US Department of Defense - Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures

j DoD 5 1 0 0 . 5 2 - M

NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT

RESPONSE PROCEDURES

(NARP)

MANUAL

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

SEPTEMBER 1990

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEW A S H I N G T O N , D C 2 0 3 0 1 - 3 0 5 0

DoD 5100. 52-M

[ A T O M I C E N E R G Y ) September 4, 1990FOREWORD

This Manual has been developed by the Defense Nuclear Agency(DNA) under the authority of DoD Directive 5100.52, “DoD Responset o a n A c c i d e n t o r S i g n i f i c a n t I n c i d e n t I n v o l v i n g R a d i o a c t i v eMaterial s,” December 21, 1989, and supersedes DNA 5100.1,!rNuclear Weapon A c c i d e n t Response p r o c e d u r e s (NARP) M a n u a l , ”January 1984.

This Manual appl ies to the Of f i ce o f the Secretary o fD e f e n s e (OSD) ; the Mi l i tary Departments ; the Chairman{ J o i n tC h i e f s o f S t a f f a n d J o i n t S t a f f ; t h e U n i f i e d a n d SPeclfledCommands; and the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities thatsupport response to a nuc lear weapon acc ident (hereaf ter re ferredto col lect ively as “DoD Components”) . T h i s M a n u a l i s e f f e c t i v eimmediately .

The purpose of this Manual is to provide the On-SceneCom~ander and h is or her p lanning s ta f f wi th a s ing le ,comprehensive document that summarizes procedural guidance,t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d D o D r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r r e s p o n d i n g t oan acc ident invo lv ing nuc lear weapons . The NARP also describesthe substant ia l resources in o ther Federa l Agenc ies that can bem a d e a v a i l a b l e t o a s s i s t i n t h e r e s p o n s e e f f o r t .

This Manual should be widely disseminated and made availableto al l commanders and staf f who may be cal led upon to respond toa nuclear weapon accident . I t should serve as a gu ide for moredeta i led p lanning for nuc lear weapon acc ident response , and canbe used to improve training and exercise programs.

Suggest ions to update or improve th is Manual are so l i c i ted .Send proposed changes through appropriate channels to :

Headquarters , Defense Nuclear AgencyA t t n : NOEA6801 Telegraph RoadA l e x a n d r i a , VA 2 2 3 1 0 - 3 3 9 8

DoD Components may obtain copies of this Manual throught h e i r o w n p u b l i c a t i o n s c h a n n e l s . Other Federal Agencies and thepublic may obtain copies from the U.S. Department of Commerce,Nat ional Technica l In format ion Serv i ce , 5285 Port Royal R o a d ,S p r i n g f i e l d , V A 2 2 1 6 1 .

%?Robert B.,

Barker

Doll 51 OO.52-M

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

—

CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

1-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-2 Purpose and Scope of the NARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-3 Organization and Us.eofthe NARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-4 Nuclear. Weapon Accident Response Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-5 The Phases of Response to a Nuclear Weapon Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-6 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-7 Change Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX I-A RESPONSE FORCE PLANNING CHECKLIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX 1-B INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE PRE-DEPARTURE CHECKLIST . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX 1-C RESPONSE FORCE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS CHECKLIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX 1-D RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN

ON-SCENE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE RESOURCES ANDPERSONNEL PERMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX 1-E SERVICE RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TOSUPPORT SUSTAINED SITE RESTORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX 1-F RADIATION HAZARDS AND BASIC RADIATIONPROTECTION PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX 1-G QUICK REFERENCE EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 2- RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-3

. . . . . . . .Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 3- RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES

3-13-23-33-43-53-63-73-83-93-1o3-113-12

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Energy (DoE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of State (DoS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Agriculture (USDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Commerce (DoC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Interior (DoI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Transportation (DoT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) ‘. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3-13-13-13-23-23-3 .3-33-4343-43-43-5

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

3-13 Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-14 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-15 General Services Administration (GSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-16 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-18 State/ Local Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 4- MANAGEMENT OF ACCIDENT RESPONSE

4-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-4 Response Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-6 Accident Response Plan Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX 4-A ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 5- RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

5-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-5 Concept of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,5-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX5-A RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX 5-B ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX 5-C SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, RADIAC REPAIR,

AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT/ CAPABILITIES TEAMS . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX 5-D AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX 5-E RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, MEASUREMENT,

CHAPTER 6-

CHAPTER 7-

CHAPTER 8-

CHAPTER 9-

AND CONTROL FORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONTAMINATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

BIOASSAY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDSAND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 10- SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX 1O-A SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX IO-B SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL . . . . . .

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4-14-14-14-24-6

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5-15-15-15-15-25-8

5-A-15-B-1

5-c-15-D-1

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8-1

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CHAPTER

CHAPTER

11 -

1 2 -

CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM . .

COMMUNICATIONS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . .12-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . .12-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 13- SECURITY

13-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 14- MEDICAL

14-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .14-7 SpecializedCourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX 14-A NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER 15- WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATIONS

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13-113-113-113-113-2134/

14-114-114-114-114-214-614-6

14-A- I

15-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-115-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-115-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1154 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-115-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-215-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-4

CHAPTER 16- PUBLIC AFFAIRS

16-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-116-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1

iv


Page

16-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-116-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............”.......... 16-116-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-2

APPENDIX 16-A PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE CONTINGENCY RELEASES . . . . . . . . . 16-A-1APPENDIX 16-B RADIATION FACT SHEETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-B-1

CHAPTER 17- LOGISTICS SUPPORT

17-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-117-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-117-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-117-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-117-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-217-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-3

APPENDIX 17-A LOGISTICS RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-A-1

CHAPTER 18- LEGAL

18-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-1

18-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 18-1

18-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-118-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-118-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-118-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-2

APPENDIX 18-A PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-A-1

CHAPTER 19- SITE RESTORATION

19-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-119-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-119-3 Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-119-4 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-119-5 Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-219-6 Accident Response Plan Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-5

CHAPTER 20- SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES

20-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-120-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-120-3 “~ Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-120-4 Department of Defense (DoD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-120-5 Department of Energy (DoE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-320-6 Federal Emergencey Management Agency (FEMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-320-7 Other Federal Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-3

APPENDIX 20-A POINTS OF CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-A-1

v


CHAPTER 21 - TRAINING

21-1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-121-2 Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1

21-3 Organizational Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-121-4 Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1

-!

.

vi

DoD 51 OO.52-M

FIGURES

FIGURE TITLE PAGE

l-l

1-2

1-3

4-1

4-2

4-3

5-1

5-A.1-I

5-B- 1

5-c- 1

5-C-2

5-c-3

5-E-1

5-E-2

5-E-3

5-E-4

5-E-5

5-E-6

5-E-7

5-E-8

7-1

7-2

8-1

12-1

Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification F1OW (Simplified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . .

Relationship of Initial Actions During a Nuclear Weapon Accident Response . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Operations Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Initial Response Force (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Service Response Force Functions and Interagency Relationships (Example) . . . . ...”.....

Sample Accident Site Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) Functional Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Spectral Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air Sampler Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ARACPlot - Lung Dose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ARAC Plot - Deposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AMS Plot (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Personal Data Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Radiological Control Area Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bioassay Screening Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Radiation Health History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Field Monitoring Data Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TLD Measurement Collection and Analysis Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Weapons Accident Environmental Radiation Alpha Probe Data Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIDLER Data Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contamination Control Station (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vehicle Contamination Control Sttion (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Estimated First-Year Dose Commitment to the Lungs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEO) (Sample Contents) . . . . . . . . . . .

I -5

1-6

1-7

4-3

4-4

4-8

5-5

5-A.1-4

5-B-2

5-C-6

5-c-7

5-c-lo

5-E-3

5-E-5

5-E-9

5-E-13

5-E-1 5’

5-E-17

5-E-19

5-E-21

7-3

7-4

8-2

12-6

vii

DoD 51 OO.52-M

— .—— —-

TABLE

5-A.1-I

5-B-1

5-B-2

5-C-1 ‘

6-1

6-2

8-1

8-2

11-1

11-2

11-3

11-4

11-5

14-1

19-1

19-2. .

19-3

20-1

21-1

TABLES

TITLE

Commonly Considered Radioactive Contaminants and Their Primary Associated RadioactiveEmissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air Sample Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air Sample Piacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Programs Contained in the HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes Program Name Description . . .

Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for Emergency Workers as a Function of AirborneContamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Protective Devices for Emergency Workers as a Function of Surface Contamination . . . . . . .

Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays . . . . . . . .

Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conversion Table (CPM to #g/ mz or #Ci/ mz) AN/ PDR 56 Alpha Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conversion Table (CPM to #g/mz or #Ci/ mz) AN/ PDR 60 or AN/PDR 54 AlphaMeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and uCi) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conversion Table to S1 Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Radioactive Contamination Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decontamination Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Organization/Team Capabilities/ Service Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PAGE

5-A.1-2

5-B-1

5-B-3

5-c-3

6-2

6-2

8-3

8-4

11-1

11-3

11-4

1 I-5

11-5

14-5

19-5

19-5

19-14

20-2

2 1 - 2

. . .WH

DoD 51OO.52-M

ACRONYMS

AACAFAFBAFOCAFRATAFRRIAIMSAOCARACARGASD(PA)ATRAPATSD(AE)AUTODINAUTOSEVOCOMAUTOVONBqCATCCAc c cCCGC c sCDCECDRHCEATCEOICFCINCCNWDICOMCOMSECCPCPMCPXDCEDCODCSDHHSDNADNAATDoCDoDDoEDoE/ ALDoE/NVDoIDOMSDoS

Ambient Air ConcentrationAir ForceAir Force BaseAir Force Operations CenterAir Force Radiation Assessment TeamArmed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute’Aerial Measurement SystemArmy Operations CenterAtmospheric Release Advisory CapabilityAccident Response GroupAssistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)Air Transportable RADIAC PackageAssistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)Automatic Digital NetworkAutomatic Secure Voice Communications NetworkAutomatic Voice NetworkBecquerelCrisis Action TeamContamination Control AreaCrisis Coordination CenterCombat Communications GroupContamination Control StationContamination Disposal Coordinating ElementCenter for Devices and Radiological HealthCommunity Emergency Action TeamCommunications Electronic Operating InstructionComposite FiberCommander-in-ChiefCritical Nuclear Weapon Design InformationChief of MissionCommunications SecurityCommand PostCounts Per MinuteCommand Post ExerciseDisaster Control ElementDisaster Control OfficerDefense Communications SystemDepartment of Health and Human ServicesDefense Nuclear AgencyDefense Nuclear Agency Advisory TeamDepartment of CommerceDepartment of DefenseDepartment of EnergyDepartment of Energy/Albuquerque OperationsDepartment of Energy/Nevada OperationsDepartment of the InteriorDirector of Mili tary ‘Support ‘Department of State

ix

ACRONYMS (CONTINUED)

DoTDPM/ m3DRFDSFOEACECSEEFIEICCEMREMTEOCEODEPAEPZERTFAAFBIFCDNAFCOFDAFEMAFONACFRCFRERPFRMACFRMAPFTSFTXGMFGSAHEHEPAHFHHSHDNAHOT SPOTHUDIcIccINDINWSIRF.JAJACC/ CPJCSJCSEJHECJICJNACC

Department of TransportationDisintegrations Per Minute Per Cubic MeterDisaster Response ForceDeputy Senior FEMA OfficialEmergency Action CommitteeExercise Control StaffEssential Elements of Friendly InformationEmergency Information and Coordination Center (FEMA)Electro-Magnetic RadiationEmergency Medical TeamEmergency Operations CenterExplosive Ordnance DisposalEnvironmental Protection AgencyEmergency Planning ZoneEmergency Response TeamFederal Aviation AdministrationFederal Bureau of InvestigationField Command, Defense Nuclear AgencyFederal Coordinating OfficerFood and Drug AdministrationFederal Emergency Management AgencyFlag Officers’ Nuclear Accident CourseFederal Response CenterFederal Radiological Emergency Response PlanFederal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment CenterFederal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment PlanFederal Telecommunications SystemField Training ExerciseGround Mobile ForceGeneral Services AdministrationHigh ExplosiveHigh Efficiency Particle AirHigh FrequencyDepartment of Health and Human ServicesHeadquarters, Defense Nuclear AgencyDepartment of Energy Mobile Counting LaboratoryDepartment of Housing and Urban DevelopmentInhaled ConcentrationInterstate Commerce CommissionImprovised Nuclear DeviceInterservice Nuclear Weapons SchoolInitial Response ForceJudge AdvocateJoint Airborne Communications Center) Command PostJoint Chiefs of StaffJoint Communications Support ElementJoint Hazard Evaluation CenterJoint Information Center

.

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center

x


JSJSCPkeVLOSMACMARDMeVMILSTRIPMPCMRATMRTNAIRNARCLNARPNASANAVMEDNCANCAICNCCNCCNCSNDANESDISNESTNMCCNMFSNOAANOSNRCNSANSCNSNNTSNTSBNUWAXNWSOAROASD(PA)OEHLOEMTO s cPAGPAOPARPLAPRPQDRRADCONRAMT

Joint StaffJoint Strategic Capability PlanThousand Electron VoltsLimit of SensitivityMilitary Airlift CommandMobile Accident Response DevelopmentMillion Electron VoltsMilitary Standard Requisitioning and Issue ProceduresMaximum Permissible ConcentrationMedical Radiobiology Advisory TeamMedical Radiology TeamNuclear Accident Incident ResponseNuclear Accident Response Capability ListingNuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures ManualNational Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNavy Bureau of Medicine and SurgeryNational Command AuthorityNuclear Chemical Accident/ Incident ControlNational Coordinating CenterNavy Command CenterNational Communications SystemNational Defense AreaNational Environmental Satellite Data and Information ServiceNuclear Emergency Search TeamNational Military Command CenterNational Marine Fisheries ServiceNational Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationNational Ocean ServiceNuclear Regulatory CommissionNational Security AreaNational Security CouncilNational Stock NumberNevada Test SiteNational Transportation Safety BoardNuclear Weapon Accident ExerciseNational Weather ServiceOffice of Oceanic and Atmospheric ResearchOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)Occupational and Environmental Health LaboratoryOperational Emergency Management TeamOn-Scene CommanderProtective Action GuidePublic Affairs OfficerProtective Action RecommendationPrincipal Legal AdvisorPersonnel Reliability ProgramQuantity DistanceRoentgen .Radiological ControlRadiological Advisory Medical Team

xi


RAPRCARCLREAC/TSRERRRFRSPSAAMSCBASECORDSENACSFOSONACSRFSRPSSN or SSANTELEXTWXuCi/ m3

UHFu sUSCINCUSDAUSFORSCOMUSMCVHFWATS

Radiological Assistance Program (DoE)Radiological Control AreaRadiological Control LineRadiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training SiteRe-entry RecommendationsRegional Response ForceRender Safe ProceduresSpecial Assignments Airlift MissionSelf Contained Breathing ApparatusSecure Cord SwitchboardSenior Executive Nuclear Accident CourseSenior FEMA OfficialSenior Officers’ Nuclear Accident CourseService Response ForceSite Restoration PlanSocial Security NumberTelephone ExchangeTeletypewriter ExchangeMicrocuries per cubic meterUltra High FrequencyUnited StatesU.S. Commander-in-ChiefU.S. Department of AgricultureU.S. Army Forces CommandU.S. Marine CorpsVery High FrequencyWide Area Telephone Service

.

xii

DoD 51 OO.52-M

REFERENCES

(a)

(b)(c)

(d)(e)(f)(!3)(h)

(i)0)(k)(1)(m)(n)(o)(P)(q)

(r)(s)(t)

(u)

(v)(w)

(x)(Y)(z)(aa)(ah)(at)(ad)(se)(m(ag)(ah)(ai)(aj)(ak)(al)(am)(an)(so)

DoD Directive 5100.52, DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving RadioactiveMaterials, 21 Dec 89.

DoD Directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance, 7 Feb 83.Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), Federal Register, 50 Fed. Reg. 46542,

8 Nov 85.DoD Directive 5148.2, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), 4 Feb 86.DoD Directive 5200.8, Security of Military Installations and Resources, 29 Jul 80.DoD Directive 4000.19, Interservice, Interdepartmental, and Interagency Support, 14 Ott 80.Public Law 93-288,22 May 74, amended by Public Law 100-107,23 Nov 88.DoD Directive 3025.1, Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies within the

United States, its Territories, and Possessions, 23 May 80.EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 18 Nov 88.JCS Publication 1-03.6, Joint Reporting Structure Event/Incident Report, Nov 80.TP 20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.Army TM 39-20-11, General Fire fighting Guidance, Jun 89.Navy S WOP 20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.Air Force T.O. 1lN-20-11, General Firefighting Guidance, Jun 89.Lawrence Livermore National Lab Report M-161, 1982.NSTM 079-39.137.AR 40-14, Control and Recording Procedures for Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,

Sep 84.NAVMED P-5055, Radiation Health Protection Manual, Nov 86.AFR 161-8, Control and Recording Procedures-Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, Sep 66.AFR 161-28, Rrsonnel Dosimetry Program and the USAF Master Radiation Exposure Registery,

Ott 73.OPNAVINST 3440.15, Minimum Criteria and Standards for Navy and Marine Corps Nuclear

Weapons Accident and Incident Response, 13 Jun 83.BUMEDINST 6470.10, Irradiated or Radioactively Contaminated I%rsonnel, 5 Dec 79.JCS MOP 167, Mobile/Transportable Communications Assets Controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

May 1978. .

Allied Communications Publication 134, Communications Assets, Jan 75.U.S. Forces Command Manual 105-1, Joint Communication Deployment and Employment, Jun 80.FM 24-2, Radio Frequency Management, Sep 85.AFR 100-31, Frequency Management and Electromagnetic Comparability, Sep 85.Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 USC 797).DoD Directive 5210.41-M, Nuclear Weapon Security Manuai, Sep 87.DoD Directive 5210.41, Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons, 23 Sep 88.DoD Regulation 5200. l-R, Information Security Program Regulation, Jun 86.DoD Directive 5210.2, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data, 12 Jan 78.AR 380-150, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data, Sep 78.AFR 205-1, Information Security Program, Apr 87.AR 40-13, MedicaI Support-Nuclear/ ChemicakAccidents and Incidents, 1 Feb 85.AR 600’10, The Army Casualty System, Aug 87.AFR 30-25, Casualty Services, Aug 87.BUPERS Manual Article 4210100, Personnel Casualty Reporting, Feb 82.NACP Report #37, June 1980.DA Circular 40-82-3, Prevention of Heat Injury. “Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training Publications 60-1.

. . .X111

REFERENCES (CONTINUED)

(ap) Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8.29, January 1984.(aq) DoD Directive 4000.25- l-M, Military Standards Requisitioning and Issue Procedure

(MILSTRIP), May 87.(ar) DNA 5100.52. l-L, Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing, Ott 89.

.

xiv

>

DoD 51 OO.52-M

DEFINITIONS

Access Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance DisposalProcedures.

Accident Response Group (ARG). The Department ofEnergy (DoE) Accident Response Group consists ofqualified scientific, medical, and technical personnel andspecialized equipment designated to execute DoE’sresponse operations upon notification of a nuclearweapon accident/incident.

Aerial Measurement System (AMS). Performs aerialmeasurements of ground and airborne radioactivity overlarge areas by utilizing instrumentation for detecting andrecording gamma radiation, both as gross count ratesand gamma energy spectra. Equipment for determiningthe position of the aircraft is integrated into the system.

Airborne Radioactivity. Any radioactive materialsuspended in the atmosphere.

Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). Afield qualified team of health physicists and healthphysics technicians established at the USAF Occupa-tional and Environmental Health Laboratory (USAFOEHL). The team is capable of responding worldwidewith air transportable equipment to radiation accidents/incidents, providing on-site health physics consultationand instrumentation for the detection. identification, andquantification of any possible radiation hazard.

Air Sampler. - A device used to collect a sample of theradioactive particulate suspended in the air.

Air Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP). Acollection of RADIAC equipment, spare parts, andtrained instrument repair technicians maintained in analert status by the Air Force Logistics Command forairlift to the scene of a nuclear weapon accident/incidentto supplement the local RADIAC equipment and repaircapability.

Alpha Team. An Army team possessing an alpharadiation monitoring capability. The team is identifiedusually as part of a Nuclear Accident and IncidentControl (NAIC) Team.

Anti-Contamination Clothing (Anti-C’s). Clothingconsisting of coveralls, shoe covers, gloves, and hood

or hair cap. Anti-contamination clothing providesprotection for the user from alpha radiation, and is alsoa control device to prevent the spread of contamination.A respirator can be worn with the anti-contaminationclothing which provides protection against the inhalationof contaminants.

Armed. The configuration of a nuclear weapon inwhich a single signal initiates the action for a nucleardetonation.

Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). ADoE asset capable of providing a computer generatedmodel of the most probable path of the radioactivecontamination released at an accident site.

Background Count. (In connection with healthprotection). The background count includes radiationproduced by naturally occurring radioactivity andcosmic rays.

Background Radiation. Radiation arising from radioac-tive material other than the one under consideration.Background radiation due to cosmic rays and naturalradioactivity is always present.

BecquereL The unit of activity of a radionuclide, equalto the activity of a quantity of a radionuclide havingone spontaneous nuclear transition per second.Symbolized Bq.

BENT SPEAR. A term used in the DoD to identifyand report a nuclear incident involving a nuclearweapon/ warhead or nuclear component. In the Armyand Air Force, this term includes a “significant incident”

as defined in DoD Directive 5100.52. See nuclear weaponincident,

Bioassay. The method(s) for determining the amountof internaI contamination received by an individual.

BROKEN ARROW. A DoD term to identify andreport an accident involving a nuclear weapon/warheador nuclear component. In the Navy this includes a“signflcant incidentm as defined in DoD Directive5100.52. See nuclear weapon(s) accident.

C*gnizant Agency Authority or Official. The foreigngovernment agency, official or the senior representative

xv

of the involved country’s government at an accident/incident site.

Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT). A teamof response and local experts that operates out of theJIC and is available to assist the local community.

Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA).The CognizantFederal Agency is that Federal agency having custodyof the weapon at the time of the accident. The CFAis responsible to:

a. Conduct and manage Federal on-site actions.

b. Develop or evaluate recommendations for publicprotective action measures off site.

c. Present recommendations for off-site protectiveaction measures, in coordination with FEMA, to theappropriate State and /or local officials or Foreign,.government.

d. Coordinate initially the release of information tothe public, Congress, and the White House untiltransferred to FEMA by mutual agreement.

Contamination. The deposit and/ or absorption ofradioactive material, biological, or chemical agents orhazardous materials on, and by, structures, areas,personnel, or objects.

Contamination Control. Procedures to avoid, reduce,remove, or render harmless, temporarily or permanently,nuclear, biological, chemical agent and hazardousmaterials contamination.

,.

Contamination Control Line (CCL). A control linesurrounding the radiological control area. Initially, thecontamination control line extends 100 meters beyondthe known/ suspected radiological contamination toprovide a measure of safety. Once the contaminationcontrol station is operational, this line is the outerboundary that separates the reduced hazard area fromthe cIean area.

Contamination Control Station (CCS). An area (tentor facility) specifically designated for controlling ingressand egress of personnel and equipment to/from theradiation control area. The outer boundary of theContamination Control Station is the contaminationcontrol line, and the inner boundary is the line segmentlabeled the hot line. An illustration of the ContaminationControl Station is at Chapter 5.

Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information’(CNWDI). TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA orSECRET RESTRICTED DATA revealing the theoryof operation or design of the components of athermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb, warhead,demolition munition, or test device. Specificallyexcluded is information concerning arming, fusing, andfiring systems, limited life components, and totallycontained quantities of fissionable, fissionable, and highexplosive materials by type. Among excluded items arethe components which Service personnel set, maintain,operate, test, or replace.

Contamination Reduction Area (CRA). The areaconcept is employed at the Contamination ControlStation to eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level)contamination adhering to personnel in the contami-nated area. The concept uses supervised, structured, andmeticulous clothing/ equipment removal proceduresprecluding mechanical transfer of contamination on aperson/ object and outside the Contamination ControlStation.

Cumulative Dose (Radiation). The total dose resultingfrom repeated exposure to radiation in the same region,or of the whole body.

Custody. Responsibility for the control of, transfer andmovement of, and access to, weapons and components.Also custody includes the maintenance of weapons andcomponents.

Decay (Radioactive). The decrease in the radiationintensity of any radioactive material with respect to time.

Decontamination. The process of making any person,object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutral-izing, making harmless, or removing hazardous materialsclinging to or around it.

Decontamination Station. A building or locationequipped and organized to cleanse personnel andmaterial of chemical, biological, or radiologicalcontaminants.

Department of Defense Executive Agent. One who actson behalf of the Secretary of Defense with his authorityover the military services and DoD agencies. For militaryassistance to disaster relief operations, the Secretary ofthe Army is the DoD Executive Agent.

Department of Energy Team Leader. The coordinatorof all Department of Energy matters, both off and

xvi

on-site, including Department of Energy AccidentResponse Group operations.

Directorate of Military Support (DOMS). Actionagency for the Secretary of the Army when acting inthe capacity of DoD Executive Agent. Directs a task-organized joint staff formed to support the planning,coordination, and execution of military support todomestic disaster relief operations.

Disaster Control. Measures taken before, during, orafter hostile action, natural or man-made disasters, toreduce the probability of damage, minimize its effects,and initiate recovery.

Disaster Control Officer (DCO). The DCO is the DoDpoint of contact with FEMA at the disaster scene forproviding DoD support to disaster recovery operations.

Disaster Cordon. A physical barrier surrounding theaccident scene where control is established to precludeunauthorized entry.

Disaster Preparedness. That series of actions to controland manage nuclear incidents or accidents and bringthem to a practicable conclusion within the establishedsecurity, response and recovery framework. Theseactions include initial and subsequent reportingresponse, Explosive Ordnance Disposal proceduralaction on the weapon(s), appropriate security, legal andmedical aspects, public information, and control ofhazards caused by the accident. Control of the accidentcaused hazards include: survey of the incident/accidentarea to establish isodose lines and all types of monitoring;personnel and area decontamination; disposition ofnuclear, high explosive, and contaminated items.

Disaster Response Force (DRF). The USAF base levelorganization which responds to disasters/accidents forestablishing command and control, and to supportdisaster operations.

Dose Rate Contour Line. A line on a map, diagram,or overlay joining all points at which the radiation doserate at a given time is the same.

Dosimetry. The measurement of radiation doses as itapplies to both the devices used (dosimeters) and to thetechniques.

Exclusion Area. Any designated area containing oneor more nuclear weapons or components.

Explosive Ordnance. All munitions containing explo-sives, nuclear fission, or fusion materials and biologicaland chemical agents. This ordnance includes bombs andwarheads, guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar,rocket, and small arms ammunition. Also, ordnanceincludes all mines, torpedoes, and depth charges;pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridges andpropellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices;clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and allsimilar or related items or components explosive innature.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The detection,identification, field evaluation, rendering-safe, and/ ordisposal of explosive ordnance which has becomehazardous by damage or deterioration when the disposalof such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilitiesof personnel assigned to routine disposal.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident. The suspectedor detected presence of unexploded ordnance, ordamaged explosive ordnance, which constitutes a hazardto operations, installation, personnel, or material. Notincluded in this definition are the accidental arming orother conditions that develop during the manufactureof high explosive material, technical service assemblyoperations, or the laying of mines and demolitioncharges.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. Thoseparticular courses or modes of action for access to,recovery, rendering-safe, and final disposaI of explosiveordnance or any hazardous material associated with anexplosive ordnance disposal incident.

a. Access Procedures. Those actions to locate exactlyand to gain access to unexploded ordnance.

b. Recovery Procedures. Those actions to recoverunexploded ordnance.

c. Render Safe Procedures. The portion of theexplosive ordnance disposal procedures involving theapplication of special explosive ordnance disposalmethods. and tools to provide the interruption offunctions or separation of essential components ofunexploded ordnance to prevent an unacceptabledetonation.

d. Final Disposal Procedures. The final disposal ofexplosive ordnance by explosive ordnance disposalp$rsonnel, which may include demolition or burning inplace, removal to a disposal area, or other appropriatemeans.

xvii

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit. Personnel withspecial training and equipment who render explosiveordnance (such as bombs, mines, projectiles, and boobytraps) safe, make intelligence reports on such ordnance,and supervise the safe removal thereof.

Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance. Reconnaissanceinvolving the investigation, detection, location, marking,initial identification, and reporting of suspectedunexploded ordnance, by explosive ordnance reconnais-sance agents, to determine further action.

Exposure. The exposure at a given point is ameasurement of radiation in relation to its ability toproduce ionization.

Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Federalofficial appointed by the President upon declaration ofa major disaster or emergency under Public Law 93-288 to coordinate the overall Federal response.

Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA). This agency establishes Federal policies forand coordinates all civil defense and civil emergencyplanning, management, mitigation, and assistancefunctions of executive agencies, FEMA assists local andstate agencies in their emergency planning. Its primaryrole in a nuclear weapon accident is one of coordinatingFederal, state, local, and volunteer response actions.

a. Emergency Information and Coordination Center(EICC) - The EICC is located in FEMA Headquartersin Washington, DC and piovides overall direction,control and coordination of Federal and state emergencyservices response/ recovery to a radiological accident oremergency.

b. Emergency Response Team (ERT) - The FEMAteam deployed to a radiological emergency scene by theFEMA Director to make an initial assessment of thesituation and then provide FEMA’s primary responsecapability.

c. Emergency Support Team (EST) - The FEMAheadquarters team that carries out notification activationand coordination procedures from the FEMA EICC.The EST is responsible for Federal agency headquarterscoordination, staff support of the FEMA Director, andsupport of the SFO.

Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan(FRERP). The Federal plan to assist State and localgovernment officials or other Federal agencies in the

response to a radiological emergency in the U. S., itspossessions and territories.

Federal Radiological Monitoring and AssessmentCenter (FRMAC). A center established near the sceneof a radiological emergency responsible for off-siteradiological response from which the FRMAC Directorconducts the FRMAP response. This center need notbe located near the on-site or Federal-State operationscenters as long as its operations can be coordinated withthem. Staffed by DoE NV.

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan(FRMAP). A plan to provide coordinated radiologicalmonitoring and assessment assistance to the State andlocal governments in response to radiolo~cal emergen-cies. This plan, authorized by 44 CFR Part 351,supersedes the Interagency Radiological AssistancePlan.

Federal Response Center (FRC). The on-site focalpoint established by the Senior FEMA Official (SFO),as required, for coordinating the Federal response toa nuclear weapon accident or significant incident.Representatives of other Federal, state, local, andvolunteer agencies will be located in the center.

FIDLER (Field Instrument for the Detection of LowEnergy Radiation). A probe, used with the PRM-5 andother supporting instrument packages, capable ofdetecting low energy gamma and X-rays.

Film Badge. A photographic film packet or badgecarried by personnel, for measuring and recordinggamma ray dosage permanently.

Final Disposal Procedures. See Explosive OrdnanceDisposal Procedures.

Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). Information removedfrom the Restricted Data category upon determinationjointly by the Department of Energy and Departmentof Defense that such information relates primarily tothe military utilization of atomic weapons and that suchinformation can be safeguarded adequately as nationalsecurity information (Section 142d, Atomic Energy Actof 1954, as amended).

Hazardous Materials. Any material that is flammable,corrosive, an oxidizing agent, explosive, toxic, poison-ous, $tiological, radioactive, nuclear, unduly magnetic,

“ a chemical agent, biological research material, com-pressed gases, or any other material that, because of

XVill

its quantity, properties, or packaging, may endangerhuman life or property.

Half-Life. The time required for the activity of a givenradioactive species to decrease to half of its initial valuedue to radioactive decay. The half-life is a characteristicproperty of each radioactive species and is independentof its amount or condition. The effective half-life of agiven isotope in the body is the time in which the quantityin the body will decrease to half as a result of bothradioactive decay and biological elimination.

Initial Response Force (IRF). An element, whosecapabilities are listed in the Nuclear Accident ResponseCapabilities Listing. (NARCL), belonging to DoD orDoE installations, facilities, or activities, which wouldtake emergency response actions necessary to maintaincommand and control on-site pending arrival of theService or agency response force. Functions which theinitial response force is tasked to perform (within itscapabilities), are:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

Rescue operations.

Accident site security.

Firefighting.

Initiation of appropriate EOD procedures.

Radiation monitoring.

Establishment of. command, control, andcommunications.

g. Public “affairs activities.

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incident. Is an eventresulting from a deliberate act, involving nuclearweapons or nuclear materials which include the sabotage,seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon or radiologicalnuclear weapon component or the fabrication andemployment of an IND or a credible threat of either.

Ingestion Pathway. The means by which a person isexposed to radiation through the food chain.

Inhalation Pathway. The means by which a person atthe accident area or downwind is subjected to respiratoryradiation exposure.

Hot Line. The Hot Line is the inner boundary of thecontamination control station, marked with tape or line.The station personnel use the line as the inner side being

contaminated and the side away from the accident asan area of reduced contamination.

Hot Spot. The region in a contaminated area in whichthe level of radioactive contamination is considerablygreater than in neighboring regions in the area. “HOTSPOT” also refers to the DoE Accident Mobile CountingLaboratory and Mobile Support Equipment.

Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). Acommunications element that provides high frequency,very high frequency, secure and super high frequencysatellite terminals and other equipment.

Joint Communicat ions Cont ingency Stat ionAssets. The communications station provides highfrequency radio, tropospheric scatter terminals,automatic digital network terminals, manual secure voiceand other equipment.

Joint Information Center (JIC). A facility at the sceneof a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident tocoordinate all public affairs. The JIC includes repres-entation from DoE, DoD, FEMA, DoS, and otherFederal agencies, as well as state, local, and/or foreigngovernments.

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center(JNACC). The DoD and DoE operate coordinatingcenters for exchanging and maintaining informationabout radiological assistance capabilities and activities.These centers are separated geographically, but linkedby direct communications networks.

Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). A facility,staffed by representatives from each of the agenciesconducting hazard survey and radiological operations,for the coordination of hazard survey data andradiological safety/health physics matters on-site.

Licensed Material. Source material, special nuclearmaterial, or by product material received, possessed,used, or transferred under a general or specific licenseissued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a state.

Maximum Permissible Dose. That radiation dosewhich a military commander or other appropriateauthority may prescribe as the limiting cumulativeradiation dose to be received over a spec~lc period oftime by members of the command, consistent withoperational military considerations.

, Monitoring. The act of detecting the presence ofradiation and the measurement thereof with radiationmeasuring instruments.

Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing(NARCL). A listing of DoD and DoE installations,facilities, or activities with nuclear accident/incidentresponse and radiation detection capabilities.

National Defense Area (NDA). An area establishedon non-Federal lands located within the United States,its possessions or territories, for the purpose ofsafeguarding classified defense information, or protect-ing DoD equipment and /or material. Establishment ofa National Defense Area temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of the DoDand results only from an emergency event. The seniorDoD representative at the scene will define the boundary,mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs.The landowner’s consent and cooperation will beobtained whenever possible; however, military necessitywill dictate the final decision regarding location, shape,and size of the NDA.

National Security Area (NSA). An area established onnon-Federal lands located within the United States, itspossessions, or territories, for safeguarding classifiedand /or restricted data information, or protecting DoEequipment and/ or material. Establishment of an NSAtemporarily places such non-Federal lands under thecontrol of the DoE and results only from an emergencyevent. The senior DoE representative having custodyof the material at the scene will define the boundary,mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs.The landowner’s consent and cooperation will beobtained whenever possible; however, operationalnecessity will dictate the final decision regardinglocation, shape, and size.

,.

Need-to-Know. A criterion in security procedureswhich requires the custodians of classified informationto establish, prior to disclosure, that the intendedrecipient must have access to the information to performhis official duties.

Nuclear Accident and Incident Control Team(NAIC). An Army team organized to minimize andprevent the loss of life, personal injury, hazardous effects,and destruction of property, to secure classitled material,and to enhance and maintain the public’s confidencein the Army’s ability to respond effectively to a nuclearaccident or incident.

Nuclear Contribution. Explosive energy released bynuclear fission or fusion reactions, as part of the totalenergy released by the accidental explosion of a nuclearweapon. Any nuclear contribution equivalent to four

or more pounds of TNT is considered significant, andwould add beta and gamma radiation hazards to otherradiological and toxic hazards present at a nuclearweapon accident site.

Nuclear Detonation. A nuclear explosion resultingfrom fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials,such as from a nuclear weapon.

Nuclear Radiation. Particulate and electromagneticradiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclearprocesses. The important nuclear radiations, from theweapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gammarays, and neutrons. All nuclear radiations are ionizingradiations, but the converse is not true.

Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). The NESTis a DoE asset with specialized equipment for conductingradiation survey and detection, field communications,EOD support, bomb/weapon diagnostics, hazardprediction, damage mitigation, and decontamination.

Nuclear Safing. The prevention of a nuclear yield inthe event of accidental detonation of the HE of a highexplosive assembly weapon or ignition of the propellantof a gun assembly weapon.

Nuclear Weapon. A device in which the explosionresults from the energy released by reaction involvingatomic nuclei, either f~sion or fusion, or both.

Nuclear Weapon Accident. An unexpected eventinvolving nuclear weapons or nuclear components thatresults in any of the following:

a. Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, oruse by U.S. forces or U.S. supported allied forces ofa nuclear capable weapons system.

b. An accidental, unauthorized, or unexplainednuclear detonation.

c. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclearweapon or nuclear component.

d. Radioactive contamination.

e. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon “or nuclearcomponent.

f. Public hazard, actual or perceived.

Nticjear Weapon Incident.involving a nuclear weapon,

An unexpected eventfacility, or component

xx

resulting in any of the following, but not constitutinga nuclear weapon(s) accident:

a. An increase in the possibility of explosion orradioactive contamination.

b. Errors committed in the assembly, testing, loading,or transportation of equipment, and/or the malfunc-tioning of equipment and material which could lead toan unintentional operation of all or part of the weaponarming and /or firing sequence, or which could lead toa substantial change in yield, or increased dudprobability.

c. Any act of God, unfavorable environment, orcondition resulting in damage to a weapon, facility, orcomponent.

Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. An unexpectedevent involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weaponcomponents or a nuclear weapon transport or launchvehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated, loaded, or onboard that does not fall in the nuclear weapon accidentcategory but:

a. Results in evident damage to a nuclear weaponor radiological nuclear weapon component to the extentthat major rework, complete replacement, or examina-tion or recertification by the DoE is required.

b. Requires immediate action in the interest of safetyor nuclear weapons security.

c. May result in adverse public reaction (national orinternational) or inadvertent release of classifiedinformat ion. “

d. Could lead to a nuclear weapon accident andwarrants that senior national officials or agencies beinformed or take action.

Nuclear Yield. The energy released in the detonationof a nuclear weapon, measured in terms of the kilotonsor megatons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) required toproduce an equivalent energy release.

Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory(OEHL). A USAF unit that provides consultant,engineering, and analytical support in radiological,occupational, and environmental health programs. TheUSAF unit offers a multitude of technical services onradiological problems. The radiological field unit of theOEHL is called the AFRAT.

Off-Site. That area beyond the boundaries of a DoDinstallation or DoE facility, including the area beyondthe boundary of an NDA or NSA, that has been, ormay become affected by a nuclear weapon accident orsignificant incident.

One-Point Detonation. A detonation ofExplosives) initiated at a single point.

One-Point Safe. The criterion for design

HE (High

safety thata weapon must have less than one chance in a millionof producing a nuclear yield of more than four poundsof TNT (equivalent energy release) when the highexplosive is initiated and detonated at any single point.

On-Scene Commander (OSC). The Flag or GeneralOfficer designated to command the DoD response effortsat the accident site.

On-Site. That area around the scene of a nuclearweapon accident or significant incident under theoperational control of the installation commander,facility manager, DoD OSC, or DoE team leader. Theon-site area includes any area which has been establishedas a NDA or NSA.

Operational Emergency Management Team(OEMT). The DoE senior management team atheadquarters that coordinates the initial FRMAPresponse to radiological emergencies.

Oralloy. Enriched uranium. One of the primaryfissionable materials in nuclear weapons.

Particulate Radiation. Radiation in the form ofparticles (for example, neutrons, electrons, alpha andbeta particles) as opposed to electromagnetic radiation.

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). A DoD pro-gram implemented for all personnel who control, handle,have access to, or control access to nuclear weaponsystems. The program covers selection, screening, andcontinuous evaluation of the personnel assigned tovarious nuclear duties. The program seeks to ensure thatpersonnel coming under its purview are mentally andemotionally stable and.reliable.

Physical Security. That part of security concerned withphysical measures designed to safeguard personnel, toprevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities,material, and documents, and to safeguard them againstespionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

xxi

Plutonium (Pu). An artificially produced fissilematerial. The Pu-239 isotope is primarily used in nuclearweapons.

Protective Action Guide (PAG). A radiation exposurelevel or range established by appropriate Federal or Stateagencies beyond which protective action should beconsidered.

Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). Advice tothe State” on emergency measures it should consider indetermining action for the public to take, avoid, orreduce exposure to radiation.

Quantity/Distance (QD) Safety Standards. Directivespertaining to the amounts and kinds of explosives thatcan be stored and the proximity of such storage tobuildings, highways, railways, magazines, and otherinstallations.

RAD. Old unit of absorbed dose radiation. One radrepresents the absorption of 0.01 joule of nuclear (orionizing) radiation energy per kilogram of the absorbingmaterial or tissue.

RADIAC. A term designating various types ofradiological measuring instruments or equipment. (Thisterm is derived from the words “radioactivity detection,indication and computation,” and is normally anadjective.

Radioactivity. The spontaneous emission of radiation,generally alpha or beta particles, often accompanied bygamma rays from the nuclei of an unstable isotope.

.

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site(REAC/TS). A treatment and consultative team forradiation emergencies, which provides training courses,at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). Aspecial team established at Walter Reed Army MedicalCenter under the Commander, U.S. Army HealthServices Command, available to the OSC, NuclearAccident and Incident Control Officer, or Commanderof a military hospital. Team personnel will advise onradiological health hazards and exposure level criteria.

Radiological “Assistance. That assistance providedafter an accident involving radioactive materials to:

a. Evaluate the radiological hazard.

b. Accomplish emergency rescue and first aid.

c. Minimize safety hazards to the public.

d. Minimize exposure of personnel to radiation orradioactive material.

e. Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination.

f. Minimize damaging effects on property.

g. Disseminate technical information and medicaladvice to appropriate authorities.

Radiological Assistance Program Team (RAPTeam). DoE teams available through DoE regionaloffices to assist in radiological emergencies.

Radiological Control Area (RCA). The control areaencompassing all known, or suspected, radiologicalcontamination at a nuclear weapon accident.

Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. Specialradiological teams of the U.S. Army and U.S. Navyorganized to provide technical assistance and advice inradiological emergencies.

Radiological Survey. The directed effort to determinethe distribution of radiological material and dose ratesin an area.

Re-entry Recommendations (RERs). Advice providedto the State concerning guidance that may be issuedto members of the public on returning to an area affectedby a radiological emergency, either permanently or forshort-term emergency actions.

Recovery Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Dispo-sal Procedures.

Render Safe Procedures. See Explosive OrdnanceDisposal Procedures.

Residual Contamination. Contamination whichremains after steps have been taken to remove it. Thesesteps may consist of nothing more than allowing thecontamination to decay naturally.

Restricted Data (RD). All data (information)concerning.

a.” Design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclearweapons.

xxii

b. Production of special nuclear material,

c. Special nuclear material in the production of energybut shall not include data declassified or removed fromthe restricted data category pursuant to Section 142 ofthe Atomic Energy Act (Section 11 W, Atomic EnergyAct of 1954, as amended).

Roentgen. A obsolete unit of exposure of gamma (orX-ray) radiation in field dosimetry. One roentgen isessentially equal to one rad,

Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal (rem). One remis the quantity of ionizing radiation of any type which,when absorbed by man or other mammals, producesa physiological effect equivalent to that produced bythe absorption of one (1) roentgen of X-ray or gammaradiation. The S1 unit replaced the rem.

Safing. As applied to weapons and ammunition, thechanging from a state of readiness for initiation to asafe condition.

Security Area. The area surrounding the accident sitein an overseas country where a two-person security policyis established to prevent unauthorized access to classifieddefense information, equipment or material. Thecooperation by local authorities and host countriesconsent should be obtained prior through host nationagreements.

Senior FEMA Official (SFO). A person appointed bythe Director of FEMA to coordinate the Federalresponse to a civil emergency.

Service Response Force (SRF). A DoD response forceappropriately manned, equipped, and able to performand coordinate all actions necessary to control andrecover from an accident or significant incident. Thespecific purpose of a Service/agency response force isto provide nuclear weapon accident/significant incidentassistance. Service/ agency response forces are organizedand maintained by those Services or agencies which havecustody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear“weapon components. “

Transuranic. Having an atomic number greater thanthat of uranium (The known elements belonging to theactinide series).

Tritium. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogenhaving one proton and two neutrons in the nucleus.Tritium is a beta emitter.

Tuballoy (TU). A term, of British origin, for uraniummetal containing U-238 and U-235 in natural propor-tions, therefore, the term is considered ambiguous andits use is discouraged. This term is sometimes appliedto depleted uranium. See uranium.

Two-Person Policy. A system designed to prohibitaccess by an individual to nuclear weapons and certaindesignated components by requiring the presence at alltimes of at least two authorized persons capable ofdetecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures withrespect to “the task to be performed. Also referred toas the two-man concept or policy.

Uranium. Uranium is a heavy, silvery white, radioac-tive metal. In air, the metal becomes coated with a layerof oxide that will make it appear from a golden-yellowcolor to almost black. Uranium is an alpha emitter.

Warhead. That part of a missile, projectile, torpedo,rocket, or other munition which contains either thenuclear or thermonuclear system, high explosive system,chemical or biological agents, or inert materials intendedto inflict damage.

Warhead Section (WHS). A completely assembled .warhead including appropriate skin sections and relatedcomponents.

Weapon Debris (nuclear). The residue of a nuclearweapon after it has exploded or burned; that is, thematerials used for the casing, and other componentsof the weapon, plus unexpended plutonium or uranium,together with fission products, if any.

Weapons Recovery. Includes a comprehensive assess-ment of the accident, neutralizing the weapon hazards,and removing, packaging, and shipping of the weaponhazards.

.

. . .Xxlll

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1 GENERAL

DoD Directive 5100.52, reference (a), provides responseguidance and the following definitions:

a. A Nuclear Weapon Accident is:“An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons

or nuclear components that results in any of thefollowing:

(I) Accidental or unauthorized launching, jiring,or use by U.S. forces or U.S. supported allied forcesof a nuclear capable weapons system. ”

(2) An accidental, unauthorized, or unexplainednuclear detonation.

(3) Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclearweapon or nuclear component.

(4) Radioactive contamination.(5) Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear

component.(6) Public hazard, actual or perceived.

b. A Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident is:“An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons,

nuclear weapon components, or a nuclear weapontransport or launch vehicle when a nuckar weapon ismated, or loaded on board that does not fall in thenuclear weapon accident category but:

(1) Results in evident damage to a nuclear weaponor radiological nuclear weapon component to the extentthat major rework, complete replacement, or examina-tion or recertijlcation by the DoE is required.

(2) Requires immediate action in the interest ofsafety or nuclear weapons security.

(3) May result in adverse public reaction (nationalor internationa~ or inadvertent release of classljledinformation.

(4) Could. lead to a nuclear weapon accident andwarrants that senior national officials or agencies beinformed or take action. ”

This directive also directs the Defense Nuclear Agency(DNA) to develop a technical document for nuclearweapon accident response. The Nuclear Weapon

Accident Response Procedures (NARP) manual hasbeen developed for this requirement. This manualsummarizes DoD responsibilities and provides procedu-ral guidance for a joint response to accidents involvingnuclear weapons or components thereof in the UnitedStates and its territories or possessions. General guidancefor overseas areas is included.

1-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE NARP

This manual consolidates procedural guidance andtechnical information to assist DoD forces in preparingfor nuclear weapon accident response and in respondingto a DoD nuclear weapon accident. The document isdesigned to standardize where appropriate and integrateDoD methods with Department of State (DoS)procedures, the Federal Radiological EmergencyResponse Plan (FRERP), and DoE Accident ResponseGroup (ARG) responsibilities/ procedures. Portions ofthe document may be useful to DoD elements respondingto non-DoD radiological accidents or incidents undercurrent interagency support agreements.

Procedures will not be addressed for response toaccidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use ofa nuclear capable weapon system, or for response andrecovery of seized or stolen weapons. This manual isdesigned to furnish a general approach to nuclearweapon accident response. The procedures must be usedin conjunction with DoD directives, Federal instructions,State/ local plans, international/ bilateral agreementsand theater policy to be effective.

1-3 ORGANIZATION AND USE OF THE NARP

This chapter introduces the NARP and provideschecklists for On-Scene Commanders (OSCS) and theirstaffs. Chapters 2 and 3 describe responsibilities” of theDoD and other Federal agencies and provide generalinformation on foreign governments’ responsibilities/,capabilities in nuclear weapon accident response/recovery. Chapter 4 discusses the concept of operationsfor response and recovery procedures, while Chapters

1-1

5 through 14 address radiological/hazardous materialsafety aspects, communications, security, medicalassistance, weapons recovery, public affairs, logisticssupport, legal implications, and site restoration. Chapter20 lists specialized units and organizations discussedthroughout the document. Chapter 21 addresses training.

Potential OSCS and their staffs will enhance their abilityto respond to a nuclear weapon accident by gainingfamiliarity with this manual.

1-4 NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSEOVERVIEW

In a nuclear weapon accident, health and safety, publicaffairs, classified information security, and weaponsrecovery are the critical concerns facing the responseforce. Other aspects, such as medical assistance, security,logistics, legal implications, site restoration, commun-ications and response force integration are areas thatmust also be addressed.

a. Health and Safety. A nuclear weapon accident canresult in an immediate, but temporary, nonradiologicalthreat to public safety from toxic or explosive hazardsassociated with the accident. Also, contamination maybe released that could create long term public healthconcerns. Rapid initial safing actions on the nuclearweapons involved in the accident are the highest priorityso that subsequent detonations and site contaminationwill not occur. Should conventional explosives in theweapon detonate, ”radiological contamination may exist.If the weapon is breached by external forces (forexample, impact,_ fuel fire /explosion) there may beradiological contamination. Rapid determination of thepresence or absence of radiological contamination is acritical element of initial accident response. Air samplingfor radiation downwind of the accident may not befeasible because once the explosion and/ or fire is over,the resultant contamination may settle or disperse ina few hours. Initial ground radiation surveys willprobably be the means of determining the presence/absence of contamination. If a radiological problemexists, or is caused during weapon recovery operations,specialized Federal, state, and local radiological responseteams will be required to define extent of contamination,protect the public, and return the area to normal use.

(1) Radiological Safety. The primary hazardsassociated with a nuclear weapon accident, unless theaccident involves a nuclear yield, are materials whichemit alpha radiation. Therefore, measures should be

implemented to prevent alpha radiation from enteringthe body. Radiation hazards and basic radiationprotection principles are described in Appendix l-F. Ifradioactive contamination occurs as a result of theaccident, the first radiological response should be toidentify the initially affected area and personnel,minimize any continuing radiological hazard toresidents, and characterize the site contamination.Action to accomplish these tasks should be includedin response force accident procedures/plans. In general,the extent of contamination is over-estimated initiallyto provide the greatest margin of safety for the publicand then refined as actual measurement of contam-ination is obtained. The response force must obtainfactual information to define the actual details of thecontamination problem. The procedures/ plans willidentify limitations on the response organization’scapability to perform such actions and will state addi-tional resource requirements, their availability, and howadditional resources will be employed. Specitlc actionsto resolve the radiological problem include

(a) Estimate the boundaries of radiologicalcontamination using the Atmospheric Release AdvisoryCapability (ARAC), if available.

(b) Disseminate precautionary/ protective mea-sures to be taken by residents in potentially contaminatedareas, for example, notification, sheltering, orevacuation.

(c) Identify, monitor, and decontaminate, ifnecessary, personnel at the accident scene and firstresponders who may have already departed the accidentscene.

(d) Establish” a radiological controls program tolimit radiation exposures to personnel.

(e) Determine the various levels of contaminationpresent within the contaminated area.

(f) Establish a bioassay program to quantifyradiation doses, if required.

(g) Fix highly contaminated areas as appropriateto minimize resuspension.

(2) Hazardous Materials Response. An accidentinvolving a weapon system can release non-nuclearhazardous materials, for example, high explosives, heavy .metals, propellants, oxidizers, and plastics. Responseprocedures must include evacuation or shelteringrecommendations to local officials and identifying,marking and containing of hazardous/toxic materials.

[3) Site Decontamination/ Restoration. Restoring acontaminated area may include removing, diluting, orfixing contamination at levels which are not detrimental

1-2

to health over a lifetime of exposure, and which willbe technically achievable and financially acceptable. Thisprocess will be the most time consuming portion ofnuclear weapon accident response and will be acoordinated Federal, State, local and/ or involvedcountry government effort. It will involve preparationof protective measures, reentry recommendations anddevelopment of restoration procedures. One of the mostdifficult steps will be selection of criteria to determinewhen site restoration is complete. Many of the legalclaims against the government will be related to the siterestoration procesy consequently, actions must beaccurately documented.

b. Public Affairs. Public Affairs encompasses muchmore than the release of information to the public. Therelationships of the OSC, his staff, and his public affairsofficials with the news media and the general publicis an important element in a comprehensive public affairsprogram designed to gain public understanding ofaccident response efforts.

(1) Public concerns which can be expected follow-ing an accident with a nuclear weapon include:

(a) Danger to those involved in or respondingto the accident;

(b) Treatment of casualties;(c) Credibility of information provided concern-

ing the accident and its long term effects;(d) Precautions to be taken by those in contam-

inated areas with regard food, water, livestock safety;(e) Adequacy of contamination diagnoses and

effects on the health of any persons exposed tocontamination; ~

(f) Availability of shelter, food, water, andclothing if the accident situation results in people beingevacuated from their homes, and security of theirpossessions;

(g) Safety of U.S. nuclear weapons;(h) Decontamination of contaminated areas;(i) Reparations for damages caused by the

accident.

(2) DoD Directive 5230.16, reference (b), statesthat, in general, it is DoD policy neither to confirmnor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weaponsat a specific location. The OSC is authorized to invoketwo exceptions:

(a) First, cotilrmation of the presence of anuclear weapon is appropriate when public safety isendangered.

(b) Second, the OSC may confirm or deny thepresence of the weapon, as necessary, to allay publicalarm.

(c) No other variations from DoD policy areauthorized. If the exceptions are invoked, confirmationof the presence of the weapon should be made as soonas possible to preclude undue public concern and toestablish response force credibility. The AssistantSecretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) andlocal government officials should be notified in advanceor advised as soon as possible that an exception hasbeen invoked.

(d) In locations outside the United States, itsterritories, and possessions, unless bilateral agreementsexist, the OSC must have the concurrence of theappropriate theater Commander-in~Chief (CINC) andthe approval of the host government through the U.S.Chief of Mission (COM), prior to exercising theexceptions above.

c. Weapon(s) Recovery. All nuclear weapon accidentswill, by definition, have some form of weapon problem.Security and weapon safety concerns should not precludeor interfere with the performance of basic medical andhumanitarian response to accident victims. Public affairsand health issues must be addressed concurrently withthe weapon recovery effort. The weapon presents botha technical problem to be addressed by ExplosiveOrdnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and the DoE ARGand a need for appropriate security for the weapon andits components. Safety and security procedures fornuclear weapons are documented in EOD and securitypublications. Weapons involved in an accident may havebeen subjected to severe stress; consequently, as muchtime as necessary should be taken to permit a thoroughassessment of possible damage by qualified EOD andDoE response personnel. (Through documentedplanning and close coordination between EOD and DoEARG, the OSC can ensure safe removal, packaging, andshipment of weapon(s) and/or weapon components totheir final destination.) If the high explosives detonateduring the accident, or detonate during recoveryoperations, searching for classified and hazardouscomponents may be necessary. Coordination betweenEOD, weapon recovery, and radiological responsepersonnel ,is essential to minimize risk to personnel.

d. Response Forces Integration and Coordinationand Associated Areas of Concern. From the initial reportof the accident until the final actions of site restoration,several organizations, both within and without the DoD,kill be involved in the response effort. The extent ofinvolvement and degree of responsibility are situation

dependent, but all forces must be integrated totally toensure effective use of their capabilities. Following initialidentification of arriving response teams, an exchangeof briefings should occur to apprise the arriving teamof the current situation, actions in progress, and toinform the OSC about the capabilities of the newlyarrived response teams. To ensure a coordinated effort,liaison officers may be exchanged, or select membersof one team may be integrated into the lead team’s staff.The following concerns and actions must be considered:initial identification and security clearance level ofresponse team members with follow-on actions to ensurerapid recurring access to the accident site: medical,communications, security, legal, restoration andlogistical support (for example, lodging, clothing, andequipment) needed or provided; and extensive adminis-trative support to ensure complete documentation ofevents, decisions, and costs.

1-5 THE PHASES OF RESPONSE TO A NUCLEARWEAPON ACCIDENT

The response procedures addressed throughout thisdocument consider two force levels. The first level isthat of Initial Response Force (IRF). The IRF may bea small force on-scene if an accident occurs near aninstallation with only a humanitarian emergencyresponse capability. The second level is that of the ServiceResponse Force (SRF). The response effort of theseforces can be divided into two phases:

a. Initial Phase. The initial phase includes accidentnotification and immediate emergency measures takenby the nearest DoD/ DoE installation to provide aFederal presence and’”humanitarian support. Initiationof nuclear weapon accident response actions by theNational Military Command Center (NMCC), Serviceoperations centers, and others assisting in the response,results automatically from accident notification.Therefore, accidents must be reported immediately usingthe most expeditious means available (secure if possible).Upon receipt of accident notification, the appropriateresponse forces are identified and tasked by the UnifiedCommands, or Service and specialized teams are alertedand prepared for deployment by the Service operationscenter. A simplified notification chain resulting fromthe initial accident report to NMCC and/or Serviceoperation centers is shown in Figure 1-1. Also, the initial

phase requires defining and stabilizing the situation bythe IRF. These actions include fire suppression, rescueand treatment of casualties, assessment of control,reconnaissance, and assessment of the hazards to publichealth and safety. Other actions of immediate concerninclude establishing communications with the accidentsite, the supporting military installation and commandcenters, public affairs, and providing security forclassified material. Figure 1-2, although not all-inclusive,illustrates the inter-relationship of initial actions.

b. Follow-on Phase. The follow-on phase includes theconduct of all operations required to recover theweapon(s) and restore the environment to a technicallyachievable/ financially acceptable condition using thecombined assets of the various agencies and organiza-tions in the response and recovery.

1-6 NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSECHECKLISTS

Checklists derived from the primary nuclear weaponaccident response requirements identified in thisdocument are contained in Chapter 1, Appendices 1-Athrough I-F as a guide for the OSC in monitoring theprogress of an accident response. The checklists’paragraphs are not all inclusive or arranged in priorityorder; the accident situation will dictate the priority andorder of response force actions. Figure 1-3 (centerfold),Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Opera-tions Flow Diagram, depicts the various response actionsand the approximate time of their occurrence. Also,Figure 1-3 may be of assistance in accident responseplanning.

