DDW10 Japan Rearm DA

7/29/2019 DDW10 Japan Rearm DA

1/23

170980804.doc Dartmouth 2K9 1

Table of ContentsTable of Contents.....................................................................................................................................................1Japan Rearm 1NC Shell...........................................................................................................................................2Uniqueness Extensions............................................................................................................................................4AFF Answers Military High Now........................................................................................................................6

AT: SDF Means Non-Unique..................................................................................................................................7AT: They are Debating Article 9 Now....................................................................................................................8Link Extensions.......................................................................................................................................................9AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link..................................................................................................................11Internal Link Extensions........................................................................................................................................12Impact Extensions..................................................................................................................................................14AT: Countries can Deter........................................................................................................................................16AT: North Korea Does Not Have Technology......................................................................................................17AT: Japan Does Not Have Technology.................................................................................................................18Extra Impacts NPT Collapse...............................................................................................................................20Extra Impacts India/Pakistan Arms Race...........................................................................................................21

Extra Impacts US/Russia Arms Race.................................................................................................................22Extra Impacts China/Taiwan Arms Race............................................................................................................23

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

1


2/23


Japan Rearm 1NC Shell

1. Japan is not rearming - nuclear allergy strong despite small changes.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asia affairs, and Mary B. Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation 2009 (, Mary B., Analyst in

Nonproliferation, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Servicehttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, pg. 2, 6/30/2010)

In general, public opinion on defense issues in Japan appears to be shifting somewhat, but pacifistsentiment remains significant. In the past, Japanese public opinion strongly supported the limitations placed on the Japanese military, butthis opposition has softened considerably since the late 1990s. Despite this overall shifting tide, the nuclear allergy among thegeneral public remains strong. The devastation of the atomic bombings led Japanese society to recoilfrom any military use of nuclear energy. Observers say that the Japanese public remainsoverwhelmingly opposed to nuclearization, pointing to factors like an educational system thatpromotes pacifism and the few surviving victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who serve as powerfulreminders of the bombs effects.

2. US withdrawal leads to nuclear rearmament by Japan- loss of credibilitySakurade 97 (Daizo Sakurade, Associate Professor of International Relations in the Integrated Arts and Science of University ofTokushima, Japan; research fellow at Center for Strategic Studies on Asia 2000 Foundation Fellowship; written July 1997)

The withdrawal of the US military forces from Japan would represent a fundamental disengagement of USmilitary commitments in East Asia; it would signify the end of American trustworthiness . Fearing Japansremilitarization, no state in the Asia-Pacific region, expect perhaps North Korea, seeks the termination of the Treaty. Oncethe Treaty is abolished, Japan would be forced to consider options that Washington would currently regard asunpalatable. Japan may decide to take on a more independent strategic role in the region. The SDF could be developed to agreater potential, and could be used directly in support of its foreign policy goals. Strategic links with China and Russia

could be reconsidered. Moreover, Japan might have to seriously consider a nuclear option . At the extreme bothJapan and the US could grow to regard each other as hostile entities. The Treaty provides a mechanism to avoid this

strategic rivalry and to deepen the cooperative strategic relationship between Japan and the United States. Todays broadconsensus in Japan is that the Treaty should remain intact for the foreseeable future. With the withdrawal of USforces from the Philippines, the importance of keeping the US bases in North Asia has increased. These forces underpin not

only the security of Japan but also that of Asia-Pacific as a whole. US air force units based in Okinawa, for instance, areresponsible as well for the defense of South Korea. The Treaty also psychologically reassures policy makers on both sidesof the Pacific that the tragedy of 1941 will never occur again. In addition, Japan would not need to develop her own nucleardeterrent as long as the Treaty continues. It should now be seen as an insurance forstability in the region as opposed to thatagainst a potential threat in the region during the Cold War. These strategic considerations together with the 1993JSP policy reorientation in favor of the Treaty underpinned Japanese support for US global military strategy and led to thereconfirmation of the Treaty between President Clinton and the Prime Minister Hashimoto in April 1996. Public opinionin both Japan and the United States endorse the present Treaty after its April 1996 reconfirmation. One survey showed that

62% of the Japanese polled consider the Treaty helpful for Japanese security while another found that 70% of Japanese

people agree to the maintenance of the Treaty. Similarly, 75% of the American public and 83% of the Americanelite surveyed support existing security arrangements with Tokyo.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

2


3/23


Japan Rearm 1NC

3. Japan rearm causes Asian arms race China and North Korea freak out and cause conflicts

Dr. Robinson Lecturer at Edith Cowan University (Australia) 2010(David, March 29, 2010 Why the West should Discourage Japanese Military Expansion Journal of Asia Pacific Studies

http://www.japss.org/upload/10.robinson.pdf.)

Japans Self-Defense Force is already considered a powerful regional force , and Japans previous decisionsnot to acquire nuclear weapons have been, on purely strategic grounds, unrelated to antimilitarism or pacifism [Bukh,

2010, pp7-8]. As Japan has a stockpile of plutonium and extremely sophisticated rocket technology, thepossibility remains that Japan could become a major nuclear power within a decade if sufficientlyprovoked by regional competitors like North Korea [Matthews, 2003, p78], and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz hasargued that Asias security environment will eventually compel Japan to nuclearise [Mirashita, 2001, p5]. China andJapan are each dominant in the others strategic thinking regarding economic, political and militaryissues, and the enhancement of Japanese military power must influence Chinas own strategic vision[Pyle, 2007, p312-315]. China and Korea also remain convinced that Japanese militarism, supported by

an invigorated nationalist right wing, lurks just beneath the surface [Samuels, 2007, p2]. At the very leastJapans new foreign policy could escalate into a regional arms race, with the potential for both Japanand South Korea to nuclearise. Issues like control of the Senkaku Islands, the division of Korea, andChinese claims on Taiwan provide continuing fault-lines around which conflict might develop[Matthews, 2003, p81].

4. East Asian arms race will cause extinction.

Ogura & Oh 97 [Toshimaru Ogura and Ingyu Oh are professors of economics, April, Nuclear clouds over the Korean peninsulaand Japan, 1997Accessed July 10, 2008 via Lexis-Nexis (Monthly Review)]

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although thesecountries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several

nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation.Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this regionand its growing importance tothe world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a globalconflagration.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

3


4/23


Uniqueness Extensions

Japan does not want to rearm and will not any time soon.

