i

DECLARATION:

I, Andrei Florin Marin, declare hereby to the Senate of the Agricultural University of

Norway that the present thesis is the original product of my own research. All sources of

information used as references and materials other than my own are duly acknowledged. The

present work has not been submitted to any university other than NLH for any type of

academic degree.

Aas, May 20003 Andrei Florin Marin

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

There are few occasions in life when one lives his dreams. I had been granted one of

these occasions. Living above the polar circle, interacting with a group of pastoralists for one

winter has been the fruition of many ‘toils and troubles’. This would have not been possible

without the help of a few special persons. All I can do to express my gratitude to them here is

a mere reminder, but, as ‘scripta manent’(latin- ‘the writing remains’), I hope to make this the

token of my appreciation all to often unexpressed.

First and foremost I am indebted to Øystein Holand at the Institute for Animal

Husbandry/ AUN, as a supervisor, mentor and friend. My fieldwork and the subsequent study

would have been more difficult, less exciting and probably unattainable if it weren’t for his

efforts. I am deeply grateful for all the encouragement, patience and time Øystein has

provided ever-since we first met, especially during periods when the odds seemed very much

against me and my plans. It made a world of difference! Tusen takk!

To my supervisor Gufu Oba at Noragric/ AUN for encouraging my interest in

rangeland ecology and pastoralism, I also owe a great deal of gratitude. I am also grateful for

all the hours in which we planed my research and discussed the outcomes. I would have been

lost without his sharp perception of worthy ideas entangled in my wordy writing. To both

Øystein and Gufu, a sincere ’thank you’ for keeping me focused and motivated and for

struggling to help me with all the practical difficulties.

To Josie Teurlings and Ingunn Andersen at Noragric for going out of their way to help

me with the all-too-many details and problems that come with being ‘a special case’- you

made it seem easier, at times even funny.

I also thank Mikkel Nils Sara and Nils Oskal at the Saami Institute in Kautokeino for

their help and encouragement- hopefully next time things would be easier.

To Jonathan Coleman for sharing his passion and inspiring me to pursue my dreams- I

bid an honest ‘thank you’ and my admiration.

Lastly, I owe a ‘thank you’ to all the herders who took their time to talk to me and help

me understand better the complicated realities of a pastoralist’s life. I appreciated their effort

even more as they didn’t give in to any prejudice related to my affiliation. Hopefully, their

efforts will eventually make a difference.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Page

DECLARATION………….. ……………………………………………………………... i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.. …………………………………………………………….. ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS….. …………………………………………………………….. iii

LIST OF FIGURES………... …………………………………………………………….. v

ABSTRACT vi

FOREWORD……………... …………………………………………………………… 1

CHAPTER 1.………………. INTRODUCTION……………………………………….. 2

1.1. Context and problem setting 2

1.2. Theoretical framework. Political Ecology 4

Discourse analysis 5

Narrative analysis 6

CHAPTER 2……………….. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY………………………. 9

2.1. The study area 9

2.2. Pastoralism in Finnmark 13

2.3. Policy rationalisation 15

CHAPTER 3……………….. METHODOLOGY………………………………………… 20

Limitations of the study 22

CHAPTER 4……………….. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION…………………………... 23

A. ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES…………………….. 23

1. The status of the winter ranges 23

2. Winter die-offs: factors and circumstances 28

3. Snow condition: its evolution and importance 29

4. Defining the quality of the ranges 30

4.1. Equilibrium vs. disequilibrium in Finnmark 32

iv

B. ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES…………………….. 38

1. The herd as productive capital 38

2. Workforce 40

3. Strategies and perceptions 42

C. SOCIAL ARENA………………………………………. 51

1. Social coordinates for the siida’s 51

2. Mobility in the social landscape 54

3.Social networks and their limitations 57

3.1. Conflict resolution: perceptions 57

3.2. Erosion of customary power 59

D. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS……………….. 64

1. Customs on the winter ranges 64

2. The role of the Reindeer Herding Administration 67

3. Security in using the winter ranges 69

4. The future laws and regulations 71

5. Conflicting visions: consequences and remedies 74

5.1. The ranges as common-pool resources 74

5.2. The tragedy in Finnmark 78

5.3. Between resignation and hope: the future law 81

CHAPTER 5……………….. CONCLUSION……………………………………… 84

REFERENCES…………….. ……………………………………………………….. 87

APPENDIX 1……………… THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF REINDEER

HERDING IN FINNMARK………………………………. 94

APPENDIX 2……………… SAAMI WORDS USED IN TEXT………………………... 96

v

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Finnmark’s reindeer ranges…………………………………………………….. 11

Figure 2: Western, Middle and Eastern reindeer ranges in Western Finnmark……………. 14

Table 1: Herders interviewed in Western Finnmark……………………………………….. 20

Figure 3: Evolution of the number of semi-domesticated reindeer in West Finnmark…….. 26

Table 2: Evolution of the main vegetation communities on the winter ranges of WestFinnmark…………………………………………………………………………... 31

Figure 4: Comparative evolution of the size of summer herds between inner and outer summer districts………………………………………………………... 43

Figure 5: Principle of the relation between number of reindeer and the standing lichen biomass…………………………………………………………... 44

Figure 6: Evolution of the number of herding units and persons involved in reindeerherding in West Finnmark………………………………………………………… 50

Figure 7: Traditional borders of the winter siida’s in the 1960’s…………………………… 63

Table 3: Success principles for enduring common pool resources…………………………. 76

vi

ABSTRACT:

Nomadic pastoralism is characterised by flexible patterns of resource use and tenure

regimes, as a response to fluctuating circumstances. In sub-arctic Norway, traditional tenure

and resource-use regimes of Saami reindeer pastoralism have been replaced by a formalized

system reinforced by the State. Today the lichen ranges are highly degraded and the enterprise

is sustained by large subsidies, legitimating more control from the Administration and calling

for a drastic revision of management approach.

Using the framework of political ecology and narrative analysis, the present study

addresses the environmental, economic, social and institutional impacts of the present

management regime on the common winter ranges in Inner Finnmark. The article contrasts

the discourse of the herders with the two meta-narratives produced by the hegemonic

discourse of the State and reproduced by society at large: a single, optimum stocking density

as a prerequisite for sustainable production; and a need for centrally-controlled, formalised

regulation system in order to avoid resource degradation.

The paper discusses the received wisdom, simplification, methodological flaws and

vested interests inherent in this approach as illustrated by herders' narratives and supported by

secondary empirical evidence and scientific theories that acknowledge the influence of

various circumstances (climatic, social, economic, cultural) upon the production strategy of

the herders.

An opportunistic management approach that develops and legitimates local

institutions to coordinate the use of common ranges according to ecological variability and

customary tenure system is proposed as an alternative.

1

FOREWORD:

I have always been fascinated by pastoral nomads. As a child, I used to read about the

Mongolians, Tuaregs or Koryaks with the any schoolboy’s hunger for adventure and

unexplored places. My interest in the study of pastoralism has been growing as I have come to

appreciate their philosophies and ways of life. The question that has puzzled me is how could

they possibly survive, adapt and thrive in such harsh and unforgiving environments? Why did

they choose to ‘wander’ on the open steppe, tundra or desert, at the mercy of the elements,

instead of the comfort of a settled life?

The present study is a partial fulfilment of my pursuit of understanding better the

human dimensions of the use of nature, particularly for nomadic pastoralism. My choice of

study of the Saami reindeer herders in the extreme Norwegian North was based on their

relevance to the present situation of pastoralists worldwide. They too struggle for the

recognition of their way of natural resource management and modes of life for promoting

sustainable livelihoods rather than short-term self-interests. They cope with management

regimes that often contradict their representations of nature and claims to resources, the

regimes imposing rigid and formal rules over a system defined by variability and fluctuations,

always at the threshold of order. In this thesis I provide the Saami reindeer herders with an

opportunity to define their views of managing the resources of the ranges. My belief is that

the knowledge they foster is a starting point in better understanding and managing the

resource they depend upon.

2

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context and problem setting

Throughout the world, most of the pastoral systems in arid, semi-arid and temperate

regions have been the subject of increasing pressure imposed by political decisions that take

into consideration various interest groups like conservationists and farmers. This in turn

creates the premises for exclusion of the pastoralists from some of their traditional grounds

and often for the degradation of the resource resulting from managing variable rangelands by

imposing rigid spatial and social boundaries (Fernández-Giménez, 2002).The present thesis

presents a similar problem from the different ecological and economic settings of sub-arctic

Norway. The livestock here is semi-domesticated reindeer (Rangifer tarandus), a ruminant

adapted to the arctic/sub-arctic environment, surviving the long winters by feeding mainly on

mat-forming lichens. The semi-nomadic reindeer herders in the study area are a part of the

Saami minority that spreads over north-central Fennoscandia and part of the Kola Peninsula.

The recent attention to the management of reindeer ranges in Finnmark (the

northernmost county in Norway) has pointed to the overall situation as an archetypal example

of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). The theory states that whenever the pasture

resources are commonly owned and the animals are private property, each herder would act in

order to maximise profits at the expense of all the others, thus “bringing ruin to all”. This

standpoint has been reinforced by a series of surveys (e.g. Orvik& Prestbakmo, 1990;

Johansen& Karlsen, 1998) that substantiate a severe degradation of the common lichen ranges

and explain it as a consequence of the excessive pressure imposed on the resource by too

large stocking densities. The same sources also suggest that, as a consequence of reduced

lichen cover, reproductive success of the reindeer herds have declined, especially during the

1990’s. This stance, adopted by the State (Reindriftforvaltningen, 2002) and reproduced by

the media in dramatic tones like “environmental catastrophe” or “irresponsible management”,

has provided the needed legitimacy for a strict control of the reindeer herding industry as a

whole.

The official policy has been to employ different strategies (both economic incentives

and law enforcement to reduce the number of animals) in order to improve the conditions of

the lichen cover, the main winter forage of reindeer. One such strategy is manipulating

reindeer population through increased culling. Despite the decline in reindeer numbers by

more than 33%, the official policy still continues to consider stocking rates as the main cause

3

of the resource degradation and further reductions of the herds have been recommended as a

desirable solution from the perspectives of state officials concerned with administration of the

reindeer husbandry (Ims& Kosmo, 2001).

The two main conceptual thrusts of this stance are: first, that in order to ensure a

sustainable use of grazing resources, the stocking density has to correspond to the carrying

capacity of the range, univocally determined by the interaction plant/herbivore (in our case

lichen/reindeer). This is later identified as the meta-narrative of an equilibrial ecological

model. The second conceptual position is that the herders will always act towards a zero-sum

competition, pursuing individual interests at the expense of the group, increasing their herds

indefinitely and degrading the vegetation. Therefore the State has the duty and the legitimacy

to create and reinforce a regime to govern the resources, avoiding degradation and ensuring

sustainability (NOU, 2001:35). This is further identified as the ‘tragedy of the

commons’meta-narrative.

The research leading to the current thesis was conducted at the time when the

Government considers the revision of the herding legislation in order to reduce the damage of

the winter and spring/autumn ranges (NOU, 2001:35). While some of the recommendations

acknowledge the suitability of traditional patterns of resource allocation, the proposal is still

based on the same conceptual framework. The goal of achieving ‘sustainable reindeer

herding’ (NOU, 2001:35) as a result of these regulations might be illusionary if the actual

causes and courses of the decline of the winter ranges are different from those suggested by

the officialdom. Indeed, experiences on herding systems in arid and semi-arid environments

are abundant to dispute the perceived “tragedy” (Behnke et al., 1993; Roe, 1999; Oba et al.,

2000; etc).

Furthermore, alternative ecological models suggest that (sub-) arctic systems such as

those of the Finnmark rangelands might reflect non-equilibrium behaviour similar to that

observed in highly variable ecosystems in Africa (Behnke, 2000; Fox, 1996). The potential

for using such models to understand the artic-rangeland ecosystems of Finnmark might be

increased if ecologists treat them not as stable but rather as highly variable non-equilibrium

systems (Tyler, 1999; Caughley& Gunn, 1993).

The present thesis aims not at testing the presence of non-equilibrium in the

ecosystems of Finnmark (this would be my goal for future research) but rather, to provide a

new analysis that incorporates the perceptions and claims of the Saami herders regarding the

present environmental situation on the winter pastures. I use the epistemology of political

ecology, and narrative analysis to contrast the important claims of the herders with those of

4

the Administration and present empirical evidence that addresses these conceptual stances.

The purpose of the thesis is to juxtapose and interrogate the arguments presented by the

Administration in order to ‘tell a better story’ (Roe, 1999) regarding the extent and

circumstances of the environmental degradation in Finnmark. The research will shift the

discussion toward a different paradigm, one that acknowledges the complex system of

ecological, socio-cultural and economic relationships that govern de facto the present

management system in Finnmark. Looking in greater detail at the theoretical framework is

thus warranted.

1.2 Theoretical framework. Political Ecology

The present study uses discourse and narrative analysis within the framework of political

ecology- broadly defined as the study of power relations defining land and environmental

management (Grennberg & Park, 1994)- to discuss the discourses related to reindeer

husbandry in Finnmark. Political ecology, as a theoretical paradigm relies on the works of

Blaikie (1985) and Blaikie & Brookfield (1987) that focus on “the land manager and his/her

relationship to nature in a historical, political and economic context” (1987), emphasizing

important issues like social origins of degradation, the plurality of perceptions and definitions

of ecological problems. Thus, one purpose of political ecology is to focus on the need to link

the distribution of power with productive activity, and ecological analysis with its complex

vision of bioenvironmental relationships. It moves away form the traditional Darwinist

perspective that competition at the individual level provides the driving force for change and

that short-term self-interested behaviour plays the exclusive role within communities.

Instead, political ecology treats communities from an integrative perspective and the

complex relationships between productive activity, human character and environment as

flexible, historically and regionally specific (Greenberg& Park, 1994). Just as self-interested

behaviour would, more often than not, result in an inadequate adaptive response in the face of

chaotic disturbances, communities do not simply reach permanent ideal adaptations to their

environments (Prigogine& Stengers, 1984; Schaeffer, 1985; Worster, 1990). In particular, the

“tragedy of the commons” viewed participants in environmental decision-making as

contributing to environmental crisis because of self-interests prevailing over communal

commitments. Instead, political ecology will be used to highlight how community constraints

5

act in a self-regulating, adaptive manner and that removal of these constraints can

significantly increase environmental degradation.

Equally relevant here is the central role given to understanding the extent to which an

alleged environmental crisis is the product of adherence to a certain construction of nature

(Fairhead& Leach, 1995). In other words, what is the extent of ‘accepted’ degradation of the

lichen ranges according to different models of sustainable resource use. Moreover, the

paradigm argues that understanding how the status quo of a claimed environmental crisis

came about is the crux of solving the crisis (Bryant& Bailey 1997:5). In this regard, I present

possible causal pathways leading to range degradation, as underlined by the reindeer herders

with empirical support.

Discourse analysis

Within the framework of political ecology, I use discourse analysis (more specifically

narrative analysis) to examine the meaning and the construction of the resource management

problem among the reindeer herders of Finnmark’s plateau in Norway. The discourse analysis

relates to the constructionist tradition in the study of the social world, which focuses not only

on a specific phenomenon itself, but also on claims concerning this phenomenon, claim-

makers and the claim-making process (Best, 1989; Agder et al., 2001). I am here conscious of

the fact that discourse analysis has been loosely applied within social sciences as

“fashionable” yet so poorly defined that it is seen as mere wordy expressions (Jørgensen &

Philips, 1999:9). Criticism aside, discourses are defined as a particular way of representing

the real world through social construction, a shared meaning of a phenomenon, produced,

reproduced and transformed by its adherents (Agder et al., 2001).

Seeing discourse as a truth regime, Agder et al. (2001) identify homogeneity in

message as its fundamental characteristic, implying that expressions share certain knowledge

and perceptions of a phenomenon, causes of problems and appropriate responses. According

to Svarstad (2002), the regularities of the statements forming a discourse occur not only as

content, but also in terms of expressive means, as “rhetorical devices- metaphors and meta-

narratives”.

The existence of a discourse implies a certain structure or stability of specific social

constructs; nevertheless, a discourse is an open structure, with no set limit. As meaning

cannot be settled once and for all, discourses change over time, sometimes in a considerable,

sudden way (ibid.). Therein resides the difficulty of analysing the discourse, as all limits

imposed on it are artificial even though essential for a successful analysis.

6

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) suggest two ways of removing the constraint of

interpreting discourses by setting limits towards meanings of words by excluding those words

that are not relevant to the discourse and by delineate competing discourses. The approach of

Agder et al. (2001), is relevant to the present research. It identifies three main elements a

discourse analysis should contain: 1) analysis of regularities in expression to identify

discourses. 2) analysis of the actors producing, reproducing and transforming discourses and

3) social impacts and policy outcomes of the discourses.

The relations between different discourses are of particular interest in revealing power

structures and relationships among actors. A discourse is labelled hegemonic when it

dominates thinking and is translated into institutional arrangements (Hajer 1995: 60-61).

Here, I identify the managerial discourse of the State as the hegemonic one based on the two

meta-narratives presented earlier. In this thesis I attempt to define an alternative discourse to

that of the Administration of reindeer herding in Finnmark, by using narrative analysis.

Narrative Analysis

Emery Roe (1999:2) defines narratives as stories cast in the form of an argument, with

premises and conclusions. They serve as rules of thumb in interpreting phenomena, in our

case evolution of pasture resources. By applying these rules of thumb, events are interpreted

in different ways and different action-paths are followed according to conceptual thrusts of

the discourse. For instance, adherence to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ theory often leads to

privatisation of rangelands and livestock control (ibid.).

A second characteristic of the narratives is that they reveal a particular structure of the

involved ‘cast’ of actors arranged in archetypes: heroes, villains and victims (Svarstad, 2002).

The distinction between narrative and discourse needs to be emphasised: while discourse can

be defined as a truth system, narratives can be defined as means of expression. A discourse is

a conceptual set of arguments. Narratives are the actual arguments.

Narratives are often constructed to simplify a complex reality (Roe, 1999) and they

can be seen as a generalised abstractions rather than specific stories. They do not simply

record events, they constitute and interpret them as meaningful parts of meaningful wholes.

They are a part of the truth regimes (discourses) and help the people who tell them construct a

signifying structure. By relating this structure to a possible reality, narratives can be used to

form a new reality (Hongslo& Benjaminsen, 2002).

Finally, meta-narratives are defined (Lyotard, 1997) as having an important historical

role- they are stories held to represent a final truth, with great generality. They may be

7

considered de-contextualised and transcending the complexities of human experience, grand

schemes of thought. While both the narrative and meta-narrative refer exclusively to

constructions belonging to the discourse in order to illustrate its message, a meta-narrative

differs from a narrative in that it has an abstract structure or pattern on which specific

narratives within the discourse are formed (Svarstad, 2002).

Concluding the description of narrative analysis relevant to the present research, we

have to acknowledge that, given a certain cast of actors and the ‘hierarchy’ of discourses these

actors propose, narratives are often constructed to be counter-narratives, ones that ‘tell a better

story’ (Roe, 1999). Roe also proposes that when appropriate, research should ‘de-narrativize’

a certain narrative by insisting that ‘there is no story to tell until the facts are in’ (ibid.).These

last two aspects, of contrasting narratives and counter-narratives in order to ‘tell a better

story’ and attempting to de-narrativize some of the accepted views embedded in the present

management regulations within the reindeer herding in Finnmark are at the core of the present

narrative analysis.

I use the information collected from the reindeer herders I interviewed in Western

Finnmark during the winter of 2001/2002 in order to first define a discourse based on

analyses of regularities in expression and then refine the discourse by looking at the actors

producing the discourse. Of significance to this approach was to capture the language used by

the interviewees as relevant to their intellectual affiliation: most of them used daily language

cast in the form of scholastic examples, while others mixed them with scientific information

in order to support their arguments. I intended to preserve these manifestations in the manner

of translating their narratives into English. The language used is significant to the

understanding of the traditional knowledge and the way the discourse is influenced by both

the sources of knowledge (empirical, scientific) and the political circumstances (herders using

scientific concepts in order to form a counter-narrative). I then turn to contrasting some of the

main narratives within the discourse of the herders with those supported by the official

administration and use scientific findings to de-narrativize some of the assumptions in the

hegemonic discourse. The purpose of my study is to identify and analyse the narratives

defining the discourse of the reindeer herders regarding the management of the ranges in

Finnmark. To this end I have combined the information from the interviews trying to reveal

the representations the herders have about their environment and the forces governing its

utilization. These representations presented in reoccurring themes seem to form an argument

with premises and conclusions. I treated these reoccurring themes as being the (more abstract)

8

meta-narratives defining the discourse of the herders, their representations of the

circumstances of the winter rangeland management in Finnmark in order to:

1. Describe winter herding strategies in relation to ecological factors in Western

Finnmark

2. Assess the role social interactions and traditional institutions play in herding strategies

3. Analyse the institutional goals and constraints that influence the decision-making of

the herders in Western Finnmark.

9

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

2.1 The study area

The study area, the county of Finnmark, is divided into three zones (Western, Middle

and Eastern) (Figure 1) and is defined by low or absent coastal mountains, which together

with the presence of the Gulf Stream, produces a sub-oceanic climate. The climate of

Finnmark shows two gradients, extending from the coast to the inland: the western coast is

affected by the Gulf Stream bringing mild and moist air from the south. The central part of

Finnmark is an inland plateau (vidda), defined by a continental climate, with cold winters and

hot and moist summers, called Finnmarksvidda. These influences lead to cool summers and

mild winters on the coast of Finnmark with precipitation of up to 1000-1200 mm, and cold

winters (extreme temperatures to –51°C) and warm summers and less precipitation (317 mm

in Kautokeino) for the inland plateau (Johansen & Karlsen, 2000).

