DECISION-MAKING || TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING?

TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING?Author(s): Catherine Grémion, Kenneth E. Boyko and J. BoddewynSource: International Studies of Management & Organization, Vol. 2, No. 2, DECISION-MAKING(SUMMER 1972), pp. 125-141Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41103791 .

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TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING?

Catherine Grémion (France)

The study of policy decisions raises the problem of finding a satisfactory intellectual device and of obtaining a theoretical framework adapted to the goal. The analysis of policy decisions is conditioned by the existence of a general theory on decision- making, just as all progress in the analysis of policy decisions enriches this general theory.

It is from this commonplace, even tautological, idea that we are attempting here not only to appraise theoretical approaches to decisions and their application to policy-making, but also to analyze recent research work on policy decisions and its contribution to the development of the general theory.

I. The Classical Rationalist School

The oldest orientation in the literature on decision-making, the one that has led to the most abundant and well known works, is the classical rationalist approach. We group under this term

Reprinted by permission of the Editions du Seuil from " Vers une nouvelle théorie de la decision ?", Sociologie du Travail, XI (October-December 1969), pp. 463-470. Catherine Grémion is associated with the Groupe de Sociologie des Organisations (Paris). The translation is by Kenneth E. Boyko and J. Boddewyn.

125



126 Catherine Gremion (France)

works belonging to entirely different disciplines, and having for authors a variety of practitioners, management specialists, political scientists, sociologists, mathematicians, economists, and social psychologists. These authors claim to give, in a very formal way, a good representation of reality, thereby being better able to analyze its mechanisms, and at the same time, in a more normative perspective, to draw the rules for the "best" decision- making. This school has found multiple appli- cations, but has been applied in particular to the study of problems in nuclear strategy and dissuasion. It constitutes a basic element in the teaching of business administration in the United States. The underlying problems of the numerous research works carried out in this perspective are the following.

1) The decision-maker is a unique actor whose behavior is not only intelligent, but rational. The decision is the choice this actor makes, in full awareness, from among all the possible alternatives he has, in order to maximize his advantages.

2) He therefore considers all the alternatives as well as the consequences that would result from all the possible choices, orders these consequences in the light of a fixed scale of prefer- ences, and chooses the alternative that procures the maximum gain.

The refinements of this model have been essentially carried in two directions.

1) A first distinction has been made between the choices made in situations of certainty, risk, and uncertainty. In the case of certainty, the decision-maker knows all the possible situations as well as the consequences to be derived from them. In a sit- uation of risk, the consequences are no longer certain, but he knows the probability of their occurring. Finally, in cases of uncertainty, the different likelihoods are known but their probabilities of occurring are not.

2) Game theory permits one to formalize these different types of choices, and introduces the notion of strategy and that of minimax or maximax gains. It also considers the optimism or pessimism of the decision-maker, who will make his choice based on a minimax regret or minimax risk. (1) Notions such



A New Theory of Decision-Making? 127

as objective or subjective probabilities also constitute directions of research enabling one to enlarge the model.

It is from these beginnings that there developed analyses from policy scientists such as Schelling (2) who, analyzing the mechanisms of dissuasion, not only considers the nation but also the opponent as an essentially rational actor whose behavior corresponds to a calculated awareness of his advantages according to a system of explicit and coherent values. Herman Kahn, in his work On Escalation (3), also takes as a point of departure SchellingTs notion of competition in risk-taking. (4) Similarly, most studies of actual policy decisions that have been carried out, especially foreign policy, utilize this model more or less consciously as a point of departure; e.g., the analysis of the origins of World War I by Hans Morgenthau or the study of United States foreign policy by Stanley Hoffmann. (5)

These concepts also constitute the basis for most theories in economics, as economists utilize the concept of the rational decision-maker in analyses of consumer behavior as well as of the entrepreneur. We will not mention here their concept of the "homo economicusn and the development of these theories (6), but we would like to draw attention to the attempts of authors who were very directly inspired by the economic model for reasoning on political phenomena. Anthony Downs and Edward Banfield are among the most interesting. (7) The analyses of these authors do not have the same objective, since Downs wants to elaborate an explanatory theory of the functioning of political democracy, whereas Banfield, much more aware of the limits of this approach to account for reality, chooses, as he himself states, to use a model of "rational planning" only for determining how the plans should have been constructed in order to be more efficient, and not for analyzing the sociology of decision- making by studying how they were made in reality. (8) He therefore warns the reader that he uses this conceptual instrument as a guide, useful for a normative objective, but arti- ficial in particular when the subject of a study is a decision made in an organization and inadequate as an instrument for the analysis of reality.




