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Democratic Deliberation in Urban Village Regeneration: integrated villagecommitteeandvillagersintourbansociety

PuNIU

DepartmentofUrbanStudiesandPlanning,UniversityofSheffield,UnitedKingdom.

Paper prepared for ICPP3 Singapore 2017, Panel 09: Authoritarian DeliberationRevisited:WhatDoesItMeanforOurUnderstandingofDemocraticGovernance?

Abstract:

China has been experiencing profound and massive social and urban transitionsfollowingthecapitalistexpansionofthelast30years.Oneaspectofthosetransitionsisa concerted program of urban regeneration in many cities. However, the standardpractice of the land-centered “demolish and rebuild” urban village regeneration hasproventobecontroversial.Totreattheproblemsandbalancetheunevendevelopmentbetweenurbanandruralsociety,theChinesegovernmenthasimplementedaso-called“human-oriented”urbanizationpolicysince2014whichemphasizesthe integrationofvillagers into the city rather than physical site developments. Under that context,democratic deliberation became a key instrument for Chinese local government toaddress the problems around urban village regeneration. Themain objectives of thisresearcharetoexploretheroleofdemocraticdeliberationasatoolofgovernancebothduring and after the urban village regeneration process. It looks at both the Chinesegovernment’s changing governing discourses (from land-centered urbanization tohuman-oriented urbanization) and daily practices in the regeneration process andregenerated communities governance, as well as the citizens’ reactions to thesegovernancetechnologies.Inthispaper,Iwillprovideanin-depthinvestigationofhowdifferentactorsnegotiatewitheachotherthroughthedeliberationinstitution,andtheresultsof theprocessof theurbanvillage regenerationprogram in the contextof theNew Type Urbanization Plan. One in-depth case studies of Zhengzhou urban villageregeneration programs was carried out. Interpretive policy analysis was used todescribe and analyze how different actors negotiate with each other through thetraditional rural deliberation institution, within the context of the New TypeUrbanizationPlan.

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Introduction:

Thispaperwilldiscusstheprocessofintegratingthevillagerandvillagecommitteeintothe urban society, in particularly, focuses how village advocating their rights andopinionsthroughthedemocraticdeliberationunderthesettingofauthoritarianChina.InrecentChina,thedemocraticdeliberationsareadoptedbylocalgovernment,withthepursersoflimitingthesocialunrest,petitioning,andcorruption,thestateencouragesasmall number of institutional changes to ‘give voice to ordinary citizens withoutjeopardizingtheCCP’smonopolyonpoliticaldecisionmaking(HeandThogersen,2010:675).Enlightenedbytheconceptsofauthoritariandeliberation(HeandWarren,2011),thispaperaddresshowdifferent stockholdersproceeddemocraticdeliberation in theintegration of social, economic, and cultural fabrics through China’s urban villageregenerationprogram.Inparticular,thispaperwillmainlyaddressthechallengesfromtheimprovingvillagers’livelihood,andcivilizingoffensives.

China has been experiencing a profound and massive social and urban transitionaccompanied by the urban regeneration and capitalist expansion. As a consequent ofthese transitions, a special type of urban neighborhood had been formed, which isnamed as “urban village” (Liu et al., 2009; Lin andHo, 2005, Ho 2003). This kind ofneighborhoodisaggregatedwith informalhousing,andcriticizedas“slum-likeareas”.The practice of urban village regeneration has proven to be controversial. It rapidlycaused more social problems, such as social exclusion, injustice, and unevendevelopmentbetweenruralandurbansociety.Totreattheseproblemsandbalancetheunevendevelopmentbetweenurbanandruralsociety,the“human-orientedNew-typeUrbanization Policy” has been implemented by the Chinese government since 2014.This new policy sets two primary goal of the urban village regeneration: thedevelopmentofthesiteoftheurbanvillageandtheintegrationofthevariousgroupsofurban villagers into urban society. In particular, it emphasizes on integrating ruralmigrants into the city rather than physical site developments. The regenerationprogramsimmediatelygeneratetheconflictsbetweenpublicandgovernment.Including:protests,petitioning,andcollectiveresistance.Theseconflictshavebeenchallengingtheillegitimateof localgovernments’decisionandpolicy implementation.Theyaggregatethroughthelandacquisition,compensation,andvillagers’reallocation.Thisisbecausetheresidentsinurbanvillage(bothnativevillagersandmigrants)experienceaseriesof‘transitionpains’duringthe integrationprocess,as theyshouldadaptchangingsocial,cultural,andeconomicstatus.

As a controversial topic, there is a series of literature focusingon themechanismsofurbanvillageregenerationthroughurbanplanning, landeconomics,urbansprawlandindustrialization,thelandadministrationsystem(e.g.Wu2013;2014;Zhangetal,2003;SmartandTan,2005;Heetal,2009;Liuetal,2010;Zhang,2011;Haoetal,2011;Xuetal, 2011; Lin and DeMeulder, 2012; Song and Zenou, 2012; Zhou, 2014). Instead tofocus the physical developmental and economical outcome of urban villageregeneration,thisresearchisdesignedtoinvestigatethemechanismsofintegratingof

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native urban villagers and migrants into the city; and in particular to focus on thedeliberativenatureofnegotiationsbetweenvariousactorsinvolvedinthisprocess.Thisresearch was designed to investigate the mechanisms of integrating of native urbanvillagersandmigrantsintothecity;andinparticulartofocusonthedeliberativenatureofnegotiationsbetweenvariousactorsinvolvedinthisprocess.Duringtheinvestigationoftheregenerationprogram,thisstudytendstofocusontheresultsofthedeliberationprocess: to interpret theexperienceof theparticipants, andmeasure theirpreferenceandopinionschangeduringthedeliberationprocess.

Themainobjectivesofthisresearcharetoexploretheroleofdemocraticdeliberationasatoolofgovernancebothduringandaftertheurbanvillageregenerationprocess.Itlooks at both the Chinese government’s changing governing discourses (from land-centered urbanization to human-oriented urbanization) and daily practices in theregenerationprocessandregeneratedcommunity’sgovernance,aswellasthecitizens’reactions to these governance technologies. The research will answer this threequestions:1)Howdemocraticdeliberationwillbeusedbylocalregimetofacilityplanningagenda.2)Howtraditionalruraldeliberationinstitutionwillbechangedandintegratedinto the urban community governance system according to theNew-Type UrbanizationPlanning(2014-2020).3)Towhatextentdoesthedemocraticdeliberationcontributethegrassroots participation in local governance. This research will adopt a mix-methodsdesign,withanemphasisonaqualitativeresearchstrategy.Twoin-depthcasestudiesofZhengzhouurbanvillageregenerationprogramswerecarriedout.Theinterpretationofthesestoriesonimplementingdemocraticdeliberationinurbanvillageregenerationcouldprovide a lens todiscoverhowdifferentdeliberativepracticescanandshouldbeorganizedinChina’surbangovernanceundertheChangingpolicycontext.Thedatawillbe collected according to qualitativemethods including document analysis, interviewandparticipant observation.This researchwill adopt a combinationof deductive andinductive data analysis strategy, therefore, the thematic analysis method (Boyatzis,1998)andGroundedtheorymethod(Charmaz,2006)areselectedtoanalyzethedata.Before the inductive interpretation, a comprehensive deductive analysis of thedeliberativeprocesswillbeconductedusingtheconceptualscheme. Itwillbeusedtoassesstheprocessandresultofdemocraticdeliberationinurbanvillageregeneration.

