DH B5 Agency Comments- Chp 1 Fdr- FAA Comments on Chp 1

8/14/2019 DH B5 Agency Comments- Chp 1 Fdr- FAA Comments on Chp 1

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FAA Comments on Chapter One - 9/11 Commission Final ReportWe appreciate the opportunity to comment on Chapter One of the 9/11 Commission'sFinal Report. The Commission has spent over 15 months investigating what happenedthat day and the FAA has produced thousands of tapes* transcripts and documents andprovided thousands of staff hours in support of the Commission's work. The FAA doesnot have benefit of all the Commission's evidence, but using the evidence that isavailable to the Agency, we offer the following comments:The Commission's report acknowledges that what happened to the United States on 9/11was unprecedented and that neither the FAA nor the Military had ever encountered ortrained for such an attack. Unfortunately, the Commission then characterizes the actionsor lack of action taken by the FAA as failures to improvise a response which might haveled to a different outcome. Where the Commission charges FAA personnel with inactionbased on our present excellent hindsight, it does a disservice both to them and to thepublic. You will appreciate that this is frustrating and disappointing for many in theFAA, both current and former employees, who have felt that the Agency responded wellconsidering the difficult and confusing circumstances of the national emergency.Chapter One is a detailed accounting of the FAA response on 9/11 from the compilationof facts gleaned from many facilities, but what is lost on the reader are these factsessential to an understanding of the tragic events:

1. Four planes were airborne and hijacked within approximately the same basictimeframe - approximately one hour.2. Information critical to an understanding of the scope of the attack was not

available instantlyto either FAA or Military personnel who might have made useof it had it been available instantly.

3. There were numerous reports of other errant aircraft that turned out to beerroneous, and4. Nearly 5,000 airplanes airborne in the airspace above the United States during the

attacks had to be safely handled by air traffic controllers, many of which werediverted to airports other than their intended destinations.

There is no question that there were communication breakdowns and other problems on9/11. However, it is important to note that FAA employees understood immediately thatcommunication capabilities had to be improved, learned from the weaknesses in oursystem, and took immediate action to address them.

Focusing on the draft of Chapter One, we provide the following comments and invite theCommission to consider them seriously. We look forward to reviewing the Commission'srecommendations.Transmissions from TerroristsThe Commission's report gives the false impression that there was immediate awarenessby controllers and others above them in the chain of command of exactly what was said


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in the transmissions from the terrorists early on that morning. The inference is thatawareness in FAA Headquarters, particularly, was much more clear and complete than itwas. The fact is that in most cases, the controllers were not sure what they were hearingand the tapes had to be pulled immediately and replayed and analyzed in order todetermine what was said. As you are aware, some of the transmissions requiredconferring with language experts at FBI after 9/11 to determine what was said. All of thetransmissions were enhanced after the fact to eliminate background noise, etc. As theevents unfolded that morning, controllers had one chance to hear the transmission. Whenthe public does have access to the actual unenhanced transmissions, we believe that thecomparison would be stark.DocumentationOn 9/11, the FAA's Headquarters did not have recording capability on Headquartersphone lines, therefore, many of the conversations that took place that day are lost toposterity. The Commission heard from many FAA Headquarters witnesses about criticalcalls made to the Military and others but those recollections are not included or notconsidered in this report asbest we can determine. It would appear that if theCommission does not have in its position a tape, a log entry, or other document provingthat a communication occurred, such communication is deemed not to have occurred.Communication ProblemsOn 9/11, the telephone lines in the Washington, DC metropolitan area were jammedmuch of the morning. There is no question that this is a contributing factor to thecommunication breakdowns among FAA, its field offices and other agencies, includingthe Department of Defense. The report makes no mention of this fact. Nor is there anymention of the fact that the Pentagon was evacuated after it was struck by American 77,which made communication between DoD and other agencies, including FAA, all themore difficult.Page specific commentsPage 4, third full paragraph"By 8:00 am on the morning of Tuesday, September 11,2001, they had defeated allof the security layers that America's civil aviation security system then had in placeto prevent a hijacking."None of the layers of security in place on 9/11 were relevant to suicide hijackingsbecause such an attack was not anticipated. It would be more accurate to say that thelayers of defense in place on 9/11 were not designed with suicide hijackings in mind, andso were no t effective against them.