Asia for Educators No Date (part of Columbia University, Essay: An Overview of Japan's Postwar Defense Policy,http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/japan/japanworkbook/fpdefense/artnine.htm, 6/30/2010)

Ironically, by the end of the occupation it was the Americans who were pressing for Japanese rearmament while the Japanese governmentresisted rearmament in the name of the American-inspired constitution . Dulles encouraged Japan to rearm itself inorder to become an effective military ally of the United States, but the Japanese were very reluctant, as many remainedshocked by the devastation of the war. The Japanese finally agreed, however, to the minimum compromise that the Americans wouldaccept, which was the creation of a "National Police Reserve," a paramilitary force of 75,000 to defend the Japanese islands.

Japan has no nuclear weapons and has an aversion to them.


While there has been growing acceptance of the American alliance and the Self-Defense Forces,

nuclear weapons are still taboo in Japan today. As the only people in the world to have been attackedwith nuclear weapons, the Japanese have a special aversion to them--they call it their "nuclear allergy ."Although Japan's high level of technology would allow easy development of nuclear weapons, even the most conservativegovernments have supported the "three nuclear principles," which prohibit the introduction, storage, and use of nuclearweapons. On the other hand, the Japanese government appreciates , especially after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,the need to deter potential opponents from using nuclear weapons against it. For this it relies on the strategic arsenalof the United States, represented particularly by the 7th Fleet; and the public, while uneasy about the visits of the 7th Fleet to Japanese ports, hascome increasingly to accept them.

Japan will not rearm because of World War Two and public opinion.

Asia for Educators No Date (part of Columbia University, Essay: An Overview of Japan's Postwar Defense Policy,

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/japan/japanworkbook/fpdefense/artnine.htm, 6/30/2010)

Fears about rearmament remain strong in Japan . Opinion polls show that the majority of Japanese support the Self-Defense Forcesbut do not wish them to be enlarged. Each August, at ceremonies at Japan's National Memorial to the Dead, which honors those who died in World War II,

there is great controversy between the left and the right over the government's official participation. Fear of militarism and of war is stillstrong in Japan today. Many Japanese feel that the lesson of World War II is that reliance on militarypower is self-defeating. They also fear that a strong military cannot be controlled and would ultimatelydestroy democracy.

It is written into their constitution that they cannot have an offensive military. (CHECK THIS CARD)

Japanese Constitution 1946 (The Constitution of Japan, November 3, http://www.constitution.org/cons/japan.txt, 6/30/2010)

CHAPTER II: RENUNCIATION OF WARArticle 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justiceand order, the Japanese people forever renounce waras a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means ofsettling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and airforces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

4


5/23


Uniqueness Extensions

Japan ratified the NPT.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asia affairs, and Mary B. Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation 2009 (, Mary B., Analyst inNonproliferation, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, pg. 2, 6/30/2010)

The bedrock of domestic law on the subject, the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955, requires Japansnuclear activities to be conducted only for peaceful purposes. In 1967, the Three Non- NuclearPrinciples (hikaku sangensoku) were announced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, enshrining the policy of notpossessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan . WhenJapan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, it reiterated its three non-nuclearprinciples, placed itself under the treaty obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state, and pledged not toproduce or acquire nuclear weapons. Japan has been a staunch NPT supporter in good standing eversince.

International law prohibits Japanese nukes.Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asia affairs, and Mary B. Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation 2009 (, Mary B., Analyst inNonproliferation, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Servicehttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, pg. 8, 6/30/2010)

Japan is obligated under Article 2 of the NPT not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever ofnuclear weapons orother nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture orotherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance inthe manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Under Article 3 of the NPT, Japan is required to accept IAEAfull-scope safeguards on its civilian nuclear program . Japan signed an Additional Protocol in 1998 under which the IAEAcan use an expanded range of measures to verify that civilian facilities and materials have not beendiverted to a military program.

Japans defensive military is shrinking.

Carolyn M. Leddy, International Affairs Fellow in Japan, 2010 (The North Asia Security Split, The Wall Street Journal, January21st, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704320104575015922923821194.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopBucket6/16/2010)

There are stark differences between Seoul and Tokyo's approaches to defense infrastructure, too. The former exported nearly $1.2 billion dollars indefense equipment last year and is on target to meet its goal of becoming a top 10 global exporter of defense equipment in 2012. By contrast,

conditions in Japan's defense industry remain bleak: The industry is shrinking rapidly because ofdecreased domestic demand, and the situation is unlikely to improve as long as Japan's self-imposedCold War-era arms export ban remains . Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa suggested reviewing Japan's primitive policy onarms exports last Tuesday. But Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama quickly rebuked him for being "loose-tongued," and reaffirmed that the

ban would remain in place.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

5


6/23


AFF Answers Military High Now

Japans Self Defense Force is partially offensive.

John Feffer, Co-Editor of Foreign Policy in Focus, 2008 (Asias Hidden Arms Race, AlterNet, 2/16/2008http://www.alternet.org/story/77225/?page=1, 7/6/2010)

These days, however, even the definition of "offensive" is changing. In 1999, the country's Self DefenseForces first used offensive force when its naval vessels fired on suspected North Korean spy ships . Lessthan a decade later, Japan provides support far from its "defensive" zone for U.S. wars , including providing fuel tocoalition forces in Afghanistan and transport in Iraq.

Japan rearming now new technology and debate over Article 9.

John Feffer, Co-Editor of Foreign Policy in Focus, 2008 (Asias Hidden Arms Race, AlterNet, 2/16/2008http://www.alternet.org/story/77225/?page=1, 7/6/2010)

Japan was once incapable of bombing other countries largely because its air force didn't have an in-air refueling capability. Thanks to Boeing,however, the first KC-767 tanker aircraft will arrive in Japan later this year,providing government officials,

who occasionally assert the country's right to launch preemptive strikes, with the means to do so . This isnot happy news for Japan's neighbors, who retain vivid memories of the 1930s and 1940s, when its military went on an imperial rampage throughout the

region. Tokyo already has among the best air forces and naval fighting forces in the world , trailing only theUnited States. But leading Japanese officials have displayed an even larger appetite. Some Japanese politiciansare lobbying to amend the peace constitution or even scrap it entirely , while sending military spending skyrocketing. To

promote these ideas, they use the thin rationale that Japan should be participating regularly in "international peacekeeping missions." The Japanese

Defense Agency -- their Pentagon -- which was upgraded to ministry level last year, wants more goodies like an aircraftcarrier, nuclear-powered submarines, and long-range missiles. A light aircraft carrier, which the government hascoyly labeled a "destroyer," will be ready in 2009. The subs and missiles, however, will have to wait. So, too, will Tokyo's attempt to take aquantum leap forward in air-fighting capabilities by importing advanced U.S. F-22 stealth planes. Concerned about releasing latest-generation technologyto the outside world, Congress scotched this deal at the last moment in August 2007.

