Differentiation and Defense - Nuclear Files€¦ · Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program i Subcommittee Mission and Members The Policy Committee

February 2003Differentiation and Defense:

House Policy CommitteeSubcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

February 2003

An Agenda for the Nuclear WeaponsProgram

Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program i

Subcommittee Mission and Members

The Policy Committee is the House Majority’s forum for discussion of specificlegislative initiatives, for the enunciation of Republican priorities on issues, and for theresolution of inter-jurisdictional policy disputes within the Conference.

The House Policy Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs works to helpcoordinate the policies of the House Armed Services Committee, the Committee onInternational Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and other Housecommittees with responsibility for issues that affect national security and foreign affairs.

The study for this report was conducted during the second session of the 107th Congress,throughout 2002. Members of the Subcommittee during this period are listed below.

Heather Wilson (NM), ChairChris Cox (CA), Committee ChairShelly Moore Capito (WV)Ander Crenshaw (FL)Tom DeLay (TX)Lincoln Diaz-Balart (FL)Vito Fossella (NY)Ben Gilman (NY)Mark Green (WI)Henry Hyde (IL)Brian Kerns (IN)

Joe Knollenberg (MI)Ron Lewis (KY)Todd Platts (PA)Bob Schaffer (CO)Bob Stump (AZ)John Sununu (NH)Todd Tiahrt (KS)Pat Toomey (PA)David Vitter (LA)J.C. Watts (OK)Roger Wicker (MS)Bill Young (FL)

For additional information on the House Policy Committee and access to other reportsand statements refer to its web-site at www.policy.house.gov.

Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program ii

February 12, 2003

Over the last year, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of theHouse Policy Committee has undertaken a review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy andforce posture. This report is a result of that effort.

From time to time, it is important for the Congress to step back from the day-to-daystruggles to pass appropriations, oversee the operation of federal agencies and craftlegislation to pause and to consider what direction we should be heading on major policyissues affecting the nation.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a significant number of members of Congress were involved andinformed on matters relating to nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons complex. Thatis less true today. Members of our subcommittee felt it was time to review andreconsider these questions.

The recommendations contained in this report have implications across a wide range ofdepartments, budgets, and programs.

I appreciate the involvement of committee members and their staffs in the creation of thisreport. Without their participation, it would not have been possible. Gary Laughlin, aCongressional Fellow from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, helpedcoordinate the work of the Subcommittee this year and provided valuable assistance inthe compilation of this report. His effort made this undertaking possible.

Heather WilsonMember of Congress, New Mexico

Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program iii

Contents

Executive Summary 1

A New World 2

Deterrence in a Changed World 3

Offense and Defense 4

Force Size and Composition 5

Nuclear Test Readiness 6

Hard and Deeply Buried Targets 7

Advanced Development 8

Ballistic Missile Defense 9

Homeland Defense 10

Preventing Proliferation 11

Maintaining the Complex 12

The End of Arms Control 13

Recommendations for the 108th Congress 14

Appendix: The Moscow Treaty 15

Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program 1

Executive Summary

Nuclear deterrence was the foundationof our national security strategy fornearly half a century during the ColdWar. The end of the Cold War usheredin a period of transition as we adjustedour strategy and force posture to newrealities.

America is now the dominant militarypower in a more complex world. Thenuclear threat is numerically smaller butmore diverse and less inherently stable.

In these new circumstances, deterrence –the capacity to dissuade others fromtaking action contrary to our vitalinterests by the maintenance ofoverwhelming power – will continue tobe a vital part of our security strategy.But the capabilities required for effectivedeterrence have changed.

In particular, we must be able to hold atrisk things which are of value in eachnon-allied state that has nuclearweapons. This differentiation requiresthat we maintain a variety of capabilitiesand options, developed in advance, forthe President to have at his disposal. Byhaving them at his disposal, the UnitedStates will be more likely to avoid war,control the escalation of a conflict, orend a conflict on terms acceptable to us.

A stockpile of 1700 to 2200 weaponsshould be adequate for deterrence, butwe will need to hold at risk hard anddeeply buried targets and extend the lifeof the nuclear stockpile through thestockpile life extension program.

The second element of our deterrentstrategy is defense. In a departure frompost World War II practice, Americawill increasingly rely on ballistic missiledefenses to protect ourselves and ourallies from limited attacks and attacks bysub-state entities. We must deployballistic missile defenses.