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LiteratureReview:

2.ChallengesofimplementationofNew-typeUrbanizationPlan

Previousurbanvillageregenerationstudies:Land-centeredurbanization

Asaformofinformalsettlement,urbanvillageswereoftencriticizedasslum-likeruralcommunity enclosure by urban areas. Accompanied by the China’s fast urbandevelopment and modernization, urban villages were not tolerated by government,media,andacademia(Zhangetal,2003;Liuetal.,2010).Thisisbecauseurbanvillagesalways have ramshackle images of poor living conditions, high crime rates, and highdensityofpopulation;bycontrast,urbanvillagesalwayshavepreferablegeographicaladvantagesthanmanyurbanareas(Haoetal.,2011).BeforetheNew-typeUrbanizationPlan 2014-2020 implemented, in some cases, the local government shifted theirenthusiasm in urban village regeneration, mainly through demolition-developmentapproach (Zhang, 2005). That is, within the targeted area, all of building andinfrastructureswillbetotallydemolished,andthisareawillbedevelopedfollowingthenew-proposal.Theexistingcasesshowthattheseurbanvillageswillbedevelopedintohighquality commercial housing,mix-used shoppingmall, or high-tech industry. Thiscould create considerable revenue income, economic growth, active image, and jobopportunities to the city. To conduct this approach, the first priority in regenerationagendashouldbe theproperties (e.g. land,housesand infrastructures)acquisition. Inperviouspractices,insomecases,governmentencouragedtheprivatesectortoinvolvein regeneration program (Li and Li 2011). It is because the amount of compensationalways outweighing the government capacity. In the beginning, private sectors haveenthusiasmbecause theurbanvillagesenjoyedanexcellentgeographical location, thehugepotentialprofitcouldbeexpected,aslandhashighpotentialmarketvalue(Chung,2009;LinandDeMeulder,2012;LiandLi2011).Insomecases,governmentiscapableto compensate for the property acquisition, the governmentwill dominant thewholeprocess.Theacquittedlandwillbesoldthroughpublicauction.Generally,theseurbanvillage regeneration programs were aiming at pursuing economic growth andmodernizationofcity’simage,theywerenamedasdevelopment-orientedurbanizationorland-centeredurbanization(Luetal.,2015).

However, land-centered urbanization is not sustainable. This is because aiming atlimiting the resistance by native villagers, local government or the developer alwayspaidhuge-amountofcompensationtonativeurbanvillagersforthepropertiesandlandacquisition.Villagerswereofferedcompensationinformofnew-buildapartmentsinthereallocation community.Usually, eachhouseholdwas compensatedby at least two tothreeapartment.Insomecases,thenativevillagewascompensatedbytensapartmentfrom developer by organized resistance. The sky-high compensation encouraged thelocal resistance and obeys the government ideology of seeking social harmony. Inaddition,abundantspareapartmentswerebuiltforthedemandofcompensation,whichimmediately exacerbate the housing bubbles. This issue also restricts the developers’

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willingness of investment, as the space of profitswill be very limited.After theNew-type urbanization plan was implemented at 2014, the urban village regenerationprogramhas turned from themarket-driven into government-led program, aiming atlimiting the negative consequences of land-centered urbanization and pursuing thesustainableurbandevelopment.

From‘Land-Centered’to‘Human-Oriented’UrbanizationPolicy

To cope with the challenges generated from the ‘land-centered urbanization’, theChinesecentralgovernmentissuedanewpolicyapproachtourbandevelopment,assetout in the ‘NationalNew-typeUrbanizationPlan (2014–2020)’ inMarch2014. In thisplan,thecentralcommitteeoftheCommunistPartyofChina(CPC)andtheStateCounciljointlyreleasedanewstrategyforurbandevelopment.Themostsignificantchangeputforth in this plan is: the transfer from a land-centered urbanization to a people-oriented urbanization. As Long et al., (2015) comments: “This was the first officialplan to regard new-type urbanization as a national policy, and it pointed out theproblemsthathademergedinthepreviousacceleratedurbanizationmode;thisplanisexpected to explore a new path toward sustainable urbanization. The most notableaspect in it is the transition from land-centered urbanization to people-orientedurbanization.” (2014: 112). According to Taylor (2015) translations: the ‘New-typeUrbanisation Plan 2014-2020’, the primary objective of urban village regenerationcouldbesummarizedasfollows:1)Unblocktheinternaldual-tracksystemofthecity,interms of social form, property ownership and citizenship. 2)Promote the New-typeurbanization strategy, facilitate the integrationof100millionmigrantworkers into thecity. (2015:108). Instead seeking for land development, this new national policy isdesignedwiththegoalofintegratingurbanvillagersandmigrantworkersintothecityeconomically,socially,andculturally.Itsettledupthreetiersoftargets:1)improvingvillagers’ livelihood and living consciousness; 2) unblock the dual track system andprovidingsamesocialwelfareandHukouidentitytothevillager;and3)civilizingtheirbehaviorsanddeveloping their legal rightsconsciousness. In thispaper,as thewordslimitation,Iwillonlydiscussthechallengesfromtargets1and3.

