DEFENCE Force JOURNALJusuf Wanandi, Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta NO. 143 JULY/AUGUST 2000 DEFENCE Force JOURNAL Managing Editor Michael P

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DEFENCEForce

CONTENTS

Defence Review 2000: Our Future DefenceForce

Comments by:3. The Honourable John Moore MP, Minister

for Defence9. Masahiro Akiyama, Visiting Scholar,

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA11. Dr Ross Babbage, Director, Centre for

International Strategic Analysis15. General J. Baker AC DSM (Retd.)19. Commodore Sam Bateman AM RAN

(Retd.)21. Dr C. Bell, Australian National University23. Associate Professor A. Bergin, Australian

Defence Force Academy25. Graeme Cheeseman, University of NSW27. Professor Paul Dibb, Strategic and Defence

Studies Centre, Australian NationalUniversity

29. Graeme Dobell, Radio Australia/ABCForeign Affairs/Defence Correspondent

31. Air Marshal S.D. Evans, AC DSO AFCRAAF (Retd.)

35. Robert Garran, Foreign Affairs and DefenceWriter, The Australian

37. Rear Admiral Richard Hill, (Retd.), Editor,The Naval Review

39. Admiral M.W. Hudson, AC, RAN (Retd.)43. Professor Robyn Lim, Nanzan University,

Nagoya, Japan45. Michael O’Connor, Australian Defence

Association47. Robert O’Neill, University of Oxford49. Honourable Derek Quigley, Consultant,

New Zealand52. Lieutenant General J. Sanderson (Retd.)57. Thomas-Durell Young, Naval Postgraduate

School61. Jusuf Wanandi, Senior Fellow, Centre for

Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

NO. 143

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DEFENCEForce

JOURNAL

Managing Editor

Michael P. Tracey

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

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A U S T R A L I A N

Prime Minister John Howard, Chief of Defence Force Admiral Chris Barrie and Defence Minister John Moore answerquestions from the press after the release of the Defence Discussion Paper at Parliament House, 27 June 2000.

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On 27 June 2000, the Prime Minister and I announced the most extensive publicconsultation process ever undertaken on defence and security issues with the

release of the Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force – A Public DiscussionPaper.

The Government has been conducting a fundamental review of defence policyand is keen to ensure that the forthcoming White Paper takes into account theviews of the Australian people. As part of this process, the Public Discussion Paperhas been designed to promote consideration of the key issues relating to Australia’sdefence requirements and how these requirements can be met. It will enable thepeople of Australia to have an input into, and better understanding of, the defenceissues that the Government must consider in preparing the White Paper.

A Community Consultation Team, appointed by the Government, has beenfacilitating public feedback and discussion and identifying and consolidating keyelements of the community response to the Discussion Paper. It will be reporting itsfindings to the Government. The Consultation Team has been travelling extensivelyand consulting with a wide range of interest groups and individuals.

Individuals and groups have been making their views on the issues raised in thePublic Discussion Paper known to the Community Consultative Team by forwardingwritten submissions, using the feedback facility on the Discussion Paper web-site, orattending the open sessions being conducted around Australia by the consultationteam.

The defence of Australia and its interests is of paramount importance to theGovernment. I look forward to an enthusiastic, thoughtful and wide-rangingresponse from the community on these vital issues.

Yours sincerely

Defence Review 2000: OurFuture Defence Force

A Public Discussion Paper

The HonourableJohn Moore, MP

Minister for Defence

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 143 JULY / AUGUST 20004

Some difficult policy choices have to bemade.

• What do we want our armed forces to beable to do?

• Where do we want our forces to be able tooperate?

• What is the best way to structure theDefence Force?

• What is the best way to spend the Defencebudget?The Services of the Defence Force must

fight as a joint organisation, but in decidinghow to develop our air and maritime forces, weface a number of choices.• What levels of adversary capability must

our forces be able to handle? • Do we want to be able to defend Australia

against any regional power, or against thelower-level military capabilities available inour nearer region?

• Can we maintain within realistic budgetlimits a full range of air and maritimecapabilities giving the Australian DefenceForce (ADF) diversity and flexibility, orshould we specialise in one or twocapabilities, putting lower priority onothers?

• Should we keep our forces prepared for

operations at short notice, or can we

assume we would have enough warning of

a crisis to bring them up to combat

readiness?

There are also key choices in developing

our land forces.

• What size forces do we want to have ready

for rapid deployment?

• How long do we want to be able to sustain

forces in the field?

• Do we want our land forces to have

capabilities to operate in more intense

combat environments?

• How much capability do we want in order

to deploy and insert land forces in

potentially hostile environments?

• Do we want the capability to expand our

Army quickly?

In the Discussion Paper, we look at a range

of issues that are the important background to

these key choices about the type of Defence

Force Australia needs. Following is a brief

summary of the topics the Paper covers.

Defence Review 2000: PublicDiscussion Paper

Executive SummaryThe Government is conducting a fundamental review of our defence policy to take account of

fundamental changes in our strategic environment, important changes in military technology andthe increasing costs and budgetary pressures for Defence. As part of this review the Governmentwants to listen to the views of the Australian community on defence. The review will focus on thebig issues – the key choices that shape our military capabilities. To do that, we have to take intoaccount financial and strategic realities.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

Strategic FundamentalsIs War a Thing of the Past? Some people

argue that long-term trends in internationalaffairs are making wars less likely, especiallymajor wars between nations. The internationalsystem works in many ways to reduce the riskof problems degenerating into wars, but weshould not assume that major wars cannothappen.

Military Operations Other than War. Overthe past few years the unique capabilities ofarmed forces have been used in an increasingnumber of non-combat operations. We haveundertaken many different types of operations,including famine relief and other forms ofhumanitarian assistance, peacekeeping andcombat operations.

Key Strategic Changes. Our region isextraordinarily dynamic and complex.Regional economic growth will contribute toregional security over the longer term. It also islikely to lead to expanding military capabilityin the region. Much will depend on how therising powers of our region define their futuregreatness.

Regional Defence Capabilities. Many ofAsia’s bigger defence budgets were onlymarginally affected by the economic crisis. Inthe last year the defence budgets of manyaffected countries have again started toincrease. If larger defence budgets in ourregion continue to expand air and maritimecapabilities, our relative military capability willcome under pressure.

What Are Our Strategic Interests? Ourstrategic interests are engaged directly inrelations between the Asia-Pacific’s majorpowers. Our most immediate strategic interestsare in the arc of islands stretching fromIndonesia to the islands of the SouthwestPacific.

Defending Against Whom? At present nocountry has any intent to use armed forceagainst Australia. But we do need to takeaccount of what capabilities are needed toattack us effectively. An invasion could not be

mounted by any country in our region now,though many already have the capacity forminor attacks.

Defending an Island Continent. Ourstrategic environment is fundamentallymaritime, though defending Australia against amajor adversary does not mean just thedefence of the coastline. If we have thecapabilities to deny our air and sea approachesto hostile ships and aircraft, we can defend ourcontinent. Land forces would also be critical,especially in some lower-level contingencies.

Alliance vs Self-Reliance. The choices wehave made over the last 25 years about thetype of forces we need have been shaped bythe policy of self-reliance. From our alliancerelationships we can expect in the future toreceive support, including military support, inany crisis that directly threatens our security.

Independent Action vs CoalitionOperations. Coalition operations have becomealmost the norm today. Investment ininteroperability may need to be a key priority.

Defending Australia vs RegionalCommitments. Some will argue we shouldmaintain a narrow focus on the defence of ourterritory. But there could be circumstances inwhich our strategic interests might require usto commit forces to operations overseas.Choosing between these demands might not benecessary if we can do both at reasonable cost.

Designing Our Defence ForceQuality, Quantity, Diversity. To keep

defence spending affordable, we will have tomake tough choices and take some consideredrisks. The quality we need is relative to thekinds of opposing capabilities we might face incombat.

Conventional Wars vs Non-CombatMilitary Operations. The ADF does disasterrelief at home, humanitarian assistance abroad,evacuations, search and rescue, coastalsurveillance and enforcement, and helps thepolice in counter-terrorism. But our DefenceForces have been structured, trained and


equipped to respond to military threats to oursecurity.

Current Capability vs Future Capability. Ittakes many years to complete a majorcapability development project that providestomorrow’s capabilities. But unexpecteddemands on today’s forces can arise with littlewarning. We need to take account of bothfactors.

What Defence Capabilities Do We Need?Our aim is to select a set of capabilities thatgives Australia the widest range of militaryoptions to support our strategic interests, at anaffordable cost. For the defence of our ownterritory, we would need air and navalcapabilities that could deny our approaches toan adversary. For defence of our regional andglobal interests, we would need capabilitiesthat could contribute to a coalition. Individualcircumstances would decide the nature of ourcontribution.

Air Combat. Australia’s air combatcapability is based on our fleet of 71 F/A-18aircraft. Key strengths are the skills of thepersonnel who operate, maintain and supportthe aircraft. At present we are losing paritywith the best regional air forces so we areupgrading the F/A-18’s radars, missiles andelectronic warfare systems. Later this decadewe face one of the most important decisions –how to retain our air combat capability afterthe F/A-18s.

Strike. Strike is the capability to target anadversary’s forces and infrastructure in theirown territory, as well as in transit to Australia.The muscle of our strike force is the uniquecapability provided by our 33 F-111 long-range bombers. In the next few years we mustconsider how to maintain our strike capabilityafter 2020.

Maritime Interdiction. Australia’s maritimeforces include surface ships and theirhelicopters, submarines, maritime patrolaircraft, and F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft that arevery effective for attacking hostile ships. Anti-ship missiles and attack by hostile aircraft are

increasingly important for us as regionalcountries improve their capabilities. Onceproblems are resolved, the Collins will beamong the best submarines in the world.

Land Capabilities. The core of our landforce is two high-readiness infantry brigades,each around 3000 personnel. We also haveSpecial Forces – highly trained specialist troopsinvaluable in a wide range of situations,including counter-terrorism. Reserve brigadesaround Australia provide the bulk of oursustainment capability.

Information Capabilities. Informationcapabilities are about applying the ideas of theknowledge economy to the business of fightingwars. With a small but sophisticated force weare well placed to keep a lead in our ability touse what we have to the best effect.

Defence Spending IssuesHow Much Does Australia Spend on

Defence? Australia spends around $13 billionor $700 per person on Defence annually.Funding for Defence has been held steady inreal terms in recent years though it hasdeclined from around 2.5 per cent of GDP inthe mid 1980s to about 1.9 per cent in 1999.The level of Defence funding is an importantsocial choice – any change in this fundingaffects the level of taxes or the amount ofmoney available for other Governmentprograms.

How Does Defence Spend Its Budget?Around 60 per cent of the Defence budget isspent on current capability, with a further thirdspent on investing in future capability. Someexpenditure is committed to providing supportto our people in uniform and takes account ofthe special nature of serving in the armedforces.

Efficiency and Reform Programs. TheGovernment is determined to increaseDefence’s efficiency further to give value totaxpayers. The next series of reforms andefficiency measures need to be bold.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7

Budget Pressures. Major investment costsare rising in real terms. A number of our keywar-fighting platforms will becomeunsupportable or no longer cost-effective tomaintain within a few years of each other afterthe middle of this decade. The cost ofrecruiting, training and retaining ADFpersonnel accounts for a major slice of thebudget.

Funding Future Capability. Furtherefficiencies offer some potential over the nextfew years to find resources for combatcapabilities without increasing funding.However, maintaining the current range ofcapabilities would require an increase infunding over the longer term. Alternatively, ifwe wish to maintain current levels of fundingpermanently, we will need to reduce somecurrent capabilities. Whatever is decided, somedifficult choices about trade-offs will remain tokeep the Defence budget within reasonablebounds.

The Future Defence ForceWhat Sort of Force Will We Need in the

Future? Responsible planning can only be doneby making deliberate and informed decisionsabout priorities. How much weight should beplaced on the more likely involvement inpeacekeeping compared with the less likely, butfar more serious consequences of an attack onAustralia? What are the likely dynamics ofregional security and what implications doesthis have for the timing of major acquisitions ofcapability?

Forces for Defeating Attacks on Australia.The most important capabilities for defeatingattacks on Australia are likely to be those that

provide air defence and maritime strike. Itwould be possible to capably defend Australiaagainst attacks, from within the currentbudget. This could place some limits on ourability to contribute to security in the region. Ifwe want to retain more options forcontributing to regional security it is unlikelythis could be achieved without additionalfunding over the longer term.

Forces Structured for Regional Security. Apolicy focusing on contributing to regionalsecurity could be a legitimate alternative tostructuring against a direct attack onAustralian territory. One option might be todevelop our land force capabilities in a waythat would allow them to contribute more tohigher-intensity conflicts, though this wouldbe an expensive approach and limit otheroptions. A different approach would involveplacing higher value on maritime forces.

Military Operations Other than War.Military operations other than war can includeassistance for a range of civil emergencies andproviding forces for humanitarian assistance.Enhancing our peacekeeping capabilitieswould require reductions in other capabilitiesto maintain the budget within realistic bounds.

Evaluating the Options. In a military crisisit is the force that we have at that precisemoment in time that will need to be used.Whatever choices are made about the size andstructure of our armed forces for the future,our goal should be that they are, qualitatively,world class.

A copy of the Defence Review 2000 Discussion Paper is available on the Defence White Paper website(whitepaper.defence.gov.au). Alternatively, you can request a copy be posted to you by [email protected] or calling free-call 1800 444 034.

Counter-terrorist exercise

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Thanks in part to the end of the Cold War,Australia, like Japan, is now faced with the

question of budget restraints. Japan remainsvery interested in the policy and initiativeswhich Australia is undertaking in order to meetthe challenges of the world's new securityenvironment. It is highly appropriate forAustralia to maintain a strong interest inupholding regional security in addition todefending its own country. Nevertheless, itseems that there are a number of crucialproblems in the areas of the defence policy andcapability that Australia must address in orderto play a more effective role in terms ofnational and regional security.

This said, I would like to offer my owncritiques on the contents of the AustraliaDefence White (Discussion) Paper.

The White Paper should present in greaterdetail Australia's view of the past, presentand future security and military situation inthe Asia Pacific region, including South Asia.Do problems only involve the rising powers?What is the extent of the military capabilityfor each country, especially those nationswhich possess offensive capabilities? How dothese capabilities compare with theAustralia's military capability? The answersto these questions are more important thandata concerning budget volume. They play acritical role in defence analysis and must beseen as the primary factors upon which acoherent national defence policy isformulated. In addition, while reviewingAustralia's military capability, the issue of

potential minor attacks seems small and shouldbe treated accordingly.

It would be helpful for Australia toformally identify which of the following twoconcepts it has selected as the underlyingtheory for its defence policy: a) defence againstthe concrete, calculated threat, or b) thestandard defence for an independent country.If Australia supports the former theory, (a),then the White Paper should provide amethodology, in a form similar to that used inUS defence policy papers, for estimating themilitary threat to Australia. As it stands, thePaper seems to suggest there is no threatcalculated. If Australia maintains the latterconcept, (b), it would be useful to know ingreater detail exactly what is meant by thereference to an “attack against Australia”.

Australia stresses that it is one of the Asiannations. It would be useful for the Paper toexplain how this concept functions from thestandpoint of security and the military policy.

Japan is interested in the Australianconcept for regional security contributions. Ispecifically remember when the AustralianPrime Minister ceased referring to the role thatAustralian Forces were playing in East Timoras “world police.” How does the Paper assessAustralia's activities in East Timor and howdoes it view the responses of other Asiancountries to this crisis? It seems that at leastIndonesia would not accept the explanationpresented in the Paper, even from thestandpoint of peacekeeping. Australia mayhave to welcome defence budget increases inneighbouring countries with relatively small-

Upholding Regional Security?By Masahiro Akiyama, Visiting Scholar; Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Firstly, let me say that I appreciate the consultation process which has been initiated throughthe process of making the Defence White Paper public. Thanks to this transparency, not only canthe Australian people appreciate the important information contained within the Discussion Paper,but analysts from abroad are afforded the valuable opportunity to present their views on such adocument, thus promoting further international engagement and understanding.

10 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 143 JULY / AUGUST 2000

to medium-sized military capability. Onlythrough such budget increases will theseneighbouring countries be able to govern theirparticular internal security situations bythemselves.

By studying issues shown above we candiscuss Australia's contribution to the regionalsecurity vis-a-vis the defence of Australia. I amparticularly interested in the relationshipbetween the defence mission and thecontributory role in regional security for theAustralian Land Force.

The claim that Australia has a militarybudget large enough to maintain maritime(and air) defence capabilities, but still cannot

provide full support for regional security seemstoo simple. The Paper should explain thereasons for this situation and how theappropriate ability to contribute to regionalsecurity matters is determined.

In terms of not only Australian nationaldefence but maintenance of regional peace andstability, how does Australia view itsrelationship with the US and the greaterframework of international cooperation in theAsia Pacific region. Furthermore, what is theoutlook for Australia's bilateral securityrelations with Indonesia, China, India andJapan in future?