The difference between the coastal and the inland parts of Finnmark also reflect

geological variability. In the coastal zones are degradable bedrocks rich in nutrients (cambro-

silurian) that generate soils able to support a high vegetation biomass. By contrast, the acidic

oligotrophic and hardly degradable soils of the Finnmark’s plateau promote the mat-forming

lichens in the competition with the vascular plants resulting in good winter pastures (Riseth,

2000). The twofold climatic and geological conditions reflect the movement of the reindeer

herds during the year: from the winter pastures of inland, with little snow and lichen beds

providing food, to the summer pastures on the coast providing cool temperatures, lush grass

vegetation and shelter from insects.

The topography and patchiness of the landscape detail this migration at micro-

landscape scale. The range is divided into eight specific seasonal types of pastures used by

herders to meet the detailed requirements of the herds during one year (for rutting, breeding,

calf marking, grazing, slaughtering, etc.) (Sara, 2001). In this context, the topography of the

range is important. At the macro level, a flat landscape promotes longer migrations requiring

a greater energy and a longer time, at a medium level the presence of borders between

different grazing areas is important for the working strategies and movement patterns*.

* e.g. the term njarga-meaning peninsula- is commonly used for a grazing area surrounded by natural borders onthree sides, this kind of landscape is considered to have a funnel effect upon the herds (Forman& Gordon,1986:113)

10

Finally, at a micro level high variation in altitude provides a large spectrum of ecological

conditions per unit area, and thus specific conditions for different seasons (Riseth, 2000).

From a bio-geographical perspective, Finnmarksvidda belongs to the Euro-Siberian

taiga, which stretches out from the Pacific Ocean through Siberia and northern Russia and to

the Atlantic Ocean. Elevations vary between 300-500 m a. s. l. Moraines and moors dominate

the region. The plateau has a very evident continental trait in the southern parts; with wide

spread plant communities, forming a mosaic of lichen communities, moors and numerous

lakes (NOU, 1978).

During the winter, thrusts of mild air from the SW make the temperatures in the

valleys much lower than those in the mountains. In the mild periods, the cold air masses

recede; if these periods are long they lead to a high increase in temperature. This wide

variation of the temperature on the plateau during winter influences all the activities

concerning life in the open, including the availability of the lichen beds for the reindeer, plant

and animal life and the decisions taken by the herders. One climatic characteristic of

Finnmarksvidda is that there is very little precipitation in the interval between October-

November through April-May, related to the frequent formation of stabile high-pressure areas

during the winter. At the same time, 50-60% of the annual precipitations fall during June-

September (NOU, 1978).

The snow comes on the plateau in October and melts by May. The snow-cover

depends on the precipitations, temperature, wind and elevation, having large yearly variations

for any given area. The deepest snow cover occurs in the outer parts on the plateau but in

certain years the inner parts receive higher snowfall (ibid.). The thickest snow-cover is

recorded in March increasing the ‘bottle-neck’ effect of food resources. This is the time of the

year when the easyly-accessible lichens are scarce. The depth of the snow layer (and its

density) is the most important element affecting the availability of lichen beds for reindeer

consumption: the herds move into areas with less snow or with snow through which is easier

to dig the so-called ‘craters’, using the hoofs. In Inner Finnmark, normally the snow is dry

and without an ice layer, nevertheless in difficult years, snow may form crust on top, leading

to inaccessible food, and in turn causing a high mortality among the animals (Paine, 1994).

The long periods of high atmospheric pressure during the winter lead to a relatively

low intensity of the dominant winds. For areas at higher altitudes the winds are generally

stronger. From October to March the main direction of the winds is between West and South

East. The intensity and direction of the winds influence the density of the snow and its

11

locations (leaves ridges barren and fills valleys), playing an important role in accessibility of

the lichen ranges (Sara, 2001).

The circumstances of the plant communities are governed by many factors, which can

be highly variable in the area of interest. The main factors are geology (connected to the soil

and its condition), climate, humidity, protection and species’ individual requirements as well

as grazing.

In Western Finnmark, reindeer grazing pastures are divided, into summer ranges (on

the coast and islands), spring/autumn ranges (farther inland) and winter ranges (farthest inland

on the plateau):

Figure 1: Finnmark’s reindeer ranges (redrawn after Aarseth, 1

The summer ranges are administratively divided into 26 distr

Middle and 7 in Eastern Finnmark. The autumn/spring ranges (Dist

commons and represent key reosurces for the migration patterns o

grounds in the spring.

The study was conducted on Finnmark’s plateau in the

Kautokeino, in the middle of the winter ranges of Western Finnmark (

WESTERN FINNMARK

MIDDLE FINNMARKEASTERNFINNMARK

Winter Ranges

Autumn/springranges

Summer ranges

985)

icts: 8 in Western, 11 in

rict 30) are managed as

f the herds and calving

area of the town of

District 31).

Year-round ranges

12

These ranges are divided into a western, middle and eastern part. They cover 5433.4 km2,

including 5% represented by surface water. The most important vegetation types are birch

forests, with or without lichen beds (37%), heathers and moors (10%), lichen-moors (12%)

and marshes of different origins (16%) (Johansen & Karlsen, 2000). These ranges are

undoubtedly the critical food resource for the reindeer as they allow survival through the

winter and development of the foetuses to be born the next spring.

In this respect some ecological aspects regarding the ecology of the lichens and their

relation with the reindeer need more detailed explanations. Thus, during winter reindeer

prefers likens such as Cladonia stellaris, C. rangiferina, C. arbuscula, Stereocaulon spp, and

Flavocetraria nivalis (Tømmervik, et al., 1996). Although the protein content in the lichen

biomass is generally low, the reindeer has the ability to use the nutrients in the lichen forage

and together with the fat accumulated during the summer and autumn to obtain the energy

required to survive the long winters. In addition, they also use vascular plants available (such

as Vaccinium spp., Betula nana) and graminoids (Festuca ovina, Deschampsia flexuosa,

Carex spp., etc).

The vascular plants that co-exist with lichens on the same oligotrophic soils

(heathlands) have low growth rates. In the case of severe droughts, the lichens are favoured as

the vascular plants die out. If, on the other hand, precipitations increase, the vascular plants

might be promoted. Furthermore, if the rain is acid, containing NO3-, the growth of vascular

plants increases and the mat-forming lichens are gradually reduced (Crittenden, 1999).

Regarding the impact of trampling and grazing on the lichen growth a few points have

to be made, as they are important in defining the plant/ herbivore relationship. First, lichens

beneath deep snow are protected against trampling of reindeer herds on the winter ranges

(ibid.). In order to graze these lichens, the animals excavate craters in the snow, causing

mechanical damage in the process (Virtala, 1992). In the summer, the lichen mats are dry and

can easily be broken by trampling (Bayfield et al., 1981). This damage is differently

distributed: for migratory herds it might be confined to the migratory routes (Crittenden,

1999). However, when artificial barriers prevent migratory movements or when the lichen

ranges are grazed out of season, a severe degradation due to summer trampling and grazing

might occur (ibid.). The recovery of these lichen mats may take from 9 to 16 years (Virtala,

1992).

13

2.2 Pastoralism in Finnmark

The patterns of resource exploitation and management of the pasture ecosystems in

Finnmark have undergone significant changes within the last hundreds of years. The use of

reindeer shifted from an initial hunting exploitation to a subsistence nomadic or semi-nomadic

herding of semi-domesticated reindeer, and recently to the market oriented approach. These

changes, combined with the system of cultural norms of the traditional reindeer pastoralism

(Sara, 1993) and the evolving administrative constraints imposed by the State, result in the

present patterns of resource exploitation.

In the following, I provide summarized highlights to these historical processes that

had bearing on the way the ranges are used and perceived today in Finnmark. The

presentation will concentrate on the period beginning with domestication and the emergence

of central governance of the Reindeer Husbandry. In the early 1800, the entire Eurasian Arctic

was undergoing what has been termed “a reindeer revolution” (Krupnic, 1993). During this

period the favourable climate arguably increased the productivity of reindeer as a

consequence of improved regeneration of the lichen mats. Moreover, stable winters, with

normal snowfalls and without winter thaws improved food accessibility for the reindeer. The

assumptions incidentally represent equilibrial changes; assuming that the reindeer cycles

(Meldgaard, 1986) are linked to and in turn influence the cycles of lichen mat regenerations.

The increase in population and pressure from the outsiders (fur traders, Finnish and

Norwegian immigrants) in the 18th century served as an incentive to increases in the size of

the herds. The owners of larger herds gave up hunting (which had run parallel to herding until

then) without the time or the need for it (Leem, 1767). With this practice came the need for

larger grazing areas and well-defined, flexible territorial agreements (Beach, 1981), allowing

herds to opportunistically use the most favourable ecological conditions. These territorial

patterns were perpetuated up to the recent years within the traditional herding system. This

system, called johtolat*, consists of migration routes and grazing areas within a delimited

zone (called orohat: geasseorohat/ summer range, dálveorohat/ winter range) used by the

groups of herds belonging to one zone (Sara, 2001). In Western Finnmark, there are three

johtolat: Oar’jebealli (‘Western’), Nour’tabealli (‘Eastern’), Gow’dojotellit (‘Middle’) (ibid.):

* see Appendix 2 for explanation of the Saami words in text.

14

Figure 2: Western, Middle and Eastern reindeer ranges in Western Finnmark

The territorial system is further detailed as individual herds, belonging to each

household (báiki), group and regroup during the year to form unions (siida) in order to meet

the requirements of each season. The structure of a siida at any given moment is a

consequence of both ecological requirements and configuration of social interactions: during

summer, when the animals graze on islands and peninsula’s on the coast, the working units

should be large enough to exploit the individual landscapes. By comparison, during winter,

the food available is distributed in patches and the herd has to move more without trampling

the snow and ‘locking’ the pasture on a too large area. In spring (the calving season) each

family has to provide patches of good pastures for the does, preferably snow-free and

nutritious (Paine, 1994).

The unions of herds acquired in time collective usufruct rights for pastures in a given

area. Thus, whenever the composition of one siida changed, by adding a new herd or by

losing one, its grazing rights remained connected to the same core-areas (orohat), but changed

to match the size of the pasture allocated with the size of the herd. This leads to the

overlapping of the borders of the neighbouring siida’s ranges and a reciprocal use of

resources. For example if during a certain year one of the siidas does not have enough animals

to use all of its rightful range, one of the neighbouring siida may use the grazing resources

surplus without the need of formal agreement (ibid.). At the same time, the migration system

(johtolat) traditionally provided detailed regulations to avoid mixing of herds and trampling

Oar

’jeb

ealli

(Wes

tern

)

Nou

r’ta

beal

li (E

aste

rn)

Gow

’doj

otel

lit (M

iddl

e)

WESTERN FINNMARK

15

of pastures (Sara, 2001: 45). However, important transformations have occurred in terms of

management, as a result of both technological and altered political environment and power

relations in the Saami lands.

2.3 Policy rationalisation

In the early 1700’s, the northern part of Fennoscandia (Norway, Sweden including

Finland and the Kola peninsula) was still a system of commonly held districts, the last area in

Europe without clearly defined borders between nation-states (Sandvik, 1989:10). As a result

of the Inter-Nordic war, Denmark/Norway and Sweden decided upon the establishment of a

border. Yet, they recognised that the nomadic herding was essential for the existence of the

Saami nation and agreed that at least in respect to the inland areas, the Saami should remain

exclusive users (Bergstrøm, 2002). This recognition took the form of an agreement,

commonly known as Lappekodisillen, in 1752, essentially allowing the free movement of the

Saami over the newly established national border. It also gave judicial recognition to both the

reindeer herding Saami and their nomadic practice as well as to the right to use the “land and

water” and the rights to trade and fish. The agreement recognises and protects the relatively

new, extensive herding practices, with their longer nomadic routes, establishing the right to

almost unlimited movement between different ranges, from the forests of Sweden and Finland

to the coasts of Norway. As a consequence, the extensive herding expanded even more in

respect to area used and number of animals, restricting the practice of more intensive herding,

with smaller herds, and limiting the group of actors involved.

In 1809, Finland came under Russian rule and this resulted in the aggravation of the

conditions for the reindeer herding since Russia did not recognise Lappekodisillen. Thus, in

1810 the border between Sweden and Finland was established followed by the border

between Norway and Russia in 1826. As the establishment of these borders did not make any

statement about the free movement of the Saami, the old movement patterns continued. Not

long after, in 1852, the border between Norway and Finland was closed, with disastrous

consequences for the northernmost Saami, as Finland had been traditional winter grazing area

for more than 50,000 reindeer from Norway (Aarseth, 1985:78).

The protests of the herders resulted in a special law for the northernmost area, called

The Reindeer Law for Finnmark, enacted in 1854, delineating reindeer herding districts and

separating summer and winter areas with the goal to control the number of animals pasturing

16

in specific areas at any given time, protecting the vegetation. The regulatory law resulted in a

loss of access to Finnish pastures for the Norwegian herders, while the Swedish Saami

benefited through coming into the southern areas of Finnmark with their extensive herds

(Bergstrøm, 2002).

It was in this context that the Common Lapp Law of 1883 came into play, mainly to

protect farmers against damages caused by reindeer, as both herders and farmers recognised

that the old rules of use of the resources were no longer applicable (Bull, 1997, Storli & Sara,

1997:56). The law contained three basic principles, still included in today’s reindeer herding

law: a) District divisions: established in areas where there was a right to herd; b) Reporting

requirements: the herder moving into a new district (even if just seasonally) had to inform the

local authority; c) Common responsibility: if a particular herder caused damage to the crops in

one area, all of the herders in the respective area had to compensate for the losses (Berg,

1994a & b).

This law moved responsibility from the practitioners to the administrative system and

to the government. Consequently, the Saami became relatively weak actors in the decision-

making. The regulations concerning reindeer herding in Finnmark became more defined and

by the end of the century, reindeer herding had come to be assumed as an inferior, transitory

development stage towards sedentary farming (Bull, 1997; Berg, 1994b). Thus, the

Government’s appointments of commissions composed mainly of representatives of

government and landowners (but no Saami herder) with the goal to establish where the

herders had traditional rights to herd and to introduce borders accordingly resulted in the

establishment of reindeer district boundaries (Haarstad, 1992: 288).

In the context of an ideological conflict between farmers and herders a new Law was

passed in 1933 reinforcing the previous principles used in grazing land divisions (i.e. district

division, reporting requirements and common responsibility). It appeared to be more

concerned with protecting agriculture. It gave more power to the central administration to

decide the borders between the spring, summer, autumn and winter pastures, the schedule of

movement between them. Moreover, it decided the number of animals a herder could own,

and limited the number of reindeer in a given district and retained the power to ban herding in

certain areas upon proof of it damaging the agriculture, livestock, forestry or fodder resources

(Severinsen, 1979).

However, after World War II, the attitude of the Norwegian State and society at large

towards the Saami improved, although the policy continued to try to change the conceptions

of the Saami society about the reindeer herding to correspond more to the Norwegian view

17

and agricultural approach (Karlstad, 1997; Paine, 1992). At the same time, the State

introduced the policy of subsidies in order to support the Saami and promote a more

‘efficient’ production (subsidies for fences, slaughter houses and purchase of live animals,

snow scooters, subsidies for houses if they were built in or near a village, etc.) (Falkenberg,

1985).

The Reindeer Management Act of 1978 introduced three administrative levels: 1) the

local District Boards (Distriktstyret) formed by active reindeer herders, that was responsible

for coordinating daily activities, management, slaughter and report sanctions, 2) Regional

Boards (Områdestyret) formed to regulate interactions between the districts, and 3) the

Reindeer Herding Board at the national level (Reindriftstyet) to advise the government on

policy and budget for the industry (Bull, 1997; Jentoft, 1998). While the Regional boards and

the Reindeer Herding Board are appointed both by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Saami

Parliament the herders are a minority in this apparatus that facilitates thus the reinforcement

of the managerial provisions in practice.

The main aims of the 1978 Act included: increase meat production, maintain the

Saami culture, help the herders have a stable economic situation, and maintain a settled

presence in the northernmost areas of Norway. It also regulated who was allowed to own

reindeer (only if one belonged to a registered/traditional herding family and an authorised

Herding Unit). Thus, the Act created a decision-making system based on economic and

ecological data but without many links to the cultural identity of the Saami pastoralists,

enforcing the management way of the State and accepting that the Saami can be a part of it

(Kalstad, 1997; Paine 1994).

Fundamentally, the Act was aimed at reducing the numbers of herders and herding

units in the area assuming that a more equal distribution of the animals between a smaller

number of herders could provide the desired economic and ecological stability of the industry.

To this end, the Administration introduced Herding Unit as the main administrative entity for

the industry (Riseth, 2000). The stipulation is that all the reindeer in Norway should belong to

individual herding units. In order to be a recognized reindeer herder, one has to prove they

descend from a Saami family that had herding as main livelihood. Further more, if one wants

to enter the industry, one has to join an existing herding unit or start a new one, in both cases

the Administration decides upon the opportunity of the decision, yet the law does not provide

the criteria to be used in this assessment, leaving it to the free interpretation of the local

District Boards. I will show in the following chapters that these boards have both the

incentives and the opportunity (as they are elected by and among the herders, the larger

18

unions get more votes and are thus better represented in decision making, having therefore

more power) to hinder the acceptance of new herders. This situation has been in effect to the

present day and is often considered an attempt at superimposing an agriculturalist

management system upon the traditional one (Paine, 1994). The Saami own the herds, while

their rangelands are Crown Lands, administered for reindeer herding purposes by the Ministry

of Agriculture through the Reindeer Herding Administration (R.H.A) that plans and regulates

distribution of herds and the grazing time schedule. Summer pastures access rights are

distributed to specific groups of herders, while the autumn/spring and winter ranges serve as

common pool resources.

At the end of the 1960’s, the snow scooters were introduced to Finnmark. This,

together with the policy of subsidies embraced by the State, resulted in an intense

mechanisation of herding, with profound implications. On the one hand, it allowed control

over much larger herds, by using less workforce and time to herd. On the other hand, the

bigger herds needed larger pasture areas. In order to have access to these pastures some of the

bigger herds ignored the traditional borders of the ranges. While the summer ranges were

clearly delimited by the administrative system, the autumn/spring and winter ranges were

stipulated in the Act as ‘common’, that are to be managed according to traditional practices

(NOU, 1978). The provisions fail to mention what regulations are to be followed for this

purpose. This situation led to the exclusion of the customary tenure system and, in the

absence of a functional alternative regime, created de facto a situation of open access to

resources. This in turn lead to a differentiation of the access to resources: the inner summer

districts (i.e. the herds that have ascertained ranges on the main land, as opposed to the one on

the islands and peninsula’s) have access to the common autumn/spring ranges. They are able

to use these ranges intermittently during summer against the schedules imposed by the

administrative system and thus expand dramatically compared to the outer summer districts

(Riseth, 2000).

From 1979 to 1989 the official number of reindeer owned in Norway increased from

124,000 to 247,200 heads (ibid.). In West Finnmark, between 1800 and 1970 the stocking

levels fluctuated between 40-60,000. The size of the herds constantly increased during the

1980’s, culminating around 1990 with at least 100,000 animals. While part of the increase can

be explained by inaccuracy in reports (initially the Saami paid taxes according to the number

of animals owned so they had an incentive in reporting lower stocks), the increase is evident.

However, by the 1990s, the numbers of animals began to decrease, giving the State the

opportunity to link degradation of the lichen mats (documented by satellite pictures and field

19

studies) to the increased reindeer population (Ims& Kosmo, 2001) and legitimising stock

reductions as a solution to the degradation of the lichen ranges.

In the Herding Agreements of 1999/ 2000 and 2000/ 2001, the parties tried to achieve

an agreement that would lead to stock reduction. The State established ceilings on the

numbers of animals allowed for each summer district in Finnmark. As a result, the Reindeer

Herding Board limits the highest number of reindeer on the ranges in West Finnmark to 64,

000 heads, a reduction by about 30% compared to the earlier limit of 90, 000 heads. This is

the first step in a process that would include regulation of grazing schedules of the siida

borders on the winter and spring/ autumn ranges where the highest stocks usually are found

(NOU, 35: 2001).

In 1998, a committee appointed to revise the law and propose changes in order to

achieve the sustainability goal pointed out the need for stronger decision power among the

reindeer herders under supervision of the Authorities. They suggested changing the

Management Unit-based system with one based on the siida units (ibid.). At the same time, a

geographical division of today’s commons (the autumn/spring and winter ranges) between

siidas was proposed, after agreements were made on rules for migration between seasonal

grazing lands and their use as well as a system of economic sanctions against siidas that fail to

abide the rules (ibid).

While the proposal appears to provide the traditional system with more autonomy, it is

still based on the old management models: assuming a univocally determined capacity of the

ranges and the need for individualized property rights to the ranges. These views are

seemingly at greater divergence with those of the Saami reindeer herders relying on a system

based on flexibility and opportunism, where patterns of resource use are governed by variable

productivity and accessibility of vegetation as a result of geology, topography, and fluctuating

climatic parameters such as snow depth and rainfall. Moreover, semi-domestic reindeer

management is an institutional landscape governed by social relations that produce flexible

tenure and appropriation regimes.

20

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

My choice of research area in West Finnmark was motivated by the long-standing

traditional herding here, the central point it holds within the Saami traditions and both formal

and informal administration. The region is also a complex centre of migration routes and

reflects the dramatic changes in animal numbers and regulation strategies employed by the

State. I focused on the circumstances regarding the management of winter lichen ranges, as

they appear to be the limiting resource and a controversial area for reindeer herding

management today. I interviewed leaders of the groups of herds (siida’s*) in West Finnmark.