Japan has the leading submarine technology in Asia.Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, co-author of Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st

Century, and James R. Holmes, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College former Senior

Research Associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, 5/17/2010 (The Next Arms Race,Pacific Freeze, http://pacificfreeze.ips-dc.org/2010/05/the-next-arms-race/, 7/6/2010)

Japans Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), meanwhile, deploys perhaps the most modern and capable diesel-electric submarine force in the world. Japanese defence planners have kept the fleet at thetechnological cutting edge by routinely retiring boats well ahead of schedule while introducing evermore capable replacements. Thus, even though the numbers have remained relatively still (at roughly 16 boats)over the past decade, the MSDF has maintained an impressively high proportion of advanced submarines . Forexample, the latest class of submarines, the Soryu, is superior to its predecessor by virtually every index of performance. The Soryu is the first Japanese

boat fitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP), a fuel-cell technology that permits submarines to operate underwater for extended periods while

quieting their noise signature. It is a formidable undersea platform. In short, the MSDF leads the region in conventionalsubmarine warfareconstituting the benchmark against which other Asian navies will be comparedagainst over the next decade.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

6


7/23


AT: SDF Means Non-Unique

The SDF is purely defensive, and barely has enough to self defend.


Japan does, nonetheless, maintain men under arms, because Article 9 has been interpreted to mean that it isacceptable to maintain purely defensive military forces, with no offensive capability. Japan's Supreme Court has refused tooverrule this interpretation. In 1954, the Diet established a "Self-Defense Agency" which converted the "National Police Reserve"into the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. The original bill provided for a force of 150,000, but this number has been slowlyexpanded to 270,000--a relatively small force compared with those of any of Japan's regional neighbors,such as Taiwan, the two Koreas, or China . Its deterrent purpose and modest capability is reflected in the prohibition of the groundforces from operating overseas. Complete self-defense against major threats would require a much larger, betterequipped force, which would probably strain the existing political compromise and popular acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces. Under presentcircumstances it would also likely cause apprehension among Japan's neighbors.

The SDF being overseas is only defensive.

Rust Deming, adjunct professor of Japan studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, M.A. in East AsianStudies, Stanford University, ex Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, ex East Asian andPacific Affairs Bureaus Senior Advisor to the United Nations General Assembly, Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs, exMinister Counselor for Political Affairs at the American Embassy in Tokyo, Chief, External Political Affairs, American EmbassyTokyo, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Policy, Department of State; Staff office, Office of the Secretary of State; Political MilitaryAffairs Officer, Japan Desk, Department of State; Political Officer, American Embassy, Tokyo; Economic Officer, American

Consulate General Osaka; and Political Officer, American Embassy Tunis., 2004 ( Japan's constitution and defense policy: enteringa new era?, November, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QZY/is_212-213/ai_n15392526/, 5/25/2010)

OVERSEAS SDF DISPATCH. When the Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954, the law did not provide forunits to be sent abroad, although the government maintained that the constitution permitted overseas dispatch for missions that did not involvethe use of force. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Diet passed specific legislation in 1992 to allow SDF

units to participate in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, basing its decision on language in the preamble of the constitutioncalling for Japan to achieve "an honored place in an international society" and by the obligations Japan undertook in joining the United Nations. In

response to September 11, the Diet authorized, by specific legislation, the dispatch of units to Afghanistan and, later, toIraq for noncombat support operations. The Japanese government plans to submit to the Diet in 2005 generic legislation to allow theSDF to participate in similar missions.

The SDF is too small to trigger the impact.

John Pike, Director of globalsecurity.org, worked at Federation of American Scientists, established the Space Policy Working Groupprovides commentary and analysis on space and security issues to PBS, CNN, MSNBC, Fox, ABC, CBS, NBC, BBC, NPR, and

numerous print and online publications, 2009 (Japan Introduction, Globalsecurity.org, February 9http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/intro.htm, 6/2/2010)

The SDF are under control of the civilian Defense Agency, subordinate to the prime minister. Although highly trained and fullyqualified to perform the limited missions assigned to them, the SDF are small, understaffed, andunderequipped for more extensive military operations. Its activities are confined to disaster relief andlimited UN peacekeeping efforts.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

7


8/23


AT: They are Debating Article 9 Now

They are changing the wording to limit the military, not expand it.

Lee Hudson Teslik, senior editor and analyst at Roubini Global Economics, previously Associate Editor for CFR.org at the Council

on Foreign Relations, speech-writer and journalist, 2006 (Japan and Its Military, Council on Foreign Relations, April 13thhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/10439/japan_and_its_military.html#p2, 6/14/2010)

Some politicians, including Koizumi, have suggested Japan's constitution, including Article Nine, should be amended .Opinion is mixed on what this might mean in practice, though officials have already said that the first clause of Article Nine, statingthat Japan will not go to war, will not be changed . But experts say the second clause could be revised, eitherto allow the SDF to participate in overseas peacekeeping operations, or more drastically to allow forparticipation in collective defense campaigns . "A change would help people know what they're getting ,"says Ellis Krauss, professor of Japanese politics at the UC-San Diego. "Not changing the constitution gives the LDP [LiberalDemocratic Party] much more leeway to interpret as they please ."

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

8


9/23


Link Extensions

US presence key to Japanese confidence fears of abandonment and no nuclear guarantee.