Over the last decade, we have notsustained parts of our nuclear weaponscomplex which demand attention. TheCongress should support reducing testreadiness to 18 months, reinvigorate theadvanced development program, andupgrade facilities to supportrefurbishment of the stockpile andscience based stockpile stewardship.

With respect to non-proliferation, ourefforts have been successful largelywhere they were not needed andproliferation poses new threats forAmerica.

The United States should focus itsefforts to prevent proliferation in threeareas: improving control of Sovietlegacy systems, strengthening suppliercontrol regimes, and developing thecapacity to disrupt the supply andefficacy of weapons of mass destruction.

But we cannot rely on an imperfect non-proliferation regime to protect thehomeland. In addition to deployment ofballistic missile defenses, we must investin technologies and intelligencecapabilities to protect ourselves fromweapons of mass destruction deliveredby unconventional means.


A New World

When the Soviet Union collapsed andthe Cold War ended in 1991, Americawent through a period of transitionconcerning our nuclear strategy andforce posture.

Many of the assumptions of an entiregeneration of military planners andstrategic thinkers changed. The armedstandoff between two ideologicallyopposed and militarily powerful nationswas over. Eastern Europe, seeing itsopportunity, lunged toward freedom’slight. The weak foundations ofcommunist economies crumbled.

With the United States building newrelationships with the democracies of theformer Soviet empire, the risk ofdeliberate attack by Russia is lower thanever. The risk of disorder and loss ofcontrol of nuclear weapons fromRussia’s still enormous nuclear arsenalcontinues to be a grave concern.

Our efforts to prevent the proliferation ofnuclear weapons have been successfullargely where they were least needed.Twelve nations are known or suspected

of having nuclear weapons programs andmany are developing ballistic missiles todeliver them.

Of greatest concern are the nuclearweapons and ballistic missile programsof countries such as North Korea, Iran,and Iraq, whose postures remain hostileto the United States.

Likewise, a new and virulent form ofterrorism threatens the United States andour way of life. These sub-state andnon-state entities have few of theinhibitions of states. They are fanatics,determined to kill and destroy. There islittle question that terrorist elementswish to acquire nuclear materials andnuclear devices.

While the United States is a dominantmilitary power, we operate in a muchmore complex environment than we didduring the Cold War. There are morenations armed with nuclear weapons.There are multiple potential opponentsand sources of conflict that could affectAmerica’s vital interests.

.


Deterrence in a Changed World

As Russia’s foreign policy leansincreasingly towards the West, somehave questioned the continued relevanceof deterrence, suggesting that nuclearweapons are no longer relevant toAmerican security.

At its core, deterrence is the capacity todissuade others from taking actioncontrary to our vital interests by themaintenance of overwhelming power. Itrequires that others perceive ourwillingness to use that power to stopthem or impose an unacceptably highprice.

Russia today is the only nation that hasthe capability to threaten the continuedexistence of the United States. While weassess the likelihood of their doing so tobe much diminished, the futility ofchallenging our military capabilityprobably discourages the resurgence ofany anti-U.S. military policy in Russiaand encourages Russia’s continued pro-western evolution.

Nations including China, North Korea,Iran and Iraq, which have or aredeveloping weapons of mass destruction,continue to pursue foreign policiesranging from potentially threatening toopenly hostile.

Nuclear weapons and deterrence remainas relevant today as they were at theheight of the Cold War. What haschanged are the elements that are likelyto make deterrence effective in today’sworld: differentiation and defense.

Differentiation

Our nuclear forces used to be oriented

toward a single likely foe – the SovietUnion. Everything else was a lesserincluded case. These footnotes of ournuclear strategy and force posture havegrown in relative importance, justifyingcareful thought and planning for eachcircumstance. What do the leaders ofeach country with weapons of massdestruction value most and how can wehold those things at risk so as to deterthe use of weapons of mass destructionagainst us or our allies?

The answer to this question will bedifferent in each case and will require avariety of capabilities and options,developed in advance, for the Presidentto have at his disposal. By having themat his disposal, the United States will bemore likely to avoid war, control theescalation of a conflict, or end a conflicton terms acceptable to us.