Page 10, last paragraphI "As news of the hijacking of American 11 filtered through the FAA and American

/ Airlines systems after 8:20, it does not seem tohave occurred to the system's


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leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might behijacked."At or shortly after 8:20am, there would have been no basis for either the FAA orAmerican Airlines to alert other aircraft that they might too be hijacked. At that point,there was one situation that the FAA wasdealing with andknew about - American 11-and no indication that multiple hijackings were about to occur.Page 11, second and fourth paragraphs"Around 9:00, the FAA, American and United Airlines were facing the staggeringrealization of apparent multiple hijackings."The assertion that by sometime around 9:00am FAA, along with American and United,failed to act to warn other aircraft of multiple hijacks grossly oversimplifies the situationas we all understood it then. There was much confusion and very little in the way of wellunderstood factual information to broadcast warning messages to thousands of aircraft at9:00am or shortly thereafter. However, FAA air traffic management did take actionlocally in Boston and New York to stop all traffic based on the information they had bythat time.Page 15, first paragraph under

.* tifofc-FAA Mission andStructure /"As of September 11,2001, the FAA was mandated by law to regulate safety andsecurity of civil aviation. From a controller^perspective, that meant maintaining asafe distance between airborne aircraft."Th e following should be added fo r clarification an d context:Before 9/11 the mission of the FAA's air traffic control system was to provide the safe,orderly and expeditious movement of aircraft in the national airspace system. Safety wasdefined as separating air traffic from other traffic, terrain an d weather. A ir Defense wasno t considered a role for the FAA. FAA air traffic personnel supported DoD efforts tocounter threats but this support contemplated an airborne threat coming from outside theU.S.Page 18, third paragraph"If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty tocontact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) to ask for amilitary "escort aircraft" to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aidsearch and rescue in the event of an emergency."As FAA indicated in comments to Staff StatementNo. 17, per the procedures that were inplace on 9/11, the request for military escort was situation dependent. It was not alwaysthe case that a military escort would be requested. The Commission's depiction of thescenario, i.e., that every confirmed hijack called for military escort is not accurate.


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Page 20, top of the page, paragraph continued from Page 19"By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south."The Commission's statement is not accurate. As FAA indicated in comments to StaffStatement No. 17, the turn at 8:26am would not have appeared "dramatic" to controllers.In hindsight with a recreation of the flight path, it does appear dramatic. Of note, whendescribing the turn at 8:26am on Page 6 (second full paragraph), the Commission uses amore factual description - "A minute later Flight 11 turned south."Page 20, top of the page, paragraph continued from Page 19 last sentence"FAA Headquarters did not follow the hijack protocol and did not contact theNMCC to request a fighter escort."The Commission's statement is not accurate. At 8:32am, the FAA Headquarters wasreceiving initial information about a possible hijacking. The information gathering was Junderway and the conference call was an internal call, not the external or "primary net"that would have included contact with NMCC.Page 24, second paragraph, last sentence"We have found no evidence to suggest that Command Center managers instructedany Centers to issue a cockpit security alert."Personnel at FAA's Command Center recall that there was a teleconference with theCenter traffic management units instructing them to issue warnings through theirfacilities. At least one Center manager remembers that such a teleconference took place.Research is underway for evidence (i.e., taped conversation) that supports theteleconference took place.