1-7 CHANGE PROCEDURES

Users are encouraged to submit recommended changesand comments which may enhance this manual’susefulness. Comments should be keyed to a specific pageand paragraph of the text. Sufficient detail andjustification should be provided to ensure understandingand provide for evaluation of the recommended change.Comments should be forwarded through command andService channels to Director, Headquarters, DefenseNuclear Agency, ATTN: NOEA, 6801 Telegraph Road,Alexandria, VA 22310-3398.

.

1-4

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1-5

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1-6

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DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1-A

RESPONSE FORCE PLANNING CHECKLIST

1. Review accident response plans to ensure:

a. Response force personnel roster is current.

b. Actions required upon arrival on-sceneidentified.

are

c. Procedures exist for establishing communicationsfrom on-base: off-base, or remote sites.

d. Procedures/authority are addressed for publicrelease of information.

e. Recommended guidance for involving civil offi-cials/ authorities.

f. Potential assistance is identified from civil officials/authorities and other federal agencies.

g. Personnel/equipment deployment plans are currentand functional.

h. Proposed response force equipment is appropriateand adequate for the mission.

i. Notification procedures and telephone numbers arecorrect.

j. Reception plans for support teams are adequate.

2. Inspect response force equipment to ensure it is:

a. Fully serviceable/operable.

b. Ready for short notice deployment.

3. Verify readiness through periodic response forcefield and command post exercises.

4. Trained personnel are assigned to key positions.Replacements are appointed and trained promptly upondeparture of incumbent.

.

1 -A-1

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1-B

INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE

PRE-DEPARTURE

1. Recall response force personnel and assembleequipment.

2. Contact authorities on-scene, if possible, foradditional information.

3. Assess situation.

4. Review accident notification message (OPREP-3),as appropriate.

5. Provide advice on possible hazards to on-sceneofficials.

6. Dispatch advance party, if appropriate.

7. Obtain weather data at time of accident and weatherforecast for accident site.

8.

CHECKLIST

Coordinate communications procedures with homebase/station.

9. Request ARAC plot, if available for the accident.

10. Augment response force, if necessary.

11. Ensure arrangements are being made for requiredlogistics support.

12. Ensure proper travel route is established and obtainsecurity escort.

13. Ensure other agencies are aware of response forceand OSC’S status.

I-B- I

DoD 51OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1-C

RESPONSE FORCE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS CHECKLIST

1. Establish a command post:

a. Identify civil and military forces present and theircapabilities.

b. Determine actions to treat, identify, and evacuatecasualties.

c. Reduce any immediate hazards (such as fires).

d. Place air samplers up and downwind of the acci-dent.

e. Determine if contamination has been released.(Notify NMCC immediately).

f. Determine actual weather conditions at the accidentsite.

2. Establish control of the accident site to:

a. Protect personnel from explosive, radiological,toxic, or other hazards.

b. Safeguard classified material.

c. Establish internal and external communications,using secure means when possible, with DoD JointNuclear Accident Coordinating Center or NMCC inaddition to the Service operation center.

3. Prepare appropriate press releases with Service andDoD Directives.

4. Establish direct communications with the Office ofthe Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), ifpossible.

5. If contamination is present:

a. Advise medical treatment facilities receivingcasualties the type of actual or possible contamination.

b. Through NMCC recommend deployment to thescene of the specialized teams from the appropriateService operations center, if necessary.

(1) Army Radiological Control Team(2) Navy Radiological Control Team

(3) Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team(4) Air Force Radiation Assessment Team(5) Air Force Air Transportable Radiac Assistance

Package(6) Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team(7) Department of Energy Accident Response

Group

c. Advise the NMCC of the TELEFAX phone numberfor ARAC plot delivery.

d. Identify and record names, addresses, and locationsof persons possibly contaminated.

7. Determine the status and location of all weapons,if possible.

8. Seek the assistance of civilian authorities/officialsand advise them of any possible hazards and precautions.

9. Keep the Service operations centers and/or NationalMilitary Command Center informed of conditions atthe accident scene.

10. Establish a continuous and secure communicationslink with the military communications system.

11. Request HAMMER ACE, Joint CommunicationsSupport Ele,rnent, Joint Communications ContingencyStation Assets or other appropriate communicationsystems.

12. Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) withtoll free number for information request.

13. Identify a forward operating or staging base andreception center for follow-on forces.

14. Secure airspace (that is, prohibited area overaccident site) with assistance of the Federal AviationAuthority or host country.

15. Establish liaison with Host Nation through Chiefof Mission.

~6. I%form emergency render safe procedures onweapons if necessary.

1 -c-1

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1-D

RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN

ON-SCENE AS SOON

AS AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL PERMIT

1. Initiate surveys and determine extent of contam-ination.

2. Direct activities of a JIC to interfam with DoS,Federal, state, or local and/or affected country govern-ment public affairs.

3. Establish a National Defense Area, or “SecurityArea” in coordination with affected country officials,if required. (Dissolve the designated area and returncontrol to civil authorities/officials after all classifiedmaterials have been removed).

4. Establish a Joint Hazard Evaluation Center tocoordinate explosive, toxic, or other hazard safetymeasures and radiological monitoring and health physicsmatters in supporting on-site operations.

5. Establish liaison with the FRC, FRMAC, and civilauthorities/ officials, legal, and law enforcementagencies.

..

6. Establish the approximate perimeter of the contam-ination area.

7. Control exposure of public/ response force personnelto contamination. Coordinate actions with local/hostnation police and public health officials.

8. Identify individuals who may have been exposedto contamination.

9. Provide advice to civil authorities or affected countrygovernment specialists, if requested, by establishing aradiological h;alth program for any civilian personnelwho may have internal contamination. Establish a simi-lar program for response forces and people stationedat the accident site.

10. Conduct weapon(s) damage assessment.

11. Perform render safe procedures on weapon(s), asrequired.

12. Initiate systematic search to re-establish accounta-bility for all the weapon(s) and weapon(s) components.

13. Develop and implement a weapons recovery plan,in conjunction and coordination with DoE ARG, toinclude the appropriate packaging requirementsconsistent with final disposition/ disposal requirementsof the weapon(s).

14. Transport/ship weapon(s) and components toappropriate disposal areas.

15. Establish an environmental exposure injuryprevention program.

16. Establish a claims processing facility. For overseasaccidents, this facility will be in coordination with theEmbassy and involved host government.

17. Determine availability of assets and facilities at ornear the scene of the accident. Initiate actions to usesupporting response force requirements.

18. Inform the Senior FEMA official or foreigngovernment officials, upon arrival, of all on-site activitieswhich could impact off-site and establish continuingliaison.

19. Document actions taken and ensure that evidenceis retained for an accident investigation board.

20. Establish a standardized access control system.

21. Consider applying fixatives to highly contaminatedareas to reduce resuspension.

’22. Establish the Community Emergency Action Team(CEAT).

l-D-l

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1-E

SERVICE RESPONSE FORCE CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS TO

SUPPORT SUSTAINED SITE RESTORATION

1. Provide required medical, administrative, andlogistic support (including that needed by DoE responseorganizations).

2. Assess levels of public understanding and identjfy/respond to concerns about nuclear issues.

3. Establish coordination with Service and NationalTransportation Safety Board accident investigationteams.

4. Coordinate communications assets and frequencyrequirements of all response organizations. Be preparedto coordinate such actions with a representative of theNational Communications System, who is responsiblefor coordinating and managing telecommunicationssupport for Federal agencies during a radiologicalemergency.

5. Publish a Communications-Electronics OperatingInstruction for use by alI response organizations.

6. Request frequency clearances, if required.

7. Obtain ad~itional communications assets, asr e q u i r e d .

8. Establish channels for coordination of technical legalmatters with higher headquarters and principal legaladvisors of other participating Federal departments andagencies andl or involved country officials.

9. Coordinate site restoration planning/action withFRMAC, FEMA, responsible state civil authorities, andmilitary organizations and/ or involved host governmentofficials.

10. Ensure actions are taken to begin preparations ofa draft site restoration strategy.

11. Conduct environmental impact assessments.

12. Conduct decontamination operations.

13. Restore contaminated area to a condition that istechnically achievable and financially acceptable.

14. Coordinate environment protection plans for post-restoration radiation monitoring and assessment withsite restoration plans. This monitoring will be definedby restoration agreements.

15. Ensure protection of U.S. Government property.

16. Provide necessary operational security.

17. Counter potential terrorist and/ or radical groupactivities or intelligence collection efforts.

18. Establish personnel replacement /rotation programto support long term operations and, as appropriate,to minimize radiation exposure to radiation workers.

19. Debrief personnel with access to classifiedinformation.

20. Discuss with the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) thepossible transfer of responsibility for the JointInformation Center to the SFO.

21. Request a Service Project Code for fund cites.

22. Consider transition of Federal responsibility forthe disestablishment of the NDA and site restoration.Coordinate with State and local officials throughFEMA.

.

1-E- I

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1-F

RADIATION HAZARDS AND BASIC RADIATION

PROTECTION

l-F-l RADIATION HAZARDS

a. With no nuclear detonation, radiation levels willbe too low to cause immediate (acute) biological effects.Do not delay or omit life or limb-saving measuresbecause of radiation or contamination to keep low theprobability that delayed effects, such as cancer, will occur

“years later.

b. The primary pathway for introduction of alpha-emitting radiological contamination is inhalation. Thegreatest hazard from inhalation occurs immediately afteran accident when contamination is released. If aweapon’s high explosives detonate, the explosion cancreate a cloud of contamination which graduallydissipates and settles from the air as it moves downwind.If a weapon burns, contamination may be carried intothe air by the smoke and thermal currents from thefire and again be dispersed by the wind. In either case,once the explosion and/ or fire is over and the resultingcontamination has settled or dispersed (approximatelytwo/ three hours), the remaining inhalation hazard fromresuspension of “radioactive particles is significantlyreduced.

c. Radioactive contamination can be introduced intothe body through wounds. The greatest potential forcontamination of wounds involves personnel, involvedin the accident or at the accident site initially; respondingEOD personnel and associated workers may sufferinjuries within the contaminated area. When respondingto an accident involving injury, those responding alwaysshould be aware that administration of first aid forserious injuries is of primary importance.

d. Ingestion of radioactive fissile material (for example,plutonium or uranium) is a minimal problem, since thesematerials are not absorbed appreciably across the liningof the gastrointestinal tract.

PRINCIPLES

l-F-2 RADIATION PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

Four basic radiation protection principles involveconcentration and isotope, time, distance, and shielding.These four factors are interrelated.

a. Concentration and Isotope. The exposure rate froma radioactive material is related directly to the amountor quantity of the material present. For the types ofradioactive materials present at nuclear weaponsaccidents, the total quantity present normally does notpresent a significant external radiation hazard. Theprimary radiation threat in a weapon accident is frominhalation. Quantity of radioactive material will beexpressed in units depending upon the medium theradioactive material is in, for example, for the measureof radioactive material in air, the units are microcuriesper cubic meter @Ci/ mj) or becquerels per cubic meter(Bq/ mj); for ground measurement, the units aremicrocuries per square meter @Ci/ mz) or becquerels persquare meter (Bq/mZ). Field measurements of quantityare normally expressed in instrument-dependent unitsof counts per minute (CPM) or counts per second (CPS)and must be converted to definitive units such aspCi/ mz or Bq/ m2 for meaningful comparison.

b. Time. Any radioactive material will emit a knownamount of radiation per unit time. For the type andquantities of radiation present at a nuclear weaponaccident, exposure to the material for months or yearswould normally be required for external radiation tobe a hazard. Exposure time to the radioactive materialspresent at a nuclear weapon accident is related to a healthhazard primarily through the amount of materialdeposited in the lungs through inhalation over a periodof time. The rate at which contamination maybe inhaledis highest during the initial period following the accidentwhen a substantial quantity of contamination is airborne.If no airborne contamination exists, or if respiratoryprotection is being worn, exposure time is not a criticalfactor in nuclear weapon accident response when nobeta/ gamma emitters are present.

l-F-l

c. Distance. The protective principle of distance, whereradiation intensity varies inversely with the square of thedistance (if the distance doubles the intensity is reducedby a factor of four), applies primarily to gamma radiation(not normally a significant part of the radiologicalproblem in a nuclear weapon accident). Alpha particles,the primary radiological prob~em, will travel about twoto three centimeters in air from its source; hence, distancewill not be a significant radiation protection factor.Note: The source material could travel long distances.

d. Shielding. Shielding results from the ability of amaterial to attenuate or stop radiation. The alpha

particles, emissions of primary concern in a nuclearweapon accident, can be stopped by paper, or cottonclothing. The emissions will not penetrate the outer layerof skin. Beta emissions can be stopped by a sheet ofaluminum, while gamma emissions may require severalinches of lead to be stopped. Alpha emitters are theprimary type of radiation dispersed fo[lowing a nuclearweapon accident. Assuming there is no nuclear yield,any light clothing or gloves used to prevent contam-ination of underlying clothing or the body will provideprotection automatically from this type of externalradiation.

l-F-2 “

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1-G

QUICK REFERENCE EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)

National Military Command Center (NMCC) AUTOVONCommercial

Crisis Coordination Center AUTOVONCommercial

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating AUTOVONCenter (DoD-JNACC) Commercial

U.S. Army Operations Center (AOC) AUTOVONCommercial

U.S. Navy Command Center AUTOVONCommercial

U.S. Air Force Operations Center (AFOC) AUTOVONCommercial

U.S. Marine Corps Operations Center AUTOVONCommercial

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) AUTOVONCommercial

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE)

HQ DoE Emergency Operation Center Commercial

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating AUTOVONCenter (DoE-JNACC) Commercial

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/ CommercialTraining Site (REAC/TS)

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

Emergency Information and Coordination AUTOVONCenter (EICC) Commercial

National Emergency Coordinating Center (NECC) AUTOVONCommercial

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DoS) ..

Operations Center Commercial

227-6340703-697-6340

364-9320202-769-9320

221-2102703-325-2102

227-0218703-697-0218

225-0231703-695-023 I

227-6103703-697-6103

225-7366703-695-7366

227-5131703-697-5131

202-586-8100

245-4667505-845-4667

703-557-2380

544-7721 / 7720202-646-2400

380-6100202-898-6100

202-647-1512

1-G- I

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 2

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2-1 GENERAL

The Department of Defense (DoD) is charged with thesecurity, safe handling, storage, maintenance, assembly,and transportation of nuclear weapons and nuclearweapon components in DoD custody. Inherent in thisresponsibility is the requirement to protect personneland property from any health or safety hazards whichcould ensue from an accident or significant incidentinvolving nuclear weapons. To fulfill these responsibil-ities, the DoD has issued policy guidance and plansrequiring the development of well-trained and equippednuclear weapon accident response organizations. TheDoD response policy recognizes the response roles ofnuclear weapon owners or custodians, the statutoryresponsibilities of various Federal agencies, of State andlocal governments, and the sovereignty of foreigngovernments concerning accidents on their territory.

2-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter describes the responsibilities of variousDoD organizations, including the management respon-sibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the militaryServices, the command and control responsibilities ofOn-Scene Commanders (OSC)S, and the responsibilitiesof the Joint J Nticlear Accident Coordinating Center(JNACC) and interface requirements as stated in theFederal Radiological Emergency Response Plan(FRERP), reference (c).

2-3 RESPONSIBILITIES

DoD Directive 5100.52, reference (a), outlines respon-sibilities for on-site command and control at the sceneof a nuclear accident or significant incident, as follows:

(1) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)(USD(P)) shall activate the Crisis Coordination Center(CCC), if required, and provide required support to theAssistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)[ATSD(AE)) in the acquisition and dissemination ofinformation about the accident.

(2) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense(Atomic Energy) (ASTD(AE)) shall:

(a) Establish policy and exercise staffcoordination for DoD radiological response andassistance matters in furtherance of the responsibilitiesassigned by DoD Directive 5148.2, reference (d).

(b) In the event of a nuclearaccident, serve astechnical advisor to the Secretary of Defense and OSDPrincipals regarding weapons composition, character-istics, and safety features; interdepartmental responsi-bilities and the Federal radiological emergency response .system; and technical capabilities of the various Federalresponse elements.

(3) The Secretaries of the Military Departments andCommanders of Unified Commands shall have primaryresponsibility for responding to an accident involvingradioactive materiais, including nuclear weapons, asfollows:

(a) When the accident occurs on a DoD instal-lation, including ships at sea, responsibility shall restwith the Secretary of the Department or TheaterCommander in Chief concerned in accordance with DoDDirective 5200.8, reference (e).

(b) When the accident occurs beyond theboundaries of DoD installations, responsibility shall restwith the Secretary of the Department or TheaterCommander in Chief having custody of the radioactivematerials at the time of the occurrence.

(4) The Secretary of the Military Department orCommander of Unified Commands having primaryresponsibility for DoD response to an accident shall:

(a) Establish, maintain, fund, and exercise a flagrank On-Scene Commander and Service ResponseForce(s) to manage all actions required to recover fromthe effects of a radiological accident. Service responseforces and On-Scene Commanders will be exercised, asa minimum, every other year.

(b) Provide available administrative, medical,and logistical support (including communications andmilitary transportation) and other available radiological,.

2-1

response resources to the DoE and other Federalresponse organizations supporting a non-DoD radio-logical accident, in accordance with enclosure 3 to DoDDirective 4000.19, reference (f).

(c) Coordinate all military support requirementsto civilian authorities with FEMA for domestic accidentsor through the Department of State for accidentsoccurring outside the United States, its territories, orpossessions. If PL 93-288, as amended, reference (g),is involved, coordination shall be handled in accordancewith DoD Directive 3025.1, reference (h).

(5) The Secretary of the Army, upon Presidentialdeclaration of a major disaster or emergency underreference (l), shall become the DoD Executive Agentfor military support to civilian authorities throughFEMA in accordance with reference (h).

(6) The Secretary of the Navy shall provide arepresentative to the Federal Radiological CoordinatingCommittees and joint working groups to address navalreactor considerations and develop planning guidancein coordination with the other Military Departmentsfor dealing with accidents involving DoD mobilereactors.

(7) The Secretary of the Air Force, through theMilitary Airlift Command (MAC), shall plan for andprovide Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM)support for deployment of DoD and interdepartmentalresponse organizations,

(8) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),shall:

(a) In coordination with the Theater Commandsand appropriate Defense Agencies, be responsible forimplementing the DoD response to radiologicalaccidents.

(b) Make notification of radiological accidentsand significant incidents as stated in DoD Directive5100.52, reference (a).

(c) Through the NMCC, keep the OSD CCC staffinformed of the radiological accident response.

(d) Through the overseas theater commander,provide the command and control for response toradiological accidents within the respective theater.

(e) Assemble a Joint Nuclear Accident ResponseTeam (JNAIRT) as appropriate to accomplish taskslisted above.

(9) The Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, shall:

(a) Operate a Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinat-ing Center (JNACC) in coordination with the DoE.

(b) Develop and maintain a deployable (techni-cal) advisory team than can assist the DoD On-SceneCommander in dealing with technical aspects of a nuclearaccident or incident.

(c) Serve as an advisor to the ATSD(AE) andJoint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on procedures for responseto accidents involving nuclear weapons.

(d) Provide liaison to the JNAIRT and CCC.

(10) The Heads of DoD Componentsshall:

(a) Ensure that accidents and significant inci-dents involving radioactive materials are reported inaccordance with reference (i).

(b) Ensure that all public information concerningaccidents involving radioactive materials and DoDpersonnel, equipment, property, or other resources isreleased in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.16,which authorizes the OSC to confirm the presence ofnuclear weapons, and the FRERP, references (b) and(c).

(c) Ensure that the JNACC is advised of allaccidents involving radioactive materials and requestsfor radiological assistance. Provide the JNACC withinformation necessary to maintain current recordsreflecting the location and capability of specialized unitsand teams that can be used for response to accidentsinvolving radioactive materials.

(d) Provide radiological assistance within exist-ing capabilities to DoE or FEMA, as set forth inreference (c), in the event of an accident involvingradioactive materials not in DoD custody withoutcreating additional personnel, facilities, or fundingrequirements.

(e) Upon request, reimburse other DoD Com-ponents for incurred costs for requested radiologicalassistance that are not included in their normal operatingexpenses and that are directly chargeable to, and causedby, the assistance provided.

2-2

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 3

RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES

3-1 GENERAL

Several agencies/ organizations outside the Departmentof Defense (DoD) have roles in a nuclear weaponaccident response. Each agency ’s/organization’sresponsibilities are situation dependent. Their involve-ment may be as a direct result of their responsibilities,interagency agreements, the Federal RadiologicalEmergency Response Plan (FRERP), reference (c),bilateral agreements, theater policy, or in response toa request for assistance.


This chapter provides an overview of Federal, State,and local government agency responsibilities, andcapabilities. The DoE and FEMA have numerousnuclear weapon accident responsibilities. Conversely,some agencies have no specific response roles, but dohave capabilities useful to response organizations.

3-3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

a. The DoE is responsible for dispatching appropriateDoE response elements, on request, to the scene of aDoD or DoE nuclear weapon accident or incident. Thespecific elements%d equipment will be tailored by DoEto best meet the accident or incident situation, and willbe coordinated with the DoE Joint Nuclear AccidentCoordinating Center (JNACC).

b. The DoE has established an Accident ResponseGroup (ARG) as its primary accident response element.The ARG is managed by the Manager, AlbuquerqueOperations Office and is comprised of scientists,technical specialists, crisis managers, and equipmentready for short notice dispatch to the scene of a nuclearaccident. The ARG will advise and assist the DoD On-Scene Commander (OSC) through the DoE TeamLeader in weapon recovery operations and in evaluating,collecting, handling, and mitigating radioactive andother weapons associated hazards. Other DoE assets,for example, the Aerial Measurement System (AMS),will be a part of the ARG, when required.

c. While at a DoD accident, the ARG providestechnical support to the DoD and will support all needsand policies of the DoD OSC for on-site activities. Adefinition of on-site is found in the GLOSSARY.

d. The ARG provides technical advice and assistanceto the OSC in:

(1) Supporting Explosive Ordinance Disposal(EOD) teams in weapon render safe and recoveryprocedures.

(2) Determining the extent of any on-site hazards.(3) Minimizing hazards to on-site workers and the

public.(4) Collecting, identifying, packaging, and dispos- .

ing of weapon components, weapon debris, and theresulting radioactive material.

(5) Identifying and protecting nuclear weapondesign information and other restricted data.

(6) Discussing with State, local, or foreign countrygovernment officials matters of special DoE competence.

(7) Explaining public affairs matters, particularlyin weapons and radiological hazards.

e. The ARG will be headed by the DoE Team Leaderwho will:

(1) Coordinate the activities of all DoE responseelements.

(2) Advise the DoD OSC of DoE responsecapabilities available at the scene or which may beobtained.

f. The ARG includes a Senior Scientific Advisor whowill provide technical advice and assistance regardingweapons and radiological health and safety matters.

g. The ARG provides liaison to the Joint InformationCenter (JIC).

h. The ARG provides one or more experienced “individual to help manage the Joint Hazard EvaluationCenter (JHEC) for the OSC.

“ i. The DoE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)Regional Coordinating Offices responding to a nuclear

3-1

weapon accident or significant incident in the UnitedStates shall:

(1) Support the DoE ARG through the DoE TeamLeader, as directed by the Director, Headquarters DoEOperational Emergency Management Team (OEMT).

(2) Provide technical advice and assistance to theState, local, and county government emergency responseforces through the DoE Team Leader, if requested.

(3) Represent the DoE, if first on the scene, untilthe DoE Team Leader arrives.

(4) Initiate monitoring off-site as outlined in theFRERP, reference (c).

j. Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). TheNEST is a DoE team of scientists, engineers, andtechnicians trained and organized to provide rapidtechnical assistance in locating nuclear weapons orspecial nuclear material. The NEST has specialequipment for conducting radiation searches anddetection, field communications, EOD support, bomb/weapon diagnostics, hazard prediction, damage mitiga-tion, and decontamination. The NEST is managed bythe Manager, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas,Nevada. NEST assets may be included as a part of theDoE

3-4

D&Us.

ARG.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DoS)

Under the direction of the Secretary of State, theexercises diplomatic and political control of theresponse to a nuclear weapon(s) accident outside

the U. S;, its territories and possessions. In the hostcountry, responsibiIities rest specifically with the U.S.Chief of Mission (COM) who will be the focal pointfor diplomatic and ‘political decisions of the U.S.government. The COM:

(f) Will be the senior U.S. government official incommunication with officials of the government involvedwith whom he will coordinate U.S. response/recoveryactions.

(2) Has the overall responsibility for U.S. govern-ment diplomatic actions responding to a nuclear weaponaccident / incident and will direct the activities of the U.S.embassy and its constituent posts.

(3) Shares with the Unified Commander theresponsibility for resolution of the situation. In fulfillingthose responsibilities, the COM will be assisted by a teamfrom the embassy’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC)with augmentation required by the situation. Liaisonofficers from the embassy will be provided to assist theOSC and the MC, at a minimum.

b. From the onset of the accident/incident, the COMand USCINC will consult regarding military operationsin view of their potential impact on U.S. politicalinterests. Any differences not resolved in theater willbe relayed immediately to Washington for resolutionin joint messages which will include as action addresseesthe White House, Secretary of State, Secretary ofDefense, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, withinformation copies to other concerned parties.

c. The DoS activates an accident/incident task forcein the Operations Center and provides liaison officersto agencies as agreed in existing plans or at the timeof the accident.

3-5 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENTAGENCY (FEMA)

When the F’RERP is implemented, FEMA is responsiblefor coordinating response actions among Federalagencies and assistance requests from State and localgovernments during a nuclear weapon accident in theU. S., its territories, or possessions, and/or causing aneffect into Canada or Mexico. Activities at the sceneof the accident include coordinating requests from Stateand local governments for assistance from Federalagencies. Also, FEMA ensures that off-site actions andresponse activities of Federal, State, and local officialsare mutually supportive and coordinated with the on-site actions of DoD and DoE. This FEMA role isimplemented by a Senior FEMA Official (SFO).

a. FEMA will dispatch the SFO and an EmergencyResponse Team (ERT) to the scene of a nuclear weaponaccident or incident when the accident has an effectoutside of DoD or DoE facility boundaries. In additionto the SFO, the ERT consists of a deputy SFO (DSFO),an administrative officer, a communications officer, apublic information officer, and others as required bythe situation.

b. The SFO will establish a Federal Response Center(FRC) at a location either pre-selected with the State(s)and DoD or established at the time of the emergencyat a location identified in conjunction with the State.The FRC will be located near the accident scene, butoutside the NDA, to avoid restrictions on access byrepresentatives from other Federal agencies, State, andlocal authorities. Each Federal agency at the scene isrepresented in the FRC. The FRC may also haverepresentation from State emergency services organiza-tions and volunteer agencies. The Service Response

3-2

Force (SRF) should assign a liaison officer to the FRCand/ or coordinate information exchange.

c. The SFO or DSFO will provide a liaison represen-tative to the OSC.

d. The SFO or DSFO will assist the OSC, as requested,in developing and evaluating protective actionrecommendations.

e. The SFO will supply coordinated information onthe Federal response to the State and/or localgovernment officials.

3-6 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA)

The functions and capabilities of the USDA to provideradiological assistance in the event of a nuclear weaponaccident include the following areas:

a. Provide assistance through regular USDA pro-grams if legally adaptable to radiological emergencies.

b. Provide emergency food coupon assistance inofficially designated disaster areas when a threshold ofneed is determined by State and Federal officials andthe commercial food system is sufficient to accommodatefood coupons.

c. Provide listings of locations of alternate sourcesof livestock feed.

d. Provide advise to State and local officials regardingthe disposition of livestock and poultry contaminatedby radioactive material.

e. Ensure the wholesomeness of meat and meatproducts, poultry and poultry products, and eggproducts identified for interstate commerce.

f. Provide for the procurement of food.

g. Assist State and local officials, in coordination withHHS and EPA, in the recommendation and implemen-tation of protective measures to minimize exposure bycontaminated food ingestion.

h. Assist in coordinating with HHS and EPA, in theemergency production, processing, storage, anddistribution of food through the wholesale level duringa radiological emergency.

i. Assess damage to agricultural resources.

j. Provide advice to State and local officials onminimizing losses to agricultural resources fromradiation effects.

k. Provide information and assistance to farmers,food processors and distributors to aid in returning tonormal after a radiological emergency.

1. Assist in reallocation of USDA donated foodsupplies from warehouses, local schools, and otheroutlets to emergency food centers. These are foodsdonated to various outlets through USDA foodprograms administered by the Food and NutritionService.

m. Provide a liaison to State agricultural agencies tokeep State and local officials informed of Federal efforts.

n. Assist DoE at the FRMAC in collecting agricul-tural samples within the 50-mile Ingestion PathwayEmergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

o. Assist in providing available temporary housingfor evacuees.

3-7

a.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMANSERVICES (HHS)

The HHS can provide:

(1) Guidance to State and local governments onthe use of radio-protective substances, including dosage,and projected radiation doses which warrant usage ofsuch drugs.

(2) Advice to medical care personnel regardingproper medical treatment of people exposed to, orcontaminated by, radioactive material.

(3) Advice and guidance to State and local officialsin assessing the consequences of radiological accidentson the health of persons in the affected area.

(4) Resources, in conjunction with the USDA,ensuring that food and animal feeds are safe forconsumption.

(5) Assistance, in coordination with USDA, indeveloping technical recommendations for State andlocal officials regarding protective measures for foodand animal feeds.

b. The Center for Devices and Radiological Health~CDRH) is responsible for radiological health activities .conducted in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

3-3

and provides the major source of radiation expertisewithin the Public Health Service. The FDA prescribescontamination levels for canned and/ or packaged foods}materials.

