Democratic attitudes among high-school pupils: The role played by perceptions of class climate

This article was downloaded by: [University of Leeds]On: 21 November 2014, At: 07:07Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

School Effectiveness and SchoolImprovement: An International Journalof Research, Policy and PracticePublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nses20

Democratic attitudes among high-school pupils: The role played byperceptions of class climateArie Perliger a , Daphna Canetti-Nisim a & Ami Pedahzur aa University of Haifa , IsraelPublished online: 16 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: Arie Perliger , Daphna Canetti-Nisim & Ami Pedahzur (2006) Democraticattitudes among high-school pupils: The role played by perceptions of class climate, SchoolEffectiveness and School Improvement: An International Journal of Research, Policy and Practice,17:1, 119-140, DOI: 10.1080/09243450500405217

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09243450500405217

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nses20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/09243450500405217

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09243450500405217

Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Democratic Attitudes Among

High-School Pupils: The role played

by perceptions of class climate

Arie Perliger*, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, and Ami Pedahzur1

University of Haifa, Israel

(Received 1 October 2003; accepted 2 June 2005)

The present study shed light on the continuing debate among students of political socialisation

regarding the effects of civic education on the upholding of democratic attitudes. Our major

conclusion is that civic education, in and of itself, has only minor effects on democratic attitudes of

pupils. Furthermore, among pupils who attended civic education classes, democratic class climate

would have a crucial effect on the internalisation of democratic attitudes, and the association

between sociodemographic characteristics and democratic attitudes is partially mediated by

perception of democratic class climate. The findings offer a model which involves demographics

and class climate for predicting the success of civic education in meeting its main goal—the

absorption and internalisation of democratic attitudes. Thus, we hope to take the ongoing debate in

the field at least one small step forward.

Introduction

In the final decades of the 20th century, Western democracies were forced to contend

with incidents characterised by intolerance, extremism, and political violence. These

were simultaneously accompanied by a significant decrease in the political interest

and involvement of youth in these countries (Bhavani, 1991; Frazer, 1999a). This

combination constitutes a major challenge to the framework of values, the texture of

social life, and the governmental stability in affected democracies (Putnam, 1995;

Shamir & Sullivan, 1985; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1982).

Law enforcement systems in democratic states have the tools necessary for coping

with such symptoms and for providing a short-range solution in terms of the state’s

*Corresponding author. Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel,

31905, Haifa, Israel. Email: [email protected]

School Effectiveness and School ImprovementVol. 17, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 119 – 140

ISSN 0924-3453 (print)/ISSN 1744-5124 (online)/06/010119–22

� 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09243450500405217

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

response. For the long-term solution, however, one of the available means is the

educational system, specifically, the programme for democratic education, also known

as citizenship (civic) or political education. All three terms reflect one basic idea:

education by the state, which aims to prepare young people for their civic roles by

inculcating the central values on which the state and its major institutions are

established (Farnen & Meloen, 2000).

In this article, we attempt to answer three questions and perhaps to serve research

on civic education by liberating it from some of the polemics which have constrained

it in recent decades. First, does civic education promote the formation of a system of

democratic attitudes of pupils? Second, does classroom climate (democratic vs. non-

democratic) play a role in the relationship between civic education and the

establishment of a democratic system of attitudes? Both these questions have been

dealt with in the literature to a certain extent. Third, what is the possible role played

by sociodemographic characteristics in shaping pupils’ democratic attitudes in the

civic education classes?

The arena chosen for the study is Israeli society. Like many other Western

countries, Israel, a multicultural society, has experienced an increase in non-

democratic sentiments in recent years (e.g., Canetti-Nisim & Pedahzur, 2003;

Shamir & Sullivan, 1985; Sprinzak, 1991). Concurrently, it has been criticised by

many scholars (Ichilov, 1993) with regard to its flawed education system and

mechanisms, particularly with respect to civic education and political culture. Thus,

Israeli society comprises a relevant field for attempting to elucidate the political

worldviews of teenagers at the dawn of their civil democratic life.

Theoretical Framework

Civic Education

Civic education in the democratic tradition is based on three underlying assumptions

(Gutmann, 1987; Levinson, 1999; Macedo, 1995; Patrick, 1977). The first claims that

the term ‘‘democracy’’ does not relate solely to the narrow sense of a specific method of

government or to a set of political practices for managing differences of opinion and

decision-making processes within a group. Rather, the liberal-democratic ideal

encompasses social, behavioural, emotional-affective, and cognitive dimensions

(Gutmann, 1987; Levinson, 1999). The second underlying principle suggests that, in

order to sustain itself, a democratic government must maintain a continuous

legitimisation of the system by its citizens, embodied in the pursuit of a democratic

way of life (Macedo, 1995). According to the third assumption, a democratic perspective

and democratic behaviours are not fully assured or naturally acquired in the socialisation

process of individuals into their society; therefore democratic countries must rely on

educational institutions in order to provide a socialising tool for internalising democratic

attitudes (Gutmann, 1987; Levinson, 1999; Macedo, 1995; Patrick, 1977).

Despite the particular context that characterises each country, civic studies

programmes offered in most democracies include at least one of the following four

120 A. Perliger et al.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

components: (1) basic technical information regarding the institutions of a

democratic government; (2) intellectual skills and abilities necessary for functioning

as a future citizen; (3) basic values and ideology of a liberal-democratic government;

and (4) behaviours and political practices that characterise a liberal-democracy,

including evaluative skills (Levinson, 1999).

The democratic attitudes in this study were determined on the basis of these skills.

They include, among others, an awareness and recognition of relevant political

events and identification with the basic principles of the democratic system, such as

political freedoms, tolerance, and willingness to participate in political processes

(Patrick, 1977).

Civic Education and Democratic Attitudes

The effects of civic education on the stability of democratic governments have

interested researchers as early as the 1930s (Merriam, 1931); however, most research

developed in the 1960s. It is interesting to note that studies at the time tended to

focus on analogous variables and the relationships among them, particularly, the

effects of civic education on attitudes, behaviours, and positive responses to the

principles and institutions of democracy. Despite the common theme, there was a

lack of consistency among the results and conclusions of the various studies (e.g.,

Langton & Jennings (1968) claim there is no influence of civic classes on the pupil’s

attitudes while Litt (1963) claims that there is influence in several aspects). Over the

years, research on this topic waned and it was only in the 1990s—a period marked by

the collapse and restructuring of nation-states, ethnic conflicts, and a renewed

increase in levels of political violence and extremism—that interest was revived and

accompanying studies resumed.2

In effect, there are two major schools of thought. Scholars (e.g., Langton &

Jennings, 1968; Mercer, 1973; Patrick, 1972; Rodgers, 1973; Stardling, 1977) of the

first and older school argue that despite acknowledged positive associations between

levels of education and democratic attitudes (Frazer, 1999b), relationships between

civic studies and pupils’ democratic attitudes are often negligible. However, they only

rarely considered intervening factors, such as teaching methods, structure of the

school and classroom, or pupils’ sociodemographic background. Hence, it cannot be

ruled out that they have somewhat failed to envision the complete picture of the

research findings (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995; Torney, 1997).