Mr. Akiyama worked in the Japan Defence Agency for seven years, during which time he was involved in the processof reaffirming the Japan-US security alliance and reviewing the defence cooperation guidelines between the twonations. He held the post of Vice Minister of Defence before retiring from the Agency in 1998. He is currently engagedin research on current security issues.

F/A 18 Hornet

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Major restructuring is required andpublic support must be won for this

and for a substantial rise in defenceexpenditure. The Discussion Paper isdesigned to raise most of the key questionsfacing defence, generate a public debate andhelp build a consensus for change.

The Discussion Paper points to many ofthe factors that are driving us to do moreand better in Defence. In real terms thedefence budget has now fallen to its lowestlevel since the late 1930s, equipmentacquisition expenditure is being squeezedeven harder, and this at a time when thecosts of new defence systems are rising atmore than three times the rate of domesticinflation. Moreover, when we look into theregion we see serious sources of instability,at least some of which are likely to beenduring and the sources of future crises.We also see some regional countries out-spending Australia in defence by more thanthree times, as a proportion of GDP, andintroducing new defence systems that areclearly superior to ours.

Australians face some stark choices. Dowe want a third-rate defence force thatwould face a serious risk of defeat in afuture crisis? Do we want to abandon thediplomatic clout that a capable defenceforce can deliver? Or, do we want to

change gears, sharpen our keyrequirements and spend enough to providethe sort of security for the medium termthat our children would expect?

In my view, we are already starting tosee the key elements of a consensus emerge.Both sides of parliament, most defence com-mentators and significant elements of themedia are favouring a lift in defencespending, a re-focussing on key defencepriorities and a continuing program ofreform in defence decision-making andoperating processes. But if this agenda forchange is to bring the increased securitythat is required, what are some of the keythemes that must win through?

Focus on the essentials but build in someflexibility

We should focus primarily on buildingthose capabilities that are essential for thedefence of Australia itself, and its immediateinterests. Capabilities acquired for thesepurposes will provide governments withseveral options for operations further afield,should they be deemed appropriate at the time.We cannot afford to acquire and maintain allof the capabilities that we might wish, so weneed to be very disciplined in avoiding thatwhich is simply “nice to have”.

New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right

By Dr Ross Babbage, Director, Centre for International Strategic Analysis

It’s Crunch TimeThe Defence Discussion Paper, that was launched by the Prime Minister on 27 June, is a well-

crafted mechanism to facilitate change; change that is badly needed. The strong rise in bothpersonnel and operating costs in recent years has threatened to cut equipment spending to a trickle.Whilst Defence has been spending to boost current and near-term capability, it has been grosslyunderspending on the investment program for the future. Simply put, the current defence approachis unsustainable.


We need to work harder on our strategy forwinning future conflicts

The Discussion Paper is surprisingly thinon the game-plan(s) for winning futureconflicts. Getting our strategy right is criticalbecause, at its core, all defence investmentneeds to be designed to help change the mindsof the opposing decision-making elite andforce them rapidly to the negotiating table onfavourable terms. If we can’t do this in therange of crises we may face in the future, wewill lose. If we get our strategy right, especiallyat the theatre level, it should be a pervadinginfluence on almost everything else thatDefence does – including what it buys.

We need to invest selectively in our own versionof the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

Creatively combining selected advancedtechnologies, new operational concepts andchanged organisational structures wouldappear to offer some very high pay-off newoptions for Australian defence forcedevelopment. We need to pick up some of themost promising opportunities and start an

evolutionary process of experimentation andadoption.

Reinforce the value of our key alliancerelationships

Australia’s current circumstances underlinethe enduring nature of our shared securityinterests with the United States and our otherclose allies and friends. Indeed, in exploringnovel approaches to the RMA and other issuesthere may be scope for more joint capabilitydemonstrators and other combined activities.Despite these close alliance links, it will remainimportant for the Australian Defence Force tobe able to conduct key categories of operationon its own, to safeguard against the possibilityof Washington being distracted elsewherewhen we face a future crisis.

Work harder to marshal whole-of-nationcapabilities for future crises

In future crises, persuading the opposingdecision-making elite to change its mind willtake much more than just our defencecapabilities. It is time that we put in placeeffective means of marshalling the diplomatic,financial, industrial, transport, and other

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEFENCE: TEN KEY ISSUES TO GET RIGHT 13

capabilities of the nation with great efficiencyand effectiveness for future crises. This mightbest be done by a small staff working directlyto the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

Face up to the new threats and get nimbleNearly all Australians would prefer to

ignore the momentum behind the proliferationof ballistic and cruise missiles, the disturbingdevelopments in chemical and biologicalweapons, the potential for the terrorist use ofweapons of mass destruction and thepreparations of others for waging cyberwar.These concerns should not drive our defencedevelopment, but there is scope for Australia tobe rather more pro-active in our efforts toprepare for these threats.

We need a new approach to our Reserve ForcesWhen regular personnel are likely to be an

even scarcer asset in the future, we need tofind ways of making better use of, andattracting and retaining larger numbers of,reserve personnel. The Australian civil skillsbase is vast and deeply impressive. New andmore flexible ways of harnessing this resourcefor defence purposes need to be found.

Reaping the full gains from contracting outWhen Defence functions are contracted

out, the surplus Defence personnel need to bewasted from the payroll, not just reallocated toother duties. It is time to get past the pain andwin some more of the gains from theCommercial Support Program.

A new toughness and rigour in defence analysisIn recent years Defence has paid a high

price for having wound back its hard-nosedanalytical capabilities. One consequence has

been some very poor and expensive decisions.Another has been some importantopportunities missed. It is time to makeamends.

More must be spentThere can be no avoiding the fact that

defence spending needs to rise from its currentlevel of 1.9 per cent of GDP to something like2.3 per cent-2.4 per cent of GDP if Australia isto develop the kind of first-rate capability todefend the country that the electorate wouldexpect. The level of expenditure needed is closeto the average we spent during the 1960s, 70sand 80s.

Moving in New DirectionsWhile there may be more money flowing to

the defence portfolio during the comingdecade, the challenges for management will beeven more intense. A strong and unavoidablemessage is that the Defence Force is facingmajor change. Some long-held capabilities canno longer be justified, but other completelynew ones are essential to bring onboardquickly. Defence needs to become much morepracticed at analysing and comparingalternative total defence systems, not justalternative elements of capability, and it needsto strengthen the skills and methodologiesrequired. Making these changes whilstmaintaining a clear focus on the essentialroles and tasks and the wherewithal forimplementing winning strategies will requiregreat management skill and strong politicalcommitment.

Dr Babbage is Director of the Centre for International Strategic Analysis (CISA), headquartered in Perth. CISA is anon-profit corporation committed to bringing the highest quality analytical minds to bear on the key issues facingAustralia’s corporate decision-makers. Dr Babbage has previously held senior positions in the Department of Defence,the Office of National Assessments, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU and with ADI Limited.

F–111 with bombs and missiles

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The fundamental problem for contemporarydefence planning at the strategic level is

that the strategic environment can and doeschange at a rate which far exceeds the ability toadjust the defence force organisation, itsstructure, capabilities and capacity.Accordingly, capability planners need to directtheir attention to future possibilities, tosituations beyond current warning indicators.This raises three issues, particularly for smallforces.a. There is a need to avoid the temptation to

have a little bit of everything, comforting tothose seeking to preserve sectional interests,but risking the attainment of effective levelsof deployable operational capability.

b. Both short-and long-term exigencies needconsideration. Short-term requirementsnaturally attract attention, but longer-termneeds should not be neglected. Difficultchoices involving both likelihood andconsequences of particular contingenciesare involved.

c. Finally, in a highly competitive resourceenvironment, how are resource levelsbeyond those required to meet evidentexisting commitments actually justified?Yet investment in future requirements andan appropriate internal allocation ofdefence resources are essential for long-term security.The decisions on long-term defence

investments are matters for government. Onlygovernments can make the key decision on thedegree of strategic risk they are prepared toaccept, on the level of resources to be devotedto defence and on the broad priorities for

defence expenditure. The task of the defenceplanner is to articulate clearly the choices andthe potential consequences of decisions.

Intelligence, no matter how professionaland competent, can not provide completeanswers to these issues. Good analysis based onsolid evidence can narrow the field in providinga substantial degree of confidence injudgements of what can not happen. Forexample, comparative force analysis withestimates of capability development times givesa high degree of confidence that Australia willnot face for some years a realistic threat ofmassive invasion of the continent. Further, it isclear that preparations for such action wouldbecome evident long before any potentialassault. But intelligence is limited in that it cannot predict with reliability what will occur,particularly over the long lead times associatedwith effective defence planning and capabilitygeneration. Discontinuities in the strategicenvironment are the factors of real concern forplanners. Yet, because unexpected, they arerarely forecast with sufficient confidence toallow effective advanced decision-making.Recent examples include the Asian Pacificfinancial crisis of 1997/98 and the Timoroperations of 1999/2000, each of which willhave significant but different long-termconsequences for Australia’s international andregional standing and for its security outlook.

Events of this significance will inevitablyhave consequences for Australia’s defencecapabilities and preparedness. And may involveincreased investment in defence and changes inpolicy and priorities. Frequently such eventswill lead to public debate and speculation about

Australia’s Defence PostureBy General J. Baker AC DSM (Retd.)

In a strategic environment of increasing uncertainty and complexity, there are few, if any,absolutes, for Australian defence planning. Rather, defence decision makers are faced with a widerange and various levels of issues. This presents challenges not only for the formulation of defenceand security policies but also for its coherent articulation.


future intentions. It is here that there is realpotential for significant misunderstanding andmisinterpretation. Importantly, it is at times ofregional tension and uncertainty that theconsequences of faulty speculation are at thegreatest danger of adding to the complexity ofmanaging the situation.

Over recent decades the publication byAustralia of an unclassified version of each ofits periodic strategic reviews has done much topromote understanding of Australia’s outlookand broad stance. Indeed the adoption byregional countries of a similar, if not quite sothorough, equivalent process has added to thetransparency and confidence-buildinginitiatives essential to the management ofrelationships with the South-East Asian Region.

However, there remains in explanation agap between the strategic policy position andforce structure outcomes. This leaves open thetendency to read fundamental policy shiftsincorrectly as relatively minor force structure orreadiness changes, and vice versa.

This gap in understanding can be overcomein part by the articulation of Australia’sDefence Posture. Such a document wouldreflect the outcome of a whole series of defencepolicy and force structure deliberations. In turnthis provides a defined baseline for ongoingdeliberations on aspects such as:

- variations to defence policy;- adjustments to military strategic concepts;- force structures;- capability considerations;- preparedness needs;- sustainability;- force disposition;- expansion planning; and- commercial supportImportantly in the expected dynamic

strategic and technological environment, massalone is an inadequate measure of defencecapability and potential. The quality andeducational level of forces will be all the moresignificant as cutting edge technologies replacemany of the past ways of warfare. In a reversalof the trend of the last century to larger forces,

decisive moves in combat now, and in thefuture, are likely to be accomplished by smaller,longer-range, precise, focussed and powerfulsystems. Under these circumstances, the qualityof the individual soldier and the commandarrangements become more important.

In future, battlefield advantages will bedrawn not so much from the superior weapons,but from the so-called Revolution in MilitaryAffairs (RMA). When mastered, the RMA allowsforces to derive great power from thesynergistic benefits of combining knowledge,experience, commitment, training discipline,and precision with advanced platforms andweapons. Australia is one of the relatively fewnations with the education, scientific, industrial,attitudinal and geographic assets to make bestuse of RMA possibilities.

In this, just as is necessary in defenceplanning to move away from straight lineprojections of trends in international affairs,force structure planning needs to become amore dynamic process if the full benefit of theRMA is to be achieved. This is best illustratedby a contemporary example. There is littledoubt that Australia’s standing in the regionand beyond has been influenced significantlyby the performance of INTERFET. It was thespeed of deployment and the professionalism ofthe personnel rather than the weapon systemswhich produced the outstanding result. As aresult Australia can aspire to leadership offuture regional reaction to contingencies ofsimilar style. Australia’s defence posture is notonly influenced by policy objectives, but theobjectives themselves are in part established byreference to national posture.

Any statement of Australia’s defenceposture needs to recognise the interactionbetween objectives and capabilities. Policypositions not only help shape capability needsof the force but characteristics of the forceshape the boundaries of feasible policyobjectives. In particular flexibility andinnovation are increasingly importantcharacteristics which should be pursued withvigour. Posture, accordingly, is the sum of

AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE POSTURE 17

capability, preparedness and sustainability asthey both express policy and influence thearticulation of policy.

For simplicity, it could be expressed as:If it is to add clarity to understanding ofAustralia’s defence intention, a statement ofposture must cover key aspects at variouslevels of significance and time-frames. Forexample, the development of the chain ofbare air bases to the north of Australia anddeployment forward of Army formationsshould be seen as part of the evolution ofdefence infrastructure rather than a changein threat perceptions. But at the same time,positioning of force elements in the north,also contributes to deployability as they areacclimatised for operations in the region. Orat a different level, units structured aroundthe needs of a conventional conflict mightbe trained and prepared to undertake othermissions such as peacekeeping.

Broadly, a statement of defence posture canbe viewed from three perspectives:a. The Fundamentals, those aspects for which

there is strong, continuing and long-termagreement and which are unlikely tochange or where change does infrequentlyoccur would require wholesale change ofapproach and force structure. This reflectskey national policy.

b. The Constants, those aspects which set outthe main characteristics of the DefenceForce. It provides the foundation of theforce structure and as such is relativelyconstant or at least involves substantivetimeframes to change markedly. Thisreflects and influences largely defencepolicy.

c. The Variables, those aspects which areconstantly under review and can bechanged relatively quickly in responselargely to changes or potential changes incommitments. This reflects largelyoperational matters.

By way of illustration the following table sets out a number of the characteristics of Australia’sdefence posture.

The Fundamentals The Constants The Variables

Non-expansionary Joint Force (not integrated) ORBAT – BalanceBased around the self-reliant Reliance on Preparednessdefence of Australia and its industry/commercial supportprimary interestsNon-nuclear force Emphasis on knowledge edge Entry standardsProfessional all volunteer force Innovation Training emphasis and

standardsMix of full-and part-time Small size of full-time High proportion of forcemembers component deployableTechnologically competent Maritime focus, emphasis on air Support to civil community

– commitmentsAlliance relationship with the Regional participation andUSA leadership

Interoperability, alliance and regionalNorthern dispositionExpandabilityFlexibility


Clearly this list is not exhaustive. It isintended only to suggest a framework aroundwhich statements of defence posture can bestructured. Depending on the audience forwhich it is directed, so the degree of detail canbe adjusted. Also, it allows further elaborationin specific areas to deal with particular issuesunder consideration at any point in time.

A further connection that needs to be madeis that the flow of effect is downward. Forexample, a change of Fundamental wouldresult in a chain reaction through theConstants and the Variables. The reverse doesnot hold true. This difference is important inexplanation of the significance of decisionsflowing from a change in the strategicenvironment. Managed properly it can assist inavoiding the misunderstandings presentlyencountered in defence policy issues anddebates.

In overcoming weaknesses in the presentpresentation of Australia’s defence outlook, itis the component headed “The Constants”where most debate occurs and explanation is

needed. It is here that the greatest interactionbetween physical and psychological factorsoccurs, where aspects such as flexibility,inventiveness and commitment can at timesmore than outweigh shortcomings in structureand capability. For example, all volunteerforces generally perform far better thanconscript forces, or command arrangementswhich provide for initiative of subordinatecommanders, often win over rigid systems.

It is in these non-material aspects thatthe Australian forces have long excelled, yetthese are rarely encountered in capabilityconsiderations. Indeed there is presently adanger that narrowly focused skillsdevelopment will work against innovation andflexibility. Considerations of posture canovercome this weakness.

Posture, then, is an articulation of how theAustralian Defence Force “looks” bothdomestically and internationally. It is notdirected at aggression or intimidation but atwhat, credibly, the Australian Defence Forcemight be required to do by Government.

General Baker joined the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1954, graduating in 1957 he was commissioned into theRoyal Australian Engineers. He served in a number of Engineers Units throughout his early career. Following a year atArmy Staff College, Queenscliff he undertook a number of staff appointments in Army Headquarters. General Bakerserved in Vietnam and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1971. Promoted Colonel in 1979 he was appointedDirector of Combat Development – Army until posted to the Office of the Chief of the Defence Force Staff in 1980.Promoted Brigadier in 1982 he assumed the duties of Director General Joint Services Policy. In 1987 he was promotedto Major General and took up the duties of Chief of Logistics – Army and in 1989 was appointed Director, JointIntelligence Organisation. Promoted Lieutenant General in 1992 he took up the appointment of Vice Chief of theDefence Force.

General Baker assumed the appointment of Chief of the Defence Force in 1995 retiring from the position in July 1998.

19

Defence Review 2000 – Our Future DefenceForce sets up a similar round of “Defence

Darwinism”. One of its basic choices is whetherwe can maintain a full range of air andmaritime capabilities or “should we specialisein one or two capabilities, putting lowerpriority on others?”1 My commentary addressesthis choice and in doing so, flags some broaderconcerns of maritime security.

