andthisinturnfueledpublicdemandformoreelaboratespectacles.

Critiquesofnavalapathyandignorancecamefromothersourcesaswell.Onthe

occasionoftheDiamondJubileetheReverendSamuelG.Greennotedinhiswork“The

DiamondJubileeandsomeofitsLessons”thattheBritishEmpirewassusceptibletothesame

fatethathadbefallentheRomanEmpire,inthattheempirewasvulnerabletodeclineand

collapse.352Additionally,inathinlyveiledstabatthosewhofavoredcutbacksinnaval

expenditures,theauthorsoftheofficialprogramforthe1909navalreviewcitedhistorical

examplestoillustratethefollyofthoseattitudes.Theseexamplesreachedasfarbackasthe

seventeenthcentury.Oneanonymousauthorargued:“Ignoranceandextravagancecombined

tomaketheGovernmentofCharlesIIneglectthetaskofmaintaininganeffectivefleet.‘They

forgottheverylessonsthatthewarhadtaught,andwerecontent,insteadofmakingthe

enemy’sshoretheEnglishfrontier,toentrustthedefenceofthecoasttofortifications,andto

layuptheshipsinharbor.’Afatalmistakenottoberepeated.”353Thissameauthorattributed

thelossofthewaragainsttheAmericancolonistsinthelateeighteenthcenturytoalackof

navalpreparedness:“In1781…wesufferedourgreatestdisaster,byneglectingtomaintaina

fleetinproportiontoourresponsibilities,andCornwallis,atYorktown,hadtosurrenderhis

351Beresford,86.352Rev.SamuelGreen,TheDiamondJubileeandSomeofItsLessons(London:TheReligiousTractSociety,1897),3‐4.TheReligiousTractSocietythatRev.GreenwroteforwasfoundedinthelateeighteenthcenturyforthepurposeofpublishingChristianliteratureandevangelizing.353OfficialProgrammeoftheGreatNavalReviewWestminstertoSouthend17‐24July1909,8‐9.

145

armyandAmerica,becauseastrongFrenchfleetforcedawaytheBritishfleetthatshouldhave

supportedhim.”354Bycontrast,theresultsofeffectiveandadequatenavalexpansionhad

bornethemselvesoutpositively:“Atthistime[theeighteenthcentury]thepowerofEngland

restedfirmlyuponagreatNavy,andwemustnotforgetthatthiswasaperiodofpeace,

commercialactivity,andcolonialexpansion.”355

Thesehistorylessonswouldinevitablygivewaytodirectcallstoaction,aswiththis

excerptfromthenavalreviewprogramin1897:“’Areyoureadytohelpusstrengthenthe

splendidfleetyouhaveseen?ThenjointheNavyLeague.Astrictlynon‐partyorganizationto

urgeupontheGovernmentofthedayandtheelectoratetheparamountimportanceofan

adequateNavyasthebestGuaranteeofPeace.’”356Suchrecruitingpitcheswereconsistentin

NavyLeagueliterature.ThedangerrepresentedbythegrowingGermanmenaceappearedin

theNavyLeagueguidetothe1909Thamesvisit,inwhichamenacing‐lookinggraphical

representationofthenavalarmsraceillustratedtheslimleadthattheBritishhadin

maintainingtheirnavalsupremacy(seeFigure17357).

ThecommemorationsdiscussedinChapterThreeservedtolinkthecelebratedpastto

thepresent.Oldheroesandoldvictorieswerepresentedasbeingreplicableinthepresent

becauseofthelong‐standingBritishvirtuesthathadledtoandsustainedBritishgreatness.In

thediscoursesurroundingthefleetreviewstherewerestrainsthatmovedintheother

direction,thatlinkedthepresenttothepast,creatingteleologiesthatpointedtothepresent

354OfficialProgrammeoftheGreatNavalReviewWestminstertoSouthend17‐24July1909,11.355OfficialProgrammeoftheGreatNavalReviewWestminstertoSouthend17‐24July1909,9.356Ruger,97.357NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,21.

146

stateofaffairsasbeingtheresultofaccumulatedvirtue.Thissentimentservedtocreatea

sensethatBritain’splaceintheworldwasitsnaturalone,thatitwasdestinedtodominatethe

worldsolongastheBritonsremainedtruetotheirinherentvirtueandupheldtheirtime‐

honoredideals.Britainhadearneditsrightfulplaceasaresultoftheuniquecontributionsto

civilizationthatithadmadeoverthenineteenthcentury.Thissentimentwasmostevidentin

theliteratureproducedontheoccasionoftheDiamondJubilee.TheNavyofthenineteenth

centuryhadfulfilleditspurposewell,andtheresilientinstitutionoftheRoyalNavythathad

hadsomuchpastsuccesswasstandingreadytotakeBritainsafelyintothetwentiethcentury,

asJohnLeylandarguedin1897:“Itmustberemembered,asamagnificentservicerenderedto

theEmpirebytheNavyduringtheQueen’sreign,thatithasenabledustoexercise,

undisputed,ourmilitaryforcewherevertheneedarose.Thissilentinfluenceofourseapower

fortheimperialadvantageshouldbeconstantlyinthereader’smind,thoughsomeinstancesof

itsexercisemaypresentlybecited.”358TheNavywaslinkedtotheimprovementsinBritain’s

standingintheworldoverthereignofQueenVictoria,andwascreditedwitheliminating

slaveryandcurtailingpiracy.ReverendGreenpointedoutthatthosewholivedinBritainatthe

timeoftheDiamondJubileecouldlookbackwithsatisfactionthatsincethebeginningofthe

reignofQueenVictoria“slavery[had]beenabolished;crime[had]diminished;[and]education

[had]advanced.”359TheRoyalNavyhadshownitselfasbeingabovereproachthroughout

Victoria’slongreign:“TheRoyalNavyrenderedsplendidservicealiketotheStateandthe

greaterhumanityduringHerMajesty’sreign…Ithastakenanobleandsustainedpartinthe358JohnLeyland,“TheInfluenceofSeaPower,1837‐1897,”inTheNavyandArmyIllustrated,Friday,25June,1897(London:Kearns,1897),60.JohnLeylandisnotlistedinthepublicationashavinganavalrankasmostoftheothersare,andthevolumedoesnotcontainbiographicalinformationforhim.PerhapshewasanofficerintheNavyLeague,orsimplyajournalistforTheNavyandArmyIllustrated.359Green,4.

147

suppressionofslavery,andpiracy.Ithasneverbeenusedtoadministerpunishmentorsecure

compensationwhensubjectshavebeenoutragedortheirgoodshavebeendestroyed.”360

Therefore,astheNavyhadbeennothingbutaforceforgoodintheworld,itwasworthyof

continuedBritishinvestment,andcouldbecountedupontocontinuetokeepBritainsecure

andtomaketheworldamoremoralplace.