Toshi Yoshihara, professor of strategy at the US Naval War College, visiting professor at the U.S. Air War College, James R.Holmes, professor of strategy at the US Naval War College, senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for

International Trade and Security, Summer 2009. [Naval War College Review 62.3, Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo's NuclearOption]

Seen in realist terms, then, China's maritime rise threatens to degrade Japan's strategic position in the region.Tokyo may ultimately conclude that self-help represents the only way to shore up its position . Skyrocketingcosts of developing and procuring weaponry are driving the force structure of the American military inexorably downward in numbers. Just one example:the Pentagon's estimates of future U.S. Navy fleet size now run as low as 150 ships, a fraction of the nearly six-hundred-ship navy of the 1980s. (6) Eventhe 313-ship fleet espoused by the Navy leadership now appears fanciful, with 283 ships currently in active service and little prospect of accelerating

shipbuilding rates enough to increase the inventory by thirty vessels. (7) Allies like Japan monitor such trends closely. A precipitous decline inconventional U.S. military capacity in the theater could have major diplomatic ramifications , undercuttingAmerican staying power in the western Pacific, giving rise to Japanese fears of abandonment, and unsettling the entireAsian security architecture. More to the point, Tokyo would likely interpret such a decline as

foreshadowing an end to the American nuclear guarantee.

US presence key to Japanese confidence access to technology and symbol of peace.

Joel Wuthnow, Ph.D. candidate at Oxford U., summa cum laude graduate of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and

International Affairs, Jan. 2005. [Strategic Studies Institute, The Impact of Missile Threats on the Reliability of U.S. Overseas Bases:A Framework for Analysis, p. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi]

In East Asia, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have a substantial presence in Japan, able to respond to aspectrum of regional crises. Russia, China, and North Korea will be able to threaten reprisal for Japanese basing agreements. However,Japan is unlikely to expel U.S. forces on the grounds of growing missile threats; indeed, the opposite is true. The reason is that Japanhas fundamental concerns about the motives of its three regional antagonists, and a significant reduction of U.S. presence wouldweaken the ability of Japan to provide defense.216 The added benefits of the defense pact include the

ability to avoid a "costly and destabilizing military buildup," access to U.S. technology, and symbolismof Japan's commitment to peace and nonaggression under civilian rule .217

US presence in Japan is key to Japan feeling safe.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asia affairs, and Mary B. Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation 2009 (, Mary B., Analyst inNonproliferation, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Servicehttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, pg. 2-3, 6/30/2010)

Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly in the past decade, developments in the region have increased Japans senseof vulnerability and caused some in the policy community to rethink Japans policy of forswearingnuclear weapons development. During the Cold War, the U.S. military presence in Japan represented the Pacificfront of containing the Soviets, a reassuring statement of commitment to Japans security to many Japanese. NorthKoreas test of a ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998 dispelled the sense of a more secure post-Cold War environment for the archipelago. Moreover, India and Pakistan both conducted underground nuclear weapons tests earlier that year,which to many undermined the success of the international non-proliferation regime and set off fears of a new nuclear arms race. Japan was particularlyalarmed at the tests, and instituted a freeze on new loans and grants to the two states.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

9


10/23


Link Extensions

Withdrawal from Japan would cause Japanese rearm.

Philippa Fogarty, staff writer for BBC, 2006 (Test sparks Asian arms race fears, BBC, October 9, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5414308.stm, 5/25/2010)

"If we see North Korea with demonstrable nuclear weapon capability and [they] turn it into something that could go on a missile, and if the USstance towards the North is perceived as weak, then the Japanese would get very nervous ," says Dr ChrisHughes of the University of Warwick in Britain. Nonetheless, says Dr Hughes, Japan's most likely move would be further sanctions, both via the UN and

its own unilateral measures, aimed at forcing North Korea to return to dialogue. In parallel, Japan could also look at acquiring itsown defence capability - such as Tomahawk missiles - that could target North Korea's missile bases.

Japan depends on the US for its nuclear protection

Sheila A. Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, 2010 (Japans Missed Opportunity, The New York Times, April 14thhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/opinion/15iht-edsmith.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1276704073-cscnOzwKuRsNAoq4KMx+SA,6/16/2010)

Another issue complicating relations stems from the deep divisions within Japan over the role U.S. nuclearweapons should play in defending the country. Foreign MinisterKatsuya Okada wrote a letter to Secretary of State HillaryClinton in December unequivocally stating that Tokyo no longer feels the need for theater nuclear weapons, and iscomfortable with the broader strategic arsenal available to Washington for deterring aggression.

Uncertainty about US deterrence causes Japanese nuclearization.

Santaro Rey, staff writer at the Asia Times, 2009 (World powerless to stop North Korea, Asia Times, 5/27/2009http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KE27Dg01.html, 7/5/2010)

For more than 60 years, South Korea and Japan have been protected from either the Soviet Union, China or North Koreaby a USnuclear umbrella. However, if Seoul or Tokyo were to ever experience doubts about the reliability ofthis deterrent, they could eventually embark on a nuclear weapons build-up . Although US presidents have warned

North Korea that using nuclear weapons would lead to their own destruction, Seoul and Tokyo cannot guarantee thatWashington would be willing to use nuclear weapons to avenge the loss of any Korean or Japanese cities if the Northhad the means to attempt a nuclear strike on the US itself.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

10


11/23


AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms the Link

Japan could change its nuclear weapons policy to protect itself.



Although possession of nuclear weapons is not forbidden in the constitution, Japan, as the only nation to experience the devastation of atomic attack,early expressed its abhorrence of nuclear arms and determined never to acquire them . The Basic Atomic EnergyLaw of 1956 limits research, development, and utilization of nuclear power to peaceful uses, and, beginning in 1956, national policy hasembodied "three non-nuclear principles"--forbidding the nation to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or to allow them to beintroduced into the nation. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made this pledge - known as the Three Non-Nuclear Principles - on February 5, 1968. The notionwas formalized by the Japanese Diet on November 24, 1971. In 1976 Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (adopted bythe United Nations Security Council in 1968) and reiterated its intention never to "develop, use, or allow the transportation of nuclear weapons through its

territory." However, if Japan believed that "extraordinary events" had jeopardised its "supreme interests",under Article X of the Treaty it could withdraw from the NPT . Such "extraordinary events" could include the acquisition of

nuclear weapons by North Korea. Japan could then legally use its plutonium to build nuclear weapons .

Japan has debated Article 9 when faced with threats.