The Discussion Paper acknowledges thatAustralia’s strategic environment is “fund-amentally maritime” but then gives littleconsideration to the complex requirements ofmaritime security.2 The Paper implies that themain Defence focus should be the ultimate, buthighly improbable, threat of major invasion ofAustralia. This will be handled through airstrikes against the invasion forces and bases ofthe adversary. The Paper emphasises aircombat and strike capabilities in higher levelsof conflict. Air Combat is the first (andpriority?) military capability discussed and witha classical Freudian slip, the Paper includestwo almost identical photographs of an F/A-18Hornet firing an AIM-7 Sparrow missile.3

This focus on high technology aircapabilities and full-scale open warfare issimplistic. It has the potential to distortAustralia’s defence capabilities in such a waythat the ADF may be incapable of effectivelydealing with contingencies short of majorassault on Australia and more likely in theforeseeable future. The focus could alsomarkedly weaken community perceptions of theutility and relevance of the ADF, particularly if

the public comes to share the view that warsbetween nations are now less likely.4

The capabilities to defeat an invasion ofAustralia may have almost no utility for moreprobable contingencies. Australia’s air combataircraft have not been used in operations sincethe Korean War while maritime and landcapabilities have figured prominently in allactive service contributions by Australia overthe last 50 years. The proponents of air combatand strike capabilities will of course argue thatthese capabilities had a major deterrent valuein East Timor. However, the same could be saidof the much more visible presence of the majorsurface combatants covering the landings inEast Timor. Also, our land forces in Timor wereheavily dependent on the sea lines ofcommunication (SLOCs) from Australia.

Incredibly there is no mention in DefenceReview 2000 of the importance of shippingand the protection of SLOCs to Australia’ssecurity. Strategically important shipping couldinclude ships carrying essential support foroperations in the island arc, criticalcommodities and military supplies intoAustralia, or fuel and stores for ADF operationsin northern Australia. High levels of air activityfrom RAAF Tindal or the Curtin and Schergerbare bases would depend upon re-supply offuel by sea as it is inconceivable that with thecurrent land transport infrastructure, thesebases could be re-supplied by land alone.

There are other major problems with theconsideration of maritime security in DefenceReview 2000. The Paper identifies Australia’smost immediate strategic interests as lying in

The Survival of the Fittest?By Commodore Sam Bateman AM RAN (Retd.)

Twenty years ago Australia’s defence planners were in the grips of “Defence Darwinism” asthey sought a survivor from the new tactical fighter project, the follow-on destroyer program, andthe Navy’s bid to maintain its aircraft carrier capability. In the event, the new tactical fighterproject led to the acquisition of the F/A-18, the follow-on destroyer program down-sized to theAustralian Frigate Program, and the Navy lost its organic fixed-wing air capability.


the arc of islands stretching from Indonesiato the Southwest Pacific but gives littleconsideration to how the ADF might operatewithin that arc. The arc is part of Australia’smaritime environment and maritimecapabilities are required to operate there,particularly to deploy and sustain apresence. Flexible sea-based capabilities willhave marked utility just as they have foroperations elsewhere around Australia andour offshore territories. Relevant sea-basedcapabilities include air defence, air supportfor land forces, command and control,surveillance and monitoring, as well asamphibious and logistic support.

Another major problem is the lack of anevident link with Australia’s Oceans Policyreleased in December 1998. Australia’sOceans Policy is a major policy initiativethat provides the strategic planningframework to protect and manage the largeareas of ocean under Australia’s jurisdiction.Australia has rights and obligations in anarea of ocean that is at least 50 per centlarger than the continental landmass ofAustralia and protecting these rights andfulfilling our obligations are major elementsof maritime security. In a section on“Protecting the National Interests",Australia’s Oceans Policy identifies that thechallenges for Defence are:• To protect Australia’s national interests

and sovereign rights.• To provide accurate, up-to-date hydro-

graphic, oceanographic and navigationinformation within our marinejurisdiction.(Australia’s Oceans Policy, Vol. 2, p. 37)In a startling breakdown in coordination

between two major areas of public policy,

there is no acknowledgement in DefenceReview 2000 of how Defence will meetthese challenges. The challenges encompassthreats, such as illegal fishing, illegalmigration, drug smuggling, piracy andpollution. The ability to deal with suchthreats is a vital element of maritimesecurity. It is not a question as to whetherthe ADF’s contributions to these roles“should grow or shrink".5 Under currentarrangements, no agency other than theADF has both a responsibility and thecapability to provide this security.

Defence Review 2000 flags some difficultpolicy choices. Many of these are set up asalternatives but the reality is that most arenot true alternatives. Some capabilities haveutility for only a limited number ofcontingencies while others are relevant to amuch fuller range. Some are morefundamental requirements than others. Froma maritime security point of view, basiccapabilities comprise those that allow us tomaintain effective surveillance and responsein Australia’s Maritime Jurisdiction andmaritime approaches, including the islandarc, and to sustain a military presence there.Rather than lose or degrade some of thesecapabilities, in the short-term it may well benecessary to accept the apparent “fallingbehind" of our air combat and strikecapability.6

NOTES1. Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence

Force, A Public Discussion Paper, June 2000, p. vii.

2. ibid., p. viii.3. ibid., pp. 36 and 59.4. ibid., p. 4.5. ibid., p. 30.6. ibid., p. 37.

Sam Bateman retired from the RAN in 1993 and is now a Principal Research Fellow in the Centre for Maritime Policyat the University of Wollongong. His naval service included four ship commands, five years in Papua New Guinea andseveral postings in the force development and strategic policy areas of the Department of Defence.

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Security Regionalisation and the Future ofthe Australian Defence Forces

By Dr C. Bell, Australian National University

The tasks that Australia's defence forces may face in the next few decades are likely to beshaped by four factors: unipolarity, normative shift, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), andsecurity regionalisation.

Unipolarity (that is, the absence for thenext few decades of any plausible

military “peer competitor" to the US) meansthat hegemonic war, like World War I and IIis very unlikely for that period of time.Normative shift means that diplomatic andpolitical pressures for intervention in the mostlikely kind of wars (local “wars of identity"such as Kosovo and East Timor) will possiblyincrease. The Revolution in Military Affairsmeans that US interventions in such episodesis likely to concentrate on modes compatiblewith the “force protection norm", which wasthe basis of the US Kosovo strategy.

Taken together, those three factors seemto me to imply the fourth: securityregionalisation. Both Kosovo and East Timorwere essentially regional crises, handledlargely by regional means. Those two smallprovinces were strategically and economicallyof importance only to their immediateneighbourhoods. And though the normcreated in each case was of universal validity(that minorities are not to be massacred orexpelled or deprived of their human rights bythe governments which claim sovereigntyover them), the military interventions touphold that norm were and are essentiallyregional. If Australia had not had forces andbases nearby (or had not been willing to usethem) nothing effective would have beenlikely on East Timor. The many crises ofAfrica are these days mostly being left toAfrican coalitions even though that hasentailed many failures and disasters. The onlyregions in which a global US-centred response

to crises still appears certain are the Gulf(because of the global interest in oil supplies)and the Korea-Taiwan area, because of itsimportance to global strategic relationships.

So security regionalisation appears wellunder way. Its main implication for thestructure and capacities of the Australiandefence forces is a clearer distinction betweenthe “high-tech" element in the ADF and thecapacities required for lower-intensityoperations. For the “high-tech" end, the USalliance is more than ever indispensable. TheRevolution in Military Affairs offers the mostpromising set of systems yet evolved to solveAustralia's permanent strategic dilemma: howto defend a very large territory and a longand vulnerable coastline with forces whichwill always remain very small by global orregional standards. The information andtechnologies which the US provides arecrucial to our retaining (or repairing?) oursomewhat diminished technological edge,which in turn is vital to the defence of thesea-air gap to the north.

The RMA is a research area in which theevolution of systems takes such radical turnsthat it justifies postponing decisions onreplacements during the “bloc obsolescence"period until as late as is compatible withsafety, even if it means interim “updatings".Advanced versions of traditional, familiarsystems are not necessarily the long-termanswers. The successors to the F18s or theF111s, 20 years hence, might be UAVs orUACVs, or missiles. The successors to thefrigates might be arsenal ships. When the


savings in personnel are taken into account,the radically new systems might actually becheaper than the current ones.

Some of the systems projected by theRMA especially surveillance, may be useful tolow-intensity operations, but here it is clearthat numbers of personnel - “boots on theground" are likely to remain vital. The basicquestion is who will be available to bewearing the boots? Fit, well-educated youngmen and women, 17-24 such as the Serviceshave traditionally looked to recruit, are goingto be a scarce and dwindling resource all overthe advanced world in the next fewgenerations. Birth rates are well belowreplacement rates almost everywhere in theWest. Able young people will have manyalluring and remunerative other professionalopportunities.

But a larger and perhaps more “available"demographic cohort is just appearing on thehorizon: the “baby-boomers". At a medianage now of 50, many of them will have raisedthe kids, paid off the mortgage and gone asfar as they are going in their careers. A newinterest, with a touch of adventure andaltruism about it, like helping a small peopleto reconstruct their devastated society, mightappeal to quite a few of them. And they willhave skills and experience useful for theactual tasks that arise in the aftermath ofevents like those of East Timor: re-creatingschools and legal systems and coping with thesad civilian casualties of modern conflict.

The troops sent to East Timor and Kosovowere combat troops, but in neither case didthey see much combat in the traditional sense.They went into “permissive environments",secured in East Timor by diplomatic pressures,and in Kosovo by an air campaign and adiplomatic deal. Those patterns seem to methe likeliest ones for many future peaceenforcement or peacekeeping operations,including the ones in the “arc of crisis" whereAustralia's primary strategic interests lie.

There are of course real dangers in suchoperations, so the “first wave" probablyshould always be of professional combattroops. But these are not necessarily going tobe brief operations: the NATO troops are stillin Bosnia, for instance, five years after“peace" was established. Australia could notpossibly tie up its tiny combat forces for solong. That is where a “second wave" of whatmight be called “guardian forces" or“auxiliary reserve" would prove useful. In theage-cohort that I have suggested difficultiesover employment promotion and familyresponsibilities (for women as well as men)might well be less than for younger reservistsstill making their careers and their lives. I amnot suggesting a “Dad's Army" but an armedand uniformed force with training, weaponsand rules of engagement adequate to allowingits members to defend not only themselvesbut the local victims of harassment orrevenge-seeking.

Dr Bell was one of the first women recruited to the Australian diplomatic service where she served during the late waryears. She moved from there to the academic analysis of international politics, obtaining her PhD in the University ofLondon. She went on to become Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, and returned to theANU in 1977. Dr Bell is interested in the future of the society of states in the new millennium, particularly in theinteraction of its economic, diplomatic and strategic dimensions in a unipolar world; also in crisis management and inAmerican foreign policy. Dr Bell has been writing a book to be published by the United Nations University in 2000,entitled "Kosovo and the International Community". Her study analyses the relation between force, diplomacy andnorms in the management of the crisis. She has also written a study of the “zero casualties” strategy as attempted inKosovo, and an article on “Washington and Unipolarity" to be published shortly by The National Interest, Washington.

23

Perhaps it isn’t sure yet. With the recentrelease of a Defence discussion paper, there

is now a formal community consultation onthe future defence force. Maybe theGovernment believes the strategic policydecisions Australia now faces are tooimportant to be left to our military HighCommand.

The White Paper must analyse the rolesthat the Australian Defence Force (ADF) needto play to provide a broad range of militaryoptions for government. The INTERFETdeployment demonstrated to many that theADF is needed to perform a leading militaryrole in the region. Even peaceniks marched forour warriors to go north.

But East Timor also highlighted the need toclarify whether the ADF should focus on beingthe leading high-tech force in the region or aforce that has enough personnel to intervene inthe immediate neighbourhood to keep peaceon the ground.

Australia’s focus in the past has been onbuilding forces to defend northern Australiafrom a relatively large military threat. But thishas occurred only once in our history. It isunlikely to arise again in the foreseeablefuture, and is an eventuality which we wouldhave most warning. Defence has, however,continued to invest in weapons platforms thathave been justified against the least likely,long-term needs of a large scale direct militarythreat.

We are, however, confronted by a range oflesser but still serious security threats such asillegal immigration, drug smuggling and illegalfishing. Our strategic environment is volatileand we may see further calls for the ADF to

undertake peacekeeping operations andevacuations.

What is more likely than the defence of thecontinent is that the ADF will be required toparticipate in regional engagements in our areaof strategic interest and beyond. The Howarddoctrine of the ADF acting as a regionaldeputy sheriff was a clear statement that thedefence of Australia does not simply begin atthe low-water mark. It includes the capacity todeploy into the region. Timor showed that ourdefence policy would be a failure if we alloweda crisis to unfold in our immediate region anddid nothing to prevent it or at least minimisethe costs.

But that is not to argue that the ADFshould be structured for high-intensity conflictremote from Australia. In the marathon race ofstates developing the Revolution in MilitaryAffairs (RMA), mainly advanced developmentsin information technology, the US is way outin front. Few countries, including Australia,can keep up. We cannot afford to go “all theway with RMA”. In most US-led coalitions wewill be the token “flag carrier”.

Contrary to the recent Green Paper, thatsuggests a decision must be made betweendefence of Australia and regional com-mitments, supporting ANZUS deploymentsand peacekeeping and that these choicesdictate different force structures, we shouldbe aiming at a balanced force of the threeServices which can participate in operationsup to and including medium level conflicteither in Australia or offshore. The termdefence of Australia should mean more thandefence of the continent – it should mean

A Balanced ForceBy Associate Professor A. Bergin, Australian Defence Force Academy

The Defence White Paper, due out later this year, is eagerly awaited because it will, no doubt,try to balance national security objectives with good financial management in a period of restraint.Will Defence limit its strategic options? And how will it manage the risks?


defence of Australia and its interests, whichincludes the capacity to deploy into the region.

Capabilities for defence of Australia willalso perform tasks to meet regionalcommitments such as peacekeeping,humanitarian operations and alliancecommitments. East Timor showed a welltrained and equipped force can handlepeacekeeping and humanitarian work. As therespected defence analyst Derek Woolnerrecently pointed out to a forum on the GreenPaper in Canberra, the choices of role for theADF do not imply exclusionary forcestructures. While there may be differences innumbers in inventory, associated systems andstates of readiness dictated by decisionsrelating to the three “choices” in the GreenPaper, Woolner correctly argues that these are“issues of balance, rather than fundamentaldifferences of force structures”.

In developing the White Paper greaterattention needs to be given to a more people-centric view of defence capability. WhileDefence has aspired to a knowledge edgestrategy for some time this is normallypresented in platform-hardware-software terms(superior knowledge of the battlespace confersa combat edge). In the future the knowledgeedge will be very dependent on harnessing theknowledge of an increasingly well-educatedADF. The Green Paper unfortunatelycharacterises capability in terms of weaponsplatforms. But it will be people with ideas andknowledge that will become the key factor ingaining a military edge in the future. Peopleneed to be linked into defence capabilities inthe White Paper. After all, they consumearound 40 per cent of the defence budget.

The extent and size of the force will belimited by the budget, but the roles required ofthe ADF as outlined should be the basic aim.Here the budgetary challenges are very severeand where the White Paper will need topresent an honest picture to allow Governmentto make a decision on resources. The GreenPaper unfortunately in places creates theimpression that lower priorities can simplybe entirely abolished without seriousconsideration of their importance to the overallforce and its long-term capabilities.

By around 2007 the ADF will have to faceup to the problem of retiring much of its mostimportant equipment. The cost of replacing thisequipment to 2020 is estimated at between $80billion and $110 billion. Personnel costs arerising and will restrict options for ADF forcestructure development. The financial pressuresare so severe that Defence will have to selectwhich of its capabilities should be developedand which removed. It will have to focus ondefining its key roles and objectives. But then,this is much of what other Departments havebeen struggling with for the past few years.

In the 1933 film Duck Soup Groucho Marxplays Rufus Firefly, dictator of the tiny nationof Freedonia that is at war with its neighbour.On being told that both sides declared aceasefire Groucho exclaims; “But they can’t—I’ve still got two months rent on thebattlefield”. Judging from Minister Moore’srecent performance, Defence will not bepermitted to collect the rent unless the WhitePaper can clearly articulate Australia’s securityneeds and define the roles of the ADF withinthat broader framework.

Associate Professor Anthony Bergin is Director of the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence ForceAcademy. Before joining ADFA in 1986 he taught for five years at the Royal Australian Naval College, Jervis Bay. Hismain interests are in Australian security policy and maritime affairs and he has published over 100 papers in thesefields.