Page 25, first paragraph, last sentence"NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked."In FAA's comments to Staff Statement No. 17 the point was made that neither FAA norNORAD knew of other hijacked aircraft when the Langley fighters were placed onbattlestations at 9:09am. The wording in the report is the same as the Staff Statement andmistakenly leaves the reader with the impression that FAA knew of additional hijackedaircraft at 9:09am.Page 26, second full paragraph"In addition, although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neitherit nor FAA headquarters issued an "all points bulletin" to surrounding centers...."As the FAA indicated in previous comments to Staff Statement No. 17, through thebenefit of hindsight and the radar reconstruction work, we now know what happened toAmerican 77. However, the suggestion that FAA should have issued an "APB" is anoverly simplistic suggestion, particularly because American 77 was believed to havecrashed. Controllers believed that they had confirmation of this. The fact is that radar


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contact was lost onAmerican 77 and there was no primary target to see forapproximately 10 minutes. Due to radar update rate variations, it would have beenextremely difficult to discern the primary target.As more information came in that morning and controllers began to question the initialassumption that the airplane had crashed, they began to quickly search for a target. AsStaff Statement No. 17 stated accurately, no one had perfect information that day.Page 26, third full paragraph"By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew thefollowing. They knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. Theyknew American 77 was lost. They knew a hijacker onboard American 11 had said'we have some planes'."The Commission's statement is not accurate.A more accurate account is this:By 9:25am, FAA HQ knew that 2 aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center,American 77 was lost and although initially believed to have crashed somewhere near theOhio/Kentucky border, controllers had by this time begun to question the earlierassumption that the plane had crashed. The search for a target was underway. There wasnot widespread awareness of the "we have some planes" transmission on 9/11 as theCommission indicates. This knowledge came in the days following. To furthercomplicate the situation, there were dozens of erroneous reports on 9/11 that controllersand others were working hard to sift through.Page 28, second paragraph, last sentence"No one at FAA Command Center or headquarters ever asked for militaryassistance with American 77".This statement provides no context around the circumstances of American 77. Forapproximately thirty minutes after the loss of radar and radio communication, controllersand others in the FAA believed that American 77 had crashed. When controllers beganto rethink the earlier assumption about American77 in the 9:20 timeframe, they began tosearch for a target. When a target was found by Dulles controllers at about 9:32, it wasnot identifiableasAmerican77. Since we did not have a target identified asAmerican77, it is difficult to understand the Commission's point about asking for Militaryassistance with American 77. And according to what the Commission has learned, therewas a call to NEADS about American 11 at 9:34 and during that communication,aWashington Center manager indicated that FAA was looking for the lost American 77.The FAA did not know that American77 had crashed into the Pentagon until sometimelater in the morning. In fact, one of the initial reports that came into Headquarterswasthat anAmerican Eagle (small commuter airplane) flight had crashed into the Pentagon.


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Page 30 and 31"A minute after that, at 9:49,13 minutes after getting the question from ClevelandCenter about military help, Command Center suggested that someone atHeadquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:FAA Headquarters: They're pulling J e f f away to go talk about United 93.Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?F AA Headquarters: U h, God,I don't know.Command Center: U h, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to makeprobably inth e next ten minutes.FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left th e room."At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed Command Center that the Deputy Directorfor Air Traffic Services was talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger aboutscrambling aircraft. Then Command Center informed headquarters controllershad lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area...."

It is not clear why the Commission did not include the following from the same transcriptat 9:54:Command Center: / wasjust advised that we are scrambling in the Washington and NewYork area.FAA Headquarters: We are scrambling in the Washington and New York area.Command Center: That's what I've been told.The selection of the quotes chosen by the Commission would lead the reader to believethat it intended to portray the FAA as an agency in disarray, indecisive, and uncaring in anational emergency. When seen in the larger context, the fact that several decisionmakershave just left the Operations Center is neither unexpected noruntoward.Page 32, first full paragraph"Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA Headquartersrequested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAAheadquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military.While we now know that the "primary net" failed to function as it did historically intraditional hijack situations, managers in Headquarters were communicating with themilitary indirectly through the Command Center. In addition, there was communicationbetween FAA liaisons at the NORAD sectors on 9/11 and FAA facilities.Some Headquarters personnel recall that communication was occurring between FAAand the Military about United 93. Unfortunately not all calls made that day were onrecorded lines. Specifically telephone lines in Headquarters were not recorded on 9/11and therefore, we have not been able to conclusively prove conversations took place. Forpurposes of reconstructing what occurred in Headquarters, those personal recollectionshave seemingly been discounted by the Commission.