This initial approach, therefore, constitutes a fundamental stage for a scientific knowledge of decisions. While intellectually attractive and extremely practical as a formulation allowing one to establish models, to research mathematical refinements, and to propose normative demonstrations, it is also very useful to the extent that, corresponding to a pure logic of choices, it allows a good representation of a certain number of mechanisms.

Nevertheless, its limits appear as soon as one analyzes its theoretical presuppositions, since it does not indeed constitute (and quite often, it must be emphasized, does not pretend to constitute) an adequate instrument for a satisfactory apprehen- sion of reality. Of the majority of the processes of decisions that take place at the individual level as well as in economic or administrative organizations - even more so at the political level in the case of decisions made by a local or national gov- ernment - it would only offer an unacceptable, simplified de- scription of reality.

Many critiques, some very old, have been formulated in this respect, and it is often very attractive to emphasize the limitations of this approach. Without developing all the objections formed against it, sometimes even by its own adepts, we would like to draw attention to some points on which works were centered which have enabled us to overcome these limitations and to propose a new method of approach to this problem.

1) One of the first limitations to this approach is the fact that it considers the decision- maker as a unique actor. Hence many critics have stressed the collective character of many decisions in the organization and at the political-administrative level, as well as the dynamic character of this process, which is not one of static choice. (9)

2) The possibility for a decision-maker (or decision-makers) to know all of the alternatives and their possible consequences is elsewhere radically challenged, especially by J. Feldman and H. Kanter (10), who show, through research carried out in order to establish a computer program that forecasts all the alternatives offered by a game of chess, the material impossi-




bility (independently of the exorbitant cost that it would represent) of a complete knowledge of all the possible choices.

3) The rationality of the decision-maker is challenged, par- ticularly in the narrow sense that economic theories of decision often give most of the time to the term "rational calculation of maximum economic gain.M Thus, motivation researchers and the human relations school question the pursuit of maximum economic gain, while organization theorists criticize the state- ment according to which entrepreneurs try to maximize the profits of the firm. Instead, they introduce the consciousness of diversity of goals and objectives; and they replace the idea of maximization of advantages by that of satisfaction. (11)

4) Finally, the last obstacle this classical rationalist approach raises to a sociological analysis of decision-making resides in its normative-deductive character. The existence of an ideal model of choices, the incarnation of a universal rationality, leads to a permanent "forcing" of reality since all nonconform- ing elements of the model are held as "disturbances" and have to be neglected in analysis as well as in action.

H. The "Neo-Rationalist" Sociology of Organizations

All of these criticisms appear today commonplace after the work and devastating criticism carried out against the classical rationality by organization sociologists. However, it is not so much on the criticisms, but on the approach and the concepts of the "neo-rationalist" school that we would now like to dwell.

These works, on their way to becoming "classical" too, do not look at decisions at the level of the individual decision- maker, but in the context of complex organizations (enterprises, administrations). Besides, they no longer put normative or pedagogical concerns in the foreground, but assert rather the desire to apprehend the actual conditions of decision-making. The authors whose contributions are most important are Herbert Simon, James G. March, and Richard Cyert. They formulate numerous fundamental propositions for a better un- derstanding of decision-making. The two major works to which



130 Catherine Gre'mion (France)

we will refer here, Organizations and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (12), constitute a reaction to the classical rational model. They coincide in their challenging the " maximization' T

of goals, and in their concern to show the limits that the study of reality uncovers in the application of rationality, especially for decisions made at an organizational level, but equally on an individual level.

By oversimplifying, we could say that they no longer consider a decision as the choice carried out by a decision- maker among the possible alternatives in order to maximize its advantages, but rather consider it as a temporal process in which actors or groups of actors placed in an organized structure participate, with various objectives that are changing and con- tradictory, an imperfect knowledge of the possible alternatives and of their consequences, and a will to reach not a maximum of advantages but an acceptable level of satisfaction. Finally, these actors do not obtain the alternatives as given, but contri- bute to the elaboration of the choices.