Scholars (e.g., Denver & Hands, 1990; Ehman, 1980; Hahn, 1999; Litt, 1963;

Niemi & Junn, 1993; Torney, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975) of the second school,

however, found clear correlations between civic studies and the internalisation of

democratic attitudes and behaviours, as these were combined with other factors such

as teaching methods and particularly, democratic classroom climate.

Classroom climate is a general concept that has attracted extensive study, especially as

to how it relates to pupils’ achievements (Cheng, 1994; Ghaith, 2003; Koutsoulis, 2000;

Rhoneck, Grob, & Schnaitman, 1998), personal relationships (Mayers & Rocca, 2001),

other socialisation agencies (Koutsoulis, 2000), and teaching methods (Lurie & Ovrebo,

Becoming Democratic Citizens 121

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

1995; Vandersijde, 1992; Wade, 1994). These studies have employed a variety of

definitions of classroom climate, mainly focusing on the level of cooperative learning,

fairness of grading, alienation from school, and social support.3 Democratic classroom

climate, however, is focused on the implementation of democratic and liberal values in

the classroom (Ehman, 1980). It is widely agreed that the level of democracy is based on

pluralism, public contestation, and methods that will ensure the implementation of the

previous two notions, hence, verifying the effectiveness of democratic infrastructure

(Arat, 1991; Bollen, 1980; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). Following Ehman’s (1969,

1980) and Hahn’s (1999) empirical work, we have chosen to focus on these three

elements of democratic dimensions underlying class climate.

The classroom is a social system with institutions, laws, and behavioural norms

(Getzels & Thelen, 1960). Thus, a democratic classroom climate, which helps pupils

understand the advantages of democratic values and practices, would have a

noticeable effect on the assimilation of values taught passively by other social agents,

as well as the common civic studies programme. Democratic attitudes and behaviours

acquired in a democratic classroom are assumed to ‘‘overflow’’ the academic

framework and pervade the encompassing social arena. This process is made possible

through two main channels. First, a democratic classroom grants pupils the

opportunity to identify and adopt democratic values and practices (Blankship,

1990; Ehman, 1969, 1980; Hahn, 1999). Second, by serving as the pupils’ role

model, teachers demonstrating democratic classroom management impart a positive

approach towards democratic values. In this manner, the often dissonant effect of

learning democratic values from an authoritarian teacher is averted (Allman-Snyder,

May, & Garcia, 1975; Engel & Ochoa, 1988).

Studies of the second school have found that democratic classroom climate

contributed to the internalisation of democratic attitudes (Ehman, 1969, 1980; Hahn,

1999), to democratic conflict resolution (Allman-Snyder et al., 1975), to political

efficacy (Glenn, 1972), and to pupils’ involvement (Ichilov, 1991). Accordingly,

despite minor disagreements, a consensus was formed stating that civic education,

along with democratic classroom climate, is a useful tool for cultivating and

promoting political democratic values.

Sociodemographic Factors and Democratic Attitudes

Most studies attributed little if any importance to the role played by socio-

demographic factors in the process of political socialisation, as noted by Niemi

and Hepburn (1995). Nevertheless, gender and socioeconomic status were

examined and were found to have a significant effect on the assimilation of

democratic attitudes via civic studies. Most studies show that boys are more

interested and involved in politics (Dearden, 1974; Hess & Torney, 1967), are

more knowledgeable, and have higher levels of efficacy (Dowse & Hughes, 1971;

Furnham & Gunter, 1983; Orum, 1972; Stardling, 1977). Recent studies have

replicated these results (Finkel, 2002; Ghaith, 2003) in the Israeli context (Ichilov,

1991) as well. Yet studies carried out both among adults (e.g., Golebiowska,


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

1999) and among adolescents (e.g., Sotelo, 1999) found significant differences,

namely, that girls are more willing to extend political rights to minorities and

negate espousal of undemocratic sentiments.

Empirical findings on the association between socioeconomic status and political

democratic views are less consistent. The pioneering study of Langton and Jennings

(1968) found that, among African-American pupils, there was a strong correlation

between civic studies and political attitudes. They point to the socioeconomic gap as

the root cause of such associations. Socioeconomic disparities create different levels of

accessibility to political information and practices. Thus, for African-American pupils

who were less exposed to information about the political system and to debates on

political and value-based issues via other socialisation agents, civics classes were much

more effective. The claim that civic studies would be most effective among pupils of

low socioeconomic status with limited sources for acquiring political knowledge was

empirically confirmed (e.g., Ehman, 1970; Ichilov, 1991; Rodgers, 1973).

Niemi and Junn (1993) found a positive effect of parental education4 on the pupil’s

level of political knowledge and efficacy. Finkel (2003) and Perry, Moyser, and Day

(1992) found associations between the level of social resources (including economic

ones) and the effectiveness of civic education. Moreover, there is a well-known

correlation between wealth, and political participation and other democratic attitudes

(Perry et al., 1992), and also evident correlations between parents’ political attitudes

and their children’s political behaviour (Chen, 2001; Ventura, 2001; Westholm,

1999). Yet, while Niemi and Junn (1998) found that the effect of civic courses was

independent from home environment, Levenson (1972), in a study conducted among

African-American pupils—whose parents are generally not so well educated—found a

negative correlation between civic studies and political involvement and a positive

correlation in terms of attitudes regarding compliance with the law and the legal

system. Levenson concluded that pupils of weaker socioeconomic background are

more sensitive to attitudes with respect to obeying the law because the legal system is

the main means available to groups of low socioeconomic status in their struggle for

political rights. Langton and Jennings (1968) and Rodgers (1973), however, argued

that pupils from a weaker background experience a vacuum in terms of political

socialisation outside the school framework, and this makes political socialisation

within the school more effective. Levenson (1972) claimed that it is precisely the

extrascholastic political socialisation that plays a central role in determining the

assimilated democratic qualities.

The Israeli context also calls for the examination of religiosity. Clear effects of

religious beliefs and practices on a wide range of values and political issues have been

found in more than one study. Most studies demonstrate positive correlations

between the degree of ‘‘religiosity’’ and a pro-national and anti-liberal value system

(Arian & Shamir, 1999). Likewise, studies conducted outside Israel also show a

strong correlation between degree of religiosity and democratic attitudes (e.g., Beatty

& Walter, 1984; Gay & Ellison, 1993; Miller & Hoffmann, 1998; Sotelo, 1997;

Tessler & Nachtwey, 1998). Thus, we may assume that religiosity plays an important

role in explaining democratic attitudes.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

From General Theories to Testable Hypotheses

This study includes several stages whereby each hypothesis is examined separately.

H1 assumes no direct correlation will be found between civic education and

democratic attitudes. Based on the first stage of the study, we will examine the

internalisation of democratic attitudes among pupils who attended civic education

classes. H2 thus assumes that in terms of assimilating democratic attitudes, civic

education will be more effective for pupils in classes with a democratic classroom

climate. H3 assumes that, mediated by a democratic classroom climate, socio-

demographic variables will be positively correlated with the inculcation of democratic

attitudes in the following manner: H3a. Male gender will have a positive effect on the

pupil’s political participation and political knowledge. H3b. Female gender will have a

positive effect on the acquisition of democratic attitudes. H3c. The more religious

pupils are, the less likely the acquisition of democratic attitudes. H3d. The higher the

level of parents’ education, the more likely the acquisition of democratic attitudes.

