DETENTE AND DETENTE AND FINLANDFINLAND

THE UNITED STATES AND THE THE UNITED STATES AND THE ONSET OF EUROPEAN ONSET OF EUROPEAN

DETENTEDETENTE

OUTLINEOUTLINE

GLOBAL CONTEXT OF U.S. FOREIGN GLOBAL CONTEXT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICYPOLICY

SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE AND SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE AND TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACYTRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY

UNITED STATES AND EUROPEUNITED STATES AND EUROPE• JOHNSON AND DE GAULLEJOHNSON AND DE GAULLE• NIXON AND OSTPOLITIKNIXON AND OSTPOLITIK• CSCECSCE

GLOBAL CONTEXTGLOBAL CONTEXT

Cold War Cold War ConundrumsConundrums

Regional ConflictsRegional Conflicts

Relative DeclineRelative Decline

JOHNSON’S DETENTEJOHNSON’S DETENTE

““Each time I Each time I mentioned mentioned missiles, Kosygin missiles, Kosygin talked about Arabs talked about Arabs and Israelis.”and Israelis.”

““The Cold War is The Cold War is not over.”not over.”

NIXON, DETENTE AND CHINANIXON, DETENTE AND CHINA ””You’ve got three for You’ve got three for

three Mr. President.”three Mr. President.”

-- Kissinger, October 12, -- Kissinger, October 12, 1972 1972

JOHNSON vs. DE GAULLEJOHNSON vs. DE GAULLE

““we’ve really we’ve really got no control got no control over their over their (France’s) (France’s) foreign foreign policy.”policy.”

HARMEL REPORT, 1967HARMEL REPORT, 1967 Military security and a policy of détente Military security and a policy of détente

are not contradictory but complementary. are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the USSR and the USA The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe. of the political problems in Europe.

NIXON & OSTPOLITIKNIXON & OSTPOLITIK

““[there is] a danger that as Brandt pursues [there is] a danger that as Brandt pursues the quest for normalization, his advisers and the quest for normalization, his advisers and supporters will eventually succeed in leading supporters will eventually succeed in leading him to jeopardize Germany’s entire him to jeopardize Germany’s entire international position… assuming Brandt international position… assuming Brandt achieves a degree of normalization, he or his achieves a degree of normalization, he or his successor may discover before long that the successor may discover before long that the hoped-for benefits fail to develop. Instead of hoped-for benefits fail to develop. Instead of ameliorating the division of Germany, ameliorating the division of Germany, recognition of the G[erman] D[emocratic] recognition of the G[erman] D[emocratic] R[epublic] may boost its status and R[epublic] may boost its status and strengthen the Communist regime…. More strengthen the Communist regime…. More fundamentally, the Soviets having achieved fundamentally, the Soviets having achieved their first set of objectives may then confront their first set of objectives may then confront the FRG with the proposition that a real and the FRG with the proposition that a real and lasting improvement in the FRG’s relations lasting improvement in the FRG’s relations with the GDR and other Eastern countries can with the GDR and other Eastern countries can only be achieved if Bonn loosens its Western only be achieved if Bonn loosens its Western ties.”ties.”-- Kissinger to Nixon, February 1970-- Kissinger to Nixon, February 1970

““This meant that Washington wanted to have This meant that Washington wanted to have the last word.”the last word.”-- Brandt-- Brandt

YEAR OF EUROPEYEAR OF EUROPE "The United States has "The United States has

global interests and global interests and responsibilities. Our responsibilities. Our European allies have European allies have regional interests." regional interests."

““For Kissinger to announce For Kissinger to announce a Year of Europe was like a Year of Europe was like for me to stand on for me to stand on Trafalgar Square and Trafalgar Square and announce that we were announce that we were embarking on a year to embarking on a year to save America!”save America!”-- Edward Heath-- Edward Heath

CSCECSCE

«They can write it in Swahili.» Kissinger«They can write it in Swahili.» Kissinger

Assessment, 1975Assessment, 1975 The CSCE has given the Russians something that The CSCE has given the Russians something that

they had long wanted very much, perhaps even they had long wanted very much, perhaps even come to over-value. But the Western come to over-value. But the Western Governments have gained also - in limiting and Governments have gained also - in limiting and qualifying their endorsement of a situation they qualifying their endorsement of a situation they do not intend to change, in forcing the Russians do not intend to change, in forcing the Russians to do battle on ground hitherto taboo and, not to do battle on ground hitherto taboo and, not least, in cohesion and the practice of co-least, in cohesion and the practice of co-operation. Elsewhere too - in the Quadripartite operation. Elsewhere too - in the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and in the development of Agreement on Berlin and in the development of Western exports to CMEA countries - the Soviet Western exports to CMEA countries - the Soviet peace policy has been shown to carry advantages peace policy has been shown to carry advantages for the West as well.for the West as well.

Assessment, 1975Assessment, 1975 Mishandled by the West, the pursuit of Mishandled by the West, the pursuit of détentedétente

could lead to a Soviet walkover in Europe. But if could lead to a Soviet walkover in Europe. But if Western countries continue, negotiation by Western countries continue, negotiation by negotiation, to stick together, to keep their guard negotiation, to stick together, to keep their guard up and to settle for nothing less than a fair up and to settle for nothing less than a fair balance of concrete advantage, they need not balance of concrete advantage, they need not shrink from it. shrink from it. DétenteDétente of that kind would differ of that kind would differ widely from the Soviet prospectus. And, in the widely from the Soviet prospectus. And, in the longer perspective, the practice of longer perspective, the practice of détentedétente may may foster developments in Soviet policies which foster developments in Soviet policies which ultimately make the USSR a less intractable, even ultimately make the USSR a less intractable, even a more reliable, partner.a more reliable, partner.

THOMAS GARVEY, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO FINLANDTHOMAS GARVEY, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO FINLAND

A BALANCE SHEETA BALANCE SHEET

«In any case, what Europe thinks is «In any case, what Europe thinks is basically irrelevant.» Kissingerbasically irrelevant.» Kissinger

EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POLICYPOLICY

GERMAN TREATIES, CSCEGERMAN TREATIES, CSCE SOVIET-AMERICAN VS. EUROPEAN SOVIET-AMERICAN VS. EUROPEAN

DETENTEDETENTE