3-8 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DoC)

a. DoC response functions for accidents involvingnuclear weapons are:

(1) Estimate the damage to industrial resources andrecommend measures to deal with problems of theindustrial sector.

(2) Provide current and forecast meteorologicalinformation about wind direction and speed, boundarylayer mixing, precipitation, and any other meteorologicaland hydrological parameters affecting radiologicalcontamination.

(3) Provide a representative to both the on-site andoff-site radiological monitoring agencies to coordinatemeteorological and hydrological information and toarrange for supplemental meteorological measurements.

b. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-istration (NOAA) is the primary agent within DoCresponsible for providing radiological emergencyassistance to Federal, State, and local organizations. TheNational Weather Service (NWS) is the focal point forradiological emergency coordination. The NWSmaintains coordination with the National Ocean Service(NOS) and Coastal Zone Management, the NationalEnvironmental Satellite Data and Information Service(NESDIS), the National Marine Fisheries Service(NMFS), and theO@ce of Oceanic and AtmosphericResearch (OAR). In an actual emergency, these officestake collective action to focus DoC resources andexpertise to assist Federal, State, and local governmentoffices in controlling and resolving a radiologicalemergency. NOAA’s main responsibilities include:

(1) Acquiring weather data and providing weatherforecasts in connection with the emergency.

(2) Disseminating weather and emergency informa-tion via NOAA Weather Radio.

(3) Assisting the FDA in assessing the safety ofmarine fishery products from radiological contam-ination.

(4) Providing current and forecast meteorologicalinformation about wind speed and direction, low-levelstability, precipitation, and other meteorological andhydrological factors affecting the transport or dispersionof radiological materials.

3-9 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (DoI)

a. DoI manages over 500 million acres of Federallands and thousands of Federal natural resourcefacilities. DoI is responsible for these lands and facilitieswhen threatened by a radiological emergency. Inaddition, DoI coordinates emergency plans for DoI-managed park and recreation areas with State and localauthorities and operates DoI water resource projects toprotect municipal and agricultural water supplies in casesof radiological emergencies.

b. DoI provides advice and assistance concerninghydrologic and natural resources, including fish andwildlife, to Federal, State, and local governments uponrequest. It is DoI policy to:

(1) Respond to incidents that affect or may affectits jurisdiction or resources.

(2) Respond to requests for assistance from theCognizant Federal Agency, SFO, and State and localofficials to the extent its mission and resources allow.

(3) Cooperate with relevant Federal, State, andlocal radiological response authorities and coordinateregional and field-level contingency plans.

3-10 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION(DoT)

a. DoT participation during a nuclear weaponaccident will be limited primarily to arranging specialtransportation activities and assistance in contactingconsignors and consignees of shipments to or from theaccident.

b. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). TheAssociate Administrator for Air Traffic and AirwayFacilities coordinates all FAA crisis managementfunctions. The FAA~s principal nuclear accident functionis to direct, upon request, air traffic in and around theaffected area.

3-11

a.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY(EPA)

The Office of Radiation Programs of the EPA hasresponsibility for coordinating EPA response to requestsfor radiological assistance. The radiological assistanceavailable consists of monitoring teams to measure

environmental radiation, evaluate the extent of thecontamination, and advise on the actions required for

3-4

protection of the public health and safety. Each teamcan collect samples for subsequent processing andanalysis at its laboratory. The EPA has the responsibilityfor coordinating the intermediate and long termradiological monitoring function at a mutually agreedupon time with DoE.

b. The Director of Criteria and Standards of EPAis responsible for establishing radiation levels to protectthe general public and to provide guidance for Federalagencies. EPA has prescribed guidelines for monitoringradioactive contamination of drinking water andexposures to the general population from nuclearactivities.

c. The EPA has radiological assistance teams locatedin Montgomery, Alabama and Las Vegas, Nevada.

3-12 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETYBOARD (NTSB)

The NTSB is responsible for transportation safety andmay conduct or assist in an investigation of the accidentand issue a report. In any case, a military accidentinvestigation will be conducted in accordance withService directives. The OSC should make provisions toassist and support the accident investigation to themaximum extent that public safety and weapon(s)recovery permits.

3-13 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION(ICC)

The ICC assists in arranging for or expediting emergencytransportation of people or property moving interstateor of foreign commerce to or from distressed areas.Specifically, the ICC establishes priorities and expeditesemergency surface transportation of people and propertyto or from areas impacted by the accident. Under thecoordinating authority of the Secretary of Trans-portation, the ICC establishes the priorities for all surfacetransportation of people and property.

3-14 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBANDEVELOPMENT (HUD)

HUD provides information on available housing/shelterfor disaster victims or displaced persons and assists in

planning for and placing homeless victims by providingemergency housing and technical support staff withinavailable resources.

3-15 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION(GSA)

GSA provides service, administrative supplies, facilities,and equipment within available resources.

3-16 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACEADMINISTRATION (NASA)

NASA coordinates the response and recovery operationsfor downed NASA spacecraft which may carry nuclearmaterials.

3-17 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(NRC)

The NRC provides personnel who can quickly assessthe nature and extent of the radiological emergency andits potential on and off-site effects on public health andsafety. The NRC provides this information to theappropriate State and local agencies. Also, the NRChas radiological monitoring equipment and mobileradiological laboratories to assist in the analysis ofenvironmental contamination and has public informa-tion personnel and technical experts who can be usedto assist in public information efforts.

3-18 STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENT/HOST NATION

Off-site authority and responsibility at a nuclear weaponaccident rests with State and local officials. It isimportant to recognize that land placed temporarilyunder Federal control by the establishment of NDA orNSA to protect U.S. Government material or classifiedproperty and materials, will revert to State control upondisestablishment of the NDA or NSA. The Stategovernor is responsible for the health, safety, and welfaredf individuals within the territorial limits of the Stateduring periods of emergency or crisis. The OSC willassist the State in ensuring that the public is protected.The Host Nation retains Sovereignty over its soil andthe responsibility for the health, safety, and welfare ofits citizens.

3-5

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 4

MANAGEMENT OF ACCIDENT RESPONSE

4-1 GENERAL

a. Command and control on-site at the scene of anuclear weapon accident rests with the agency in chargeof the facility or geographic area where the accidentoccurs. If the accident occurs outside these boundaries,the Service or agency having custody of the weaponat the time of the accident has command and control.If the accident occurs outside the 48 contiguous states,responsibility for directing the US response shall restwith the Unified Commander in Chief in whose areaof responsibility the accident occurred. If the accidentoccurs outside the US or its territories, the UnifiedCommander will coordinate with the State Department,as appropriate. “On-site” is that area around a nuclearweapon accident under the operational control of theinstallation commander, facility manager, Departmentof Defense, On-Scene Commander (OSC), or Depart-ment of Energy Team Leader (at a DoE accident), orhost government official. For accidents/ incidents in theU. S., its territories or possessions, on-site includes anyarea established as a National Defense Area (NDA) orNational Security Area (NSA). When overseas, this on-site secure area should be defined in the host nationagreement and will be referred in this document as aSecurity Area. This area, although not equivalent tothe NDA or NSA, uses local authorities to restrict peoplefrom the ire-mediate area of the accident for theirprotection and the safeguarding of weapon systems.“Off-site” is defined as that area beyond the boundariesof a DoD/ military installation or DoE facility, includingthe area beyond the boundary of a NDA, NSA or aSecurity Area, affected by a nuclear weapon accident/incident.

b. Civil authorities/officials have primary responsi-bility for command and control off-site and will requestFederal assistance and assets through the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA). The SeniorFEMA official (SFO) coordinates requests for Federalassistance to ensure that assistance is provided. If anaccident /incident involving nuclear weapons results ina Presidential declaration of a major disaster oremergency, Public Law 93-288, reference (g), states thePresident will appoint a Federal Coordinating Office

(FCO) to coordinate the overall Federal response. TheSecretary of the Army will become the DoD ExecutiveAgent for providing additional military support (off-site) to the FCO as required, subject to the militarymissions and priorities of DoD.

c. The responsibility for security and command andcontrol at, accidents/ incidents in a country outside theU.S. rests with the host country government.

d. Command and control for the Initial ResponseForce (IRF) and Service Response Force (SRF) at anuclear weapon accident involves directing DoDresources and coordinating DoD actions with civilianauthorities/ officials providing response to any domesticemergency.


This chapter provides guidance on interagency relation-ships at the accident site suggested response forceorganization and actions required during an accidentresponse. The discussions in this chapter are applicableto the IRF and the SRF On-Scene Commanders (OSC)and their staffs.

4-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

The basic requirements for command and control ofa nuclear weapon accident response are similar for theIRF and SRF OSC’S though they vary in scope andmagnitude. Specific actions taken by the respectiveresponse forces will vary because of differences inmanning, resources, capabilities, and training betweenthe IRF and SRF. As a minimum, the IRF and SRFOSC’S are required to:

a. Provide life saving/humanitarian- assistance at theaccident site.

~ b. Establish command and control.

c. Safeguard classified material.

4- I

d. Protect the public and mitigate public health andsafety hazards.

e. Seek the assistance and cooperation of civilianauthorities/ officials and advise them of possible hazards.

f. Initiate public affairs procedures and establishdirect communications with the Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)).

g. Establish a NDA. When overseas, request that localauthorities establish a Security Area to provide a cordonfor security of classified material, and protection of thepublic.

h. Establish an operations area, a base camp, anda contamination control area.

4-4 RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS “

Military and civilian response organizations which maybe present at the scene of a nuclear weapon accidentare:

a. Initial Response Force (IRF). A response forcebelonging to the nearest DoD activity/unit, which willtake emergency response actions to establish commandand control on-site pending arrival of the SRF.

(1) The IRF OSC will generally be an O-5 or O-6, as established by Service policy. An illustration ofa typical response force is at Figure 4-1. He will usuallyremain the OSC until relieved by the SRF OSC.

(2) The IRF performs the following functions:rescue operations; fug fighting; accident site security,public affairs activities establish command, control, andcommunications. The IRF initiates EOD procedures;determines if hazardous materials and/or radioactivecontamination are present, and if so, minimizes itsspread; and establishes procedures to control theexposure of personnel to contamination.

b. Service Response Force (SR~. The SRF consistsof a military and DoD civilian staff. The response forcemay be augmented by DoE scientific and technicaladvisors, and by specialized teams from other Services,FEMA personnel andl or host country governmentofficials/ representatives as required. An example of theSRF functional organization and interagency relation-ships is at Figure 4-2.

(1) OSC. The SRF OSC will be a flag/general rankofficer appointed by the responsible Service/ UnKled

Command. A Deputy OSC should be in grade of O-6 and shall manage the information flow between thesite, headquarter’s operation centers, and DoS. The OSCis responsible for all SRF actions at the accident siteincluding:

(a) Safeguarding national security materials andinformation. Establishing a NDA or NSA. Overseas,requesting that local authorities establish a Security Areato provide a disaster cordon and security for classifiedmaterial.

(b) Establishing command and control. Ensuringthat special teams arriving at the accident scene areintegrated into the response force with a clear chainof command and that their capabilities are known byall cleared personnel on the SRF. Communications mustbe established with the NMCC and other levels ofauthority, and frequency assignments allocated to allresponse teams.

(c) Establishing priorities for response/ recoveryefforts.

(d) Assessing hazards involving public health andsafety.

~ (e) Seeking the assistance and cooperation ofcivilian authorities/ officials and advising them of thepossible hazards.

(f) Notifying civilian authorities/officials of theprecautions and other measures required for theprotection of public health and safety and potentialimpact off-site.

(g) Establishing a public affairs program forcoordinating, reviewing, and approving public informa-tion and. news releases. Establishing direct communi-cations with the (OASD(PA)) or American Embassy/USCINC as appropriate.

(h) Integrating civilian authorities/ officials/representatives into the response force. As a minimum,coordination must be completed between civilianauthorities/ officials. A liaison officer will be providedby the SFO to the OSC. Overseas, a liaison officer willbe provided by the U.S. Embassy to the OSC.

(i) Assessing protective action measures and re-entry recommendations developed by the State.

(j) Coordinating with the SFO and civilianofficials to develop a site restoration plan.

(k) Coordinating with the accident investigationboard or team.

(1) Obtaining assets required to supportresponse/ recovery operations.

(m) Establishing the Joint Hazard EvaluationCenter (JHEC) and initiating an on-site hazard andradiafion health, weapons recovery, safety and envir-onmental monitoring

4 - 2

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program. Off-site coordination will be with the FederalRadiological Monitoring and Assessment Center(FRMAC) and civilian authority response elements, asappropriate.

(n) Assisting the involved country governmentofficial/ representative in ensuring the health and safetyof individuals within the country. Response forceofficials and the Embassy representative will assist inimplementing measures that satisfy host governmentrequirements.

(o) Providing required medical, logistics, andadministrative support, including that needed by DoEresponse organizations.

(2) SRF Staff Members. Members are responsibleto the OSC and include expertise in hazardous materialsand radiological safety, security, medical, EOD, publicaffairs, and legal areas. Representatives from DoE,JHEC, and the site restoration planning group shouldserve as staff members to improve response forceeffectiveness. More than one person may be requiredto keep the OSC apprised of all on-going hazardousmaterials and radiological related activities. Protocolofficers should facilitate visits to the accident scene bysenior civil and military officials.

c. DoE Accident Response Group (ARG). Thecomposition of the ARG, including specialized equip-ment, will be selected to meet the requirements of theaccident or incident. Initially, the ARG will deploy aTeam Leader, Senior Scientific Advisor, and specialiststo assess the situation and determine what additionalDoE assets are required.

(1) Deployment of additional equipment andpersonnel will be coordinated through the DoD JointNuclear Accident Coordinating Center (.JNACC) and theDoD OSC.

(2) The ARG is responsible to the OSC for on-site activities at a DoD nuclear weapon accident. Inthe event of an accident or significant incident affectingoff-site areas, the DoE Team Leader has specificresponsibilities and activities implemented through theFederal Radiological Emergency Response Plan(FRERP), reference (c).

d. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).FEMA will establish a Federal Response Center (FRC)at a location selected in cooperation with State and localauthorities. The FRC located near the accident scenewill initially be manned by an Emergency ResponseTeam (ERT) deployed by FEMA. The FRC and theDoD on-scene command post have similar functions and

represent atives should be exchanged. The FRC will beconcerned primarily with nonradiological off-sitesupport to the state and local agencies. At FEMA’srequest, the ERT will include a General ServicesAdministration (GSA) representative to assist theresponse force in obtaining local services and supplies.

e. Defense Nuclear Agency Accident Advisory Team(DNAAT).

(1) The DNAAT assists an OSC and his or her staffin the response operations following an accident. Theadvisory team is composed of personnel knowledgeablein nuclear accident response requirements, healthphysics, radiation medicine, public affairs, legalimplications and site restoration. This team is availableupon request and can deploy as soon as transportationbecomes available. When deployed, the team isresponsible to the OSC.

(2) Request for services or additional informationabout the DNAAT should be directed to the DoDJNACC.

f. Other Organizations

(1) Accident Investigation Boards. A Serviceaccident investigation board, and, if appropriate, theNational Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) willdispatch investigation teams to the accident site.Commensurate with personnel and public safety, theOSC should support the activities and administration/documentation requirements of these teams.

(2) The Services and the DoE maintain variousteams with specialized training applicable to nuclearweapon accident response. When a team is deployed,it is responsible to the OSC, either directly, or throughthe DoE Team Leader. These teams are discussed inChapter 20.

(3) State and Local Response. In an off-installationaccident, State and local police, firefighters, and medicaltreatment personnel may be the first to respond. TheIRF should coordinate directly with personnel fromState and local agencies. State and local authoritiesestablish control over any portion of the hazardous andradiological control area which extends beyond the NDAor NSA. Upon dissolution of the NDA or NSA, Stateand local authorities will become the controllingauthority for any portion of the accident site not underFederal control (e.g., military installations). The SRFOSC should provide essential information to state andlocal authorit-ies..

(4) For accidents/ incidentsterritories, and possessions:

outside the U. S., its

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(a) On and off-site authority for a nuclearweapon/ components accident/ incident rests with thehost Government officials/ representatives. The Amer-ican Embassy provides the diplomatic and political focalpoint to the host government.

(b) The host government officials/ representa-tives will ensure the health and safety of individualswithin the country and will be assisted by the responseforce staff or the Embassy to implement measures tosatisfy host government requirements.

4-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The concept of operations presents actions of the IRFand SRF and assumes a “worst case” accident; that is,a nuclear weapon accident off a military installation withthe spread of contamination. Also the concept presentsdifficult weapon recovery problems, public involvement,extensive logistic support requirements, the need forextensive deployed communications support, andcomplex site restoration problems.

a. Response Phases. Response can be divided intotwo phases.

(1) Initial Phase. Included in this phase are thoseimmediate measures taken by the nearest DoE or DoDinstallation to provide a U.S. government presence,humanitarian support and assistance, and designationand deployment of a response force. Accidents will beexpeditiously reported directly to the National MilitaryCommand Center (NMCC) and/or the Service oper-ations center in accordance with JCS Pub 1-03.6. Uponreceipt of accident notification, the appropriate IRF andSRF will be identi~e@and tasked, and specialized teamsalerted and prepared for immediate deployment. Asimplified notification plan is illustrated in Chapter 1,Figure 1-1.

(2) Follow-on Phase. The SRF, during the follow-on phase, continues those actions initiated by the IRF,and commences long term actions to return theenvironment to an acceptable condition. Weapon(s)recovery and site restoration are the primary objectivesof this phase.

b. Response Considerations, As the OSC assesses theaccident, the following differences between a nuclearweapon accident and other accidents should beconsidered:

(1) Classified Material. In accidents involvingnuclear weapons/components, classified materials mustbe located, recovered and protected.

(2) Contamination.

(a) Non-radiological hazardous materials may bereleased due to weapon system damage. The problemmay consist of variom hazardous materials, for example,solid or Iiquid missile propellants, oxidizers, or highexplosives. A high explosive detonation could dispersehazardous materials several hundred meters around anaccident site. Aerosolized hazardous materials could bereleased and dispersed downwind. The materials wouldremain in the area unless diffused by aeration,neutralization, or removal. The toxic materials maypresent a serious hazard to the general public and requireimmediate and effective reaction by public affairspersonnel to allay public apprehension.

(b) The radiological hazards released by theburning or high explosive detonation of a nuclearweapon or weapon components may consist of isotopesof plutonium, uranium, and possibly tntium. Windvelocity and other meteorological conditions, the heightof the cloud or plume containing the radioactivematerial, and terrai~ all influence the extent to whichcontamination may be spread. After the contaminanthas fallen to the ground, it may be resuspended by windor mechanical action. The long term carcinogenic effectsof inhaled plutonium represents the greatest hazard tothe general public; actions to assess specific risk mustbe promptly initiated. Public perception of theradiological hazard may be disproportionately largerthan the actual hazard.

(3) Public Affairs. An immediate, but temporary,threat to the safety of the nearby public may exist fromtoxic or explosive hazards associated with the accident.However, the less immediate radiological hazard hashistorically been of greatest concern to civil authoritiesand the general public. Although DoD policy is to neitherconfirm nor deny the presence of nucIear weapons orcomponents at a specific location, such confirmationshall be made either when required to protect publicsafety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm..In locations outside the United States, its territories andpossessions, the OSC must have the approval of theappropriate Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and hostgovernment, through the American Embassy, prior toexercising the exceptions (reference: DoD Directive5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public AffairsGuidance). Early notification of actual accidentassociated hazards, and of what can and is being doneto reduce the risk, is a key issue in allaying” publicconcern. Media interest and public scrutiny will beinten>e; the OSC and his staff must prepare to address

those public concerns related to nuclear accidents asthey assess the accident situation.

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c. Response Force Actions. The initial actions of theresponse force upon arrival at the accident scene willbe directed toward stabilizing the situation and definingthe problem. The following paragraphs describe someof the actions required:

(1) Command Post (CP). The IRF should establisha CP to accommodate the arriving personnel andequipment of the SRF. This facility should serve as thefocal point of command and control as the accidentresponse expands. All accident response elements mustreport to the CP which will facilitate continuity ofcommand and control during the transition from IRFto SRF.

(a) The CP may be located within the NDA orNSA. Access routes and prevailing winds will determinethe direction and distance of the CP from the accidentscene and contaminated area. The CP should be locatedso that normal wind shifts will not interfere withoperations and require relocating the CP. Figure 4-3provides a sample accident site organizational diagram.Consideration should be given to establishing the CP,the DoE ARG operations center, and the communica-tions center in a restricted area to simplify the protectionof classified information. The FRC and CP will exchangeliaison representatives to coordinate off-site actions andconcerns.

(b) Communications. Among the various agen-cies, frequency management is important. Communica-tions at the accident site may be limited initially. Whenestablishing initial communications from an off-baseaccident site, consideration should be given to usingradio or telephone through the nearest militaryinstallation. Also, relay via local police communicationschannels may provide a viable initial communicationschannel. Until record communications are established,specific relay instructions should be included intelephonic communications, and consideration shouldbe given to conference calls to keep all concernedcommands informed. Situation reporting according toService/ agency directives should be initiated as soon aspossible. Effective communication within the responseforce, with higher authorities, and with Federal, Stateand local and /or involved country agencies respondingto the accident is essential to command and control.The CP should be established by the lRF with adequatecommunications to maintain command and controlbetween the accident site, SRF, and NMCC.

(2) Fire Suppression. Weapons and other materialsinvolved in the accident pose a danger to firefighters.

If for any reason, the response force does not arriveon-scene soon after the accident, civilian firefightersshould be advised of the possible presence of hazardousmaterials, including high explosives. All safety precau-tions should be taken including electromagneticradiation (EMR) restrictions. Specific firefightingguidance is contained in Technical Publication TP 20-11, TM 39-20-11, Navy SWOP 20-11, Air Force TO 1 lN-20-11, references (k), (l), (m), and (n).

(3) Casualty Identification and Treatment. Therescue and treatment of casualties should receive highpriority. Until proven otherwise, casualties should beconsidered as having been contaminated by radioactivematerial. For this reason, officials at hospitals and clinicsto which casualties are evacuated should be notified ofthe possibility of radioactive contamination so thatproper measures can be taken. Ensure of compliancewith DoD notification procedures. As soon as thepresence or absence of radioactive contamination isconfirmed, these officials should be advised. Casualtyhandling procedures are described in Chapter 14.

(4) Assessment. The OSC determines the accidentsituation, status, and implications of the accident.Determination and reporting of whether contaminationwas released is of highest priority. The OSC assessesthe extent of the hazard(s), accident response elementsmust report to the CP which will facilitate continuityof command and control during the transition from IRFto SRF.

(5) Air Sampling. Air sampling provides aneffective means of determining airborne and downwindcontamination at the accident scene. Within approxi-mately 1 hour after the high explosive detonation orfire extinguishment, the OSC should have air sampler(s)placed downwind from the accident. Monitoring anddecontamination, as appropriate, will be provided forpersonnel positioning air samplers.

(6) Identification of Public Health Hazards. Oncean evaluation has been made, the effect of any hazardsand the potential impact of the hazards to public healthmust be determined. If required, coordination shouldbe made with civilian officials to inform the public ofprotective action measures to minimize undesirableeffects on the public. This action is time sensitive andmust be completed rapidly. Radiological hazards andpossible actions to minimize hazards are discussed inChapter 5. Hazardous materials which may be presentare discussed in Chapter 9.

(7) Public Affairs. The OSC must establish orensure direct communication with OASD/ PA. A JointInformation Center (JIC) must be established and publicaffairs measures implemented to ensure that timely,accurate and consistent information is available at the

4-7

//

/’ f .

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accident scene. Since a great deal of information willbe generated at the accident site and more than oneorganization will be collecting and analyzing data, allinformation must be coordinated within the JIC beforerelease to the media or general public. Additionally, thepublic affairs officer must be informed of all informationprovided to civil authorities/ foreign governmentofficials by the OSC or his designated representative.Public affairs actions are discussed in more detail inChapter 16.

(8) Reconnaissance Operations.

(a) Confirmation of weapon location and statusmay not be possible until fires are extinguished, the waittime is observed, and the wreckage can be examined.Reconnaissance and Render Safe Procedures by EODpersonnel should commence as soon as possible.Radiological considerations, protective measuresrequirements, and/ or re-entry recommendations on theinitial entry are discussed in Chapter 5, and EOD entryprocedures in Chapter 15. If contamination is present,actions to determine the extent of contamination shouldbe initiated immediately. The initial reconnaissanceshould provide enough information to determinesubsequent actions and priorities. The initial reconnais-sance should provide or confirm the following:

~. Casualties (injured and deceased) notpreviously found, their number, location, and extent ofinjuries. Injured people will be moved to a safe area.

~. Weapons and components condition, loca-tion, and chance of. explosions.

j. Existence of radioactive contamination andlevels of it.

~. Ex@osive hazards present.

(b) Other specialists or emergency personnel maybe part of the initial reconnaissance team if the OSCconsiders them essential. The OSC will approve allentries into the exclusion area prior to the weapons beingdeclared safe. As a safety precaution, the senior EODperson entering the accident site should be the initialreconnaissance team chief. The team chief should ensurethat team members are briefed on emergency, safety,and other procedures before entering the accident site.If possible, still photography should be used to depictthe accident site and area, document findings, and assistin developing the weapon recovery procedures. Positivemeasures should be taken to prevent electromagnetic(RF) energy from initiating explosive devices. Also,unsecure radio transmission and the use of classifiedinformation and data which may cause undue alarm

to outside listeners, should be avoided. Vehicles andequipment used in a contaminated area duringreconnaissance may be left for future use, but must bechecked for contamination before leaving the accidentsite. The radiological control area need not be establishedprior to reconnaissance team entry. However, thefollowing should be considered by the OSC: establishan initial or cursory contamination control line at least100 meters upwind of the initial contaminant or hazard,so that exiting initial reconnaissance team members canbe monitored and decontaminated, if required. Ifcontamination is present, determine the actual areawhich is contaminated so that appropriate actions canbe taken, and civil authorities can be advised of theextent of the problem. Procedures for completing theinitial perimeter survey of the contaminated area arediscussed in Chapter 5. Atmospheric Release AdvisoryCapability (ARAC) projections discussed in Appendix5C will provide a worst case estimate of the contaminatedarea to assist in planning the survey.

(9) Hazard Assessment.

(a) Radiation Monitoring/ Control. The firstpriority is to determine if contamination has beenreleased. Upon making this determination, heavydemands will be p[aced upon available radiationdetection instruments and personnel. A contaminationcontrol station should be established as soon asequipment and personnel are on-scene unless it has beendetermined that all weapons are intact and that therewas no spread of contamination. The reconnaissanceteam need not wait for the contamination control stationto be established before entering the are% however, thereconnaissance team and any civilian personnel in thecontaminated, or potentially contaminated area, shouldbe processed through the initial contamination controlline or the contamination control station upon exit fromthe area. When contamination is present, immediateactions should be initiated to obtain information on theextent of contamination, establish radiological controllines, and notify medical treatment facilities which mayhave contaminated casualties or emergency responseequipment. If resources are available, assistance inmonitoring and decontaminating response forces shouldbe offered. The amount of radiation monitoringequipment available to the response force may precludesimultaneous accomplishment of all actions, and theOSC must establish priorities based on the hazard tothe general public and responding forces.

~. Prior to departing for the accident site, theresponse force, if not on the notification system; should .

4-9

provide its Service operations center with an appropriateTELEFAX phone number for delivery of ARACprojections of downwind radiation doses and contami-nation depositions. If a TELEFAX device is deployedto the accident site, the on-site phone number shouldbe provided for direct data receipt. Specific accidentdata provided in Appendix 5C should be provided toARAC directly, or through the Service operations centeror JNACC.

~. Equipment and personnel limitations maypreclude the response force from conducting detailedradiation surveys of the accident site. If contaminationis present, available radiation monitoring equipment willbe needed to:

g. Monitor and decontaminate responsepersonnel/ vehicles, bystanders, nearby residents, andaffected medical treatment facilities.

~. Perform an initial perimeter survey todetermine the extent of contamination and position forestablishing a contamination control area.

c. Operate the contamination control.station.

~. Determine which, if any, security postsare in the contaminated area.

(b) Hazard Evaluation. Include an evaluation ofall the hazardous materials present. ,

(10) Weapon Recovery Operations. Weaponrecovery operations commence with reconnaissance andcontinue until the weapons and/ or components havebeen removed from the accident site. Locating anddetermining the status .of the weapons and weaponcomponents should receive a high priority. Until thelocation and status of the weapons can be determined,fragmentation distarkes should be considered whenestablishing the CP, NDA, NSA or Security Area andpositioning security guards and other personnel. Rendersafe procedures (RSP) shall be conducted by EODpersonnel. Until this action is taken by certifiedtechnicians, no personnel should be allowed into thearea without the OSC’S approval. Specific EOD books(series 6) cover RSP operations and must be followedunless situations or conditions dictate a need forprocedural deviations. Only emergency RSP actionsshould be performed to achieve site stabilization. If sitestabilization has been achieved, continuation of RSPbeyond emergency procedures should be suspended untilthe SRF and DoE ARG can arrive. Necessary weaponrecovery procedures should then be developed jointlyby EOD and ARG personnel and modified to assuremaximum safety. Plans for packaging and shipping thedamaged weapon(s) or their components will be an

integral part of these procedl.wes and must be approvedby the OSC prior to implementation.

(11) Security (Physical and Classified Material).