Defense

After exploring defensive concepts inthe 50s and 60s, the United States andthe Soviet Union acknowledged theoverwhelming superiority of the offenseand, through the Anti-Ballistic Missile(ABM) Treaty, incorporated mutualvulnerability into nuclear strategy. Whilewe may still be unable to envision animpermeable shield against a massiveassault on the United States, we shouldbe capable of protecting ourselvesagainst an accidental or rogue attack, oran attack by an emerging power.

The ability to parry and respond bymeans of our own choosing is a strongelement of an effective deterrent againsta multitude of potential enemies.


Offense and Defense

The inclusion of active and passivedefenses in America’s nuclear strategyand force posture is a significantdeparture from post-1960s strategy.

Following the Soviet build-up in the1960s and 1970s, the technologicaldominance of the offense and theeventual limitation of defenses set theparameters of nuclear strategy. Wefaced a monolithic enemy that, despitemilitary doctrine, was basically as averseto using nuclear weapons as we were.Our strategy relied on the ability toretaliate.

There has always been a distaste forassured destruction. But even with newlabels like “sufficiency”, “flexibleresponse" or “essential equivalence” noreal alternative to the balance of terroremerged.

Part of the challenge was technological:the computing power and controlsystems to detect, target, track and shootdown an ICBM just weren’t there. Butthere was also a grim logic to massiveretaliation in a world of twosuperpowers. Stable mutual deterrencewas preferable to both sides seekingdecisive advantage and both worryingthat they were losing that advantage.

Circumstances have changedprofoundly. The threat is numericallysmaller but more diverse and lessinherently stable. And we havedeveloped the technology.

We are less than two years away fromfielding the first elements of land andsea based missile defense systems. Weare within five years of an operational

Airborne Laser system capable ofshooting down missiles in boost phase.

National Missile Defense is movingfrom an R&D project to systemdeployment. The Congress shouldcontinue to support the development,testing and eventual deployment ofballistic missile defense systems.

Preemption

In addition to developing missiledefense, the United States must furtherdevelop tools to detect, defeat or disruptweapons of mass destruction before theycan be used.

In some cases, these defenses mayinvolve U.S. military forces. In others, itmay be law enforcement or intelligenceoperations using highly sophisticatedtechniques.

At the zenith of our national power,America must not squander our moralauthority by justifying the use of forcepreemptively other than in highlyunusual circumstances. Possession ofweapons of mass destruction alone isinsufficient justification for militaryaction. Possession combined withevidence of the intent to use thoseweapons is sufficient.

There is no obligation to wait to be hitfirst. There is a limited right ofanticipatory self-defense in somecircumstances, even if it is not certainthat a strike is imminent.

With these weapons, imminence isimperceptible and the risk of inaction isincalculable.


Force Size and Composition

The current U.S. nuclear weaponsstockpile is designed and sized for theSoviet threat of the past.

The Administration believes that a muchsmaller level of between 1,700 and 2,200deployed strategic nuclear warheads issufficient to provide for Americansecurity. The Moscow Treaty codifiesAmerica’s intent to reach that level by2012.

There are some principles that should setparameters for the size of our deployedstockpile.

• We should retain the strategictriad of Submarine LaunchedBallistic Missiles, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missilesand Bombers.

• We should retain sufficient sizesand types of weapons to reliablyhold at risk targets of value topotential adversaries possessingweapons of mass destruction.

• With the exception of Russia, ourdeployed stockpile should besignificantly larger than anyother single nuclear weaponscapable state.

Disposition of Warheads

The United States is currently unable tobuild a new nuclear weapon. We do nothave the capability to build new nuclear

primaries, or pits, beyond a very limitedcapability at Los Alamos NationalLaboratory.

There has been unwarranted criticism ofthe Moscow Treaty because it does notrequire that nuclear warheads bedestroyed. No arms control agreementhas ever had such a requirement or evena requirement to stop production ofassociated nuclear warheads. It isn’tverifiable because the level of intrusionwould compromise design details.Moreover, in the case of the UnitedStates, because we do not have thecapacity to make replacements, if thereis a problem with a deployed weapon,we need to maintain sufficient storedweapons to address the problem.

Stockpile Life Extension

There are nine types of bombs andmissile warheads in the U.S. inventory.The nation’s weapons are expected toremain in service well beyond theiroriginal design life.