Thethematicstrandsexploredinthischapterculminateintheoverarchingrolethat

culturalmanifestationsofnavalstrengthplayedinBritishsociety.Thisultimaterolewasthe

compensationandmitigationofBritishuneaseanddoubtsaboutthefutureoftheBritish

EmpireandtheBritishpeople.Thenavyreassureditspatronsinthreeways.First,itdirectly

pointedtoafuturethatwouldbeasbrightasthepasthadbeen.ThenotionoftheRoyalNavy

asapillarofstabilitythatwouldallowBritaintosuccessfullytransitiontothetwentiethcentury

appearedinthisexcerptfromtheNavyandArmyIllustratedinitscoverageoftheDiamond

Jubileenavalreview:“Wearenowproceedingsteadily,andonwell‐assuredlines,indeveloping

ourNavy;anditsrestorationtoapositionitheldatthebeginningofthecenturywillhereafter,I

believe,beconsideredthespecialfeatureofareigngloriousineveryrespect.”361Thesecond

waywasthatitseemedtomitigateproblemsofidentitycrisisthatplaguedBritishsociety

duringthisperiod.JanRugerarguesthattheRoyalNavyofferedameansofstabilizingBritain’s

nationalidentityinawaythatthearmycouldnot:

Thenavyservedasaprimesymbolofnationalidentityatatimewhenideasof‘thenation’werecontestedbothfromwithinandwithout.Whilethearmyand

360Leyland,70.361P.H.Colomb,“TheNavalPersonnelDuringtheQueen’sReign,”inTheNavyandArmyIllustrated,Friday,25June,1897(London:Kearns,1897),74.ColombwasaretiredViceAdmiralwhobecameanhistorianandavocalcriticofnavalpolicyafterheretiredfromactiveserviceinthe1880s.

148

itsrepresentationwererootedinregionaltraditions,thenavywasagenuinelynationalinstitution…Itspubliccelebrationaimedtoreconcilelocal,regionalandnationalcontexts.Thecapabilitytosymbolicallymergedifferentnationalsignifiersintoonepotentdisplaymadethisauniquearenaforculturalnation‐building.362

Thenavyallowedforconsolidationofnotionsof“Britishness”togoalongsideandtooverride

English,Welsh,Scottish,andIrishnationalism.363Rugerarguesthat“threatstotheBritish

commandofthesea…underminedsensesofnationalidentity,closelyconnectedastheywere

tonavalsuperiorityinthisperiod.Allthismeantthatastrongsenseofunresolvedness

characterizedtheissueofnationhoodintheUnitedKingdomofthelatenineteenthcentury,a

kingdomthatwasincreasinglystrugglingtoaccommodateitsfournationsanddefinetheir

commonpurpose.”364Unlikethearmy,whichhadlocalties,thenavybelongedtoeverybody

undertheumbrellaoftheUnitedKingdomanditsEmpire.Theofficialprogramfromthefleet’s

visittotheThamesin1909alludedtothisfeelingofimperialunity:“Inone,andthata

thoroughlypractical,sensetheNavyhasalwaysbeenImperial.Initsdistributionandactivity

therehasbeennodistinctionbetweenonepartoftheEmpireandtheothers.Itsshipsand

theircrewshavebeen,andstillare,unreservedlyattheserviceofeverypartwherever

situated.”365Finally,thenavywasusedtodeclarethesolidarityandmasculinevirtueofthe

Britishrace,contestingthenotionthattheracewasindecline:“The‘onevastmachine’that

wasthenavywasanexclusivelymaledomination,arealmofmasculinityinwhich‘gunsand

men’cametogether.”366The1909programlinkedthevigorofBritishyouthtothecontinued

362Ruger,10.363Ruger,165.364Ruger,165‐166.365TheNavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,23.366Ruger,194.ThisquotewasassembledfromthelanguageusedonthecoveroftheOfficialProgrammeoftheCoronationReview,1911,andfromanarticleintheDailyExpressonJuly19th,1909.

149

strengthoftheNavy:“WithalltheattractionsofasealifeintheRoyalNavyitisawonderthat

anyboyprefersalifeonshore.Forgrantedthatheisphysicallyfit,healthyandambitious,he

notonlyseesagreatdealoftheworld,buthehasachanceofdistinguishinghimselfbyhis

braveryandzeal.”367Therefore,thefloweroftheBritishnationcouldfinditsnaturalplaceof

employmentinthatmostBritishofinstitutions:theRoyalNavy.Thecurrentincarnationof

Britain’syouth,stillas“fit,healthy,andambitious”astheirancestors,couldrealizetheirfull

potentialthroughthenavalservice.

IntheyearsleadinguptoWorldWarOne,Germanybecamemoremenacing,and

Britain’spositionseemedlesssecure.AsthestabilityofBritain’spositionasthepremierworld

powerwaned,theculturalimportanceoftheRoyalNavyincreased,368andthiswasdirectly

linkedtothevastincreaseinthecomplexityandfrequencyofnavalspectacles.

Incontinuitywithitsheroictradition,thecontemporaryincarnationoftheRoyalNavy

waspresentedtotheBritishpublicasasourceofphysicalandmoralstrength,capableof

securingBritain’splaceinagloriousfuture.Justascommemorationsofpastvictoriesservedto

remindBritonsofwhattheyhadachieved,thesecelebrationsoftheircontemporarynaval

strengthaimedtoreassurethemabouttheirsecurity.Representationsofnavalstrengthwere

usedtocompensateforasenseofanxietyasBritain’spowerwasincreasinglythreatenedby

Germany.Thefleetreviewsoftheearlytwentiethcenturydrewunprecedentedcrowds.With

theriseofthemassmarket,moreandmorepeoplewereinvolvedinthe“cultofthenavy,”and

increasinglydemandedgreaterandgreaterparticipationinnavalspectacles.Asthearmsrace

367TheNavyLeagueGuidetothetotheThamesReview,41.368Ruger,182.

150

continuedandthefleetexpanded,thenavalestablishmenthadmoreshipstoshowoff,anddid

soinordertodemonstratetotheBritishpeopletheresultsoftheirinvestment.Increasing

demandforproductswithnavalthemesledtothecommercializationoftheRoyalNavyin

unprecedentedways.Civilianscouldconsumenavychocolate,navycigarettes,usenavysoap,

andbuydreadnoughttoysfortheirchildren.Adultsandchildrenalikecouldrecreateoldnaval

battlesathomeorplayoutnewones.Thisphenomenonofincreasedpublicdemandfornaval

culturalartifactsfueledtheculturalimpulseforthearmsraceasitsimultaneouslyplacatedthe

publicandprovidedthemwithaheightenedsenseofprideintheirinvinciblebattlefleet.This

battlefleetwouldonlybeusedinonesignificantactionaftertheoutbreakofhostilitieswith

Germany–theBattleofJutland,andthisactionclosedwithdisappointingresults.Itistothis

singleuseofBritain’smightiestweaponandthereactionstotheresultsofthatusethatthis

thesiswillfinallyturn.

151

Figure12Top:AdmiraltyplanforNavalReviewin1887

Bottom:aSimilarplanfor1914

152

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ThamesReview,1909

156

IV

ill

II

1912 I

f:, '

i :, '

n ! !1905 I f ~

DREADNOUGHT

DIAGRAM.

1-

x x x 191Q-II1718 1920

-it.: 71•• I I T* k I< ~ ..1909-10131i ISISb

41909-10.·

l'< x x171615 1i

3

2~ GERMAN. 1912

2IV

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1910

2II

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IV

ill

II

I 1905

IV

ill

II

I 1901

IV

ill

II

I 1906

IV

ill

II

I 1905

,

,

~ !1905-09

X: :. x13 12 II 10

i

: 3: 1901-oS

rO

EXPLANATION.

• EACH LINE REPRESENTS A DREADNDUCHT.

<:> INDICATES DATE lAID DOWN.

X INDICATES DATE VOTED.

FIGURES 3, 2., 2, INDICATE MARGINAL LIMITS OF POSSIBLE COMPLETION.

REFERENCE NUMBERS 1, 2, 3, 4, ETC., ARE ATTACHED TO EACH SHIP.

,....INOICATES COMPUTED.

REFERENCE.

3

1906-07

BRITISH.