(a) A security perimeter should be established assoon as possible. Civilian response personnel willestablish some form of control to keep nonessentialpersonnel from interfering with the civilian responseactions. Coordination with civilian law enforcementagencies should be conducted to ensure that adequatesecurity is provided for the weapons until the responseforce arrives. Upon arrival of the response force,establishment of a NDA or NSA as discussed in Chapter13, should be considered. In overseas areas, cooperationwith local authorities allows establishment of a disastercordon or a Security Area. This area, -although notequivalent to the NDA or NSA, utilizes local authoritiesto restrict personnel from the accident site for theirprotection and safeguarding weapon systems.

(b) Debriefings. The OSC is required to debriefall personnel with aczess to classified information. Acomprehensive debriefing procedure should be estab-lished to gain all possible information from responseforce personnel who observed the accident and itsaftermath, or who were in the accident area. Informationgained from these debriefings may also assist insubsequent accident investigations and aid in planningfor initial response actions.

(12) Protective Measures, Re-Entry Recommenda-tions and Recovery Plan. The protective measuresrecommendations include procedures to protectpersonnel and resources in the hazard area. These actionsinclude notitlcation, protective measures, and controlledevacuation. The re-entry recommendations includeprocedures to remove or decontaminate materials andto return contaminated land/resources to an acceptablecondition. The recommendations will be incorporatedinto the recovery pkn. .Details on protective measuresand recovery are contained in Chapter 5.

(13) SRF Organization and Operation of theAccident Scene.

(a) The Operations Area. The operations areaprovides facilities for the OSC, command and control,response, recovery and restoration functions. This areawill be located far enough from the accident site to ensurethat the operations area is free of airborne contaminationand, in the event of a wind change, the area is out ofthe contamination area. Figure 4-3 provides a sampleaccident site organizational diagram.

. ~. Space (an area approximately 100 metersx 150 meters) is furnished for the following functions

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with the DoE, FEMA, and civilian authorities coun-terparts or equivalents as appropriate:

g. OSC or DoE Team Leader.Q. On-Scene CP.g. On-Scene Control Group (DoE ARG,

and/ or the EOD team).Q JHEC

~. Other facilities which should be provided

Communications area.Control group briefing area.Personnel and dosimeter control point.Radiation equipment repair area.Vehicle park.Medical control point.VIP/ visitor reception/briefing area.Messing.Rest area.Latrines.

(b) The base camp.

~. The base camp includes those logistical,administrative, billeting, and recreation functions tosupport recovery and restoration requirements. Thenearest military installation should be used as the basecamp if practicable. (The distance from the installationor terrain may require setup in the field.) The IRF unitcommander or the nearest Installation Commander willset up and operate the base camp.

~. The base camp will be located farther fromthe accident than the operations area is located fromthe accident. Base camp facilities will include as aminimum:

a.~,

;

i3h.7.1.i

(c) The

Personnel control point.JIC.HelipadMaterial receiving point.Clean clothing and bulk issue area.Mess] ration breakdown point.Billeting area. “Shower and latrines.Administrative vehicle park area.Water and POL point.

Contamination Control Area. TheContamination Control Area (CCA) includes facilitiesfor monitoring and decontaminating personnel,

resources and vehicles. The CCA incorporates thecontamination control line (hot line), the contaminationcontrol station, personnel and equipment processinglines, and material/casualty transfer point. Considera-tion should be given for using building(s) or tent(s) forsetup of the contamination control station andcontamination control line. Multiple processing lines willbe used to facilitate personnel processing. Contaminatedmaterials and run-off will be contained and maintainedfor DoD disposition.

d. Service Response Force. Upon arrival at theaccident site, the SRF continues actions initiated by theIRF, and initiates additional actions as required. Specitlcoperations and actions of concern to the SRF areaddressed below.

(1) Command, Control and Communications.

(a) Upon designation of the SRF, the com-mander establishes communications with the responseforce or the response force’s base command center toobtain all ~ossible information and coordinate SRFarrival and ‘expected requirements. The DoE ARGcomposition, travel plans, and support requirements areobtained through the Service operations center orJNACC.

(b) Upon arrival at the accident site, the SRFcommander should be briefed by the IRF OSC and meetwith senior State and local emergency responseauthorities or host-country officials. The briefing shouldcover the status, functions, capabilities, and supportrequirements of all organizations, agencies, andspecialized teams on-scene. An overflight of the accidentsite is recommended. Upon completion of turnoverbriefings, the SRF commander should assume the dutiesof OSC. All members of the response force should remainon-scene until the OSC determines that they are nolonger required.

(c) As soon as all radiological data is known,preparation of a site recovery and restoration plan shouldbe directed. FEMA, state, and local authorities and hostgovernment officials must be included in the planningand management of site restoration operations.

(d) Initial communications capabilities on-scenemay be inadequate and should be improved as soonas possible.

(e) Congressionalprovided as required.

(2) Public Affairs.

relations support must be

The OSC should form aCommunity Emergency Action Team (CEAT) at somepoint after weapons recovery. The CEAT, coordinated

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with FEMA or affected country representatives, wouldprovide a direct interface with the public through avariety of means that could include town meetings.

(3) Hazard Evaluation.

(a) Radiation Monitoring/ Hazard Control.Radiological surveys are required to define thecontamination area and identify any personnel exposedto contamination. The SRF is responsible for all on-site operations. DoE is responsible for coordinating off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities ofFederal agencies through the FRMAC in accordancewith reference (c). Also, civil authorities may conductmonitoring and survey operations, and are responsiblefor control of off-site contaminated areas. To obtaina consolidated and consistent presentation of the bestdata available, on-site radiological monitoring andsurveying must be coordinated by the JHEC, asdescribed in Chapter 5. The radiological hazard toresponse personnel and the general public are a majorconcern of Federal, State, and local authorities andinvolve country government officials. All personnel mustbe kept informed. An effective health safety programshould be initiated as soon as possible. State, DoE andhost country government personnel are responsible formonitoring and treating the general publiq however,military assistance can be offered and may be requireduntil sufficient civilian equipment and personnel areavailable.

~. The DoE has an Aerial MeasurementSurvey (AMS) capability that can determine the extentand severity of contamination. This capability shouldbe coordinated with the DoE team leader.

~. Ground &veys are required to confirm andrefine the results of aerial surveys. Military assistancemay be requested for ground surveys conducted outsidethe NDA, NSA or Security Area. If possible, initialground surveys should be performed within .5 days ofthe accident because the contamination may migrate intosurfaces and become more difficult to measure andremove. The USAF Air Transportable Radiac Package(ATRAP) team can field, calibrate, and repair allinstruments to provide standardization.

(b) Hazard Assessment. The JHEC assesses theradiological and non-radiological hazards at a nuclearweapons accident/ incident. Also, for assessment andultimate clean-up of radiological and non-radiologicalmaterials, a respiratory protection program should beestablished to ensure the health and safety of each personentering the controlled area.

(4) Weapon Recovery Operations. Accident con-ditions, the time required to locate the weapon(s), andthe availability of qualified EOD personnel determineto what extent RSP have been accomplished prior tothe SRF’S arrival. If the weapon(s) were in a stableenvironment and time permitted, RSP may have beenheld in abeyance until the SRF and DoE ARG arrive.The condition of the weapons should be assessedcarefully prior to movement, even if RSP were performedby the response force. If all weapons and componentshave not been located when the SRF arrives, an extensivesearch may be required to find them.

(a) Weapons involved in an accident may havesuffered substantial internal structural damage. Whentime permits, joint EOD and DoE inspection andassessment of weapon damage is desirable. The highpriority given to weapon recovery operations does notinherently imply a need for rapid action. Safety is ofutmost importance.

(b) A staging area should be established outsidethe contaminated area, but within the NDA, or hostgovernment Security Area, where weapons, components,and hazardous material can be packaged for shipmentand stored until shipment may be made.

(c) A large number of personnel maybe requiredto conduct searches for weapons, weapon components,and explosive hazards. EOD personnel will supervisesearches by available personnel on-site after providingappropriate briefings on search and safety procedures.Search procedures are discussed in Chapter 15.

(5) Security. Site security is established by theresponse force and/ or civil autho~,ties. Additionalsecurity is required for temporary weapon storage areas,the communications center, and other areas whereclassified material is kept or discussed. A badging andidentification system should be implemented to facilitatepassage of civilian and military response personnel andteams. When DoD resources, such as nuclear weapons,components, and other classified materials are removedfrom the accident site, justification for an NDA, or NSAwith military control no longer exists, although aradiological hazard may still exist. Therefore, transitionfrom military control should be coordinated with civilauthorities.

. (6) Claims. A nuclear weapon accident whichresults in contamination will generate a large numberof claims by civilians. A claims processing facility shouldbe established where people can gain access easily andis m~tually agreeable to local officials. This locationmust be publicized.

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(7) Site Restoration. A comprehensive and detailedplot of the contaminated area is essential for developingan accurate site restoration plan. Determination of clean-up levels will be a major issue and require theconcurrence/ agreement of Federal and State authoritiesand host country government officials. Most of the siterestoration work occurs after weapon or componentsremoval. The SRF and the appropriate response forceelements will assist civil authorities/ officials inperforming site restoration work. Federal assistance tothe state is coordinated by the SFO.

e. Logistic Support.

(1) Arrangements must be made for feeding,billeting, and for sanitation facilities at or near theaccident site. The extent and specific requirements forthese facilities depend primarily on location, environ-mental conditions, the number of personnel involved,and the expected duration of response operations. Untilmessing and billeting arrangements are established, allpersonnel should arrive with sufficient personal itemsto meet their needs for a period of 2 to 3 days withoutsignificant external support. In remote areas, extremelyaustere conditions should be anticipated with onlylimited support for 7 to 10 days.

(2) Weapon recovery operations, radiological andsite restoration operations, and base camp requirementsdetermine the type and amount of logistic supportrequired. Historical data supports initial planning for1000 people for up to 6 months.

f. Reporting and Documentation.

(I) Repo~s “me prepared according to applicableService directives. In addition to the reports of the OSC,the DoE has reporting requirements that should beconsidered when establishing response force commun-ication capabilities. Parent organizations of specializedunits and teams on-scene should be informationaddressees on situation reports. The OSC staff mustrecognize the need to provide information up the chain-of-command to keep the Washington policy organizationinformed. If adequate information is not provided, directcommunication to the site will be established to obtainstatus. Information expected or requested by variousagencies and officials may include:

(a) On-scene response forces by Service orAgency.

(b) Status of weapon recovery operations.

(c) Status and results of radiological surveys.(d) Status and results of personnel monitoring,

including number of people contaminated, and theradiation doses received.

(e) Names, SSN, and service/agency of allparticipants and visitors.

(2) Documentation of the accident response effortis essential. In addition to the documentation require-ments of the accident investigation teams, all aspectsof the accident response itself should be documentedto permit improvement of response procedures. Evenin accidents with little or no spread of contamination,complete documentation of radiological surveys isnecessary because questions concerning the accident mayarise many years later. Early in the accident response,a responsible official should be tasked with the primaryresponsibility for documenting events and recording datafor historical records.

4-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLANDEVELOPMENT

Development of the accident response plan should beginduring planning and training, and those portions of theplan which may be accident specific completed as soonas practicable. The plan should establish priorities forexpected actions, provide procedures to be followed, andidentify what coordination may be required with otheraccident response organizations. The accident responseplan outlined in Appendix 4-A should not be confusedwith the site restoration plan developed in conjunctionwith civil authorities. The operations annex to theaccident response plan should include:

a. A description of all expected operations and theirinterrelationships.

b. Identification of those activities responsible forexpected operations and methods for coordinatingelements.

c. Identification of required equipment and personnelfor the operations center.

d. A description of the operations center organization,responsibilities, and procedures for the responseoperations.

~ e. Procedures for liaison with other agencies’operations centers (for example, FEMA and State).

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DoD 51OO.52-M

APPENDIX 4-A

ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN

4-A-1 GENERAL

Every nuclear weapon accident has its own uniquerequirements, priorities, and problems. Also, the specificforces responding to each accident will vary, as will thetype and amount of support required. Althoughnumerous unpredictable variables are involved in anuclear accident, the key to a successful response isplanning. Many actions and procedures required inresponse to an accident are known and can be plannedin advance. However, some planned actions andprocedures may not be required, or may requiremodification to meet specific circumstances encountered.All response forces should draft as much of an accidentresponse plan and its associated annexes as possible tobe prepared when, and if, called upon.

4-A-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This appendix provides basic guidelines and informationwhich should be contained in an accident response plan.The response plan is intended to identify actions andprocedures to be used at the accident scene commencingwith the arrival of. the response force and continuingthrough site restoration and the return home of theresponse forces. Possible site restoration proceduresshould be included as an annex to the SRF accidentresponse plans to assist in preparation of site restorationplans in conjunction with civil authorities.

4-A-3 BASIC ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN

The basic accident response plan should state thesituation, the mission, the method of execution, logisticsarrangements, command relationships, and commu-nications links.

a. Situation. The situation section should providefacts surrounding the accident and accident location,the status of response efforts at the time the plan wasprepared, and other key planning factors which mayhave an impact on mission accomplishment. Informationwhich might be contained in this section, if known,includes:

(1) The number, type, condition, and location ofweapons and weapons components involved.

(2) The number of military and civilian personnelinjured or killed and the disposition of all casualties.

(3) Radiological, explosive, and other hazardsexpected to be encountered.

(4) A summary of initial response actions andproblems encountered, including chronology of signif-icant events.

(5) The area of contamination, either projected orsurveyed.

(6) Habitation and terrain features which mayimpact on operations or be affected significantly by theaccident (for example, watersheds, nearby residences orpopulation centers, major roads or thoroughfares,animal feed lots, or other farming enterprises).

(7) Public awareness of the presence of nuclearweapons, either by official announcement or observa-tion assumption.

(8) Status of arrangements with civilian authoritiesincluding establishment of National Defense Area(NDA), or Security Area if required.

(9) Civil and military response organizations orteams on scene, or requested, and their specific functionsor capabilities.

b. Mission. This section contains a statement of thetasks and objectives to be accomplished by the accidentresponse force. Normally there will be two majorobjectives: weapon(s) recovery and site restoration.Scattering of weapon parts by high explosive detona-tions, an unlocated weapon, and specific site restorationobjectives are factors to be considered when stating themission.

c. Execution. In the first subparagraph, give asummary of the tentative plan. In subsequent subpa-ragraphs, assign specific tasks to each element of theresponse force based upon the element’s functionalcapabilities. All organizations and teams, whethercivilian or military, working in the NTDA or SecurityArea or reporting to the OSC should be considered apart of the response force. The plan must delineate the

‘reporting structure and responsibilities of the variousresponse force elements. Moreover, guidance on the

4-A- 1

interface with civilian authorities should be provided,and the plan should identify the response force role injoint activities, such as public safety, the JHEC, andthe JIC. If desired, instructions applicable to two ormore elements of the response force may be placed ina final subparagraph headed “Coordinating Instruc-tions. ”

d. Logistics and Administration. This section containsa statement of the administrative and logistic arrange-ments applicable to the operation. Billeting, transpor-tation, and airheads or other key supply points/routesto support the operation should be identified. Somerequirements may not be known until engineers havedetermined what equipment is required to restore thesite. If lengthy, or not ready for inclusion when the restof the plan is completed, this section may be issuedseparately.

e. Command and Communications. Comman”drelationships for the entire operation should be statedwith expected changes of command indicated, and timeor event at which such changes will occur. These changesmay be in overall command, such as would occur whenthe SRF commander relieves the IRF commander.Additionally, changes should be stated within areas, suchas civilian security forces relieving the military securityforces following removal of weapons, weapon compo-nents, and other classified information from the accidentsite. Plans should ensure communications links betweenall organizations participating in the response force, withparticipants’ parent organizations, and with organiza-tions supporting the response force. Many organizationswill arrive with some degree of organic communicationswhich should be coordinated by thjs plan. COMSECand OPSEC requirements should be identified.

4-A-4 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNE”XES

Annexes to the accident response plan should providein-depth guidance for operations in functional areaswhich are applicable to the response effort. They shouldinclude all actions which must be performed, includingsupplementary information indicating which actionsrequire coordination with other elements to insure safetyand/ or optimum use of assets. Areas in which annexesmay be desired are:

a. Task Organization (if not included in basic plan).Integrating the actions of the multitude of units andorganizations, both civilian and military, responding toa nuclear weapon accident is essential to an efficient

response operation. Organizational relationships willvary as the response operation progresses, most notablywhen the NDA or Security Area is dissolved. The TaskOrganization annex should identify all units andorganizations responding to a nuclear weapon accident,their capabilities, and their relationships. At a minimumthe following units and organizations should beconsidered:

(1) Initial Response Force.(2) Service Response Force.(3) Department of Energy Accident Response

Group.(4) Specialized Service Teams.(5) Federal Emergency Management Agency,

including the Senior FEMA Official, i.e., FRC.(6) Defense Nuclear Agency Nuclear Weapon

Accident Advisory Team.(7) Other Federal agencies responding to the

accident.(8) Civilian/ Host country agencies responding to

the accident.

b. Operations. This annex should identify thoseactions which will, or may be required, assignresponsibilities for execution of identified actions, andestablish procedures for coordinating and controllingall actions at the accident site, i.e., FRC liaison officer.

c. Hazard/Radiological Safety/ Health Physics. Thisannex should define the responsibilities of all agenciesand elements with a hazard/radiological capability andestablish a comprehensive hazard/radiation controlprogram.

d. Communications. This annex should establishcommunications requirements and communicationsoperating procedures.

e. Security. This annex should describe the respon-sibilities and procedures of the security forces.

f. Medical. This annex should describe responsibilitiesand special procedures used by the medical staff.

g. Weapons Operations. The Weapons OperationsAnnex should establish the procedures used for weaponsrecovery operations.

h. Public Affairs. The Public Affairs Annex shouldprovide procedures for the coordination and release ofpublic affairs information. This annex should include:

4-A-2

(1) Procedures to ensure that all press releases arecoordinated properly with the OSC and other key staffmembers prior to release.

(2) Guidance on selecting the location for, repres-entation to, and operation of the Joint InformationCenter.

(3) Pre-coordinated contingency releases forconfirming the presence of nuclear weapons, andchecklists prescribed by DoD Directive 5230.16,reference (b).

i. Logistic Support. The logistic Support Annexshould provide procedures for establishing andmaintaining support for response force operations.Chapter 17 provides guidance and recommendedprocedures for the development of this annex.

j. Legal. This annex should provide procedures forestablishment of a claims center. Chapter 16 containsa discussion of legal problems which maybe encounteredfollowing a nuclear weapon accident.

k, Site Restoration. The Site Restoration Annexshould identify possible methods to restore an accidentsite and contaminated area. A separate Site RestorationPlan will be developed in coordination with Federal,State, and local authorities and will probably requirethat an environmental assessment and engineering studybe made. The Site Restoration Annex shouId provideinformation to guide the response force and be of usein drafting a site restoration strategy. Chapter 19discusses site restoration issues which may assist inpreparation of the Site Restoration-Annex.

. .

4-A-3

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 5

RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY

ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

5-1 GENERAL

A nuclear weapon aczident is different from other acci-dents due to the possibility of radioactive contaminationat the immediate accident site and extending “beyondthe accident vicinity. The complexities of a nuclearweapon accident are compounded further by general lackof public understanding regarding radiological hazards.The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must therefore,quickly establish a vigorous and comprehensive healthphysics program to manage the health safety aspectsof a nuclear weapons accident. A good health physicsprogram provides for civil authority/ official involve-ment in the cooperative development of response effortsand a site restoration plan,


This chapter provides information on health physics andguidance concerning the radiological safety and otherhazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident. Alsoincluded is information on the radiological controlresources avrdable, the hazards and characteristics ofradioactive materials present, and suggested methods fordetecting these hazards and protecting personnel fromthem. This information assists the OSC in the operationsunder his control. The Joint Hazard Evaluation Center(JHEC) is the OSC’S organizational means to task on-site hazard and radiological data collection and analyzedata collected for the most accurate and completehazard/ radiological assessment. The chapter furnishesrecommendations, advice, sample forms, and assistanceto civil authorities with jurisdiction over areas affectedby the accident. Also, weapon systems contain non-radioactive toxic materials, such as beryllium, lithium,lead, propellants, high explosives, oxidizers and plastics.These hazards are discussed in Chapter 9. The JHECcoordinates closely with the FRMAC. The FRMACsupports the OSC with off-site monitoring andassessment.


Department of Defense (DoD) has an obligation toprotect response force personnel and the public fromon-site hazards associated with a nuclear weaponaccident and to mitigate potential health and safetyproblems. To accomplish this, the DoD establishes aJHEC with the following objectives:

a. Determine if radioactive contamination has beenreleased.

b. Advise the OSC of precautionary measures forresidents and other persons in potentially contaminatedareas.

c. Identify and monitor potentially contaminatedpersonnel on-site, including decontamination efforts,and establish a bioassay program.

d. Determine levels of contamination present and on-site boundaries of the contaminated areas throughground and air surveys.

e. Establish dosimetry and documentation proceduresduring personnel decontamination and restorationoperations.

f. Recommend methods and procedures to preventspread of radioactive contamination.

g. Assist the Federal Radiological Monitoring andAssessment Center (FRMAC) in coordinating and plan-ning the site restoration plan.

5-4 RESOURCES

a. Response Force Resources. Response forces shouldhave a full complement of operable and calibrated radio-logical monitoring equipment. Sufficient quantities ofmaterials should also be available for replacement or

5-1

repair of critical or high failure rate components suchas mylar probe faces. Replacement plans are necessarybecause radiation detection equipment (RADIACS)available to initial response forces will not meet initialoperational needs after a large release of contamination.Though response forces are equipped and trained toconduct radiation surveys for low levels of radioactivecontamination, it is difficult to do over rough surfaceslike rocks, plants, and wet surfaces. Specialized DoDand Department of Energy (DoE) teams are betterequipped to conduct low level contamination monitor-ing, and monitoring should wait until the teams arrive.Appendix 5-A contains a list of radiological monitoringequipment used by the Services with a summary of theircapabilities and limitations. Additionally, personnelshould be cognizant of the various units in whichcontamination levels might be measured or reported,and of the method of converting from one unit toanother. A conversion table for various measurementsis provided in Chapter 11.

b. Specialized Teams. Several specialized teams areavailable within the DoD and DoE with substantialradiological monitoring, hazard assessment, andinstrument repair capabilities. Moreover, they canprovide field laboratories and analytical facilities.Specialized teams when integrated into the ServiceResponse Force (SRF), provide adequate technicalresources to make a complete assessment of the radio-logical hazards. Additionally, specialized DoE teams,which have off-site responsibilities, should be integratedinto the SRF. Integration of specialized team operationsis accomplished best through establishment of a JHECas discussed in paragraph 5-5. When not required on-site, DoD specialized teams should assist in the off-siteradiological response-efforts. Specialized teams are:

(1) The U.S. Army Radiological Advisory MedicalTeam (RAMT) is discussed in Chapter 14.

(2) The following specialized teams or resources arediscussed in detail in Chapter 20:

(a) U.S. Army Radiological Control (RADCON)Team.

(b) U.S. Navy Radiological Control (RADCON)Team.

(c) U.S. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team(AFRAT).

(d) U.S. Air “Force Air Transportable RADIACPackage (ATRAP).

(e) Department of Energy Aerial MeasurementSystem (AMS).

(f) Department of Energy Atmospheric ReleaseAdvisory Capability (ARAC).

(g) Department of Energy Mobile AccidentResponse Group Unit (HOT SPOT).

(h) Department of Energy RANGER Environ-mental Monitoring Capability.

(i) Department of Energy Radiological AirSampling Counting and Analysis Lab (RASCAL).

(j) Department of Energy Mobile Decontamina-tion Station.

(k) Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team.(1) DoD EOD Teams.


This concept of.operations assumes that an accident hasresulted in release of contamination to areas beyondthe immediate vicinity of the accident site. The distinc-tion between on-site and off-site is significant for securityand legal purposes; however, for effective collection andmeaningful correlation of radiological data, the entireregion of contamination must be treated as an entity.The on-site and off-site distinction should be consideredonly when assigning areas to monitoring teams. Possibleresponse force actions are addressed first in this conceptof operations. Only limited equipment and expertise maybe available to the initial response force.

a. Initial Response Force (IRF) Actions. Within theconstraints of available resources, IRF action shoulddetermine the absence or presence of any radiologicalproblem and its nature; minimize possible radiationhazards to the public and response force personnel;identify all persons who may have been contaminatedand decontaminate them as necessa~, provide approp-riate news releases; and notify officials/ personnel ofpotential hazards. If responding by air, radiationdetection instrumentation should be carried to ensurethat personnel and aircraft are not contaminated. Effortsshould be made, during the flight, to avoid contam-ination; appropriate ground support should be providedupon landing if personnel and aircraft becomecontaminated.

(1) Pre-Deployment Actions.

(a) Prior to departing for the accident site,delivery arrangements should be made for an Atmos-pheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) plot, ifavailable, to assist in determining possible areas ofcontamination. AIQ4C plots will provide theoreticalestimates of the radiation dose to personnel downwindat the time of the accident. Also, plots will provide theexpelted location and level of contamination depositionon the ground. A detailed discussion of ARAC is in

5-2

Appendix 5-C. As it becomes known, specific accidentdata described in the appendices should be providedto the ARAC facility at Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory.

(b) If an advance party is deployed, at least onetrained person should have radiation detection instru-ments to determine if alpha emitting contamination wasdispersed and to confirm that no beta and/or gammahazard exists. The earlier that confirmation of releasedcontamination is established, the easier it will be todevelop a plan of action and communicate with involvedcivil authorities.

(2) Initial Actions.

(a) If the OSC, or an advance party, deploys byhelicopter to the accident site, an overflight of theaccident scene and the downwind area can provide arapid assessment of streets or roads in the area and thetypes and uses of potentially effected property. Duringhelicopter operations, flights should remain above orclear of any smoke, and at a sufficient altitude to preventresuspension from the downdraft when flying overpotentially contaminated areas. The landing zone shouldbe upwind, or crosswind, from the accident site.

(b) After arrival at the site, a reconnaissance teamshould enter the accident site to inspect the area forhazards; determ~ne the type(s) of contamination present;measure levels of contamination; and assess weaponstatus. The approach to the scene should be from anupwind direction if at all possible. The accident situationindicates whether anti-contamination or respiratoryprotection is required for the initial entry team. Everyconsideration should be given to protecting the initialentry team, and go preventing undue public alarm. Untilthe hazards “’are identified, only essential personnelshould enter the possible contamination or fragmenta-tion area of the specific weapon(s). The generally

. . accepted explosive safety distance for nuclear weaponsis 610 meters (2000 feet); however, the contaminationmay extend beyond this distance. Additional explosivesafety distances may be found in classified EODpublications. At this point, a temporary contaminationcontrol line should be considered. Later, when theboundary of the contaminated area is defined andexplosive hazards are known, the control line may bemoved for better access to the area. Contamination, orthe lack of it, “should be reported immediately to theOSC. Anti-contamination clothing and respiratoryprotection should always be donned before entering asuspect area.

(c) If radiation detection instruments are not yeton-scene, observations from firefighters and witnesses

and the condition of the wreckage or debris may indicatecontamination. Anticipated questions that may be askedto evaluate the release of contamination are:

~. Was there a high explosives detonation?~. Has a weapon undergone sustained burning?~. How many intact weapons or containers

have been observed?~. Do broken or damaged weapons or con-

tainers appear to have been involved in an explosionor fire?

(d) If no contamination was released by theaccident, the remaining radiological response becomespreparations for response in the event of a release duringweapon recovery operations.

(3) Actions to be taken if contamination is detected.“Authorities should be notified and the assistance ofspecialized radiological teams and the DoE Aerial Mea-surement System requested. The highest priority shouldbe actions to initiate general public hazard abatement.Do not delay or omit any life-saving measures becauseof radiation contamination. If precautionary measureshave not been implemented to reduce the hazard to thepublic, civil authorities/ officials should be advised ofthe situation and consider possible actions. Actionswhich should be initiated include:

(a) Dispatch monitor teams, with radios ifpossible, to conduct an initial survey of the security area.

(b) Prepare appropriate news release.(c) Determine if medical treatment facilities with

casualties have a suitable radiation monitoringcapability. If not, dispatch a monitor to determine ifthe casualties were contaminated. Also assist in ensuringthat contamination has not spread in the facility.Procedures a medical treatment facility may use tominimize the spread of contamination are described in.Chapter 14.

(d) Initiate air sampling.(e) Identify, in conjunction with civil authorities/

officials, witnesses, bystanders, and others present at theaccident scene.

(f) Establish a contamination control station anda personnel monitoring program. If available, civilauthorities/ officials should have monitoring assistanceprovided at established personnel processing points.

(g) Implement procedures to protect responsepersonnel. Protective coveralls (anti-contaminationclothing), hoods, gloves, and boots are necessary to‘protect response personnel from contamination and toprevent its spread to uncontaminated areas. If airborne

5-3

contamination exists, respiratory protection is required.Respiratory protection can be provided in most instancesby using Service approved protective masks. If extremelyhigh contamination levels of tritium are suspected ina confined area, firefighting and other special actionsrequire a positive pressure self-contained breathingapparatus. Unless an accident is contained within anenclosed space, such as a magazine, only those personnelworking directly with the weapon need take precautionsagainst tritium.

(h) Develop and implement plans for controllingthe spread of contamination. Administrative controlsmust stop contamination from being spread by personnelor equipment, and protect response force personnel andthe general public. This control is usually establishedby determining a control area and limiting access andexit through a Contamination Control Station (CCS).The perimeter of the contamination control area willbe in the vicinity of the line defined by the perimetersurvey; however, early in the response before a fullperimeter survey is completed, a buffer zone may beconsidered. If the control area extends beyond theNational Defense Area (NDA) or Security Area theassistance of civil authorities/officials will be requiredto establish and maintain the control area perimeter.Personnel and equipment should not leave the controlarea until monitored and decontaminated. Injuredpersonnel should be monitored and decontaminated tothe extent their condition permits. A case-by-caseexception to this policy is necessary in life threateningsituations.