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Finally, it is important to know that information coming into FAA facilities, much ofwhich was erroneous, had to be vetted before it was given to the Military as fact. BothFA A and Military personnel were aware of the potential for a tragedy if an airplane weremis-identified as hostile and shot down.Page 33, second paragraph under "Clarifying the Record""We do not believe that understanding the truth about the events of that morningreflects discredit on the operational personnel from NEADS or FAA facilities."This statement seems to implicate both FAA and NORAD leadership. The use of theword "truth" in the first sentence will leave any reader with the mistaken impression thataccounts of 9/11 heretofore were fabrications. The Commission reveals discrepancies innotification times by DoD when they testified before the Commission in May 2003. TheMay 2003 testimony was based on information that DoD and FAA shared in the earlydays after 9/11 as we were reconstructing what happened and when.The Commissionhas spent over 15 months investigating what happened on 9/11. Wenow know that some of the information developed after 9/11 was incorrect but there wasno intentional misrepresenting of information. In the days and months following thattragic day, the FAA's focus was in support of the FBI investigation into the terrorist actsand in establishing security measures and procedures to prevent subsequent attacks andwe did not conduct an in-depth review on the scale of the Commission's investigation.Page 36, first paragraph last sentence"Acting Deputy FAA Administrator Belger was frustrated and upset to learn laterin the morning that the military had not been on the call."A more accurate description of Mr. Belger's frustration is this:Mr. Belger was frustrated to learn that a conference call initiated with the NMCC as aparticipant did not at that time include the Military. For reasons unknown to us at thistime, perhaps owing to the telephone problems encountered that day or other factors, theNMCC was no longer part of the telconference at the time of Mr. Belger's inquiry.

Page 37The Pentagon TeleconferencesComment:There was well-established protocol for handlinghijack incidents prior to 9/11. On thatday, the FAA attempted to follow the protocol initially, although the established protocolin no way considered that hijacked aircraft would be used as missiles. Nonetheless, theonly protocol the Agency knew was what had been used effectively over the years. Wecan only assume that NMCC chose not to follow the protocol and improvised analternative course based on the attacks. Unfortunately FAA was not largely a part of thecommunication network that NMCC established. There is no indication that NMCCcalled FAAHeadquarters to be part of the Air Threat Conference Call. Perhaps they


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could not get through to Headquarters. It is not clear to us how the decision was made atNMCC to include the Command Center on the Air Threat Conference Call. Based onthis it seems unfair to criticize the FAA's participation on this call.

Endnotes64 "FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes afterit was taken over and that Flight 175 was a hijacking 9 minutes after it was takenover. There is no evidence to indicate that FAA recognized Flight 77 as a hijackinguntil it crashed into the Pentagon."This is a complete overstatement with regard to the knowledge of Flight 11 and Flight175. Some FAA employees may have known or suspected this fact. However, to makethe statement that indicates the FAA as a whole knew this information is entirelyinaccurate.The Commission acknowledges that information was not instantaneously known on 9/11;as noted on page 16, the Commission states "Each Center thus had part of the knowledgeof what was going on across the system. But it is important to remember that whatBoston Center knew was not necessarily known by centers in New York, Cleveland, orIndianapolis, or for that matter by the Command Center in Herndon or FAA Headquartersin Washington."In spite of the Commission's statement above, Chapter One is replete with conclusivestatements that FAA knew about certain information before all of the critical parts of theFAA actually had theinformation.

Documents

DH B5 Agency Comments- Chp 1 Fdr- FAA Comments on Chp 1