Dreadnought 1Invincible 2Indomitable 3InOexible . ... 4Benerophon: 5Temeraire 6Superb 7St. Vincent 8Collingwood 9Vanguard 10Neptune 11Indefatigable 12

4-

1905-06·

G~N.

1 Nassau.2 Westfalen,3 Rheinland41'Pbsen.5 F6 G7 Oldenburg.8 Beowulf.9 ~Siegfried.10 FritbjofII Heimdan12 Hildebrand.13 H

4- ,i"1901-0S! : i i

XXXX9 876

,

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3 :

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2 ;

1905-06 ~2

programme. Of these last four ships, two were laid down

some time before their due dates, and arrangements have

already been made for the building of the other two. Further,

we know that the GermrHl Navy League is urging for an~increase even on this heavy programme. These facts by

themselves are serious enough, but they are not all. Since our

naval estimates were presented in March, it has become known

that Austria, a country bound by ties of the closest alliance with

Germany, is adopting a naval programme which will give her in

a few years a strong position in the Mediterranean. Without

using the language of exaggeration or of panic, the Navy League

wishes to bring these indisputable facts before all of its fellow

citizens that it can reach. We ask those who read this G1:l.ide

to consider and weigh them with care, to appreciate what ,they

mean to the country which we love and to the Empire of which

we are so justly proud, and to use their best endeavours to

encourage a sound public opinion, which will serve to

1ltrengthenthe hands of those responsible for the safety of the

country. There may be other ways in which this valuable and

necessarywork can be done, but there is none which will be

foundmore effective than that of supporting the Navy League

3.?dassisting to make it a force to which even Ministers of the

Crownmust listen.

THE TWO FLEETS OF THE ITALIAN

RACE.

ALL know the admirable courage and discipline that

have uniformly distinguished the navy of Austria in her

varied historic forms. Few recognise how little Austrian, in

tbe South German sense, is, and ever has been, the Austrian

fleet. British passengers by Austrian-Lloyd steamers are

always puzzled when they first hear the words of command

given in the Italian tongue, and find themselves unable to

recognise anything that is German in the commercial

fleet which has its headquarters at Trieste. But Trieste

itself is a German city (large as is its Italian population)

when compared with the ports of the Dalmatian coast,

which, whether"Austrian or Hungarian, have always been the

bases of the Austrian navy. That there is a considerable

Slavonic element on that coast no one can doubt, but, just as

the Greek tongue and Greek civilisationhave affected all the

various races of the maritime provinces 'of Asia Minor, so the

Italian tongue and Italian civilisation have treated the Slavs

of:the North~Eastern Adriatic. The navy which-fought against

A 10

Figure17NavyLeagueGuidetotheThamesReview,1909

p.21

157

EPILOGUE

“WHEREISOURNELSON?”

OntheeveningofMarch30th,1916AdmiralJohnJellicoe,Commander‐in‐Chiefofthe

BritishGrandFleet,weighedanchorandputtoseafromhisbaseatScapaFlow.Almost

simultaneously,theBritishBattleCruiserFleetunderViceAdmiralDavidBeattyleftitsbaseat

theFirthofForth.BothforcessteamedeastintotheNorthSea,withorderstodeployin

anticipationoftheGermanHighSeasFleetemergingfromitsprotectedharborat

Wilhelmshaven.369TherewaslittleenthusiasmamongtheBritishfleetpersonnel,whohad

beengivensimilarassignmentsbefore,whichhadbythistimebecomedullroutine.Sincethe

outbreakofhostilitiesin1914,therehadbeennodecisivenavalencounterwiththeGermans.

Onthisoccasion,however,aboutthreehoursaftertheBritishfleetsleftharbor,theGerman

HighSeasFleetunderAdmiralScheer,supportedbyaGermanbattlecruiserforceunderVice

AdmiralvonHipper,leftWilhelmshaventoattempttoreopenthesupplylinestotheAtlantic

cutoffbytheBritishblockadeandharassBritishshippingifencountered.370

Thefleetsbecameawareofeachotherthefollowingafternoon.Thefirstforces

engagedwerethebattlecruisersquadronsunderBeattyandvonHipper.Whatinitially

developedwasaBritishsternchaseoftheGermanbattlecruiserfleet,withvonHipperleading

BeattytothewesttowardthemainGermanforce.Thetwosidesexchangedfireatextreme

range,andupontakingtwoGermanshellstheBritishbattlecruiserHMSIndefatigable

369HolgerHerwig,“Luxury”Fleet:TheImperialGermanNavy1888‐1918(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1980),178.370Herwig,178.

158

exploded,rackedbynumeroussecondaryexplosions.371DuringBeatty’spursuitofScheer,the

battlecruiserHMSQueenMarysufferedthesamefate.Hermagazines,fullofcorditecharges,

wereeasilypenetratedbytheGermanshellsandtheshipwascompletelydestroyed.Having

catastrophicallylosttwobattlecruisers,Beattyiscreditedwithhavingsaid,withstereotypical

Britishunderstatement,“Thereseemstobesomethingwrongwithourbloodyshipstoday.”372

UponsightingScheer’smainforcethatvonHipperhadledhimtoward,Beattyturnedhisown

fleetnorth,ostensiblytoleadthewholeoftheGermanfleettowardJellicoe.373Scheerandvon

HipperwiththeirnewlycombinedforcespursuedBeattyforaboutninetyminutes,atwhich

pointtheyfoundthemselvesexposedtoJellicoe’sfullbroadside.Upongraspingthesituation,

Jellicoeexecutedarapidredeploymentofhisfleettoformaneast/westline,“CrossingtheT”

ofthecombinedGermanFleet,whichwasorientedinanorth/southline,andclosingrange.

Jellicoe’smaneuverplacedtheGermansataconsiderabledisadvantageintermsofthenumber

ofgunstheycouldbringtobear,andtheBritishsalvoswereinflictingheavydamageonthe

GermanfleetasitclosedrangewithJellicoe’sline.374

Afterstumblingintothisunfortunatefleetgeometry,Scheerquicklyattemptedto

disengage.HeturnedhisfleetawayfromtheGrandFleet,andwascutoffasecondtimeby

Jellicoe,whohadturnedsouth,recreatingthesamegeometryina90‐degreerotationfromthe

originalscenario.Asnightfell,Scheersuccessfullydisengagedfromthefighting,andby9pm

thehottestpartofthebattlewasover.375Inthedarkness,theGermanHighSeasFleet

371Herwig,181.372Herwig,182.373Herwig,182.374Herwig,183.375Herwig,185.

159

managedtoevadeJellicoe,whowashesitanttopursueaggressivelybecausethiswouldhave

madehisfleetvulnerabletotorpedoattacks.Bymorning,Scheerhadmadegoodhisescape.376

TherawdataassociatedwiththebattledidnotseemtofavortheBritish.Theyhadlost

14shipstotheGermans’11.Theyhadlostmoreheavilyintermsofdisplacement,111,000

tonstotheGermans’62,000tons.MoreBritishwerekilled,taking6,784casualtiestothe

Germans’3,058.377ThiswasafarcryfromwhattheBritishpublichadbeenledtoexpect,in

thewakeofalloftheexpectationsof“anotherTrafalgar”thathadbeenraisedintherealmof

navaltheaterandcommemoration.Britonsweretaught,throughthesecommemorationsand

fleetreviews,thattheRoyalNavywasinvincible,andthatanyencounterwiththeGermanfleet

wouldhaveledtonothinglessthanthecompleteannihilationoftheGermans.Whenthisdid

nothappenatJutland,apassionatedebateensuedabouttheappropriateplacetoassignblame

fortheabsenceofcrushingvictory.Thisdebateevolvedovertimeaspassionscooled.