(i) Establishing the location and initial operationof the Command Post, Operations Area, JHEC, andBase Camp is discussed in Chapter 4.

b. Service Respon~e Force (SRF) Actions. Uponarrival on-scene, the SRF personnel review the initialresponse force actions. Actions include: the status ofidentification and care of potentially contaminatedpeople, casualties, and fatalities; the results of radiationsurveys and air sampling; radiological response assetson-scene or expected; logs and records; and the locationfor the JHEC. Representatives from the DoE, FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Envir-onmental Protection Agency (EPA) will be on-scenewithin a few hours after the response force. They andcivil officials, are the primary off-site health and safetyinterface with the public. However, the SRF shouldcontinue to provide assistance and radiation monitoringsupport, as necessary. During those periods early in theresponse when Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)operations limit access to the accident site, radiologicalsurvey teams should only support the weapon recovery

efforts. Off-site radiological surveys require coordinationwith civil authorities. This arrangement can beunderstood by explaining the role of the JI+EC andFRMAC, and by inviting the civil government/approvedradiological response organization to participate inFRMAC operation. DoD specialized teams and theDepartment of Energy Accident Response Group (DoEARG) are integral parts of the SRF. The OSC shouldintegrate DoE ARG radiological assets into the JHECorganization.

(1) Joint Hazard Evaluation Center. The JHEC isthe organization that oversees the on-site hazard andradiological data collection and assessment efforts. Byanalyzing data, it provides accurate and complete on-site hazard/ radiological recommendations. The JHECDirector should be knowledgeable about data on-siteand how to best employ the technical resources available.The recommended functional organtifation is shown atFigure 5-1.

(a) On-site collected data is processed throughand further distributed by the JHEC to the FRMAC.

(b) JHEC is the single control point for allhazard/ radiological on-site data and will provide themost rapid, accurate, and complete radiologicalinformation to both military and civil users. Dataprovided to the JHEC for analysis, correlation, andvalidation includes all hazard data on-site. After theinitial response, the JHEC establishes a radiation anddosimetry program which meets Service needs andrequirements for personnel working in or entering theon-site contamination control area. The JHEC should:

~. Collect radiological and hazard datarequired by the OSC on-site. Refer all unofficial requestsfor contamination information to the Joint InformationCenter (JIC).

~. Analyze and correlate all contaminationdata collected to identify inconsistencies which requirefurther investigation.

~. Provide contamination plots and otherrequired data to the OSC.

~, Review and correlate records from contam-ination control stations and other personnel processingpoints to ensure bioassays or other appropriate follow-up actions are taken.

~. Implement OSC’S health and safety stand-ards and monitor the safety procedures of all partic-ipating in weapon recovery operations.

~. Brief and train people not designatedpreviously as radiation workers who will be workingin” the contaminated area on personal protectiveequipment, hazards, and safety measures.

5-4

u!

(n

Senior Health JHEC Director FRMAC Liaison

Deputy Director OSC Liaisonand

Safety AdvisorWeapon Recovery

Chief of Staff LiaisonI

I●

SiteSecurity

RestorationLogistics

Administration

I I I I

“EzIzizlm. RAD Survey Teams . Contamination . Mobile Laboratories

. Ranger Control Station . Instrument Cali-

● Air Sampling . Industrial Hygiene bration and Repair

. Environmental . Industrial Safety . Equipment DECON

Sampling, etc. . Bioassy . Fixative Application● A M S . Personnel Decon

● Dosimetry. Waste Control● RAD SAFE SUPPOrt

(Radiography). Medical

Figure 5-1. Joint Harard Evaluation Center (JHEC) Functional Organization

PAssessmentand

Evaluation

. Data Control /QA

. Plotting

. Evaluation andAssessment

. Meteorology

. DispersionModeI (ARAC)

. Overview

(c) Consolidate all radiological assessmentinformation for on-site recovery operations and provideit to the OSC.

(d) When the National Defense Area (NDA) isdissolved, JHEC personnel and resources may beintegrated into FRMAC operations.

(2) Materials Sampling.

(a) Environmental Sampling.

~. Air sampling is conducted to determine ifairborne contamination is present. Also it provides abasis for estimating the radiation dose/exposure whichpeople without respiratory protection may have received.The reaction time to an accident combined with the timerequired to initiate air sampling will result in little orno data being obtained during the initial release ofcontamination. It is at this period that the highest levelsof contamination are expected. Later placement of asampler downwind the accident, per Appendix 5-B, willresult in a sample of airborne contamination. Airsampling will verify the resuspension hazard duringresponse and recovery operations. To achieve this,samplers should be placed downwind of the accident,dependent on wind velocity approximately 500 metersupwind, and at the contamination control station.

~. Soil, water, vegetation and swipe samplingof surfaces are required. Sampling should be initiatedin the contaminated area soon after the accident.Samples must be taken also at locations remote fromthe contaminated area to verify background readings.After this, samples are required periodically during therecovery process to determine radioactive materialmigration and dispersion and to substantiate decontam-ination/ recovery c(jmjletion. The JHEC will determineon-site sampling parameters, for example, samplelocation(s), method, frequency, volume of sample, andsize.

(b) Bioassay Program,

j. Bioassays methods estimate the amount ofradioactive material deposited in the body. The methodsuse either direct measurement, sensitive x-ray detectorsplaced over the chest (lung counting) and/ or otherorgans, or detection of radioactivity y in the excreta (nasalmucous, feces or urine).

~, A bioassay program for all individuals isrecommended to determine if any internal dose wasreceived, and to assure those who did not receive a dosethat their health was not impaired. Implementation ofa bioassay program and the documented results will be

important in the equitable settlement of any legal actionsthat may occur in the years following a nuclear weaponaccident. Personnel monitoring and bioassay programsare discussed in this paragraph and bioassay techniquesin Chapter 8.

(3) Work Force Protection. Standard radiationaccident and incident response procedures provideguidance for personnel protection during the first fewdays. As conditions stabilize, regulations governing workin radiation areas should be implemented. Considerationmust be given to participating organizations or Servicesdosage calculation methods and previous dosages as longas their procedures do not jeopardize health and safety,or unduly impair operations. The JHEC is responsiblefor implementing the OSC’S health and safety standardsand monitoring closely the safety procedures of all par-ticipating organizations. Personnel entering thecontaminated areas, if not trained to work in a radiationenvironment,’ should be given specific guidance.

(4) Radiological Surveys. Radiological surveys andother radiological data are required by the OSC andcivil authorities/ officials to identify actions to minimizehazards to the response force and the public. Site charac-terization and decontamination, and restorationplanning will also need this information. Radiologicalsurvey and data requirements must be given to theFRMAC for implementation to meet this requirementin an expeditious manner. Prior to extensive surveyinitiation, the following must be completed: selectappropriate detection equipment, calibrate instruments,and determine the background readings. Surveys includeNDA perimeter, area, and resource/facility surveys. Thesurvey results are complicated by sensitivity y/ fragilit y of.equipment, background readings, and the age of the

fissile materials. The survey process can require daysto weeks to compIete. Survey procedures are locatedin Appendix 5-D and forms are at Appendix 5-E.

(5) Radiological Advisory to the JIC. All publicrelease of information will be processed by DoD “Directive 5230.16, reference (b), and made through theJIC. Public interest in the actual or perceived radiologicalhazard resulting from a nuclear weapon accident willproduce intense media concern and public scrutiny ofresponse operations. The JIC requires assistance fromthe JHEC and FRMAC in preparing press releases tominimize and allay these concerns. Any portion of thepublic which may have been advised to take precau-tionary measures will seek clear, understandableexplanations of methods to protect their health andproperty. The public must be provided informationthrough the JIC and the Community Emergency ActionTeam (CEAT) explaining all real hazards, in terms which

5-6

recognize the populace’s knowledge level and under-standing of radiation and its effects.

(6) Fixing of Contaminants. Fixatives maybe usedto reduce resuspension and the spread of contamination.If water is readily available, it may be used as a temporaryfixative to reduce resuspension. Other more permanentfixatives may be used to reduce the spread ofcontamination by resuspension and run-off from highlycontaminated areas. The use of fixatives in areas of lowlevel contamination is usually inappropriate. Fixativesmay enhance or hinder decontamination and restorationoperations, and affect radiation survey procedures. TheDoE ARG can provide information on the advantagesand disadvantages of different types of fiiatives andmethods of application. They should be consulted priorto application of permanent fixatives.

(7) Recovery/ Restoration,

(a) Recovery. This activity includes the initialreconnaissance, the render safe procedures, hazardremoval, and disposition of the weapons and compo-nents. The two-person rule must be enforced strictlywhen working with nuclear weapons. In the early stagesof accident response, following all of the requiredsecurity measures may be difficult. However, the OSCshould implement necessary security procedures as soonas possible. The initial entry will determine thepreliminary weapon(s) status and hazards in the area.In the process of determining the weapon condition,search may be required to find the weapon(s). The OSCdirects the initiation of the render safe procedures. TheEOD team advises the OSC of the safest and mostreliable means for neutralizing weapon hazards.

(b) Sitey Restoration. Procedures/methods toreturn the accident scene to a technically achievable andfinancially acceptable condition begins early in theresponse effort. Site restoration becomes a major issueafter classitled information, weapons, weapon debris,and other hazards are removed. Several factors havesignificant influence on site restoration decisions andprocedures, such as size of the contaminated area,topographical, geological, hydrological, meteorologicaland demographic information. Other important aspectsare utilization of the area and civil authorities/officialsprerogatives for the area. Restoration will include thosemeasures to remove or neutralize the contamination.

(8) Disposal of Contaminated Waste. Contam-ination control staticm operations and JHEC fieldlaboratory operations creates considerable quantities ofcontaminated waste. Provisions, are required therefore,to store this waste temporarily in the contaminated area

.

until it can be moved to a disposal site. Procedures forthe disposal of contaminated waste are addressed as partof site restoration in Chapter 19.

(9) Logistics Support for Recovery/ RadiologicalOperations. Radiological response assets arrive withsufficient supplies to last a few days. High use itemswhich soon require resupply include hundreds of setsof anti-contamination clothing each day, two-inchmasking or duct tape, varied sizes of polyethylene bags,marking tape for contaminated materials, and respiratorfilters. Anti-contamination clothing may be launderedin special laundry facilities (discussed in Appendix 17-A) and reused. The turnaround time, when established,determines the approximate amount of anti-contamination clothing required. Close liaison will berequired between the JHEC and the SRF supply officer.

c. Radiological Hazards. The primary radiologicalhazard associated with a nuclear weapon accident is fromthe fissile material, particularly the alpha emitters.Sufficient quantities of beta/gamma emitters to posea significant health problem will not normally be presentat a nuclear weapon accident.

(1) Radiological Hazard Assessment. From flheoutset, concern exists about the potential health hazardto the general public, particularly by those residing nearthe accident site. Consideration of possible radiationexposures is the primary method of estimating thepotential health hazard. If no beta/ gamma radiation ispresent, the primary risk is inhalation of alpha emitterswhich may cause a long term increase in the probabilityof radiation related diseases. Initial hazard assessmentswill, of necessity, be based on limited information,assumptions, and worst case projections of possibleradiation doses received. Atmospheric Release AdvisoryCapability (ARAC), described in Appendix 5-C,provides a theoretical projection of the maximuminternal radiation dose people may have received ifoutdoors without respiratory protection from the timeof release to the effective time of the ARAC plot.Exposure to resuspended contaminants normally resultsin doses which are a small fraction of that dose whichwould be received from exposure to the initial releasefor the same time period. Contamination released bythe accident should not normally affect the safety ofpublic water systems with adequate water treatmentcapability.

(2) Reduction of Public Exposure. The hazardassessment must be followed quickly by recommendedprecautionary and safety measures to protect the publicfrom exposure. To control and minimize exposure,radioactive contaminants must be prevented from

5-7

entering the body and confined to specific geographicareas so that the contamination can be removedsystematically. Methods for reducing the exposure tothe public should be implemented by, or through, civilauthorities/ officials. Although political and possiblyinternational issues are likely to be involved, the ultimatedecisions on measures to be taken should be made basedon health and safety considerations.

(a) The initial response force may need to advisecivil authorities/ officials of recommended actions andprovide technical assistance until appropriate civilianassets arrive. When contamination has been released,or when probable cause exists to believe that contam-ination was released, the implementation of precaution-ary measures to reduce exposure to radiation orcontamination are appropriate, even though the serviceresponse force personnel may not arrive for some time.

(b) Protective measures include:

~. Establishing a contamination control area.This operation requires identifying people in the areaat the time of the accident/incident or and restrictingaccess to the area. Any vehicles or people exiting thearea should be identified and directed to go to a moni-toring point immediately.

~. Sheltering. Sheltering is used to minimizeexposure to the initial rdease of contamination as itmoves downwind, and to minimize exposure toresuspended contamination prior to an evacuation. Shel-tering is implemented by advising the people to seekshelter and the procedures to follow. The effectivenessof sheltering depends on following the proceduresprovided.

j. Evacuation. Contaminated areas must bedefined and an evacuation procedure developed andimplemented by civil authorities. Civil authorities willbe responsible for the evacuation but may requireradiological advice and assistance. Immediate evacua-tion of downwind personnel should be discouraged sincethe probability of inhalation of contaminants mayincrease. Explosive or toxic materials may present animmediate hazard to people near the accident site andimmediate evacuation would then be required.

~. Fixing Areas of High Contamination. Areasof high contamination must be controlled to preventspread by resuspension, water run-off, or movement ofpersonnel. Although fixing of contamination is part ofthe site restoration process, some fixing procedures maybe necessary long before site restoration plans areimplemented.

d. Respiratory and Whole Body Protection. Protec-tion of the general public, response force members, and

workers in the accident area from exposure throughinhalation is extremely important. Refer to Appendix5-D for additional guidance.

e. Radiation Surveys. Extensive radiation surveys willbe required to identify and characterize the area so thatdecontamination and restoration plans may be deve-loped and the results evaluated. Determining thatcontamination was released by the accident is veryimportant, if release occurred, priority must be givento the actions to identify and minimize the hazards topeople. These actions are included in Appendix 5-E.

f. Site Restoration. Site restoration involves negotiat-ing cleanup levels and fixing or removing contamination.The removal is most time consuming and requires anextensive workload to collect, remove, decontaminate,if appropriate, and replace the top soil. Monitoring isrequired during the removal process to verify thatcleanup has been achieved.

g. Verification. The decontamination effectivenesswill be verified by remonitoring/ resurveying the accidentscene to determine that the cleanup levels are achieved.

h. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) andre-entry recommendations (RERs) provide appropriateprotective action and re-entry recommendations to thepublic. The PARs and RERs will have been coordinated/reviewed by the cognizant federal authority (DoD) andresponsible civilian authorities/ officials. The PARs andRERs will consider Protective Action Guides issued byEPA and state agencies. In an accident, PARs for initialnotification or evacuation would likely not be preparedformally. The notification in the accident area wouldoccur via visual means or word-of-mouth. Evacuationof approximately a 600 meter disaster cordon mightoccur automatically or at the direction of civilian lawenforcement personnel. A PAR for a controlledevacuation could be formalized in anticipation of asubsequent release of hazardous materials or radioactivecontamination. The PAR/ RER format may include, asa minimum; problem, discussion, action, coordinationand approval sections (the format should be site andsituation specific). A sample PAR for controlledevacuation is found on the next page.

5-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

Procedures and information appropriate for inclusionin the’ Radiological Hazard Safety annex to the accidentresponse plan include

5-8

Major Accident

Protective Action Recommendation

for

at (location

Issued by:

Problem: An accident involving missile system re-entry vehicle occurred at (Time,date and location). Maintenance technicians have experienced complications in removing the missile secondstage from the missile launch facility.

. Discussion: It is possible, though highly improbable, that the second stage could explode. In the unlikelyevent of an explosion, debris could be thrown yards/ meters. As a result, an evacuation of (outlinethe specific area) has been ordered by Civilian Authority Office,

Action: With the possibility of the explosion of the missile second stage during removal operations, thefollowing area will be evacuated. (Indicate the specific area to be vacated and a schedule indicating evacuationstart, completion, verification of evacuation, maintenance work start, work completion and return to the area).Note: All personnel are required to sign in at a specific location(s) during evacuation to help local lawenforcement/ SRF personnel verify that all personnel are out of the area prior to maintenance start. A holdingarea, for example, YMCA, gymnasium, or school may be a temporary holding area for evacuees. Also, theevacuees could be released for shopping or other activities outside the area. Upon successful completion ofmaintenance, the personnel would return to their houses/businesses.

Note: Release of this “Protective Action Recommendation” cannot precede confirmation of the presenceof a nuclear weapon by the OSC and should b< coordinated with local officials and PAO priorto release.

5-9

a. A description of the JHEC organization andresponsibilities.

b. Procedures for operation of the JHEC.

c. Procedures for establishing and maintaining thecontamination control line.

d. Procedures for ensuring that all indigenouspersonnel possibly exposed to contamination areidentified, screened, and treated. This function willbecome DoE and/ or civilian responsibility as timeprogresses.

e. Guidelines for determining radiation survey anddecontamination priorities.

f. Procedures for ensuring that response forcepersonnel working in the contaminated area are properlyprotected.

g. Procedures for recording and maintaining pertinentdata for the radiological safety of response forcepersonnel.

h. Procedures for recording, correlating, and plottingthe results of radiological surveys and data collectioninstrumentation (for example, air samplers).

i. Procedures for JHEC and FRMAC interfacing.

j. Procedures for JHEC incorporation into theFRMAC.

5-1o

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 5-A

Instrument

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT

DOSIMETERS

Self Reading IonizationChamber Dosimeter “

Non-Self ReadingIonization Chamber 0.Dosimeter

Film Badge

ThermoluminescentDosimeter (TLD)

Capability/Limitations

Reusable device for measuring exposure to X- and/or gamma radiation.Limitations: False positive readings due to charge leakage and sensitivity tomechanical shock.

<,Same capabilities, limitations, and use aq Self-Reading Ionization ChamberDosimeter. Additional Limitations: Requires reading device.

Provides measurement and permanent record of beta and gamma radiationdoses over wide dosage range. Special neutron films are available. Ten (10)percent dose accuracy depending on quality control during development.Limitations: Sensitive to light, humidity, aging, and exposure to x-radiation.Delay between exposure and dose reading due to processing time.

The TLD (thermoluminescent dosimeter) provides measurement of gammaradiation dose equivalents up to 10000 rem. Accurate to within a factor oftwo when the energy of the neutrons is unknown. Limitations: after longperiods of exposure (* mrem), damaged or bent cards delay processing, staticelectric discharge causes spurious readings, and temperatures >115° degreesF reduce sensitivity. Delay between exposure and dose reading due to centralprocessing of TLDs.

.“

TRITHJM DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

Instrument Capability Scale Indicator

T-446 Tritium o to 10 pCi/ m3

Portable, tritium detector; automatic scale switching; and trickle charger for nickel cadmium F cells. With adapterkit, has urinalysis capability for tritium with 5-minute response. Weighs 22 pounds. Has particulate filter withfilters down to 0.3 microns (eliminates sensitivity to smoke and paint fumes).

T-290A Tritium 0 to 1,0003 ranges

Portable, air sampler; and detects presence of radioactive gas. Weighs 17 pounds

flCi/m3Concentration of gasin chamber

Must be rezeroed after 15 minutesof operation and once an hour thereafter. Sensitive to smoke and paint fumes. External battery pack is availablefor cold weather operations.

5-A- I

-“

TRITIUM DETECTION INSTRUMENTS (CONTINUED)

Instrument Capability S c a l e Indicator

Ic-T2/PAB(M) Tritium . 0 to 100,000 flCi/mJ3 ranges

Portable air monitor designed to detect gaseous radioactivity in ambient air. Alarm sounds at preset meter readings.

AN/ PDR-74 Tritium O to lOOK pCi/ m3

3 ranges

The portable RADIAC set contains an IM-246 light weight tritium air monitor to detect airborne radioactive gases.Also, the instrument is calibrated directly in terms of tritium activity but may also be used to detect other radiogasesor to monitor gamma radiation if appropriate calibration factors are applied to the meter reading. The instrumentis battery operated (D cells) and has an audible alarm when radioactivity exceeds a preset level.

ALPHA SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

Instrument Capability Type Scale Indicator

AN/ PDR-56 Alpha Scintillation O to 1,000K CPM/ 17 cmz4 ianges

A small auxiliary probe provided for monitoring irregular objects. Mylar probe face is extremely fragile and apuncture disables the instrument until repaired. Accompanying x-ray probe is calibrated for 17 KeV with associatedmeter scale from O-10 mg/ m2 in four ranges.

AN/ PDR-60 Alpha Scintillation O to 2,000K . CPM/ 60 cmz(PAC-ISAGA) G a m m a G-M tube 4 ranges R/ hr

Capable of measuring gamma utilizing the 2R range. Intermediate and high-range alpha survey; intermediate gammarange; weighs eight pounds. May use plutonium gamma detector (pG-l) for inclement weather. Mylar probe faceis delicate and puncture disables alpha monitor capability until repaired; gamma detector will continue to function.AN/ PDR-60 or PAC-IS has identical alpha capabilities but does not have the gamma detection capability.

PRM-5 Alpha Scintillation O to 500K CPM4 ranges

Portable, high and low-range instrument, for detecting alpha contamination through measurement of the associatedX-rays and low energy gamma radiation. This exercise is done with probes with separate ranges. PG-2 probe,10 to 100 KeV and FIDLER probe O to 100 Kev. Weighs 5.4 pounds. The FIDLER probe has significantly greatersensitivity than other probes. Very few units other than specialized Service and DoE teams possess the FIDLER.PRM-5 probes are effective in inclement weather and are much less subject to damage during field use than otheralpha meter probes.

5-A-2

ALPHA SURVEY INSTRUMENTS (CONTINUED)


Ludlum Alpha/ Beta/ Gamma Scintillation O to 400K cpmModel 3 G-M Tube O to 200mR/h mR/ h

Portable, high and low range analyzer for detecting alpha, beta and gamma emissions. The Model 3 is an electronicpackage similar in operation and function to the PDR-60 analyzer. Probe 43-5 detects alpha via scintillation, theprobe surface area is 50 cmz. Probe 44-6 (Hot Dog) uses a G-M tube to detect beta and gamma. Probe 44-9(Pancake Probe) detects low energy gamma, O to 200 mR/h.

Ludlum Alpha Scintillation O to 500K cpmModel 2220 4 ranges

The Model 2220 is an alpha detector electronics package that has a liquid crystal display and integral digital readout.The unit weighs 3.5 pounds and has an adjustable high voltage and adjustable lower level discrimination feature.

VIOLINIST II - HIVOLT-PREAMP FIDLER INSTRUMENT SET. This instrument set includes the FIDLER,high voltage power supply and preamplifier and the Violinist H. The Violinist 11 consists of a battery operated256 multi-channel analyzer and a preprogrammed microprocessor. This instrument set, when calibrated appropriately,measures and determines surface contamination levels of plutonium and amencum-241 in pCi/ m2.

RANGER. The instrument set includes the FIDLER/ Violinist 11 and a position determining system. The microwaveranging system uses a base station, fixed repeaters and mobile units. The mobile units transmit FIDLER radiationdata to the repeaters and base station. The microprocessor develops in near real time radiation readings, contaminationdensity, and isopleths. The microwave ranging system is limited to near line-of-sight. Dense vegetation, building,and hilly terrain may effect the ranging signal.

BETA/GAMMA SURVEY INSTRUMENTS


AN/ PDR-27 Measures gamma on Geiger-Muller o to 500 mR/hall scales. Detects beta 4 rangestwo lower scales.

Low range; weighs eight pounds; beta window on probe to detect beta, and suitable for personnel monitoring.May saturate and read zero in high-radiation fields (over 1,000 r/ hr).

AN/ PDR-43 Measures gamma. Geiger-Muller o to 500Detects beta on 3 rangesall scales.

High range; weighs 4.5 pounds, and will not saturate in high-radiation area.CO-60 may have inaccuracies greater than 20 percent.

IM-174/PD Gamma Integrating 0.1 to 10ion chamber o to 500

High range; weighs 3 pounds; logarithmic scale, and temperature sensitive.

Ludlum Gamma Scintillation O to 5 mrl hrModel 19

5-A-3

R/h

Readings in gamma fields other than

R/h

uR)h

DoD 51 OO.52-M

-’

APPENDIX 5-A. I

RADIATION DETECTION AND MEASUREMENT

(The Inference of Piutonium Contamination using the FIDLER)

5-A.1-1 OVERVIEW

. .a. Quantltattve measurements of radioactive contam-

ination m the field are extremely difficult. Particleshaving short ranges, such as alpha and low energy betaradiation, are significantly and incalculably affected byminute amounts of overburden, for example, dust orprecipitation. Therefore, detection rather than measure-ment is a more realistic goal for alpha-beta surveys. Morepenetrating radiations, such as gamma and higher energyx-rays, are effected less by such overburden; however,these elements require special attention to fieldcalibration techniques in order to convert meter readingsto contamination estimates.

b. Field survey of uranium is best accomplishedthrough measurement of x-rays in the 60-80 thousandelectron volt (keV) range emitted by uranium isotopesand daughters. For plutonium, the best technique is todetect the accompanying contaminant Am-24 1, whichemits a strong 60 keV gamma-ray. Knowing the originalassay and the age of the weapon, the ratio of plutoniumto americium can be calculated accurately and thus thetotal plutonium contamination determined.

c. Many of the factors which cannot be controlledin a field environment can be managed in a mobilelaboratory which can be brought to an accident/ incidentsite. Typically, the capabilities include gamma spectros-copy, low background counting for very thin alpha- andbeta-emitting samples and liquid scintillation countersfor extremely low energy beta emitters such as tritium.

5-A.1-2 GENERAL

a. Scope. This appendix provides detailed informa-tion from LLNL Report M-161 and Steven G. Hamann,references (o) and (p) on the instrumentation andassociated techniques used to perform radiologicalmonitoring at an incident/accident involving the releaseof radioactive material. This appendix is not intended

to serve as a “user’s manual” for the various instruments.However, it includes sufficient detail to provide anunderstanding of the limitations of field measurementtechniques and thus provides for proper application andthe use of techniques in case of an emergency. Forcompleteness, some elementary characteristics ofdifferent kinds of radiation are included. Throughoutthis appendix the word “radiation” will refer only tonuclear radiations found at a nuclear incident/accident.

b. Detection versus Measurement.

(1) Nuclear radiation cannot be detected easily.Thus, radiation detection is always a multi-step, highlyindirect process. For example, in a scintillation detector,incident radiation excites a floresc.ent material that de-excites by emitting photons of light. The light is focusedonto the photocathode of a photomultiplier tube thattriggers an electron avalanche. The electron showerproduces an electrical pulse which activates a meter readby the operator. Not surprisingly, the quantitativerelationship between the amount of radiation actuallyemitted and the reading on the meter is a complexfunction of many factors. Since control of those factorscan only be accomplished well within a laboratory, onlyin a laboratory setting can true measurements be made.

(2) On the other hand, detection is the qualitativedetermination that radioactivity is or is not present.Although the evaluation of minimum levels of detec-tability is a considerable quantitative challenge forinstrumentation engineers, the task of determiningwhether a meter records anything is considered mucheasier than the quantitative interpretation of thatreading.

(3) The above discussion suggests that the sameequipment can be used for either detection or measure-ment. In fact generally, detectors have meters from whichnumbers can be extracted. However, to the extent thatthe user is unable to control factors which influencethe readings, those readings must be recognized asindications of the presents of activity (detection) onlyand not measurements.

5-A. I-1

(4) In the discussions that follow, personnel mu~tbe aware of the limitations imposed by field conditionsand their implications on the meaning of readings taken.Therefore, instructions are careful to indicate the extentto which various instruments may be used as measure-ment devices or can be used only as detectors.

5-A.1-3 TYPES OF RADIATION

a. General. Four major forms of radiation arecommonly found emanating from radioactive matter:alpha, beta, gamma and x-radiation. The markeddifferences in the characteristics of these radiationsstrongly influence their difficulty in detection andconsequently the detection methods used.

b. Alpha. An alpha particle is the heaviest and mosthighly charged of the common nuclear radiations. Asa result, alpha particles very quickly give up their energyto any medium through which they pass, rapidly comingto equilibrium with and disappearing in the medium.Since nearly all common alpha radioactive contaminantsemit particles of approximately the same energy, 5million electron volt (MeV), some general statementscan be made about the penetration length of alpharadiation. Generally speaking, a sheet of paper, a thinlayer (a few hundredths of a millimeter) of dust, anycoating of water or less than four (4) centimeters ofair are sufficient to stop alpha radiation. As a result,alpha radiation is the most difficult to detect. Moreover,since even traces of such materials are sufficient to stopsome of the alpha particles and thus change detectorreadings, quantitative measurement of alpha radiationis impossible outside of a laboratory environment wherespecial care can be given to sample preparation anddetector efficiency.

c. Beta. Beta particles are energetic electrons emittedfrom the nuclei of many natural and man-madematerials. Being much lighter than alpha particles, betaparticles are much more penetrating. For example, a500 keV beta particle has a range in air that is ordersof magnitude longer than that of the alpha particle fromplutonium, even though the latter has ten times moreenergy. However, many beta-active elements emitparticles with very low energies. For example, tritiumemits a (maximum energy) 18.6 keV beta particle. Atthis low an energy, beta particles are less penetratingthan common alpha particles, requiring very specialtechniques for detection. (See Chapter 7).

d. Gamma and x-radiation. Gamma rays are a formof electromagnetic radiation and as such, are the mostpenetrating of the four radiations and easiest to detect.Once emitted, gamma rays differ from x-rays only intheir energies, with x-rays generally ly”ing below a few100 keV. As a result, x-rays are less penetrating andharder to detect. However, even a 60 keV gamma-rayhas a typical range of a hundred meters in air, and mightpenetrate a centimeter of aluminum. In situations inwhich several kinds of radiations are present, thesepenetration properties make x-ray/gamma ray detectionthe technique of choice.

e. Radiations from the Common Contaminants. Thefollowing table lists some of the commonly consideredradioactive contaminants and their p@nary associatedradiations.