25

Choosing to Make ChoicesBy Graeme Cheeseman, University of New South Wales

In the preface to their Public Discussion Paper, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defenceargue that Australia must review its existing defence policies in light of growing budgetarypressures and the fundamental changes taking place around us. Unlike in the past, the Governmentnow wants to include the Australian people in its considerations as part of a “new approach tomaking defence policy" in Australia (Canada and Britain conducted similar broad-ranging reviewsin 1994 and 1997 respectively). The people are being asked for their views on four questions: 1)what should Australia’s armed forces do? 2) where should they operate? 3) how should they bestructured; and 4) how should we spend the existing (or an expanded) defence budget. TheDiscussion Paper, associated video and “capability fact book", are intended to help the publicinform its considerations on these questions by detailing Australia’s changing strategic environmentand interests, some of the key policy, capability and spending choices and dilemmas facing ourdefence planners, and three potential force structures for Australia’s military forces.

While on the surface, the DiscussionPaper and associated consultative

process are both welcome and overdue, acloser examination gives us some causes forconcern. In spite of the complex nature ofthe issues involved, less than six weeks hasbeen allocated for meeting with the public.Some of those doing the consulting arealready on the record as supporting one orother of the options being canvassed. Andthe series of public and private hearings hasbeen constructed specifically to excludemost of those who write and research on thetopics of national, regional and globalsecurity. For a document concerned withencouraging a “vigorous, challenging andconstructive discussion" of Australia’s defenceand security policies, moreover, theDiscussion Paper does little to assist theaverage Australian in coming to an informeddecision on the matters raised. We hear onlyone side of the story - that presented by theDepartment of Defence. This acknowledges insome areas the problematic nature of some ofthe arguments and premises being made, butfails to elaborate on these or, even, to provideinformation or pointers to enable thoseinterested in the issue to follow them up.

More worrying still is the way in whichthe force structure options are presented. Thethird option – organising Australia’s militaryforces for operations other than war – isprobably, as I will argue shortly, the mostappropriate one for Australia in the comingdecades. Yet it is presented in a way that isneither fair nor reasonable. The kinds ofactivities included under this option are toonarrowly defined. Readers are warned that itwould entail “significant cuts to our forces’warfighting components", and could only befollowed “if it was assessed that the need forcombat forces was very low and that allianceswould provide an adequate guarantee of oursecurity". In case we hadn’t got the message,the Paper adds that the option would be a“major departure in current policy", and onethat would take us down the road of NewZealand! In any case, such operations are saidto be able to be carried out by forcesdeveloped for the other two “warfighting"options (a position that is informed as muchby myths and mantras as an objective view ofthe issue). Whoever wrote this section of thePaper is clearly only interested in open orfrank discussion if it focuses on options oneand two.


And yet, as the Paper’s own analysismakes clear, the option of organising theADF for security rather than traditionaldefence operations needs to be taken veryseriously. The end of the Cold War and theprocess of globalisation is lessening theprospect of major interstate wars. The keysecurity concerns for Australia, and thecountries in its immediate region, are nowlargely non-military in nature. While thereare various causes for concern about theprospects for peace and security in theregion, so are there increasing causes foroptimism. Australia’s defence and securityposture should be fundamentally concernedwith enhancing these causes for optimismrather than with remaining obsessed withthe causes for concern. This requires us todo what we have done in practice for thelast 20 years: in cooperation with othershelp failed or failing states through theirtroubles and became part of theinternational community, be ready toprotect local communities against humanrights and other abuses, and deal with suchsources of insecurity as international crime,piracy and environmental degradation.These kinds of roles do not require F-111aircraft or missile-firing submarines. Theyrequire, rather, the kinds of forces,capabilities, skills and attitudes we haveseen in operation in such places as EastTimor, Cambodia, Namibia, andBougainville. The problem for the DefenceMinister and his advisers is that this pathwill require a change, not only in policy butalso in Australia’s military and publiccultures. This remains the last, mostdifficult yet most important area of defencereform.

The Government is correct in insistingthat the current process is about choices and

decisions. The Defence establishment needsboundaries within which to work and plan.The Government has also to meet certainresponsibilities and expectations, both to itsown citizens and those beyond Australia’sborders. But Australia has finite resources. Itcannot do everything everyone would likeor expect it to do, nor should it try. Thereal questions are, first, whether theGovernment is prepared to make decisionsand set boundaries. It says it is but its andits predecessor’s record on adjustingconceptually to fundamentally “new times"is poor to say the least. Second, on whatbasis should the choices outlined, albeitimperfectly, in the Discussion Paper bemade? In an era of fundamental and far-reaching change, is it reasonable to proceedfrom a start-point which is problematic and,in many respects, out-moded? Or from thebasis of popular understandings of peaceand war that are centred around the policiesand practices of the past? Or in accord withthe insular and self-serving dictates of realpolitik? The task ahead of the Governmentis much more difficult than is allowed by itsspokespersons or, even, the DefenceDiscussion Paper . It requires not juststrength of resolve but an appreciation ofour changing times and their securityimplications, a sense of strategic vision, apreparedness to lead rather than follow, anda capacity and willingness to see Australiaand its interests in much broader terms:from an increasingly cosmopolitan ratherthan a communitarian perspective. There isno evidence that politicians and theiradvisers are capable of, or interested in,making these kinds of adjustments. We arelikely, therefore, to see the same old answersbeing given to the same old questions.

Graeme Cheeseman lectures in politics and defence studies at the University College, University of New South Wales.

27

There is also the question of where we wantour Armed Forces to be able to operate. In

defending Australia's regional interests, doesthat include a force capable of making asubstantial contribution to high-intensityconflict in Northeast Asia? If so, what wouldthat cost?

When it comes to determining the bestway to structure the Defence Force it isobvious that military operations other thanwar, including peacekeeping, are muchcheaper than maintaining a high-technologyforce structured for high-intensity conflict.But if Australia is to be taken seriously as acompetent military power it must be able todo much more than peacekeeping, asimportant as that may be in our newstrategic environment.

It is, however, ridiculous to believe thatAustralia can afford to structure its DefenceForce to fight at the high end of the combatspectrum in Northeast Asia. If, for example, wewanted to have a force of two or threearmoured divisions equipped with attackhelicopters and ground to air missiles andcapable of operating in a nuclear, chemicaland biological threat, what would that cost? Orwhat about having one or two aircraft carrierbattle groups with VSTOL aircraft andequipped with Tomahawk land attack cruise

missiles? And what would be the cost ofacquiring 70 to 100 advanced combat aircraft,such as the F22, to operate alongside US forcesin a high-intensity combat environment inNortheast Asia?

Acquisition costs alone for such a highthreat expeditionary force might well exceed$70 to 100 billion. And the through-lifesupport costs could be at least three times thisamount. Clearly, those who dream about suchmatters when we spend only about $2.5 billiona year on equipment acquisition are living in afool's paradise.

The former Chief of the Defence Force,General John Baker, in evidence before theDefence Subcommittee of the Parliament'sJoint Standing Committee on Foreign AffairsDefence and Trade on the 30 June said that: “Iam a strong proponent of structuring aroundthe self-reliant defence of Australia”. He wenton to say that any contribution that Australiacould make to high-intensity combat inNortheast Asia would be “minuscule” and thatwe need to clearly understand the limitationsof Australia's power.

But there can be no doubt that we do needto transform the ADF into a different sort ofDefence Force to meet the strategic challengesof the 21st century. My view is that thedefence of Australia and the archipelago to our

Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure Forthe 21st Century

By Professor Paul Dibb, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

The most difficult part in writing any Defence White Paper is the process of arriving at forcestructure priorities. The relatively easy part is analysing the strategic situation and what it meansfor Australia. But even so there are some difficult questions to answer about what is an appropriatedefence strategy. The Public Discussion Paper asks what do we want our Armed Forces to be able todo. One reply is that they must be structured for the defence of Australia and to protect Australia'sinterests. But what are "Australia's interests"? Do they include, for example, the ability to defendour sea lines of communication and is this a credible task for a small nation such as ours? Orrather do we concentrate on the ability to defend our maritime approaches and focal points?Australia’s interests should be few in number and expressed in priority order.


north and east are now one force structureplanning problem. This is what I have termed“the Regional Defence of Australia”. We needto be able to operate there in an essentiallymaritime and littoral environment. We alsoneed to be able to handle two regionalcontingencies simultaneously (for example anescalated East Timor type situation at the sametime as a Service protected evacuation fromPapua New Guinea).

The sort of limited expeditionary forcessuggested here should include a larger andmore mobile Army supported by greater airand sealift and armed reconnaissancehelicopters. Our Navy needs to move awayfrom the idea of open ocean AAW destroyersand concentrate instead on maritimeoperations, including in support of the Army,in the archipelago and the maritimeapproaches to Australia. Our Air Force isdeficient in in-flight refuelling and mostcontingency plans show that this, as well asheavier airlift, are very significant forcemultipliers. And we should think aboutradically different solutions for our futurestrike requirements.

Above all else, we need to press ahead andgive very high priority to having a clearsuperiority over regional powers in the areas ofintelligence and surveillance, as well ascommand and control and communications.

This will not come cheap. It may amount toas much as 30 per cent of our future capitalspend. As for interoperability with the United

States, it is obviously crucial that we retain thiscapacity but in highly selected areas. Andwhilst we must always be able to make amodest contribution to alliance operationsmuch further afield, the US will expect us to bethe most influential military power in our ownregion.

What might all this cost to develop aDefence Force for “the Regional Defence ofAustralia”? It is hard to say with any precisionuntil the real accrual-based costs of the forceelement groups that I have described arearrived at. An indicative estimate, based on theUnited Kingdom's experience in developing anexpeditionary force for mid-intensity conflict,is that it will cost about 2.5 per cent of GDP.Australia currently spends 1.8 per cent of GDPon defence. If then we were to emulate the UKit would cost an additional $4.2 billion a year,which is an increase of one-third on ourcurrent defence budget.

This is clearly a big ask. A more feasiblegoal politically would be for the Governmentimmediately to increase the defence budget to2 per cent of GDP, which would be an increaseof about $1.2 billion. It would then need tocommit itself to real growth in the defencebudget of three to four per cent per annum.This would generate an additional $5 to 6billion over five years. Given Defence’spresently parlous budgetary condition, thiswould only provide the bare minimum forwhat is necessary to transform the forcestructure of the ADF for the 21st century.

Professor Paul Dibb is Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and waspreviously Deputy Secretary in the Department of Defence.

Educating CabinetBy Graeme Dobell, Radio Australia/ABC Foreign Affairs/Defence Correspondent

The Discussion Paper wins an immediate prize for the most lukewarm endorsement of the USalliance ever formally issued from Russell Hill. The Green Paper strays into marshlands ofprobability and imagination as it grapples with Australian expectations of future American actions.

29

It is hard to imagine today’s United Statesstanding back if a close ally like Australia

was threatened… So we can probably expectto receive support, including military support,in any crisis that directly threatens oursecurity… America is hardly likely to allowAustralia to be overrun. But we need to thinkhow things might change in the decadesahead."

It is clearly an honest rendering of thelimits on probable help from America. In itsunipolar moment, the US is still great andpowerful, but how the friendship will apply isopen to speculation. Just as a key reason forholding Parliamentary inquiries is to educateParliamentarians, so a central purpose for aGreen/White paper process is to educate aCabinet. A government that expressedsurprise when it couldn’t summon American“on the ground" for Timor needs to clarify itsassumptions (or hopes) about the alliance.

The Green Paper questions how closelyAustralia’s interests and perceptions willmatch those of the US. And, by implication,the Paper expresses doubt about the currentAmerican doctrine that the US will have themilitary capacity to fight two regional warssimultaneously, asking: “What would happenif the US was deeply committed elsewherewhen we needed its support?"

The continuing tensions between self-reliance and the enormous benefits of thealliance run through the equipment debatesthat drive the discussion. In brutal win-loseterms, the Air Force is way ahead and thesurface Navy is taking water.

A lot of space is devoted to the investmentchallenge posed by future fighter capability.

This is described as the most difficult budgetissue because the fighters “provide Australiawith the primary means of controlling our airand maritime approaches".

While the Air Force fighter gets a coupleof pages, the surface Navy is effectively dealtwith in one sharp paragraph. The Paperdefines two big decisions:• Do we need expensive ships that can

shoot down attacking aircraft at along range?

• What size and quality of fleet do we buildfor the second decade of the 21st centuryand beyond?The surface Navy-fighter aircraft tension

is the starkest equipment conundrum becauseit is the most expensive. But other choiceswill be equally hard fought. Do we really needtanks, for instance? The agonising over theaircraft carrier in the early 1980s shows howhard it is for Australia to let go of acapability. And this leads us back to thealliance and Australia’s musings about itsregional roles.

Blessedly, the second Howard Governmenthas outgrown the map creep or mission creepthat marked its first term. We hear less aboutAustralia’s defence role in the Asia Pacific,with all that implied about operations inKorea, the Taiwan Straits and the South ChinaSea.

Timor, Bougainville, Solomon Islands andFiji and the huge issues confronting Indonesiamean Australia has brought its focus back tothe foreground – South-East Asia and theSouth Pacific (with the odd worried glanceacross the Indian Ocean at the new nuclearpowers).

“


When the Paper talks about “our region"it is looking at ASEAN and the island states.The North Asia rhetoric of the early Howardyears is much less evident. The education ofCabinet is under way. The hard part is still tocome. Defence has to start choosing

capabilities, and letting some capabilities slideor disappear. We can see the shape of thedebate. But the winners are still hidden in thefog of war that stretches from Russell Hill tothe Cabinet room opposite the PrimeMinister’s office.

Graeme Dobell is Foreign Affairs/Defence correspondent in Canberra for Radio Australia and ABC radio. He has heldthe post several times since 1978, between postings to Europe and Asia. His previous position was as the ABC’sSouth-East Asia correspondent. His book Australia Finds Home: The choices and chances of an Asia Pacific journeywas published in August.

Fremantle Class Patrol Boat.

31

The first question I will address sets the veryfoundation for structuring the Australian

Defence Force (ADF) – its raison d’etre – thedefence of Australia and its interests. In theirdefence policy statements the major politicalparties attest that the first responsibility ofgovernment is the security of Australia and itsinterests. One might rightly expect that theAustralian Defence Force would be structuredfor this predominant task. Furthermore andthis point is crucial, a force structured for thedefence of Australia can contribute usefully toalmost all the other calls likely to be made onthe ADF. Indeed, the ADF has carried out, withcommendable skill, peacekeeping missions inCambodia, Namibia and Somalia; peacemaking and then peacekeeping in Timor;humanitarian aid in Rwanda; search andrescue deep in the Southern Ocean; flood reliefand a host of other non-combat tasks overrecent years. However, let it be perfectly clear,that a force structured only to accomplishthese tasks would be totally inadequate indefending Australian sovereignty or theAustralian people.

Perhaps the obvious question that followsfrom this – can the ADF provide for thedefence of Australia, a large landmass andoceanic area, from a population of only 19million? The answer is yes, it can, providedthat the strategic concept for this defence issoundly based and that the resources of theADF are not frittered away by structuring forextraneous tasks.

In determining this strategic concept,account must be taken of the factors that haveshaped consideration of Australia’s defence

planning for the past two decades – afterrejection of wasteful and illogical Core Forceconcept of the 70s and early 80s. That is, tothose enduring characteristics of the Australianenvironment that will not change or do so veryslowly, and to reassess their relevance to thedefence of Australia at this time.

Australia is an island continent, tanks andenemy forces cannot just roll across ourborders. To get here an enemy force wouldneed to transit on, over or under the seas thatsurround us – a progress during which anopponent would be extremely vulnerable. Alsoa telling factor is the deficiency in manpoweravailable from a nation of only 19 millionpeople – particularly bearing in mind thepopulation of the nearer nations of our region.Operations that are manpower intensive – landbattles – would see Australia at a distinctdisadvantage. A disadvantage exacerbated bythe huge landmass and poor communicationsacross the Australian continent.

Looking to our defensive strengths we haveour island geography – the seas that surroundus and across which an aggressor must transit.We are a technically-advanced people able tomaintain and operate the most sophisticatedand effective weapons systems givingextraordinary flexibility, mobility, speed ofresponse and, when combined with state-of-the-art precision weapons, concentrated,effective firepower.

Using such weapons systems the ADFshould be structured to achieve our strategicaim – to prevent a lodgement on Australianshores and to defeat air and missile attacks onour infrastructure.

The Defence of Australia and its InterestsBy Air Marshal S D Evans, AC DSO AFC RAAF (Retd)

Firstly I congratulate the Government on this ground-breaking initiative of putting thesefundamental but critical options before the Australian community and giving those so inclined theopportunity to express their views. These issues have been the subject of debate and discussionswithin defence circles for over two decades.


Currently this involves the capability forsurveillance, early warning, air defence andstrike operations provided by air, together withsurface and sub-surface naval forces and, ofcourse, the means to protect these assets andtheir bases against commando or other landattack. Given the vast area to be covered thecall on mobility and in speed of response areparamount requirements. Air power, with itsinnate capability for such operations will be apivotal element of the force structure requiredfor the defence of Australia. Furthermore, asthe range of cruise missiles and stand-off

weapons increase, as they do with eachgeneration of missiles, the tactical advantageprovided by the sea-air gap to our North willbe reduced and the ADF must be able to outreach the reach of our adversary. Of course thesea-air gap will remain hugely important inregard to an anti-lodgement scenario.