In Saami tradition, the leader of a siida (siida-iseđ) merely mediates between the herders and

his influence is a rather moral one, based on knowledge, as all the herders involved in a siida

at a given time have equal decision powers regarding the herding strategy of the group (Paine,

1994; Sara, 2001).

There are 58-61 winter siida’s in West Finnmark. Out of these I selected 6 belonging

to 6 different districts during the summer and interviewed them in the winter of 2001/2002.

These units were evenly distributed on the winter range representing the western, middle and

eastern zones of West Finnmark’s winter range (District 31A, B and C). I chose this

distribution in order to cover a larger array of local environmental and administrative

variation. (table 1):

Table 1: Herders interviewed in Western Finnmark

HERDER(siida-iseđ)

LOCATION No. of herding units

No. of persons involved

No. of animals

Herder 1 East zone 5 29 1143Herder 2 West zone 6 15 152Herder 3 West zone 5 19 1337Herder 4 Middle zone 3 19 396Herder 5 East zone 11 63 3036Herder 6 Middle zone 1 8 525

* As previously shown, they define both the composition of the herd at any given time and the social structure ofthe management unit (band), with flexible composition in time, usually based on kinship

21

An additional source of primary data were informal discussions with four key-

informants: two of them highly esteemed former practitioners now retired from the industry,

one involved in the educational system for reindeer herding and owner of reindeer himself

and one representative of the Norwegian Reindeer Herding Administration in Kautokeino.

The key-informants provided me with a detailed holistic perspective on the herding of the old

days, their interpretation of the present situation and solutions to it. For later discussions the

informants were identified as N.L (highly esteemed herder, with a reputation of being a

‘tough bone’ and having large herd; retired from herding recently after being active for 50

years), N.B (his siida was established around 1900, retired now but still present at winter

roun-ups and important events; esteemed as most knowledgeable on West Finnmark); B.N.H

(teacher of ‘reindeer herding’ at the local high-school, not an active herder anymore but

owner of reindeer and experienced practitioner, has an important social status and insight);

K.J.I ( reindeer agronomist, works for the Reindeer Administration, position allowing him

detailed insight into the local community and the State policy).

I used the flexibility provided by semi-structured interviews of a rather lengthy format,

concentrating on few major issues. This instrumentation allowed greater freedom in

sequencing of questions, in their wording and the amount of time and attention given to

different topics. I taped all the interviews and some of the informal discussions. I did not

notice any reluctance among my interviewees towards taping the discussions. At the same

time, I allowed for an introductory part before starting with the questions; during this, I

presented myself and the general direction of studies I was following, as well as the intended

scope of the information I was about to receive. In some cases, the discussion continued after

I had finished asking my questions, returning to issues of particular interest or import to my

interviewees, allowing them to add comments, develop their points with things they didn’t

remember previously. These explanations proved very useful for building confidence and

detailing the information needed.

The design of the interviews and the informal discussions was based on two aspects of

the management system and its decision-making: the opportunities and the constraints a

herder has in his choice of action. In this approach, I relied on the theoretical framework

proposed by Blaikie and Brookfield in their key text Land Degradation and Society (1987)

arguing that the focus of the enquiry should be on the land manager and on their opportunities

and constraints within a social, economic and political arena. This perspective tries to

integrate questions of access and control over resources and relations of production as realms

of possibility and constraint, within human ecology (Peet& Watts, 1998).

22

For the part concerning the resource base the questions were centred on the

distribution of the pasture units, their ecological features (resilience, quality, etc.) and their

availability (access) in during the winter. Describing the social setting, the key concepts

looked upon were social capital, interdependence, reciprocity and their importance. Regarding

the management strategies, the important concepts used were micro and macro scale mobility,

relations with the neighbours as safety nets, effects of losses upon management goals and

opportunities.

Limitations of the study:

In sampling the siida leaders, an important bias could have been introduced by the fact

that in recent past, very often, such leaders were elected solely based on their skills of

Norwegian language, enabling them to communicate easier with the representatives of the

central administration, rather than for their detailed insight into the management system.

Nevertheless, this situation is not so wide spread anymore as most of the herders speak

Norwegian and have a good insight into the administrative system.

Furthermore, some of the siida’s I wanted to look into proved off-limits in the end,

both because of their tight schedule (at some points in time) and because of their attitudes and

perceptions towards me. Being a student at the Agricultural University of Norway seems to

have influenced the context of my research. On the one hand, this seemed to uncover some

resentment towards the agriculturalist visions of Reindeer Herding Administration, very much

contested by the herders. On the other hand, not being Norwegian was perceived both as a

badge of genuine interest and lack of bias but at times placed me in the standing of a complete

outsider, a daža (non-saami male; see Appendix 2) with no insight into the problem I was

looking at.

Finally, the communication between me and the interviewees being based on

Norwegian, which is neither my nor their mother-tongue might have had an influence on the

way we all perceived each-other’s words, even if I tried to limit the concepts used in my

questions to everyday language, avoiding scientific terms and using Saami concepts to define

detailed issues.

23

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I shall present the most important of the meta-narratives, and the

narratives supporting them as they appear from the interviews I conducted in the winter of

2001/2002 with the reindeer herders in Finnmark. I structured the presentation of the

arguments into four sections concerning ecology, economy, social relations and institutional

arrangements. This division is morphological rather than conceptual. The issues touched upon

in each of the sections reflect and are connected with arguments in the others, forming a

conceptual framework of premises and interpretations. The discussion sections were

integrated here in order to clarify the narratives of the herders and contrast them with the

managerial discourse of the State. The aim is to ‘tell a better story’ and analyse the status quo

of reindeer herding in Finnmark as being defined by the interests and perceptions of different

actors, with different decision-power and goals. The first section addresses the perceptions

and arguments concerning the ecological realities on the ranges and the influence of density-

independent factors upon the relation between animals and pastures. It compares the

narratives of the herders with the equilibrium meta-narrative advocated by the Administration.

A. ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

1. The status of the winter ranges

The general position of the interviewed herders is that their winter ranges today are

usually very good but defined by yearly variability:

“ The pastures are different from year to year: if it’s more snow and lots of

wind, it’s more čearga*- and then it’s less pasture. It freezes on the peaks. So in the

end it’s Nature who decides this. That’s the way it is. But when it freezes on the

peaks, it changes towards the spring, March-April, and then you have again pasture

there, so that is saved naturally.” (Herder 4)

The herders define the quality of their ranges as a result of both abundance and

accessibility of lichen cover. Furthermore, regarding the species composition of the pastures,

* wind-packed snow, see Appendix 2.

24

the opinion was unanimous that lichens are the important winter food but not the exclusive

source in the winter reindeer diet:

“ Here it’s very good lichen, even if (...) most of, or let’s say half of the middle

zone uses this area when they move (from autumn to winter ranges), so it’s used quite

a lot, but when there are good pasture like this year and last year it doesn’t matter.

(Q:” How important is the lichen cover?”) I don’t know- it’s different to what one uses

the area for: in autumn/early winter, I don’t think reindeer is so dependent on lichen.

Then they go down to the marshes and eat grasses and everything else they find in the

forest areas. And I have experienced that reindeer doesn’t need that much lichen in

autumn/early winter; they just need to graze in peace. And then there are very good

pastures by Christmas and New Year’s when you come closer to the winter, and then I

think they need more lichen. But it’s not so important that it’s big lichen, just as long

as they manage to come through the snow to the lichen. I don’t think it’s so important

to have big lichen.” (Herder 4)

As showed earlier, the question regarding the quality of the pastures (defined in terms

of vegetation cover and species composition) is one of the main arguments the State uses in

defining its environmental crisis narrative, justifying the reduction of the number of animals

and formalisation of access rights. To this end, the statements of the herders as having very

good pastures could be interpreted as formative, trying to counteract the arguments of the

State of a constant degradation of the pastures. That this is not the case is demonstrated by the

fact that herders agree that lichen-beds diminished in size. While the majority admits to a

change, two of the herders (one from the western zone and one from the eastern zone) state

that the changes are very significant. In all the cases, explanations and arguments are given

for the causes and the context of wear-down but show different perceptions. One iseđ (siida

leader) from the eastern zone argues:

“ There’s much less lichen now than before, say 20 years ago. It diminished very

much; I don’t know to say in percent. And that’s because there have been too many

reindeer over a too long time. It’s one of the reasons, but it can also be other

reasons: it can be a change in climate, which makes that the lichen doesn’t succeed in

competition with other species, or it can also be the pollution along the (migration)

routes. You know, the lichen is not a plant but a symbiosis of an alga and a mushroom

so the air is important, if the air is polluted the lichen is weaker, weaker than it has

25

been before. These are three of the factors that might have played a lot in that the

lichen is so much diminished.” (Herder 1)

A view of moderate change is maintained by two herders from the middle zone, and

related to the patterns of use and the pressure exerted on vegetation:

“ Indeed, there’s a change, but it’s so that one can see that it depends a lot on how

one area is used. If one has the herd often in one place, then you can see that this

‘breaks’* more, but if you change a bit and use smaller areas (at a time), then it can

come again (regenerate). You know, before we had a different way of herding, and

then the flock was very close to us, and in the autumn, you know, we fenced the

reindeer around the tent and took the milk from the does and we did that everyday. It

was almost like a clock, the reindeers were there everyday in the afternoon and then

we milked the does. And then you could notice the wearing early around the tenting

place. And there were many places like that, but today you can see they recovered and

they have the best lichen, grass and lichen. One can see where there’re a lot of fences

especially in the first 2-3 years, within 200 m from the fence it’s worn down, but after

a while it begins to recover (...).” (Herder 4)

The views of the herders can be summarised in two meta-narratives. First, that a

pasture’s quality is determined by access to the forage (regulated by climate and utilisation

patterns) and the lichen cover. Second, the lichen cover is diminished now compared to

‘before’ but the extent of the change and causes that brought it about are varied. One

circumstance that influences the quality of the lichen beds is its accessibility. Rangelands

covered with hard-packed or frozen snow require more energy expended in digging the

craters. This reduces the energy gained through intake even though the yearlings have the

advantage of using the craters dug by their mothers (it is mostly the pregnant females that

retain their antlers during the winter) (Paine, 1994). Moreover, the mechanical damage upon

the lichen mats due to digging is much higher than the consumption itself (up to 10 times

higher- Virtala, 1992). Thus, even if the lichens beds are in good condition, a ‘bad year’, with

circumstances that require lots of craters to be dug, can have a severe impact on the ranges,

turning a range with high primary production into a degraded one in a matter of months. As

the recovery of broken lichen-thalluses is measured in decades in the absence of disturbance

* Term used to describe the effect of trampling on lichen, especially when the lichen is dry, in summer or inautumn, with a considerably destructive consequence- see below.

26

(Crittenden, 1999: 133) the degradation is more important. Furthermore, a range can be

‘locked’ under packed snow that has been trampled upon by a big herd (and snow-scooters),

resulting in bigger pressure (mechanical damage) from the animals and diminished

availability of food.

We see herein some arguments for considering the quality of the winter ranges being

first and foremost a product of climate and exploitation patterns even if lichens are the

essential food source during winter. This is a more detailed vision upon productivity than the

one employed by the management authorities arguing for a stocking rate based on the

carrying capacity of the whole winter range, which is considered both uniform and defined by

a predictable primary production (see below).

Regarding the second meta-narrative, asserting that the lichen mats have diminished in

time due to various influences, we notice a detailed scenario of possible influences. The

statement that ‘there have been too many animals, over a too long time’, implies that the bad

condition of the lichen ranges is induced not by pressure alone (large stocking rates) but by a

constant high pressure, that doesn’t respond to fluctuations in range quality as defined above.

The number of reindeers in West Finnmark during the last 20 years shows a significant

increase when compared to previous periods. This high level, even if not constant, maintained

throughout the 1980’s and to the present day, with a peak in 1989/1990 (Fig.5.1). Even

though between 1960-1975 the stocking levels were constantly high, the difference during the

last 20 years, is that the pattern of variation shifted upwards. Thus, what before was a

temporary peak now became average or low level. In this respect, the empirical data support

the argument of the narrative, that the numbers have been constantly high (I shall return to

this point later).

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

1835

1865

1895

1925

1953

1985

Figure 3: Evolution of the number of semi-domesticated reindeer in West Finnmark

between 1835- 1999 (after Ims& Kosmo, 2001)

27

The narratives also quote fences as another possible cause for the degradation of

ranges: by changing the access patterns when introduced in an area through which the animals

were used to migrate. This is said to have brought about a severe degradation due to trampling

along the fences. Numerous studies have addressed the problem in extensive livestock

production systems of semi-arid Africa, showing a significant decrease in the resilience of

pastures as a result of their fragmentation by fencing (Behnke et al., 1993; Boone & Hobbs,

2003). In Fennoscandia, some data show a negative influence of fragmentation due to

infrastructure imposing pressure on reindeer movement (Beach, 1981:52). In Finnmark, there

are two kinds of fences: restraining fences (permanent, delineating different management

areas like state borders, seasonal ranges, summer districts) and leading fences (temporary

used in herding to direct the animals in a certain direction during seasonal migrations)

(Tømmervik et al. 1996: p.25). While the leading fences are making herding easier by

avoiding spreading of herds and mixing, the permanent fences may be a manifestation of the

insecurity in access to resources according to customary rights or an expression of the

powerful actors from among the herders that try to ensure appropriation from the resources by

excluding others.

Moreover, recent studies show a strong influence of hindrances (fences, huts, power

lines) on the grazing pressure and vegetation quality as domesticated reindeer avoid them on a

radius sometimes measured in km (Vistnes& Nelleman, 2001). During the last decade a large

number of permits for building cabins and new restraining (permanent) fences have been

issued by the Authorities (often at the request of the district boards and the Norwegian

Reindeer Herders Association-NRL). This has had adverse effects on the reindeer distribution

and pressure upon ranges (Reindriftforvaltningen, 2002: 40-41). Therefore, the degradation of

rangelands appears to be more related to poor distribution (artificial) of animals as opposed to

the actual numbers. More so as it is documented that more than 50 % of the reindeer ranges in

Northern Norway are seriously affected by human influence, and that it is expected that the

semi-domesticated reindeer will significantly reduce their use of ranges close to the cabin

areas (UNDP, 2001). This situation points at a conflict between the perceptions and interests

of the herders and those of the management system, even if the gradual introduction of fences

has been supported by groups of herders arguably following the need to secure access to

resources in the absence of other regulatory bodies.

28

2. Winter die-offs: factors and circumstances

The term ‘winter die-off’ refers to large losses of reindeer on the winter ranges as a

result of different causes. These include animals dying of starvation or in snow-slides, killed

by predators or drowning, etc. The die-off is an indicator of catastrophic events, with dramatic

consequences for pastoral strategies as well as ecological relations. Despite its ambiguity, the

term seemed familiar to most of the herders, but they related different circumstances to its

occurrence.

“We haven’t had it but it was in the years with most reindeer that the pastures

began to worsen and then a lot of reindeer died, but there are many reasons to that.

Both hunger and predators and places where they drowned or been taken by snow-

slide. There were many things that did it, 15-20 years ago.” (Herder 1)

Most of the herders connected the term to bad snow circumstances as the main

influence.

“ We haven’t had much of it. We had our share of losses three years ago- quite a

lot- the animals because there hadn’t been enough food. And that was because of the

snow condition: it was icy on top. The condition of the animals was good we had had very

good autumn pastures, but you know, when the winter pastures are locked, they don’t

manage.” (Herder 3)

In the same context, one of my key informants recalled a significant event:

“About ten years ago, towards the end of the winter, the weather had been warm

for some days and the herd tried to cross the river. The ice was too thin and it cracked so

they fell in, we lost a lot of animals. Nobody could help them. They drowned.“ (key-

informant N.B.)

The emerging narrative describes winter die-off as a ‘catastrophic’ event triggered

by climatic conditions (snow condition/ freezing, snow-slides, etc.). This perception is

further detailed in talking about the general influence of climate upon the use of lichen

ranges and their quality.

29

3. Snow condition: its evolution and importance

The importance the herders attributed to climatic factors, as driving force, cannot be

overstated. Their narratives touched upon two major points. The change in climatic conditions

(snow in particular) and the influence this change brings about. One position maintained that

there is an obvious change in the characteristics of the snow and that the situation has

worsened during the last 10 years:

“ Yes, the snow condition has changed. It has happened a climatic change, the

case is sure, and we see it especially on spring and autumn- it can suddenly come snow

and then get warm again. That never happened 30-40 years ago. First it freezes for 3-4

weeks with –10 to –20º C, and then suddenly comes snow and then it disappears just as

fast. (...) It has happened to us - we had to move on the summer pastures in February

because of this- but only in the last 10 years, then it started to be more serious.” (Herder

1)

“ It has been so much climatic change the last 10 years, now it’s ice and so much

milder (weather) than it was normal before: it snows and snows and then it rains again

and then it becomes ice. When one has so much experience as I do, one can see that

climate has changed and it’s not much one can do about it.” (Herder 6)

The changes are also perceived as more encompassing, a general climatic alteration

that diminished access to winter pastures:

“ The snow condition- I don’t think it changed at all. But mild weather- it can

suddenly be mild weather and then icy. There has been quite stable bad weather in the

last 5-6 years. It can suddenly turn to very bad weather and this can destroy a lot, but the

snow hasn’t changed. “ (Herder 3).

The importance of the climatic factors on the winter pastures is furthermore described

in the same context; the general estimation is that the climatic settings are most important in

regulating the relation between herbivores and vegetation.

“ It’s clear that the condition of the snow is important- if the reindeers don’t manage

to come through to the pasture. Well, it’s alpha and omega that they manage to get access to

30

the pastures. In 1994 we had a bad, bad winter. The pastures were locked. Then we had to

release the herd.*” (Herder 2)

The herders agree that the climatic circumstances have significantly changed. The

narrative argues for some major changes: milder weather, short-term variability in

temperature and precipitations, increased snow. Among the last 10 years, the last two have

been exceptionally good in terms of climatic/ snow condition. During all my discussions,

these last 2 years in general (and the winters in particular) were termed as ‘very good years’

the emphasis always being on the stable weather that allowed good access to the resources). I

shall now dwell on how the above narratives may be interpreted.

4. Defining the quality of the ranges

The narratives appear to be in agreement on a discourse that puts a strong accent on

the influence of climate on the herding strategies, opportunities and constraints. Thus, access

to the resources rather than their quantity is ‘the alpha and omega’, and in this context, the

timing, quantity and correlation of precipitation and temperature make the difference between

‘good’ and ‘bad’ years, and in turn determine the outcome of herding. It is interesting to see

the interpretation the experts give to these phenomena.

The discourse of the State, the hegemonic one considering that the whole managerial

and legislative strategy is based on it, has a contrasting position. The reindeer herding trade in

Finnmark is primarily challenged by “the problem of the common ranges and the adjustment

of reindeer number.” (Reindriftforvaltningen, 2002: p.2). The discourse of the State regarding

the pastures in Finmmark can be thus summarised: throughout the 1980’s the number of

reindeer increased in Finnmark, culminating in March 31st, 1989 to ca. 200 000 animals

(ibid.). For the same period, satellite pictures show a severe reduction of the lichen mats on

the winter, spring and autumn ranges. This proves that pasture carrying capacity and stock

levels have not been correlated and that this has lead to a challenging situation (i.e. crisis) that

has to be addressed as the low productivity and big losses increase the toil of the herders.

Henceforth, the need for regulations that would ensure a three-fold sustainability: “the

* This practice is resolved to only when pastures can no longer be found and the herder releases the animalshoping that their instincts would guide them to accessible pastures. This is a dangerous practice as the wholeherd can be lost to neighbours or die.

31

development of an ecologically, economically and culturally sustainable reindeer herding

(industry)” (ibid.).

Regarding the evolution of vegetation on the winter ranges (District 31), the most

recent data (based on a series of studies that use aerial pictures and satellite images) present a

severe reduction in lichen-mat cover during the last forty years- from 42.1% in 1961 to 6.9%

in 2000 (Johansen, B. 1998, 2002):

Table 2: Evolution of the main vegetation communities on the winter ranges of West

Finnmark (after Johansen, B., 1998; 2002)

Vegetation category (km2)/ YEAR 1961 1973 1980 1987 1996 2000Not categorized 51.9 516.0 10.1 9.6 7.3Bare forest 15.5 15.5 15.5 17.4 10.9 18.2Birch forest with low lichencontent 860.1 860.1 793.0 908.3 1186.8 1451.1Mountain birch forest w. lichen 581.6 581.6 554.5 958.3 921.5 664.8Rice bog/ mixed bogs 519.1 677.9 527.1 432.6 553.6 463.9Grass bog, wetland 420.7 318.6 445.4 538.0 427.3 539.1Heather, shrub moors 439.8 542.2 452.3 817.0 662.8 612.3Lichen moors 2300.3 2042.9 1813.2 1376.0 652.7 376.3Worn lichen moors 0.0 3.2 2.2 45.8 694.8 929.7Cultivated meadows 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 11.5Impediment (unproductive) 71.0 93.7 65.6 41.3 35.2 79.4Snow-beds 0.0 18.7 120.7 37.7 35.9 39.7Water 257.6 257.6 158.4 281.4 268.4 270.6Total 5463.9 5463.9 5463.9 5463.9 5463.9 5463.9

Furthermore, the discourse continues, in order to ensure the ecological sustainability,

the stocking rates have to correspond to the carrying capacity (CC) of the rangeland. Even if

not explicitly defined here (see below), CC is a concept largely employed in rangeland

management world-wide and relies on 3 assumptions. First, that the growth and number of

animals are controlled by the quality and availability of forage. Second, that the production of

forage is controlled by the number of animals and finally, that the populations of animals and

their forage plants tend towards a stable equilibrium. Thus, the productivity of both herds and

pastures can be manipulated in a predictable manner by adjusting stocking densities (Tyler,

1999).

