Philosophical Review

Das Ich als Dolmetsch für die Erkenntnis des Nicht-Ich. by H. G. OpitzReview by: G. W. CunninghamThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan., 1914), pp. 98-99Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2178517 .

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98 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. XXIII.

For pre-scientific thinking this is always consciousness. At the moment of operating we find that consciousness knows itself not merely as given only at this moment but also as an individual to which belong other moments beside this moment. Therefore consciousness knows itself at this moment as the activity of itself, i. e., as a self-knowing individual (p. 73). Its activity is will, but consciousness must not be thought to change in its willing. To pro- duce is only to condition an appearing variation. Will is such a producing by consciousness, the condition of an individual relating itself causally to a represented variation. Consciousness cannot bring about its own variations in the sense that A produces or causes B. Such effecting demands at least two individuals; man, being an effective unity of soul and body, two indi- viduals, seems to produce such effects in himself.

Chapter IV, on Consciousness and Subject, Thing and Place, eliminates the false connotations of a subject as an individual by showing its origin in the misinterpretation of the situation "I am a perceiving, a feeling, a thinking" as "I perceive, feel, think." In this chapter Professor Rehmke also returns to his problem of spacial conditioning, and distinguishes with much subtlity quantity, form, and place as "thing-conditions" more primary than mere position. Zeno's difficulties are explained as the result of confusing things and places. His conclusions were right as meaning that one place-thing cannot pass into another place-thing. Motion is really a change of a thing with respect to its place-determinations, i. e., a change of place-determinations (p. 19). Similarly, a line, as a continuum, cannot be conceived as a series of points for this is contradicted by the very conception of "continuum." Furthermore, just as every place has its location-determination so every movement has its direction-determination. And, finally, things are not infinitely divisible, but this is not because simple things have not quantity as a determination, but because they are not unitary effects (Wirkenseinheit).

H. C. BROWN. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Das Ich als Dolmetsch fur die Erkenntnis des Nicht-Ich. Von H. G. OPITZ.

Berlin, Leonhard Simion Nf., I9I3.-PP. 42.

This monograph, which forms the seventh volume of the Bibliothek fur Philosophie, undertakes to answer the question how a knowledge of the external world is possible. The author draws a distinction between the psycho- logical and metaphysical aspects of the problem of knowledge, giving over to the field of psychology the treatment of the process of knowledge as such, while retaining for the metaphysician the problem of the relation between the process of knowledge and its object. It is this latter problem with which he himself is concerned, his particular interest being to determine what are the presup- positions of the knowing relation between subject and object. The answer which he gives to this question is that "we somehow bring the external world into relation to the ego," and that it is only in so far as we are successful in this that knowledge of the external world by us is possible (p. i9). Later, in sum-

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No. I.] NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS. 99

ming up his position, he says that an immediate knowledge of the external world is impossible, that "this knowledge is only possible through carrying over to the external world the counterpart (Erscheinung) of our ego (Ich)"; in other words, it is necessary for us to anthropomorphize the external world before we can know it (p. 41). Such is the presupposition of knowledge.

It is not very easy to see why this doctrine, if carried to its logical conclu- sion, would not land us in the same predicament in which Berkeley found himself. Indeed, if meaning is put into the metaphors used, it is not easy to see that the theory differs essentially from Berkeley's. One cannot but wonder how, if we must know only through the objectification of the ego, we can ever know anything but the ego. Of course it is necessary for us to anthropomorphize, we must create the world after our own image; but to insist that this anthropomorphizing tendency is the logical presupposition of the knowing process seems to leave us suspended in the air catching at straws. It would seem that, if we insist that all we have to start with is the Ich, then the Ich is all we have when we end our speculations. But perhaps the author will clear up some of these difficulties in a later discussion.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM. MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

Wilhelm Wundts Stellung zur Erkenntnistheorie Kants. Von Dr. WILLI NEF. Berlin, Leonhard Simion Nf., I9I3.-PP. 47.

In current philosophical literature, Wundt's epistemological theory has not received the consideration that it deserves. The explanation of this, in the opinion of the author of the present monograph, is probably to be found in the fact that Wundt has not followed the usual custom of taking Kant as his point of departure. It seems appropriate, therefore, in order that those whose overlook or misunderstand Wundt's doctrines may get a clear notion of them,, to compare his epistemology with that of Kant. This service to the Wundtianm theory of knowledge Dr. Nef undertakes. In the present work, which is the sixth volume of the Bibliothek fur Philosophie, the author devotes himself exclusively to the historical problem of indicating the relation between the epistemology of Wundt and that of the K6nigsberg philosopher. The critical discussion of problems here raised the author reserves for future consideration.

The monograph opens with a short review of Wundt's general epistemological standpoint and a statement of Wundt's view of Kant's historical position. The body of the essay deals with the following problems: subject and object; the forms of intuition, space and time; and the fundamental concepts of the understanding, universality, substance, causality, and purpose. The pamphlet concludes with a brief discussion of the Ding-an-sich.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM. MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

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