Challengesfromlivelihood

Withinthepasttwodecades,thelivelihoodofthesenativevillagershadbeenchangedtwicesinceurbanvillage formation.The first timechangehappenedduring theurbanvillage formationprocess, the villagers lost their farmlandand rural incomeswithouttheurbanwelfaresystemguarantee.Majorityofthesepeoplecouldonlyaccesstothelow-incomeworkingopportunityduetotheirlimitedworkingskills(Wuetal.,Heetal.,).This urged them to seek alternative income sources to make their livelihood.Accompanying with the boom of low-rental accommodation demands, theyreconstructed their houses into many poor-conditioned accommodations to get thecheaprentalfrommigrantsasthemajorincomesources(LinandDeMeulder,2012;Liuet al., 2010). Compare to other kinds of low-status job, the housing-rental income is

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relativelystableandhandsome.Astheconsequences,insteadofimprovetheirworkingskill,mostofthemoperatedacheap-rentalbusinessesandgotaconsiderableprofit(Heetal.,2010;Liuetal.,2010).AftertheNew-urbanizationPlan2014-2020implemented,the regeneration will overturn their rental income. The compensation policy of landacquisitionhadbeen transferred into thecombinationofpartly sized ratioapartmentandcashcompensation.Thispolicy isdesignedto limittheoverallhousingbubbles inmarketbylimitingthevacanthouseinnew-builtcommunity.Somelocalgovernmentstriedtostart limitingthescaleofthepartly-sizeratioapartmentcompensationbeforeNew-typeurbanizationplanwasimplemented.Thispolicyleadsthenativevillagerstolose their housing rental income. As the New-type Urbanization Plan was justimplemented, more research could be done around the cases that compensatedvillagers by partly sized ratio apartment and cash compensation. It could provideexperiences for the issuesaround their livelihoodand life-styleafter theymoved intothemodernapartmentunderthenewpolicy.

ChallengefromCulturalIntegration:CivilizingOffensives

Based on former research (De Rooy 1979, Kruithof, and de Regt), Flint et al., (2015)summariestheconceptofcivilizingoffensives:‘middle-classattemptsatimprovingthelot of the lower classes (both within western nation states and of native indigenouspopulationduringtheprojectsofimperialcolonization)and‘raisingthem’toahigher,civilizedstandardofconductp.1’.Thisconceptwasutilizedtoexploretheinteractionsbetween different social groups, especially for a targeted projectwhich embarked bytheone(morepowerful)groupwiththeaimof‘civilizing’thebehaviorofanother(lesspowerful)group(DeRegt1984;Mitzman1987,Verrips1987;vanGinkel1996).Mostrecently,thisconceptisalsousedontheperniciousorbarbariceffectsonpopularandminorityculturecausedbymigrants(Mitzman1987;VanKrieken1999).Thisresearchborrows this concept todescribe the actions raisedbyChinese local government andauthorities with the particular aim to ‘civilizing’ the behaviors of urban villagers. Itshould be declared that, in Chinese context, themost significant distinction betweensocial groups is the former household registration: the rural residents are treated as‘peasant’,whichrefersthelowerclasspeoplethanurbanresidents(He,2005).

SincetheChineseNew-typeurbanizationpolicyaimingatintegratingvillagersandruralmigrants into the city, one of the most important tasks is to integrate villagers andmigrantsculturally.Inpractice,thevillagersandmigrantsareurgedtofollowtheurbanlifestyle.As the traditional rural lifestyle ismuchdifferentwithurban lifestyle,urbanvillagersandruralmigrantsaresufferedfromthetransitionalpain:theyneedtochangetheir behaviours into urban style, under the pressures from the local authorities anddiscriminate from the urban residents. During this process, the local authorities andurbanresidentsalwaysusetheterm‘uncivilizedbehaviour’todescribetheirtraditionallifestyle;andthelocalauthoritiesandurbanresidentsalwaysusetheterm‘civilize’totakeupthemoraladvantageandlegitimacyoftheiractions.These‘civilizers’oftenledto stigmatisation and spatial marginalisation, and these actions are more about

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disciplining rather than enlightening (RobVanGinkel, 1996).Therefore, tensions andconflictsarecommoninthereallocationcommunities, if thesecommunities’authoritywant make efforts on changing behaviours of these ‘new urban residents’. However,although others committees’ authorities who reluctant to take this response, thesecommunities and their residents are criticized in the internet and public media as‘uncivilizedarea’,andalsodiscriminatedbyotherurbanresidentsas‘peasant’.

3.FormalandInformalDeliberationsinChina.

The new policy of New-type urbanization significantly promotes “human-oriented”through the political reform: the public participation in planning has been enhanced,aiming at respecting thewillingness of local residents aswell as limiting the conflictbetweenstakeholders.Astheoneofthemostimportantparticipationchannel,aseriesformsofdemocraticdeliberationshadbeendiscoveredinurbangovernancepractices.The deliberation could facility the human-oriented policy because in the deliberationprocess, participants make decisions not simply by counting what preferences havegreaternumerical support,but “bydeterminingwhichproposals the collectiveagreesare supported by the best reasons” (Young 2000: 23). During the recent decades,deliberationpracticeshadbeenimplementaccompanyingthePartiesdiscourse:“powermustbesupervisedbythepeopleandexercisedtransparently”andcalledfor“enrichingdemocraticformstoshowtheadvantagesofChina’ssocialistdeliberativedemocracy.”These practices raised a theoretical discussion around deliberation under anauthoritarian setting. These existingwestern research has recognized the function ofdeliberation in liberal democratic societies, as the democratic deliberation couldcontributetheequalandinclusivenegotiationanddiscussionbetweenthestakeholdersandpubliccoulddeepens“participants’knowledgeofissues,awarenessoftheinterestsofothers,andtheconfidencetoplayanactivepartinpublicaffairs(Saward,2000,p.5).”Itisbecausedeliberativecommunicationcouldwidenthedemocraticparticipationandimprove the authenticityofdemocracy. In addition, the existing researchalsodiscussthedeliberativenatureofdemocracy,andargues:“politicaldecision-makingshouldbetalk-centric rather than vote-centric” (Elstub & McLaverty, 2014, p.1)”. In addition,recently, the western research shows that the deliberative politics experienced a‘discursive turn’ and it becomes increasingly inclusive. Dryzek (2009) points out theinclusive and tolerance of ‘informal deliberative forum’. In addition, Benhabib (1996)andHabermas(1996)stressthe informalpublicsphere,wheredeliberationgeneratespublicopinionwhichthenoughttoinfluencedeliberationinthelegislature.Theideaoftheseexistingresearchispointedoutthesignificanceandlegitimacyofthedeliberationactionsininformalsetting.Theyhighlighttheimportanceofcommunicativeprocesses,and inclusive theseprocesses to ‘informed, respectful, andcompetentdialogue’ (Tang2015; Dryzek, 2010). This ‘informal’ and ‘un-structured’ deliberation haswidened toeverytaking,internet/mediadiscussion,andcivilsociety.(Dryzek,1990).