Civic Education in Israel

Until the mid-1990s, civic education in Israel was one of the more peripheral disciplines.

The amount of time dedicated to civics studies was the lowest of all instructed

disciplines—90 hr in the 12th grade (Gutmann, 1990). Moreover, teachers con-

centrated strictly on the materials necessary for the matriculation examination

(Kremnizer, 1996).5 In addition, courses focused mainly on procedural aspects of

democratic polities while neglecting important aspects of political culture, such as civil

rights, relations between the majority and minorities, and democratic and liberal ideas

(Ichilov, 1993), which are not insignificant for making democracy work. While in other

disciplines a certification studies diploma was required, most of the civic teachers lacked

specific training and were usually history teachers (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2003).

Results of this educational policy were underscored by surveys in the 1980s and

early 1990s, which showed high levels of espousal of antidemocratic sentiments

among Israeli pupils (Binyaminy, 1986; Carmel, 1996; Zemah, 1988), far from the

tolerance necessary in a democracy. These findings, along with the deep concern

expressed by leading educational figures, brought about the formation of a special

committee by the Education Ministry.6 As a result, new civic teachers’ diploma

programmes were established and the course was radically changed. The credos of

political philosophers such as Montesquieu, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes, along

with topics revolving around active citizenship, such as political participation,

tolerance, and the limits of political protest, were added to the curriculum. In

addition, there are still large sections of the programme which deal with the

relationships between minorities and the majority in a democracy (focusing on the

Arab minority), civil rights, and the conflict of Israel’s identity as both a Jewish and a

democratic state. The amount of time in the curriculum devoted to civics, however,

did not undergo a radical change, and is still limited to 90 – 100 hr per year (Civic

education supervisor circular No. 1, 2004).7


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Method

Sample and Participants

During February and March 2001, trained research assistants distributed a

questionnaire among 10th to 12th graders studying in five high schools in Israel.

The schools were chosen to secure representation of the characteristics of the

general Jewish high-school population. We sampled one school from a peripheral

municipality (Karmiel), another two were public schools focusing on Humanities

and Social Sciences, and the last two were private schools (one was more

technologically oriented and the other more humanities oriented).8 Questionnaires

were given to test groups—those studying civic education, and to control groups—

those who were not. Of the 820 questionnaires, 718 were completed, constituting an

87.5% return rate. The sample reflects the relevant population in the Jewish sector.9

Further scrutiny showed that the pupils’ characteristics were not related to the

decision to study civic education. Sociodemographic characteristics of both the test

(n¼ 389) and the control (n¼ 329) groups were similar and Chi-square and t tests

showed no significant differences.10 In both groups, most pupils were born in Israel

(75.5% and 75.9%, respectively), most of the fathers and mothers had academic

education (test group: fathers—69.8%, mothers—61.8%; control group: fathers—

62.3%, mothers—59.9%), and defined themselves as secular (80.7% and 77.9%,

respectively). Finally, respondents perceived themselves to be above average pupils

(87.6% in the test groups and 84.5% in the control group).

Measurement Instruments

We measured five independent variables (gender, religiosity, mother’s education,

father’s education, and class climate)11 and six dependent variables (xenophobia,

political knowledge, political efficacy, political participation, political cynicism, and

democratic orientations). As illustrated in Table 1, all measures were based on

established scales and adapted to match the political and educational culture in Israel.

Based on Cronbach’s alpha (a measure of internal consistency that is defined in the

scale level), item-rest correlation (a measure of internal consistency that is defined in

the item level), and factor analysis, the scales were constructed. Hence, following

Borgers, Hox, and Sikkel (2004), for those scales which produced lower reliabilities

(e.g., political efficacy, political cynicism, class climate) we used item-rest correlations.

The unidimensionality of the scales was confirmed by principle component analysis.12

Data Analysis

To test H1, we advanced an analysis of variance to assess the differences between

pupils who attended civic education class (test group) and those who did not (control

group), in terms of support for democratic attitudes. To test H2, we advanced an

analysis of variance among those who attended civic education class. We attempted to

assess the differences between pupils who perceived their class climate to be


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Table 1. Measurement instruments, sources, operation, and reliabilities

Variables (alpha Cronbach) and

Sources of Scales Items

Xenophobia: the unwillingness to interact with

the ‘‘other’’ or, in particular, the fear of

corruption by foreign influences (.83)

(Bogardus, 1928, 1959; Brigham, 1993;

Campbell & McCandless, 1951; Triandis,

1964).a

1. To what extent would you be willing to

continue supporting Russian new immigrants

financially, i.e., to grant them state-sponsored

financial privileges?;* 2. Russian immigrants

are always around where they’re not

welcome; 3. The Russians’ influence on

Israeli politics is exaggerated; 4. The

Russians’ complaints regarding their

conditions in Israel are unjustified.

Political knowledge: three aspects of

knowledge—of major figures in the political

system; of political mechanisms; and of

political ideologies (.65) (McAllister, 1998;

Denver & Hands, 1990).b

1. Moshe Katzav is . . .; 2. Amir Peretz is

General Secretary of . . .; 3. The Minister of

Legal Affairs is . . .; 4. Elyakim Rubunstein’s

position is . . .; 5. To pass a law in Parliament,

it must be . . .; 6. The members of

Parliamentary committees are . . .; 7. A

motion to overthrow the government can

pass by . . .; 8. The Supreme Court of Justice

functions as . . .; 9. Right-wing parties in

Israel favour a far-reaching compromise on

the territories . . .; 10. The economic

right-wing favours a free market, completely

uncontrolled by government.

Political efficacy: the ability one thinks one

has to influence the political system. (.55)

(Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954).c

1. I don’t think public officials care much what

people like me think;* 2. Voting is the only

way that people like me can have any say

about how the government runs things;*

3. Sometimes politics and the government

seem so complicated that a person like me

can’t really understand what’s going on;*

4. People like me don’t have any say about

what the government does.*

Political participation: the degree to which

a citizen is actively involved in the political life

of the state (.84) (Roper Polls, 1973 – 2000;

Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993).

To what extent have you participated in the

following activities over the last year?

1. Signed a petition; 2. Attended a public

meeting on town or school affairs; 3. Written

to the mayor of your city or the prime

minister; 4. Served as an officer of some club

or organisation; 5. Written a letter to the

editor of newspaper; 6. Made a speech;

7. Worked for a political organisation;

8. Belonged to some group interested in

better government; 9. Written an article for a

magazine or newspaper; 10. Attended a

political rally or speech. 11. Run for public

office (e.g., school council).

(continued )


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Table 1. (Continued )

Variables (alpha Cronbach) and

Sources of Scales Items

Political cynicism: the amount of trust one

has in the political system and its incumbents

(.50) (Baylora, 1979).

1. Government officials are highly qualified;*

2. Government officials pay a lot of attention

to ordinary citizens;* 3. Government officials

most of the time are efficient.*

Democratic orientations: the extent to which

one supports various democratic norms and

values (.70) (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts,

1981; Miller, Helsi, & Reisinger, 1994, 1995).