Danielle Demetriou, Tokyo correspondent for the Daily and Sunday Telegraph and for Monocle magazine, 20 09 (Japan 'shoulddevelop nuclear weapons' to counter North Korea threat, Telegraph.co.uk, April 20http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/5187269/Japan-should-develop-nuclear-weapons-to-counter-North-Korea-threat.html, 6/4/2010)

Takeo Kawamura, chief cabinet secretary, said: "It's impossible for Japan to get nuclear weapons. [ ] "Japanalso has the obligation of observing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, under which it would not produce nor obtain

nuclear weapons." However, it is not the first time that a politician has discussed the possibility ofallowing the possession nuclear arms weapons and debated whether this would be permitted within the

constitution. Shinzo Abe, a former prime minister, and chief cabinet secretary, Yasuo Fukuda, are amonghigh profile politicians who have previously stated that Japan's pacifist constitution does not precludethe acquisition of nuclear weapons for tactical defence purposes .

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

11


12/23


Internal Link Extensions

Japan rearm starts an arms race between Japan, China, and North Korea.

Zachary D. Kaufman, Adjunct Professor at the University of Puerto Rico Law School, a graduate of Yale University, the Universityof Oxford, and Yale Law School, 2009-10 law clerk on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, completing PhD

degree in International Relations at the University of Oxford, 20 08 ("No Right to Fight: The Modern Implications of Japan's PacifistPostwar Constitution.", Yale Journal of International Law. Vol. 33, Issue 1, Winter 2008http://www.yale.edu/yjil/PDFs/vol_33/Recent_Developments_v33_1.pdf, 5/20/2010)

Japans full and unambiguous remilitarization would have significant consequences for itself, itsneighbors, and its closest military ally, the United States . For Japan, remilitarizing could alienate Japans former victims orcurrent competitors. As Francis Fukuyama argues, Japans unilateral revision of Article 9, viewed against the backdrop of its new nationalism, would

isolate Japan from virtually the whole of Asia.37 Such a scenario might prompt an arms race between Japan and Chinaor North Korea. Nonetheless, some believe that, even with a constitutional revision, Japan would remainpeaceful since no country could fail to learn its lesson after such a horrible war.38 But it is preciselyJapans perceived lack of learning that so concerns domestic and foreign critics of its remilitarization. NationalistJapanese authorities have revised schoolbooks in order to exonerate Japan for its guilt over aggression and atrocities in World War II.39 Japanese teachers

claim to have been punished for discussing taboo topics such as the comfort women or for refusing to participate in nationalistic demonstrations, such assaluting the flag or standing for the national anthem.40 Several recent official visits to Japanese shrines that glorify the countrys war dead have angeredChina and Korea, which suffered Japanese wartime atrocities. 41 And Japan continues to resist officially acknowledging the atrocities it perpetrated in its

horrific past.42 As one commentator observed, because of this omission, Japan lives in dread of its neighbors disgust andmisunderstanding.43 Precisely because the United States, Japans closest military ally, provides a nuclear umbrella, the United States, more thanmost countries, could experience both benefits and drawbacks from a rearmed Japan. A Japan more capable of defending itself and projecting its powerwould reduce or even relieve the U.S. burden to safeguard its ally and would provide the United States with a more able partner in promoting internationalsecurity.44Japans increased involvement in U.S. military ventures would bolster the credibility of American claims of multilateralism. On the other hand,

a less dependent Japan might mean a less trusted ally . A Japan not shielded under the U.S. nuclear umbrella might become agreater critic of, or even threat to, U.S. strategic interests. At the same time, a United States less reliant on Japan for its loyalty and assistance might bemore willing to criticize Japan. After all, Fukuyama suspects that the United Statess gratitude for Japanese support in Iraq caused the United States to

refrain from discussing Japans nationalistic trend.45 Rearmament would also have consequences for U.S. relations withJapans neighbors, especially if it appears that Japan rearmed with or because of U.S. support . William O.Beeman, a professor of Japanese anthropology, argues that,because of states like Korea, where memories of Japanesemilitary atrocities in World War II are still alive, the United States, in encouraging Japans increasedmilitary action, may think it has helped some short-term problems. But it may have bought a great dealof trouble down the line.46 And such long-term consequences might include a shifting of regionalalliances that would harm U.S. interests. One commentator hypothesizes that the United States couldfind itself and Tokyo ostracized by vital allies like Korea and Thailand, moving it even further fromChina.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

12


13/23


Internal Link Extensions

Japanese rearm causes an arms race between South Korea, China, Taiwan, India, and Pakistan - MAD is

wrong.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, specialist in Asia affairs, and Mary B. Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation 2009 (, Mary B., Analyst inNonproliferation, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Servicehttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, pg. 11, 6/30/2010)

To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a

regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop itsown program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possiblyinspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the alreadynuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospector even realityof several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife withhistorical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some securityexperts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balancecould be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential

stabilizing factors.

Japanese rearm would cause global proliferation.


Japans development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S.nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclearweapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give uptheir weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use andthe IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty . If a

close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United Stateswould be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally.

Japanese rearm angers China, decreases US hegemony, and causes an East Asian arms race.

Santaro Rey, staff writer at the Asia Times, 2009 (World powerless to stop North Korea, Asia Times, 5/27/2009http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KE27Dg01.html, 7/5/2010)

Ultimately, a nuclear South Korea and Japan could transform the geostrategic landscape of East Asia , andpossibly the world. It could hasten the end of US hegemony in Asia , since the two would become less dependent on the US toguarantee their security. There would be less need for US bases in the region, and Seoul and Tokyo might become a lot more assertive. Meanwhile,China would at the very least be uncomfortable with a nuclear South Korea. One reason is that Seoul could become more assertive about future territorialdisputes concerning the ancient kingdom of Koguryo (Goguryeo), which incorporated large tracts of China and Korea. But the bigger reason is that anuclear South Korea might encourage Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons for fear of being left behind in the nuclear race. For China, a nuclear Taiwanwould be intolerable, for it would make it easier for the island to declare independence from the mainland without fear of retribution if the Taiwanese

people's desire arose. Finally, China would be especially concerned about a nuclear Japan, since Tokyo isBeijing's most formidable geopolitical rival in East Asia and a potential check on its self-proclaimed peaceful rise.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

13


14/23


Impact Extensions

Proliferation causes massively destructive nuclear wars

Utgoff, survival v. 44 no 2 summer2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that suchshoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with theweapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the AmericanWild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the worldmay even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies ofdead cities or even whole nations.