32

These assumptions form the basis of the management strategy of the Administration.

First, the total area covered with lichen mats is estimated. Then, a model based on densities of

wild reindeer in the Hardanger plateau (central Norway) suggests an optimum stocking level

for the lichen ranges of 14 reindeer/ km2 of lichen-mat. As the reindeer herding has the goal

of ‘largest meat yields/ surface unit’ (Ims& Kosmo, 2001), the density proposed is 16

reindeer/ km2 lichen-mat. Then, this is adjusted to the grazing season of 245 days and to the

percentage of forest in each zone. These estimates are then verified through a second method

based on estimates of the primary production (which is estimated at 10% of the lichen

biomass). This production is in turn used to estimate the optimum density of animals,

admitting that every adult reindeer consumes a certain amount of forage on the lichen ranges

(490 kg/ period) out of which the lichen represents 80%. Moreover, the total amount of lichen

expended (ingested, trampled, etc.) is 3-11 times larger than the amount needed for

consumption (utile). This leads to an estimate of the number of animals a given area can

sustain (Ims& Kosmo 2001: p.137).

I shall disregard for now the methodological simplifications of the model above and

their effects: e.g. as a starting point densities of wild reindeer are adjusted with only 14%,

while historical records show a stocking rate of domesticated reindeer in Finnmark 3 to 13

times higher than that of wildlife (Fox, 1996: 5). In the same line, the estimates of percentage

represented by lichen in the diet of the reindeer and quantity of lichen expended over and

above that consumed by the animals are circumstantial and highly variable (Tømmervik et al,

1996: 35; Virtala, 1992). Instead, I shall concentrate on the validity of the model presented

above in order to explain the lichen-reindeer dynamics from the two perspectives: the herder

narratives and the dominant and often contradictory ecological theories.

4.1 Equilibrium vs. Disequilibrium in Finnmark

The managerial discourse in Finnmark is based on the concept of carrying capacity.

This is in turn a product of an ecological paradigm, dominant in rangeland development for

decades, the so-called successional model. This approach to plant ecology argues that a given

rangeland has a single persistent state (the climax) in the absence of grazing (Clements,

1916). All possible states of the vegetation align on a single continuum, from heavily grazed

(early-successional, poor condition) to ungrazed (climax, excellent condition) and succession

towards this climax is a steady process. Grazing pressure produces progressive changes that

33

are opposed to the successional tendency. Therefore, if the grazing pressure were made equal

to the successional tendency, this would produce equilibrium in the vegetation at a set

stocking rate. This point of equilibrium (designated ‘K’ in ecological literature) is termed

ecological carrying capacity (Caughley, 1979). At ecological carrying capacity, livestock

may be plentiful but not in a particularly good condition; neither will the vegetation be as

dense nor will the plant communities necessarily be composed of the same species as they

would be in the absence of animals (ibid.). As at K the animal production and the die-offs are

equal, there is no animal surplus to be harvested. As the goal of herding is animal production,

the herders must maintain fewer animals, at a stocking density that generates a maximum

sustained yield. This stocking density has been termed economic carrying capacity (ibid). A

sustainable yield of livestock can be harvested at such equilibrium.

Under the successional (equilibrium) model, the goal of the management is to choose

a stocking rate, which establishes a long-term equilibrium between the pressure of grazing

and the successional tendency (Westoby et al., 1989). Even though not applied exactly as the

theory suggests, the model embraced by the State in order to manage the ranges in Finnmark

is rooted in the equilibrium model that argues for a long-term balance between the pressure of

grazing by reindeer and the successional tendency of the lichen-dominated vegetation. In this

context, an important body of literature provides data support this managerial approach,

showing correlations between reproductive parameters or the life history of northern

ungulates and the density of animals on the range (Coulson et al., 1997; Mysterud &

Mysterud, 2000; Ims& Kosmo, 2001).

An alternative model acknowledges that in many situations rangeland dynamics are

better described by “a set of discrete ‘states’ of the vegetation on one piece of ground” and a

set of discrete ‘transitions’ between these states (Westoby, et al. 1989:268). The transitions

between the states are triggered by natural ‘events’ (weather, fire, etc.) and/or by management

‘actions’ (change in stocking rates, destruction of plant population, fertilisation, etc.). The

transition can be sudden (e.g. when triggered by fire) or slow (e.g. a generation of woody

plants grows up) but the system doesn’t rest halfway through it (ibid.). As a state is basically

an abstraction, that encompasses a certain amount of variation in space and time (here in the

transition from lichen mats to heathlands) the configurations of the species composition varies

in time and space. The amount of detail involved in the description of ranges depends on how

many states and transitions the management recognises as important.

In arid and semi-arid Africa, the ranges and the dynamics of the interaction between

ranges and livestock populations are subject to episodic events and the influences of grazing

34

and intrinsic vegetation change act intermittently, and are better described by a non-

equilibrium model (Behnke et al. 1993; Oba et al. 2000). The low and erratic rainfall has a

much stronger influence on the abundance of forage than animal numbers, therefore

productivity is more a function of abiotic perturbations (droughts, die-offs), that the manager

is unable to predict or control. If these perturbations are severe and frequent, the grazing

systems cannot sustain livestock populations at or near the long-term ecological carrying

capacity as defined by the successional model and set stocking rates have little relevance.

Instead, more important is the ability to adjust stocking rates rapidly to track sudden changes

in feed availability: “In such an environment, managers should see themselves as facing an

oncoming stream of events, a mixture of opportunities and hazards”(Westoby, 1989:271).

Therefore the goal of the management is to seize the opportunities and evade the hazards,

based on adjusting the management to expected climatic circumstances relevant to particular

transitions.

It has taken a history of failure of sub-Saharan range management projects, a few

decades of research and an impressive effort for dissemination of research in order to achieve

acknowledgement for the state-and-transition model and that the successional model and a

fixed carrying capacity are inappropriate for most of the arid and semi-arid African

rangelands (Behnke et al. 1993; Dijkman, 1999).

This controversy has received little attention in the sub-arctic regions. Nevertheless,

the importance of the model used to define the plan for managing the grazing resources is

indisputable. Here, the herders argue that access to forage controls (to a large extent) the

growth and number of animals, and that climate in general and episodic events in particular

control the stocking levels. On the other hand, the Administration employs the equilibrium

model in deciding their strategies. This choice can be also explained by the interests vested in

this approach: if the growth and production of forage on lichen ranges are controlled by the

number of reindeer, then the present resource degradation in Finnmark is the result of a too

large stock. Moreover, if the growth and number of animals is determined by the quality and

availability of forage, then the constant reduction in number and live weights of the reindeer

here is the evidence of degraded ranges. These narratives contribute to defining the crisis

meta-narrative and legitimate the Administration as stakeholders in managing the local

resources. This meta-narrative has in turn become received wisdom (Leach& Mearns, 1998:8)

in the sense that it is taken for granted and uncontested in the general perception of the

situation in Finnmark, produced and reproduced in various contexts.

35

Nevertheless, these narratives of the hegemonic discourse are ‘de-narrativised’ to a

large extent by some of the recent studies showing that in sub-arctic regions ‘components of

climate that determine plant growth (…) vary prodigiously from year to year’ (Caughley&

Gunn 1993: 52). Forage availability rather than herbivore density drives the changes in

herbivore populations and does so quickly. Data on population trends of major caribou herds

in Canada, show a high instability (Gunn, 1998), with populations regulated by ‘the impact of

frequent density independent factors’ (Ouellet et al., 1996; Tyler, 1999), irregular weather

setbacks, pointing that “there is no true equilibrium in this system” (Whitten, 1996).

In Northern Norway, a study by Tyler (1999) found no correlation between numbers

or mean body mass and production in the herds studied as their rate of production varied

substantially. In stead, body mass in the autumn (September) was strongly correlated with the

mean July temperature in both herds (when the average temperature increased, the body mass

decreased). The study proposes that the per capita food supply in summer is determined

mainly by the rate of growth and/or quantity of forage rather than the number of animals.

Concerning the relevance of a non-equilibrium model for the Arctic, Behnke (1999:

p.147) argues that in semi-arid Africa and Australia weather influences the relationship

plant/herbivore in a simple way (“either it rains or it doesn’t, no other climatic factor comes

close to having the importance of rainfall”). The situation at higher latitudes is more complex:

fluctuations in both temperature and precipitation influence both the growth of forage in

summer and the availability of forage in winter (ibid.). Thus, one set of variables (rainfall,

timing of thawing in spring, etc.) may cause fluctuations in the quantity and quality of feed

production, while a second set of variables (depth of snow cover, prevalence of ground ice)

determine how much of the total primary production is accessible to herbivores in winter

(Mech et al., 1987; Tyler 1987; McRoberts et al., 1995; Langvatn et al., 1996; Post et al.,

1997; Forchhammer et al., 1998). Thus weather-induced stress is a function of the impact of

individual factors, their correlation, and their additive or offsetting consequences, in other

words, how this variability is “packaged” in individual years (Behnke, 1999). Furthermore,

the vegetation in the sub-Arctic is differently influenced by fluctuations: the green vegetation

reacts rapidly to weather stimuli while the lichens don’t (ibid.). This complicates even more

the prediction of appropriate stocking densities, as the different feed are consumed in different

periods and influence different vital rates (e.g. growth in the summer, pregnancy success,

birth rates in the winter) (Sæther, 1997). This thrust of research supports the arguments of the

herders that climatic events and use patterns influence the growth and numbers of reindeer.

36

And justify the traditional herding strategies that acknowledge these fine distinctions and try

to meet the challenges imposed by variability.

Climatic studies relevant for the population ecology of reindeer in Fennoscandia

support the narratives of the herders related to evolution of climatic parameters, showing an

overall increase in precipitation, with a large between year variability throughout the 20th

century (Yoccoz et al., 2002). The series of particularly warm and wet winters that started at

the end of the 1980’s and continued through the 1990’s in Finnmark coincided with the

beginning of the decline in the reindeer industry. Furthermore, the variability patterns

changed for the same period: while in the 1930’s and 1960’s the variability was annual,

starting with 1970’s this became decadal (i.e. climate trends lasted for up to 10 years).

Moreover, the atmospheric circulation patterns had a homogenising influence on the

temperature patterns in winter (i.e. a warm winter is warm overall) (ibid.). This supports the

claims of the herders for ‘bad years’ during the last decade.

The results are supported by other research in the area that show “ since the late

1980’s there has been a gradual warming, with the positive temperature anomalies

increasing”, especially for the winter temperature (Lee et al, 2000). Furthermore, their results

show a positive correlation between the temperature of the previous autumn and the total

number of live reindeer calves: the warmer the autumn, the greater the number. An even

stronger negative correlation was found in winter: the warmer the winter prior to the rut, the

lower the number of calves born the next spring. (ibid). The study also showed that climate

change may promote the faster-growing vascular plants to out-compete lichens (ibid.). This

position is substantiated by other studies concerned with the ecology of mat-forming lichens

that identify an increase in precipitation as a source of possible out-competition of the lichens

by the vascular plants (Crittenden, 1999: 132).

The research quoted above comes to detail the picture of the evolution of reindeer

populations in Northern Norway and identify a series of possible causes (e.g. climatic change)

that seem to support the narratives of the herders arguing for the importance of climatic

events in defining the plant herbivore interaction. To this end, the model used by the State in

determining the management strategy appears to be an over-simplification of the actual

situation on the ranges. The ‘fact’ that the degradation of the ranges is the result of stocking

densities, established as a scientific argument for regulation through culling is contested both

by the narratives of the herders and empirical evidence, even though the number and extent of

studies that can validate this perspective are rather limited. Moreover, the terms ‘degraded’

and ‘overgrazed’ are circumstantial, they are neither value-free, nor objectively defined: “the

37

term overgrazing has essentially no meaning for natural ecosystems. It derives meaning only

when we include a basis of human evaluation of what components are desirable.” (Fox,

1996:10). As the ranges on Finnmark’s plateau are managed by humans, the problem of

defining degradation and overgrazing achieves an ideological and political dimension: whose

knowledge is recognised and used in decisions-making for the management of resources. The

problem of conflicting representations of the realities and the vested interests of these

representations arises: the representation of the vegetation/herbivore relationship is influenced

by the divergent management visions of the Administration and the herders. Thus, “the

traditional range succession model is associated with the management objective of achieving

an equilibrium condition under an equilibrium grazing policy” (Westoby, 1989). By contrast,

the state-and-transition model would describe rangelands by means of catalogues of

alternative states and of possible transitions between states. Moreover, under the state-and-

transition model, range management would not see itself as establishing a permanent

equilibrium. “Rather, it would see itself as engaged in a continuing game, the object of which

is to seize opportunities and to evade hazards, so far as possible. The emphasis would be on

timing and flexibility rather than on establishing a fixed policy”(ibid.) We see therefore that

while the herders acknowledges variability and adjusts to it through flexible use of resources,

the discourse of the state argues for a predictable and univocally determined relationship

between reindeers and vegetation.

These representations of ecological relations are reflected in and inter-related with all

the other aspects of reindeer herding today (economy, social relations, institutional

arrangements). In order to understand these positions and the rationale behind them we look

further into other aspects, which stem from the ecological approaches and define the two

divergent discourses.

38

B. ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The following section summarises the way the herders described some of the major

economic opportunities and constraints that influence their herding strategies. The issues

touched upon here form by no means an exhaustive presentation of the economy of the

reindeer herding in Finnmark or the particular groups of households for that matter. Rather,

this is a short presentation of the topics that seemed more important to my interviewees and

their positions regarding these topics: the herd as productive capital, the work force as

management tool, the income and it’s role. The narratives of the herders explain subtle

circumstances that govern their economic strategies. These perceptions also underline the

importance of multifaceted non-economic criteria in determining a long-term strategy. In this

context, the narrative and objectives advocated by the hegemonic administrative discourse

appear over-simplified and formative.

1. The herd as productive capital

First, all the herders stated that the actual number of animals in their siida’s has

decreased and that this trend has been constant for a number of years (the last 5 to 15 years) to

the present day (or except for the last two years). While this perception coincides with the

official data, the causes for this reduction are put in a complex context, rather than the

diminished primary production caused by pasture degradation.

“ Well, the highest number of animals was in 1986. There have been much worse

years since 1987, the last ten years except the last two (n.b. 2000 and 2001)- these two

have been very good. So it’s 1986 to 1999 have been very bad, but since then it started

going up again. Then there were bad pastures, you know, and many predators- almost all

the calves died and the bad pastures were because of freezing and icing.” (Herder 3)

The evolution of the size of reindeer herds is placed in a larger perspective, one

that acknowledges the influence of more general aspects (e.g. good climatic conditions-

‘good years’). This position seems to contradict again the assumption that stocking levels

of reindeer are controlled chiefly by the relation herbivore/pasture, arguing that different

management regimes and pasture productivity can produce similar outcomes:

39

“ The number has gone down the last maybe 10 years. The highest number was in

1989. Then it was the highest in the whole of Norway, and not only here, in the whole of

Sweden and Finland as well, everywhere!” (Herder 5)

Next I investigated the effect the loss of animals has in economic terms and if the

economic hardship determines herders to quit herding altogether as a result of large losses;

trying to understand the rationality of the herding. The relevance of the topic is conferred by

the importance of understanding how decision-making works among herders and to what

extent they are driven by economic achievement. The answers were similar in that even if

large animal losses (die-offs, etc.) have an important economic influence on the family

economy, this is seldom a reason for shifting to other enterprises:

“ It’s for sure- when one is affected by (winter) die-off this affects the economy,

and when one gets a bad economy in a trade (occupation) one starts thinking if it’s

profitable to do it. But there is also another thing: for us who are grown up herding

reindeer, it’s not just a job, it’s our lifestyle, it’s our life; so to quit it’s not so easy,

it’s the last solution! (Q: Do people seek for alternative sources of income?) I

suppose one has to do it (increase income from alternative sources) if one gets some

bad years; but the most important for us who herd reindeer is to get the most part of

income, and rather all of it from herding.” (Herder 2)

In the same line, the herding strategies employed as a result of ‘bottle-neck’ years and

their consequent losses are important: in order to counteract these effects one has to stop

slaughtering animals and the herd would build up again. We see herein one explanation to the

strategy of increasing the size of the herd by limiting slaughtering, strategy often pointed at as

unsustainable in the discourse of the Administration:

“ It depends on how many reindeer one has, but one mustn’t slaughter the next years

to build the herd up again.” (Herder 2)

“ When it happens that one has a bad year, it can take a few years before building

up the flock again, but it can be faster if there are good years with lots of calves and so.”

(Herder 5)

This ubiquitous position is on the one hand supported by the series of bad years

during the last decade. On the other hand, it portrays limited slaughtering as an insurance

40

mechanism against the vagaries of the weather, correlating the relative low slaughtering

levels of the last decade with the series of bad years.

2. Workforce

The rationale behind the construction of a siida unit was traditionally grounded in

having a team of herders that could provide enough work force and knowledge leading to

optimal circumstances for the herd. This aspect has been very relevant in the years before the

mechanisation of reindeer herding, when mobility in terrain was limited and detailed

ecological knowledge represented an important capital. The following narratives contribute

with details of strategies regarding the workforce and the division of labour today, when

mechanisation (in the form of snow-scooters, four-wheel drives, etc.) substitutes some of the

need for workforce:

“ The work force is how one divides it. When one has (enough) people one makes

his own siida; then you have enough people to handle the amount of reindeer you have. If

you have a lot of animals and just one herder, it doesn’t work. So, siida doahllo* it’s

normal when you value which people you want to have in your siida, and of course you

want your own people in your siida.”

(Herder 1)

Of basic importance in understanding the strategies for dividing work force is whether

or not the siida’s have enough labour supply and if its lack would influence the migration

patterns of the herders. In other words, if having fewer herders to take care of the reindeer

would bring about a more sedentary grazing, with longer stops in one place and a changed

schedule, and possibly more pressure on the lichen resources. The narratives underline the

fact that traditional migration patterns are not significantly influenced by workforce

availability, following both the migration routes and the grazing schedule, showing that the

customary management system still holds an important place in reality even if lacking legal

recognition:

“ It has been a generation shift in our siida, but it’s been better (work force) now,

the last years. It’s so that when you have enough labour resources you have better

overview and control, but the migration routes and schedules are the same.” (Herder 2)

41

The division of labour inside each group of herders (siida) requires more attention. As

individual herds have different sizes but are herded together in a group (siida), an equitable

system for this division is required. The recent administrative provisions hold the herding unit

(driftsenhet)** as the basic division for estimating economic performance. On the other hand,

traditionally, the household (baiki) had the central position in dividing benefits and duties.

This distinction is important in estimating economic indices of reindeer herding as an

enterprise. The general attitude of the herders towards this topic was that division of labour is

rather flexible and that whether it is done among households, or herding units, usually it is

equally divided unless the differences in the number of animals are very significant:

“ We, in our siida, have divided it between baikidoahllo. We divide it equally, no

matter the number of reindeer- that doesn’t play any role as long as all the households

form a core. But it can also be that if one household doesn’t have people to do a certain

job in the extensive working periods, they can help accordingly in the intensive working

periods. You don’t say ‘No, you have to!’ if they cannot, and that’s ok, you cannot force

them.” (Herder 1)

“ We have young people who are always there to help, but it’s the households who

have to contribute equally during the winter. (Q: What about the number of animals?) No,

it’s just the household. None of us has so many reindeer so that the differences are so big

anyway.” (Herder 4)

This position seems to run counter to one of the main goals of the administrative

approach: an equal division of labour among herding units in order to ensure a relatively

uniform distribution of income across the groups. The contradiction of the two paradigms is

reconfirmed by the strategy of distributing the workload during the winter and the

requirements for different periods. The herders identify clearly the dichotomy between

intensive and extensive working periods and relate those periods to both climatic conditions

and the instinct-driven migration of reindeer:

“ It’s so that we have intensive and extensive working periods. In winter it’s,

extensive: then one uses for instance 2 hours/ working-day. In the intensive working

periods it’s 12 hours/ working-day. Now (n.b. February) one works 2 hours/ week and we

have a guard for 3 days a week 2hours/ day. So in these extensive periods we don’t work

all of us at the same time, while in the intensive ones we work all day.”(Herder1)

* Siida structure, see Appendix 2** The basic administrative unit, with one person registered as the legal responsible before the Administration.For more details concerning household/ herding unit/ siida see following chapter.

42

“ In the autumn there’s less snow so the reindeer move more. In mid-winter,

January-February and maybe March, there are calmer periods, and then in April, begins

reindeer to pull towards the north. Then you have to guard them more and there’re more

predators and it’s very easy that they start moving northwards when something stirs them

from the south. They need very little (disturbance) from the south”. (Herder 2)

The herders identify the influence of complex circumstances (climate, food

availability, social relations) as decisive in respect to the amount and timing of herding effort,

underlining again the flexibility needed in the distribution of workforce and knowledge:

“ Well, when we come in on the winter ranges there’s a lot to do- a lot of herding

to avoid mixing of herds and to keep the herd together on the way until they reach the set

grazing places. Then it’s a lot of herding. After that we keep the flock on the ranges that

we have. If it’s bad winter, then it’s more to do: they spread much more, trying to eat

lichen from the trees and so. Otherwise, it’s calm until April; in April-March we reach the

calving places and then it’s more to do, we have to be there all the time, they don’t spread

but we have to take care of the calves, or sometimes there are smaller flock spreading

from the main one.” (Herder 5)

3. Strategies and perceptions

The reindeer herding trade in Norway and especially in Finnmark appears as

unproductive in the managerial discourse: the income generated from meat production has not

exceeded the total expenses during the last 5 years. At the same time the total number of

animals slaughtered has decreased from ca. 88 000 in 1991/1992 to ca. 43 000 in 2000/2001

(the slaughtered percentages decreased from 39% to 25% in the same interval)

(Reindriftforvaltningen, 2001). Moreover, the weight of both the slaughtered and living

animals has significantly decreased during the last 5 years. The total stock reduced from the

peak of ca. 200 000 at 31 March 1989, to ca. 160 000, while in West Finnmark, the total

number of animals decreased from ca. 112 000 in 1989 to ca. 58 000 in 2001(ibid.).