However, different with western theory, those Chinese deliberative practices havedifferent political functions and rationales. He and Warren (2011) points out the

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rational of the authoritarian regimes such to adopt the deliberation into theirgovernanceandprovidesthefunctionalismperspective:thedeliberationcouldbeusedto pursue social stability and governance legitimacy. They argue that deliberativepolitics could limit conflict, enhance governance capacity, and produce legitimacy inpracticalgovernancematter(HeandWarren,2011,Dryzek,2010).Theexistingstudyaround participatory and deliberative democracy in China mainly around: ruraldeliberative practice, government-led deliberative forums, designed deliberationpolling, designed democratic roundtable meeting (He, 2006; 2014; He and Warren,2011,Dryzek,2010,TangandDryzek,2014,Tang,2015).Theseresearchesexplainedthe dynamics of the implementation of deliberation at local governance practices.However, the existing researches mainly focus the local deliberative practices ondesigneddeliberativedemocracyexperiment,suchasdeliberativeforums,deliberationpolling, and democratic roundtables (He, 2014). Clearly, these designed practices arestrictly abiding by the designed and structured. Apart from those practices, the‘informal’ and ‘unstructured’ deliberations are widely observed in China’s localgovernancepractices.InChina,democraticdeliberationinurbanvillageregenerationisdevelopedfromprevioustraditionalvillagedeliberationpractices.Thisevolutioncanbeseenasearlyasthevillagedeliberativeforumsinthe1980s:avillagecommitteewouldholddeliberationforumswheredecision-makers(villageofficials)wouldcometogetherto discuss village affairswith villagers, and facilitate a give-and-take decision-makingprocess. It should be declared that as the Chinese traditional rural villageadministration relies on a ‘person-network’ based on the authority and credibility ofvillagecadre, thedeliberationonvillageaffairsalways involve lotsof informalactionslikestreettalkinganddoor-to-doorvisiting(Tang,2015).Theroleof‘unstructured’and‘informal’ deliberation should be equally investigated in urban village regenerationprocess.Itisbecausetheseactionscouldwidencitizenparticipationbyinvolvinglargerrangeofinterestgroupsandvariouschanneltoexchangeopinions.

AsthispaperfocusesontheChinesecase,Iwillborrowtheterm‘informaldeliberation(Tang, 2015)’ to describe the various communicative processes between governmentofficials, experts and publics. The only difference between these actions and ‘formal’actionsis‘thesetting’:theseactionsarealwaystreatedasinformalbyscholarbecausethese deliberations are always happened in informal setting, such as street talking,door-to-door visiting. Based on Dryzek (1996:1), ‘the deliberation process should betolerance,which allow argument, rhetoric, humor, emotion, testimony or storytelling,andgossip.Theonlycondition forauthenticdeliberation is thentherequirement thatcommunication inducereflectionuponpreferences innon-coercive fashion.p.1’.Theseinformal deliberations should be respected equally with government-led formaldeliberations, as the formsofdeliberation shouldbevarious and flexible. In addition,theseactionsarealsoledbygovernmentorvillage/communityauthority.Thatistheseactions are ‘formally’ on behalf of the officials’ legitimacy, authority and credibility.Therefore, the term ‘informal public deliberation’ will be used to describe thedeliberation beyond institutional process and designed forums. As the informal

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deliberationpracticesisveryflexibleanddifficulttomakesenseforwesternscholariftheydonothaveenoughChineseknowledge,therefore,Iwill introducethemwiththecaseinlatersections.Thelocalgovernmentandvillage/communityauthorityleadtheseactions,aimingattowidenparticipationandfacilitatenegotiationbyinvolvingalargerrangeofgrassrootsgroupsandnon-eliteinterestgroupstodelivertheiropinions(Tang,2015). This could help local government and planners to improve their proposal byinclusive local knowledge. In the following sections, I will introduce how democraticdeliberation (both formaland informalactions)hasbeenusedasa tool to facility theimplementation ofNew-typeUrbanization Plan 2014-2020 through the lens of urbanvillageregeneration.

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CaseStudies:

Implementationofformalandinformaldeliberationatlocallevel

One large-scaleurbanvillageregenerationprogramwillbediscussed.Thedemocraticdeliberation in China’s urban development is different from Western democraticpoliticalsystems.Publicdeliberationandotherparticipationsare‘symbolic’methodsoflabeling and ensuring legitimacy for proposed plan. However, in urban regenerationpractice at Shangjie District, local government treats the ‘public deliberation’ morethan justproviding legitimacy. Instead,aimingat limitingconflictbetweencitizenandgovernment, the public deliberation becomes increasingly important in terms ofbuilding a consensus for local planning. Especially, formal and informal democraticdeliberationswereadaptedtofacilityShangjieDistrictgovernmenttoovercomethesechallengesbysolvingtheconflictsofeachchallenges.

Tonghang community is a newly-built urban residential community aiming atreallocating the urban villagers from 4 former urban villages. The new ResidentialCommitteewas struggling since thenewcommunitywill administrating the residentsfrom4differentvillages.Thecommitteeisorganizedbythesemi-districtgovernment,whichconstitutedfromkeymembers(director)from4formervillagesandstuffsfromsemi-district government. The rational is the keymember from former village couldprovide thecredibilityandauthorityofnewly-hiredcommittee. Inaddition, thesekeymemberscouldalsoprovidelocalknowledgetoassistthenewstuffinroutinematters.The leadership of the committee has one director who is pointed by the semi-streetgovernment, and 4 deputy directors who are the former director of 4 villages. Thisarrangementcouldprovidetheefficiencyintermsoffacilitatingpolicyimplementation.Thedirectorservesasmore than thehighest leaderof communitywhorepresent theinterest of the whole community, instead, the director also has its supervisory dutyrepresentthesemi-districtgovernment.Underthatarrangement,theleadershipgroupscould be considered as 5 mediators who are on behalf of different interest groups.Based on the investigation of the case, I will briefly introduce each forms ofparticipationsfirst.Thiswillbehelpfulforwesternscholartomakesenseoffollowingcasestudies.

The‘formaldeliberation’includes:

• Expert Consultation: It always happens at plan-making level, the planningsystem has been greatly open up at China, currently, the government adoptsexternal institutions competitions instead internal local planning bureaus tomaketheplan.Therefore,theplan-makingprocesshasopenedtheplan-makingprocess to processional organizations. To select the ‘best proposal’ for localdevelopment, the ‘expert consultation’ becomes increasingly important. The‘expert consultation’ served as the ‘counselor’ to provide suggestion andcountermeasure for government, they not only support local government tomake a better choice at designing competitions, but also support the selectedplanning institution to amend their planning proposal. In addition, the ‘expert

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consultation’ is often used to add credibility to the proposed plan and urbanpolicy,insteadenhancedemocraticauthenticity.