TABLE 5-A.1-1. Commonly Considered RadioactiveContaminants and Their Primary Asso-ciated Radioactive Emissions

Alpha Beta Gamma X-rays

Ac-227Am-241Cd-109C-14

co-57CO-60H-3I- 125

I- 1291-131K-40Pa-23 1

Pm-147PO-21OPu-239Ra-224

Ra-226Ra-228Sr-90Th-228

Th-230Th-232U (nat.)U-235

U-228Y-90

xx

x

xxx

x

xx

xxx

x

xx xx

xx

x

xxx

xx xx

x

xxxx

x

x

xx

5-A. 1-2

.’

5-A.1-4 ALPHA DETECTION

a. Because of the extremely low penetration of alphaparticles, special techniques must be employed to allowthe particles to enter the active region of a detector.In the most common field instruments (AN/ PDR-56and -60), an extremely thin piece of aluminized mylarfilm is used on the face of the detector probe to covera thin layer of fluorescent material. Energy attenuationof the incident alpha radiation by the mylar is estimatedto be less than ten (10) percent. However, use of thisfilm makes the detector extremely fragile. Thus, contactwith literally any hard object, such as a blade of hardgrass, can puncture the film allowing ambient light toenter the detection region and overwhelm the photo-multiplier and meter. (Even sudden temperature changeshave been shown to introduce stresses that can destroya film). In addition, contact with a contaminated itemcould transfer contamination onto the detector. Thus,monitoring techniques must be used which keep thedetector from contacting any surface. However, recallthat the range of the alpha radiation is less than four(4) centimeters in air. This requirement to be withina few centimeters of monitored locations without evertouching one makes use of such detectors impracticalexcept for special, controlled situations (for example,monitoring of individuals at the hotline or air samplerfilters).

b. As discussed above, the sensitivity (minimumdetectability) of an alpha detector is not dictated bythe ability of the active region of the detector to respondto the passage of an alpha particle; counting efficiencyfor alpha detectors is 25-60 percent of the alpha particlesfrom a distributed source that reach the detector probe.Fortunately, -alpha detectors” in good repair normallyhave a fairly low background: there are few counts fromcosmic and other spurious radiation sources and theelimination of most electronic noise is easy with currentstate-of-the-art instruments. As a result, count rates inthe order of a few hundred counts per minute are easilydetectable on instruments such as the AN/ PDR-60.However, the detectability is dominated by the abilityof the alpha particles to get into the active region ofthe detector, which depends upon such factors asoverburden (amount of dust and/or moisture lyingbetween the alpha emitters and the detector), and theproximity of the detector to the emitters.

c. In demonstrations conducted in the laboratory, asealed alpha source (Am-24 1) was monitored with a wellmaintained AN/ PDR-60 alpha probe and meter. Dustand water were sprinkled onto the source and changes

noted. It was found that a drop of water, a heavy pieceof lint or a single thickness of tissue paper totallyeliminated all readings. A light spray of water,comparable to a light dew, reduced readings by 40-50percent. A layer of dust that was just visible on theshiny source had minimal effect on the count rate;however, a dust level that was only thick enough toshow finger tracks reduced readings by 25 percent. Thesesimple demonstrations reinforced the knowledge thatdetection of alpha particles in any but the most idealsituations is most problematical. The leaching or settlingof contaminants into a grassy area or the dust stirredup by vehicular traffic on paved areas will significantlydecrease or eliminate alpha detection.

5-A.1-5 BETA/GAMMA DET~CTION

a. Gamma rays and high energy (>1 MeV) betaparticles are highly penetrating radiations. As a result,the major problems listed for alpha detection do notapply. Furthermore, at the energies of concern in nuclearweapon accidents/ incidents, detection efficiency formost detectors is relatively high. Thus, beta/gammadetection is relatively easy.

b. From a detection standpoint, unfortunately, highenergy beta and gamma radiation are not produced inthe most likely radioactive contaminants (for example,Plutonium, Uranium or Tritium). Rather, the majorpotential source of beta/gamma emitters is from fissionproduct radioelements which could be produced in theextremely unlikely event of a partial nuclear yield. Beta/gamma detection, therefore, has no quantitative use indetermining the extent of plutonium or uraniumcontamination, but is used as a safety precaution todetermine any areas containing hazardous fissionproducts.

c. Common gamma detectors are scintillationdetectors (using scintillation media different from thatdescribed above for alpha detection) or gas ionizationtype detectors (ion chambers, proportional counters orGeiger counters). In either case, the high penetrabilityof the radiation allows the detector to have reasonablyheavy aluminum, beryllium or plastic windows and tobe carried at a 0.5-1 .Om height. Dimensions of the activeregion of the detector (for example, the thickness ofa scintillation crystal) can be made larger to increasesensitivity. Because the detection efficiencies arereasonably insensitive to energies in the energy regionsof interest, the detectors can be calibrated in terms ofdosage (rads or rem), rather than in terms of activity:

5-A.1-3

-’

this practice reflects the common use for beta/ gammadetectors

d. Typical of a beta/gamma detector is the LudlumModel 3 with a Ludlum 44-9 “pancake” (Geiger-Muller)probe. Minimum detectability for such a detector is aradiation field that produces readings two to three timesgreater than the background (no-contaminant, naturalradiation plus electronic noise) reading. Customarily,this corresponds to a few hundredths of a millirem perhour.

5-A.1-6 X-RAY DETECTION

a. For low energy (17-100 keV) x-rays, the scintillationdetector is again the instrument of choice. Windowthickness is again a factor, though not as much as withalpha particles. For example, the half-thickness forabsorption of 17 keV x-rays in aluminum is 0.4 mmand in air is about four meters. These factors increaserapidly with energy. For 60 keV x-rays, the distancesbecome 2.5 cm and 190 m respectively. Thus, for x-rays above 15 keV, an x-ray detector can be held ata comfortable height (0.5 m) above the contaminatedsurface.

b. The size of an electronic pulse produced by anx-ray in a scintillation-type detector is proportional tothe energy of the x-ray. This has a most importantapplication, commonly called pulse-height discrimina-tion. Because of the relatively low (10s of keV) energyof the x-rays of interest, an x-ray detector and itselectronics must be quite sensitive. Unfortunately, sucha detector is sensitive also to the myriad of radiationsfrom natural sources and to common low-level electronic

Figure 5-A.1-1:

noise. The result is a deluge of signals that overwhelmthe pulses from sought-after x-rays. To remove theunwanted signals, circuitry is installed in the meter toignore all pulses whose size lies below a user-selectablelower level (threshold). In cases of high (natural)background, it is also useful to discard all pulses whosesize is greater than a user-selectable upper level. Theaccepted pulses, therefore, are only those from thedesired x-rays and that small amount of backgroundthat happens to fall in the same pulse-size region.

c. Unfortunately, pulse-height discrimination is notas “easy” as described above. In fact, the signals fromthe detection of identical x-rays will not be identicalin size; rather, a large number of such detections willproduce a distribution of pulse sizes which cluster abouta mean pulse size. If one sets the lower-level discriminate orslightly below and the upper level slightly above themean pulse size, “a large fraction of the desired pulseswill be eliminated, resulting in a significant decrease indetector response. However, setting the discriminatorlevels far from the mean will admit too muchbackground, thereby masking the true signals. See Figure5-A. 1-1. Thus, the setting of discriminator levels requiresa qualitative judgment which can significantly affect thereadings from a given contamination. Furthermore, sincethe width of the pulse size distribution depends in amost complicated way upon the condition and age ofthe detector, it is impossible to specify one setting forall similar instruments. Rather, techniques have beendeveloped to establish the sensitivity of a given detector,with its electronics, in a field environment. Thistechnique is described in the following section.

d. In spite of the above complications, the scintillationdetector remains the instrument of choice for detection

Photo Peak

}

‘Typical~Discriminator

Senings

Spectral Plot (Showing Normal Spread Of Pulses From A Mono-energetic Source Mixed With A Typical Background Spectrumand Indicating Typical Discriminator Settings).

5-A.14

-“

of x-ray emitting radioactive contamination. One suchdetector is !he Field Instrument for Detection of LowEnergy Radiation (FIDLER). A FIDLER (4*x1 mm.NaI (Tl)) probe, in good condition, mated to a Ludlum2220 electronics package, can detect 60 keV activity aslow as 0.2 microcuries per meter. In a typical weapon-grade mix for a medium-aged weapon, this mix wouldcorrespond to about one microcurie of plutonium persquare meter. Furthermore, since the x-rays are muchless affected by overburden than are alpha particles, theradiation monitor has much better control of the factorswhich influence his meter readings. As a result, themonitor can make quantitative measurements of theamount of radiation, and infer the actual amount ofcontamination, with far greater confidence than withany other field technique.

5-A.1-7 DETECTION OF URANIUMAND PLUTONIUM

a. Although uranium and plutonium are alphaemitters, they and their daughters also emit x-radiation.Therefore, as discussed above, the instrument of choicefor detection of these elements is a scintillation detector.

b. The detection of uranium contamination is fairlystraightforward. Among the radiations emitted in thedecay of Uranium-235 and its daughters is an 80 keVx-ray. Set-up and field calibration of the detector asdescribed in this chapter allows measurement of the x-rayactivity per square meter and thus evaluation of theuranium contamination. Confidence in the accuracy ofthese measurements is in the p/ -25 percent range.

c. The detection of plutonium is somewhat morecomplicated. Plutonium-239 and its daughters emit a17 keV x-ray which can be detected with a FIDLERdetector. However, absorption of that relatively lowenergy x-ray by overburden plus interference bybackground signals in the same range as the desiredx-ray make measurement of the 17 keV a highly uncertaintechnique. The determination of plutonium contam-ination can be made more confidently through thefollowing, indirect technique.

(1) Weapons grade plutonium contains severalisotopes: in addition to the dominant Pu-239, there isalways a trace amount of Pu-241. Pu-241 beta decays,with a half-life of 14.35 years, to Am-241. Am-241subsequently decays with the emission of a 60-keV x-raywhich, like the 80 keV x-ray of uranium, is relativelyeasy to detect under field conditions. Thus, a mostsensitive technique for the detection of weapons gradeplutonium is to detect the contaminant Am-241 and inferthe accompanying plutonium.

(2) Clearly, this technique requires more informa-tion than the direct detection of radiation from the mostplentiful isotope, such as knowledge of the age andoriginal assay of the weapon material. However, decaytimes, weapon age and assay-are known or controllablequantities, whereas overburden and its effect on alphaand low energy x-radiation are not. Thus, the safeguardscommunity has standardized upon the detection ofplutonium via its americium daughter.

d. To facilitate the calculations and calibration neededto measure plutonium contamination by x-ray detectionin the field, the Lawrence Livermore National Labor-atory has produced a series of utility codes called theHOT SPOT Codes.1 Available for IBM-compatiblecomputers, as well as the HP-41 calculator systems, theHOT SPOT Codes include an interactive, user-friendlyutility routine called FIDLER which steps a user throughthe process of calibrating an x-ray detector (the FieldInstrument for Detection of Low Energy Radiation),the FIDLER code is applicable to any x-ray detectorif the full calibration technique, involving a knownamericium calibration source, is used.

e. Particularly useful in the FIDLER code is theprovision to aid in the measurement of the geometricfactor for any specific detector. Measurements made atthe Ballistic Research Laboratory arid the LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory have shown that thevalue of K(h) for h = 30cm can vary from less than0.4 m2 to over 1.0 m2, apparently depending uponexternal configuration and subtle internal details of aparticular FIDLER probe. For this reason, the FIDLERcode contains both a detailed laboratory procedure anda field-expedient procedure for determining K(h) for agiven detector. The code provides also a default valueof 0.5 m2. This value was chosen to give a relativelyconservative reading indication of contamination percount rate.

lSteven G. Homann, HOT SJ?3T Health Physics Codes, Lawrence Lkermore Laboratory Report M-161 (April 1985).2Steven G. Homann, Hazard Control Department, Lawremx Ltvermore National Laboratory, private communication.

5-A. 1-5

-“

5-A.1-8 LABORATORY TECHNIQUES

As discussed above, laboratory procedures are necessaryto make quantitative measurements of radiationcontamination. For this reason, mobile laboratories areavailable within DoD and DoE for deployment to anaccident site. Although specific instrumentation willvary, the types of laboratory analyses fall into threecategories: gamma and x-ray spectroscopy, alpha-betacounting, and liquid scintillation.

a. Gamma and X-ray Spectroscopy. The major toolsinvolved in gamma and x-ray spectroscopy are areasonably high resolution gamma/ x-ray detector (suchas a GeLi or selectively high resolution NaI) and a multi-channel analyzer. With this equipment, it is possible toaccurately determine the energies of the gamma and x-radiation emitted by a contaminated sample. Generally,spectroscopic techniques are not used for absolutemeasurements of amount of contamination (for example,microcuries) in a sample. However, by adjusting for theenergy dependence of detection efficiencies and usingstandard spectral unfolding techniques, the relativeamounts of various isotopes present in the contaminantmay be determined accurately. Recalling the discussionsin the preceding sections, immediate application can beseen for such information: For example, spectroscopyallows determination of the relative abundance of Am-241 to Pu-239, resulting in accurate calibration of themost sensitive (FIDLER) survey techniques.

b. Alpha-Beta Counting.

(1) Another laboratory technique, alpha-betacounting, results in a reasonably accurate determinationof the absolute amount of contamination in a sample.Two types of counters are common and both are fairlysimple in principle. In one, a reasonably sensitive alpha-beta detector, such as a thin layer of ZnS mated toa photomultiplier tube, is mounted in a chamber thatis shielded to remove background radiation. A sample,made very thin to minimize self-absorption, is insertedinto the chamber under the detector. In some apparatus,air is evacuated from the chamber to eliminate airabsorption of the radiation. The count rate is thenmeasured. Knowing the geometry of the experiment

permits translating the count rate to an absoluteevaluation of sample activity.

(2) Another alpha-beta technique involves gas-floyproportional counters. In these devices, a sample isinserted ‘into the chamber of a proportional counter.Any emitted radiation causes ionization of the gas inthe counter which is electronically amplified andcounted.

(3) In both types of alpha-beta counter, the mostdifficult, sensitive part of the experiment is the samplepreparation. To achieve absolute measurements ofactivity, absorption of the radiation must be minimizedby the overburden caused by the sample itself.Techniques used include dissolution of the sample ontoa sample holder; evaporation of the solvent leaves avery thin, negligibly absorbing sample. Clearly,quantitative alpha-beta counting is a difficult, time-consuming process.

c. Liquid Scintillation.

(1) In a few cases, notably in the detection of betaradiation from tritium, the energy of the radiation isso low - and the resultant absorption is so high - thatsolid samples cannot be used for quantitative analysis.In these cases, dissolving the contaminant in ascintillating liquid may be possible. Glass vials of suchliquid can then be placed in a dark chamber and theresulting scintillation light pulses counted usingphotomultipliers.

(2) Again, the outstanding difficulty with thisprocess is in the sample preparation. Scintillation liquidsare extremely sensitive to most impurities which tendto quench the output of light pulses. As a result, themost common technique for liquid scintillation samplegathering is to wipe a fixed area (typically 100 squarecentimeters) of a hard surface in the contaminated areawith a small piece of cloth. The cloth can then beimmersed totally in scintillation liquid in such a waythat subsequent light emission will be visible to one ofthe photomultipliers in the analysis chamber. Alter-natively, the cloth can be replaced by a special plasticmaterial that dissoIves in scintillation liquid withoutsignificantly quenching light output. In either case, thetechnique works best when the contamination can begathered without large amounts of local dirt, oil, etc.

5-A. 1-6

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 5-B

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING

5-B-1 GENERAL

The collection and analysis of samples providesnumerical data which describes a particular situation.The JHEC will provide direction for sampling proce-dures. The sampling criteria will be situation and sitedependent. The results then may be used for the formu-lation of a course of action. This appendix addressesair, soil, vegetation, water, and swipe sampies.

a, Air Sampling. Air sampling is conducted todetermine if airborne contamination is present. Itprovides a basis for estimating the radiation dose whichpeople without respiratory protection may have received.The time required to respond to an accident and initiatean air sampling program will result normally in littleor no data being obtained during the initial release ofcontamination when the highest levels of airbornecontamination are expected. Most air sampling dataobtained during an accident response will reflect airbornecontamination caused by resuspension. Even though thisdiscussion is directed primarily at airborne contamina-tion caused by resuspension, the recommended prioritiesand procedures will permit as much information aspossible to be collected on the initial release if airsamplers are positioned soon enough. Priority should,therefore, be given to initiation of an air samplingprogram as soon as possible after arrival on-scene.Whether or not data is obtained on the initial release,air sampling data will be needed immediately to assessthe hazard to people still in the area, to identify areasand operations which require respiratory protection andto identify actions required to fix the contaminant toreduce the airborne hazard and spread of contamination.When using filtration to collect particulate samples, theselection of filter medium is extremely important. Thefilter used must have a high collection efficiency forparticle sizes that will deposit readily in the lung (5microns or less).

b, Response plans should include provisions forestablishing an air sampling program. This plan wouldinclude sufficient air monitors (battery powered or asufficient number of portable electric generators), airmonitor stands, filter paper, personnel to deploy

samplers and collect filters, analysis capability and amethod to mark and secure the area monitors againsttampering. Also important is a means to ensure thatair samplers are properly calibrated (see Table 5-B-l).Staplex air samplers use the CKHV calibrator for 4“filter and CKHV-81O calibrator for the 8“ x 10” filters.Normally, 1000 CFM of air must be sampled for accurateresults. x-

Table 5-B-1. Air Sample Calibration

OperationFilter Type Cal.Kit Flow Rate Time

4“ TFA #41 CKHV 18 CFM 55 min4“ TFA #21 33 CKHV 36 CFM 28 min49, TFA “S33 CKHV 70 CFM 15 min8“ X 10” TFA-81O CKHV-81O 50 CFM 20 min

5-B-2 AIR SAMPLING TIME

The period of time over which an air sample is collecteddetermines the volume of air sampled. Variables whichaffect the accuracy of air sampling results include thetype of sampling equipment used, the accuracy withwhich contaminants on the filter can be measured, andthe size of the sample. The sum of the errors can beoffset, in part, by increasing the total volume of thesample collected. Increasing sample time presents no realdifficulty when the interest is in long-term averageconcentrations, precision of results, or in detection ofvery low levels of contamination, as will be the caseduring decontamination and restoration operations.During the initial response, when the interest is in rapidevaluation of air contamination to identify areas wherehigh concentrations of airborne contamination couldpose a hazard to unprotected persons in relatively shortperiods of time, short sampling times are appropriate.When taking samples for rapid evaluation, samplersshould be operated long enough to sample a minimumof 1000 cubic feet of air. Once that data required forprompt evaluation is obtained, an air sampling programshould be established(equipment permitting),regular basis.

toor

obtain 24 hour sampleshigh volume samples on a

5-B-1

5-B-3 AIR SAMPLER PLACEMENT,

Sampler positioning is directed toward the first 24-48hours following an accident, or until an air samplingprogram tailored to the specific situation can beimplemented. During this period the number of airsamplers available will be limited, and should be placedto obtain the maximum amount of information possible.

a. The amount of airborne contamination caused byresuspension will vary from location to location as afunction of surface type, physical activity, surface windpatterns, and the level of contamination on the ground.Recommendations on the initial placement of samplersassume that the mix of surface t ypes is relatively constantthroughout the area, that air samplers will be placedto minimize any localized wind effects, and that thelocation of physical activity in the area (for example,response actions or evacuation) will be known andcontrolled. The main variables in determining theamount of airborne contamination will be groundcontamination levels and wind speed. To provide thequickest and most accurate estimate of the maximumconcentrations of airborne contamination, priorityshould therefore be given to placing an air sampler at,

or near, the most highly contaminated area which isaccessible.

b. Figure 5-B-1 shows the recommended placementof air samplers. The sampler number indicates thepriority which should be given to placement. All airsampling locations should “be marked with a uniquenumber or symbol on a stake, so that data may becorrelated with other information in the following days.During the initial response, sampler No. 1 is placeddownwind from the accident site to determine the hazardin the immediate area of the accident and should operatecontinuously. The distance should be modified in adownwind direction if necessary to permit access by aclear path for placement and periodic readings and f,herchanges. The time of readings and/or filter changesshould be coordinated with EOD personnel. Air SamplerPlacement sampler No. 2 is placed downwind from theaccident at a distance dependent upon the wind velocity,see Table 5-B-2. Modifications to this location shouldbe considered based on accessibility, the location ofnearby populated areas and microclimatology. Down-wind samplers should be operated until it can bedetermined that no airborne contamination exists at theirlocations, and that actions taken upwind of the location

u Command Post

&‘3

/

+$’

&

(Background)

4:

0 (ContaminationControl Station)

%

.

b:,

@

. . < . _

1

&’

(Contamination)

2

(Downwind Hazard)

Figure 5-B-1. Air Sampler Placement.

5-B-2

.’

Table 5-B-2. Air Sample Placement (No. 2)

Approximate DownwindWind Speed Distance

(MPH) (Knots) (Meters) (Feet)

6-10 4-9 1,000 3,30011-IS 10-13 1,500 5,10016-20 14-17 2,000 6,600

Above 20 Above 17 2,500 8,200

or changes in meteorological conditions will not resultin airborne contamination. Sampler No. 3 is placedapproximately 610 meters upwind of all contaminationand outside the contamination control area to obtainsimultaneous background air samples for use ininterpretation of other readings. Background samplesshould be collected concurrently with the sample ofinterest, if possible, as the amount of naturally occurringairborne radioactive particulate may vary as a functionof time due to wind changes. Air sampler No. 4 is placedat the contamination control station and operatedcontinuously during contamination control stationoperations since personnel leaving the contaminated areamay carry and resuspend contaminants. The amountof contamination resuspended in this manner is expectedto be small. During the initial phases of response,consideration should be given to using all additionalsamplers, if available, in downwind locations tosupplement sampler No. 2, particularly when populatedareas are in, or near, the contaminated area.

5-B-4 AIR SAMPLE DATA RECORDING

For air sampling data used in the overall radiologicalassessment and confirmation of field calculations, andconfirmed or validated later by laboratory analysis, allpertinent data must be recorded. An air sampling logcontaining all of the folIowing data should bemaintained. When falters are changed, they should beplaced in a plastic bag for laboratory analysis andannotated with items a - f.

a.

b.field

Type and serial number of sampler.

Location of sampler, including ident~lcation ofmarking (stake) used to mark location.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g

h.

Average flow rate and/ or volume of air.

Date.

Start and stop time of sample.

Wind direction and weather conditions.

Type of filter.

Field readings on filter and time made, particularlyif readings were taken without changing falter. Includingradiation detection instrument type and serial numberas well as designation of attached probe used to monitorthe filter. - -

i. Laboratory facility to which the filter was sent forprocessing..

5-B-5 AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS

Air sampler filters can be analyzed using radioanalyticaltechniques by DoE, RADCON, and AFRAT personnelor by using a calculation method. The calculations shownbelow are for field use in calculating gross activity onthe filter. Any background radiation from naturallyoccurring radionuclides (for example, radon, thoron,and their daughters) should be subtracted when applyingthe calculated results to protection standards. Thiscalculation is done by subtracting the gross activity ofthe background sampler (No. 3) from the gross activityof the sampler of interest when making rapid evaluations.Background corrected, results may also be obtained byletting the naturally occurring radon, thoron, and theirdaughters decay to background. The radon chain maybe considered completely decayed after almost fourhours, and the thoron chain after almost three days.Re-measurement after these times permits identificationof the amount of sample activity caused by theseelements. During rapid field calculations early in theresponse, the check for radon is appropriate if, or when,levels of airborne contamination detected are at orslightly above the established levels. The three-day decaytime precludes checking for thoron during the initialresponse.

a. The following equation may be used for initial fieldevaluation of air sampling data to obtain rough estimatesof airborne contamination utilizing the AN/ PDR-60 orAN/ PDR-56 (with the large probe attached)10 inch or 4-inch (round) Whatman #41 filters.

and 8 x

5-B-3

dpm/m3 =

where cpm =

A F R =

T=

CF =

cpm x CF — BackgroundAFR x T (rein) Reading

alpha meter reading on air filter incounts per minuteAverage Flow Rate of the air samplerin cubic feet per minuteTime in minutes the air sampler wasrunningConversion factor (1000 for AN/PDR-60, 4000 for AN/ PDR-56)includes unit conversions, area cor-rection factors, and other constants,assuming use of 8 x 10 inch Whatman#41 filter paper. For 4-inch, (round)filter paper, the conversion factors are200 and 800 for the AN/ PDR-60 andAN/ PDR-56 respectively.

b. If other alpha instruments or filters are being usedthe following equation should be used for field evaluationof air sampling data.

dpm/ mj =

where cpm =

A~ =

Ac =

F =

Ef =

m3 =

Ec =

cpm x Af

0.5xm3x FxEfx Ecx A~

alpha meter reading on air filter incounts per minuteArea of filter used (any units)Area of filter actually counted by theinstrument (same units as Af)Alpha absorption factor for filterused (from manufacturer’sspecifications)Collection efficiency of filter used(from manufacturer’s specifications)Total volume of sampled air in cubicmetersEfficiency of counting instrument

5-B-6 ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES

a. Soil. Soil sampling procedures depend on thepurpose of the sampling program. In all cases, carefulselection of control (background) samples is requiredto allow interpretation of results. The followingminimum quantities are necessary for analysis:

(1) Gamma spectrometry plus gross alpha and/orgross beta—two kilograms of soil (approximately onesquare foot area three inches deep).

(2) Gross alpha and/ or gross beta only—100 grams.(3) For a specific alpha and/or beta radionuclide,

particularly Pu-239 (plutonium) —consult the approp-riate Service laboratory.

b. Water. < -

(1) Surface and/ or waste discharge sources-twoliters.

(2) Drinking water sources—one liter.

c. Vegetation. The minimum sample volume is threeliters of densely packed sample and should be doubleplastic bagged or packed in a one-gallon wide-mouthplastic jar.

d. Swipes. Filter paper discs are used for taking swipetests. Whatman No. 41 filter paper, 4.25 cm, FSN 6640-00-836-6870, is recommended for swipes. If this isunavailable, other filter paper with a maximum diameterof 1 3/4 inches may be substituted. Place a small “x”IN PENCIL ONLY on the outer edge of the filter paperon the side which is to touch the radioactive sourceor area being tested for contamination. Each swipeshould be taken from an area of about 100 cm2 by gentlyrubbing two or three times with the dry filter paperdisc. The swipe is then placed, unfolded, in a properlycompleted Service form for a Swipe Container. If formsare unavailable, a plain envelope containing the requiredcollection information may be substituted.

5-B-4

DoD 51 OO.52-M

.

APPENDIX 5-C

SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING,

RADIAC REPAIR, AND HAZARD

ASSESSMENT/CAPABILITIES TEAMS

5-C-1 GENERAL

a. This appendix provides information on serviceradiation monitoring teams (health physics and bioassayspecialists, a radiation equipment repair team) and onDoE and related monitoring and assessment capabilities.

b. The detection/measurement of different types ofradiation and the inherent difficulties have beenenumerated. However, in the event of an incident/accident, radiation detection/ measurement must becompleted. The need or preliminary data on the absencelpresence of radiation for the OSC is imperative. Manymilitary units and some civilian firms/ agencies possessalpha and gamma detection capabilities. These units/firms have equipment and individual monitor capabil-ities that can provide radiation measurements andpreliminary survey data. However, a finite defiriition ofthe accident area is needed to plan, initiate, and completesite restoration.

c. The rad-iological characterization of the accidentsite is an iterative process involving the systematicintegration of data produced by several assessmenttechniques. The following describes those resourcesavailable to enable theoretical, preliminary, anddefinitive site characterization for the OSC.

5-C-2 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

a. U.S. Army Radiological Control (RADCON)Team. The RADCON Team is a specialized team locatedat Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and organizedto provide technical assistance and advice to the OSCin radiological emergencies.

(1) The RADCON Team is organized to:

(a) Perform detailed radiological surveys foralpha, beta, and gamma radiatio+, .

(b) Control and supervise waste disposalmeasures.

(c) Provide health physics services.(d) Control and supervise radiological safety

services.(e) Supervise and provide technical advice for

decontamination operations.(f) Supervise and provide technical advice for the

control and containment of the radiological contami-nation at an accident site.

(2) The RADCON Team will consist as a minimumof a team leader, a qualified health physicist, and eightspecialists qualified in air sampling and in monitoringfor alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. All team membershave a minimum security clearance of Secret and areauthorized access to Restricted Data and CriticalNuclear Weapons Design Information.

(3) Requests for additional information shouid bedirected to RADCON personnel. Radiological Controlteam aw.istance may be requested through the ArmyOperations Center or the JNACC.

b. U.S. Air Force Occupational and EnvironmentalHealth Laboratory (OEHL). The Occupation andEnvironmental Health Laboratory, Brooks AFB, Texas,78235, provides many radiation protection services asfollows:

(1) Conducts calibration, traceable to the NationalInstitute of Standards and Technology, and minor repairservices for portable instruments used and owned bythe USAF Medical Service for. the detection andmeasurement of electromagnetic and ionizing radiation.