ThebulkofthisepiloguewillstudyBritishreactionstotheBattleofJutlandintheform

ofpoliticalspeechesandwritingsproducedbymilitaryelitesastheyanalyzedthebattle,and

willshowhowtheyawninggulfbetweenexpectationandrealityprovokedafirestormof

criticismandaccusation.Thesehighemotionswanedastimepassed,andmorerational

analysesofthetrueimportanceoftheclashatJutlandwerepublished.Thesereactionsare

indicativeofjusthowsolidlythenavaltheaterhadformedhighexpectationsofcrushing

victory.Thesereactionsvariedbetweencriticismofthelackofadecisivevictory,andattempts

toreinterpretthebattleasavictoryinordertosootheegosandreassurethepublic.

376Herwig,187.377Herwig,188.

160

TheimmediateBritishreportsofthebattlecamelaterthantheirGermancounterparts.

TheGermanswerequicktopointoutthelargernumberofshipstheyhadsunk,andtheirpress

spunthebattleasagreatGermanvictory.LordJellicoe’sinitialreportpublishedintheLondon

GazetteinearlyJulyattemptedtoputthebestspinonthebattlewithoutgoingintotoomuch

detail:

Theconductofofficersandmenthroughoutthedayandnightactionswasentirelybeyondpraise.Nowordsofminecoulddothemjustice.Onallsidesitisreportedtomethattheglorioustraditionsofthepastweremostworthilyupheld–whetherinheavyships,cruisers,light‐cruisers,ordestroyers–thesameadmirablespiritprevailed.Officersandmenwerecoolanddetermined,withacheerinessthatwouldhavecarriedthemthroughanything.Theheroismofthewoundedwastheadmirationofall.IcannotadequatelyexpressthepridewithwhichthespiritoftheFleetfilledme.378

Jellicoecarefullycraftedreferencestothesustainingofnavaltradition(“theglorioustraditions

ofthepastweremostworthilyupheld”)andthepresenceofgoodBritishvirtue(“cooland

determined”).TheadmiraltyalsopublisheddocumentsdenyingthetruthoftheGermanclaim

ofvictory,aswiththefollowingdiarypublishedin1916bytwoanonymoussailorswhohad

servedatJutland.Oneofthesailorswrotethat“June1stsawtheBritishfleetsearchingfor[the

Germans]justoutsidetheirminefields,andfuriousatmissingthem.Itsawtheminharbour,

rubbingtheirhands–overwhat?Overavictory?No!butbecausetheyhadescapedwiththeir

lives…The‘triumphant’Hunjustchucklesbecausehehasmetusandnotbeenannihilated.”379

Theothersailorechoedthatsentimentbysayingthat“We,indeed,arenottriumphant;weare

veryunhappybecausewewerenotabletoannihilatehimaswehadhopedto;butbequite

378“ThirdSupplementtotheLondonGazette–Tuesday,4July1916”inTheLondonGazette,July4th,1916.379UnknownAuthors,TheJutlandBattle:ByTwoWhoTookPartinIt(London:Burrup,Mathies&Sprague,1916),10.

161

surethatifwehadgotathimonaclearday;ifwehadsightedhimat4aminsteadof4pmon

thatday,itwouldbeaverysmallHunnow,countingnottheshipsthathehadlostbutthefew

thatremainedtohim.”380Bothofthesepassagesunderlinethefrustrationfeltbythefleet

personnelathavingnotfullyrealizedtheirculturallyconstructedpurpose.

Thepublicfeltthisfrustrationaswell,andmembersofParliamentcraftedtheir

speechestocompensatefortheirconstituents’disappointment.PrimeMinsterAsquith,

speakingatQueen’sHallinAugust1916,saidthat:

TheNavy,liketheArmy,hasbeenanxioustotryconclusionswiththeenemy.Theenemytookgoodcarethattheirchancesofdoingsoshallbefewandfarbetween.Sinceitsgloriousvictoryofthe31stofMaytheGermanHighSeaFleet,orwhatremainsofit,hasnotventuredtoemergefromitsports.Ithasshrunk,apparently,fromrepeatingitstriumphantexperience.(Laughter)AsIsaidatthetime,acouplemoreofsuchvictoriesandtherewouldbenothingorverylittleleftoftheGermanFleet.(Laughter)381

FollowinghismockingoftheGermanclaimsofvictory(claimsthatwerebasedonrelative

casualtiesbetweentheBritishandGermans),Asquithwentontomodifytheculturally

constructedmainpurposeoftheBritishfleet.Insteadofportrayingthefleetasaninstrument

fortheannihilationoftheenemy,hepointedtothefleet’simportanceasameansof

economicallystranglingGermany:

Wearetooapttoforget–thatitistheNavy,unobtrusive,silent,butalwaysonthewatch,withitsever‐tighteninggrip,thatisstarvingtheGermanpowerofresistanceandthrottlingthelifeofGermany.Therehasneverinthewholeofhistorybeensuchadecisiveproofofthesupreme,naycapital,importanceofthecommandofthesea.Ithinkweshallallagreethatitwasawiseandfar‐sighted

380UnknownAuthors,TheJutlandBattle,10‐11.381H.H.Asquith,“MrAsquith’sSpeechattheQueen’sHall,August4th,1916”inAfterTwoYears,ed.Unknown(London:Hodder&Stoughton,1916),24‐25.

162

policythathasledoutstatesmenofallpartiesandschoolsinthepasttoinsistonthecardinalnecessityforusofnavalsupremacy.382

Thispassagewasanecessaryrealignmentofexpectations.Alloftheenergyandenthusiasmfor

acrushingnavalvictorynowhadtoberedirected,becauseitcouldnotberealisticallysatiated.

Mr.BonarLaw,theFirstLordoftheAdmiralty,immediatelystoodupandechoedthePrime

Minister’ssentiments:

Fortwoyearsoursailorshavekepttheirsilent,theirlonelyandarduousvigil,uponwhichthelifeofthiscountryandthefortunesofthiswardepended,andwhentheopportunitycametheyweregladtoallowtheGermanFleettowinthevictoryofwhichthePrimeMinisterhasspoken(LaughterandCheers).Neverinourhistoryhasnavalsupremacybeensogreatasinthiswar,andwhenthewarisoveritwillberealized,asIthinkitisrealizedbyourAlliestoday,thatwithoutourNavyvictorywouldhavebeenimpossible,andthatwithourNavyvictorywillbecomplete.383

Thispassagealsoincludedanattemptatreassuranceaboutthefuture,withtheguaranteeof

eventualvictoryovertheGermans,whilesimultaneouslychasteningexpectationsoverthe

Navy’sprospectsofcompletelydestroyingitsGermancounterpart.ArthurBalfourspoke

specificallyoftheBattleofJutland,andrefutedtheGermanclaimofvictorybyofferinga

favorableanalysisoftheresultsofthebattle:

Itwouldbeanerror,however,tosupposethatthenavalvictorychangedthesituation;whatitdidwastoconfirmit.BeforeJutland,asafterit,theGermanFleetwasimprisoned;thebattlewasanattempttobreakthebarsandbursttheconfininggates;itfailed,andwithitsfailuretheHighSeasFleetsankagainintoimpotence.384

382Asquith,24‐25.383A.BonarLaw,“Mr.BonarLaw’sSpeech,”inAfterTwoYears,38.384ArthurBalfour,“TheNavy’sPart:FruitsoftheBattleofJutland,Mr.Balfour’sMessage,”inAfterTwoYears,43‐44.