• Public Consultation: The public consultation is a method for government topublic their proposed local policy, plan, and particular decision to ordinarypeople,anditisalsoachanneltocollectedthepublicopinion.Sometimes,itwillbe taken place through the media, such as internet, news papers, and TVprogram.Thegovernmentusesthemediatopublicthedetailinformationabouttheirproposalandcall for feedbackfromthepublic.However, itbecomesmoreprocedural rather than substantial at urban regeneration practices. This isbecause theregenerationprogram isdominatedby thestakeholders,especiallywhoownedtheresources,suchaslandlordsanddevelopers.

• VillagersCongress:Villagers’ congress is abranchofThePeople’s congress inthe rural-governance system. It is the lowest level in the hierarchical electoralsysteminChina,itdirectlyelectstheleadershipbyelectors.Itisalsothehighestdecisionmakinginstitutioninthevillage,everymostimportantdecisionismadethroughthedirectlyvoteatVillagers’Congress.AccordingtoHe(2005):‘villagemeeting is an important institution that givesvillagers anopportunity tovoicetheiropinionsbeforemajordecisionaremade.AccordingtotheOrganicLawofVillageCommittee,villagemeetingsshouldinvolveallvillagersaged18orabove.Themeetingshouldhaveaminimumquorumofhalfofthoseeligibletoattendor,alternatively, two thirds of the household representatives of the village. Themeeting reviews the committee’s work at least once a year. It is called by thevillagecommittee,butcanalsobesummonedifdemandedbyatleastonetenthofvillagers.p.209’

• Villagers’ Representatives Conference: It should be noticed that the villagers’representative conference is different with the household representativescongressinvillagers’congress.Villagers’representativesareelectedbyandfromthe household representatives in different villager groups. In each villagergroups, there were numbers of representatives to represent a numbers ofhouseholds. Villagers’ Representative Conference is central to obtaining publicparticipation inurbanvillageregeneration. It isacrucialelement inpromotinginteraction with the native villagers. This conference is always happened as apre-conference tovillagers’ congress.The leadershipof thevillagewilluse thisinstitutiontocollect thefirstroundopinionfromthevillagers’reps. Itwillalsoaskvillagers’ reps tocollectvillagers’opinionandbring theseopinionsbacktotheconferenceasasecondroundopinionscollections.Itcouldhelpthedecisionmakertoamendtheirproposalandagenda.

• CoordinationMeeting: It is a kindofdemocratic roundtablemeetingholedbysmallgroupsofpeopletonegotiatessomeproposaloragenda.Theprocessofthemeeting isalwaysconfidential;onlydirect stakeholdercouldparticipate it.Thedirectstakeholdermeanssomespecificissuesintheprogramonlyaffectasmallnumbersof stakeholders; this smallgroupof isdirect stakeholder.Normally, inanurbanregenerationproject,therewereaseriescoordinationmeetingsholedby different people. It is an informal technic for the participants to persuadeothers.Itisakindofhomevisit.Itisparticularlyusefulforthegovernmentorthe

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leaderofvillagetosolvetheindividualopponentorsmallgroupsofopponents.

• Residents’Congress:Itdirectlyelectstheleadershipofthecommunity.Differentfrom the villagers’ congress, the electors in theurban communityDoNothavetherighttonominatetheelectoralcandidates.Theelectoralcandidatesmustbeworkedoutthrough“discussionandconsultation”theupperlevelofgovernment.Inaddition,thedecisionmakingfunctionoftheresidents’congressisalsolimitedand symbolic.Themost importantdecisionwill bemadeby theupper level ofpeoples’congressand localgovernment; thedecisionwillbe ‘informed’ instead‘consulted’.

The‘informaldeliberation’includes:

• Door-to-DoorVisiting:Itisaninformaltechnicfortheparticipantstopersuadeothers.Itisakindofhomevisit.Itisparticularlyusefulforthegovernmentortheleaderofvillagetosolvetheindividualopponentorsmallgroupsofopponents.

• Stakeholders’DirectlyParticipate:It isnot formalwayforthedecisionmakerto directly collect the opinions and demands from the most importantstakeholders.Itmightinvolveaseriesformssuchasthroughtelephones,street-talking, and roundtable discussion. The most important character is thecommunicationsbetweentheparticipantsarealwaysconfidential,andexclusivefromoutsiders.Italwayshappenedbeforetheformalcoordinationmeeting.

• Streettalking:differentwiththeotherkindsofparticipation.Thestreettalkingismainlyusedasapilotforcommunitylevelregimetocollectopinionsforsomeissues.Insometimes,theregimemightusethismethodtogeneratesomesocialpressureviadispersinggossip.

Thedomainsand formsofparticipationsweresummarizedas thetablebelow. In thistable the following acronyms will be used: ‘EC’ = Expert Consultation, ‘PC’ = PublicConsultation, ‘CM’=CoordinationMeeting, ‘VC’=VillagersCongress, ‘VRC’=VillagersRepresentativeConference,‘DV’=Door-to-DoorVisiting,‘SDP’=Stakeholders’DirectlyParticipate, ‘RC’ = Residents’ Congress. These forms of participations include bothformaldeliberationandinformaldeliberations.

DomainsofParticipations TonnghangCommunity

NiezhaiCommunity

Masterplanofdistrictlevel EC EC

Planningofsemi-districtlevel EC,CM EC,CM

Planning of reallocationcommunity,

EC,CM,VC,VRC EC,CM,VC,VRC

Details of architectural design EC,CM,VC,VRC EC,CM,VC,VRC

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proposal

Demolishmentagenda CM,VC,VRC,DV CM,VC,VRC,DV

Detailsofcompensation CM,VC,VRC,DV CM,VC,VRC,DV

Reallocationagenda CM,VC,VRC,DV CM,VC,VRC,DV

Electionofthenewcommunity VC,RC,SDP VC,RC,SDP

Routine governance in newcommunity

RC,SDP RC,SDP

Planning of government acquiredland

EC,CM EC,CM

Collective property and economymanagement beforeredevelopment

VC VC

Collective property and economymanagementafterredevelopment

VC SDP

Challengesfromvillagers’livelihood:Seekingalternativeincomesources

Thedemocraticdeliberationsweremainlyusedtosolvetheinternalconflictswithinthevillage.Thisisduetothelocalgovernmentdidnotallowanynegotiateintermsoftheamount and ratio of compensation. As the compensation ratio is stable, the villagecommittee could trigger the regeneration program if they can got the supports ratemore than70%.Theurbanvillage regeneration inShangjieDistrictwas started sincethe end of 2006, which is much later than most megacity in China as well as otherdistrictsinZhengzhouCity.Thedistrictgovernmentsorganizedaseriessurveyontheexistingcases.Amingatlimitingthepublicresistantanddecreasethefinancialpressure,the government decided to limit the scale of apartment compensation in a constantpartly-size ratio: the scale of apartment compensation should be limited within 1.7times of the authorized legal rural homestead size (rural homestead: land for ruralresidentsconstructingtheirownhouse).After2011,accordingtothemeanandmodeoflegal rural homestead size, the district government decided the scale of apartmentcompensation is 258 square meter per homestead. In principle, their compensationapartments will be built at their original location. Therefore, the local governmentscarcely to directly negotiate with the local residents, instead, they encourage thevillagecommitteetopromotetheagenda.Althoughthecompensationpolicyaffectsthenativevillagers’rentalincome,theamountofcompensationisstillattractivetomostofthevillagers,inparticular,thosewhodidnotrelyontherentalincome.Therefore,asIstatebefore, thevillagers inTonghang community came from4different villages, the