The United States must refurbish andmodernize each weapon that will remainin the stockpile. This is a complicatedenterprise and requires long-termplanning.

The Congress should fund the stockpilelife extension program for the nuclearstockpile and should carefully monitorthe implementation of this program overthe next decade.


Nuclear Test Readiness

It’s been ten years since America lastconducted an underground nuclear test.Each year the Secretary of Energy mustcertify that he is confident the nuclearweapons stockpile is safe and reliablewithout having tested it.

The FY93 Energy and WaterDevelopment Appropriations billincluded the Hatfield amendment, whichtemporarily banned testing. EachAdministration has extended themoratorium. The amendment placedconditions, including the requirementthat another country must test first,before a U.S. test could be conducted.

Since 1993, U.S. policy has posited theresumption of nuclear testing withinthree years of a Presidential decision todo so. A recent report from the DOEInspector General1 (IG) states that theDepartment of Energy may not be ableto meet this requirement.

Nearly half of the people who haveexperience in nuclear testing no longerwork for DOE. In addition, theequipment and facilities for conductingnuclear tests are obsolete or have notbeen maintained. The IG also found theDepartment did not have a solid plan toaddress these problems.

Three years for test readiness is in itselftoo long. A Presidential decision toconduct a test is likely only if there werea serious or imperfectly understood flawin the stockpile, or the need for a newdesign beyond existing knowledge.

1 National Nuclear Security Administration’sTest Readiness Program, DOE Inspector GeneralAudit Report, DOE/IG-0566, September 2002.

The process to obtain a test decisioncould itself be exceedingly difficult andlengthy. Imagine telling a President wehave a problem that requires testing, butwe won’t be able to test for another threeyears.

The timeframe to be prepared to conductan underground nuclear test must bereduced to no more than 18 months, andpossibly as low as 12 months. TheNational Nuclear SecurityAdministration (NNSA) now has a planfor reaching the 18 month goal overseveral years.

The National Defense Authorization Actfor FY2003 requires the Secretary ofEnergy to prepare plans for establishinga test readiness posture for intervals ofsix months from six months to twenty-four months.

The moratorium on underground nucleartesting depends on the success of theScience Based Stockpile Stewardshipprogram. It will be about a decadebefore we see if the development of asimulation-based capability forcertifying that the state of health of ournuclear weapons is sufficient.

The Congress must continue supportingthe Science Based Stockpile Stewardshipprogram. Given the uncertainty aboutwhether it will be sufficient, thePresident must have a credible optionavailable for testing a nuclear weaponwithin a more reasonable timeframe.


Hard and Deeply Buried Targets

Credible deterrence requires that thePresident be able to hold at risk thethings most important to an adversarywho would seek to attack America.Deep underground facilities, includinghardened bunkers and hard-rock tunnels,provide effective haven from attack.

Our potential enemies are burrowing intheir chemical weapons capability, theirconventional capability, their commandand control, biological and nuclearweapons programs. Our current weaponssystems cannot destroy targets that aredeeply buried in tunnels. They were notdesigned to do so.

In the 2001 Defense Authorization Bill,the Congress directed NNSA to studywhether we can take an existing nuclearweapon and encase it in such a way sothat it will penetrate the earth before itexplodes. The intent is to hold at riskhard and deeply buried targets.

Having a Robust Nuclear EarthPenetrator (RNEP) does not make itmore likely that the President would usesuch a weapon. The use of nuclearweapons is one of the gravest decisionsany President can contemplate. It doesmake it more probable that that weaponwould destroy a deeply buried target ifhe had to use it, and, hence, more likelythat we could deter the use of weaponsof mass destruction by an enemy.

The President should have options -- theoptions of conventional forces, ofprecision conventional weapons, and ofnuclear weapons that are capable ofholding all targets at risk.

The Congress should continue to supportthe study and evaluation of munitions tohold hard and deeply buried targets atrisk in order to ensure robust deterrenceand effective Presidential options ifneeded.


Advanced Development

During the Cold War, America had anactive advanced development programthat explored ideas for new or modifiednuclear weapons. This programadvanced safety and reliability inweapon systems and considered newthreats and problems.