163

Thiscompletelycontradictedthedominantnavalimagery,andcleverlyre‐craftedthepublically

consumablenotionofthebattlewiththemetaphoroftheRoyalNavyasaprisonguardkeeping

theGermanfleetlockedup.Indeed,itportrayedtheBattleofJutlandashavingturnedout

exactlyastheBritishintended.

Inspiteofthepoliticians’attemptstoputthebestpossible(thoughessentiallyaccurate)

spinonthesignificanceofJutland,thiswasnotsufficienttostemthetideofdisappointment

overtheseemingbreakwiththepastlegaciesofTrafalgarandthedefeatoftheSpanish

Armada.Thepublicyearnedforascapegoat.NavalofficerslineduptodefendeitherJellicoe

orBeatty,whileplacingblamefortheabsenceofatotalvictoryononeortheotheradmiral.385

MostoftheblameimmediatelyfellonJellicoefornotbeingaggressiveenough.Thepublichad

becomeenamoredwiththepopularconceptionofViceAdmiralBeattyasanaggressive

reincarnationofNelson,asdemonstratedbyJohnBuchan’sworkpublishedshortlyafterthe

warended:“SirDavidBeattywasneverforamomentindoubt…Navalbattlesarenotwonby

playingforsafety.HawkepursuedConflansinastormyduskintoQuiberonBay,andNelson

beforethebattleoftheNileriskedinthedarknesstheshoalsandreefsofanunchartedsea.”386

HealsomademoreexplicitreferencestothetiebetweenBeattyandtheoldnavalheroes:“Sir

DavidBeattyfacedgreatoddsandgreatdifficultiesinthespiritof…Nelson.”387Inalater

passagehereinforcedthisnotionofaggressivenessasthecardinalnavalvirtue,whichtosome

wouldhavebeenseenasasnubdirectedatJellicoe:“Itisonlytheignorantwhoimaginethat

385LanghorneGibsonandJ.E.T.Harper,TheRiddleofJutland:AnAuthenticHistory(NewYork:Coward‐McCann,1934),373.386JohnBuchan,TheBattleofJutland(London:ThomasNelson&Sons,Ltd.,191‐?),9.387Buchan,43.

164

thelossofafewshipscouldmeanaweakeningofBritishnavalprestige.Afleet,ifitistobe

betterthanscrapiron,mustberiskedgallantlywhenoccasionoffers.”388

WhilerecallingNelsonandpointingtohisreincarnation,Buchanattemptedtoquellthe

sensethatsomehowtheBritishpeoplehadfallenfromtheirearlierstateofgreatness,and

assertedthatJutland,whilenotascrushingavictoryasTrafalgar,hadinfactelevatedthe

reputationoftheBritishTar:“Notlessconspicuousthantheleadershipwastheamazing

fightingqualityoftheBritishsailors.Itwasmorethanacenturysincehadhadtheopportunity

ofafirst‐classnavalaction,anditmaybeconfidentlysaidthatnotevenatTrafalgardidthe

spiritofherseamenshinemorebrightly.”389Thesepassagescollectivelyattempttoplacatethe

Britishpublic,yearningforitsTrafalgar,byboldlyclaimingthatJutlandessentiallywas

Trafalgar.IthaditsownNelson(inthepersonofBeatty)andtheBritishsailorswhohadfought

atJutlandhadactuallysurpassedtheaccomplishmentsofthesailorsatTrafalgar.

InrushingtoJellicoe’said,AdmiralReginaldBacondescribedthenatureofthe“Jutland

controversy”in1925:

[AfterJutland]peopleasked:“Whatiswrong,whereisourNelson?”ThePubliconlyremainedpartlysatisfiedthatthecauseoftheapparentinactionwasduetothedisinclinationoftheGermanFleettoputtosea…Then[atJutland]theyconfidentlybelievedourdayatlastwouldhavecome–Trafalgarwouldberepeated,andshipaftershipoftheGermanNavywouldbesenttothebottom.SuchweretheuneducatedhopesoftheBritishnation.Intheearlymonthsof1916thedaycame–issuewasjoinedandthebattlefought.Thenewsoftheresultspreaddismay–apparentlyourfleethadbeenmoredamagedthanthatoftheenemy…wherewasthevictory,thecrushingdefeatsoeagerlyanticipated?Surelysomeonehadblundered,andsurelysomegrossmistakehadbeenmade?

388Buchan,41‐42.389Buchan,44.

165

Timewenton;thewarwaswon;butstillthereremainedafeelingthatthechaptersinNavalHistorywrittenbyoursailorsinthewarlackedthegloryofthosehandeddownbyourancestors.390

ItisironicthatAdmiralBaconblamedthe“uneducated”Britishpublicafterthenaval

establishmentandpressuregroupshadgonetosuchtroubleintheyearsleadinguptoWorld

WarOneto“educate”them.Thepurposeofthis“education”wastoconveythenotionthata

decisivevictorywaspreciselywhattheBritishnationcouldexpectinaconflictwithGermany,

andthatalloftheirtaxexpendituresdevotedtocreatingamightyfleetwerespecificallygoing

towardthatend.HavingblamedtheilltreatmentofJellicoeonanartificialandunrealistic

expectationofdecisivenavalvictory,BaconthendeconstructedthememoryofNelson,and

assertedthatJellicoe,notBeatty,wasthetruetwentiethcenturyreincarnationofBritain’s

greatestnavalhero:“Nelsonwas,andalwayswillbe,auniquepersonality;sincemuchofthe

picturesqeunessofhiscomplexcharacterwasduetotheconditionsofthetimesinwhichhe

lived.HadNelsonlivedinthetwentiethcenturyhewouldappeartothosewriterstobetotally

differenttotheNelsonofwhomtheywrite,andwholivedintheearlynineteenthcentury.”391

Hespecificallyassertedthat:

ThekernelofNelson’scharacterwouldstillremainifhewerealivetoday:hisdevotiontodutyandpromptdecision,theresultofearnestthought,wouldpersist;buttheconditionsthatwouldgoverntheuseofthesequalitiesinamodernnavywouldbesodifferentthattheywouldappeartobetotallydifferentattributes.TheonepredominantqualitythatNelsonexhibited,andwhichstampshimasagreatseacommander,wasaswiftandunerringjudgmentandquickdeterminationinacrisisinbattle.392

390ReginaldBacon,TheJutlandScandal(London:Hutchinson&Co.,1925),2‐3.391Bacon,11.392Bacon,11‐12.