These two studies thus overlap fairly closely in the area of basic theoretical principles, although each one insists on quite different aspects of the process of decision-making and constitutes an original contribution.

The essential contributions of March and Simon in Organiza- tions are their criticism of the classical notion of individual rationality and the new concept that they propose. Their theoretical propositions are still founded on relatively little research. However, it seems necessary for them to consider that in economic life, neither the entrepreneur nor the executants search for the optimal solution. Each one stops, whether consciously or not, at the first satisfying solution they discover, and their criteria of satisfaction depend on both their values and on their perception of reality. They therefore propose to substitute at the first abstraction of the rational decision- maker another one which recognizes that the members of the organization have needs, drives, and inclinations which vary, and that they are limited in their knowledge and their aptitude to learn and to solve problems. Still dwelling on the individual level,




they thus emphasize the essentially subjective and relative character of rationality.

The contribution of The Behavioral Theory of the Firm which also displays this individual neo-rationality resides even more in the study of the limitations which the structures and rules of the game inside the organization impose on the exercising of this rationality, as well as in the study of the consequences which the collective and temporal character of decision- making can have on its results.

The structures of the organization are simultaneously con- straints for the exercising of individual rationality as well as an answer to the difficulty of carrying out rational choices. The division of labor and the specialization of units entail an atomized knowledge of problems as well as a diversity of goals and objectives that introduces a certain lack of coherence and is a source of conflicts. On the other hand, this same atomiza- tion [ fractionnement] of the organization allows a reduction of complex problems to a series of simple ones, and brings about a Sequential attention to the goals.tT The problem of coherence does not present itself in the form of an evaluation at a given point of the overall coherence of sought after goals, but rather presents itself in the form of answers given successively to different requirements.

The rules that are established bring an answer to the difficulties that arise from the fragmentation of organizational structures and the collective character of decision- making. (13) Thus, the authors notice the existence of rules that allow the decision to take place at an acceptable level and not at the best level. What is important is that overall decisions made by a series of independent centers lead to a satisfactory common solution for all and not to the best possible result. The organizational choice therefore turns out to be the first alternative that the various expectations identify as acceptable in terms of organizational goals.

In addition, the authors draw attention to the mechanisms that allow the organization to avoid uncertainty. Far from as- suming risks and uncertainties, as classical theorists of




decision-making would think, enterprises are managed most often by rules that stress short-term reactions, and they prefer to insure a relative predictability of the environment by negotiation rather than assume the uncertainties of long-term consequences.

Finally, their analysis stresses the "process" character of decision- making and the successive appearance of the choices. They criticize, in particular, the classical idea according to which the various alternatives are basics that are given; and they study in detail how these alternatives are instead the result of a progressive elaboration which is the outcome of a search of which they describe the mechanisms, and of which they stress the partial, subjective, and approximate character. This search, in general, only leads to proposing solutions close to current practices; it is a function more of past experience than an evaluation of the future. This concept of decisions as a process of progressive commitment to undertake certain actions could appear to be dysfunctional, what with the successive contributions of the different elements of the system leav- ing at each stage much confusion and ambiguity. It is nothing of the sort. The authors emphasize that these limitations to the exercise of classical rationality are the very condition of survival of the organization because full awareness and complete rationality on the part of the various actors and groups would entail such violent conflicts that they would lead to the breakdown of the organization. The maintenance of an important zone of ambiguity is thus necessary for the smooth functioning of the whole.

HI. Policy Decisions and the Politics of Decision-Making

It is both paradoxical and in a certain way regrettable that the research trends started by Cyert, March, and Simon have in the end been very little used in empirical studies of decisions in organizations. It is rather at the sociological level of policy decisions that the junction will occur between (1) the new theo-




retical roads opened by neo-rationalist sociologists and (2) empirical research. It is works of this nature that we would now like to examine.

One cannot speak, with regard to recent studies, of a new theoretical trend. However, whatever the point of departure of the authors, one cannot fail to observe a series of common pre- occupations.

Their conception of decision as a subject for research is extremely close to that of the preceding authors, since it too starts from a view of the decision as a temporal process and not as a static choice, and draws particular attention to its collective character.