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situation was much different between the villages within this case. For example,villagers fromXiaowaVillage held advantage of geographical location,where is closeenough to the core area of Industrial Development Zone in Shangjie District. Thisadvantage enabled their households to establish rental businesses. Different withXiaowaVillage,theotherthreevillageswithinTonghangcommunitywerelocatedattheedge of the Industrial Development Zone. Although the households also establishedtheir rental businesses, their rental income were much lower than Xiaowa Village.Generally speaking, although the amount of the compensation is settled, it is stillattractive frommajority of villagers. These villagers supported village community topromote the regeneration. However, the number of opponentswere considerable, astheir livelihood are mainly based on the rental income. The regeneration programterrified thesevillagers, especially for thesehouseholdswhodonot took formal jobs.Duringtheeraoftheurbanvillage,someofthemfeltneedlessoftheemploymentastherentalincomeisenoughtomaintaintheirlivelihood.

Beforethevillagecommitteebroughttheregenerationproposalatthevillagecongressto discuss, the village committee organised a villagers’ representative meetings andaskedtheserepstocollectallofvillagers’willingnessfortheregenerationprogram.Itsoon boosted a sharp conflict between two groups of villagers: both supporters andopponents holds too strong attitude to compromise. This is because the rentingbusinesswasstableincome,buttheaccommodationcompensationwerealsoattractive.After the first round of opinion collections, the village committee believe that theirsupporters were holding the majority, but not enough to dominate the voting invillagers’congress.TheHouseholdAwasaverytypicalfamilyofsupporter:theyhadajob and only treat the rental income like a basic life security, the accommodationcompensationbecameveryattractive.

HouseholdA:thisfamilyof7livedinDongbaisheVillage,avillagelocatedattheedgeofNew-IndustryDevelopmentDistrict,whichistoofarfromthecoreareatoattractrentalbusinessandcollectiverealestateincome.In2012,theyreceive3apartments,oneof3bedrooms’apartmentandtwoof2bedrooms’apartmentinTonghangCommunity.Thefamily members include the paternal grandparents, father, mother, and two elderdaughtersinprimaryschoolandason.Thefathermade5000yuanamonthforataxi-driver, others are jobless, they also get 1000 yuan monthly by rental housing. Theregenerationprogramdoesnotimpacttheirincomesignificantly.

Villager A: We can get 700 from the housing rental, my house cannot rent aconsiderableprice in thepast.Now,westillkeep2modernapartments to live,whichismuchbetterthanmyprevioushouse.

Inaddition,thevillagerscalculatedthegapsbetweenrentalincomeandaccommodationcompensation:

VillagerB:Myrentalincomecannotallowmetoownanurbanproperty.Iwantownamodernaccommodation,because it ismorevaluableandmucheasierto

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sale. If I sale one of the 3 compensation accommodations, I can get at least250,000yuanincome,equalwithmorethan80monthsrental.

Differentwiththesupporters, therental iscrucial foropponents.Sincethesevillagerslosttheirfarmland,someofthemgaveupworkingandreliedontheirrentalincome.Asthe regeneration programhad significantly impacted the housing rental income, theywerefrighteningofthefuture.ThesituationofHouseholdCistypicaloftheopponent:

HouseholdC:This family live inXiaowaVillage,which is theoneof themostpopularrental village in Shangjie District. There are 6 people living in this family: paternalgrandparents, father,mother, and twins.Theyhadbuilt 15 rental roomand theywillreceivemore than 5000 yuanmonthly from the housing rental. As this village has astrongcollectiveeconomy,eachadultinthisfamilycouldget5000-6000yuanwelfareperyear.Thefatherandmotheralsoranastreetfoodtosalethebreakfastanddinnertothemigrantworkers,atbeginning,theyearned3000yuanmonthly,butafter2010,theyrentedthisshopouttoaretailerandreceive2500yuanmonthly.Theregenerationin2012letthemlostbothaccommodationrentalandshoprentalincome.Instead,theygot3apartmentscompensationplusadditional90000yuancash.

VillagerC:Wehavenothingnow,onlyoneaccommodationcanberentout.Thisisfarfromenoughforustolive.Wehadtofindajob.Welostourleisurelife.

Afterthefirstroundopinioncollection,theinternalconflictsweresignificantbetweendifferent groups of villagers, and village committee. Being concerns about the socialstability,andthetimelimitedtoformallyresponsetothelocalgovernment,thevillagecommitteedecidestoholdseriesforumstodiscusstheissuesaroundtheregeneration.Villager committee invited all of villagers’ representatives, local government officials,andsomeformercadresofotherregeneratedvillageintoforums,theaimsoftheforumswereproviding informationandexplain thepolicy to thevillagers’ representativesasdetailaspossible.Bothsupportersandopponentscoulddirectlyquestiongovernmentofficials and other people who experienced regeneration. According to the Direct ofVillageCommittee:

The outcome of the forumwas quite surprised at the beginning, it seems thatbothsupportersandopponentshadlotsofbiasofourpolicy.Itseemstheyhadproblemstounderstandourpolicy,theycan’tmakeclearargument.

Becauseofthereasonsabove,theforumswereextendedtothreedays.Theaimsofthisforumshadchangedalittlebit.AccordingtotheDirectofVillageCommittee:

Afterthefirstdayoftheforum,wedecidedtochangetheforum.Theyonlyknowsome gossips...we decided to spent another 2 days to introduce the policy indetail.Afterthat,weselectedsomewell-knowledgevillagers’representativesandsomegovernmentstuffasthepropagandateamstoexplainthepolicytovillagersdoortodoor.