1. Arab citizens should not be included in a

referendum on the peace process;* 2. Arabs

complaints of discrimination are

unfounded;* 3. The Israeli government

should encourage Arabs to emigrate;* 4. The

Arabs are overly insistent in regard to their

rights;* 5. Occasionally, even successful

political leaders must compromise with their

political adversaries; 6. It is the government’s

responsibility to uphold the rights of minority

groups (such as Arabs or Druze); 7. Every

citizen and organisation has the right to

oppose or organise opposition to the

government’s activities; 8. Citizen

participation or involvement is unnecessary

as long as decision-making is in the hands

of a small number of skilled and trustworthy

leaders.

Class climate: the extent to which speech and

discussions in civic education classes reflect

pluralism (.53) (Ehman, 1969, 1980).d

1. I can express my opinion on controversial

issues in civic education classes; 2. How

often are controversial issues raised in civic

education classes?; 3. When controversial

issues are raised in civic education classes, is

it common to address the full spectrum of

opinions?

8. Gender 0. Male; 1. Female

9. Religiosity 1. Secular; 2; Traditional; 3. Orthodox;

4. Ultra-orthodox

10. Mother’s education 1. Elementary; 2. High school; 3. Academic

11. Father’s education 1. Elementary; 2. High school; 3. Academic

aFollowing Borgers, Hox, and Sikkel’s (2004) conclusion that offering four response options is

optimal with children as respondents, items of political attitudes scales were measured on a 1 – 4

scales with items ranging from 1 denoting least agreement and 4 denoting the most agreement.

Reversed items (marked with asterisk) were recoded.bItems of political knowledge were summed up to create a scale ranging from 0 (no knowledge) to

10 (maximum knowledge), while for the remaining scales the items mean formed each scale.cThe more items there are in a scale designed to measure a particular concept, the more reliable the

measurement (sum scale) will be. Thus, scales with small number of items typically produce lower

alphas (Krosnick & Fabrigar, 2001).dClass climate ranges between 3 – 12 as three items range from 1 – 4; 3¼democratic class climate,

12¼non-democratic class climate.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

democratic and those who did not, in terms of support for democratic attitudes. To

do this, following common methods (Ehman, 1969) we divided the pupils by the

median, resulting in 59.2% (n¼ 228) pupils who perceived their class climate as

democratic and 40.8% (n¼ 161) who perceived their class climate as less democratic.

To test H3, we advanced an estimation of structural equations models (SEM) with

latent variables, using version 4.0 of the AMOS programme using full information

maximum likelihood procedure (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999; please see Appendix) for

pupils who attended civic education class. For reasons illuminated elsewhere, we have

advanced a model that includes both direct and indirect (via class climate perception)

associations between sociodemographics and democratic attitudes. The quality of the

model was evaluated using three criteria. The first, following Raykov, Tomer, and

Nesselroade (1991), consists of five fit measures: The w2 test is the most basic, but is

sensitive to sample size, and is considered stable and reliable only in samples of 200 –

400 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1994) or of 50 – 500 (Hayduk, 1987). NFI, TLI, CFI; and

RMSEA are also reported (Boomsma, 2000). Good fit of the hypothesised model to

the observed data, however, does not necessarily mean that it is the correct model

(Kline, 1998). Hence, the second set of criteria consists of the magnitude and direction

of the path coefficients ( Joreskog & Sorbom, 1994). The third criterion is a high

percentage of explained variance of the dependent variable.

Results

Descriptive Overview

This preliminary perusal is three-stepped: means of the computed scales, some

correlations, and analyses of variance. The data indicate reasonable psychometric

properties of the measures used in this study. Endorsement of xenophobic sentiments

(M¼ 2.60, SD¼ .77), political knowledge (M¼ 5.52, SD¼ 2.26), political efficacy

(M¼ 2.41, SD¼ .63), political cynicism (M¼ 2.10, SD¼ .51), and democratic

orientations (M¼ 2.74, SD¼ .50) were largely in the middle of the scale. The mean

level of political participation was rather low (M¼ 1.83, SD¼ .85). Finally,

perceptions of democratic class climate were fairly high (M¼4.47, SD¼ .1.55).

Correlations among the study variables were mostly significant and in the expected

direction. Correlations among independent variables were not high, except for that

between mother education and father education which, as expected, was rather strong

(r¼ .54, p¼ .000), but none higher than .70. Thus, plausibility of multicollinearity

was significantly reduced (Aiken & West, 1991).

As for the correlations between independent sociodemographic variables and

democratic values, moderate correlations with high significance were found between

gender (female) and political knowledge (r¼7.27, p¼ .000), as well as between

religiosity and xenophobia (r¼ .23, p¼ .000) and between religiosity and democratic

orientations (r¼7.21, p¼ .000). As it is appropriate to test mediation when the

predictor and dependent variables are significantly correlated (Baron & Kenny, 1986),

these correlations provide a preliminary justification to test the mediation role of class


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

climate in supplementary analyses. Also, most political variables were naturally

correlated, particularly xenophobia and democratic orientations (r¼7.32, p¼ .000).

As seen in Table 2, the extent of political participation among those who did not

attend civic education classes was significantly higher (F¼9.546, p¼ .000), while

their level of political knowledge was lower (F¼5.65, p¼ .020). These findings

provide some support for H1 and will be further discussed at some length. Results

in Table 3 show that among pupils who attended civic education classes, democratic

class climate had a positive effect on an array of political variables. Of particular

prominence were results regarding political efficacy (F¼ 4.95, p¼ .02), political

participation (F¼ 5.03, p¼ .02), and democratic orientations (F¼ 3.72, p¼ .04).

Indeed, these findings provide initial support for H2.

Estimating the Model

The model was based on a viable measurement model and has adequate fit to

the data (w2(434, N¼ 389)¼ 1069.97, p5 .000; NFI¼ .96; TLI¼ .97; CFI¼ .97;

RMSEA¼ .06.). As can be seen in Figure 1, 41% of the direct paths (10/24) were

significant. Particularly, gender (female), religiosity, and father’s education proved to

be rather valuable independent variables. The most prominent outcome variables

were xenophobia, political knowledge, and democratic orientations. Likewise, 40% of

the indirect paths (4/10) were significant, and mediation seems plausible only when

the associations involve father’s education as the independent variable, and political

knowledge, political efficacy, and political participation as outcome variables.

The indirect path between father’s education and political knowledge (.226 .18¼.03),13 that between father’s education and political participation (.226 .28¼ .06), and

that between father’s education and political participation (.226.28¼ .06)—all via class

Table 2. Differences between pupils who attended civic education classes (n¼ 389) and those who

did not (n¼ 329)

Variables Group M (SD) F-VALUE Eta squared

Xenophobia Civic education 2.75 (.610) 1.38 .002

No civic education 2.71 (.632)

Political knowledge Civic education 5.72 (2.241) 5.65** .008

No civic education 5.32 (2.275)

Political efficacy Civic education 2.45 (.635) 3.44 .005


Political participation Civic education 1.73 (.818) 9.54*** .014


Political cynicism Civic education 2.08 (.509) .38 .001


Democratic orientations Civic education 2.75 (.490) .59 .001


p5 .05, **p5 .01, ***p5 .001.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Table 3. Differences between pupils who perceived their class climate as democratic (n¼ 228) and

those who did not (n¼ 161), among pupils who attended civic education classes

Variables Group Mean (SD) F-VALUE Eta squared

Xenophobia Democratic climate 2.75 (.610) .31 .001

Non-democratic 2.71 (.640)

Political knowledge Democratic climate 5.73 (2.241) 1.82 .005

Non-democratic 5.32 (2.275)

Political efficacy Democratic climate 2.50 (.641) 4.95* .013


Political participation Democratic climate 1.8 (.866) 5.08* .013


Political cynicisms Democratic climate 2.07 (.484) 1.04 .003


Democratic orientations Democratic climate 2.78 (.501) 3.72* .010


*p5 .05.