These facts form the outline of the economic dimension of the crisis in the hegemonic

discourse (of the Administration). This is in turn coupled with the ecological model in order

to define the resource problem in Finnmark:

“As a consequence of the missing regulations and unclear arrangements, the industry

has been in a critical (resource) condition over the last years. At the same time, it seems

that the negative development of the lichen rangelands risks to generalise as showed by

43

the severe decrease in the number of reindeer” (Reindriftforvaltningen, 2001: p.3, my

translation).

In order to counteract this situation, the economic strategy of the State relies on three

meta-narratives: a) the proper (sustainable) balance between reindeer and pasture has to be

achieved by reducing the stocking level; b) the number of animals should be distributed

among herders so that the incomes generated allow the herders to sustain themselves from the

industry alone (full-time employment); c) the highest capital is achievable by a certain herd

composition and slaughtering scheme (less bulls, younger does, slaughtering calves, etc).

The first meta-narrative is illustrated by the models used in determining the optimum

number of reindeer and, on the other hand, by the economic framework used for achieving

that goal. The State has employed important economic efforts to stimulate the reduction of the

number of reindeer, combining a complex system of subsidies and enforced regulations

during the last 10-12 years. These regulations have had some varied effects: some herders

quitted the industry; others increased their herds (inner summer districts), yet others complied

with the requirements and maintained their herds relatively constant (outer summer districts).

This variability points at the different attitudes herders have vis-à-vis the policy of the State

and the influence of these attitudes in the evolution of the herding industry in the latest years.

Moreover, a detailed estimate of the opportunities and constraints of different groups of

herders might provide better answers regarding the evolution of resource exploitation in

Finnmark. Therefore, it’s important to show that while the reindeer stocks varied significantly

during the last decades, the grounds for this variation might be more complicated than a

univocally defined plant/herbivore relationship that fails to explain the big differences

between the development of the outer and inner districts:

0

25

50

75

100

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

Her

d si

ze (i

n th

ousa

nd)

Outer districts Inner districts

Figure 4: Comparative evolution of the size of summer herds between inner and outer summer districts (after Riseth, 2001)

44

Even if the Administration acknowledges that “the reasons for the increase (of

reindeer stocks) are complex”, it tries to connect it to “a better economy and increased

investment power, following the establishment of the (1978) Reindeer Agreement, and very

good prices for the reindeer meat” (Ims& Kosmo, 2001:16- my translation). These

circumstances fail to explain the significant differences between the two groups of herders:

the inner summer districts that could use intermittently the common autumn/spring ranges

increased their herds and diminished the autumn resources for the outer districts (confined to

islands and peninsulas during summer). Nor can the arguments above explain the equivalent

increase in Sweden, but the narrative continues by indicating that other influences have also

taken place, among which “good and stable pasture circumstances over a long time” and

presents a model that would explain the transformations. The model details the narrative of

the carrying capacity: the fully-grown lichen pastures can be partly overgrazed but “the art is

to stop when one range has, on average, has its highest (primary) production (of 60g/m2 per

year)” (ibid: p.15). In other words, the challenge is to stock at the economic carrying capacity,

i.e. the level that assures the highest amount of food on the ranges, that would in turn translate

into increased body weights and better reproductive success of the animals.

Reindeer StockLichen biomass

No. of reindeer

Lichen

.Time

30…110 years

Figure 5: Principle of the relation between number of reindeer and the standing lichen biomass (after Danell, 1998)

Nevertheless, the model fails to explain why the number of reindeer has always had

significant fluctuations, on a shorter time lag, with peaks and bottoms at various intervals.

This situation could not be easily explained by the status of the lichen ranges alone (as

showed previously, most of the lichens need more than ten years to recover from stress, in the

Stocking levelwith highestgrowth rate/highest yield

45

absence of trampling). These fluctuations are evident in Finnmark (see table 5.1 above),

Sweden (Danell, 1998) and Russia (Kryazhimskii& Danilov, 2000). Furthermore, the

explanation for the highest number of reindeer is that the herders reacted to the congenial

economic climate created in Norway. Yet, it fails to show why the number of animals reached

its peak at the same time (1989/1990) in Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Russia (ibid.). These

countries have completely different management systems (from settled reindeer ‘farms’ in

Finland to extensive nomadism in Russia), and economic circumstances (in Norway the State

subsidised heavily the acquisition of snow scooters, houses etc., in Russia the herds were the

property of the State, in Finland the herds are fed lichens inside the fences, etc.). At the same

time, the interval between the lowest and the highest stock levels of 1989/ 1990 was 10-15

years for the whole Fennoscandia. This is much shorter than the model would indicate and not

long enough to allow a transition from a completely overgrazed range to one with the highest

productivity if the trampling/ grazing would have been removed (see previous section).

On the other hand, the counter-narrative of the herders argues that it was the series of

‘good years’ that brought about this increase and conversely, that it was the (too) long series

of ‘bad years’ that contributed to the fall. Good years are defined in terms of good access to

winter pastures, lots of calves born and good summer pastures. We have seen above that all of

these factors can be, to a large extent influenced, if not determined by climatic factors, thus

contradicting the mainstream narrative that explains the increase in numbers by economic

power and the decrease by overgrazing.

A part of the same strategy encouraging de-stocking has been the subsidy programme.

There are various forms of subsidies and the rules upon which they were granted changed

significantly over time, today they are. Production subsidy requires slaughtering of at least 9.5

kg/reindeer in the spring herd; the goal is to adjust the stocking levels, improve quality of

production, improve and distribute uniformly income among herding units. Early slaughter

subsidy is a premium for slaughtering on the summer ranges or early on the autumn ranges in

order to reduce the pressure on the lichen ranges. Calf slaughter subsidy- with the goal to

stimulate the biggest possible productivity”- in Finnmark, where the production is

traditionally based on varit*, it is meant to increase the production and avoid the loss of

calves. District subsidy (gives economic resources for planning and solving issues important

for the district). The whole subsidy scheme is based on meeting the production requirements

and slaughtering scheme defined by the administration. Thus, one has to slaughter a certain

percentage of the flock or to give up herding (in 1996, a provision was introduced that allows

46

herders to ‘sell’ their herding units to the State and be paid at once 450 000 NOK**) in order

to be eligible for subsidy.

The narratives of the herders, by contrast, show that even when people have a series of

‘bad years’ and lose many animals, they don’t easily consider quitting, while the offer of the

State might seem to be more than tempting. They rather try to build up the herd and go

through a period of economic ‘recession’. The reasoning appears to be more detailed than the

one acknowledged by the managerial discourse. This attitude is motivated by a subjective

rationality, based not only on economic interest (as assumed by the Administration) but also

on identity as herder (‘it not just a job, it’s our lifestyle’) and ethnicity as a Saami.

In a recent study in Finnmark, Ulvevadet (2001) mentioned some of the reasons why

the elaborated subsidy programme of the Administration didn’t work. She argues that the fact

that the industry has increased the required costs in short time (for a house in the town/village,

snow scooters, four-wheel drive, gas, etc.) has made it to be dependent on a certain

productivity. Being a part of the industry is decided by the productivity and the ability of

paying back loans and meeting the necessary expenses. What makes this trade different, she

continues, is the importance of subjective elements like culture, tradition, identity and

ethnicity in the strategy the herders adopt, to the extent that “many are willing to ‘suffer’

economically in order to continue in the trade”. Her main conclusion is therefore: “money

counts, culture decides.” (p.116). We see herein that the narrative of economic sustainability

through stock reduction is not supported by either the perceptions of the herders or empirical

evidence.

The second and third meta-narratives of the hegemonic discourse (full-time

employment of herders; a certain herd composition and slaughtering scheme generating

highest income) are also reflected in the letter and the spirit of the subsidy provisions. Equally

relevant are the reactions of the herders during the last decade. From 1992 to 1995 the

programme was voluntary, and the subsidies were paid if the herder slaughtered a certain

percentage of the herd (in order to achieve the said goal of a size and structure fit for the

pasture capacity). At the same time the animals in a ‘poor condition’ (light) were to be

slaughtered, but as the requirements were too high, they had to be lowered; to little avail

though: the small-scale herders didn’t afford slaughtering, the larger herds grew still

(Ulvevadet, 2001). Between 1996 and 1999, the subsidies were cut for the herding units with

* (North-Saami): 1 ½ year old bull; see also Appendix 2** This provision applied only to the inner districts, as they were the ones perceived as inducing more stress uponthe lichen ranges.

47

more than 600 animals. The early slaughter and calf slaughter subsidies were stopped if the

production requirements were not met but granted upon slaughtering of a certain percentage

of does. This provision was not successful either: the smaller herders tried to follow (as they

needed more money), the larger ones had few incentives to do so (they earned more from the

living does-through progeny). Trying to change this situation, the State kept on subsidising

the districts that complied with the requirements (as a whole, not at the unit level) if they

delivered a slaughtering plan for all the herding units in the district. As not all of the herding

units agreed, the provision failed.

This situation led the Administration to conclude that the only choice was to enforce

the provisions from inside, and gave the District Boards (elected from among the herders)

more power in deciding the weight limits for age and gender categories of reindeer. This

seemed to shift the conflict to another arena and didn’t have any effect (ibid.). As a result the

Area Board was selected to reinforce it, to the same result. Today, the Administration

contemplates coercive measures in order to reduce the stocking levels of the units, yet the new

yearly Agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Norwegian Reindeer Herder

Association seems to give more power to the local divisions of the RHA. While this stand is a

clear sign of decentralisation, its practical effects are difficult to assess, as the distribution of

power among herders today is often uneven. Therefore, a mere distribution of power could

translate into further increase of the larger herds and the gradual exclusion of smaller herd

owners.

The fact that the herders were not attracted to leave the industry can be explained to an

important degree by their subjectivity: being a herder is connected to ethnicity, identity, self

esteem. The size of the herd is connected to a multi-layered economic strategy: if the

household has enough pasture and workforce to tend to the animals, if the are any children

that want to establish their own household soon and remove a part of the family herd, if the

herd is recovering from a series of bad events or not, if the internal consumption is met from

other sources, etc. (see next sections). Thus, the reduction of the herd size has to be placed in

an intricate web of opportunities and constraints.

Furthermore, if the herders think of their environment as a highly unpredictable one

(at least to some extent), the theory (Roe, 1999) and the experiences (Behnke et al., 1993)

show that they would keep their ranges always stocked at the highest controllable level that

would allow them to meet the hazards. Therefore, they would not easily reduce the stock.

Moreover, some of the provisions implied decisions that ran counter to important elements of

48

the Saami tradition: slaughtering calves was inconceivable in the beginning, and it is argued

(Paine, 1994) that nobody does it light-heartedly.

Concerning the work distribution, the narrative of the State tries to apply principles

from other industries. The goal is to have fully employed people that can make a living from

their labour, if this means ‘letting go’ some of the herders, it will happen for the betterment of

the community as a whole. The question is how does the State decide who is to stay and who

is to leave the industry. To this end, the official data points yet again at the low productivity

of the industry. Using man-years to estimate the labour employed during one year, the

idleness in the industry in Finnmark is defined. It is suggested that, while the profit clearly

decreased (as a result of increased costs and reduced income) from ca. 41 million NOK in

1980 to ca. 14 million in 1992, the workload almost doubled (Riseth, 2001) for the same

period. In other words the herders worked more and gained less.

Little is said though of the narrative of the herders, which points at the importance of

the timing of work. In the reindeer herding system one needs much more work in certain

periods (6 to 20 times more- see narratives), during the year, and that the distribution of

workforce can be very much influenced by exogenous conditions. For example, if the snow is

packed or frozen (as it has happened during the last decade) the animals strain and tend to

travel more in search for food. Migrations are instinct-driven so at the end of the winter, when

the impulse is to migrate northwards, the approach of a predator (and their numbers increased

significantly lately) or any other disturbance from the south can easily fright and spread the

herd (Herder 2). Furthermore if the pastures are ‘bad’ the herds are more prone to mixing, that

can lead to loss of animals or more work to separate them.

In this perspective, therefore, the amount of work comes second to its distribution in

space and time. Moreover, the kind of work required is different, and the skills of the workers

are differentiated in time. If in mid-winter one person can control a herd in an area with good

food and no predators, the situation is different in the spring when the herd is split and the

females led to the calving places, protected and provided with good ranges and tranquillity. In

order to use the workload as a reliable indicator of the welfare of the industry, one has to

define the unit of study. As the administrative system is superimposed on the traditional one,

the configuration of a given herd can differ a lot (a registered herding unit can consist of one

or more household herds, or be a part of a household herd along with other herding units). As

a result, both the estimates of workload and income, and the requirements for limits of the

number of animals at a certain time during the year, have to consider the structure of the unit

they address, and the circumstances in which it exists.

49

The narratives of the herders show that the division of labour is rather flexible and

permissive and uses different basic units: either the herding unit or the household unit

(baikidaohllo). The system of economic support employed by the State fails to acknowledge

this aspect. The requirements are made at the district level or/ and at the herding unit level,

leading to pitfalls in the policy and in turn to undesirable economic consequences (see section

D. Institutional Arrangements): increase in the numbers of animals, segregation of economic

power, various forms of externalities. Thus, herders were constrained to increase the size of

their herds to meet the higher expenses brought by the mechanised era (snow scooters, four-

wheel drives, semi-sedentarisation and thus more pending between the herd and home). This

change can be considered a natural evolution to a certain extent (as it would have probably

taken place, eventually). Yet, this change turned into an aggregate of externalities as a result

of the policy of subsidies encouraging mechanisation and the exclusion of the traditional

regulatory system without replacing it with a functional one. The use of mechanisation had

the effect of a technological externality, as it increased the productivity costs for the users of

other technologies, even more so as the access to winter pastures was ‘open’ de facto,

following the degradation of the customary access system (see next sections). Migration

turned into a race from the coastal summer ranges to the inland winter ones, in which the only

principle was the ‘first-come-first-served’. In this respect, a herder had to choose between

purchasing scooters and losing access to pasture. This brought about the need for more cash to

pay for maintenance of scooters and cars, fuel, etc. and from here the need to increase herd

size. And the cycle repeated. Moreover, the herds that have summer ranges closer to inland

(Inner districts) are able to pulse into the common autumn/spring lichen ranges and use and

degrade this resource at the expense of the others. As these herders have access to more

resources, they increase their herds (also as they are able to meet the requirements for meat

production and collect prizes from the State), pressure the others and appropriate more

resources on the winter ranges as well. Therein is the explanation for the difference in size

and production of the inner and outer. The size of the inner districts tripled from 1980 to 1990

and decreased to double by 1995, while their harvests increased slightly (Riseth 2001- see

above). In this context the evolution of the number of herding units and the number of persons

in these units seems to tell a better story:

50

050

100150200250300350

79/8

0

81/8

2

83/8

4

85/8

6

87/8

8

89/9

0

91/9

2

93/9

4

95/9

6

97/9

8

99/0

0

Herding years

Uni

ts

1050110011501200125013001350140014501500

Pers

ons

No. Of Herding Units No. Of Persons in herding units

Figure 6: Evolution of the number of herding units and persons involved in reindeerherding in West Finnmark (after Ims& Kosmo, 2001).

The number of persons involved in the industry has constantly increased since the

1980s, reaching its peak in the period with the most reindeer (1988/1990). Overall, the

number of persons involved increased, while the number of registered units decreased,

leading thus to a higher concentration of workforce for each unit. Even though, the details

about the distribution of these persons are not apparent from here, this configuration seems to

show both that it has become more difficult to establish a new registered unit and that the

demand for being a part of the industry has increased. This seems to confirm the position of

the herders claiming that their workforce more than meets their needs. At the same time the

decrease in the number of the herding units from 1993 to 1997 seems to be related to subsidy

policy of the State.

The analysis above points to a deeper gap between the discourses, one that stems from

two divergent ecological models (Westoby, 1989: 267). On the one hand, the refined tuning

of pastoralists to various sources of hazard, accepted and included in their strategies; on the

other hand, the attempt of the Administration to find the right constant balance between

pasture and animals in order to generate reliable income. This divergence is further explained

by the intricate social and institutional infrastructure of the traditional herding community

when compared to the present managerial discourses and practices.

51

C. SOCIAL ARENA

Robert Paine reporting (1994) about the Saami reindeer herders of the 1960’s,

suggested that they migrated simultaneously within a social landscape as well as in a

geographical one. The importance of social relations among the herders today has been

affirmed in many occasions. Yet, the profound changes undergone by the industry during the

last 40 years are reflected in the extent, importance and influence these relations have on

reindeer herding as a whole. In the following section I present some of the most important

narratives that defined the representations of the herders on forces that govern the social

dimension of the enterprise today.

1. Social coordinates for the siida’s

The discussion revolved around different potential sources of conflict related especially to

winter herding (mixing of herds, theft, etc.), and their intensity and circumstances. These

sources of conflicts represent important pressure forces in determining the strategy of the

herders for a shorter or longer perspective. At the same time, the allegedly increased tension

among herders provides the hegemonic discourse of the State with another argument for the

need of strict regulations. The herders have a different perception of the sources of conflicts

and their nature.

One potential source of conflict is the mixing of herds belonging to different siida’s either

during migration to or while on the common ranges. This event can lead to loss of animals*

and also serve as a power display among neighbour when done intentionally (Paine, 1970). In

any event, the herders try to avoid mixing, as it requires a considerable effort to remedy its

damage. The general feeling of the herders regarding the mixing of herds was that it wasn’t

significant for their groups:

(Q:“ Is there a lot of mixing on your winter range?”)

“ No, it’s not, not big. We haven’t had any mixing this winter (2001/2002), not at all.

And we haven’t missed any reindeer in mixing or theft either.”

(Herder 1)

Other herders place mixing of herds in a context of difficult climatic circumstances and

‘bad pastures’, frequent throughout the 1990’s:

* Usually unmarked animals, often calves (born in the spring and that are to be marked at the round-ups in theautumn)

52

“ Yes, it is- when the pastures are bad, then there is a lot of mixing. It’s been a lot of

those lately but the last two years have been very good pastures. But we haven’t lost any

reindeer; no. One just has to ask for separations- we plan it usually at least once every

winter, together. We get the reindeer in the fence and sort them out.” (Herder 4)

“ No, we don’t have any mixing. It’s only our herd the whole winter, starting in the

last days of November. It’s only the yearly separation we use. But sometimes, when the

pastures are really bad, we have more mixing.” (Herder 5)

The Saami herders have been documented to have a very sophisticated traditional system

of defining these conflicts (Paine, 1970). Thus, a strong distinction was made between mixing

of herds due to mistakes or bad weather and a deliberate belligerent act (big herders trying to

incorporate smaller herds in their migration and then claim possession of unmarked animals)

(ibid.). At the same time, what from an outsider’s perspective appeared as theft, had a

different meaning internally. If one’s neighbour would constantly trespass on one’s traditional

ranges without a reason, stealing a white doe in the spring would be a strong signal that the

act have been noticed and resented (ibid.). Nevertheless, these practices don’t seem so present

anymore in today’s herding, even though the refined way of interpreting potential conflictual

situations is illustrated by some of the narratives.

When talking about theft of animals and conflicts in general, the common position was

that these were not of much concern. Some of the herders contradict the representations of the

media that the conflicts on the ranges are a constant threat:

“ Not necessarily, there is not more theft now than it has always been. I mean you will

always have small ‘gangsters’ that break the laws. And that’s how it is everywhere, you

cannot find a society that doesn’t have them. When it happens, for instance when the

animals go farther towards roads, they are hunted from the car, shot and taken into the

car and no one can ever trace them again. But in winter we have better possibilities to

find them. If you take the winter months, half a year, it’s around 20% of the yearly losses

to theft, and the rest of 80% happens in summer. So we don’t have big losses to theft in

winter, normally. But it can be different, if the reindeer spreads and the weather is worse

then now over a very long time, then one can lose much more in winter, up to 80%.”

(Herder 1)

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This explanation of the conflicts as being related to climatic circumstances is supported by

most of the herders even when they admitted to have been affected more by theft and conflict

in general:

“ Yes, we’ve lost animals because of conflicts, a lot, before in time: hundreds, maybe a

thousand during the last 30 years. But lately, there hasn’t been any theft. It only happens

when the herds mix and one loses reindeer to another herd and doesn’t separate them as

soon as one maybe should.” (Herder 3)

An important part of the arguments focused on explaining the circumstance of potential

conflicts that can lead to loss of animals, how these can influence social relations in general.

These explanations are critical to the fact that today the State regulates the number of herders

by issuing permits to become a herder and that this has probably allowed for more herders

than there would be if selection were based solely on competence or in the absence of

subsidies (see details in section D. Institutional Arrangements). This situation has in turn lead

to a different distribution of resources on the common ranges:

“ We haven’t had many conflicts lately, and the reason is that there are not so

many animals. Had it been more animals, it would be more mixing ‘cause the density

is much higher in Inner Finnmark in winter. That’s one of the reasons, that we don’t

have much mixing. (Q: Do you think there are more conflicts now than in the past?)