In addition, if it adopts the various phases distinguished by the research on organizational decision, it is with an empirical concern much more pronounced that it studies concretely, especially through a large number of monographs, the processes of developing alternatives and of negotiation among the actors, and the conditions of the final choice.

This phase of elaborating alternatives, completely absent from the rational model and made apparent by Cyert and March, constitutes an essential object of the analysis. LindblomTs (14) contribution is quite significant in this respect, as he analyzes the mechanisms of elaborating the solutions proposed by the "analysts" to those responsible for policy. He also insists on the notion of "incr ementali sm," which constitutes the basis of his reasoning. For him, one never makes a complete analysis of different possible solutions, but only an analysis of solutions differing from the status quo, and among themselves only by marginal elements. This allows the analysts to view only a very reduced number of solutions. In addition, these analysts envis- age for each solution considered only a limited number of consequences, neglecting all the consequences "that are of little interest to them, those that are hidden, imponderable, poorly known, etc.," whatever their importance may be.

On the other hand, Lindblom does not think that analysts al- ways neglect long-term effects. Besides, for him, the adaptation of the ends to the means is more frequent than the reverse,




because the selection of goals and values, and that of the empirical necessities of action, are not distinguished. The nature of a "good policy" par excellence is that it receives the agree- ment of several analysts, without their having tried to find out if it constituted the most adapted means to an objective. Thus, those responsible for the final choice can only decide in favor of a small number of solutions falling in a very narrow field compared to the actual possibilities, and with a very approximate knowledge of the consequences of their decision.

This stage of the process is also the object of particular attention on the part of Haroun Jamous, who, in his study of decisions regarding university hospital reform, attempted to determine the conditions for the emergence of solutions more or less close to the status quo. (15) He shows that in certain situations, contrary to what Lindblom believes, solutions that question the fundamental values of the anterior system may appear. He also identifies well the cases where, on the contrary, the conditions for the elaboration of alternative solutions will only allow the appearance of extremely close solutions to the anterior state or solutions differing only on relatively marginal points. It is for the same purpose of determining the conditions that may allow the adoption of one or another type of alternatives that Jamous has studied the process that leads to the development of possible solutions to the final choices.

This constitutes the second characteristic of these new re- searches: the process of negotiation that leads to the final choice is a subject of privileged study to which the different authors grant a very large place to the extent that, through its accidental course, it offers an explanation of the respective chances of success of the various proposed solutions. Their more or less formulated objective is to extract by this study rules that will allow one to forecast the adoption of different types of decisions.

The study of this phase of decision-making is carried out in a completely different perspective than the one that appeared in the works of Cyert, March, and Simon, and for which the regulating elements of the emerging choice were the structures




and rules of internal functioning of the organization. This time it is the relations of authority and influence at all levels of the political game that help explain the outcome.

This appears in Lindblom throughout his theory of " mutual adjustment/' as well as in the work of Jamous, who explains the chances for the emergence of the various solutions by an analysis of the state and the game of the powers involved. It is also present in the works of authors like R. Neustadt and G. T. Allison, who propose very profound analyses of the conditions for the adoption of political decisions in the United States. (16) This reintroduction of the notions of power and influence as bases of analysis is especially significant because it is surprising that most of the analysts of decision-making had not called attention to them. Such a silence is even more astonishing because the contribution of the studies of decisions to the study of power structures, notably at the local community level, have often been stressed (17), and because the works of Dahl, in particular his study of New Haven (18), represent a significant step in that direction. That power relations among the different actors in the decision-making process could have remained absent from the majority of studies carried out on decisions until recently has constituted a major gap which is being remedied.

R. Neustadt, throughout the detailed analysis of a certain number of decisions taken by U. S. Presidents since Theodore Roosevelt, has asked questions about the nature of their authority: "What it is, how to get it, how to keep it, how to increase it." This power has to be exercised in a complex arena where the personal advisers of the President come into play, as well as the departments, Congress, the parties, the press, and the public. All of these groups of actors enter into competition to influence governmental action, which is the product of their interactions. Neustadt analyzes the different levels of inter- related negotiations among these institutions that "share" authority, and he attempts to show the type of game the President can play in the middle of this structure. His legal attributes are almost never sufficient to insure the respect of his will,




especially because each key actor having particular responsi- bilities resting on different bases and authority is rarely free to adhere totally to the President's orders. Therefore, the main method of operation of the President is to persuade the actors that what he asks them to accomplish corresponds to their own best interests. This power of persuasion itself is exercised through the negotiations he conducts with his different partners, according to certain rules of the game. Neustadt especially analyzes in great detail the decision processes, the different actors involved, the respective state of forces present at the outset of these processes and during the subsequent course, as well as the respective strategies. This allows him to establish the conditions that permit the different actors to consolidate or increase their authority, and the cases where the process followed ends in a weakening of this authority.