Figure 1. The impact of sociodemographic characteristics and class climate on political knowledge,

attitudes, and behaviours among pupils who attended civic education classes


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

climate, were rather weak. Yet the parallel direct paths between father’s education and

these same outcome variables were either insignificant or not very strong; the path

between father’s education and political efficacy was .14. Further scrutiny shows that the

mean of indirect paths (M¼ .24) was higher than that of the direct paths (M¼ .17),

namely, by and large they are of higher magnitude. In addition, the coefficients of the

paths from manifests to latent variables generally showed adequate values.14 As seen in

Figure 1, the explained variances were generally adequate.

In terms of substance, the model means that girls are less xenophobic, less

knowledgeable about politics, and present higher endorsement of democratic

orientations. The more religious the pupils, the more they come across as more

xenophobic, less knowledgeable, and less in favour of democratic orientations. Those

pupils whose mothers are highly educated tend to participate more in politics. Those

pupils whose fathers are highly educated tend to be less xenophobic, have higher

sense of efficacy, and support higher levels of democratic orientations. In addition, for

those pupils whose fathers are highly educated, the more democratic their perception

of class climate, the more political knowledge and the more political efficacy they tend

to have and they tend to participate in political activities to a great extent.

To summarise, the model advanced for pupils who attended civic education classes

showed that only some half of the paths were significant. Yet they were mostly in the

expected direction, and of adequate magnitude. The sociodemographic predictors

were directly and significantly related to most of the outcome political variables,

except for political cynicism. In two cases, however, the indirect paths between

father’s education on the one hand, and political knowledge and political

participation on the other hand, were significant, whereas the relevant direct ones

were not. Although these findings lend partial support for H3, we can still say that the

role of class climate as a mediator is not dismissible in some specific cases.

Notwithstanding, our model highlights additional relevant information, that is class

climate not only mediates the impact of sociodemographics on democratic attitudes

and behaviours, but also has a strong direct impact of its own.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study addresses fundamental concerns about the sources of reinforcement of

democratic values and, more generally, the role of civic education in democratic theory.

The objective of the study was to disentangle the nature of the relations between civic

education, sociodemographic characteristics, perceptions of class climate, and

democratic attitudes. The results are rather consistent with expectations, showing that

civic education, in and of itself, has only minor effects on democratic attitudes of pupils.

Among pupils who attended civic education classes, democratic class climate has a

crucial effect on the internalisation of democratic attitudes, and the association between

sociodemographic characteristics and democratic attitudes is partially mediated by

perception of democratic class climate. The findings also highlight the potent impact of

class climate on democratic attitudes, not only as a mediating variable but on its own.

These findings bear witness to claims and findings that there are strong associations


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

between class climate and democratic attitudes (e.g., Ehman, 1969, 1980; Hahn, 1999),

as well as with findings showing that class climate may be a stronger predictor of

democratic attitudes compared to some sociodemographic characteristics. Yet in the

way it is designed, this study uncovers substantial methodological and theoretical

highlights that are innovative and clearly different from others.

Research findings show support for our first hypothesis: Civic education on its own

does not facilitate democratic values. It does, however, to a limited extent, help to

uphold the level of political knowledge. These results are similar to most findings in

the literature. Yet in our study, civic education may also seem to prompt pupils to

reduce their participation in political activities. Further, we can cautiously suggest

that in non-liberal democracies in general and in Israeli civic classes in particular, the

passive role of the citizen is more likely to be emphasised (Pedahzur & Perliger,

2003). Hence, it cannot be ruled out that civic education may reduce, or at least not

foster, the tendency to become politically involved.

Our second hypothesis was also confirmed as it was found that civic education

classes, when conducted in a democratic classroom climate, can help to promote

democratic attitudes and behaviours. In particular, this refers to the positive effect of

perception of class climate on political efficacy, political participation, and democratic

orientations among pupils who attended civic education classes. These findings lend

credence to theories and findings discussed at some length in the introduction to this

article (Allman-Snyder et al., 1975; Hahn, 1999).

Our analyses lend partial credence to the third hypothesis, saying that the effect

of sociodemographics on the endorsement of democratic political attitudes and

behaviours is partially mediated by classroom climate. In the current study, we

found that this is the case in the effects of fathers’ education on political knowledge,

political efficacy, and political participation. Put differently, pupils with democratic

class perceptions are likely to endorse democratic political attitudes and behaviours,

whether their father has a high level of education or not. Yet pupils with fathers who

have higher education are likely to endorse these same democratic basics because of

the strong association between fathers’ education and class climate.

The body of literature has recorded correlations between sociodemographics and

the assimilation of democratic values (Furnham & Gunter, 1983; Langton &

Jennings, 1968; Niemi & Junn, 1993). Our findings show that the role of

demographics is not unlimited; only gender, religiosity, and father’s education

proved to have prominent effects, mainly on xenophobia, political knowledge, and

democratic orientations. At the same time, the body of literature offers only few

studies which address the relationship among sociodemographics, classroom climate,

and the formation of democratic attitudes (Hahn, 1999). We can cautiously assert

that our findings support the assumptions developed by Niemi and Junn (1998),

claiming that not only sociodemographics, but more importantly, class climate plays a

role in the formation of democratic political attitudes and behaviours.

Practically speaking, although the study shows that certain demographics are

directly related to political variables, unlike classroom climate and its perception

thereof, demographics can hardly be modified or controlled. Class climate, however,


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

can be altered or managed in an attempt to promote democratic citizenship among

adolescents who are on the road to becoming active citizens.

This study, at least implicitly, sheds light on the ways to improve educational

programmes for high-school pupils. When designing an educational programme

attempting to foster democratic values, it is desirable to emphasise the need for a

social-teaching framework which embodies the norms and values forming the basis of

democratic thought. Such a democratic model will include basic pluralism, openness

and tolerance at all levels of school forums. Moreover, it will include channels where

the pupils can directly influence the learning environment and it will foster solving

conflicts between the pupils and the teaching staff or between the pupils themselves in

a conciliatory, non-violent or enforceable manner. This model will compel the

students to be active citizens in school and in their communities. Hence, this model is

considered potentially capable of extending beyond the boundaries of the educational

field and may assist future citizens to adopt a democratic worldview. Indirectly, it may

be assumed that instruction of this kind of citizenship will have a positive effect by

strengthening the democratic foundations of government and society.