Eh... there are more people now. We have never had so many herders in West

Finnmark before. More people...more things that can go wrong. And it’s like that

everywhere in the world: more people, more problems, both among them and with the

outside society. For today, without so many reindeer, we have a good relation with

the neighbours- but if the number increases, to the double for instance, then we’d get

twice as many problems”. (Herder 1)

Furthermore, the conflicts are related to the newer forms of management, touching a very

important point in describing the influence of institutional arrangements on social relations:

“ There is a bit of conflict. The number hasn’t increased, but there are going to be

conflicts as long as it is ‘common pasture’. But as for today, it’s not common; they

just call it that... The conflicts started in the 1980’s and 1990’s, when the concept of

‘common pasture’ was introduced: since then it was common, so anybody could

graze anywhere they wanted. (Herder 2 –my emphasis)

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We see herein that the herders maintain that mixing of herds and conflicts in general are

influenced by various practical circumstances: if the pastures are bad or the density of the

animals/ groups increases, so does the number of conflicts. Some of these conflicts are

avoided by the use customary migration patterns, when these patterns are still in place,

conferred legitimacy through practice and adherence:

“ No, I don’t think the conflicts have increased in the last years, at least not in our

area. People have kept to their own traditional pastures, so it’s been less and lees

mixing of herds. If the conflicts lead to a tensed situation, I can’t answer this

properly: there are many different kinds of conflicts, it can be that one has a

disagreement with somebody (about pasture), but when one comes almost illegally

there, when one has no pasture area there, the situation is more tensed. But this

hasn’t happened to us- they all keep to their own areas and when they move, they

overnight 1-2 days on somebody else’s pastures.” (Herder 4)

2. Mobility in the social landscape

Among the opportunities a herder has in his/her decision-making, an important aspect

is the possibility of changing the group of herders one works with. The reason for this shift

could be twofold: either the resources are better in an area used by a different siida or the

composition of the siida (in terms of herders and their social relations or herds and their size)

would bring about advantages. Due to the profound changes of the last decades, the decision

of shifting the group seems almost impossible today. Thus, the new group to be joined has to

have pasture available. The new comer has to have strong kinship ties to the group to be

joined and represent an asset for the other herders and most importantly, the move has to be

approved by the Herding Administration (at the Regional Board level).

In this context, the narratives of the herders illustrate their opportunities of mobility

among different groups of herders and of establishing their own independent herding unit as

very limited:

“No, I don’t have this possibility. You know, it’s too little pasture and too

many reindeer, so there is no possibility for moving, so we have to keep to what

we’ve been given. It hasn’t happened in my siida.” (Herder 3)

55

Moving to another siida is not inexistent, though. Two herders said it had happened in

their siida’s and one of them would have this opportunity if he wanted to:

“Yes, I have this opportunity, it’s normal to think about it especially if they have

a bit better winter pastures. It has happened, some years ago, and 3 years ago we

were in another siida, or they were in ours. It can be relevant if one gets married,

then it can be normal to move. Or if some would use the pastures collectively and

not necessarily based on kinship... This is decided by people, there are not some

decided relationships ‘forever’.” (Herder 1)

Given its difficulty, this kind of mobility can be replaced by other forms of flexibility.

All of the herders agreed upon flexible territoriality as one of these strategies:

“If for instance I have pasture here and it’s bad-‘locked’ with ice and the animals

don’t manage to come down to it- then I can loan a bit of pasture from the neighbour if he

(siida) has good pastures. And get to use it until mine’s good again. This is the way it has

worked for hundreds of years.” (Herder 3)

This position is reiterated in the discussion regarding the customary borders of the

winter range and the way they function. Most of the herders agreed that these borders are well

defined and that they are functional today, even if they are ‘fluid’ to some extent:

“ The traditional borders are stable throughout the winter. They don’t fluctuate as

long as there are good pastures; just if there are bad pastures one moves maybe to a

place where a neighbour should have grazed (his animals).” (Herder 3)

The traditional territoriality seems to have lead to loss of access to winter ranges for

the weaker actors, as a consequence of new provisions regarding the rule-in-use:

“ Yes, the customary borders are set. It was later, with the concept of ‘common

pasture’ that the traditional borders were no longer important, then it was ‘common’, there

was a possibility (to ignore them). But these borders are set; they don’t change. I have lost

access to some of my winter range, and neighbours use it now; more than half of it. We have

the least reindeer there so I guess it’s ok (enough) for us for today, maybe a little too small

and that’s because it’s common.” (Herder 2)

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This perspective of traditional borders being discarded by the present laws is

underlined by most of the herders. They maintained that the law created the opportunity for

the customs and the way they were reinforced, to be ignored and deprived of practical power:

“You know, in winter, the law doesn’t say anything else. If it had said that you

have your own traditional winter pasture siida borders, the case would have been great.

You could follow the law and if your borders were trespassed you could complain. There

would have been fewer bandits in Inner Finnmark.

For instance, 50 years ago, we had maybe 40 siida’s, while now they are 60. If

you ask about all the 60 siida’s, I have to say they have clear borders. But then you have

to belong to one of these 40 old traditional siida’s, from 50-60 years ago. If your siida

stems from these old ones, your borders are clear. If you divide your siida into two herds

you have to use the same area, but if you choose to use another area, then it’s illegal. And

that’s what some have done- moved out of their areas and started using other areas.”

(Herder 1)

One other important aspect is the existence of agreements between siida’s in case of a

crisis, with poor quality pastures over a long time. Even if the agreements are rarely identified

as such and formalised, the practice of grazing outside the traditional range is accepted

implicitly:

“ No, we don’t have any agreements. It’s automatic; one can use them (other areas).

It can happen that one tries to keep his borders fixed- it doesn’t work. You have to accept that

other herders come into your area, but that’s just for a few days or like overnight. This is the

custom.” (Herder 4)

“ No, there are no agreements. For instance in 1997, we could graze in other areas. It

wasn’t any deal; there was nobody who opposed it. Every siida moved where they could find

pastures in the neighbouring areas and just used it. But this only happens in the worst years,

with ‘locked’ pastures.” (Herder 5)

The herders state that customary borders of the winter ranges for each siida are still

recognised and that these borders are flexible, in order to allow a distributions of resources

among neighbours according to climatic variability. By comparison, the present provisions

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enforcing a ‘common range’ influence negatively the extent to which these borders are

functional, and deprive the system of sanction opportunities against non-compliants.

3. Social networks and their limitations

“Humanity is mediating the relation between land and animals, while the paradigm

adopted by conventional quantitative-oriented science presupposes a social vacuum where

the only relation of interest is the one between animals and pasture” (Bjørklund 1990:76).

3.1.Conflict resolution: perceptions

The narratives of the herders define two dimensions of the social landscape for

reindeer herding. On the one hand they portray the social interactions as a detailed response of

the multileveled variability faced by herding, on the other hand they relate these interactions

to the limitations imposed by the administrative regulations.

Mixing of herds is a conflictual situation the herders try to avoid. In the event a herder

can lose an important number of animals (especially if they are unmarked). The mixing of

herds can be perceived as a conflict-generating situation or as normal according to its

circumstances. Paine (1994: p.65) gives one example: one of the herds is rumoured to have

2000 strayed animals in their ranks when approaching the autumn ranges. The situation seems

acceptable for the rest of the herders as the mentioned herd is “ the last to leave the summer

pastures, it therefore follows that the strays they bring with them are the animals that got left

behind from the herds that moved earlier, and these animals will be retrieved later.” This

description concurs with the narrative of the herders, pointing at the fact that perceptions of

conflicts and the situations leading to them are different between herders and the

Administration.

Furthermore, mixing of herds is always related to climatic conditions. Thus, when the

pastures ‘are really bad’ it leads to more mixing. The number of conflicts can be influenced

by the number of reindeer on one range at a given time, and more importantly, by their

distribution in herds. More animals lead to increased density and more interaction between

herds. If these animals are distributed in more herds, each with different interests and

strategies, more conflicts can arise. We noticed in the previous section that during 1988-1992,

the number of officially registered herding units increased disproportional in relation to the

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number of persons involved in herding in Finnmark. This has contributed to the fragmentation

of the interests of the herders. By introducing individual legal permits for using the common

ranges, the herders didn’t need the approval of the community at large and could pursue their

own interests.

The very same period is pointed at in the narrative of the Administration: there are

many more conflicts now as a result of the increased number of animals, pointing at the need

of stronger regulation. This is used as another argument defining the ‘crisis’ narrative and

points at the need for stronger regulation. By the end of 1980’s, using data from the RHA the

media recreated the crisis narrative by presenting that about 20 000 animals were reported

missing (n.b. not dead!) every year and made the fact news-worthy in the headline: “Reindeer

Valued at 33 Million Kroner Become Food for Crows” (Paine, 1994:173). This served on the

one hand to sustain the narrative: too few animals are slaughtered, the herds are too large for

the pastures, thus the animals are weaker, especially the calves and the old cows, so they die.

On the other hand the Administration maintained that most of the animals are stolen and that

this is common knowledge among herders (ibid.).

The opinions of the herders seem to contradict this approach. They argue that it is

normal to have some conflicts, is a part of the herding and of any other society, and it’s

influenced by other circumstances as well. In this respect, the differences in perception can

have unsettling consequences. As Paine explains: for an outsider the “system of an anarchic

society (without any coordinating and binding authority)” is likely puzzling and the practice

of “reindeer rustling” is condemned as unacceptable, while for the herders it might be a

source of sanction among herders. From the herders’ perspective, rustling is explained as

normal: according to their logic, while each tries to fill their pasture, they attempt to reduce

encroachment into their ranges by the neighbouring siida’s so they take animals that come

their way, and the number is “nothing extraordinary”(ibid.).

Of great significance are the details of this analysis concerning the number of herders

that accept this situation, the causes of losses, and the kind of animals that are lost. Paine

points at three possible causes that bring about more stealing: crowding (there are more

animals, herds and pastoralists) makes herd control more difficult (making rustling easier) and

reinforces a stronger territorial motivation. Second the increased difficulty of getting started

as a young herder (more about this in the following), and finally the pressure monetary

economy places on individuals for a supply of cash. In addition, among the herders, there are

winners and losers, and those that are more prone to losing are the larger herders and even

more so those who don’t have enough control over their herd. To this end, rustling is a

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detailed mechanism of redistribution of resources, through an ‘informal economic system’

(ibid: 175), contributing to an adjustment of the power relations among pastoralists.

2. Erosion of customary power:

With modernisation of the industry the herders became more mobile. They needed less

information about the status of their herds and of the neighbouring ones. A more

individualistic behaviour emerged. At the same time, the traditional system of dividing the

ranges was being changed by the provisions of the new laws. The pastures were termed

‘common’ and the old regime regulating their use was ignored by the legal provisions,

without being replaced by another regime. This, in turn lead to a situation closer to ‘open

competition’, in which the rules have been removed. This competition was increased even

more by the escalating need for cash (more about this in the next section) and the increased

number of herders involved.

In this context the narratives of my interviewees are important. According to them, the

conflicts are a result of the introduction of the new provisions- “then it was common, so

anybody could graze anywhere they wanted”. It was thus removed the practical power of the

old regime, leading to an unproductive environment, in which herders focused on defending

their territories through pressure. In the process, some extended pressure to areas they didn’t

have any rights to: “if the institutional matrix rewards piracy (or more generally redistributive

activities) more than productive activity then learning will take the form of learning to be

better pirates” (North, 2000).

The extent to which the 1933 Act and the 1978 Law contributed to change in

institutional arrangements will be discussed shortly. Here, I mention only that the law of

1978, in effect today, stipulates the following regarding the common ranges:

“Furthermore, the Reindeer Herding Board can undertake division of the traditional

common spring, autumn and winter ranges in Finnmark, where the exploitation has

followed traditional patterns. There can also be decided grazing schedules, weight limits

for reindeer and/or the highest number of reindeer for the new districts” (Article1, § 2).

Nothing is mentioned about the criteria on which these decisions (division of ranges, grazing

schedules, etc.) are to be based on. Thus, the use of ranges, and the decisions regarding

productive parameters are placed under the authority of the central Board.

In the same context, the narratives referring to the mobility between different herding

groups (siida’s) describe an important source of flexibility in management. This practice

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allows herders to adjust the size of a herd to the resources available in terms of pasture,

workforce and knowledge at any given time. This was reflected traditionally in the frequent

regrouping of siida partners (siidaguoibmi) determining the number of siida’s to fluctuate

between different seasons and years (Sara, 2001). At the same time the development in terms

of size of herd and competent personnel are important in influencing regrouping: a broader

choice of possible siida partners gives better opportunities in providing the best conditions for

the animals (ibid: 96). These flexible arrangements also give the opportunity to improve co-

operation between the partners in each siida. No kinship tie is decisive in forming the groups:

“ even a father who wants to have his sons as his partners cannot bind them; all he can do is to

make it attractive enough for them (…) to stay. In other words, father and married son have

contractual relations like those between any other two partners.” (Paine, 1970: 56)

Even if the network of herders and their belonging to a certain siida is rather a

“strategic merit” (ibid.), the kinship ties still influence this distribution as they provide access

to the industry. Being recognised as a reindeer herder is “on the one side the outcome of long

term social negotiations and adaptive trials from the part of the herders. On the other hand, it

is the result of reindeer managing to properly settle in during a long trial period.”

(Bjørklund& Brantenberg, 1981:35).

We see herein reflected the narratives of the interviewees: the formation of siidas and

mobility between them is influenced by kinship but determined by other ecological and social

factors. More, these relations are flexible in time, there is no set duration for their survival:

“there are no relations ‘forever’” (herder 1). This is an important tool for tuning the social and

economic requirements to the ecological opportunities and constraints: the range, the

territoriality of the reindeer (if the territory is shifted often, one can totally miss control over

the herd- Sara, 2001:98), etc. Thus, the balance between flexibility and territorial stability is

traditionally carefully weighed and adjusted to the specific needs of the household.

During the recent years, this intricate system of managing the work force and

knowledge has gradually been replaced by the management apparatus. First the State decides

who is allowed to practice reindeer herding. While the Act of 1933 gave the right to be a ‘full-

time herder’ in Finnmark exclusively to Saami, the law of 1978 stipulated that only Saami

who had herding as their main line of work, or those descending from this kind of herders

were allowed to practice herding here (§ 3). This requirement applied not only to the full-time

herders but also to those who would want to own a few reindeer (as ‘whining reindeer’). So,

any herder who didn’t manage to prove that his/her father or grandfather had been full-time

herder could not get access into the industry. This proof is hampered both by the technical

61

difficulty (lack of written records or census) and by the ambiguity of the term ‘full-time

herder’ (a more accurate translation would be ‘which has had reindeer herding as main

sustenance’, but no other details were given as to how to decide this). As a consequence, the

provisions were met with a general disenchantment and felt as unjust.

In addition, the Law of Reindeer Herding from 1978 (NOU 35: 2001- 6.2.6)

introduced the provision that every reindeer has to belong to a certain herding unit

(driftsenhet). The right to own a herding unit was to be given to people of Saami descent

“who have reindeer herding as profession and main activity”. A herding unit can consist of

many herders but only one of them is considered the legal holder of the unit. The spirit of the

provision was that only the legally responsible herders were to be considered professionals

while the other owners of reindeer in each herding unit were relatives of the above and “don’t

practice themselves reindeer herding as a self-sufficient enterprise” (Article 4, second

paragraph). According to the same law, the establishment of new herding units has to be

approved by the Area Board (Division of Reindeer Herding Administration). Neither this law

nor its predecessor (from 1933) mention any criteria for assessing an application for the

establishment of a new herding unit, the decision being left to the free interpretation of the

authorities (NOU 35:2001-6.2.7).

We see therefore that the decision as to who is allowed to own reindeer, the

independence of the individual herders (now related to owning a herding unit) and how to

organise themselves was to a large extent removed from the traditional system and replaced

with a rigid system similar to other industries. The new system failed to acknowledge the

need for flexibility in using the pastures (it is now more difficult to move across groups, at

least for the majority of the herders) according to highly variable sets of circumstances

(climatic, productive, etc.). At the same time, it limited entrance into the industry conceding it

based on subjective criteria (the herders are in minority in the Regional Boards, the body that

grants access into the industry- see Appendix 1). Thus, the traditional system of trial-and-

error, that assessed the ecological impact of a new herd in a given area over a long period,

was discarded. This decision was again related to the narrative of a stable carrying capacity of

the range in question, without any regard to the discourse of the herders.

Finally, the herders explain more thoroughly the customary ways of defining and

reinforcing territoriality on the winter ranges. According to their discourse, the customary

borders on the winter range were very well defined and known, yet flexible. The herders

define their traditional territory in relation to exogenous factors that reduce predictability and

thus require a degree of flexibility in herding. The instability can be induced by climate- mild

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weather followed by frost, strong winds- or by herding practices (herds trampling and packing

the snow). In this case, the borders are regarded as permissive rather that exclusive and one

can take the animals on somebody else’s range for a short period, without previous

agreements if the action is motivated by a critical situation- the more critical the

circumstances, the more fluid the borders.

Herein is restated the importance of flexibility in herding, allowing the herders to cope

with the vagaries of climate. At all times the budget of opportunities and constraints in which

decisions are taken has to be relatively stable. The stricter the limits imposed by nature, the

more permissive the limits imposed by territoriality need to be. Furthermore, the flexibility of

the traditional borders is also dictated by the balance between the number of animals and the

size of the range. Even if one feels he lost some of his traditional ranges to the neighbours, as

long as he doesn’t need it (i.e. he doesn’t have enough reindeer to use all of it) for the time

being, the case is not a source of tension. Even more so, these practices are conferred

legitimacy through the ‘hundreds of years’ of practice, as part of the tradition.

This system often seems ‘at odds’ with a modern form of territoriality reinforced

throughout the western world: that of nation state. This ‘modern’ territoriality has been taken

for granted within international relations. Its distinctive feature is that it is formed by

“territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states” (Forrest,

1998: 15), with exact boundaries, codified by international law and enforced by the principle

of sovereignty. On the other hand, pre-modern territoriality is defined by rough divisions

through frontier areas (ibid.) where there is not one territoriality but many, with a multitude of

expressions, based on non-exclusivity, mobility and flexibility.

For the Saami, this form of flexible territoriality is manifested in different aspects

regarding resource use, rooted in the practice of nomadism, prior to the emergence of reindeer

herding. This is illustrated by division of fishing rights in the lakes on Finnmarksvidda

(timing, species and quantities allowed to be harvested by specific groups of Saami-NOU 35:

2001), or the existence of “residual rights” (Saami that now lived in Sweden still had right to

fish in the area without being considered trespassers) (Odner, 1992: 91). In the same line, the

pastoral siida system acts to regulate access to pasture among groups of herders. It reserves

most of the pastures for its members divided along a complex seasonal migration and

allocated in relation to the size of individual herd, while at the same time allows access to

herds from neighbouring siida’s when their pasture is insufficient. In this respect, the position

of the herders runs counter to exclusive borders advocated by the State as the solution to

degradation. While an increasing number of herders today express the need of predictability

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in access to ranges, some even arguing for a formalised private tenure of the common ranges,

this situation needs more attention.

Figure 7: Traditional borders of the winter siida’s in the 1960’s (after Paine, 1994)

In the following section I address the aspect of tenure arrangements and the

motivation behind the need for change. In many cases (Galilea, 1998; Férnandez-Giménez,

2002) the request for a change in tenure system from common to private property is motivated

by the corrosion of the institutions that regulate the use of resources. In Finnmark the

traditional rules and norms translated into sophisticated tenure arrangements. The failure to

acknowledge these strong influences led to a gradual replacement of the traditional

institutions for resource allocation with a rigid bureaucratic system that divested herders of

decision power and control over resources, contributing to resource degradation.

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D. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

This is the final section outlining the discourse of the herders related to the

opportunities and constraints that define their working environment. The discussion touched

upon three main parts: the customary institutions/ sets of rules and norms that regulate

interactions, divide resources and apply sanctions; the official administrative institutions -

their role and efficiency; the effects of the present and future regulations on the security of the

herders. This distinction is rather artificial as the concepts were entangled in the narrative

threads of the herders, but helps pointing out the sets of rules-in-use and their perception.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines institution as a society or organisation set up

for the promotion of scientific, education, or other public objective. In a broader acceptance,

institutions are more than that: they embody the cultural norms, beliefs, traditions and

ideologies that facilitate the rationalisation of the world around us (North, 2000). For the

purpose of the present discussion, institutions are regarded as ‘the rules in use’ (Ostrom et al.,

1994) regulating the management of the common ranges in Finnmark.

The term common-pool resources (CPR’s in the following) refers to a particular class

of goods characterised by two features: (1) it is difficult (costly) to exclude individuals from

using the resource through either physical barriers or legal instruments and (2) the benefits

consumed by one user subtract from the benefits available to the others (Ostrom, 1994:6).

Another related term, often used interchangeably with the CPR, is common property regime:

it defines the system (regime) that controls access and appropriation from a common pool

resource, the institutional arrangement, the sum-total of the ‘rules in use’. This regime allows

the members of a clearly demarcated group the legal right to exclude those who are not

members of that group from using the resource (ibid.). Here, the CPR’s are the common

lichen ranges (Autumn/Spring and Winter) while the Common property regime is defined by

the rules (formal) and norms (informal) that regulate the use of these ranges.

1. Customs on the winter ranges

While the summer ranges in Finnmark are distributed to individual siida’s, the rest of

the ranges (including the winter areas) are managed as a common pool resource. Extensive

literature has documented customary rules and informal institutional arrangements for the

management of the ranges in the north of Fennoscandia (Beach, 1981; Bjørklund, 1990;

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Paine, 1970, 1994) before the northern States introduced the new rules and laws. If these old

customary rules of management are still in place and how efficient and legitimate are they is a

matter of great interest in order to understand the realities of the herders.