166

ThisattemptedtoteardownthenotionthatBeattywasthenewNelsonsimplybecausehewas

aggressive.Instead,JellicoewasthenewNelsonbecauseofhissuperiorjudgment.Bacon

reiteratedthisconceptmoreexplicitlyinthefollowingpassage:

Letusthen,aboveall,correctanymistakenideaswemayhaveimbibedfromsensationalwritingsaboutNelsonasaseaofficer.Hewasnotinanywaymerelyabullatthegatefighter;thereweredozensofsuchmenintheBritishNavyatthetimewhoneverroseabovemerepassingdistinction.Hewasessentiallyathinkerandanorganizerandagreatleaderofmen.Loyaltyandsingle‐mindednessweresuchmarkedfeaturesinhischaracterthatneverwouldhehavepermittedanyonetolettheiradulationoverstepthelimitsofproprietyandseektomagnifyNelsonattheexpenseofanyofhisCommandersinChief.393

Attheendofthislastpassage,BaconwaschastisingBeattyfornotcomingtotheaidofJellicoe

onhisowninthisverypublicdebate.BaconcompletedthetransformationofJellicoeintothe

newNelsonbyclaimingthatNelsonwouldhaveactedpreciselyasJellicoehad:

If,therefore,NelsonthegreatseaofficerhadbeenincommandoftheGrandFleetatJutland,wemaybeperfectlycertainofonething;thathewouldhavedonenothingfoolish,hewouldneverhaveallowedanygallerydisplaytoleadhimtorisktheGrandFleet,hewouldneverhaveappliedTrafalgartacticstotwentieth‐centuryfighting.Itisgrosslylibeloustoimaginehewouldhavedoneso.Wemaybequitesurethatthesoundtacticwastheonethatwouldhavebeenfollowedbyhiminstantlyandonthespurofthemoment.394

ThisisindicativeoftheversatilityoftheNelsonlegend,anditsabilitytobeskillfullyadaptedto

advancedifferingarguments.BaconusedmanymorecomparisonsbetweenNelson’sactions

throughouthiscareerandJellicoe’satJutlandinordertodemonstratethecomparablequality

ofthetwoadmirals.

393Bacon,19.394Bacon,19‐20.

167

AdmiralBacon’sworkwasfiercelypartisan(heendedhisworkwiththesentence

“ThankGodthatLordJellicoecommandedtheGrandFleetbothbeforeandattheBattleof

Jutland”),395buthisconclusionswerelargelyborneoutbysubsequenthistoriography.After

passionshadcooled,amorerationalassessmentofthebattle—focusedonthebattle’sreal

impactonthewareffortratherthanonitslackofromanticparallelstotheheroictraditionof

theRoyalNavy—vindicatedJellicoe’slackofaggressionfollowingthedisengagementofthe

Germanfleet.Aworkpublishedin1934waskindertoJellicoe:“Inthecourseofminutes,

indeedseconds,Jellicoehadtodecideonthemannerofthedeploymentofhisvastarmada

intothelineofbattle.AtthatmomentthefateoftheBritishFleet,oftheBritishEmpire,ofthe

Alliedcause,andofcivilizationdependedonthecleartacticalvisionofthisoneman.Hedid

thequickestbitofthinkingsincemanbecameanintelligentcreature.”396Theylaterwentonto

extolhisvirtue:“Jellicoe’sgreatness–hispower–layinanessentialclarityanddirectnessof

thought…Jellicoewasanadmiralofthemodernage,thinkingandactingonastrategicplane

higherthanthatofothernavalleadersafloatinhisday.AtJutlandhedisplayedeveryqualityof

thegreatcommander–hewasacourageous,aggressivefighter,acollectedandbrilliant

tactician,andastrategistofthefirstwater.”397WhilebeingkindtoJellicoe,theauthorsdidnot

feelcompelledtoattackBeatty,whichhadcharacterizedearlier,morepartisan,literature

abouttheBattleofJutland,andinsteadtreatedthetwomenasequalswhohadservedtheir

countrywithdistinction:“JellicoeandBeatty,twooppositepoles,twohistoriccharacters,had

eachservedthenationwithallhisindividualbeing.Eachhadcontributedanimperishable

395Bacon,148.396GibsonandHarper,ix.397GibsonandHarper,247.

168

memorytotheRoyalNavy‐onehadcarriedonthetraditionofgreatstrategicadmirals‐the

otherhadpersonifiedtheinstinctivewarriorwhoflungasideallconsiderationtocometo

grips.”398ThiswasindicativeoftheeffectthatthepassingofeighteenyearshadonBritish

popularmemoryofthebattle.Theshockofdisappointmentoverthelackofdecisiveresultsat

Jutlandhadstartedtowearoff.Therewasnolongerthesameimpulsetoaccusethe

commandersofthefleetofincompetenceorsqueamishness.

CombinedwithacknowledgingthedifficultsituationthatJellicoehadbeeninandhow

wellJellicoehadperformed,GibsonandHarperacknowledgedthatwhileJutlandhadnotledto

thetotaldestructionoftheGermanfleet,ithadbeendecisive:“TheHighSeaFleetceasedfrom

thetimeitreachedthesafeentourageofWilhelmshaventohaveanyinfluenceonthewarby

seaorbylandorbyair.Itwasaspowerlessasthoughithadbeeneliminated.”399Theauthors

thenreachedevenfurthertoascribethefallofGermanytothebattleitself:“TheGerman

defeatwasthebeginningoftheend.Itinfectedthenation,whichhadreposedsuchcomplete

confidenceintheFleet.Therevolutionof1918wasthebitterfruitofthedefeatatJutland–of

thepressureoftheblockadeandnotofthereversessustainedonland.”400Moststrikingwas

theauthors’claimthatJutlandhadnotbeenadecisivebattle,whichtheythencontradicted

laterintheirwork.TheimmediatenegativeimpressionsoftheBritishpeopleweremisplaced,

andwouldbeprovenincorrectbythesubsequentcourseofthewar:

DisappointmentandmisinformationledtheBritishpublictominimizeandunderestimatethebattle.Theycouldnotrealizethatthe‘annihilation,’whichtheyhadbelievedtheirfleetwouldachieve,hadactuallybeenaccomplished–

398GibsonandHarper,387.399GibsonandHarper,x.400GibsonandHarper,xi.

169

thatthefleetofGermanywouldneverstrike,nevermenaceBritainagain;neversomuchasfireanotherguninaNorthSeabattle–wouldcometoitsendintotalsurrenderanddestruction.JutlandemergedtotakeitsplacebesideTrafalgarasoneoftheverygreatmilestonesinBritishnavalhistory.401

ThistendencytowardrevisionismindicatedthestillpowerfuldesireoftheBritishtoremember

JutlandinthewaythatwouldmostpowerfullysustaintheBritishnavaltraditionsandprovide

inspirationforfuturegenerations.

Twenty‐firstcenturyauthors,whoarefarremovedfromtheemotionsoftheperiod,

andwhodonothavetheculturalprogrammingthatwouldmakethemyearnforrepeatsof

Trafalgar,reinforcethenotionofJutlandasadecisiveBritishvictory,albeitwithoutthe

emotionofearlierworks.KeithYates’sworkpublishedin2000attemptedtojustifythelackof

adecisiveoutcomeatJutland:“JutlandwasobviouslynotdecisiveinthesensethatTrafalgar

hadbeen.However,intheselattercasesthedefeatedadmiralshadeitherchosentostandand

fightitoutorcouldn’tavoidit.Thesebattlesalsoinvolvedopposingfleetsandadmiralsof

vastlydifferentcapabilities,andthustheyarenotatallcomparablewiththesituationon31

May1916.”402AlongwithassertingtheunrealisticexpectationsthattheBritishhadwithregard

toJutland,theauthorisalsokindtoJellicoe:“Jellicoe’sresponsibilitieswereonadifferentscale

fromthoseoftheotheradmirals.Heknewhewastheonlymanoneithersidewhocouldlose

thewarinanafternoon,andhewasdeterminednottoletthishappen.”403ThisechoesBacon’s

sentimentsaboutJellicoe’ssuperiorjudgmentandappropriaterestraint.

401GibsonandHarper,394.402KeithYates,FlawedVictory:Jutland,1916(Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,2000),223.403Yates,223.