Asian war would be devastatingarms races have left the region incredibly militarized.Feffer February 2008 Co-Editor of Foreign Policy in FocusJohn, World Beat, FPIF February 19 2k8 http://www.fpif.org/fpifzines/wb/4979

The only problem with this explanation is that Northeast Asia is in the middle of a hot-and-heavy armsrace. As I explain in Asia's Hidden Arms Racean article published with TomDispatch, the excellentNation-affiliated website run by Tom EngelhardtSouth Korea has increased its military spending by over 50% since embarking on its make-nice policy withthe North and plans to increase it by an average of 10% a year until 2020. Japan is acquiring a whole newrange of offensive military capabilities, including the option of long-range bombing. China is boosting its militaryspending hand over fist. And Russia, recovered from its 1990s economic slump, is chasing the UnitedStates again to become top arms exporter. Even cash-strapped North Korea is desperately trying to keeppace by devoting as much as one-quarter of its budget to the military. And let's not forget the putativeguarantor of security in the region. The United States has been pushing Japan to break out of its "peaceconstitution" by selling it high-tech weaponry and spending billions to build a joint missile defense program. And what wouldyou call the ring of alliances that the United States has created with India, Australia, the Philippines, South

Korea, and Japan? Not to mention close ties with Central Asian countries, Pakistan, and Thailand? Connectthe dots and it looks a lot like the encirclement of China. And, by the way, the United States has increasedmilitary spending over 70% underthe Bushadministration. Much of the weaponry (submarines, destroyers) has nothing to do with the so-called global war on terror. China is the only significant challenge to American hegemony that the Pentagon sees onthe horizon. In the most optimistic scenario, the countries negotiating with North Korea in the Six PartyTalksthe United States, Japan, China, Russia, and South Koreawill reach agreement ondenuclearization, establishment of diplomatic relations, and a peace treaty to end the Korean War. And they might turn thenegotiating structure into a permanent peace and security framework. But, as Suzy Kim and I argue inHardliners Target Dtente in NorthKorea, not everyone is enthusiastic about this trajectory. "Some critics," we write, "continue to hold ontothe old Bush strategy of isolation and regime change because, they argue, North Korea cannot be trusted to abide by any agreement.Other critics focus on North Korea's nuclear program itself, both its internal characteristics and purported external cooperation with countries such as Syria. Athird set of criticisms focuses on the February 13 agreement itself and identify flaws, ambiguities, and blind spots, particularly around the question of

verification. Another group focuses instead on North Korea's human rights record. And finally there are conservative critics in Japan andSouth Korea who are attempting to undermine dtente from the sidelines." Even if engagement with North Koreaovercomes these obstacles, however, all this talk of peace runs straight up against the major increases in militaryspending and the acquisition of ever more sophisticated weaponry.North Korea wants nuclear weapons to deter attacks.Bland reassurances at the negotiating table don't quite square with Japan's desire to acquire the latest F-22fighter jets, South Korea's new Aegis-equipped destroyer, or the billions of dollars that the United States isspending on missile defense. There hasn't been a war in Northeast Asia in 50 years. But the world's largestmilitaries face off in Northeast Asia, and they are bulking up. If something sparks a conflict, the results are

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

14
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4951http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4951http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4951http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4951http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4951


15/23


not going to be pretty.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

15


16/23


AT: Countries can Deter

Countries in East Asia would not be able to deter launches in real time.

George Perkovich, vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace Nuclear Proliferation, 1998 (Foreign Policy No. 112, pp. 12-23)

However, it is the very lack of such elaborate systems that is cause for worry in regional arms races,whether in East Asia, the Middle East, or South Asia. These countries may not have the satellitesneeded to monitor deployment of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads , or the sophisticated early warning systemsto detect launches in real time or to determine whether aircraft entering air space are carrying nuclear weapons. Proximity is also an issue. Forinstance, given the three-to-ten minute missile and aircraft flight times in South Asia and the six-to-thirty-five minute flight times in the Middle East,

there is little opportunity to gather real-time information about potential preparations to launch nuclearwarheads.

MAD will not deter countries mistrust and lack of regional architecture.Cynthia Lee, staff writer for Asia Times , 2009 (Conflicts in Chinas North Korea Policy, Asia Times, 7/22/2009http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KG22Ad01.html, 7/6/2010)

Most nations in this region are unpredictable, autocratic, and vulnerable in one way or another.Combined with high poverty and low education levels, there are no assurances that nuclearproliferation with follow the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) paradigm of Western proliferation. Deterrence throughMAD simply may not work or rogue nations bound by heavy sanctions may sell their technology toother states and worse, to non-state actors . Equally disturbing is the reality that the Asian region is one marked byhigh levels of mistrust (which are owed largely in part to its complicated and violent history). Once proliferation begins, mistrustamongst the political actors will make it difficult to stop - to say nothing of Asia's lack of an effectiveregional architecture and thus a central, impartial organization to conduct proliferation efforts.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

16


17/23


AT: North Korea Does Not Have Technology

North Korea proved they had nukes years ago.

David Usborne, New York Correspondent at The Independent, 2006 (North Korea: epicentre of a new nuclear arms race, TheIndependent, October 10, http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=ODQ3Nzg0Nw%3D%3D, 5/23/2010)

World leaders reacted with grim dismay to news thatNorth Korea had successfully conducted its first nuclear test, an act ofwillful defiance which threatens to redraw the strategic map of the entire Asian region and precipitate a global diplomatic crisis of uncalculated

proportions. The blast, at an underground facility in North Hamgyong province, was believed to have occurred at 11.36amNorth Korean time yesterday. Although seismic experts in other countries were trying to verify the claim, there seemed noreason to believe North Korea was bluffing. Russian experts said they believed the claim was accurateand that the explosion may have had the power of about 15 kilotons of TNT, roughly the same as theHiroshima bomb in 1945. "We have no doubt that it was a nuclear explosion," said Russia's DefenceMinister, Sergei Ivanov. Counterparts in South Korea and the US speculated it may have been on a smaller scale.

North Koreas 100 nuclear weapon stockpile grows by 1 every two month.