It should be understood that the maritimestrategy formulated for the defence ofAustralia does not mean that there is no placefor the Australian Army. Indeed, an enemymust assess that landing on Australian shoreswould involve combat with a highly trained,

An Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV)

THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA AND ITS INTERESTS 33

well-equipped, well lead, professional army.The enemy would be required to fight anintense and bloody battle should it land onthe Australian continent. To do so it wouldhave to transport across the sea a verysubstantial force. Facing a demonstrablystrong maritime offensive capability and aneffective air defence system the enemy maywell conclude that it would not be a viableoperation of war. Such a force structure maywell deter an invasion attempt.

A potential enemy in some dispute withAustralia might see it as more productive toengage in harassing action as a way ofextracting concessions. This could includeintrusions into our airspace and territorialwaters, action against our off-shore oil andgas installations, threatening moves such asbuild up of forces in West Timor or IrianJaya, small raids on Australian shores or onChristmas or Cocos Islands. Australia, intrying to counter these hostile andprovocative acts, would soon exhaust thelimited sustainability of our small forces. Theonly options would be to negotiate, perhapson terms dictated by our opponents, or toescalate. Our best course would be to seize theinitiative by action against the enemy andthereby force them to cease harassing tactics.This course of action would require the samelevel and type of force structure needed forthe defence of Australia.

More likely than the scenarios outlinedabove and relatively more frequent, willbe calls on Australia to take part inpeacekeeping, peace making or humanitariansupport operations. We should not expect theAustralian taxpayer to provide additionalforce elements for such voluntary

participation in contributing to UnitedNations operations or request from alliancepartners. On the other hand there will beoccasions when the Government may wish tocontribute as a good global citizen or to payour dues. Such contributions could beprovided from the force structure developedto counter the ultimate threat – hostile actionagainst continental Australia, our overseasterritories or our vital interests.

Can we afford the high technology forcestructure required to provide for the strategyoutlined above? I believe the answer is yes.But clearly it will demand a higher allocationof resources than the 1.9 per cent of the GDPpresently provided. We must involve civilcontractors and industry, to the greatestpractical extent, as partners and workassiduously to develop and maintain aneffective reserve force. Developing the reserveforce required will involve a cultural changein the Australian community and may welltake a generation or even longer. However wemust embark on that course of action and, inthe meantime, put in place the severallegislative actions required. These include,enabling the reserves to be activated whenrequired, for compensation to employers andfor the protection of the jobs of reservemembers. The fact that such measures will notbe well received initially should not deter theGovernment from its responsibility to thedefence of the nation.

Other matters to be addressed and thatmay have some impact on the force structureto be acquired would be our strategy inregard to offshore territories, in particularCocos and Christmas Islands. Would we wantto defend either or both? – Why? – How?

Air Marshal David Evans AC DSO AFC, graduated as sergeant pilot RAAF in August 1943. After World War II heflew Transport operations including Courier to Japan and Berlin Airlift. Air Marshal Evans had extensive flyingpostings (8600 hours) including Canberra bombers in Malaya and Vietnam (Commanded No.2 Squadron) F-111’swhen Commanding RAAF Amberley. Senior Appointments include Chief of Air Force Operations, Deputy Chief of AirStaff, Chief of Joint Operations and Plans, Chief of Air Staff.

Brazilian contingent greeted by INTERFET Commander.

35

That leaves the Discussion Paper with oneoverriding purpose: to generate support

within the public and the Government for anincrease in defence spending. Prime MinisterJohn Howard almost said as much when at theDiscussion Paper's launch he put a little moresubstance to his promise to raise defencespending, saying the increase would not be“nominal or derisory”, and promising to atleast hold spending steady as a proportion ofnational output. Even this seemingly modestgoal would mean a turnaround from defence'sshrinking share of the national cake over thepast decade and would amount to a spendingincrease of $500 million a year on the current$12.5 billion budget. The figure could be muchhigher than that. These comments were madebefore the widespread community discussionthe Paper was supposed to engender debate ondefence policy.

That said, the Discussion Paper does asksome important questions about the futurecapability of the Defence Force. But theanswers are heavily contingent on the Paper'sassumptions about the security environment.The assumptions frame the answers it gives.

The Discussion Paper canvasses the keyissues of Australia's strategic environment in asection headed Strategic Fundamentals. As theheading implies, the most fundamental debatesin defence policy are at the strategic level. Butthese the Paper takes as given, and although itseems to be inviting debate by raising a seriesof choices, the choices it canvasses relate notto strategic judgements, but to the capabilityneeded to meet strategic objectives that havealready been made clear.

Australia's strategic situation, the Paperasserts, is this: Although no country has anyintention of using armed force againstAustralia, this could change with littlewarning. The strategic environment is dynamicand uncertain, and although cooperation andintegration are growing, risks remain. Plannersshould not assume that major conflicts arebecoming less of a threat, even if they are lesslikely. The US alliance is critical to Australia'ssecurity. Regional defence budgets are risingagain after the Asian crisis. There are growingdemands for an Australian role in low-levelmilitary operations outside war such as faminerelief and peacekeeping.

Only after laying this foundation does thePaper address the difficult and complexchoices that have to be made within aconstrained budget to respond to it. Thediscussion poses six “key choices” facing theGovernment for the Defence Force. The firstthree of the six “choices” relate to the strategicenvironment, the last three to the capabilityneeded to respond. Should the ADF focus ondefending the continent without relying onallies' combat forces? Surely the answer is thatAustralia will try to do both – rely on itsalliances, especially with the US, but withinthat alliance to seek a level of self-reliance.

The Paper's second choice, “independentaction versus coalition operations”, has asimilar answer. As the Paper says, coalitionoperations have become the norm, andinvestment in interoperability with othercountries' forces – especially the United States'– is critical. The third question, posed as achoice between defending Australia versus

A Clever DeceptionBy Robert Garran, Foreign Affairs and Defence Writer, The Australian

Defence Review 2000 indulges in a clever deception. On the face of it, the Review poses two keyquestions: what do Australians want the Defence Force to do, and how much are they prepared topay for it? But closer examination shows that the Paper neatly avoids raising questions about themost important issues in Australian security, by taking them as given.


regional commitments, is one of the greatdebates in Australian defence policy, and reallyshould precede questions one and two.

The Howard Government in its first termespoused ambitions to play a role in thebroader region that were probably beyondAustralia's resources to fulfil. This is a bigquestion, but it gets smothered in theDiscussion Paper by the detail devoted todifferent kinds of questions about militarycapability.

Answers to the next three questions will beheavily influenced by the views about thestrategic environment, and by the constraint oflimited resources. On the choice betweenquality and quantity, it is difficult to disputethe argument that with relatively smallnumbers of personnel the ADF needs tomaintain high technological capability. Thefifth choice, between conventional wars andnon-combat military operations, will be met bytrying to do both. The sixth choice, betweencurrent and future capability, is a technicalquestion that will depend critically onjudgements about the nature of the securityenvironment.

The Paper does reveal, perhapsinadvertently, a battle within the DefenceForces over the nature of new high-endcapability – an intriguing debate, but one forexperts, not the sort likely to be advanced bydiscussion among a lay audience. It makes

clear the authors' preference for jet fighters asthe heart of the capability for defendingAustralia's air and maritime approaches,presumably at the expense of Navy's aspirationfor improved air warfare capability. Nor isthere much enthusiasm for Army ambitions forgreater “weight and firepower” or enhancedability for amphibious operations in high-levelconflict.

In spite of the confusion of purpose in theDiscussion Paper, the authors' views aregenerally clear. Not fortuitously, they coincidewith the consensus that is already emerging inthe National Security Committee of FederalCabinet, which devoted a day to discussingstrategic policy in February, and will revisit theissue when it finalises the Defence White Paperdue late in the year. More than likely the WhitePaper will propose a modest increase inspending, of perhaps $1 billion a year. Theunderlying strategic doctrine will not change.Preventing attacks against Australia willremain the primary doctrine for designingcapability, with the aim of making onlymodest contributions to coalition operationsbeyond South-East Asia and the Pacific. Therewill be some increase in Army capability, butthis will not meet the Army's bigger ambitions.There will be some scaling back of future high-end capability, which cannot all be affordedwithin even a modestly expanded budget.

Robert Garran is foreign affairs and defence writer for The Australian, based in the Canberra Press Gallery. He isauthor of Tigers Tamed: The end of the Asian miracle, Previous positions include Tokyo correspondent and economicscorrespondent for The Australian.

37

It is natural, given the method I have adopted,to look first at Section 3 of the PDP. The

sequence of “Strategic Interests” stated there isinteresting, beginning with the wider Asia-Pacific area and narrowing down to thedefence of an island continent. This is areversal of the more natural sequence ofTerritorial Integrity and Regional Stability and,paradoxically, it has the effect of weakeningthe claims of the latter because the reader is ledtowards the conclusion “Ah, but what reallymatters is our own territory”. This in my viewwould be a profoundly mistaken conclusionfor a developed medium power.

Great and Powerful FriendsThe unique position of the USA in the

current global strategic situation is rightlyacknowledged throughout the PDP. There ismore than a hint, particularly in “Key Choices”,Section 4, of a partial return to reliance on“Great and Powerful Friends”, the Australiandefence philosophy up to the late 1970s. Whilethe language is suitably hedged, it seems tothis observer that it would be a curious pathfor a prosperous and expanding nation tofollow.

That is not to say that US engagement inAustralian security should not be sought orencouraged. But more powerful levers than ahopeful “America is hardly likely to allowAustralia to be overrun”, or even a reiteration

of the ANZUS Treaty, are required. A helpfulnotion here might be that of catalysis; theability of Australian forces to put up robustand spirited opposition to any violation ofAustralia’s vital interests and to sustain it forlong enough to ensure either a satisfactoryoutcome unaided, or a decisive Americanreaction. This really, it seems to me, sets theupper limit for Australian aspirations to self-reliance. It will not be easy to reach.

Levels of OperationThat upper limit represents what we may

call Operations at the Higher Level, mostcritically (but least probably) in the case ofaggression against Australian territory, and thenotion of catalysis makes it clear that theforces provided must be the core of Australiandefence capability. Necessarily brief commentson their nature will be offered later in thisarticle, here it need only be said that becauseAustralia is an island continent the forces willbe predominantly maritime (three-dimensionally maritime) but with enough landcomponents to dispute or dislodge any landincursion.

But by far the more likely operations willbe in support of regional stability, and herethey are less likely to be at the Higher Level(what used to be called War) than at LowIntensity. This is a phrase more precise than

Territorial Integrity and RegionalStability

By Rear Admiral Richard Hill, (Retd.), Editor, The Naval Review

The Interloping PomIt is a great honour to be invited to contribute, from the UK, to this special edition of the

Australian Defence Force Journal. My meager credentials are a book called Maritime Strategy forMedium Powers (Croom Helm, 1986) that has had more attention in Australia than in my owncountry; several contributions to Australian conferences and publications in the last decade and ahalf; and two lecture tours, the later of which in the year 2000 resulted in Medium Power StrategyRevisited, Working Paper No.3 of the RAN Sea Power Centre. This sets out the more detailedunderpinning of the following comments on the Public Discussion Paper (PDP).


the fashionable “Operations Other than War”,allowing for the sporadic acts of violence,regulated in most cases by strict Rules ofEngagement, that are a feature of many suchoperations. Because, typically, they arepolitically sensitive they require very precise orspecialised application of military force orresources and therefore may needcharacteristics different from those needed forHigher Level operations.

ReachThe force structure dilemmas for a nation

with a limited defence budget, suggested aboveand emphasised in Section 7 of the PDP, arenot much helped in Australia’s case byconsiderations of Reach – the distance fromthe home base at which operations can besustained. The huge distances throughout theregion put great strains on logistic support andendurance. In the defence of Australia itselfthey may work to Australia’s advantage; thesupply lines of any assaulting force are highlyvulnerable. That is one reason for havingrobust maritime forces operating at the HigherLevel. But in operations supporting regionalstability, attaining the desirable reach is a realproblem, soluble only by carefully scaling theforces put in to match the capacity to sustainthem. Operationally, this means choosing thelowest intensity that is viable, and seekingcoalition partners wherever possible. In forceplanning, it means providing robust andflexible units of good endurance, with enoughlogistic backup to ensure effective autonomy.

Resolving the DilemmasAnalysis beyond the space allowed in this

article, centred on maritime forces, may befound in my Appendix to SPC Working Paper

No. 3. But in all too brief summary, I see thedeficiencies in future plans as follows:• Area Air Defence for surface forces:

because regional-stability operationsdemand defence of amphibious and logisticshipping against air and missile attack, thecapability in the “Perth” class must bereplaced.

• Mine countermeasures: the mine is anunderrated threat and current forces,though capable are short of numbers.

• Amphibious shipping and training:increased emphasis on this element of jointoperations will be required.If it is absolutely necessary to cut

capabilities in other areas to accommodatethese elements, then I would suggest that lowerpriority should be given to sophisticated anti-submarine warfare and nuclear, biological andchemical defence. Total neglect would ofcourse be unacceptable, scaling down mightnot be.

Finally, the question of strike capability iscertain to arise in the longer term (PDP, p.38),and it seems to this observer surprising that aTomahawk Land Attack Missile option is notmentioned.

ConclusionThe PDP is a frank and worthy effort to

engage the public in the difficult choices facingAustralian defence. This commentator from theother side of the world detects some trends thatdon’t seem desirable for a medium power, andsees many difficulties in providing all thatAustralia needs, if the defence budget iscapped. Stay Lucky!

Rear Admiral Richard Hill served at sea from 1946 to 1962 and then mainly in staff appointments until retirement in1983. He has since written and spoken extensively on maritime strategy, particularly in the context of medium powers.He is editor of The Naval Review.

39

My concern with the Public DiscussionPaper is that it presents the major force

structure options in a simplistic way, whichcould suggest to the wider public that theoptimum solution lies in only one or the other.This is a dangerous road to follow, ignoringthe complexity of the spectrum of activity inwhich the ADF could potentially be involved.

My intention, within the limited spaceavailable for this article, is not to advocatespecific military capabilities which meet ourneeds but to set out very briefly what I believeare the basic principles of air, sea and landcontrol for our particular circumstances andthose more important principles governingforce development. If they serve as a catalystfor debate and expansion I will be more thanpleased.

The most fundamental responsibility ofthe Australian Government is to provide forthe defence of Australia and her sovereigninterests. Those latter interests are too oftenoverlooked but they embrace political,economic, social and cultural factors whichinclude our global responsibilities flowingfrom the Charter of the United Nations, theimportance of our contribution to thesecurity of our strategic region of interest,the protection of our overseas trade, threatsto Australia’s maritime resources and the

safety of Australian citizens at home andabroad.

While the threat of global war has subsidedsince the end of the Cold War, and there is atthis stage no apparent threat, there can be noguarantees that Australia and her territorieswill never be physically threatened, albeit thethreat of large scale military action directed atthe Australian landmass, or portions of it,would appear very remote.

However, low to medium conflicts continuearound the globe, and even within our ownregion political tensions continue to arisewhich could require Australia’s involvement.The potential for Australia’s continuinginvolvement in United Nations actions seemsvery real.

Australia’s geographic environment, a largecontinental landmass surrounded by sea,provides both protection and a threat. The seais a major challenge to any would be aggressorbut it also means the lifeblood of our nation,its maritime trade, is vulnerable to attack. It isa vast area and not an easy environment todefend, requiring highly capable naval and airforces.

While it is hard to imagine that anycountry would seek to control our entirelandmass, its size facilitates the landing ofsmall to medium sized forces with the aim ofcontrolling key areas. The challenge to our

Australian Government’s MajorResponsibilities and the Principles

Underlying Defence Force DevelopmentBy Admiral M. W. Hudson, AC, RAN (Retd.)

I applaud the Government’s decision to conduct a fundamental review of our defence policy butI hope this will not be seen as a license to rebut all that has gone before. Our Defence Force todayhas evolved over many years of experience in a range of conflicts, and in the time since World WarII we have had several comprehensive strategic defence analyses. Of course it should be modified, ifnecessary, to meet contemporary circumstances but no amount of change can be effective withoutmore adequate funding than we have seen over the last 15 years.


own land forces would be great, with longdistances requiring high mobility, quickresponse and endurance.

The bottom line is that in any conflictdirected at Australia the aggressor must comeby or over the sea and it is this maritimeenvironment that must embrace our first lineof defence. But there can be no certainty thatour territorial integrity will never be threatenednor our vital sea and air lines ofcommunications free from interdiction.

Regional stability appears to beincreasingly less certain and it is in ournational interests that whatever defenceposture we have now and may develop in thefuture it be seen as capable of contributing toregional security. A defence force capable ofdefending Australia should be able to do thisbut this assertion must be tested againstrelevant scenarios.