G. T. Allison was inspired by Neustadt1 s method of analysis for his study of the Cuban crisis. (19) He also concludes that, to explain a particular decision, the games and players must be identified, the coalitions exposed - along with the bargain- ings and the compromises - and sense made of the confusion from which the final choice will emerge. He stresses the notions of authority and the stakes involved, since the influence of an actor in the negotiation is simultaneously a function of the authority of which he disposes (and of which Allison analyzes the principal elements), of the stake which the negotiation represents for him, and also of the perception the others have of these first two elements.

Allison also remarks that the negotiation does not follow a hap- hazard course, but that circuits (1) regulate the course of action for certain types of decisions, and (2) structure the game by select- ing in advance the particular partners and their points of entry into the game, and by granting them advantages or disadvantages in advance accordingto the type of game. In addition, naturally, the solutions to the problems studied are not derived from analyses clearly carried out by actors detached from all other cares, but are developed by actors caught in a network of various imperatives that significantly influence the aspect taken by the problem.




All of these analyses, more or less dispersed, fragmented, and little formalized, appear to converge to make evident the complex and limitedly "rational" character of policy-making. However, they also converge in a study at another level, not in the ideal rationality of the classical model, but in the internal rationality of the process with regard to the object of the action. What Cyert and March had outlined by researching the problem in the light of the survival of the enterprise and the confusion in which decisions are taken is brought up again at the policy level by these authors who study rationality with regard to the political character of such processes.

Thus Lindblom, whose analysis stresses the apparently dysfunctional character of the elaboration of alternatives, tends in reality to show that this is good, not only for the survival of the system, but even for good decision-making. In the same way, he proves in The Intelligence of Democracy the superior- ity of the "incremental adjustment" - which one could call decision-making by "groping" - over the central coordination which would allow a greater application of the model of rational choice. It is through this fragmented, laborious research, in which the relations between the actors matter as much as the rational criteria of choice, that the best decisions evolve, bear- ing in mind the context in which they must be applied.

He parallels in this regard the observations of A. O. Hirsch- man on economic development. (20>) The latter indeed believes that an economy whose sectors develop in an unbalanced manner and without central coordination is more dynamic - whatever the costs and wastes that result - than an economy where the growth of these very sectors is balanced, harmonized, and organized in a rational manner. (2^) Hirschman pursued this idea by studies of investment decisions that led him to develop the theory of the "hiding hand." The examples in this work show that in order to resolve certain types of choices, a bad evaluation at the outset of the conditions surrounding the application of a decision is necessary to its implementation because a preliminary knowledge of the difficulties would lead to a re- fusal of the incurred risk. The obscurity in which the first




choice evolves is the condition of progress and ulterior innova- tion.

After this brief review of the most recent works on decision- making, several questions come to the mind of the sociologist. At the limit, does the criticism of classical rationality not lead the students of policy-making to the "dissolving" of decisions as an object of study? What stands out indeed in the most recent works is that, starting from an analysis of the elaboration of alternatives, the researchers finish by shifting the emphasis of their investigations. What would be pertinent for any given organization would be not so much the procedures of elaboration of the rational alternatives but its capacity to react to the unexpected consequences of the forecasts. Henceforth, one can see, decisions are but a pretext, or more profoundly, a field of operationalization for the comparative study of organized social systems; and the study of decisions focuses more and more on this "capacity" of systems to simultaneously use rationality and nonrationality in the formulation of their policies. The subject "decision" would thus fade into history and the study of social systems.