As of February 2005 Defense Intelligence Agency analysts were reported to believe that North Korea may already haveproduced as many as 12 to 15 nuclear weapons. This would imply thatby the end of 2004 North Korea hadproduced somewhere between four and eight uranium bombs [on top of the seven or eight plutonium bombs already onhand]. The DIA's estimate was at the high end of an intelligence community-wide assessment of North Korea's nuclear arsenal completed in early 2005.The CIA lowballed the estimate at two to three bombs, which would suggest an assessment that the DPRK either had not reprocessed a significant amountof plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed from storage in early 2003, or had not fabricated a significant number of weapons from whatever

amount of plutonium had been reprocessed. The Department of Energy's analysis put North Korea's stockpilesomewhere in between, which would be consistent with the roughly 7 or 8 plutonium bombs that could

be produced from all existing plutonium stocks, with no uranium bombs. If one assumes that theDPRK produced sufficient plutonium for eight bombs, and expended one of these bombs in a test inPakistan in 1998, then as of 2005 their plutonium bomb inventory would be seven weapons. Taking themid-point of the DIA's estimate of between four and eight uranium bombs, the plausible uranium bombstockpile as of early 2005 would be six weapons, increasing at a rate of one bomb every two months.Thus the early 2005 stockpile would be 13 weapons, growing to about 20 weapons by the end of theyear.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

17


18/23


AT: Japan Does Not Have Technology

Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons.

Steven Aftergood, senior research analyst and director of the Federation of American Scientists, 2000 (Nuclear WeaponsProgram, April 16, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke/, 5/25/2010)

Having renounced war, the possession of war potential, the right of belligerency, and the possession of nuclear weaponry, it held theview that it should possess only the minimum defense necessary to face external threats. The Japanesegovernment values its close relations with the United States, and it remains dependent on the United States nuclearumbrella. During the Sato cabinet in the 1960's, it is reported that Japan secretly studied the development of nuclearweapons. On 17 June 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata told reporters that "it's certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possessnuclear weapons but has not made them." This remark aroused widespread concern in the international media at that time. Japan's nuclear power program

based on reprocessed plutonium has aroused widespread suspicion that Japan is secretly planning to develop nuclear weapons. Japan's nucleartechnology and ambiguous nuclear inclinations have provided a considerable nuclear potential , becoming a"paranuclear state." Japan would not have material or technological difficulties in making nuclear weapons .Japan has the raw materials, technology, and capital for developing nuclear weapons. Japan could possibly produce functional

nuclear weapons in as little as a year's time . On the strength of its nuclear industry, and its stockpile of weapons-useable plutonium,Japan in some respects considers itself, and is treated by others as, as a virtual nuclear weapons state.

Japan could create missiles equal to or better than those of the US.

FAS, group of scientists that analyze complex global issues that hinge on science and technology including biosecurity and strategic

security, 2000 (Missile Program, April 16, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/missile/index.html, 5/25/2010)

Japan has an active commercial space launch program using several types of solid- fuel rockets, which could providethe basis for a long-range ballistic missile program. Under the conditions set by the Allied Powers following World War II, Japanwas forbidden to develop rockets until 1955.(1) The solid-propellant M-4S, capable of placing a 180 kg payload in a 250 km orbit, was started in 1963 andfour vehicles were launched in the period between 1970 and 1972. The M-4S is no longer in production or in service. The M-3C (195 kg in 250 km orbit)and the M-3H (290 kg in 250 km orbit) were the next generation of rockets first launched in 1974. They also are no longer in production or service, having

been superceded by the M-3S-II (780 kg in 250 km orbit), first launched in 1985. The initial M-3S-II launches injected Japan's first interplanetary probes,Sakigake and Suisei, toward Halley's Comet.(2) The M-3S-II is also considered to be capable of a surface-to-surface range of 4,000 km with a 500 kg

payload(3) Development of the new M-V rocket was begun in 1989 and first launched in 1995. The M-V is more than twice the weight of the M-3S-II(130,000 kg vs. 61,700 kg). It will is able to place a 1,800 kg into low earth orbit or inject a 300-400-kg payload into space for planetary surveys.(4)

Apparently, the M-V would be capable of intercontinental range as a ballistic missile. 1 - A comparison of Japanese solid rocketmotor launch vehicles and American ICBMs is interesting . Although precise calculations would be even more interesting,these rough numbers indicate rather clearly Japanese competence in this field. If converted to ballistic missile applications, theM-5 would seem likely to give Japan an ICBM roughly equivalent to the MX Peacekeeper, and the J-1would probably give Japan an ICBM surpassing the perfomance of a Minuteman 3 .

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

18


19/23


AT: Japan Does Not Have Technology

They already have the plutonium.



Weapon-grade plutonium is nearly pure plutonium 239, whereas the plutonium in commercial fuel ismuch lower in plutonium 239 and higher in the isotopes that are undesirable for weapons use. This, however, is not a crucialdifference, since all plutonium can be used in weapons . The US nuclear weapons arsenal does not utilize commercial (reactorgrade) plutonium from spent fuel. Tests were completed, however, to confirm that reactor grade plutonium couldbe used in a nuclear explosive and is therefore a nonproliferation concern. Some have said the Japanesereactor-grade plutonium would not be fully usable, but the US detonated a reactor-grade plutoniumdevice in 1962, and in order to discourage other countries from using plutonium as a fuel, President Carter declassified data on the feasibility of areactor-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1976. A nuclear bomb similar to the one exploded in Nagasaki can be made with seven to eight kg of

plutonium.

Japan has enough plutonium to make over 1000 nuclear weapons, and this number is growing.


Two of the more controversial aspects of Japans civilian power program are its large stocks ofseparated plutonium and advanced fuel cycle facilities. Plutonium is a by-product of the uranium fuel used in all nuclearreactors. Plutonium in spent fuel is not weapons-usable. Once this reactorgrade6 plutonium is separatedout of spent fuel through reprocessing, it is potentially directly usable in nuclear weapons .7 Thisseparated plutonium can also be recycled into MOX fuel for light-water power reactors . France, India,Japan, Russia and the U.K. currently all produce reactor fuel through reprocessing. The global stockpile of separated plutonium is estimated to be about

500 tons, including military and civilian stocks.8 Stocks of civilian separated plutonium are growing around the world. Japan possesses 6.7MT of civilian stocks of separated plutonium stored in Japan, and 38 MT of separated plutoniumstored outside the country.9 This material has the potential to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons.Japans civilian separated plutonium stockpile is expected to grow to 70 tons by 2020 .