Principles of Air, Sea and Land ControlIn providing for the defence of Australia it

would not be possible for Australia to exercisetotal control of our entire air, sea and landenvironment. Therefore, our military aim at thestrategic, operational and tactical levels of warmust be, in the first instance, to utilise ournaval and air forces to exercise control of thesea and the airspace above it, most relevant tothe situation at the time. Offence is the bestform of defence and the ability to strike anaggressor’s military bases would be animportant element of exercising sea and aircontrol.

Should this be totally effective any attemptto breach our territorial integrity withincursions onto continental Australia or itsrelated territories would fail. But this cannotbe guaranteed and provision must be made forland and air forces capable of counteringoffensives in those most likely areas of threat.Naval forces would also be required in theinshore areas (e.g. mine warfare) and toprovide amphibious forces for the movementof land force elements. The latter would also

be relevant to regional security and UnitedNations commitments.

Principles for ADF Force DevelopmentThe ADF should have the capability to

deter aggression at the higher level of conflictwith the clear message that anyone attemptingto breach our territorial integrity would beputting themselves in harm’s way. Such aforce should, in the main, be capable ofcontributing to regional security and UnitedNations actions.

Our relatively limited resources and theextent of our geography and regional interestsmean that our armed forces must be balanced,flexible, multi-purpose and sustainable,capable of joint and independent operations,often at long distances from base resources.

Where choices have to be made betweenplatforms having similar potential capabilitiesthe cost effectiveness of each against the othermust be fully analysed, with weight beinggiven to those of a multi-purpose nature.

High-grade intelligence and the ability tocommunicate this to the relevant militarycommanders are essential.

With our limited means multi purposeplatforms should not only offer significantfinancial savings but also flexibility ofemployment, be they at sea, in the air or on theland.

The ability to conduct joint operations isessential, as is interoperability with our majorally, the United States, and those regionalcountries with which we are most likely tooperate

While Over-the-Horizon radar offerspotentially good surveillance of our maritimesurrounds, at least in our major areas ofinterest, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAV’s) should be actively pursued.

A strong industrial base, familiar with theneeds of defence, is essential to provideAustralia, as far as possible, with independencefrom other countries.

MAJOR REPONSIBILITIES AND THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING DEFENCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT 41

Priority must be given to the acquisition ofcombat forces, including those forces vital tologistic support in combat areas.

There is need to ensure that there is nooverlap between areas of responsibility ofstrategic, operational and tactical headquarters.

With defence spending having fallen from2.5 per cent of the GDP in the mid 1980s tonow about 1.95 per cent it appears clear thatincreased funding will be necessary toovercome potential block obsolescence in thenear future.

The very strong political, military andpersonal relationships we have with the UnitedStates must continue to be fostered.

ConclusionsWhatever the final outcome of Defence

Review 2000 it will dictate our capacity todefend Australia and discharge our global andregional responsibilities for the next 30-oddyears. It should not be rushed, although thereare sufficient indicators that funding hasreached rock bottom.

Admiral Michael Wyndham Hudson joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1947. His Sea Commands included HMAShips Vendetta, Brisbane, Stalwart and Melbourne. During his naval career he held the Office of Director of NavalPlans, other appointments included Director General Naval Plans and Policy, Assistant Chief of the Defence Force(Policy) retiring in 1991 as the Chief of Naval Staff.

Commercial support for Defence

Guided Missile Frigates

43

Threats in the inner arc are likely to ariseonly as a consequence of great power

tensions further north. Our interests havealways required seeing power balances struckand conflicts resolved as far from our shores aspossible.

Australia is an island continent, so it needsmaritime protection. Because we lack thepopulation and resources to defend ourselvesagainst major attacks on our territory, we havealways sought the extra margin of security thatalliances provide.

For us, because we are an island, alliancewith the dominant maritime power representsoptimal security. Currently, the United States isthe global offshore balancer – having inheritedthat role from Britain – so it needs to maintaina balance of power on the opposite shores ofboth great oceans. That is highly congruentwith our key strategic interest, which is tofoster a settled balance of power in East Asia.

But the United States is also a democracy,and democracies find it hard to thinkstrategically in the absence of palpable threat.Many Americans now believe they shouldbring their forces home, and end their“entangling alliances”. That’s all the morereason for us to press our interests insustaining our alliance with America.

A US withdrawal from East Asia wouldgive a free hand to the region’s rising andambitious power, China. In the 1940s, wewould have found life highly unpleasant in aregion dominated by Japan, had the US beenwilling to grant Japan a free hand. For thesame reasons, we would find life disagreeable

now in a region dominated by China – even ifwe were not threatened with invasion.

But alliances are two-way streets; securitybenefits come with costs and risks attached –for both parties. Australia has generally beenwilling to accept its share of costs and risks.We joined worldwide efforts to preventGermany, Japan and the Soviet Union fromexercising regional or global power in waysinimical to our interests.

Defending Australia from a distance waswhat my grandfather was doing in Palestine inthe Light Horse with the 1st AIF, in the dayswhen “expeditionary force” was still a positiveterm. And this was indeed Australia’s war –had Germany and its allies won, Australiawould have become part of the spoils of theBritish Empire.

But in Brisbane a quarter of a century later,after the fall of Singapore, my grandfather andhis family were facing the threat of invasion.That threat did not arise in the sea-air gap. Itoriginated much further north, but Japanstruck south over vast distances because ofopportunities presented by the collapse of theglobal balance.

Nor did the threat arise without warning.The Pacific War had its roots early in thecentury when America started to resist Japan’sdemands for a free hand in East Asia. Majorthreats do not arise out of the blue, thoughchanging strategic circumstances can makethem suddenly more dangerous.

In February 1942, all the advantages oftactical surprise and concentration of force laywith the Japanese, while Australian forces were

Alliances: Two-way StreetsBy Professor Robyn Lim, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan

The Defence Review 2000 – our future Defence Force moves further away from neo-isolationism, and the delusion that we can pursue defence on the cheap. But not far enough. It stillfocuses on the least likely threats to our security – those that appear in the so-called sea-air gap –while skirting the critical issue of whether we are willing to incur the costs and risks required toremain credible as a US ally. The Review’s approach still reflects that of the 1970s – the era of ourdisillusionment with allies, and consequent flirtations with isolationism.


dispersed and left guessing where the invadermight land. No strategist, my grandfather didknow that fighting Turks in Palestine wasvastly preferable to fighting Japanese onQueensland beaches. Luckily for us, the USplaced global priority after Pearl Harbor onkeeping open the lines of communication fromAustralia to Hawaii – while not losing sight ofthe need to concentrate on Hitler, whorepresented the greater threat.

We started to forget the importance of theglobal balance for our security in the late1960s. With the US in post-Vietnam strategicparalysis, and Britain also in retreat, it waseasy to become disillusioned with allies. Thatwas reflected in the 1986 Dibb Report, whichrepresented the global balance as irrelevant toour security. To justify force structure anddefence spending, it conjured up a threat fromIndonesia. Yet Indonesia has never had thecapability or intention to invade us.

Since then, we have based our forcestructure mostly on dealing with phantomthreats in the inner arc, while fostering thedelusion that we can get away with minimalcommitments to allied “out of area” operations.During the Gulf War, Bob Hawke was shrewdenough to calculate that if he got in early, hewouldn’t have to do much. So he sent twofrigates and an oiler, and had the chutzpah tocall it a task force. Next time, we may not beso lucky. We might, for example, fail a criticaltest of alliance in a Taiwan crisis. America –especially the Congress – would not besatisfied with token commitments.

True, a Taiwan crisis would be tricky. Weare not obliged to support the US in defence ofTaiwan – our commitment under ANZUS isonly to consult in accordance with our

constitutional processes. But the critical issue isChina’s insistence on its right to use force. IfChina succeeded in taking Taiwan by force orthreat, that would threaten our security overthe longer term. It might also induce Japan togo it alone.

A rupture of the alliance consequent uponour failing a critical test is a far more seriousthreat than that of Indonesian fishing boats inthe inner arc. So our force structure must serveboth our defence (defined in terms of threat ofinvasion) and wider security requirements. Wedon’t need a huge defence industry or Army,or the most expensive and advanced fighteraircraft or submarines available. And “blocobsolescence” is a distraction; what we neededin the past is no guide to the future.

We do need a core capacity to expand ourforces rapidly in order to defend againstinvasion, should that unlikely possibility everarise. We also need an ADF capable ofresponding to challenges in our immediateenvirons, to build on the success of East Timor,as well as being able to make meaningfulcontributions to “out of area” contingencies.

So we need forces interoperable with thoseof allies, especially maritime and air assets,capable of participating in the Revolution inMilitary Affairs. We should also considerdeveloping amphibious forces like the USMarine Corps – a sort of modern Light Horse.

Some, including those sympathetic toChina’s interests, would say that such“expeditionary forces” would be provocative.But our friends and allies would welcome aWhite Paper and consequent force structurewhich showed that Australia had finallyabandoned the neo-isolationism of the 1970s.

Robyn Lim is Professor of International Politics at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan. From 1988 to 1994, sheworked in the Office of National Assessments, Canberra, where her last job was acting Head of Current Intelligence. Aregular commentator on East Asian security issues for the International Herald Tribune, she is writing a book entitledThe Geopolitics of East Asia. Email is [email protected]

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In the absence of a manifest and clear threat,defence policy should be devoted to the

creation and sustainment of the widest possiblerange of options for the use, potential oractual, of military force in support ofgovernment policy. Committing Australia toany one defence strategy or concept ofoperations would serve only to encourage apotential adversary to develop alternatives.

Defence planning should be based uponthree fundamental principles that are at oddswith our somewhat rigid traditional practicesand, to some extent, with Defence Review2000. The three principles are:

Strategy should be flexible;Capabilities should be adaptable; andThe force must be sustainable.A country like Australia can use its defence

force reactively to deal with threats to nationalinterests as they arise or it can operate pro-actively to strengthen its strategic position. Inthe modern era, neither role is likely to be usedunilaterally. Rather the Australian DefenceForce (ADF) will operate with allies eitherdirectly in operations or in strategic concert.The notion that the ADF will ever have tooperate on its own in some last-ditch defenceof Australian territory is conceptually faulty. IfAustralia is ever reduced to such a desperatesituation, it will have already lost.

Popular – and indeed some professional –discussion of defence policy in Australia tendsto focus on the defence of Australian territoryas the fundamental basis of any nationalsecurity strategy. Such a focus ignores thereality that Australia has a wide range ofinterests that define the nature of Australiansociety. The political reality is that Australia

will commit, as it always has committed,military forces to distant operations tomaintain global or regional order. Maintainingsuch order is an overriding national interestthat may in some circumstances be a vitalinterest. In the latter case, it will be equallyvital but more immediate in time thandefending Australian territory.

In this context, the failure of DefenceReview 2000 even to mention the importanceof Australia’s sea and air lines of com-munication is little short of astonishing. By itsvery nature, Australia always has been and is anation that engages commercially and sociallywith much of the rest of the world. Itscommunications have always been crucial toits existence. Previous defence policy papershave also ignored this factor with at least onearguing that Australia could be self-sufficientin extremis. The argument is fundamentallyflawed because it ignores the domestic andinternational political pressures that wouldflow from an interruption to Australia’scommunications.

Of course, such communications areimportant to Australia’s partners so that anythreat to them would engage those partners.Less obviously, any threat to our tradingpartners’ communications will necessarilyengage Australian interests in a classicmanifestation of John Donne’s dictum that noman is an island, entire of itself; every man isa piece of the Continent, a part of the main.

In formulating a force structure that will beboth relevant to strategic and political realitiesas well as the constraints applied by a smallpopulation, Australia needs to do more thansimply defend Australian territory against

Crafting a National Defence PolicyBy Michael O’Connor, Australian Defence Association

The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the mostpenetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you

– Sun Tzu


assault. At the same time, it cannot try toimitate its principal allies and attempt to doeverything. There must be a strategic focus todefine a force that can contribute in anaffordable way to the defence of Australianinterests.

The issue of what is affordable is crucialbut all too often avoided in serious discussion.Defence Review 2000 is certainly less thanhelpful in its somewhat vague discussion of thefinancial issues. Very properly, the documentremarks that measurements of defencespending as a proportion of GDP are generallyflawed but then proceeds to do just that. Itpoints out that Australians spend about $600per capita per annum on defence but fails tonote that, in real terms, current spending is atthe low end of a very small range over the past20 years. Over the same period, personnel andequipment costs have increased verysubstantially in real terms so that effectivespending has fallen sharply. This, rather thanefficiency considerations, is the real reason forthe 28 per cent cut in military numbers overthe past 20 years.

Similarly, it offers flawed comparisons withregional countries. South-East Asian countriesspend much less in raw terms than Australiaeven though they are said to be modernisingmore rapidly than us. No explanation is given

for the seeming discrepancy, not even theobvious one that their wage rates are so muchlower than ours that Indonesia for examplecan buy 30 soldiers for the price of oneAustralian. The document points out that sevenper cent of total Federal outlays are devoted todefence but does not point out, for example,that in 1991 the figure was nine per cent. Overthe same period, Federal outlays on health,education and welfare have grown from 51 percent of the Budget to 65 per cent currently.

The simple fact is that Australia canafford to spend whatever is necessary for aperfectly adequate and markedly morecapable defence force to support a flexiblesecurity strategy. With the economy growingat between 3 and 4 per cent annually in realterms, the capacity exists to increase defenceoutlays with little or no political pain. The1987 White Paper made a commitment,unfulfilled, to increase defence spending to 3per cent of GDP, currently about $20 billionannually. That level of commitment of nationalresources is almost certainly more than isnecessary but, if it was considered achievableand sustainable in 1987, a lesser commitmentof, say, $15 billion should be so now, even if ittakes some years to achieve.

Following service as a patrol officer in Papua New Guinea and full-time duty as a naval reserve officer in the NavalIntelligence Division, Michael O’Connor was appointed National Executive Director of the Australia DefenceAssociation in 1981. A detailed statement of the Association’s views and its formal response to Defence Review 2000can be found at www.ada.asn.au

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History teaches us that it is usually foolishto plan specifically to meet any one set of

contingencies because the internationalenvironment is too unpredictable. In the 1920swe were preparing to face Japan as the mostlikely enemy. Where did we end up fighting in1940? The Middle East. In 1950 we weregearing up for major commitments in theMiddle East and where did we go? Korea andMalaya. For 40 years the United Statesprepared primarily to fight the Soviet Union. Itfought in Korea, Vietnam and the Middle East.What is the point? Sudden storms can blow upfrom across a wide horizon. We have to beable to face any that hit us, not just one or twofrom a particular sector.

And the world is changing rapidly. In thefirst truly global war, the Seven Years War of1756-63, decisions for and against alliances,for and against wars, were taken by kings andtheir handfuls of advisers. In the next globalwar, the Napoleonic Wars, the group ofessential decision-makers widened to includekey ministers and planners of nationaleconomies. The two global wars of the 20thcentury gave public opinion and therefore themedia major influence. They also led to theestablishment of a global authority forupholding peace - the UN Charter. As nationaldecision-making structures have widened, theinternational system has become more stable.

It is becoming harder and harder to thinkof ways of beginning wars which do not prove

counter-productive. Hence the majorcontingencies, which Australia might have toface, are less likely to be global wars, orconflicts between well armed major powersthan at any time in our history. But it is foolishto say they could not happen. The current stateof world order could be unravelled. Mankind iscapable of such action.

Equally it would be foolish to say thatAustralia could never be the target of directpressure from a major hostile power. To meetboth of these contingencies we need as muchself-reliance as we can muster with a stouteffort, plus the underpinning of a soundalliance with the strongest power in the world.

The more likely dangers will be trouble inour own region, both the distant sector of Eastand North East Asia, and the near arc fromAcheh to Fiji. We must be able to play a partcommensurate with our size, wealth,vulnerability and interest in regional peace, toreinforce friendship, and cooperationthroughout these two sectors. We can also becalled upon by the UN or our major ally tohelp reinforce the rule of international law inmany parts of the globe. We need to havesomething to offer – not only ships, aircraftand combat ground forces, but above all highskill and outstanding performance in whateverelements we contribute.

The key requirement for meeting such awide and essentially unpredictable range ofcontingencies is a substantial pool of

Australia’s Security Needs DilemmasBy Robert O'Neill, University of Oxford

In presenting this document to the Australian and international public, the AustralianGovernment is making clear the acuteness of the dilemmas it faces in addressing Australia'ssecurity needs over the next 20 to 40 years. It is good that the Government has produced such anintelligent paper. It is not so good that the questions presented are so imponderable. The fourquestions posed by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence in their introduction to theGreen Paper (what do we want our armed forces to be able to do; where do we want our forces tobe able to operate; what is the best way to structure the Defence Force; what is the best way tospend the Defence budget?) can be answered correctly only with the wisdom of hindsight.


competent professionals. The Green Paperdoes not dwell on this need, althoughobviously its authors are not unaware of it.But I would like to suggest that many of theimponderable issues raised in the documentcan be dealt with only by reinforcing themid-levels of our Defence Force. The historyof wars, warfare and international relationsgenerally shows that surprises are more theorder of the day than foreseeable outcomes.The way countries faced with these problemsin the past have met them has been byimprovisation - intelligent, brave, adventurouspeople putting their lives on the line aided bywhatever was to hand by way of equipment,manpower and resources.