In the past decade we have done verylittle to adapt the stockpile to theevolving capabilities of potentialadversaries. The closest we have comeare the stockpile life extension projects.These are important projects, but areinherently limited in nature.

An active advanced developmentprogram would include assessing thecapabilities of adversaries,conceptualizing innovative methods forcountering them, developing weaponsystem requirements, and prototypingand evaluating the concepts.

The 1993 prohibition against research onlow-yield weapons (under five kilotonsyield) is a significant barrier to a robustadvanced development program.Congress should consider repealing thisban.

An active advanced developmentprogram, coordinating the efforts of boththe NNSA and Department of Defense,is a necessary component of acapabilities-based defense strategy. Itallows the United States to have teamsof scientists and engineers working on

emerging threats and potential problemsbefore they become severe. Advanceddevelopment is another form ofreadiness.

An advanced development program willattract and train the next generation ofscientists and engineers who will beresponsible for maintaining thereliability, safety, and capability of thestockpile.

In addition, nuclear weapon designerscontribute uniquely to intelligence aboutforeign technology. The absence ofexploring new ideas negatively affectsthe capability of this critical function ina time of growing concern aboutproliferation.

The Congress should support therevitalization of the nuclear weaponsadvanced development program. TheNuclear Weapons Council shouldreestablish such a program consistentwith the capabilities-based approach fornational security.

We do not know what threats will faceus from new adversaries who are seekingto acquire nuclear weapons and theability to deliver them. It is wise to havean active program considering thesepotential challenges and how we mightaddress them.


Ballistic Missile Defense

Ballistic missile intercept testing hasdemonstrated the technical capability toshoot down missiles. It is time to begindeployment of a layered missile defensesystem to counter the threat of a limitedstrike on the U.S. or its allies.

The U.S. should deploy a system scopedto destroying a limited attack from roguestates or accidental launches against theU.S., our troops overseas, and our allies.

Establishing a layered ballistic missiledefense system is a long-termcommitment. The technology willmature and change over time. Just aswe’ve upgraded and improved ouroffensive forces (bombers, submarines,

and missiles) we will do the same withour defenses. Initial implementation is astarting point to be built upon.

In particular, the airborne lasercomponent of missile defense shouldmove aggressively towards adeployment capability.

The deployment of a layered missiledefense system will complement andenhance nuclear deterrence. It adds todeterrence by showing adversaries thattheir attack or threat of attack wouldhave a high chance of failure.


Homeland Defense

The prospect of terrorists obtaining aweapon of mass destruction anddelivering it by unconventional meanscreates completely new problems for ournation’s defense.

The war on terrorism will be lengthy,and requires an offensive strategy –seeking out terrorist cells and destroyingthem. But we also have to improve ourability to defend ourselves at home.

The creation of the Homeland SecurityDepartment provides an opportunity tointegrate our two greatest strengths –technology and intelligence – and usethem to enhance our security.

Technology

The challenge is to detect, identify anddisable harmful chemical, biological ornuclear materials before anyone is hurt.

Radiation detection equipment fordetecting nuclear materials is not new.But most of it is narrowly focussed andrequires close proximity to the material.

The Customs Service has been slow toevaluate the need for detectionequipment and to establish plans for itsdeployment. Insufficient R&D isunderway to develop new technologies,including remote sensing and broad areacoverage.

The new Homeland Security Departmentand the Department of Energy mustdevelop an aggressive and well-fundedR&D effort that includes:

• Further development anddeployment of technologies to senseand identify in real time nuclearmaterials coming through our ports,being carried through our airports ortransported on our roads.

• Developing low cost capabilities tocontinuously monitor air, water andfood supplies in order to detectchemical and biologicalcontaminants.

• Developing the capability to rapidlyand remotely locate nuclear materialsover large areas, including cities.

• Further development of techniques todisable explosives withoutdetonating them.

• Continued development andmaintenance of the expertise todisable nuclear weapons, or bombscontaining nuclear materials.

Intelligence

A weapon of mass destruction thatreaches our border is already too close.Relying upon our intelligence capability,we must extend our secure zone awayfrom entry points out to embarkationpoints and beyond.

To this end, we must continue tostrengthen intelligence collection,analysis and information integration.