170

NigelSteelandPeterHart’sworkpublishedin2003reinforcesthesesentiments.They

praiseJellicoe:“Nevertheless,hisnaturalcalmness,intelligenceandclearthinkingallowedhim

totranscendthesehandicapstoachievehisoverridingaimsafely:toretainforBritain

commandoftheworld’soceansbeyondthenarrowconfinesoftheNorthSea.”404Theypoint

tothemisplacedexpectationsoftheBritishpeople:“Popularexpectations,foundedon

centuriesofnavalsupremacy,hadalwaysbeenabsurdlyhigh.Nothingbutthecomplete

destructionoftheGermanfleetwouldhavebeenacceptabletotheBritishpublic…Theysimply

expectedtheGermanstobesoundlythrashed.Intheharshlightofthisviewwhatactually

happenedatJutlandfellfarshortofexpectations.”405Finally,SteelandHartconcludethat

JutlandwasavictoryfortheBritish,ratherthanadraw.DanielAllenButler’s2006workcomes

toallofthesesameconclusions.406

Itisunderstandablethatthefinalmomentofreleaseofallofthestoredenergythathad

accumulatedoverthecourseofthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturynaval

pageantrywouldhaveevokedsuchastorm.TheBritishpeoplehadgivenupsomuchtobuild

andmaintainthemostpowerfulnavyonearth.Theyhadbeentoldtimeandtimeagainthat

thoughtheirpositionofpowerandprosperityrelativetotherestoftheworldseemedunstable

andincreasinglythreatened,therewassomethinginherentinthequalitiesoftheBritishrace

thatwouldcarrythemthrough.OldBritishvirtues,exemplifiedbyNelsonandDrake,and

celebratedatcommemorationsofTrafalgarandthedefeatoftheArmada,weretimelessand

eternal.Thedisplaysoflarge,modernbattleshipsingreaternumbersthanhadeverbeenseen

404NigelSteelandPeterHart,Jutland1916:DeathintheGreyWastes(London:Cassell,2003),435.405SteelandHart,418.406DanielAllenButler,DistantVictory:TheBattleofJutlandandtheAlliedTriumphintheFirstWorldWar(Westport:PraegerSecurityInternational,2006),5,220,223.

171

beforewereamplifiedinthepublicconsciousnessbytheincreasedcommercializationofthe

cultofthenavyandtheriseofthepublicmassmarket.Howcouldsuchapowerfulfleetnot

achieveoverwhelmingvictory?Britainhadnumericalsuperiority,superiorityinweightof

broadside,andthemostfinelytunedandhighlytrainednavalenlistedandofficercorpsinthe

world.Howcouldthepublicnothavebeendisappointedbytheresult?

Theseedsofa“partialvictory”ratherthanatotalonewerelaidinBritain’smaterial

readiness.TheBritisharmorpiercingshellsdidnotworkcorrectly.AsdescribedinChapter

One,theshellssufferedfromfusingproblemsthatcausedthemtoexplodeprematurely,and

wereespeciallysusceptibletofragmentationwhenstrikinganenemyhullatanobliqueangle.

Followingthewar,unreliableexplosivetestingpracticescametolightthatindicatedthat

between30%and70%oftheBritishshellsfiredattheGermanfleetwereduds.407Arthur

Pollen’sfirecontrolsystemhadbeenblockedbybureaucraticstagnationattheAdmiralty,and

especiallybyAdmiralWilsonandCommanderDreyer,thelatterofwhichhadchosentocashin

ontheconceptwithadeviceofhisown.Theadoptionofcorditeexplosiveshadmadethe

Britishbattlecruiserssusceptibletosecondaryexplosions,whichhaddoomedtheIndefatigable

andtheQueenMary.Luckhadalsoplayedarole,inthatnighthadfallenonMay31stbefore

JellicoecouldfinishboxinginScheer.Hadanyofthesefactorsnotbeenpresenttohamperthe

RoyalNavy,theBritishmighthavehadtheveryvictorytheyhadlustedafteranddemanded.

ThedegreetowhichtheRoyalNavyalmostmettheincredibleexpectationsplacedonitwas

itselfremarkable.Thoughsuchavictorywaspossible,theexpectationscultivatedbythenaval

theaterwereanachronistic.Theyweredesignedtogalvanizepublicsupportforallocationof

407Yates,222.

172

publicresources,buttheybecameaculturalforceallontheirown.Thenavywasacrucialpart

ofBritishidentity,andthenavaltheater,bothintermsofcommemorationsandreviews,only

intensifiedthiscentrality.TheconceptoftheNavynotonlyservedtoknitthenationtogether

culturally,butitwasrememberedasasourceofpastsecurity,andrelieduponasanassurance

offuturesecurity.Thedegreetowhichtheconceptofnavalpowerwascentraltowhatit

meanttobeaBritoncannotbeoverestimated.

173

CONCLUSION

ThisthesishasarguedthattheRoyalNavy,asaculturallyconstructedinstitution,helda

centralplaceintheBritishconsciousnessduringtheyearsthatimmediatelyprecededWorld

WarOne.ThenumerousandvariedwaysinwhichtheNavywasrepresentedinBritishsociety

indicateditsreachandimportance,andthevaryingformsoftheserepresentationswere

indicativeoftheinstitution’sversatility.Thisall‐importantculturallyconstructedinstitution

wasinturnusedtobolsteraflaggingconfidenceinthefutureoftheBritishrace.TheBritish

hadcompellingreasonstobeapprehensiveabouttheirfutureduringthisperiod.TheGreat

Depressionofthe1870shaddestabilizedtheirunqualifiedbeliefineconomicliberalism.

Britain’sunchallengedpositionasthe“gloriouslyisolated”Europeannationwasnolonger

tenablebytheendofthecentury.TheshockwavesassociatedwiththeunificationofGermany

followingtheFranco‐PrussianWarhadknockedEuropeoffbalance.Asaresult,Britain’s

primaryforeignpolicyaim,whichwascenteredonstayingabovethefrayofthepolitical

turmoilontheContinent,wasincreasinglyquestioned.Thisperiodisilluminatingintermsof

studyingtheBritishself‐conceptionbecauseitisintimesofgreatstrifeanduncertaintythat

peopleandsocietiesturn,orratherreturn,totheirmostbasicvaluesandsourcesofidentity.

ChapterTwoarguedthattheBritishculturalcaricatureoftheGermansrevealeda

significantamountabouthowtheBritishviewedthemselves,aswellashowtheyspecifically

characterizedtheGermansasathreattotheirnationalsecurity.Alwaysquietlyconfident,the

BritishrespondedtotheirowngrowingsenseofuneasebypointingtotheirGermancousins,

whotheyperceivedasbeingsignificantlymoreunstable.Thiswascoupledwithaninsistence

174

on“stayingthecourse,”intermsofmaintainingthetimehonoredBritishvirtuethathadgotten

themthisfar.

InadditiontorevealingtheculturalvaluesthatanimatedBritishsocietyatthistime,this

periodalsorevealsthoseindispensibleinstitutionsthatwereatthecoreofBritishnational

identity.InadditiontoeternalBritishvirtueanimatingtheBritishsenseofselfintheirtimeof

uncertainty,theinstitutionoftheRoyalNavyreinforcedandsustainedBritons’senseof

strengthandpower.ChapterThreeillustratedhowthecharacterofDrakeandespeciallyof

NelsonservedasracialmarkersthatwouldpointtheBritishintherightdirectionasthey

searchedforwaystoreassurethemselvesabouttheirdecliningpositionontheworldstage.

Memoryofaheroicnavalpastwasusedtoinspireandreassurethepublic.Theheroesofthe

pastwereeternal,andremainedwithintheBritishsoulwaitingtobereawakenedinBritain’s

criticalhourofneed.