In major commitments the chief problemhas usually been shortage of mid-leveloperational commanders and staff personnel.The First and Second AIF took some threeyears each to climb the learning curve. Itdepended mainly on company and battalioncommanders mastering their jobs. The RANand RAAF in war also faced seriousbottlenecks of the same kind. National defenceplanning and operational direction sufferedbecause there were so few professionals, civiland military, who could contribute usefully toit.

The most important element in determiningwhether or not the Defence Review 2000 willbe judged a success or not will be whether the

Government brings together, keeps togetherand trains superbly the mid-levels of theDefence Force. We are not going to be short ofsenior commanders and planners. Thepersonnel pyramid is broad enough, and deepenough to provide outstanding leaders at thetop. But they will not be able to commandproperly without a surplus to peacetimerequirement of company commanders, shipcaptains and squadron leaders. These are whatwe will need most desperately in time of majordanger, and also in time of multiple but lessercommitments in support of regional peace andinternational law.

The Government and its key adviserstherefore would be wise to lay emphasis on therecruitment, training and retention of moremid-level professionals. They should be givenchallenging education in first-rate institutionsat home and abroad, they should be developedin tough, realistic exercises, and broadenedthrough frequent cooperation withinternational partners - in exercises,secondments, training and close and lastingpersonal contacts and friendships.

With more strength and quality in the mid-levels we have much more hope of improvisingsuccessfully to meet the surprising future. Topretend that we can get the answers to thosefour opening questions right, and avoid anyneed for a lot of improvisation would be theheight of self-delusion.

Robert O'Neill is the Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, University of Oxford. He is alsoChairman of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Chairman of Trustees of the ImperialWar Museum, London.

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Why? Because the June 2000 Green Paperrecognises that the ADF “is only one

part of Australia's wider approach to ensuring[the] country's security and prosperity”, butthen devotes virtually all of its attention toseeking responses to standard militaryquestions.

Nowhere is this more obvious than inChapter 7 where the question: “What Sort ofForce Will We Need in the Future?” isdiscussed under three headings: Forces forDefeating Attacks on Australia; ForcesStructured for Regional Security; and, MilitaryOperations Other Than War. My guess is thatthe answer will be “all three”.

In my view, this is the wrong approach. Atthe start of the 21st century Australia needs,not more of the same, but a root and branchreview of defence. This should be similar towhat we did in New Zealand two years ago,where – unlike the current Australianexercise based on a Department of Defencediscussion paper – a multi-partyParliamentary Select Committee started witha clean sheet of paper and analysed the wayahead for defence, based on widespreadpublic input and consultation.

The resulting document became theblueprint for the current Labor/AllianceGovernment's new defence policy.

In contrast, the Australian Green Paper isall about sustaining a traditional approach todefence. Hugh Smith, writing in the SydneyMorning Herald of July 5, 2000, makes thevery valid point that it is based on fourassumptions that could result in “majorincreases in defence spending with no clearpurpose in mind”.

All countries, including the United Stateswith all of its resources, are confronting theneed for new thinking on security issues. TheEuropeans are trying to grapple with the newenvironment by creating a new Euro defenceforce.

For smaller countries like New Zealand –and even middle powers – the sheer cost andcomplexity of new defence systems becomeeye-watering and increasingly difficult tojustify, given competing demands from areassuch as health, education and welfare.

The Americans and the Europeans aremoving to put their forces into expeditionarystructures, capable of rapid deployment totrouble spots around the world. As the formerBritish Secretary of State for Defence and nowSecretary-General of NATO, George Robertson,put it in 1998, “having flexible, well-trained,well-equipped, sustainable and survivableforces is what modern defence is all about”. Hiscomments are even more valid two years later,given the experience of Kosovo and EastTimor.

There are parallels between the experiencesof Australia and New Zealand in redefiningdefence policy. Both face increasing financialdemands caused by bloc obsolescence, agingequipment, rapid technological advances andthe difficulty of retaining sufficient welltrained, well motivated personnel.

Both countries need to be more selective inretaining and acquiring assets. This has beenacknowledged by the Australian Secretary ofDefence and the New Zealand Governmentwhich is taking sensible steps to determinespecific equipment acquisition priorities.

New Directions for Australia's DefenceBy the Honourable Derek Quigley, Consultant, New Zealand

It is tempting to conclude that the current extensive community consultation campaign underway to chart Australian attitudes to defence is simply a public relations exercise to justify anincrease in the defence vote.


How then should we proceed? We need tolook at what we want from defence from theperspective of questions like:

what does national security mean?how best can it be achieved?what is the best balance betweendiplomatic and military means to achievesecurity?what are the trade-offs? what are the appropriate roles for thearmed forces?This does not mean that we should train

and equip for every eventuality on a country-by-country basis. For smaller states this isparticularly important, given the staggeringcost of traditional defence equipment and theintellectual challenge of using it properly.

This suggests two things. First, that weshould keep as many options as possible openfor as long as possible. Hugh Smith makes thepoint that we may be witnessing the end oftraditional warfare and a shift to “asymmetricwar” where regular forces campaign againstirregulars, guerillas, freedom fighters,terrorists, militias and the like. East Timor is agood illustration.

Coupled with this, is the rapidly evolvingnature of military technology. Given thisreality, why would any defence force withlimited resources lock itself into a particularcapability – such as, for example,conventional military aircraft – if unmannedaerial vehicles are likely to take over many oftheir tasks, ranging from reconnaissance tostrike, in the not too distant future? To quoteThe Economist of December 18, 1999, whichcited a USAF officer:

In the near future, unmanned weaponssystems will prevail over their mannedequivalents by every indicator. To productsof the Nintendo generation… that's obvious.The potential for these types of

developments does not mean that we shouldhang off and do nothing, as there are nowacquisition options available that can avoidthe risk of traditional bloc obsolescence. The

recently cancelled F-16 contract that wouldhave provided the NZRAF with near-newcombat aircraft is a case in point. That “lease-to-buy” deal contained a 180-day exitprovision in favour of both contractingparties, plus two further break points at theend of each five year lease. The “option” topurchase in the contract was simply that, anoption, and did not have to be exercised. Interms of the “deal”, New Zealand wastherefore not locked into the F-16s indefinitelyand could have settled for different aircraft, orindeed no strike aircraft at all, at the end ofthe lease period.

Secondly, the lessons of Kosovo and EastTimor suggest that collective capabilities willinvariably be required in the future for mostcrisis management operations. However, onpast experience, the armed forces of manypotential contributors are currentlyinadequately equipped or prepared for thesetasks. To quote the 1999 UK Defence WhitePaper:

Too few have been modernised to meettoday's requirements. Too few can bedeployed to crises quickly, are flexibleenough to meet the difficulties they willface, or [are] sustainable over long periodsin difficult conditions.The European Council's answer is to be

able to deploy, by the year 2003, a rapidreaction Euro force of up to 60,000 personnelfor humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping andpeace making tasks.

Closer to home, the East Timor deploymentdemonstrated the value of coalition operationsto nations in the region and has spurredinterest in moves to develop standardprocedures for planning and conducting thesetypes of initiatives. It also emphasised the needfor better communications amongst theregion's armed forces and for them to be bettercoordinated, trained and equipped.

More importantly, East Timor illustrated thelikely extent of future American involvementin coalition activities in this part of the world

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE 51

and has brought home to Australia and NewZealand the need for them to be prepared toassume more active responsibility for themaintenance of peace and security in theirown region. As Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USNavy Commander-in-Chief, US PacificCommand said on 7 March 2000 to the SenateArmed Services Committee:

Our program improves the ability ofregional partners to defend themselves,…and promotes security arrangementsbetter suited to the challenges of the 21stcentury.In view of this comment and clear

American reluctance to put its own forces onthe ground in harms way, perhaps the focus ofAustralia's current defence and security policy

review should be on regional security and howit can be enhanced in concert with other like-minded countries. This would require adeparture from traditional thinking and wouldput Australia more in tune with the viewsexpressed in The Economist of February 26,2000, which discussed European defenceneeds:

The Europeans will need time to work outexactly who does what in ways thatproduce a coherent military effort, ratherthan just the quirky sum of the hotchpotchof national parts.It will be interesting to see whether this

sort of thinking will emerge at the end of theheroic and exhausting public consultations onthe Green Paper. I fear not!

Derek Quigley is a self-employed consultant residing in Auckland. He is a former New Zealand National Party CabinetMinister; chaired a major review of the New Zealand Defence Force in 1987; was chairman of the Foreign Affairs,Defence and Trade Parliamentary Select Committee that produced the “Defence Beyond 2000” report in 1999; andearlier this year, reviewed – for the current Labor/Alliance Government – the F-16 contract which the previousadministration had entered into with the United States of America.

Commandos conducting a beach assault

52

National security is a whole of nation issue,which should engage a broad cross-

section of our society in the building of aconsensus on the way Australia commits itsresources to the generation of a dynamic andenduring relationship with the internationalcommunity. The fact that the globalenvironment is experiencing unprecedentedtechnological and sociological change isreason enough for the Defence Policyconsultation with the Australian community.At the end of the day the most importantingredient of national security is nationalunity, and governments of any type areobliged to bring the community they representalong with them as they pursue nationalinterests.

Planning horizons of five years are waybeyond the limits of predictability, both in thenature of technology, and in social change.Despite this, the Public Discussion Paperreleased in June 2000 asks much the samequestions that have been a constant part of theDefence Review process since the VietnamWar. By its nature, the Paper suggests that itsprincipal purpose is a sharing of the challengesthat beset Defence as a prelude to a much-delayed increase in the Defence Budget.

Instead of further salami slicing into whatare now minimal Defence capabilities, thePaper suggests that whole capabilities willhave to go in order to replace others that areapproaching the end of their useful life. Thefact is that there are many things that havealready gone that emerging circumstances are

suggesting Australia continues to need. Manyof these are to do with expeditionarycapability, which was once heavily discountedin order to provide funds for continentaldefence infrastructure.

The Defence ProgramSince 1986, the Defence Program has

always been larger than the Defence Budgetand Forward Estimates. The 1986 DefenceReview called for the Defence Budget to growat the same rate as the national economy, i.e.3.1 per cent. If Defence spending had remainedat the 2.8 per cent of GDP of that time, theannual Defence Budget today would be of theorder of $18–19 billion. More to the point, thewedge of foregone Defence expenditure overthe period since 1988 is something like $36billion in today dollars. The truth is, that inkeeping with the trend towards smallergovernment, the Defence allocations werenever going to be able to finance themodernisation of the force structure while re-orienting the Defence infrastructure to matchthe demands of both the 1986 Review and thechanging strategic environment. Such anoutcome would be more acceptable if it couldbe agreed that our strategic circumstanceshad improved markedly in the past decade.

The Strategic OutlookWith the exceptions of New Zealand,

Singapore and Malaysia, none of Australia’snear neighbours appear to have the necessarycombination of educated labour, effectiveconsensual governance, modern infrastructure

Force Structuring for UncertaintyBy Lieutenant General J. Sanderson (Retd.)

Australians all let us rejoiceOur land is girt by sea

If we can help our powerful friendsWe’ll have security

(To the tune of Advance Australia Fair)Australia’s Defence Strategy since Federation

FORCE STRUCTURING FOR UNCERTAINTY 53

and natural resources to advance the interestsof their people in 21st century terms. The trendif anything is away from these desirableeconomic and social conditions. The prospectfor Australia to have a growing band ofmendicant states in its immediate vicinityappears to be gaining in probability. A largepart of these populations are already severelydisadvantaged and the growing divide betweenrich and poor creates a potential for chaos thatwill generate unforeseen outcomes. Thearchipelago and the South Pacific arebeginning to resonate with the Africansyndrome, where tribal struggles override theLaw, and political leaders resort to and supporta form of modern day fascism in order toconsolidate their power.

Australia cannot turn its back on thesedevelopments without enduring repercussions.Defence planning that is based on wishfulthinking has always been a recipe for strategicsurprise. The alternative for Australia is a morepro-active, hands-on strategic approach thanhas been considered desirable in the past.Australia’s regional engagement should be thefocus of its defence of the approaches to theregion and the continent.

The Strategic TraditionSince 1945 and the advent of weapons of

mass destruction, nearly all wars have reallybeen operations other than war, where fightingwhile negotiating has become the standardstrategy. The mass armies of mobilised andpartly trained reserve forces that died in suchlarge numbers in World Wars I and II, haveslowly given way to professional armed forceswhose services can be applied as part of thenegotiating process without having to arousenations to the full and impassioned responsethat mobilisation entails

The Australian tradition of mobilisingvoluntary expeditionary forces for defence ofthe Empire finished with Korea. Manpowerpolicy subsided into the confusion of the1960s, when it was decided to expand the

Regular Army by balloted conscription to meetthe demands of a forward defence strategyaimed at keeping the major Western powersengaged in Asia. The 1950s experiment ofbuilding a national mobilisation base throughmale universal national service only lastedthrough that decade.

The tradition of preparing forces to fight assubordinate elements of larger allied forcesresulted in separate development of theAustralian Navy, Army and Air Force, eachdeveloping characteristics and culture moreakin to their British or American counterpartsthan to each other. The different focus of eachof the Services also resulted in varyingphilosophies for development. Very lowpriority was accorded by the Services tocapabilities for the support of each other.

Producing a coherent strategy that enduresand overcomes the latent effects of thesetraditions and development philosophies has sofar proven to be very difficult and costly. Theprimary cause of this retardation has been thelack of national consensus on an appropriatefuture role for Australia, and an increasinglyambiguous division between the politicalparties on the centre of gravity of Australia’sstrategic focus. Rather than the shift in theServices’ commitment to each other beingpolicy driven, the indications are that it willcome in the form of fait accompli militarymissions, like the East Timor intervention, inwhich the Services generate shared values andoperational requirements as a result of havingto do things together. The extent to which thisnatural development will be inhibited by theinfluence of non-operators will depend on themomentum of changes in our region thatdemand military responses. It seems that thismomentum is increasing.

The 1987 and 1997 Defence Policy StatementsThe Defence Policy Statement presented to

Parliament in March 1987 by the HawkeGovernment has been much derided because ofits seeming emphasis on continental defence.


Of the coalition deployments that followed inthe five years after its release, only Cambodiahad any linkage with the Defence Policy, beingregional, international peacekeeping, and inthe national interest.

That aside, there were many positives tocome from this continental defence in-terregnum. All three Services had deployedmore capability and support structure into theNorth, allowing the capacity to build andsustain coalitions for use in the archipelago.The focus of C4I infrastructure on the Northand northern approaches gave advantages thatdid not exist before 1987. A joint commandand control capability had been established,both in the North, and in a deployable form.Operations could confidently be launched fromnorthern bases, which could be defended ifnecessary. Australia’s ability to do all of thesethings was a powerful signal of its willingnessand capacity to protect its interests on itsmaritime approaches.

The 1997 Defence Policy Statement is alesser document, clearly produced without thebenefits of the intellectual engagement of abroader community, and transparently aimedat shoring up the spending priorities in anincreasingly crammed Defence Program. Itsanalysis of the nature and impact of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs is cursoryand shallow, and its broad allocation ofpriorities is very confusing.

Both policy statements reveal a fun-damental flaw in Defence policy development,and that is that operational requirements aredriven from the top down rather than from thefront back. If the policy makers were to say tothe operators for example, "We want you to becapable of doing such and such. Now tell uswhat you need", you would then have thebeginning of proper capability based planning.That is, provided the question was asked of aproperly constituted joint command team thathad the analytical tools as well as theexperience, and was supported by Industry andScience to give you the right answers. Such a

capability at the operational level could beexpected to allow significant savings in thestrategic level bureaucracy bringing it to themuch smaller size of defence organisationssuch as Germany’s. Of course, if such a team isnever established the initiative must remainelsewhere.

Perhaps such a team, if it existed, coulddemonstrate why Army has to have effectivemobile firepower and armoured protection ifany sort of break-in against any well-armedenemy in a fortified position is contemplated.You don’t have to go to the Korean Peninsulaor the Persian Gulf to experience this need. Itwill be a requirement to take and hold anypiece of infrastructure that is vital to defenceneeds.

Perhaps such a joint operational teamcould also explain that any continental ormaritime defence that depends almost entirelyon a couple of strips of concrete should takethe defence of those bits of concrete veryseriously. They might also be able to show youwhy you cannot sustain a maritime passagethrough a strait unless you have compliantforces holding either side. If they were to tellyou all these things and more, a totallydifferent view of the demands for managementof the strategic environment might emerge,together with a different set of strategicpriorities.