Caution is called for, however. A possible limitation may be the issue of

generalisability. The focus of this study, based on a segment of the population in

one country, may reduce this quality. Yet this could be a contribution rather than a

drawback because it can establish a comparison to other non-liberal democracies,

particularly the new emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. The lack of

generalisation ability in the findings within Israel may also stem from the fact that

the study does not include ultra-orthodox pupils. These Jews make up about 5% of

the Jewish population15 and were not surveyed because very few ultra-orthodox Jews

attend ordinary schools, and because they tend to keep themselves aloof from the rest

of the population, which makes them difficult to study. Finally, the mediating role of

class climate should perhaps be examined with a greater selection of socio-

demographics. Such an analysis may allow a better understanding of the specific

roles of both demographics and democratic class climate in the process of the political

and democratic socialisation among high-school pupils in general, and among those

participating in civic education classes in particular.

In summary, the study contributes to the development of theoretical and

substantive knowledge in democratic education. Initially, it adds to the still small

number of empirical studies which simultaneously examine the relationships between

sociodemographic characteristics and class climate on the one hand, and a variety of

democratic attitudes, on the other. To our knowledge, it is the only published study

to date that methodically examines both direct and mediated relationships, and the

only study that includes all the studied variables. Previous studies, of which there are

many, have been carried out either from an educational or a political perspective.

Studies carried out by education scholars have examined the impact of civic

education on political attitudes. Studies by political scientists have sought to explain

support for democratic political values by means of sociodemographics, but did not

consider class climate. This study brings together the separate approaches of the two

fields to try to explain support for political dimensions of democratic attitudes using


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

both social and educational variables. Greater attention to the interface between

education mechanisms and political attitudes is particularly pertinent in our times, in

light of the rise of antidemocratic belligerency by social groups of all sorts. We hope

that, whatever further study may demonstrate, the end result will be a better

understanding of the origins of negation of democracy among adolescents.

Notes

1. All authors had an equal contribution.

2. On the reasons for the decline in the interest in the role of civics in the political socialisation

process and the flourishing of research on the topic in the 1990s, please refer to Niemi and

Hepburn (1995).

3. For detailed information on the components of class climate that were identified theoretically

and through factor analysis, refer to Johnson and Johnson (1983) as well as to Johnson,

Johnson, and Anderson (1983).

4. Parental education is occasionally regarded as a component of the socioeconomic status of the

pupil’s family (Chen, 2001; Ventura, 2001; Westholm, 1999).

5. Grades on these exams comprise the high-school diploma and grade average determines the

pupil’s chances of being accepted to institutions of higher education.

6. The ‘‘Kremnizer’’ Committee was set up in March 1995. It recommended several important

reforms, which were thereafter implemented.

7. The most prominent topic in the civic curriculum in 2004 was the principals of the democratic

idea such as rule of law, limits of the government, definitions of democracy (Civic education

supervisor circular No. 1, 2004).

8. This type of sampling is well established in the field and has become accepted over the years

(e.g., Hahn, 1999). Further, it seems to be a requirement in the Israeli context because of

assumed differences in political atmosphere between pupils of different schools (e.g., Ichilov,

1991).

9. In the sample 59.8% were females, and in the population the percentage is 56.4%.;78% were

born in Israel and 18% in the former USSR. Similarly, in the population 71.4% were born in

Israel and 16.2% in the USSR. Most parents were born in Israel (43.4% of the fathers and

46.3% of the mothers), and approximately a quarter of the parents were born in the former

USSR (21.3% of fathers and 22.1% of mothers). The remaining parents were equally

distributed between European/American descent and Asian/African descent. These distribu-

tions also reflect the general population in Israel, of which Russian immigrants make up 18.5%

of the general population, while 22.9% have Asian/African origins and another 12% are

European/American immigrants. The majority of pupils defined themselves as secular (79.3%),

or traditional (19.4%) and only a negligible percent were religious-orthodox. This also is a close

reflection of the distribution in the general pupil population (72.2% and 20.8% respectively).

Thus, the demographic features of the subjects of this study successfully reflected the

distribution of the nationwide 258,584 Israeli high-school pupils in the Jewish sector.

10. Chi square tests show that there are no significant differences between the groups regarding

state in which the pupil was born (w2¼ 4.236). T test was done for the following variables:

father and mother education, student religiosity, and pupil level of excellence. None of the tests

were significant, hence no difference identified between the two groups in those variables. Here

are the results of the T tests: father education (t¼7.449); mother education (t¼71.416);

student level of religiosity (t¼ .294); pupil level of excellence (t¼7.278).

11. As this model asks the question as to whether other sociodemographics would create a better

model, we have advanced a series of extensive preliminary analyses using additional such

sociodemographics. The results showed that only these four play a substantial role (full details

available upon request).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

12. Reliability analyses reported here represent only the final stage of comprehensive preliminary

work to grant validity and reliability of each measure (full details available upon request).

13. To calculate the magnitude of an indirect path, it is acceptable to multiple the two indirect

paths (Bollen, 1989; Kline, 1998).

14. Due to the relatively large number of paths from manifests to latent variables (28), and for

space considerations, we cannot provide the full list of factor loadings. Details can be provided

by the authors upon request.

15. The data can be found in the Israeli Bureau of Statistics: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/

?MIval¼ cw_usr_view_Folder&ID¼ 141

References

Aiken, S. L., & West, G. S. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury

Park, CA: Sage.

Allman, S. A., May, M. J., & Garcia, F. L. (1975). Classroom structure and children perceptions of

authority, an open and closed case. Urban Education, X, 131 – 149.

Arbuckle, J. L., & Wothke, W. (1999). AMOS user’s guide 4.0. Chicago: Smallwaters.

Arat, Z. F. (1991). Democracy and human rights in developing countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (1999). Collective identity and electoral competition in Israel. American

Political Science Review, 93, 265 – 277.

Baloyra, A. E. (1979). Criticism, cynicism and political evaluation: A Venezuelan example.

American Political Science Review, 72, 987 – 1002.

Bandalos, D. L. (2002). The effects of item parceling on goodness-of-fit and parameter estimate

bias in structural equation modeling. Structural Equation Modeling, 9, 78 – 102.

Baron, R., & Kenny, D. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social

psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Personality and

Social Psychology, 51, 1173 – 1182.

Bhavani, K. (1991). Talking politics: A psychological framing for views from youth in Britain.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Beatty, K., & Walter, O. (1984). Religious preference and practice: Revaluating their impact on

political tolerance. Public Opinion Quarterly, 48, 318 – 329.

Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 238 – 246.

Binyaminy, K. (1986). Political, sociological and psycho-educational reviews. Psychology and

Counselling, 2, 31 – 46 (Hebrew).

Blankship, G. (1990). Classroom climate, global knowledge, global attitudes, political attitudes.

Theory and Research in Social Education, 18, 363 – 386.

Bogardus, E. S. (1928). Immigration and race attitudes. Boston: Heath.

Bogardus, E. S. (1959). Social distance. Yellow Springs, OH: Antioch Press.

Bolck, A., Croon, M., & Hagenaars, J. (2004). Estimating latent structure models with categorical

variables: One-step versus three-step estimators. Political Analysis, 12, 3 – 27.

Bollen, K. A. (1980). Issues in the comparative measurement of political democracy. American

Sociological Review, 45(2), 370 – 390.

Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural equation with latent variables. New York: Wiley.