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The village committee organize above ten little teams to held the street talking anddoor-to-door visiting to access the villagers. Within a teams, there were onegovernmentstuffworkingasapolicyinterpreter,andonevillager’representativeswhoworkingasamediator.After the interpretingpolicy,eachvillagergotabasicsenseofwhattheyloseandwhattheygot.

Villager D: I was misled by the gossip from other villagers, I think I will loseeverything. the government stuffmademe clear, and I became to support theregeneration. Itwas not a bad deal, I hadmoved into this community for twoyears,Istillthinkso.VillagerE:At thebeginning, IreadsomenewandIbelieveIcanbecomesuperrichbythecompensation,buttheratioofcompensationwassettledasfarfrommyexpectation,IthinkIcouldgetmore,soIbecameanopponenttoorganizeamassivedefense.

Thesedoor-to-doorvisitinghelpedthelocalgovernmenttoamendtheirproposal.Afterthe opinion collections, they were aware of villagers were worrying about theirlivelihoodaftertheylosttheirrentalincome.Thegovernmentorganizedtheroundtablemeetingaround the enterprises nearby, and ask them to provide listsof employmentdemands and conditions. These enterprises were happy to provide priority to thesevillagers as theydidnothaveprovide accommodation to these villagersnearby.Afterthese efforts, the supporting ratewas increased to almost 85% in villagers’ congress.Theregenerationproposalwaslegallypassed.Theformervillagedirectorcommented:

Finally, it solved at that stages. Itwas too hard to persuade the villagers… Icannotdomore for thembecause thegovernmentwon’t givemeanychance. Ibelievedintheexistingcases,everyvillagetriedtoarguesomething,butIhaven’tseenanysuccessfulcases.Thecompensationpolicyneverchanged.

In this case, thesedeliberationsprovidedchannels forpublic toexpress theirvoice tothe decisionmaker and got someoutcome.However, it is clear that the legitimacy ofdeliberationswasbasedongovernmentendorsement,especially intermsofthescopeof issues.This isbecauseunder theauthoritariancontext, thegovernmentonlyadoptthe deliberation to facility their policy implementation, rather than deliver thedemocracytothepublic.

Challenges from cultural integration: distinguish traditional lifestyle andoffensives

Differentwithotherurbancommunity,Residents’Committeenotonlytakesthepublicservice duty and but also push the former villagers to integrate into urban life. Itaffected almost 10 thousand urban villagers and rapidly caused a conflict betweenformer villagers and Residents’ Committee. The Committee list a lots of ‘uncivilized’behaviorsincludes:feedingfowlsinpublicarea,cultivatinginpublicgreenspaces,high-altitude through about, occupying public spaces, and etc. These actions also causedmass defensive as the villagers complained that the Residential Community bullied

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them as they discriminate ‘traditional rural lifestyle’ as ‘offensives’. The complainingraised a debate about how to distinguish ‘traditional lifestyle’ and ‘uncivilizedoffensives’,aswellashowto‘civilizeoffensives’.Thecontroversybetween‘uncivilizedbehaviors’and‘discriminate’hadbeenraisedbeforetheresidentialcommitteesettled.Assoonastheregenerationprojectstarted,thecardersfrom4formervillageorganizeda temporary council to manage the issues around the reallocations. The temporarycouncil put the ‘uncivilized behaviors’ as the most important task because thesebehaviorsnotonlynegatively impactedthepublic image,butalsocausedtherisksforpublic safety. After a short discuss, these 4 former village committees formed atemporaryleadershipgroups:the4formerdirectorsofvillageconstitutedasstandingcommittee.Everydecisionabout thewholecommunitywillbe firstlydiscussedat thestandingcommittee,andtheywillseparatethetasksvillagebyvillage.That is, formervillagerswithinthiscommunitywerestillgovernedbytheirformervillagecommittee.Thetemporarycouncilofthecommitteelaidoutalistofprohibitbehaviors:theyvisitedseveralreallocatedvillagestolearntheirexperience.Basedontheirexperience,adraftof prohibit behaviors was coming out, and processed to the opinions collections.AccordingtheDeputycommunitydirectors:

Wewere anxious that our communityhad risk to turn back into urbanvillageimage,ifwedonotstopit.…Weonlyprohibitverylimitedbehaviorsthatmightaffect public security and public interest. However, when you talk it to thevillagers, they won’t take these behaviors as a serious matter. But it has verysignificant risk if we put these into this community.We need to involve somestrike and force action toprohibit it. The startingpoint of these rules is fewerthannow.Wemodifyitaccompanyingwithroutineadministration.

As soon as they got a draft, the temporary council organized a series lectures andforums topersuade thevillagers to following ‘civilized lifestyle’.However, theactionsaround the civilization were questioned as ‘official discriminate’. Some villagerscriticized them as the local government bullied them by unequal social structure,educationlevel,andpersonalskill.

VillageG:Theyinvitedanexperttointroducethe‘goodness(MeideinChinese)’and ‘civilization (Wenminig)’ for us. I still remember that feeling. The expertthink he was standing high above us. I can only feel the discriminations andpressures… How can I make a debate? He is the expert. I just expressed mydissatisfactionsbutIcan’tmakeanargument.VillageH: The council justwant us to follow their rules. Theywant follow thelocal government.Because theywant keeping their positionof leadership. Wedon’tbelievetheexpert,butIcan’texpressmyopinions.

Itshouldbenoticedthat,intermsoftheskillofexpressopinions,thevillageHandGarebetter than many villagers. During the interview, I found lots of villagers had thedifficultytoexpresstheirexperienceandopinions.Becausetheyarenotgoodattalking,they can’t deliver their voice to the decision makers through the deliberations. The

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forums and lectures were failed and it generate tension between villagers andtemporarycouncil.Toreducethetensionandpressure,thesevillagecardersstartedtodiscusstheissuesaround‘civilizedlifestyle’throughstreettalking.Thecouncilneedtoreducethetensionbecausethetheyneedtoensurethattheygotenoughsupporterstohandle the public issues. For example, after these villagersmoved into the Tonghangcommunity, some of villagers cultivate the vegetables in the public green space.Althoughthetemporarycouncilmadethedecisiontopunishthesebehaviors,theystillcollectedthepublicopinions.AccordingtotheDeputycommunitydirectors:

We need public supporting us, we need to explain something to them. But aresidents’ congress is not a good ideabecause street talking and door-to-doorvisiting canmade them relax.We didn’t need authorized by wewantedmoresupporter.Thisiscrucialthatwecouldgetsupportfrommajorityresidents.