Why is this matter so important? The firstreason is that there has never been sufficientemphasis on this process of developing anunderstanding of what constitutes acapability from the operational end, and thiscreates a disconnect between the operationaland strategic levels. Furthermore, without aproperly collocated and constituted operationalheadquarters with a high level of modellingand analytical ability, there is a more than aneven chance that priority will be accorded tocapabilities that are irrelevant to futurestrategic problems. The second reason is thatthe purely equipment or platform orientedapproach adopted at the strategic level

FORCE STRUCTURING FOR UNCERTAINTY 55

heavily discounts the key ingredient inDefence capability, and that is talented andcreative people who have both theunderstanding and the courage to makedecisions in complex and chaoticenvironments.

The FutureIt seems most unlikely that any power will

challenge the United States in either themaritime or the aerospace environments forthe next half century at least, and therefore thepossibility of naval battles on the high seas isremote, as is the idea of invasion forces fromanywhere ever putting to sea. Nobody willwaste resources on these options. The truth isthat anything that travels at less than 35 knotsin a flat two dimensional plain would have tohave extraordinary organic defensive systemsto consider operating alone in range of land-based attack systems of even the mostfundamental type. The extraordinary costs ofhaving aircraft deployed at sea are well beyondAustralia’s resources and those of any othernation in the region. Air Force and Army

between them will therefore have to take andhold airfields if air cover is to be provided toAustralian ships at sea beyond the range of ournorthern bases.

The problems we are facing are unlikely tobe solved by standing off and taking out civilinfrastructure with missiles or bombs, nor arethere likely to be military targets in our regionthe destruction of which would have muchimpact on our objectives. While Australianeeds leading edge maritime defencecapabilities on her northern approaches, andthe capacity to destroy any specific militaryinfrastructure that supports operations againstour deployed forces, there is a much lowerprobability of having to use these capabilitiesthan there is the more intimate and directweapon systems of intervention.

The third issue is that defence of the airbases in the North becomes paramount. Unlessthese are alive and functioning, the sea-air gapcan belong to someone else, and deploymentsto influence or intervene on the northernapproaches will not be an option. The truth isthat these bases are what Army used to call

Information systems


vital ground, and you do not defend on thevital ground. You defend well forward of itwhich, for Australia, is in the archipelago itself.This does not mean the invasion and takeoverof other territories, but the sharing of a mutualdefence purpose whereby Australia acceptspart of the defence burden of friendly countriesas a means of defending itself. How to makethem friendly countries while they are understress and fracturing is the moot point. Youclearly can’t do this unless you are engagedand seen to be acting in the mutual interestrather than just your own. Australia needs togenerate and lead a regional alliance.

The region we live in is our responsibility.No one else is really interested, and no othernation in the region has the capacity or thedesire to adopt a leadership role on regionalissues. There is plenty of evidence to suggestthat a vacuum in this part of the world is justas destabilising as a vacuum anywhere.Whether we in Australia like it or not, theproblems of the region will not go away, andin all probability, will get worse. They aremuch more important to us than problems inAfrica or the Middle East or North East Asia. Itis transparently obvious that our major allyexpects us to lead on these regional matters.

Returning to the issue of creative people.They are far more important than pieces ofequipment in a chaotic environment where

there is a high probability of strategic surprise.Australia has to stop paying lip service to thisneed. The people who make good modern daywarriors are not in a majority in this countryor anywhere else for that matter. They will bedifficult to find, and expensive to train, andeven more expensive to retain. These sorts ofpeople are most unlikely to come from theranks of the unemployed, as they will beattractive to any employer. They can comefrom the ranks of the reserve, but only if theyare fully trained and prepared for conflict.

Finally, the entire development processneeds to become more organic and responsive.The idea of controlling operationalrequirements and equipment solutions on alinear five to ten year basis as Defence hasdone in the past is irrelevant to what isactually happening with technology and itsapplication. We need a collocated jointoperational headquarters that is properlystaffed and engaged in the developmentbusiness in real time with Science andIndustry. This is the most fundamental ofrequirements to link development to thestrategic circumstances of the future ratherthan the strategic circumstances of the past.

None of this will be at all possible ifDefence funding is not increased by significantamounts.

Lieutenant General John Sanderson was the Chief of the Australian Army from 1995-98. He joined the Army in1958, graduating from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1961. During his military career he saw operationalservice in Malaysia and Vietnam. Promoted to Major General in 1989, he was first the ACDF Policy, and then theACDF Development. After promotion to Lieutenant General in 1992, he assumed command of the military componentof the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia, remaining in the appointment until the successful conclusionof that mission in October 1993. Between 1993 and 1995 he was the first Commander Joint Forces Australia.

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Of course, the problem of how Australia willdefend itself and its interests is hardly new

and harkens back to the defence debate inAlfred Deakin’s Government followingFederation. The Australian defence dilemma isone with which successive governments havestruggled: finding a balance betweencontinental defence (aka: Defence of Australiaand Self-Reliance), or force projection todefend Australia and its interests within severefinancial constraints. In some Australiandefence circles the latter has become known byone of its characteristics, “forward defence”,and has been discredited as inappropriate foran independently-minded Australia. Andindeed, the Defence Review 2000 documentdutifully raises the question of the US securitycommitment to Australia (in a qualified way tobe sure).

But how important is this particularqualification? In other words, how importantlyshould the force structure requirements of theADF consider the collective defence aspects ofthe ANZUS Security Treaty? As I will arguein this short response, the siren of defenceof Australia and self-reliance has produceda distorted Australian Defence Force

force structure, given decisions taken bysuccessive governments to deploy the ADFbeyond Australia. In other words, “Defence ofAustralia” has failed to keep the ADF on the“Fatal Shore” and therefore it makes little senseto “structure” the ADF predominantly for“Defence of Australia”. Now is a fortuitoustime for the Howard Government to establishclear force development guidance for the ADFthe better to enable it to defend Australiaproper, whilst at the same time being morecapable of carrying out the foreign policyobjectives of the Government.

To be sure, any country would beimprudent to assume that another will foreverunderwrite its security. Yet, I would argue thatfor the purpose of ADF force structureplanning, the issue of the United Statescommitment is of less importance now thanthose who have previously argued the case of“Defence of Australia”. For, as Defence Review2000 accurately points out, the United States iscurrently at the pinnacle of its power in theworld. If Australian defence planners cannotassume US assistance now, when could suchassumption be considered?

Information CapabilitiesAn Unofficial American View

By Thomas-Durell Young, Naval Postgraduate School

The release of Defence Review 2000 by the Australian Government is a novel approach toaddress Australia’s future security requirements. To the optimist, the Howard Government isattempting to engage the Australian public in a public discussion regarding the future forcestructure requirements of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). To the cynic, the Review delays thepublication of the Government’s long awaited Defence White Paper, i.e. buying six months beforehaving to make any hard financial decisions. Whatever the rationales behind the CoalitionGovernment publishing this Review and delaying the release of its long-awaited White Paper, thefact remains hard decisions will need to be made if the ADF is to be structured to carry out themissions the Coalition Government have determined it must undertake in future — Defence ofAustralia proper and force projection beyond Australia with its allies.1 That the ADF has beendeveloped for 25 years solely for missions tied to the “Defence of Australia”, the HowardGovernment’s defence policy objectives are, to say the least, ambitious.


Rather than debating whether the UnitedStates will come to the aid of Australia in “itstime of need” (and, ergo, “Defence ofAustralia”), what is of critical contemporaryimport for the force development objectives ofthe ADF is determining which capabilities needto be obtained in order to: 1) defend thecountry and 2) achieve the external objectivesestablishment by Government. In both cases,the continued adherence to the moreconservative interpretations of “Defence ofAustralia” is unlikely to provide Governmentwith the capabilities needed for eitherobjective. After all, it has long been recognisedby successive Australian governments that thedefence of Australia proper, in almost allscenarios, can only be undertaken withassistance from friends and allies. Even thelower-level contingencies envisaged by Dr PaulDibb in his seminal review of Australiandefence capabilities, and mirrored in the 1987Defence White Paper, external assistance wasassumed in the form of materiel, combatservice support, strategic intelligence, etc. Thus,a force development policy that limits theADF’s development solely to Defence ofAustralia has limited value given theinternational security environment.

Given that the ADF will require assistancefrom friends and allies in times of crisis (as doAustralia’s friends and allies), the next issuethat needs to be addressed is which capabilitiesdo the ADF need in order to fulfill the policyobjectives of Government? The stated foreignand security policies of Australia, as well as theUnited States, recognise that the world is at acritical juncture where many countries aresusceptible to adopting Western norms, butmany need assistance to do so.2 Western armedforces no longer can claim to have solely acollective defence mission, but rather must alsoadopt the capability to undertake peace-support operations (PSOs), in all of theirdifferent manifestations. As a result, a defenceforce orientation that is fixated on a specificgeographic region or limited missions is of

declining relevance. Thus, for the West toachieve a “better peace”, largely the samecapabilities required for power-projection areneeded for crisis management and PSOs: theAustralian-led International Force East Timorbeing an excellent case in point.

A final and related aspect of therequirements for the ADF’s future forcestructure requirements is the increasing needfor armed forces to participate in coalitionoperations. In carrying out the defence ofAustralia proper and undertaking peace-support operations, the ADF could well requirea greater capacity for working effectivelytogether with the armed forces of othercountries, both sophisticated and those thathave modest capabilities. Since the end of theCold War Western armed forces are findingthat they must be capable of operating across abroadened spectrum of conflict, as well as withsmaller national contributions, therebyrequiring multinationality at increasingly lowerorganisational levels, i.e. squadrons, battalions,etc. Whilst long stressed by the ADF, enhancecapabilities in this area will pay dividends forAustralian security policy in: 1) undertakingpeace-support operations, 2) equipping theADF to serve as a bridge between armed forceswith disparate capabilities, 3) defendingAustralia proper with allies if required, and 4)engaging in shaping activities with friends andallies. Again, such requirements hardly alignthemselves to a strictly defined forcedevelopment policy that focuses predominantlyon the “Defence of Australia”.

In the end, the Coalition Government hasdifficult and crucial decisions that must bemade in the near future if the ADF is to remaina technologically advanced defence force,capable of furthering the country’s objectivesand interests. Despite the past value theconcept of Defence of Australia has providedin the area of disciplined defence planning,the time has come for a break with some ofits atavistic aspects and concepts. A lessnarrowly-focused national-level defence

INFORMATION CAPABILITIES: AN UNOFFICIAL AMERICAN VIEW 59

concept is now required if the ADF is to havethe capabilities necessary to meet statedGovernment objectives. This orientationshould place a premium on improved power-projection and sustainment capabilities. Sucha sea-change in policy should have thebeneficial effect of better structuring the ADF,as well as reinvigorating the strategic debatein Australia and thereby avoiding intellectualstasis.

NOTES1. Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic

Policy, Canberra: Defence Publishing and

Visual Communications, December, 1997, pp.29; 44-45.

2. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In theNational Interest: Australia’s Foreign and TradePolicy White Paper, Canberra, 1997; William J.Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a NewCentury, Washington, DC: The White House,December 1999, p. iv

* The views expressed in this article are those ofthe author and do not necessarily reflect theofficial policy or position of the Department ofthe Navy, the Department of Defense, or the USGovernment.

Thomas-Durell Young is European Programme Manager, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval PostgraduateSchool, Monterey, CA 93943, USA. He is author of Australian, New Zealand and United States Security Relations,1951-1986, Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992; and "The Australian-United States Security Alliance," in Australia’sSecurity in the 21st Century, edited by J. Mohan Malik, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1999, 53-66.

Information Capabilities

Many Government functions contribute to maintaining Australia’s national security – foreign trade, immigrationand aid policies are among them. The Minister for Foreign Affairs vists Cambodia in May 2000 to view demining

operations.

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The Defence Review 2000 gives a very usefuloverview of the real and strategic choices

that Australia has in formulating its defencepolicies in the future. The arguments on thosechoices are balanced and down to earth. It alsomade explicit the consequences, in strategic,political, and financial terms, of those differentoptions.

I would like to concentrate my commentson Australia and the region. As has beenunderlined in the proposal a correct assessmentof strategic and security developments in theregion is critical for Australia’s defence. Forthat reason a network of bilateral andmultilateral security cooperation with theregion is of great significance. It also providesthe basis for confidence building measures parexcellence.

In fact, regional cooperation should alsoinclude political, social and economic ones,since defence and security in the region has tobe understood in a comprehensive way wherediplomacy as well as economic cooperation arepart and parcel of it.

Australia must keep relations with theregion as a high priority. The region as wellas Australia has benefited from Australia’sregional initiatives and participation in allregional institutions. This remains valid inthe future as well.

In all these efforts in the Asia Pacific andEast Asia, the second track activities andcontributions from academe and intellectualsin cooperating together with officials in aprivate capacity are an important contribution

towards regional cooperation, especially forundertaking studies and introducing new ideasto be looked into. Here Australian scholarshave excelled.

Therefore, APEC (Asia Pacific EconomicCooperation) as well as PECC (PacificEconomic Cooperation Council) in theeconomic field or ARF (ASEAN RegionalForum) and CSCAP (Council for SecurityCooperation in the Asia Pacific) in the securityfield are all making a significant contributionto regional peace and prosperity. In due time,Australia should also participate in theemerging East Asian regional cooperationstructure. Now is the time for both Australiaand Indonesia to take the lead in cooperationwith others to reinvigorate those regionalinstitutions after the financial crisis broughtthem almost to a standstill.

An important issue to be examined iswhether Australia should be involved only inthe defence of the continent, its territories oralso in security problems of the region. Ofcourse, it should be both. The emphasis shouldbe on the defence of the continent, first andforemost through its maritime and aircapabilities and then with ground troops thatshould be mobile.

At the same time that Australia is involvedin the region through regional and bilateraldefence and security relations andarrangement it should also be ready for allkinds of engagement in the region: search andrescue (SAR), peacekeeping operations (PKO),new security issues (narcotics, transnational

An Indonesian ViewBy Jusuf Wanandi, Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

It is an excellent idea of the Australian Government to offer to the public the opportunity tocomment on the Defence Review to be issued at the end of the year. That is how a democraticgovernment should work and to get much feedback and ideas from the Australian public.

It is even more encouraging that they have invited regional thinkers and strategists to give theirviews. This is indeed significant. Although Australia is geographically a separate continent, it ispolitically, economically, and strategically very much a part of East Asia and the Asia Pacific.


crime, environment, migration, evenhumanitarian issues and domestic instabilities).In the event of humanitarian intervention,such as in East Timor, Australia was wise to doit after Indonesia had given its agreement andwith the support of the UN Security Council.Although the rhetoric and theatrics of itsintervention was controversial, the fact that itwas willing to do it and had done it in aprofessional and capable way is to be lauded.

By hindsight it could be argued that theHoward Government could have preventedsuch a human calamity in East Timor if it didnot support the Habibie plan too eagerly.Apparently, it did that in the belief that only atransition government with a weak presidentand a demoralised army could deliverindependence to East Timor. But as history hasshown, it did not work out that way, becausethe Habibie Government was too weak todeliver and the military leadership never

accepted the idea of East Timor becomingindependent. They have tried to sabotage theplebiscite from the beginning.

Since relations with Indonesia has beensingled out as vital to Australia’s defence, thenew Indonesia provides an opportunity forlaying down a broader-based relationship thanthe one which developed with the Soehartoregime. Although Indonesia is going through acrisis, in the end there is a fair chance for ademocracy to emerge. It should be inAustralia’s interest to assist and fully supportefforts in every field it can. In this context, astrong defence for Australia is an additionalsupport for a stable, secure and democraticIndonesia.

This only suggests that the right judgmentcoupled with intensive relations with theregion, including with Indonesia, are critical toAustralia’s defence and security.

Mr Jusuf Wanandi is a Member of the Board of Directors and Senior Fellow of the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategicand International Studies (CSIS).

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IT’S YOUR DEFENCE FORCE. HAVE YOUR SAY!

Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence Force

What’s it all about?Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force – A Public DiscussionPaper aims to inform the public on the future challenges facing Defenceand to generate broader debate in the Australian Community. TheGovernment hopes all Australians forward their views on defenceissues.

How do I get a copy of the Discussion Paper?A copy of the Discussion Paper and more information is available onthe website (whitepaper.defence.gov.au). You can also request a copybe posted to you by e-mailing [email protected] orcalling 1800 444 034 (free-call).

How do I have my say?The Government appointed a Community Consultation Teamcomprising The Honourable Andrew Peacock, Doctor David MacGibbon,Mr Stephen Loosley and Major General Adrian Clunies-Ross (Retd.).

This team has been visiting capital cities and regional centres toconduct public meetings throughout July and August. Furtherinformation is available from the website (whitepaper.defence.gov.au).All Australians have been encouraged to express their views bye-mailing a submission to [email protected] or byposting it to:

Defence Review 2000R1-5-A137Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600

What happens then?The Community Consultation Team will submit its report to Governmentin late September. The report will identify and consolidate the issuesraised by the Australian community, and will inform the Government’sreview of the fundamental principals underlying the structure and role ofthe Australian Defence Force.

Documents

DEFENCE Force JOURNALJusuf Wanandi, Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta NO. 143 JULY/AUGUST 2000 DEFENCE Force JOURNAL Managing Editor Michael P