Boomsma, A. (2000). Reporting analyses of covariance structures. Structural Equation Modeling, 7,

461 – 482.

Borgers, N., Hox, J., & Sikkel, D. (2004). Response effects in surveys on children and adolescents:

The effect of number of response options, negative wording, and neutral mid-point. Quality

and Quantity, 38, 17 – 33.

Brigham, J. C. (1993). College pupils’ racial attitudes. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23,

1933 – 1967.

Campbell, D., & McCandless, B. (1951). Ethnocentrism, xenophobia & personality. Human

Relations, 4, 185 – 192.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Campbell, G., Gurin, G., & Miller, W. I. (1954). The voter decides. Evanson, IL: Row, Peterson.

Canetti-Nisim, D., & Pedahzur, A. (2003). Contributory factors to political xenophobia in a multi-

cultural society: The case of Israel. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 27, 307 – 333.

Carmel, E. (1996). The post-Oslo youth. Haley Hinuhe, 13 – 14, 30 – 31 (Hebrew).

Chen, W. C. (2001). The role of the family in political learning of elementary school students in

Taiwan. Issues & Studies, 37(4), 38 – 68.

Cheng, Y. C. (1994). Classroom climate and student affective performance—an effective profile.

Journal of Experimental Education, 62(3), 221 – 239.

Civic education supervisor circular No. 1, 2004. Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Education.

Dearden, J. (1974). Sex-linked differences of political behaviour: An investigation of their possible

innate origins. Social Science Information, 43, 19 – 45.

Denver, D., & Hands, G. (1990). Does studying politics make a difference? The political knowledge

attitudes, and perceptions of school pupils. British Journal of Political Science, 20, 263 – 288.

Dowse, R. E., & Hughes, J. A. (1971). Girls, boys, and politics. British Journal of Sociology, 22,

53 – 67.

Ehman, L. H. (1969). An analysis of the relationships of selected educational variables with

the political socialisation of high school pupils. American Educational Research Journal, 6,

559 – 580.

Ehman, L. H. (1970). Political socialisation and the high school social studies curriculum (Doctoral

dissertation, University of Michigan, 1969). Dissertation Abstracts International, 30, 3780A.

Ehman, L. H. (1980). Change in high school pupils political attitudes as a function of social studies

classroom climate. American Educational Research Journal, 17, 253 – 265.

Engel, S. H., & Ochoa, A. (1988). Education for democratic citizenship: Decision-making in the social

studies. New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.

Farnen, F. R., & Meloen, J. D. (2000). Democracy, authoritarianism and education. London:

Macmillan.

Finkel, S. E. (2002). Civic education and the mobilization of political participation in developing

democracies. Journal of Politics, 64(4), 994 – 1020.

Finkel, S. E. (2003). Can democracy be taught? Journal of Democracy, 14(4), 137 – 151.

Frazer, E. (1999a). Introduction: The idea of political education. Oxford Review of Education, 25,

5 – 22.

Frazer, E. (1999b). Politics: The education effect. Oxford Review of Education, 25, 251 – 273.

Furnham, A., & Gunter, B. (1983). Political knowledge and awareness in adolescents. Journal of

Adolescence, 6, 373 – 385.

Ghaith, G. (2003). The relationship between forms of instruction, achievement and perceptions of

classroom climate. Educational Research, 45(1), 83 – 93.

Gay, D., & Ellison, C. (1993). Religious subcultures and political tolerance: Do denominations still

matter? Review of Religious Research, 34, 311 – 332.

Getzels, J. W., & Thelen, H. A. (1960). The classroom as a unique social system. In N. B. Henry

(Ed.), National society for the study of education yearbook, 59 (pp. 53 – 81), Chicago: University

of Chicago Press.

Glenn, A. D. (1972). Elementary school children’s attitudes toward politics. In B. G. Massialas

(Ed.), Political youth, traditional schools: National and international perspective (pp. 51 – 63).

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Golebiowska, A. E. (1999). Gender gap in political tolerance. Political Behavior, 21(1), 43 – 66.

Gutmann, A. (1987). Democratic education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gutmann, I. (1990). A letter to the education minister, Zvulon Hammer, from I. Guttman, Chairman of

the Civic Curriculum Committee (Hebrew).

Hahn, L. (1999). Citizenship education: An empirical study of policy, practices and outcome.

Oxford Review of Education, 25, 231 – 250.

Hayduk, L. A. (1987). Structural equation modeling with LISREL: Essentials and advances. Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Hess, R. D., & Torney, J. (1967). The development of political attitudes in children. Chicago: Aldine Press.

Ichilov, O. (1991). Political socialisation and schooling effects among Israeli adolescents.

Comparative Education Review, 35, 430 – 446.

Ichilov, O. (1993). Civic education in Israel. Tel Aviv: Poalim (Hebrew).

Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. (1983). Social interdependence and perceived academic and

personal support in the classroom. Journal of Social Psychology, 120, 77 – 82.

Johnson, D. W., Johnson, R., & Anderson, D. (1983). Social interdependence and classroom

climate. Journal of Psychology, 114, 135 – 142.

Joreskog, K., & Sorbom, D. (1994). Structural equation modelling with the Simplis Command

Language. Chicago: Scientific Software International.

Kline, R. B. (1998). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. New York: Guilford Press.

Koutsoulis, M. (2000). The classroom climate and its relation to family environment and

achievement. International Journal of Psychology, 35(3–4), 28 – 38.

Kremnizer M. (1996). Being citizens, civic education for all Israeli children: Intermediate Report.

Jerusalem: Educational Program Department in the Education Ministry (Hebrew).

Krosnick, J. A., & Fabrigar, L. R. (2001). Designing good questionnaires: Insights from psychology. New

York: Oxford University Press.

Langton, M. J., & Jennings, M. K. (1968). Political socialisation and the high school civics

curriculum in the United States. American Political Science Review, 62, 852 – 867.

Levenson, G. (1972). The school’s contribution to the learning of participatory responsibility. In

B. G. Massialas (Ed.), Political youth, traditional schools: National and international perspectives

(pp. 123 – 136). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Levinson, M. (1999). The demands of liberal education. Oxford Review of Education, 25, 39 – 58.

Litt, E. (1963). Civics education, community norms and political indoctrination. American

Sociological Review, 28, 69 – 75.

Lurie, E. E., & Ovrebo, B. (1995). Using a cooperative classroom climate and experimental

learning in teaching evaluation research. Teaching Sociology, 23(3), 252 – 258.

Macedo, C. (1995). Liberal civic education and religious fundamentalism: The case of God vs.

John Rawls. Ethics, 105, 468 – 496.

Marsh, H. W., Hau, K., Balla, J. R., & Grayson, D. (1998). Is more ever too much? The number

of indicators per factor in confirmatory factor analysis. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 33,

181 – 220.

Mayers, S. A., & Rocca, K. A. (2001). Perceived instructor argumentativeness and verbal

aggressiveness in the college classroom: Effects on student perceptions of climate,

apprehension, and state motivation. Western Journal of Communication, 65(2), 113 – 137.

McAllister, I. (1998). Civic education and political knowledge in Australia. Journal of Political

Science, 33, 7 – 22.