Preventing Proliferation

The spread of nuclear materials andmissile technology will continue to be anational security challenge. Negotiatednon-proliferation regimes have beensuccessful largely where they were notneeded.

The United States should focus itsefforts to prevent proliferation in threeareas: Soviet legacy systems, suppliercontrols, and disruption.

Soviet Legacy Systems

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,the United States has funded cooperativeprograms, including Nunn-Lugar, toreduce the likelihood that materials andexpertise from the Soviet nuclearweapons program would end up in thewrong hands. While certainly there hasbeen some good done, these efforts havebeen excessively bureaucratic andlacking focus.

The United States needs to strengthenand re-energize its cooperation withRussia and other nations of the formerSoviet empire by:

• Involving the American privatesector in the effort to redirectRussian expertise in a way that willbenefit Russia’s economy andAmerican security interests.

• Developing an overarching strategyto guide our cooperative programs.

• Expanding co-operative programswith the Russians to improve theirmaterial control and accountabilitysystems.

• Jointly exploring and developingwith Russia the means to detect andinterdict the movement of nuclearmaterials.

Supplier Controls

Beyond Russia, there are supplier statesthat sell materials to countries seeking todevelop weapons of mass destruction.The United States needs to work withour allies to reinvigorate the suppliercontrol regimes and engage othercountries at the highest levels on theneed to control the export of criticaltechnology from their countries.

When necessary, the United States mustbe willing to impose stiff sanctions oncompanies and countries that exportmaterials that must be controlled toprevent the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction. We must continue toinfluence other countries to do the samebecause sanctions are more effectivewhen more countries are involved inenforcing them.

Disruption

Because the diplomatic and financialtools at our disposal to discourageproliferation are limited, we mustdirectly face the threat proliferationposes to our nation. The United Statesshould use its intelligence resources andtechnological capabilities to overtly andcovertly disrupt the supply and efficacyof weapons of mass destruction beingsought by countries and sub-state entitieswhose interests are contrary to our own.


Maintaining the Weapons Complex

The U.S. is currently unable to produce anew nuclear weapon. Since the closureof the Rocky Flats plant in 1989, we nolonger have a nuclear primary, or pit,production facility with the exception ofvery limited capability at Los AlamosNational Laboratory.

While the NNSA is in a site selectionprocess for a new pit production facility,it will be more than a decade before it isoperational.

This is just one example of the erosionof the nuclear weapons complex, whichis particularly evident at our productionfacilities. The Congress and theAdministration began a Facilities andInfrastructure program in last year’sdefense authorization bill to beginaddressing this long-term modernizationneed.

The successful licensing of the WattsBar Nuclear Station of the TennesseeValley Authority for the production oftritium was an important success for theNNSA. This program reestablishes adomestic tritium production source,essential for the maintenance of thenuclear stockpile.

Three weapons in the enduring stockpileare in the early stages of programs toextend their life by replacing parts thatare beyond their design life usingmodern electronics, materials andmanufacturing processes that differ fromwhen the weapons were originallyqualified. This must be done withoutimpacting the certification criteria of thenuclear assemblies of the warheads.

Ensuring a fully capable nuclearweapons complex is necessary as long aswe intend to have a credible nucleardeterrent. Central to this capability,even beyond having modern facilities, ishaving the confident, capable workforceneeded to operate this complex.

The Science Based StockpileStewardship program was conceived todramatically enhance the fundamentalknowledge and simulation capability ofthe physics of nuclear weaponsperformance. This is envisioned as themethod that will form the basis for thefuture annual certification of thestockpile (and, if needed, new weapons)in the absence of underground nucleartests.

Congress must support modernization ofthe NNSA complex of laboratories andmanufacturing facilities, the sciencebased stockpile stewardship program,life extension programs, and advanceddevelopment programs so that theworkforce will be fully capable ofmaintaining and certifying the nuclearweapons stockpile.

The life extension programs willchallenge broader parts of the workforcethrough the next decade. If augmentedwith advanced development programs,the combination of challenging workshould be sufficiently enticing andgenuine to train a new generation ofweapon scientists and engineers.


The End of Arms Control

Arms control dominated the nationalsecurity agenda in the 1970s and 1980s.It was the centerpiece of America’srelationship with the Soviet Union.Indeed, in the elaborate preparation forsummits, America had to insist on twoother “baskets” of issues – human rightsand economic affairs -- that would be onthe table. And “basket” was about theright size.