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

19


20/23


Extra Impacts NPT Collapse

Japan rearm sets off Asian arm race, greatly weakens NPT

Bakanic 08 (Elizabeth D. Bakanic Department of Homeland Security Graduate Fellow for Science and Technology, 6/9/08, Theend of Japan's nuclear taboo Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo)

In terms ofthe teetering nonproliferation regime, a change in Japan's attitude toward nuclear weapons wouldbe a serious blow. To date, Tokyo has been a foremost advocate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,campaigning against proliferation and rejecting the idea of developing nuclear weapons despite possessing the best nuclearcapability of any non-nuclear weapon state and having two nuclear weapon states near its borders. The binding nature of

international agreements relies on such attention and support from its signatories. So although Japan may never violate thetreaty, if Tokyo is perceived as being less supportive as it opens up domestically on the nuclear issue, theeffect on NPT morale could be dire, which speaks directly to the NPT's current vulnerability. Some element of thechanging attitude toward nuclear weapons in Japan must be due to discomfort with the status quo and a security need thatthe NPT or the country's other security partnerships isn't satisfying. Therefore, a disturbing factor of Japan's nuclearnormalization is what it may symbolize for the NPT overall.

Weakened NPT leads to worldwide arms race

Jackson 09 (Van Jackson, Founder and Executive Editor of Asia Chronicle, Contributing Analyst for FPIF, 7/6/ 09 DC AsiaPolicy Examiner, Obama's nuclear plan could prevent Asian arms race http://www.examiner.com/x-16317-DC-Asia-Policy-Examiner~y2009m7d6-Obamas-nuclear-plan-could-prevent-Asian-arms-race)

This is not overly pessimistic hyperbole but a realistic scenario according to the classic literature on security dilemmas.

Just imagine a world where the most powerful countries in Asia all eitherpossess nuclear weapons or areengaged in covert programs to develop a nuclear weapons capability, each in the name of its own security. Such adreadful possibility is exactly what the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) wasdesigned to prevent. But the efficacy of the NPT has been called into question by some in recent years because of theactions of de facto and aspiring nuclear weapons states. De jure nuclear weapons states like the United States have done

little to help matters. In 2005, the Bush Administration took actions that some consider contrary to the spirit of the NPT byinitiating a push to rewrite U.S. law and international regulations to recognize Indias nuclear capability in such a way that

NPT-based sanctions would no longer apply. Legally speaking, the NPT is the only thing that has prevented aglobal nuclear arms race to date and it is increasingly at risk of becoming irrelevant. Absent strategicchanges on the part of global leaders like the United States and China, a North Korean decision to keep its nuclearweaponscould sparkthe spiral model arms race described above.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

20


21/23


Extra Impacts India/Pakistan Arms Race

A nuclear Japan would create an arms race with India and Pakistan

Eugene A. Matthews, former Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, President of Nintai (international educational

firm), 2003 ("Japan's New Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, Nov. - Dec., 2003, JSTOR, 5/20/10)

Having said that, Washington must persuade Tokyo not to acquire nuclear weapons. A nuclear Japan would make Asia a moredangerous place, starting an arms race unlike any the region has ever seen . China would increase its nuclear stockpileand seek more military resources, particularly nuclear submarines. Asia would suddenly have five nuclear powers-China, India,Japan, Pakistan, andNorth Korea-and South Korea would quickly follow, raising the potential for disastrousconflict.

Extinction

Fai 01 (Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director, Kashmiri American Council, Washington Times, 7-8)

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to

aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed andillegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignitedtwo wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and anuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncraticview. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. BothIndia and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbingdespite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. The boiling witches' brew in Kashmir should propel theUnited States to assertive facilitation or mediation of Kashmir negotiations. The impending July 14-16 summit in New Delhi between President Musharrafand Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee featuring Kashmir on the agenda does not justify complacency.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

21


22/23


Extra Impacts US/Russia Arms Race

Japanese rearm would cause an arms race between Russia and the US.

Chungang Ilbo 2009 (South Korean daily urges North to stop 'toying with missile, BBChttp://www.lexisnexis.com.lexproxy.minlib.net/us/lnlib/results/docview/docview.do?

docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9386679243&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9386679246&cisb=22_T9386679245&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=3, 5/20/10 LexisNexis)

Japan's enhancement of its military capacity will inevitably stimulate China and Russia as well as us.North Korea's missile will come back at it like a boomerang. An armament race will certainly put a burden on strong

countries. But it will be a calamity to us and North Korea, because we have no chance of winning thearmament race of strong countries. North Korea's missile blocks an opportunity for Northeast Asian countries toprosper together in peace.

US-Russian nuclear war causes extinction

Nick Bostrom, PhD and Professor at Oxford, Recipient of the Gannon Award, March 2002www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html

A much greaterexistential risk emerged with the build-up ofnuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-outnuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify asglobal and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddonwould occurand that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nucleararsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large

nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since itwould not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently.

Last printed 7/4/2010 09:53:00 PM

22


23/23


Extra Impacts China/Taiwan Arms Race

Japanese rearm would cause an arms race between China and Taiwan.

Philippa Fogarty, staff writer for BBC, 2006 (Test sparks Asian arms race fears, BBC, October 9, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5414308.stm, 5/25/2010)

Any move by Japan would have a knock-on effect on the region . "There is no way that a South Koreanleader could sit by idly while Japan [is being] nuclearised ," says Dr Pinkston. There would be popular support for this - a pollin 2005 by South Korean daily Joongang Ilbo showed that two-thirds of respondents believed South Korea should possess nuclear weapons. And withJapan and South Korea set on such a path, China , until now the region's only nuclear power, could then move towardsmodernising and upgrading its own arsenal, potentially triggering a similar response from Taiwan.

China-Taiwan war causes extinction.

Straits Times 2kThe Straits Times, June 25, 2000 (Regional Fallout: No One Gains in War Over Taiwan. Straits Times. Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US

and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomesunavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and --horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijinghas already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as

belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore . If China

were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powerselsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefineEurope's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likesof Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan , each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, couldenter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway,commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons againstChina to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and itsimplications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which couldhave led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,

there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates thatChina possessesabout 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go

for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "nonfirst use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-fundedInstitute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washingtonthat although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He

said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismembermentas a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see thedestruction of civilisation.

Documents

DDW10 Japan Rearm DA