VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 205De Roma vs. Court of Appeals

No. L­46903. July 23, 1987.*

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, asGuardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.

Civil Law; Succession; Intestacy; Collation; Fact that adonation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donatedproperties from collation as required under Art. 1061, Civil Code;Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent­donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if thathad been the donor's intention.—We agree with the respondentcourt that there is nothing in the above provisions expresslyprohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the saidcourt correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ngpagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described thedonation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as anexpress prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation isirrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof fromthe collation required under Article 1061. We surmise from theuse of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed ofdonation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may alsopresume he understood the legal consequences of the donationbeing made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the preciselanguage of the document, that he would have included therein anexpress prohibition to collate if that had been the donor'sintention. Anything less than such express prohibition will notsuffice under the clear language of Article 1062.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Intention to exempt donatedproperties from collation should be expressed plainly andunequivocally as an exception to the general rule in Art. 1062,Civil Code; Absent such a clear indication of that intention, therule not the exception should be applied.—The intention to exemptfrom collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as

an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not theexception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

Constitutional Law; Judiciary; Decisions; Provision in Art. X,Sec. 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution fixing the period for the Courtof

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Roma vs. Court of Appeals

Appeals to decide cases within the 12­month period is merelydirectory, and failure to decide would not deprive thecorresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisionsinvalid; Provision reworded in Art. VIII, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitutionwhich impresses upon courts the need for speedy disposition ofcases, but serious studies and efforts are now being taken by theSupreme Court—There is no need to dwell long on the other errorassigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealedcase by the respondent court beyond the 12month periodprescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. Aswe held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merelydirectory and failure to decide on time would not deprive thecorresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisionsinvalid. It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provisionhas now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice,indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy dispositionof the cases that have been clogging their dockets these manyyears. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by theCourt to meet that need.

PETITION to review the order of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CRUZ, J.:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters,Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestateon April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings wereinstituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by theprivate respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay wasappointed administratrix and in due time filed aninventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda onthe ground that certain properties earlier donated byCandelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not beenincluded.

1

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels ofcoconut land worth P10,297.50.

2 There is no dispute

regarding their valuation; what the parties cannot agreeupon is whether these lands are subject to collation. Theprivate respondent vigorously argues that it is,conformably to Article 1061 of the

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1 Record on Appeal, pp. 14­23.2 Ibid., pp. 69­73.

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VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 207De Roma vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claimsshe has no obligation to collate because the decedentprohibited such collation and the donation was notofficious.

The two articles provide as follows:

"Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with othercompulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate anyproperty or right which he may have received from the decedentduring the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any othergratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in thedetermination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account ofthe partition."

"Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsoryheirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if thedonee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donationshould be reduced as inofficious."

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trialcourt,

** which held that the decedent, when she made the

donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of thetwo adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, andin fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria'sestate.

3

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, therespondent court

*** holding that the deed of donation

contained no express prohibition to collate as an exceptionto Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation andequally divided the net estate of the decedent, including thefruits of the donated property, between Buhay andRosalinda.

4

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

"IKALAWA. Na alang­alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin atpagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasalkay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang,mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang­sulatdin dito sa Lungsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatangito ay kusang­loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sanabang­

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** Judge Manuel T. Reyes.3 Rollo, pp. 16­25.*** San Diego, J., ponente, and Busran and Jimenez, JJ.4 Ibid., pp. 31­35.

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208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDDe Roma vs. Court of Appeals

git na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili attagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di namababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi saitaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na angnagmamay­aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaringipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyangpangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rinang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mganasabing lupa;

"IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mgapag­aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong itoay hindi masisira ang legitima ng mga tao na dapat magmana saakin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ngaking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit nakaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion." '

5

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing inthe above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation ofthe donated properties. As the said court correctlyobserved, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na dina mababawing muli" merely described the donation as"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an expressprohibition against collation.

6 The fact that a donation is

irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereoffrom the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and"free portion" in the deed of donation that it was preparedby a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood thelegal consequences of the donation being made. It isreasonable to suppose, given the precise language of thedocument, that he would have included therein an expressprohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will notsuffice under the clear language of Article 1062. Thesuggestion that there was an implied prohibition becausethe properties donated were imputable to the free portionof the decedent's estate merits little consideration.Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed thatthe disputed donation is of­

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5 Id., pp. 15­16.6 Tagalog Forms for Notaries Public, Rosendo Ignacio, 1967 2nd. Ed.,

pp. 21, 23, 26, 28, 31.

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VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 209De Roma vs. Court of Appeals

ficious. The sole issue is whether or not there was anexpress prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be

expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to thegeneral rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clearindication of that intention, we apply not the exception butthe rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other errorassigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of theappealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12­month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,

7 the

said provision was merely directory and failure to decide ontime would not deprive the corresponding courts ofjurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provisionhas now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts ofjustice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for thespeedy disposition of the cases that have been cloggingtheir dockets these many years. Serious studies and effortsare now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED intoto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco,JJ., concur.

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—A rule which would require a judge to resolve amotion for execution within 15 days would be difficult, ifnot impossible to follow. (Universal Far East Corporationvs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 642.)

Failure of judge to decide a case within 30 days does not

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7 121 SCRA 51; New Frontier Mines vs. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502;Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L­41222, Nov.13, 1985.

210

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDPackaging Products Corporation vs. NLRC

divest him of his jurisdiction. (Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr., 121

SCRA 51.)

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