McConahay, J. B., Hardee, B. B., & Batts, V. (1981). Has racism declined in America? It depends

on who is asking and what is asked. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, 563 – 579.

Mercer, G. (1973). Political interest among adolescents: The influence of formal political

education. Teaching Politics, 1, 8 – 13.

Merriam, C. (1931). The making of citizens. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press.

Miller, A., Helsi, V., & Reisinger, W. (1994). Reassessing mass support for political and economic

change in the former USSR. American Political Science Review, 88, 399 – 411.

Miller, A., Helsi, V., & Reisinger, W. (1995). Comparing citizen and elite belief systems in post-

soviet Russia and Ukraine. Public Opinion Quarterly, 59, 1 – 40.

Miller, A., & Hoffmann, J. (1998). Race-specific predictors of trust in the federal government.

Sociological Focus, 31, 81 – 91.

Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy. Comparative

Political Studies, 35(1), 5 – 34.

Niemi, R. G., & Hepburn, M. A. (1995). The rebirth of political socialization. Perspectives on

Political Science, 24(1), 7 – 15.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Niemi, R. G., & Junn, J. (1993, September). Civics courses and the political knowledge of high school

seniors. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,

Washington, DC. (ED.372001.)

Niemi, R. G., & Junn, J. (1998). Civic education, what makes students learn. New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press.

Orum, A. (1972). The seeds of politics: Youth and politics in America. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Patrick, J. J. (1972). The impact of an experimental course, ‘‘American Political Behaviour’’, on

secondary school pupils. Social Education, 36, 168 – 179.

Patrick, J. J. (1977). Political socialisation and political education in schools. In S. Renshon (Ed.),

Handbook of political socialisation (pp. 190 – 222). New York: Free Press.

Pedahzur, A., & Perliger, A. (2003). The inherent paradox of civic education in Israel. Megamot, 43,

73 – 108.

Perry, G., Moyser, G., & Day, N. (1992). Political participation and democracy in Britain. Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6,

65 – 78.

Raykov, T., Tomer, A., & Nesselroade, J. R. (1991). Reporting structural equation modeling results

in psychology and aging: Some proposed guidelines. Psychology and Aging, 6, 499 – 503.

Rodgers, H. R. (1973). The civic curriculum and southern school children: The impact segregation

and integrated school environments. Journal of Politics, 35, 1002 – 1007.

Rhoneck, C., Grob, K., & Schnaitman, G. W. (1998). Learning in basic electricity: How do

motivation, cognitive and classroom climate factors influence achievement in physics?

International Journal of Science Education, 20(5), 551 – 565.

Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). Mobilisation, participation, and democracy in America.

New York: Macmillan.

Shamir, M., & Sullivan, J. (1985). Political tolerance in Israel. Megamot, 29, 155 – 169 (Hebrew).

Sotelo, M. J. (1997). Political tolerance among adolescents towards feminists. Feminism &

Psychology, 7, 517 – 528.

Sotelo, M. J. (1999). Gender differences in political tolerance among adolescents. Journal of Gender

Studies, 8(2), 211 – 217.

Sprinzak, E. (1991). The ascendance of Israel’s radical right. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

Stardling, R. (1977). The political awareness of the school leaver: A programme for political education.

London: Hansard Society.

Sullivan, J., Pierson, J., & Marcus, G. (1982). Political tolerance and American democracy. Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press.

Tessler, M., & Nachtwey, J. (1998). Islam and attitudes toward international conflict. Journal of

Conflict Resolution, 42, 619 – 636.

Torney, J. (1997). Review assay: Links and missing links between education, political knowledge,

and citizenship. American Journal of Education, 105, 446 – 457.

Torney, J., Oppenheim, A. N., & Farnen, R. (1975). Civic education in ten countries: An empirical

study. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell.

Triandis, H. C. (1964). Exploratory factor analyses of the behavioural component of social

attitudes. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68, 420 – 430.

Vandersijde, P. C. (1992). The influence of a teacher-training program on student perception of

classroom climate. Journal of Education for Teaching, 18(3), 287 – 295.

Ventura, R. (2001). Family political socialization in multiparty systems. Comparative Political

Studies, 34(6), 666 – 691.

Wade, R. C. (1994). Teacher-education students views of class discussion—implications for

fostering critical reflection. Teaching and Teacher Education, 10(2), 231 – 243.

Westholm, A. (1999). The perceptual pathway: Tracing the mechanisms of political value transfer

across generations. Political Psychology, 20(3), 525 – 549.

Zemah, M. (1988). Appendix to Maharachot. Maharachot, 312 – 313, 12 – 13 (Hebrew).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Str

uct

ura

lco

effi

cien

tso

fth

ere

sear

chva

riab

les

Dep

end

ents!

(pat

hs

fro

mla

ten

tto

man

ifes

t

vari

able

s)

Ind

epen

den

ts#

Xen

op

ho

bia

(.6

8,

78

,7

8,

70

)

Po

liti

cal

kn

ow

led

ge

(.4

0,

.64

,.7

4)

Po

liti

cal

effi

cacy

(.7

3,

.42

,.4

2,

.43

)

Po

liti

cal

par

tici

pat

ion

(.8

5,

.76

,.7

4)

Po

liti

cal

cyn

icis

m(.

62

,

.52

,.4

3)

Dem

ocr

atic

ori

enta

tio

ns

(.6

0,

.74

,.6

6,

.15

,.1

0,

.45

,

.10

,.7

1)

Cla

sscl

imat

e

(.4

7,

.50

,.6

2)

Cla

sscl

imat

e7

.03

.18**

.28**

.28***

.11

.12

Gen

der

(fem

ale)

7.1

6*

7.3

4***

7.0

47

.05

7.1

1.1

0*

7.0

7

Rel

igio

sity

.16**

7.1

3*

7.0

4.0

4.0

17

.24***

.01

Mo

ther

’sed

uca

tio

n7

.03

.02

.00

.11*

.04

.05

.09

Fat

her

’sed

uca

tio

n7

.20**

.01

.14**

.01

.11

.16**

.22**

*p5

.05

,**

p5

.01

,***

p5

.00

1.

Ap

pen

dix


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

AppendixThe SEM consists of confirmatory latent-variable structural models (Bentler, 1990),

which are powerful tools for dealing with the systematic and unsystematic

measurement errors (Bolck, Croon, & Hagenaars, 2004; Bollen, 1989; Boomsma,

2000). It provides simultaneous estimation of the hypothesised regressions using the

estimated covariance matrix generated on the basis of the observed covariance matrix

of the measured variables (Kline, 1998). The estimated matrix is also used for

evaluating the goodness of fit between the data and the model. A covariance matrix

among the research variables formed the input for the analysis and the results were

calculated. In setting the indicators for the latent variables, we advanced two

approaches. As for xenophobia, political efficacy, political cynicism, democratic

orientations, and class climate, the results were calculated on the basis of the

indicators comprising a latent variable. As recommended in use of a large number of

indicators (Bandalos, 2002; Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998), parcelling

technique was advanced for political knowledge and political participation. Finally,

gender, religiosity, mother’s education, and father’s education were four observed

exogenous variables.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f L

eeds

] at

07:

07 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

Documents

Democratic attitudes among high-school pupils: The role played by perceptions of class climate