ChapterFourshowedhowenergeticallythepublicyearnedforreassurancethattheir

fleetwasreadytodefendthem,andhowthesepublicyearningswerethentranslatedbackinto

increasedexpenditure.FromallcornersoftheUnitedKingdom,peoplecametoconsumetheir

mightybattlefleetintheformoffleetreviews,andtookpiecesoftheirnavyhomewiththemin

theformoftheincreasinglyproliferatingcommercialproductswithnavalthemes.

Finally,theEpiloguedemonstratedthefrustrationandbelatedpanicthatresultedfrom

thefailureofthenavytoliveuptoitsculturallyconstructedpurpose.Themostpowerful

weaponinBritain’sarsenalhadfailedtoutterlydestroyitsintendedtarget,theGermanHigh

SeasFleet,andthissentripplesofdisappointmentthroughtheBritishpublic—especiallythe

175

navalenthusiasts—andpromptednumerousandvariedattemptstoreinterprettheBattleof

Jutlandasavictoryinordertosoothethispublicdisappointment.

Thatthenavyfilledsuchacriticalroleinthesewaysisindicativeofhowcentralthe

notionofBritainastheunassailablemasteroftheseaswastotheBritishpeople.Themost

powerfulnavyintheworldwastheirbirthright,theirentitlement.Itwastheinstrumentby

whichtheywouldmaintainthehealthandsecurityoftheBritishEmpire,whichwasaforcefor

civilizationandjustice.TheRoyalNavyhadstoppedtheslavetradeandfoughtpiracy.Ithad

broughtprosperitytoGreatBritainbyprovidingastableenvironmentfortradeandcommerce.

TheBritishtreatmentoftheirnavyalsoprovidesanexampleofapeoplereactingtoasenseof

decline.Hyper‐masculinereassuranceofastrongandpowerfulnavyreadytodefendthemas

theirworldpositionslippedawayprovidesanilluminatingstudyofthehumancondition.When

theyfeltthreatened,theBritishreturnedtothoseinstitutionstheyfeltwerethemoststable

andthemostreassuring.

TherearealsorecognizableelementsintheBritishstoryinAmericansocietytoday.

WhentheAmericanpeoplelookbackonthetwentiethcentury,thepicturelooksaspleasant

andself‐congratulatingasthatofnineteenth‐centuryBritain.TheAmericanswereonthe

victors’sideinWorldWarOne,wereprimarilyresponsibleforthedefeatoftheJapanesein

WorldWarII,enjoyedarelativelyprosperouseconomicboominthe1950sand1960s(which

wasthentranslatedintomilitaryhegemonybytheendofthetwentiethcentury)anddefeated

theUSSRintheColdWar.Attheendofthetwentiethcentury,theAmericanshadgoodreason

tofeelconfidentabouttheirpositionrelativetotherestoftheworld.Thisconfidencehasnot

176

survivedthefirstdecadeofthetwenty‐firstcentury.Americanconfidencewasbadlyshakenin

thewakeoftheterroristattacksofSeptember11th,2001.Thisconfidenceremainsshakywith

twowarsraginginAfghanistanandIraqagainstanominallyreligion‐basedinsurgencyengaging

inasymmetricwarfare,towhichAmericansarenotwellsuited.Asaresultofthisshaken

confidence,theAmericansfindthemselvesincreasinglyquestioninghowtheycanclingtotheir

positionasworldhegemonandstewardoftheAmericanEmpire.

Bycomparison,theBritishoversawalongperiodofeconomicgrowthoverthe

nineteenthcentury,whichtheytranslatedintooverwhelmingnavalpower.In1904they

managedtoremovetheirmostpersistentantagonist(France)fromtheirlistofpotential

enemies.But,Britons’confidenceintheirownsuperioritydidnotgounchallengedeither.

TheywerebadlyshockedbytheBoerWar,andhadnewreasontoquestiontheirownsecurity.

InanincreasinglyfragileConcertofEurope,BritonslookedwithalarmatanupstartGermany

andsoughttocontinuallyreassurethemselvesthattheirnavycouldholdontotheirpositionas

asuperpowerindefinitely.

JustastheBritishlookedtotheirnavytoreassurethem,Americanstodayseekouttheir

ownpillarsofstrength.Americanstodayareconfrontedwithnewsreportsandother

commissionedstudiesabouttheunfitnessofAmerica’syouthformilitaryservice,408andwitha

senseofsocietaldisintegrationinthewakeofthecounterculturalrevolutionof1968andthe

riseofpostmodernthought.TheyhavereasontofeelasenseofdeclinejustastheBritishdid.

408CommitteeonYouthPopulationandMilitaryRecruitment:Physical,Medical,andMentalHealthStandards,AssessingFitnessforMilitaryEnlistment:Physical,Medical,andMentalHealthStandards(Washington:NationalResearchCouncil,2006),178.

177

IamnotarguingthattheAmericanpositionwithregardtotherestoftheworldis

directlyanalogoustothatofGreatBritainintheperiodstudiedinthisthesis—todosowould

betodenythehistoricalspecificityanduniquenessofeachperiod.Iam,however,suggesting

thattherearecertainelementsofthestorythatAmericanscanempathizewithinlookingback

attheirBritishforerunnersintheirdelicatepositionasthelastremainingworldsuperpower.

Thestorytoldinthisthesisisthatofasocietyconvincingitselftocommitvastresources

towardmilitarizationinordertodefenditselfandprotectitsinterests.Theseexpenditures

werecouchedinculturallyconstructednotionsofpatriotismandprideinaheroicpast,and

wereareactiontopanic.ThelargestincreasesintheBritishnavalbuildingprograms

immediatelyfollowedeventschronicledbyhistoriansas“scares.”Thisrapidbuildup,inturn,

fedtheAnglo‐German“misunderstanding,”asGermanycontinuedtobuildupitsownnavyto

try(unsuccessfully)tokeeppacewithGreatBritain.PaulKennedyarguesthatthenaval

questionwas,forcontemporarypublicopinion,themostsignificantcatalystfortheworsening

Anglo‐GermanrelationsandsubsequentlyfortheoutbreakofWorldWarOne.409

Anacknowledgementofthisphenomenoncanallowusinourcontemporarysocietyto

recognizeanddismantleourownculturally‐constructednotionsofourall‐powerfulAmerican

military.WhenFoxNewslaudseventhemosttrivialgesturesoraccomplishmentsofevery

singleservice‐member,theyareplayingintothistendency.WhenTobyKeithwritessongs

abouttheAmericanSoldier,whoselyricsarealove‐lettertothemorallypurebutfictitious

archetypeoftheAmerican“race,”heisincitingthepublictorallyaroundthisconstructionand

409PaulKennedy,TheRiseoftheAnglo‐GermanAntagonism1860‐1914(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1980),416.

178

touseittoconvincethemoftheirownsecurity.Byconvincingourselvesthattheseimpossible

idealsaretrueaboutourmilitary,wefailtoseeoursoldiers,sailors,andMarinesthewaythey

trulyare.Weblindourselvestothenegative—theinefficiencyandwaste,theindividual

failuresandpoorperformances,andthemisguidedexecutionofunilateralforeignpoliciesthat

havecharacterizedthefirstdecadeofthetwenty‐firstcentury.Byrelyingonourmilitaryto

continuetopreserveourpositionintheworld,wemakeourselvesmoreapttousemilitary

forceattheexpenseofalternative,morecosmopolitanwaysofengagingtheworld.By

removing,oratleastrecognizing,theseculturalconstructions,wewillhaveabetter,more

realisticnotionofouridealidentityandplaceintheworldrelativetotheinternational

communityandourfellowhumanity.

179

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