Arms control is not an end in itself andnever has been. It is a tool to enhancesecurity, particularly security againstnuclear war.

But the most notable acts ofdisarmament have been as a response tothe lowering of political tensions. Ithappens gradually over time when statesdo not feel their interests clash or theyabandon military precautions againsteach other.

We are in that period of evolution withrespect to our relationship with Russia.Arms control is no longer a dominatingaspect of our relationship.

The President announced his decision toreduce the operationally deployedstrategic nuclear arsenal to between1,700 and 2,200 within a decadeunilaterally, and invited Russia to do thesame. While the Russians wanted andgot the Moscow Treaty to memorializethose mutual decisions, America made itclear that we were not going to allow the

slow machinery of formal negotiationsto delay action.

The Moscow Treaty formalizeddecisions already made. It sealed agentlemen’s agreement. It was not theforum where rivals sought advantage ordisadvantage and wrangled over arcanedetail as was the case in past armscontrol talks.

The era of arms control with the formerSoviet empire is over. In its place is amuch richer, multifaceted relationship.

Multilateral Regimes

With respect to other security challengesposed by weapons of mass destruction,there are limited opportunities forstrengthening arms control regimes inthe areas of most concern. The statesthat are seeking to develop theseweapons are largely uninterested inlimiting their programs throughnegotiation or in honoring theagreements they make.

There is some potential to strengthenInternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) inspections, and developstronger export control regimes withlikeminded states. But these effortsalone are marginal and cannot be reliedupon to significantly increase America’ssecurity against those who wouldthreaten us.


Recommendations for the 108th Congress

1. Continue to support thedevelopment, testing and eventualdeployment of ballistic missiledefense systems as an integratedelement of deterrence and nationalsecurity.

2. Accelerate the development of toolsto detect, disrupt or defeat weaponsof mass destruction before they canbe used.

3. Fund the service life extensionprogram for the nuclear stockpileand carefully monitor theimplementation of this program overthe next decade.

4. Require and support a test readinessprogram that could achieve anunderground diagnostic test within18 months.

5. Continue to support the ScienceBased Stockpile Stewardshipprogram.

6. Support the study and evaluation ofmunitions, including nuclear, to holdhard and deeply buried targets atrisk.

7. Support the revitalization of thenuclear weapons advanceddevelopment program consistentwith the capabilities based approachfor national security. Considerrepealing the ban against research onlow-yield nuclear weapons.

8. Support research and developmentefforts for homeland security

including technologies to sense andidentify nuclear materials, monitorair, water and food for contaminants,remotely locate nuclear materialsover large areas, disable explosiveswithout detonating them, and disablebombs containing nuclear material.

9. Improve our nuclear nonproliferationprograms by involving the privatesector in ways to benefit Russia’seconomy and U.S. security,expanding programs to improveRussian material control andaccountability systems, and co-developing with Russia means todetect and interdict the movement ofnuclear materials.

10. Require that the U.S. in cooperationwith our allies reinvigorate suppliercontrol regimes to thwart countriesselling technologies for proliferationof weapons of mass destruction.

11. Invest in technologies andcapabilities to disrupt the supply andefficacy of weapons of massdestruction being sought by countriesand sub-state entities whose interestsare contrary to our own.

12. Support the modernization of theNNSA complex of laboratories,manufacturing facilities, ScienceBased Stockpile Stewardshipprogram, weapon life extensionprogram, and advanced developmentprograms so that the workforce willbe fully capable of maintaining andcertifying the nuclear weaponsstockpile.


U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

(The Moscow Treaty)

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as theParties,

Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal ofstrengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,

Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitativelynew foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,

Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security,cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability,

Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms,

Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of Americaand the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoaand on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001in Washington,

Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America andthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of StrategicOffensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and

Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for activelypromoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President ofthe United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of theRussian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so thatby December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure ofits strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number ofsuch warheads.


Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice ayear of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutionalprocedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of theexchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended byagreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treatyupon three months written notice to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the UnitedNations.Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russianlanguages, both texts being equally authentic.

Released May 24, 2002

Documents

Differentiation and Defense - Nuclear Files€¦ · Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program i Subcommittee Mission and Members The Policy Committee