When asked to identify the most important customary rules that have to be respected

on the winter ranges in relation to other siida’s and internal for each siida, most of the herders

referred to the customary borders of the ranges and the migration routes. They identified the

respect for customary territoriality as indispensable for reindeer herding:

“ One has to respect the neighbours (siida’s) and the others. And we have the

borders that have been set up through generations- you have to have respect for those. If

you don’t, then you break the borders and this leads to problems.” (Herder 2)

This is also evident in the use of pastures during seasonal migrations in order to limit

degradation of the ranges through trampling or consumption:

“ There are no rules for this, but if we’re talking about moral rules, you must

decide it yourself where to graze your animals so that others can graze too, maybe they

come long afterwards. So if you move early on the autumn ranges, you can graze along

the rivers or on lake shores so that the animals don’t take too much from the area and

those that come afterwards can go straight to the lichen beds. This way there are not so

many conflicts.” (Herder 3)

Despite the narratives describing these customs as a vivid part of today’s herding, the

herders seemed to agree that the customs don’t have sanction power, nor do they play a

significant role in mediating conflicts. This situation seemed to be related to the intrusions of

the newer managerial provisions:

“ We try to use the customary rules, but if they work I can’t say. There are no

possibilities for sanction at all (Q: What do you think decides the management?) Today

there is no management, really. This area it’s like a ‘free’ area: the district boards

concern only the summer ranges, the plans of the districts are juridical, and they are

obligatory (only for summer ranges).”(Herder 2)

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Furthermore, this position is reiterated in respect to the forces that mange the herding

today. Even though the new regulation system is employed, it lacks sanction power and

legitimacy:

“ There are no sanctioning possibilities. It’s not managed according to the old

Saami customs. It hasn’t been, it hasn’t been practised, you know. It’s the law that says

something quite different, so then one has to manage not against the law but with the law,

and the law says that this is common pasture. So we manage it like a common pasture.

The case is quite clear: the old Saami customs haven’t been accepted by the Authorities

(...)” (Herder 1)

The narratives of the herders focused on the respect for customary rules and possible

influences on the decisions to respect these rules. The adherence to the customs is

differentiated among the herders, even if most of them are perceived as respecting them.

Moreover, there is a fine line between adherence and rule- breaking. Thus, if one has more

animals, it’s normal that he/she needs more pasture but this has to receive the tacit approval of

neighbours, failing to do so places the herder outside the moral obligation. The situation is

further complicated by the evolution of the goals and constraints of the herders. While in the

past the growth of a herd was limited by a complex system of reciprocal checks from the

neighbours, today this limit is removed:

“Yes, I think there is a connection between size of herd and respecting customary

borders. When one has many animals, one has to keep away from the moral, old Saami

customs. One has too many reindeer to be able to keep within his traditional area. So one

has to use the area of somebody else. That’s the consequence. When it’s the reindeer who

has to have the best conditions, one doesn’t care about morals and customs, when the

goal is producing reindeer meat ” (Herder 1)

The present situation is further detailed in this respect and explained in a time frame:

“Yes, I think there is a connection: because there’s fight over pastures,

competition. If there are more people in a group, they have more power, one can say that

it’s the right of the strongest that prevails. It has been like this since the end of the 1980’s

and the beginning of the 1990’s, until today ” (Herder 2)

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The narratives underline that acquiring access to resources through increased pressure

on neighbouring herds is not accepted as normal behaviour even if this behaviour might be

spread, it is resented:

“Yes, I think the bigger siida’s have bigger ranges but I don’t think they have

possibility to push more if they are bigger. It hasn’t been possible to take from the areas

of others; they have their own areas. Even if the borders are not entirely fixed, you know

yourself what is yours.” (Herder 5)

The idea of antagonistic forces pressing the herds against each other in the order to

allocate the pastures is further explained. The apparent contradiction with the statements

above seems to be explained by the details of implicit local arrangements between

neighbours:

“Well, it’s so that bigger herds need more space. Those who don’t have it (a big

herd), they need less place. It cannot be so that 100 reindeers can keep a very large area

just because the tradition has to be respected (...) One can use a bigger herd as an

‘argument’, the bigger herds that can override others, but I don’t think there’s connection

to the respect for customs. So it is that one has to share it; it has always been so in

traditional herding that one has to see where the others graze- if one grazes there, we

have to graze the other way.” (Herder 4)

While the narratives seem to acknowledge the lack of sanction opportunities against

the trespassers of customary rules, they argue for the need of flexible allocation of resources

based on traditional borders of the siida’s but attuned to the distribution of animals on the

ranges. In this respect, the attempts to introduce a formalised rigid tenure system similar to

that employed for the summer ranges appear misplaced in the realities advocated by the

herders.

2. The role of the Reindeer Herding Administration

An important part of the discussion revolved around the role of the Reindeer Herding

Administration and its opportunities to regulate the use of resources. Of no less significance

was the question of how legitimate are the decisions of the Administration from the

perspective of the herders. One common stance of the herders was that the present system

lacks monitoring and sanctioning power.

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“The District Boards for today concern only the summer ranges, there is no

authority on the winter ranges. We’ve tried to complain to the Common Range District

Board* sometimes but they have no authority, they can only urge the herders to have

respect for each other (...) As long as it’s ‘common’ range, there will be ‘grey areas’ and

people who try to get more than they actually have.” (Herder 2)

This situation is further related to the fact that the Administration lacks insight into

the detailed local problems and that this hampers management.

“I think they have opportunities to regulate but it has to be so that the herders in

each district plan the management themselves. Those who are not herders and don’t know

the area, they cannot decide how many reindeer can be within an area. It’s the herders

who have to decide that, and they’d do it properly” (Herder 4)

Moreover, the herders relate the failures of the managerial system to the lack of moral

support, legitimacy from the part of the herders, as the Administration is just a bureaucratic

body.

“They are the supreme authority, they have their own rules that they use about the

herding rights. Now, in last years we had 2000 reindeer which we were allowed to have on

our range, but now they have cut it down to 1400, so they have taken away 600. I guess the

Board doesn’t always lead the industry in the smartest way. Most of the herders distrust the

Administration; it should only be the Regional Board that steers and the herders themselves

to be represented, because they have the understanding and insight needed. This is a totally

unnecessary apparatus decided by the State.” (Herder 3)

This position is further explained as the narratives show the herders oppose more the

decisions affecting their individuality and self-determination rather than the position of the

State as a supervising body.

“Such is the case that no one wants to reduce the number of animals, it’s the

responsibility of the State. And it’s true that there are so many people in the industry, too

many people. But they (the Sate, through RHA) shouldn’t come further in and try to

regulate the number. If we have to reduce the number, it’s a question from the part of the

herders: if we reduce the number or quit herding, what does the State offer us? There are

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a lot of us that think: we can cut down the number if we get (paid) a bit more for the meat,

for example. But for today, they just drag taxes.” (Herder 4)

The narrative is further refined in respect to different groups of actors. Thus owners of

larger herds would have an incentive to support the policy of the State: on the one hand it

allows them unrestricted access to resources (through the “common use” of pastures). On the

other hand, it bolsters their interests through culling: the stock reduction is demanded at the

summer district level. Thus, if the summer herd has to reduce the herd by a certain number of

animals, this number is not proportionally divided among household herds (every herd has to

reduce by the same number) impacting more on smaller herds:

“I think the districts which have bigger number of animals support them (the

Administration), and those which have smaller numbers or have to reduce their numbers,

don’t support them. For instance, in our district, if we have to cut down with 50%, it can

be difficult. It has to be another way, not just the number of reindeer that decides. If they

say that all the animals have to produce so many and so many kilos, everybody knows

that that’s the goal, and then they would get more support. If they just say that it’s so

many reindeer that are allowed within one district, not that they have to produce so much,

that can lead to problems.” (Herder 5)

While these positions can be seen as a result of cultural manifestations for the

need of independence and individuality (central in the Saami tradition), they also show

the opportunities for improving the management system by devolving power to the local

levels, thus providing both legitimacy and insight.

3. Security in using the winter ranges

The way the institutions work in practice, the extent to which they manage to secure a

sustainable use of pastures and a swift and effective control is the topic addressed in the

following. This point is essential in understanding the strategies of the herders: throughout the

pastoralist societies, increasing the size of the herd acts as an insurance against various forms

of insecurity (Roe, 1999). If resource accessibility is uncertain due to both climatic

fluctuations and weak tenure rights, the incentives to increase the size of the herd are doubled,

even more so if the possibility of sanctioning trespassers is cumbersome or unattainable.

* See below and Appendix 1

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In this context, the narratives of the herders pointed at the need for security in

accessing the resources. The majority of the herders revealed that they felt secure in the use of

their winter ranges, arguing that the customary range borders are clearly defined and that if

used constantly, this confers a certain security:

(Q: “ Do you feel safe/ secure in using the winter range within your siida’s

customary borders?”)

“ Yes, we have grazed in the same area for 20 years now. I think the borders are

clearly defined geographically, but one also has to use his range: you cannot just say

‘this is our area’, otherwise (if not used) one can lose area. The case with the winter

pastures is so that one cannot live in Troms or in East Finnmark and say this is my

traditional range (in West Finnmark), it doesn’t work like that.” (Herder 4)

The particular herder has traditional ranges in the middle zone, closer to the autumn/

spring pastures and has to allow a large number of herds to pass through his territory to-and-

fro the winter ranges farther inland. This location has the potential to generate conflicts and

possibly loss of pasture, especially given that his herd (400 animals) had rather limited

potential for pressing away the neighbours. Moreover, herders from the eastern and western

zones, with larger herds, seem to agree with this position:

“ I feel safe, there hasn’t been anybody else in the area we use. The borders are quite

clear and the changes are not so big.” (Herder 5)

Nevertheless, a minority of the herders stated that they didn’t feel secure at all, even if

the borders were clear, their experiences pointed to the fact that at least in some cases they

were not respected:

“ No, not with the present laws and rules. One is absolutely not safe. No, no! Write

many ‘No’s!” back there!” (Herder 1)

This position is further detailed by another herder who experienced loss in access to

some of his traditional range and had a small herd (150 animals):

“ No, I don’t feel safe, absolutely not! Even if the borders are clearly defined as they are

inherited traditionally.” (Herder 2)

The arguments were further detailed when discussing the sanctions that were

applicable in order to enforce a certain conduct (conforming to customs or administrative

rules). Most of the herders expressed a need for sanction opportunities and proposed different

contexts in which these sanctions to be enforced. These contexts formed a hierarchy in which

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the Administration should be involved only as the last solution, or as a consultative body. The

herders can and should solve their problems internally and only when this option is exhausted,

they should turn to a public force.

“It should be the herders themselves, have such a Board, like the ones on the

summer pastures. We need a management, preferably from people inside the industry who

know the ways. In the worst case the police.” (Herder 2)

This position seems to be resented by some of the herders associating sanction with an

illegitimate force outside the herding community:

“No, I don’t think there should be sanctions. I think it’s necessary that the siida’s

get the opportunity to cooperate concerning their borders themselves. To enforce

sanctions, it has to be the police who shepherds the herders and the herders who

shepherd the reindeer...I don’t think that’s necessary...!” (Herder 4)

This position was further maintained in respect to measures of ensuring the feeling of

security in using the winter ranges. The herders agreed that in order to feel secure they needed

more predictable access to winter pastures, enforced by an officially recognised division of

the winter range:

“It has to be predictable winter resource, (and) winter range borders. No matter if

it’s customary borders or management borders, they have to be predictable, that don’t

take from the others. They have to be (made) public, these management borders or private

siida borders.” (Herder 1)

4. The future laws and regulations

At this point, the discussion shifted to connect the opinions and attitudes of the herders

with the present work on institutional change in the use of common ranges. As stated before,

the State employed a rather impressive effort (in terms of time, money and people involved)

in the work for a better management act for the reindeer herding. The herders were familiar

with the progress of the proposal and it’s main suggestions. Some of these suggestions

referred to a division of the common ranges and an administrative system similar to the one

functioning on the summer ranges: a system of private usufruct rights for each siida in a given

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area, defined by set borders. At the same time the proposal argues for the need of emphasis on

the role of siida within the management (as opposed to herding unit, and district).

The narratives of the herders address the opportunity of a new law for the management

of common ranges, and its implementation. The majority trust that the use of pastures would

improve if the role of the herders were to be central.

“ Yes, I think it will make it easier to use the ranges. It would be easier to plan,

then you know what you have: you have your own area distributed so then you can plan

better; while today you make a plan and when you get there it’s all grazed, you don’t

know what you have, it’s so uncertain. We have to divide the ranges on a siida basis and

have the highest number of animals for each siida*, and then it can be decided how many

herding units should be and so on...” (Herder 2)

Moreover, the narratives of the herders argue that the management would improve if

the decision-making and the authority for conflict resolution would be transferred to the

herders, and the monitoring system would be more effective, yet allow for flexibility.

“I think the herding would improve if we get our own Board to plan together for

all the winter siida’s. The conflicts should be handled by the District Board first; they

know the case, if there is a case. So, first the herders and if they disagree, it has to be a

system that decides over the herders, the Regional Board or the Management Board.”

(Herder 4)

“I think (the new law) would make things easier if it keeps the borders we have

and make them easier to control. The borders have to be stronger between the zones, not

between the individual siida’s. We need overlapping between the siida’s, like ‘grey

areas’. It’s not so that everybody has to fence themselves within their range and not use

them at all. It has to be so that one can graze over the borders. It has always worked with

grey areas, not with borders between siida’s, so that it’s only you who use your range.

The conflicts are because of the range borders, if the new law settles them, then it

would be illegal to graze on somebody else’s range. First we have to try to solve the

conflicts ourselves, if it doesn’t work it should be the Area board who does it.” (Herder 5)

These attitudes are omnipresent in the narratives of the herders regarding the

privatisation of the common ranges and it’s benefits and disadvantages, even if the

* In today’s legislation the highest number of animals is set for the herds on the summer ranges and is decidedfor each district, one district containing usually more than one siida. (NOU 35: 2001).

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administrative regulations are perceived as an unjustified intrusion and formalisation of

access rights as a means to control the herders.

“No, I don’t’ think it would help. I for one would say that this has no meaning; it

doesn’t help. It’s just the State who wants to have this (system) to be able to regulate, to

keep the number of reindeer constant. It’s the idea of the State. There would be no

advantages if they privatise (the common ranges), it will be the same anyway: we know

what we have and don’t have today as well; we have borders and keep them. It won’t

change anything.

But it can be of some help with the legal system, if it comes so long as to establish

a legal system for the pastures. (Q: Some people say that when there’s common range

there are no possibilities for sanction...) That’s stupid: common range is a good thing, and

these common ranges are not that big. When one gets summer mixing and such things,

one can stay on the common range (n.b. the autumn/ spring range) until he gets his own

herd and plan when to go. If you privatise the advantage can be that if you have a legal

action, you can follow it with your rights to the range, but there are disadvantages. If one

decides to change the migration routes, it’s difficult for the reindeer, they grew up with

those routes, it takes time to learn new routes and it just brings problems.” (Herder 3)

Even if some herders are sceptical about the results of the new law and feel threatened

in the use of winter ranges, they still argue that the borders should be rather fluid, underlining

the importance of flexibility for the use of winter ranges:

(Q: “ Do you think privatising the ranges would help solving the conflict? What could

be the advantages/ disadvantages?”)

“Privatisation... when you look at the siida level, siida as legal subject, is a private

unit. So the privatisation has to be based on that, but not so that one can have very large,

private areas and a number of animals that would never match the ranges, so that one

uses only 20% of range within his rightful siida borders. It should be so that that one can

set management borders within the private siida borders.” (Herder 1)

The issue of privatisation providing stronger recognition for the customary rights

reoccurs and is connected to the traditional permissive way of managing. A successful

solution is a variation of traditional customs that promotes the balance between formalised

tenure and flexible management.

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“Yes; I think it has to be more like private, more rights. Not so that one keeps

others away, it has to be a use (usufruct) right. I think that’s the only way to get a better

system. It has to come from the traditions and people have to agree on the borders that

come from the traditions, not with the use of fences. It has to be just the herders who plan

it and decide together. Many of us have problems with our rights today and the use of

pastures but it’s possible to solve them. It’s important to get started with it. In the first

years it doesn’t happen so much, but if you use enough time it gets there. There will be

disagreements first, but when one comes with arguments, we can solve them. We had

some meetings on this, and first it was quite a lot of disagreement and then we managed

so that maybe 90% of the siida’s from all the three zones agreed about the borders. It’s

this plan that would be used for the new law.” (Herder 4)

The narrative regarding the opportunity of the new law (with its proposals for a

changed institutional arrangement in using the common ranges) argues that these changes

would both improve the management and gain recognition provided they ensure a detailed

legal recognition of the local tenure and resource access arrangements.

5. Conflicting visions: consequences and remedies

5.1 The Ranges as Common-Pool Resources

The narratives of the herders point at the fact that, apart from the model (ecological,

economic and social) used by the State being unfit for the realities on the ranges, its failure is

also an outcome of the failure to understand the life modes of the herders in two important

respects. First, the traditional customs rely heavily on respecting the traditional borders and

the interests of all the herders that use a common range. In this respect, well-defined rules

regarding the migration through somebody else’s territory have been in place: one was

allowed to migrate along a certain route in a specified interval and rest his/her herd in specific

points for a limited interval. It was thus avoided both the degradation of lichen by trampling,

the reduction of resource availability by ‘locking’ the pasture under hard packed snow, and

the danger of mixing herds (Herder 1, informal discussion). Moreover, it was the

responsibility of the herders to avoid a harmful impact upon the ranges of another herder.

Failure to do so was always regarded as a conscious act and interpreted accordingly in a

complex web of social relations, leading to a chain of strategic decisions to counteract the

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cause (meetings among herders, change of migration schedules, retaliation through raiding,

etc.) (Paine, 1994).

Second, these rules are not in effect anymore today. The system (regime) managing

the ranges de facto as well as de jure ignores these customs, leading to a situation where the

pastures are ‘free’. This situation is a widespread consequence of communal lands passing

under the property of the State:

“The institutional arrangements that local users had devised to limit entry and use lost

their legal standing, but the national governments lacked monetary resources and

personnel to monitor the use of these resources effectively. Thus, resources that had been

under a de facto common property regime enforced by local users were converted to a de

jure government-property regime, but reverted to a de facto open-access regime. When

resources that were previously controlled by local participants have been nationalised,

state control has usually proved to be less effective and efficient than control by those

directly affected, if not disastrous in its consequences.” (Ostrom, 2000)

In Norway, even if the State limited entry into the livelihood to the Saami, (even

more: to Saami with herding ancestry), it removed both the decision of whom from among the

Saami was allowed to join and of how the ranges were to be used. This could be described as

a situation of open access with a limited number of actors, in the sense that the resource is not

open to outsiders (even if an unfit herder, lacking ecological knowledge and social network,

that is granted access into the industry by the present system, can be regarded as an outsider).

Herein lies the explanation for the ubiquitous statement that the ranges are not

common (“they just call it common, but it’s not”), but rather ‘free’. Here anybody ‘can

pasture wherever they want’, and this situation is unmistakably connected in the narratives of

the herders to the introduction of the “common range” concept, alien to them. To appreciate if

the situation is according to the description of the herders, the theoretical framework defined

by research in institutional arrangements for CPR’s can provide some insight. Enduring

effective CPR’s are defined by a set of success principles:

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Success Principles DESCRIPTION

1. Clearly defined physical boundaries Clear relative to neighbours and other uses

2. Clearly defined membership andrights

Multi-layered rights system; may include the right to physical access, towithdraw resources, to manage or decide on use, to exclude others, etc.

3. Congruence between appropriationand provision rules

Should be a reasonable balance between what individuals contributewith and what remove from the resource

4. Collective choice arrangements Most of the affected people can contribute to decision-making

5. Effective monitoring procedures Those who monitor and audit CPR conditions are accountable

6. Legitimate system for graduatesanctions

There are rules against violation. Sanction depends on the offence. Itshould be assessed by fellow users or accountable officials.

7. Cheap/accessible conflict-resolutionmechanisms

Conflict-resolution should be swift, inexpensive and fair.

8. Recognition of right to organize No challenge by external government authorities; if they come in andoverrule local decision, local authority is undermined.

Table 3: Success principles for enduring common pool resources (after Ostrom, 1996).

Comparing the success principles with the narratives of the herders, most of the

requirements cited seem to have been in place in the traditional system: the physical

boundaries of each siida’s seasonal range were clearly defined, inherited and perpetuated

through tradition. The borders did not fluctuate de jure, they allowed temporary,

circumstantial access to a well defined group of users (the neighbours) according to climatic

variability. The rights to use any given range derived from being a part of the siida (the

group), access into the group was decided by the herders alone upon a detailed evaluation, in

a long time trial-and-error fashion. The allocation of resources was constantly reassessed in

order to fit the requirements of the group as a whole (one siida could not keep the traditional

range unused). The monitoring of the use of the ranges was constantly done and interpreted

among herders, with a detailed way of interpreting the actions (the meaning of trespassing, its

circumstances, its perpetrators, etc.). The sanctions ranged from ridicule in public gatherings

to full-force retaliation through rustling (Paine, 1970). The legitimacy of the system was

conferred by its internal representation and the fact that it was customary and gradual: all the

herders knew the borders and could appreciated if a trespasser was forced to use somebody

else’s range by circumstance or was just making a power statement.

The flaws of the system are inherent to one that has to deal with a highly variable

environment: deciding the correctness of an act is circumstantial and influenced by personal

relations. Moreover, the sanctioning system can be used in self-interest. Yet, as the actors

repeat ‘the game’ (i.e. the decisions taken are also pieces of information that shape the

perceptions the herders have about each other and, in consequence, their future actions), the

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margins of error tend to diminish. Thus, a herder that was regarded as an illegal trespasser in a

specific circumstance could redeem himself by acting differently in a similar situation. In

other words, it is the long-term strategy that shapes the reputation of a herder, the way he

behaves in repeated instances. As Paine (1970) shows, the reputation of each herder was an

important asset in establishing the networks of herding partners.