It is clear that, the street talking and door-to-door visiting shows strong deliberationnature.Beforethetemporarycounciltookactions,theyadoptedtheseinformalactionsto set up a channel to communicate with villagers. Compared to hold a villagers’congress, these informal actions are muchmore effective. However, as these actionswere not taken place at a formal setting, sometimes, the conversations might beconfidential. These actions were always questioned as ‘black room deals’ by theopponents.

VillageF:Idon’tbelievewhattheysay.Hundredhouseholdplannedvegetable…Theyaskmetofollowthemassive.Ifact,Ithinkwhateverytheywanttodo,theywilltellusthisispublicopinions.Village G: They won’t ask my opinions. I have very bad relationship to thedirector,ourrepresentativesneveraskmeanything.Sometimes,theyjustinformmesomedecisions,andsometimes,theywon’tletmeknowanything.

Accordingtothesetwovillagers,thefairnessoftheseactionsshouldbequestioned.Thedecision maker might establish obstacles for the opponents by limiting theiropportunity. It is because these actions are based on the personal network, themediatorsmighthavebiasabouttheparticipants.

Thisgeneratedanother issue.Thecredibilityandauthorityofvillage committeewerelabelledonthecarderspersonally. Instead labelledonthe ‘titleof leadership’.MostofthevillagersIinterviewedexpressedthatalthoughIrespectedothermembersorstuffwithintheircommunity,emotionally,theyprefertotrusttheirformervillagedirectors.This isbecause thevillagedirectoralways tookcharge in theirvillage foravery longtime, and the villagers always respect that person, rather than that title. However, itbroughtabigchallengeinTonghangcommunity,asitwasmadeby4villages.Assoonas theymoved innewcommunity, they feltdifficult togetcredibilityandauthority tolead the new community as a whole. According to one of deputy director of theResidents’committee:

there are hugedifferences betweenworking in the community and village.We

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arestrugglingtogethertofindarightway...asyousee,currently,allofstuffinthecommunityworkscollectively inthesamereception.Comparetoformervillagecouncil, this reception is symbolic…Onlya titleof leadership isnothing, aswedon’thaveanycredibilityfortheresidentsfromothervillage.

Asaresult,thelocalgovernmentendorsedthetemporarycouncilandintegrateditintoResidents’ Committee. The 4 former village leadership were nominated as 4 deputydirectors,andthegovernmentdesignatedadirectorfromthestreetoffice.Intermsofthe conflict solving, the former village leader took charge of the issue andmade thedecision individually if the conflict is raiseby their formervillagers.According to theDeputyDirectorsofResidentialcommittee:

Becausethevillagehastheirindividualadministrationsystem,thevillageaffairsshould be agreed within the village, so I as the former cadre of the A villagecannotparticipatestheBvillageaffairs.Commonly,thesevillagersarehabituatedto our former institutional arrangement, theywant to find their former villagecadretosolvetheirproblemsortomakeajudgement.Theydon’tbelieveanewauthorityfromothervillagesaswellaslocalgovernment.

Underthatarrangement,theirformergovernancetechniquesarestillvalidinpractices.It keeps the community governance combining the urban services and ruraldeliberations.Comparedwiththeurbangovernmentofficials,theformervillagecadresnot only havemore credibility, but also havemore local knowledge. Their sympathy,andempathywerealsokeytomaintainthecommunicationastheyofferthemmorein-depthunderstandingoftheissuesthanlocalgovernmentstuff.

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Conclusion:

This research addresses the issues around democratic deliberations in China’s urbanvillageregenerations,withtheemphasisonthe integrationof thevillagersandvillagecommittee.Followingtheconceptofauthoritariandeliberation,thisresearchdiscussesbothformalandinformalinteractionsbetweengrassrootsanddecision-makersthroughthedeliberations.Theresearchfoundoutthatthedeliberationsareeffectiveintermsofopinioncollectionsandconflictsolving,andplayingsignificantroleineachstageoftheurban village regeneration. These deliberations in urban village regeneration weredeveloped from the rural deliberations, which were based on their former villagegovernance network. In particular, it is based on the former village cadres and theircredibility and authority within their rural village network. The village committeealways play a leading role in organizing the deliberations. As the organizer andmediator, theircredibilityandauthoritywere labelledon ‘person’ insteadofa ‘titleofleadership’.

Thefunctionsoftheruralgovernancenetworkshavebeenreservedandcontinuedintourbancommunity.Astheresidents’committeeinthereallocationcommunityisrelyingon rural governance network, it could be considered as a transitional institution ofvillagecommittee.Thedeliberationsstillplayacrucial roleafter thereallocation.Thelocal government endorsed the rational rural governance system by formallyintegratingtheirleaderintotheurbangovernancesystem.Theformervillagedirectorsstillgotapositionintheleadershipgroups,andsomeofformervillagecardersalsogotpositionsintheresidents’committee.Inpractice,thelocalgovernmentauthorizedtheautonomy to the village committee and residents’ committee. Their decisions andopinionswererespectedbythelocalgovernmentseriously.Even,sometimes,theywerethe key decisionmakers of some issues. From these sense, the deliberation in urbanvillageregenerationcouldbeconsideredas‘democraticdeliberation’incertaindegree.Asitprovidesthepublicachanneltoexpresstheirvoicetothedecisionmaker.

However, the deliberations in urban village regeneration also shows a clearauthoritarian characters. The power source and autonomy of the democraticdeliberations is from the local government’s endorsement. The rational is the villagedeliberationsystemcouldfacilitylocalgovernmentintermsofconflictsolving,agendasetting, and amending proposal. These deliberative actions were taken by localgovernment,villagecommittee,and,residentialcommitteewithatop-downideology.Inthis case, deliberations are rarely triggered by the grassroots. Instead, the villagecommittee and local government and village committee showed their enthusiasm toadoptsthedeliberation.Itisbecausethedeliberationprocesscouldbeunevenastheyhold lots of advantages than grassroots. For example, the advantages of reputation,educationlevel,andcommunicationskillcouldsignificantlyimpact,evendominatethedeliberation result. Thedeliberations could be shapedby the government and villagecommittee through involving some participants who have some advantages to thevillagers. Thismight generate a new ‘injustice’, because the disadvantage groups still

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faceconsiderableobstaclestofightfortheirrightthroughthedeliberation.Inaddition,although the informal actions could bring efficiency to the governance, thisarrangement brings controversy and risks. It is because these communications arealways taken place at an informal setting, like street or home. Due to the luck ofsupervision,theblackroomsdealorcorruptionsmightexist.Thesecommunicationsarealways private and confidential, the village committee and the residential committeealways hold the dominate position as their personal authority might become thehegemony.Thepersonal relations andbias from thevillage cardersmight impact theresultandnegativeimpacttheiropponents’interests.

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