Nevertheless, if the study of the elaboration of alternatives leads to studying the characteristics of social systems, it re- mains to specify sociologically what this "capacity" of systems to produce this or that type of decision is. Neither the "incre- mentalism" of Lindblom nor the "hiding hand" of Hirschman appears to us as satisfactory explanations. They witness the crisis of the classical rationality in today's big, complex organizations (and the tentative search for another model of action) rather than furnish adequate sociological instruments to explain the new conditions of decision-making in these organizations. If our interpretation is correct, this task could be ac- complished only if sociologists are able to define what an organization is as a social system. This, it would seem, will con- tinue to furnish material for long theoretical discussions. The big merit of the students of policy -making will have been, in our opinion, to demonstrate that the "science of decision- making" is perhaps only a blind alley.




Notes

1) Donald W. Taylor provides a good review of these theories in "Decision-Making and Problem Solving," in Handbook of Or- ganizations (J. G. March, ed.) Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965, pp. 48-86.

2) T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963.

3) H. Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, New York, Praeger, 1965.

4) The brilliant analyses of Boulding and Rappoport are other interesting examples of the possibilities of this model. See H. Kahn and K. Boulding, Power and Conflict in Organizations, London, Tavistock, 1964; A. Rappoport, Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966.

5) Stanley Hoffmann, "Restraints and Choices in American Policy," in Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York, 1948.

6) In relation to this topic, see the presentation by W. Edwards of the contribution of economists to the theory of consumer choices in his article "The Theory of Decision-Making," Psy- chological Bulletin, 1954, No. 51.

7) A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper and Row, 1957; Meyerson and Banfield, Politics, Planning and Public Interest, New York, The Free Press, 1955.

8) See in particular the "Note on the Conceptual Scheme" in Politics, Planning and Public Interest, pp. 303-329.

9) R. M. Cyert and D. G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963. 10) J. Feldman and H. E. Kanter, "Organizational Decision-

Making," in Handbook of Organizations (J. G. March, ed.), Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965. 11) See J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations, New

York, Wiley, 1958. 12) Ibid. 13) Cyert and March criticize, in particular, the preconceived




idea according to which a decision is made by the entrepreneur and is then carried out by the enterprise. They emphasize instead the role that the entire enterprise takes in decision- making.

14) D. Braybrooke and C. E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Deci- sion; Policy Evaluation as a Social Process, New York, The Free Press, 1963; C. E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy; Decision-Making Through Mutual Adjustment, New York, The Free Press, 1965.

15) Haroun Jamous, "Contributions aune sociologie de la dé- cision; La réforme des études médicales et des structures hospitalières" [Contribution to a Sociology of the Decision: The Reform of Medical Studies and Hospital Structures] , Paris, Copedith, 1968.

16) R. E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Lead- ership, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1960 (4th ed. 1964); G. T. Allison, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (mimeographed thesis, Harvard, 1968). H. Jamous, MUne théorie sociologique des dé- cisions politiques" [A Sociological Theory of Political Deci- sions], Revue Française de Sociologie, IX (1), 1968; R. Hilsman, To Move a Nation; Politics of Forcing Policy in the Adminis- tration of J. F. Kennedy, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1967.

17) Catherine Schmid, "Quelques recherches recentes sur le problême du pouvoir dans les communautés locales" [ Recent Research on the Problem of Authority in Local Communities] , Sociologie du Travail, 1962 (2); Terry N. Clark, Community Structure and Decision-Making; A Comparative Analysis, San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co.

18) Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, New Haven, Yale Univer- sity Press, 1961.

19) Allison, op. cit. 20) Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Develop-

ment, 1958. 21) Klein and Mekling have reached the same conclusions

about the development of technological research. They prove that it is more efficient and economical when it is carried out



A New Theory of Decision- Making? 141

in the face of duplication, confusion, and lack of communication of the actors working in a parallel fashion. With regard to this, see A. O. HirschmanandC. E. Lindblom, Economic Development, Research and Development Policy-Making; Some Converging Views, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, 1960. W. Schelling in his study The Politics of National Defense, Fiscal Year 1950 pushes this type of analysis to the extreme but reaches op- posite conclusions, for far from considering that those processes where irrational factors are dominant constitute an adequate answer to the problems posed, he diagnoses a veritable political syndrome, which is distinguished by several symptoms: (1) no policy at all; (2) compromised policy; (3) paper policy; (4) blind policy; (5) slow policy; (6) leaderless policy.



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DECISION-MAKING || TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF DECISION-MAKING?