The present regulations have evidently overruled the local decision system, without

providing a functional alternative. The borders only refer to the seasonal ranges as a whole:

between the winter and autumn/spring (while the summer ranges are divided among groups

into districts), without allocation of resources for groups (be it siida’s, districts or herding

units). The membership is not connected to a clear distribution of the rights to use specific

parts of the range (the law only stipulates that the lichen ranges are ‘common’ and that they

are to be managed according to a traditional pattern- see above). While this provision might

seem to provide local decision power, the local arrangements have little practical relevance.

The law gives equal right to everybody everywhere (“now anybody can pasture where they

want”). Furthermore, the monitoring of the herders, effective as it may be, cannot be followed

through with sanctions, as the legitimacy of these sanctions is not recognized by he law (“one

has to manage with the law, not against it”). Instead, the Authorities have introduced a

consultative body, called Common Range Board with the goal of mediating among herders on

the common ranges, but with no legislative power and weak legitimacy among herders as all

they could do is ‘urge the herders to behave’.

We see herein that most of the successful principles for enduring CPR’s are not

fulfilled in the present institutional arrangements. Even if some of the customs and norms that

formed the rules of the older pastoralism are still in place, they lack power and are entangled

in a system of provisions that doesn’t recognise them, more often it undermines them. This

divergence is further reflected in the way the herders and the Administration present the

situation. On the one hand the present management system lacks regulating mechanisms,

legitimacy among herders and insight into the detailed problems. At the other end, the

discourse of the State seeks legitimacy from two sources: it is the right and the moral duty of

the State to protect the lichen ranges from ecological degradation. Secondly, as the State has

to ensure the happiness and welfare of all its citizens, it is its duty to ensure the sustainability

(economic this time) of the livelihood and of the Saami culture. The meta-narrative of the

managerial discourse maintains that for large parts of he commons in Finnmark, the crisis is a

fact, requiring strict regulation. This approach stems from a commonly accepted theory used

in rangeland development throughout the world: the tragedy of the commons.

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5.2. The Tragedy in Finnmark:

The theory was introduced by biologist and human ecologist Garrett Hardin, in his

article from 1968: “The Tragedy of the Commons”, in which he extrapolates an example from

the English common ship ranges*. The paper opens like a narrative (“Picture a pasture open to

all…”), and follows through with a theoretical deduction of the behaviour of the pastoralists

based on three assumptions. First, the resources (ranges) are open to all; second, the

individual herders behave so as to maximise their revenue at the expense of the group; third,

the resources are limited and cannot sustain the ever-increasing demands of the herders. The

narrative underlines that individual interests of the herders (owning as many animals as

possible) and the collective interest of the group (having “sustainable” resources) do not

coincide, and no internal institution has the power to ensure that they do. Consequently, the

situation will lead to the degradation of the resource. Each herder continually adds to his/her

herd for as long as the marginal return brought by each animal added is positive. As a

consequence the resource is depleted for all the herders in the group, and the average return

for the group is falling:

“Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to

increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward

which all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a society that believes in the

freedom of the commons.” (Hardin, 1969: p.1244).

Therefore, efficient use of the resources requires a limitation of the herd size and a careful

distribution of the pastures. However, as the herders will not altruistically limit the size of

their herd unless all the others do, this course of action requires an external organisation (i.e.

the State). The situation will only be stabilised under an enforced optimal distribution of

resources in the best interest of both individuals and the group.

This paradigm has received strong support and shaped policy-making regarding

pastoralism all over the world. Its thesis fits perfectly with the ideological framework of the

welfare state. Its advocacy for privatisation of common-pool resources as the best way of

managing the resources appealed within the political climate of the Cold War and perpetuated

to recent years in the paradigms of mainstream sustainable development approach (Adams,

2001:103). In Finnmark, it forms the crux of the regulation mechanism implemented by the

State, manifested not only in the concepts and models used but also explicitly in order to

justify the need for intervention:

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“ Such is the situation today, that large parts of pasture resources in Finnmark are

managed in principle as a common resource with open access for a larger number of

herders. This brings about a ‘game’ between common and individual interests, which

are conflicting. The common interest is to ensure a maximum sustainable yield, while

individual interests are concerned with how this yield is distributed. This game is

governed by the fact that the advantages from appropriating more from the resource

affects only the individuals while the disadvantages are equally divided to all. If the

‘game’ doesn’t come under control, it will sooner or latter end up in a resource crisis

for every one. For large areas of the common ranges in Inner Finnmark is this resource

crisis now a fact.” (Reindriftforvaltningen, 2001: 34-my translation).

This stance shaped most of the decisions that are in act today in the reindeer industry,

even if their affiliation changed context and discourse during the years, and cannot be

dissociated from what the industry is today. Yet, if new regulations are to be introduced as the

old regime fit the three assumptions of the ‘tragedy’, a thorough analysis of the causes of

failure is in place, in order to see how the status quo came about (Briant & Bailey, 1997).

Recent research of reindeer herding in Finnmark used the paradigm of the tragedy of

the commons in order to explain the causes that brought about the resource degradation on the

lichen ranges, arguing that the Administration played an important role in producing the

tragedy (viz. the resource degradation) in Finnmark. Berg (1995) argues that the Norwegian

State played an important role in the degradation of resources by gradually allowing other

interests to expand into the areas traditionally used for reindeer herding. This argument is

more interesting if correlated to the evidence of increased number of fences, huts, roads, etc.

built in Finnmark during the past 40 years. This increase determined both a reduction of

vegetation cover and, more importantly, had a magnified effect on the interaction between

reindeer and vegetation: the pressure is significantly increased along fences, and other specific

sites (Vistnes & Nelleman, 2001). Furthermore, if a herd loses access to patches of the range

due to these hindrances, the consequence is increased if they are key-resources at specific

points in time. For instance, at the end of the winter, the higher, sunnier ridges are the ones

that are free of snow first, and if the winter has been ‘bad’ (lots of snow, frost, etc.), this key

resource can make the difference between life and death for the reindeer. More, if a cabin is

built on the ridge, the reindeer would avoid the valley underneath as well (Sara, 2001),

increasing the loss and decreasing the quality of the range from the perspective of varied

landscape (souitče) important for the herders. * Where the term ‘commons’ originates;

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On a larger scale, it has been argued that the subsidy policy of the State increased the

pressure upon the ranges. First, the profound changes in the society (sedentarisation,

permanent schools for children, etc.) increased the need of mobility for the herders: in order

to spend more time with the sedentary family they needed faster transport than that provided

by reindeer. This motivated the need for snow-scooters, 4-whell drives, etc. While, the change

would have probably taken place anyway, the subsidies paid by the state have arguably

increased the number beyond the strictly necessary. This brought about increased pressure on

the lichen ranges and possibly more degradation due to reduced accessibility (through packing

the snow) and breaking of lichen mats.

Nevertheless, the effects of mechanisation are far beyond those of pressure on lichen:

they increased the need for a monetary economy, and the expenses related to herding (fuel,

maintenance, etc). Thus, the households had to increase the size of their herds in order to

survive. Furthermore, as the traditional rules of use were abolished by the new laws, the use

of common ranges became a ‘race’ from the summer (secure, assured) to the autumn and

winter ranges, in order to secure access to resources. Thus the scooter became indispensable

for any herder, not only the larger ones.

This is the position argued by Ottar Brox (2001) regarding the use of the tragedy of

the commons paradigm: “Most tragedies start to develop and are attended to when the

commons are no longer accessible to the commoner, but only to the select minority that has

been able to stay in the rat race for what remains of the free natural resources.” Thus, the

present resource problems have not come about through horizontal (population) growth but

through vertical growth (the transformation of exploiting units into expansive economic

actors as a result of he government policy stimulating expansion). The strategy was

contradicted in practice as the expected exodus of the non-expansive units from the industry

turned out to be unrealistic (ibid), as we have seen, the herders are often motivated

subjectively by issues as identity and culture.

Here a series of unexpected results seems to come into play as a result of the cultural

and strategic differences in the two discourses. As the subsidies decreased the need for

money, the herders increased their herds. This acted both as an insurance against the

fluctuating environment and for economic and cultural reasons (traditionally, prestige was

derived from having a ‘properly acquired’ large herd, that is from having the knowledge and

stamina to maintain control over it) (Paine, 1994). The subsidies intended to reduce the

numbers of animals, were use opportunistically: while the total number of animals decreased,

81

the number of does increased creating potential for a new, and constant increase (Mosli,

1996).

Impressive amounts of public money have been spent in order to achieve the explicit

goal of the State: induce as many owners of small herds to leave the industry, thus providing a

better economic environment for the fewer ‘larger’ herders creating an unprecedented fracture

within the livelihood. It promoted, explicitly or implicitly the interests of owners of larger

herds at the expense of the others, and as the larger herders gained political momentum, they

tried to influence decision-making and secure individual access rights to resources. Herein is

to be found the source of discontentment and awe the herders have in regard to the present

institutions at work on the ranges of Finnmark. As their interests are not properly represented

and their rights are not enforceable, most of them are weak actors in managing the resources.

5.3 Between resignation and hope- the future law:

The narratives regarding the future laws and regulations converge toward a central

theme: the need for stronger rights over the ranges, a system of property rights that puts the

traditional ways of management on the legal map is crucial. The herders stress the need to

have private rights for the territory of each siida but resent the idea of exclusivity per se, they

argue instead for excludability. In other words, the regime should provide legal recognition

for the collective rights each siida has to their own traditional ranges but, equally important, it

should introduce a system of ‘management borders’ adjustable to the size of the herds of each

group at any given time. As a consequence, each group would have clearly recognised

traditional borders and inside these, fluid management borders that would allow neighbouring

siida’s to use the remaining pasture on the ranges of neighbours.

The proposed regime is basically an expression of the traditional herding system and

their interpretation of the dangers of privatisation for the interests of different groups of actors

involved in managing the ranges. As Brox (1998) explains, armed with the “tragedy of the

commons” theory, leaders of the largest reindeer owners have argued for privatisation of

pastures and formed coalition with strong market-liberalist forces of the Norwegian political

centre. They have managed to influence the building of reindeer fences between the summer

districts and into the commons (autumn/spring range), thus providing a material infrastructure

for privatisation. This course of action was possible as it was in harmony with the policy to

induce as many owners of smaller herds to leave the industry, thus leaving the bigger herders

better off. The same policy has been employed in the fishing industry in Norway, where

82

small-scale fishing has been constantly undermined and eliminated with the goal of promoting

a ‘viable and sustainable’ filleting industry. The result was the depletion of the stocks of cod

and the fruitlessness of the industry as a whole. The fear is that the same thing would happen

with the reindeer trade should the rights to graze be privatised, effecting in the resource

depletion and zero-sum competition* (ibid.).

The narratives of the herders also reflect the power-game on the plateau. First, the

expansionist herders have been supported (willingly or not) by the strategy adopted by the

State: the requirements for de-stocking have been settled at the district level. They benefit

from the open access situation by the vantage conferred by a larger herd that can exert a

strong pressure power on the neighbours. Even more so as the decisions concerning the

districts are taken by the district boards, based on majority, i.e. the bigger siida’s (more herds)

have more people represented in the district board, so bigger decision power. More

importantly, their strategies are in line with the expectations of the State.

We see herein, confirmed again that what is portrayed as a tragedy of the commons in

the hegemonic discourse is rather a degradation brought about by a system that didn’t

understand the realities at play on the ranges, justifying the position of Emery Roe (1999) that

one cannot “picture a pasture open to all”, as it simply does not exist:

“If you differentiate herders, their herds and ranges (…) you will never find a tragedy

of the commons (Hardin, 1968) taking place”.

The proposal for the new law gives a central role to the siida and asks for the

distribution of power at a local level on the common ranges. Yet, it still maintains the old

assumptions regarding the tragedy of the commons and the need for regulation and the

ecological model arguing for a density-dependent relation between pastures and reindeer. On

the other hand herders’ counter-narrative argues for the devolution of power and the creation

of a forum that can mediate between herders, where they can solve their problems internally

and which has decision power. In turn the Administration should have consultative functions.

This devolution of power is often identified as a possible solution to CPR problems. Involving

the herders in decision-making and using their knowledge to estimate the limits to the

exploitation of the resource can provide the conditions for using the resources in a sustainable

way by the herder community at large. The commons “should be kept open in the sense that

people in districts traditionally dependent upon common resources must not be denied access

to them” (Brox, 1998). Basically, this is a reflection of the traditional system that allowed a

* In economics, a situation in which the gain of one group of agents means the loss for the others, making theindustry stagnate.

83

swift and accurate decision-making in the face of continuous change, a well-educated

opportunistic behaviour trying to make the best out of the constant hazards at work on these

ranges.

This system can still provide a great empirical foundation for designing a sustainable

use of resources, with important cultural implications for the herding community and the

Saami minority at large. The task of the administration is to recognise this potential, accept

the challenge of a different perception of sustainability and include it in designing enduring,

legitimate management regimes, with local significance.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The present thesis draws interest from the general situation of today’s pastoralism

world-wide, while referring to a specific group: the Saami reindeer herders of Northern

Norway. The situation presented here is alas not singular: across latitudes, pastoralists are

confronted with challenges in the form of poverty, insecurity, marginalisation or segregation.

Here, today, both herders and State acknowledge the need for a change in the management

system. A commission of legal expert, herders and administrators has been appointed to

produce a proposal for the new regulation system.

My research uses the epistemology of political ecology and narrative analysis as an

instrumental tool in the attempt to shed more light on the nature and the context of the

resource problem on the ranges in Finnmark. To this end, I compare two often-divergent

discourses. On the one hand the hegemonic discourse, the one that underlies the present

management system and legal provisions, rests on two meta-narratives. First, that of a

relationship between reindeer and pastures defined by equilibrium, predictable in time and

reliable in defining management strategies. Second, that of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ in

the absence of state-intervention and regulation. In this management strategy, the herders are

weak actors as it is based on the division of power locally, rather than its devolution, and the

formalisation of an individualised tenure system rather than an opportunistic one responding

to complex variation.

The narratives of the herders, on the other hand, point at their need for secure access to

resources, more than a formalised tenure system. They argue for the need of a system that

allows flexibility in using the resources according to variability and one that at the same time

provides a swift and efficient way of regulating access to the resource. This system is a

detailed response the various sources of hazards that govern the use of resources and presents

the relation between reindeer and pastures as protean, defined by extreme events. Therefore,

the traditional system divided the seasonal ranges into well-defined areas connected to

individual siida’s. These areas were regarded as home-ranges rather than territories per se,

that is the siida’s had access rights to the area, and the power of excludability of outsiders, not

exclusivity nor ownership, even if the access right to the area was inheritable. In other words,

the tenants of the access rights had primacy in using the resources, which were managed by a

system of ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ (Paine 1970, 1994; Sara 2001).

The present study proposes the arguments of the herders as a counter-narrative to the

present managerial system. It also uses relevant scientific evidence in order to denarrativize

85

some of the assumptions embedded in the perception of reindeer pastoralism by society at

large. While acknowledging the divergent views of environmental management of the two

discourses, my conclusion parts with the extreme relativistic approach that of nature as

entirely socially constructed, and its definitions equally valid. I argue that science can be used

as a divide between constructions of nature and that “getting the science right” (Sullivan,

2000) is possible and necessary. Without the basis in science, seemingly objective, value-free

concepts like carrying capacity, overgrazing, or sustainability remain normative, mere tools of

faulty political argumentation.

In this respect, my conclusion points at the need for future investigation in order to

establish scientifically the relevance and applicability of the narratives that form the two

discourses mirrored here. First, a more thorough investigation of the rangeland ecosystems in

Finnmark is required in order to understand in detail the nature of plant/herbivore

relationship. As showed before, an alternative scientific position argues that this relation is

highly variable, requiring flexible management adaptations- as evidence is mounting to

suggest that flexibility and security form the crux of sustainability of livestock production in

variable environments (Ellis& Swift, 1988; Fernández-Giménez, 2002; Niamir-Fuller, 1998).

More importantly, the situation points at the need for autonomy in decision-making

for the individual herders. They need to define and influence the development of their

enterprise by defining its goals (which can be as varied as meat production or culture

preservation) and the ways to achieve them. General experiences from elsewhere are

reconfirmed here: as tenure formalisation is most of the time relatively inflexible, potentially

inequitable and difficult to monitor and enforce (Fernández-Giménez, 2002), herders reject it

or accept it as a ‘lesser evil’ in a disrupted system (Galilea, 1998). Instead they propose an

opportunistic management system, attuned to the variations and risks, with overlapping,

inclusive and reciprocal resource rights and regulated seasonal movements. Moreover, in

order to design enduring common property regimes for the use of ranges, the traditional

system provides a valuable backdrop, but the success principle underlined previously have to

be investigated in connection with the refined subjective rationality of the herders.

As perceptions and representation of the environment and of the forces that regulate

its use are translated into management strategies, they are more than benign reflection in the

eye of the beholder: they affect real people, with real lives, sometimes for generations to

come. Therefore, my attempt reaches beyond de-narrativizing. It argues for the need to

address the hard choices of sustainable resource utilisation from a different perspective, one

that tries to bring together the assets and expectations of both the State and the herders as

86

equal partners in the design of a legitimate and enduring co-management system. The past

distance between their two discourses has a dismal history. The future might escape this

dreary scenario if the counter-narratives presented above find a way towards mainstream

scientific recognition and then policy making. Failure to do so can only leave the State and

the herder community in a no-win situation and add to the long list of ‘white elephants’ of

pastoralism worldwide, this time in the sub-arctic environment.

87

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Yoccoz N.G., R. A. Ims, P. Fauchald & T. Tveraa, 2002: Climatic Variables Relevant for thePopulation Ecology of Reindeer and Geometrid Moths in Northern Fennoscandia: dataaqusition and preliminary analyses;http://acia.npolar.no/Dokumenter/Prosjektrapporter/Ims(1).pdf (accessed April, 2003);

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APPENDIX 1: THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF REINDEER HERDINGIN FINNMARK

Reindeer Herding Board (Reindriftstyret)- is a national board appointed by the Ministry ofAgriculture (4 memebers) and the Saami Parliament (3 memebers) for four years at a time.The Board is a scientific adviser for the management of the enterprise and for research. TheBoard has the authority to undertake the division of herding districts, decide the highestnumber of reindeer for each district and herding unit, divide the districts into grazing zonesand decide the grazing schedules. The Board is the superior authority for resolution ofcomplaints from the Area Boards.

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE-Reindeer herding office-

Reindeer Herding Administration (RHA)-REINDEER HERDING BOARD-

-REGIONAL BOARD-(6 Regional Boards for the 6reindeer regions in Norway)

-DISTRICT BOARDS-(24 summer districts in W.Finnmark)

-COMMON RANGEDISTRICT BOARD-

(for the spring/ autumn andwinter ranges)

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Regional Boards (Områdestyrene)- appointed for each of the six reindeer rangeland regionsby the County Administration (3; 4 members) and the Saami Parliament (2; 3 members), for 4years at a time. The Regional Council handles area disputes according to the planning andconstruction laws and is a scientific adviser and premise giver on public management for thereindeer herding. It also controls the districts’ planning, evaluates applications for changingaffiliation of a herding unit to a different district and issues permits for new herding units. TheRegional Council also regulates the number of herding units in the specific region and decidesthe grazing schedule if requested by the Reindeer Herding Board.

District Boards (Distriktsstyrene)- elected by and from the reindeer owners in each district.The District Board represents the district in cases/affairs, it provides the daily managementdirections and administrates common infrastructure and funds. It has limited coercive power(e.g. it can order a herd to be moved, assembled and counted if the owner does not fulfil hisobligations). More important decisions (e.g. that a person must give up herding) have to beapproved by the Regional Board.Common Range District Board (Fellesbeitedistrikt styret)- with attributions similarto the District Boards, regulating the use of common pasture districts (spring/autumnand winter, Districts 30 and 31 respectively). It is formed by one representative fromeach summer district in Finnmark. The board is elected annually.

Definitions:

Reindeer (pasture) district: the delimited area each reindeer range is dividedinto where the grazing schedule is decided and the highest number of animalsis settled.

Active reindeer herder: person who has the right to practice reindeer herding(according to The Law on Reindeer Herding, 1978:§3), employs his workforcemainly within the industry and the lifestyle connected to this profession.

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APPENDIX 2: SAAMI WORDS USED IN TEXT

Čearga- hard packed snow under the influence of the winds when the temperatures are low;

Dálveorohat: delimited area used as winter range (Sara, 2001)

Daža: non-Saami male, in common usage as “(male) Norwegian”; hencedažaboazodoallot: “Norwegian reindeer husbandry” (Paine, 1994);

Geasseorohat: delimited area used as summer range (Sara, 2001)

Gow’do: middle; hence Gow’dojottelit: “Middle movement” of Kautokeino reindeer range (Paine, 1994);

Guoibme: herding partner (ibid); for insiders in the group

Iseđ: male head of a family herd, sometimes of a combined herd of several families (siida); owner of animals;

Johtingeaidnu: migration route for individual sii’da; these routes cross each other thus requiring regulation to avoid mixing of herds (Sara, 2001);

Johtolat: system of seasonal migration formed of migration routes (johtingeaidnu) and seasonal ranges (orohat) within a delimited area (e.g. Nuor’tabealli) (Sara, 2001);

Njar’ga: peninsula (Paine, 1994);

Nuor’ta: east; hence Nuor’tabealli: “eastern half” of Kautokeino reindeer range

Sii’da: basic herding unit (the animals and their herders); hence sii’da guoibme: “herding partner” (ibid);

Suoitce: an area of terrain that is ecologically varied as pasture (ibid.)