(2) Maintains the USAF stock of low energy photonfield survey instruments with trained operators tosupport disaster operations.

5-c-1

(3) Deploys a field-qualified team of healt~physicists, health physics technicians, and equipmentcalled the AFRAT. This team is capable of respondingworldwide to radiation accidents with air transportableequipment for detecting, identifying, and quantifying anytype of radiation hazard; radioisotope analysis ofselected environmental, biological, and manufacturedmaterials; and on-site equipment maintenance andcalibration.

(4) Conducts special projects dealing with long andshort term evaluations of radiation exposures.

(5) Request for additional information should bedirected to OEHL personnel. OEHL services may berequested through the Air Force Operations Center orthe JNACC,

c. U.S. Air Force Air Transportable RADIACPackage (ATRAP). The Air Transportable RADIACPackage is located at Kelly AFB, Texas. It is a collectionof RADIAC equipment, spare parts, and trainedinstrument repair technicians maintained in an alertstatus by the Air Force Logistics Command for airliftto the scene of a nuclear accident or radiological incident.The Air Transportable RADIAC Package is able tosupport forces responding to an accident or incidentby providing spare RADIAC sets and an on-scene repairshop for instruments used in radiological surveys. TheATRAP team is prepared to repair, calibrate and issueRADIAC instruments to radiation survey teams at thescene of the accident on a twenty-four hours, seven daysa week basis.

(1) The OSC will coordinate support for theATRAP and accompanying technicians.

(2) The ATRAP will maintain in a ready status fordeployment to the scene of a nuclear accident/radiological emergency within four hours after notifi-cation by the Air Force Operations Center. The ATRAPwill move over the road to sites within 150 miles ofKelly AFB, Texas. Beyond three hours driving time,the ATRAP will be airlifted by Military AirliftCommand. For accident sites on inaccessible terrain orin water, ATRAP units will be moved by helicopter orby water/ sealift means.

(3) Requests for additional information should bedirected to ATRAP personnel. ATRAP services may berequested through the Air Force Operations Center orthe JNACC. Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 1-G.

d. U.S. Navy RADCON Team. The Navy RADCONTeam provides health physics assistance to the OSC oractivity commander in the event of a nuclear weaponsaccident. The Navy RADCON Team is located at the

Naval Sea Systems Command Detachment, Radiolog-ical Affairs Support Office (NAVSEADET RASO),Yorktown Virginia.

(1) The Navy RA,DCON Team canfollowing capabilities:”

(a) Field survey and laboratoryalpha, beta and gamma radiation emitters.

(b) Environmental sample analysis,(c) Limited bioassay analysis.

provide the

analysis for “

(d) RADCON and radiation health expertise tothe OSC.

(e) Reference library.(f) Air deployable assets.(g) personnel dosimetry su~p.ort, limited

RADIAC repair, and Hot Line management.

(2) Request for additional information should beforwarded to the Director, Radiological ControlsProgram Office (SEA-06GN), Naval Sea SystemsCommand.

5-C-3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE)

Services of DoE capabilities will be requested by theDoE Team Leader, but requests may be made alsothrough JNACC if the DoE Team Leader is not on-scene.

a. HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes.

(1) The HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes weredeveloped for the Department of Energy’s AccidentResponse Group (DoE ARG) to provide a quick initialassessment of accidents involving radioactive materials.These codes are run on the Hewlett-Packard HP-41family of hand-held computers to allow for easy “field”use. Also, the codes are available in an IBM-PCcompatible version. At present, 13 separate programsexist, ranging from general programs for downwindassessment following the release of radioactive materialto more specific programs dealing with the release ofplutonium, uranium, or tritium to programs thatestimate the dose commitment from the inhalation ofvarious radionuclides.

(2) The HOT SPOT computer programs werecreated to provide Health Physics personnel with a fast,field-portable calculational aid for evaluating accidentsinvolving radioactive materials. These codes provide afirst-order approximation of the radiation effectsassociated with the atmospheric release of radionuclides

within minutes of data input. Although significant errorsare possible, the HOT SPOT programs will provide a

reasonable level of accuracy for a timely initialassessment. More importantly, the HOT SPOT codeswill produce a consistent output for the same inputassumptions, thus minimizing the potential errorsassociated with reading a graph incorrectly or scalinga universal nomogram during an emergency situation.

(3) The HOT SPOT Health Physics Codes oper-ating instructions and information are contained inLawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)Manual 161, reference (o). The manual is designed forusers of the codes and therefore does not contain detaileddescriptions of algorithms used in the codes; however,Key assumptions (for example, particle-size distributionand release fraction) are noted as appropriate.

(4) Table 5-C-1 is a summary of the programscontained in reference (o). Several programs deal withthe release of plutonium, uranium, and tritium, toexpedite the initial assessment of accidents involvingnuclear weapons. Three general programs: PLUME,EXPLUME, and RESUS—allow for downwind doseassessment following the release of any radioactive

material as a result of the continuous or puff release,explosive release, or an area contamination event. Thesethree programs interact with a data-base containing 75radionuclides selected from ICRP Publication 30. Thesource term can contain any or all of the radionuclidesin the database, each with its independent releasefraction, activity, and mitigation factor, if applicable.Should a desired radionuclide not reside in the database,a dose-conversion factor can be input by the user. Otherprograms estimate the dose commitment from inhalationof any one of the radionuclides listed in the databaseand estimate the effects of a surface-burst detonationof a nuclear weapon.

(5) The dosimetric methods of ICRP have been usedthroughout the HOT SPOT programs. Individual organdose values (unweighed) are produced, along with thecommitted dose equivalent (weighted, equivalent whole-body dose commitment). Programs involving theatmospheric transport of radionuclides employ aGaussian plume-dispersal model. Initial radionuclidedistribution is modeled using virtual source terms asneeded, for example, modeling the initial distributionassociated with an explosive release or area.

PUEXP

PUFIRE

PURES

FIDLER

TRIT

UFIRE

LUNG

BOMB

RADWORK

PLUME

EXPLUM”E

RESUS

DOSE

TABLE 5-C-1. Programs Contained in the HOT SPOT Physics CodesProgram Name Description

Downwind dose commitment and ground deposition estimates resulting from an explosive release of plutonium.

Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a fire involving plutonium.

Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from the resuspension of plutonium.

FJDLER calibration and data reduction. Also contains a subroutine for the determination of radionuclideweight fractions as a function of mix age.

Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a tritium release.

Downwind dose commitment estimates resulting from a fire involving natural uranium of any enrichment of235U.

Lung screening for plutonium using a FIDLER detector.

Effects of a surface-burst fission weapon.

Determination of recommended workplaces for the handling of radioactive materials.

General Gaussian plume dispersion model, using ICRP-30 Library.

General explosive release dispersion model, using ICRP-30 Library.

General resuspension model, using ICRP-30 Library.

Inhalation dose commitment, using ICRP-30 Library.

Resuspension Source Term. Owing to the large uncertainties associa~ed with the source terms and diffusion coefficients, additionalfine tuning of the model with plume-rise algorithms and similar modifications was deemed unwarranted.

5-c-3

b. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability(ARAC). ARAC is a DoE and DoD resource, directedby the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, thatprovides support to emergency response teams duringaccidents involving radioactive materials.

(1) ARAC provides the user with computer modelestimates of the contamination distribution resultingfrom a nuclear weapon accident. ARAC products includecomputer generated estimates of the location andcontamination levels of deposited radiological materialand radiation dose to exposed population in thesurrounding areas. Until time and equipment permitcompletion of extensive radiation surveys and bioassays,ARAC projections will assist in assessing the potentialimpact of an accident and in identifying areas for initialinvestigation by response force radiological teams.

(2) In the event of a nuclear weapon accident ator near an ARAC-serviced facility, the ARAC Centerwill be alerted by the facilit y’s personnel using the ARACsite system computer located at the installation,immediately after the initial report to the NMCC iscompleted. If the accident occurred in a CONUS area,remote from an ARAC serviced DoD installation,notification of ARAC will come through the NMCC’SJNAIR Team. However, ARAC should be contacteddirectly by the installation initiating the OPREP-3 reportto NMCC, by calling ARAC’S EMERGENCY number:commercial (41 5) 422-9100, FTS 532-9100, or throughAUTOVON by asking the Albuquerque operator for theLivermore tie line extension 2-9100. At this time ARACcan’t support OCONUS facilities in the same manneras CONUS facilities.

(3) During normal working hours (currently 0730to 1615 Pacific Tirne)l- initial estimates of the extent ofcontamination can be ready for transmission fromARAC approximately 30 minutes after ARAC hasreceived notification of the:

(a) Accident location.(b) Time of accident.(c) Type and quantity of weapons involved in

the accident [weapon information should be transmittedusing the line number(s) contained in TP-20-11, GeneralFirefighting Guidance (C)].

(4) Responses outside the hours listed above aresubject to an additional 60:90 minutes delay.

(5) Every effort should be made to provide updatedor supplementary information to the ARAC Center assoon as it is available. Desired information includes:

(a) Observed wind speed and wind direction atthe time of the accident, and subsequent weatherchanges.

(b) Description of accident particulars, includingIine numbers for the specific weapon(s) releasing.contamination, type and amount of fuel involved andmeasured contamination at specific locations withrespect to the contamination source, if available.

(c) Specific details of accident fire or explosion,such as mechanism of the release (high explosivedetonation or fire), duration of any fire, and height andsize of the plume or cloud (if available from reliableobservers).

(6) Approximately 30 minutes after the ARACfacility has been notified of the necessary accidentinformation, a computer generated estimate of maxi-mum credible ground-level-contamination spread andprojected whole-body effective dose to exposed personsin the downwind area will be available. Conservativeassumptions are made in calculating the amount ofradiological material released so that these initialprojections place an upper bound on levels of resultingcontamination and dose. Weapons at risk, excludinginsensitive high explosive (IHE) weapons, when exposedto unusual stress during the accident undergo a non-nuclear high-explosive detonation. Also, all the nuclearmaterial at risk (except that of the IHE item[s]), isreleased in an aerosolized form. Similar conservativeassumptions are made where specific accident informa-tion is missing or unknown. If the accident location isn’tclose to an ARAC serviced site, the initial projectionswill probabiy not include geographic features (roads,city boundaries, etc.). ARAC projected doses will assistinitial response efforts in evaluating the potential hazardto the general public until comprehensive radiationmeasurements and bioassays can be performed.Projected deposition patterns will assist estimates of siterestoration efforts.

(7) Approximately 60 to 90 minutes after notifi-cation of ARAC, a more refined projection will beavailable in somewhat less conservative assumptions aremade in estimating the actual amount of material atrisk released during the accident. (Estimates are nowbased on only those known to have undergone a high-explosive detonation). For consequence analyses, ARACcan generate a calculation based on a meteorologicalforecast to give projected contamination patterns in caseof dispersal during a weapon-safing operation. Althoughthe initial projections are shown typically on a 30-by-30’ k~lometer grid, these refined projections may covereither a larger or smaller area depending on the

5-c-4

downwind extent of the contamination. Note that ARACcan generate projection plots to match a given map scale(for example, 1:50,000) for ease of overlaying theprojected deposition pattern.

(8) When available, ARAC may be transmitted tothe ARAC site system computer located at most ARAC-serviced sites. If the site does not have a site systemcomputer, the projections can be telefaxed to any CCITTGroup 3 telecopier machine. The following paragraphsprovide information regarding the ARAC example“initial” projections shown in Figures 5-C- I and 5-C-2.

(a) Geographic Contour Display. Release loca-tion is centered in this a~ea (refined projections mayhave release location offset from center) with a 2000-foot fragmentation circle drawn around the release point.The display is always oriented with north toward thetop. A maximum of three contoured areas will be shownemanating from the release point which will, in mostcases, overlay a geographic representation, showing roadnetworks and waterways, etc., of the area around theaccident site. The words “SEE NOTES” will be printedacross the middle of the display directing the viewerto the ARAC Computer Estimation Notes on the rightside of the graphics plot. Printed across the top of eachgraphic display area will be the title of the underlyingcomputer estimation denoting either a “50 Year WholeBody Effective Dose” or “Cumulative Deposition” plot.

(b) Descriptive Notes. To the right of the contourdisplay will be a legend. The first line is a title line forthese notes. The second line will denote the date andtime that the specific computer model estimation wasproduced. Lines three through six will be reserved forgeneral amplifying remarks about the computerestimation. - Lme seven identifies either the doseintegration period or total deposition period time asappropriate (NOTE: All times will be shown as “Z” time.“Z” is equivalent to Universal Coordinated Time (UTC)which has replaced the more familiar Greenwich MeanTime (GMT)). Line nine shows the radiological materialmodeled, and the height above ground level at whichthe contour levels are calculated and displayed. Lines10 through 22 will show the specific computer estimationaction levels as calculated for that particular plot. Thenext several lines (down to the scale of the display shownin both kilometers and feet) comprise three separateblocks of information. Within each block is an areashowing a particular contour cross hatch pattern usedto mark areas in the contour display where the doseor deposition is greater than the stated value; the areacovered by this particular pattern in square kilometers;and abbreviated, generalized actions that may be

considered within this area. Note that the area givenwill encompass the area of all higher levels shown (forexample, the area given for exceeding 25 rem is the sumof the area covered by the 25 and 150 rem contourpatterns). There are a maximum of three cumulativedeposition and four dose exposure levels for whichprojections are made. Only the areas with the threehighest projected levels will be shown on any ARACplot. Projected cumulative depositions are for levelsgreater than 600,60, and 6 microCuries per square meter@Ci/ mz). Dose exposures are projected for levels greaterthan 150, 25, 5, and 0.5 rem, which refer to a 50 yearwhole body effective dose via the inhalation pathway.

(9) The wording which accompanies the actionlevels in the legend follows:

(a) 50-Yr Whole-Body Effective-Dose “Expo-sure Action Levels.” Projected doses apply only to peopleoutdoors without respiratory protection from the timeof the accident until the valid time of the plot, andrecommended actions are to reduce the projected doseto those people exposed.

~ Greater than 150 rem - Immediaterespiratory protection and evacuation recommended.

~ Greater than 25 rem - Prompt actionrequired; respiratory protection required; considersheltering or evacuation.

& Greater than 5 rem - Respiratory protec-tion required; recommend sheltering; considerevacuation.

< Greater than 0.5 rem - Considersheltering.

(b) Cumulative Deposition “Exposure ActionLevels.”

~ Greater than 600 pCi/mz - Immediateaction may be required until the contamination isstabilized or removed; issue sheltering instructions;recommend controlled evacuation.

2. Greater than 60pCi/ m2 - Supervised are%issue shelte~lng instructions; recommend controlledevacuation 2-14 days.

& Greater than 6 pCi/ mz - Restricted are%access on need only basis; possible controlled evacuationrequired.

(c) The wording of the preceding deposition‘ action levels was contracted because of space limitations

on the ARAC plots. The full wording follows:

5-c-5

v

TE s t

v v v v RQC C o m p u t e r S i m u l a t i o n N o t e s

~en er ated: 31t19R89 2 3 3 2 2

m a t Eff. W B D o s e <R e m a r k s : I n i t i a l P l o t .

H— E D e t o f a l l l i n e i t e m s .N

—

y

n‘&

/

t

I—

. .

K. . .. . .— ,. . .. . .. . .,./ .,

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II= E

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,.,. . . ... . . . ,. . . . . .,, ., ~.,

I l\ I ‘ . . . . . . .

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1

Figure 5-C-1: ARAC PLOT-Lung Dose.

,.

I A\—

) 1— /~kLeuel und Rrea Couered) I

—Jm:i“otal D e p o s i t i o n :

L

0MQR89 2 2 9 0 Z t o 31MRR89 0 0 0 9 Z

\

ateriul: PU-239 a t 0.0 m

xposure Rct ion Leuels:

IxxxmI

2 0 0 0 F T tendhe)

[\

s e d area; r e c o m m e n dl e d e v a c u a t i o n 2 - 1 4 days;

612E! uCi/mZ 2 . 0 sq kma c t i o n r e q u i r e d ;c o n t r o l l e d e v a c u a t i o n ;

Itering i n s t r u c t i o n s .6B uCi/m2 1(3.9 sq km

.,,., B i s s u e s h e l t e r i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s .

E

Ezzzl’ 6 uCi/m2 4 6 . 5 s q kmR e s t r i c t e d a r e a : R e c e s s o n n e e d

\ only b a s i s . P o s s i b l e c o n t r o l l e de v a c u a t i o n r e q u i r e d .

L I. . . . . . . 5.9 km S o u r c e L o c a t i o n :. . . . ,, v v L a t : 3 7 ° 4 2 ’ 0 4 ” N

~. . . $. 1 0 0 0 0 . 0 ft L e n : 1 2 1 ° 5 5 ’ 4 9 ” H,.

—-~ ,. . . . . I

Figure 5-C-2. ARAC PLCJl_-Deposition.

1. Greater than 600 pCi/m2 - Immediateaction requ~ed. Urgent remedial action may be neededfrom within a few hours up to two days. Full anti-contamination clothing and respiratory protectionrequired by all emergency staff in this area. Residentsshould remain indoors with doors and windows closed.Room air conditioners should be turned off. Controlledevacuation of children and adults should be consideredurgent. All work on, or the use of, agricultural productsand/ or meat and poultry must be controlled and furtheraction regarding them assessed.

~ Greater than 60 pC1/ mt - Supervised area.Controlled evacuation should be considered and mayhave to occur between about two days and two weeksor more. All activities should be considered carefullyand supervised. Full anti-contamination clothing andrespirators required for all personnel engaged in heavywork or dusty, windy operations. Residents shouldremain indoors with windows closed unless evacuationis in progress or there is no significant airborne hazardand none forecast to occur via resuspension.

~ Greater than 6 pCi/ mz - Restricted area.Entry restricted to those who live, work, and/or havea need to be there. Decontamination personnel andpublic health and safety staff should wear limited anti-contamination protective clothing. Controlled evacua-tion of residents, especially children, is possible duringdecontamination if there is a possibility of airbornecontamination via resuspension.

c. Aerial Measurement System (AMS).

(1) General. The EG&G AMS has three capabilitiesavaiIable to support a weapon accident: aerial radio-logical mapping, aerial search for weapons and/ orweapon components, and aerial photography.

(2) Aerial Radiological Mapping. Aerial radiolog-ical surveys provide rapid assessment and thoroughcoverage of large areas and yield average groundconcentrations of the contaminant. The system can alsobe used to quickly prepare crude, but appropriatelyscaled, incident site maps. Instrumentation includeslarge-volume, sodium-iodide gamma-ray detectors, dataformatting and recording” equipment, positioningequipment, meteorological instruments, direct readouthardware, and data ‘analysis equipment. A variety ofDoE owned aerial platforms (fixed-wing and helicopter)are dedicated to supporting this mission. Also,equipment capable of being mounted on a variety ofDoD helicopters is available to perform survey missionsas needed.

(a) In, a nuclear weapon accident, a preliminaryradiological survey would establish whether radioactivematerials had been dispersed from the weapon.Dispersion patterns and relative radiation intensities,immediately available from the initial survey, may beused to guide radiation survey teams to the areas ofheaviest contamination. AMS personnel will assistinterpreting and correlating their information with otherradiological survey data. Additional data processing willestablish the identity and concentration of the isotopesinvolved. Subsequent surveys could provide data on theprogress of clean-up operations.

(b) The first radiological photography surveyconducted after a weapon accident is likely to followthis protocol and time frame:

1. The helicopter would arrive six to tenhours follo=ng notification.

~ The helicopter would then be refueled andthe crew would obtain instructions within two hours.

~ A survey would then be conducted in aserpentine pattern of survey lines 0.5 to five miles apartto determine:

& Radiological deposition outline.~ Direction of the plume centerline.q Approximate radiation levels along the

plume centerline.& Dominant isotopes.

+ Information from 3 would be transmittedby radio to base operations during the survey.

~ The analysis laboratory would arrive 4hours (plus driving time) after notification.

~ Full analysis of flight results would beavailable 6 to 12 hours after the flight is completed orafter the analysis laboratory arrives.

(c) After the first, broad survey is completed, aseries of smaller area surveys would be initiated. Theflight altitude would likely be 100 feet with 200 footline spacings. The purpose of these surveys would beto map the contaminated area in detail. The length oftime required to complete this series of surveys maybe from one to five days, depending upon the area tobe surveyed and the weather.

(d) The results of an aerial survey of Area 13of the Nevada Test Site is shown in Figure 5-C-3. Thiswas the site of a “one-point” detonation in the 1950sto simulate a weapon accident. The aerial survey data..were”analyzed for the 60 keV photopeak of Am241.

Detailed radiological contours, such as those shown in

5-C-8

Figure 5-C-3 would be available five to eight hours afterthe completion of the previous survey flight.

(e) The sensitivity of the system depends uponthe flight altitude, area of contamination and theinterference of other isotopes (both natural and man-made). Experience has shown that the lower level ofdetectability y of Am241 can be expected to be 0.03 to1.0 flCi/mz, and 0.03 to 0.3 #Ci/ mz for both CS137 and1131. The americium concentrations indicated representson the order of 1 to 10 flCi/ mz of plutonium.

(f) Comparison with ground-based survey andsample results should be done with caution. The areasampled in a single aerial measurement is on the orderof 1,000 times the area sampled by a FIDLER-typeinstrument at one (1) foot above the ground and1,000,000 times larger than the area sampled by an alphaprobe or a soil sample. The aerial survey results average-scale averages and take into account the overall effectof roads, ditches, water bodies, vegetation cover andterrain effects.

(3) Aerial Search. In certain scenarios, the aerialsearch capabilities available from AMS capabilities may

need to be employed. These consist of gamma andneutron detector modules designed for the DoE ownedBO-105 helicopters or portable modules that can be usedin helicopters, such as the UH-60 and U H- 1. Thiscapability may be useful only for certain sources ofknown detectability and normally requires low altitudes(100 feet or less) and slow speeds (approximately 60knots). Aerial search personnel will be able to determinethe appropriate flight parameters when notified of theparticular scenario.

(4) Aerial Photography. Two major photographicsystems are used to acquire detailed serial photos overa site. One system consists of a large format aerialmapping camera operated in fixed-wing aircraft, whichproduces detailed aerial photographs= The second systemoperates out of helicopters, utilizing the Hasselblad70mm cameras to produce color photographs. Film fromthe Hasselblad system can be produced and printedunder field conditions. Large prints up to 20” x 24”produced to map scales can be printed on-site generallywithin hours of the completion of the flight.

.

5-c-9

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5-C-1O

DoD 51OO.52-M

APPENDIX 5-D

AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS

5-D-1 SURVEYS

a. General. Extensive radiation predictions andsurveys will be required to identify and characterize thearea for decontamination and to develop and evaluaterestoration plans. During the initial hours of theresponse, available radiation survey instruments andmonitoring personnel for survey operations will belimited. Determining whether contamination wasreleased by the accident must be done immediately. Ifa release occurred, priority must be given to those actionsrequired to identify and minimize the hazards to people.These actions include identification of the affected area(perimeter survey) to permit identification of potentiallycontaminated people. Each successive survey operationwill be based in part on the information gained fromearlier operations. Initial radiation surveys may be basedon ARAC information, if available, or only on the knowl-edge that contamination will be dispersed downwind.Later surveys will be based on the initial survey dataand AMS plots. Days will be required to completecomprehensive contamination characterization.

b. General Survey Procedures. Selection of instru-mentation, identification of the edge of contamination,determination of the location of measurements made,and data recorqing procedures are similar for mostsurvey operations.

(1) Selection of Instrumentation.

(a) Alpha Instruments. Alpha instruments candetect lower levels of contamination than low energygamma instruments. Under field conditions, however,alpha radiation has an extremely short detection rangeand its detection may be blocked by nothing more thansurface moisture. Alpha surveys are possible only underdry conditions, for example, after any morning dew hasevaporated. The fragility of the Mylar probe face onmost alpha instruments combined with the shortdetection range of alpha radiation results in a high rateof instrument failure when field use requires measure-ment of contamination on rough ground or otherirregular surfaces. Alpha instruments should thereforebe used primarily for personnel and equipment

monitoring at the hot line. Field use should be limitedto only smooth surfaces like pavement and buildings.

(b) Low Energy Gamma Instruments. Instru-ments capable of detecting the low energy gamma- andx-ray radiations from plutonium, and its americiumdaughter, may be used to detect contamination. Low “energy gamma/ x-ray instruments are not subject todamage by surfaces being monitored and field surveyscan be rapidly conducted. Low energy gamma instru-ments are, therefore, the recommended instruments forfield surveys of plutonium contamination, whereas theSPA 3 probe is more useful for measuring the mediumenergy gamma radiation from uranium. For the bestdetection efficiency, low energy x-ray surveys should beconducted prior to any rainfall, and during the first fivedays after the accident before part of the measurablelow energy radiation present is screened by the plutoniummigrating into the soil. The best instrumentation forlow energy gamma/x-ray surveys uses FIDLER probes,which will not normally be available until the specializedteams arrive. The type and amount of low energy gammaand x-ray radiation present depends on the age of theplutonium. Many weapons will contain plutonium over10 years old, resulting in higher signal strengths for thesame level of contamination as that produced by a “new”weapon; therefore, the age of the plutonium andprojected signal strength should be determined as soonas possible. The age of the plutonium in a weapon canbe obtained from the DoE ARG.

(2) Perimeter Contamination Levels. When alphainstruments are used to establish the perimeter, readingsof 500 CPM are recommended for instruments with 60cm probe area and 105 CPM for instruments with 17cm probes be used to mark the perimeter. When lowenergy gamma/ x-ray instruments are used to establishthe perimeter, a reading of twice background isrecommended to mark the perimeter. FIDLERs arerecommended to perform perimeter surveys, with alphainstruments the second choice. If FIDLERs areunavailable, and if weather or field conditions precludethe use of alpha instruments, the AN/ PDR-56F, withthe x-ray probe attached, may be used. If fission products‘were caused by the accident, priority should be givento establishing a 10 mR/ hr perimeter.

5-D- I

(3) Fixing Survey Points.

(a) For radiation monitoring data to be useful,the point where it is collected must be identifiable ona map or aerial photo of the area, Engineering surveyequipment may be unavailable to determine precisepositions in the early phases of response, or theimmediate need for radiological data may outweigh thetime required to determine precise positions.

~. Data points should be marked in somemanner so that the point can be later relocated for otheractions, or the position determined precisely for latercorrelation of the data with other information.

~. A numbered or uniquely identified stakemay be used to mark the location on soil, and a similarunique identification painted or otherwise marked onpavement or other hard surfaces for later reference.When engineering survey equipment is not being used,the monitoring log, or data collection record, shouldshow the identification marking used at each point, andan estimated position to use immediately following datacollection.

~. Estimated positions may be street addressesin urban areas, the estimated distance down a streetor road from an identifiable intersection, compassbearings taken on two or more identified referencepoints, or any other reference which can be located onthe maps being used. If a vehicle is used during theinitial perimeter survey, the odometer mileage from anintersection or other known point may be adequate foridentifying positions in sparse[y populated areas.

(4) Recording Survey Data.(a) If an engi~eering survey is being performed

concurrently with the radiological survey, recordingprocedures must ensure that positional data beingrecorded at the transit position and radiological databeing recorded by the monitors can be correlated.Monitoring and survey teams’ records should includethe following information:

~. Team member names.~. Type instrument and serial number.~. Date and start/stop time of survey.~. Data location mark (stake number or other

marking) when used.~. Estimated or surveyed position,Q. Instrument reading indicating if the reading

is “Gross,” meaning background radiation reading hasnot been subtracted, or “Net” meaning the backgroundradiation reading has not subtracted from the instrumentreading.

(5) Perimeter Surveys.

(a) Initial Fkrimeter Survey. Rapid identificationof the perimeter of the contaminated area is requiredto prevent undue alarm, to aid in identifying affectedpeople, and to establish controls to prevent the spreadof contamination. The On-Scene Commander and civilauthorities will need at least a rough plot of the perimeteras soon as possible upon which to base their actions.The urgency of perimeter definition is directly relatedto the population in the area. Streets and roads willnormally provide rapid access to populated areas,although the location of rivers or other terrain featureswhich may hinder access to portions of the potentiallycontaminated area must be considered when directingthe perimeter survey. The contaminated area may bea mile or more wide and several miles long, thereforeuse of widely separated monitoring points and a vehicleto move between monitoring points should be consideredwhen directing the initiaI perimeter survey. ARACprojections, if available, will assist in determining thearea and distance the perimeter survey teams may berequired to cover, and perimeter survey procedures maybe adjusted accordingly. If perimeter survey teams areequipped with a radio, a position report at the perimeterlocations on each traverse will provide an immediatelocation of the perimeter to the command center andpermit team progress to be tracked. While not classified,transmissiorr of radiation readings should be discouragedon unsecure nets.

(b) Full Perimeter Survey. FIDLERs should beused when performing a full survey of the perimeter.This may not be possible until after the specialized teamsarrive and may take weeks to complete. The proceduremost likely to be used will consist of monitoring in andout along the edge of the area with readings being takenabout every 50 feet. If weather or terrain require theuse of the AN/ PDR-56 x-ray probe on the initialperimeter survey, the full perimeter survey can resultin an expansion of the perimeter. If an alpha instrumentwas used for the initial perimeter survey, the perimeterestablished by the fuIl perimeter survey should be aboutthe same size or slightly smaller.

(6) Area Surveys.

(a) Radiological surveys of the contaminatedarea are required to identify areas requiring fixation,to support decontamination and restoration planning,and jo determine decontamination effectiveness. Thefirst survey covering the entire area wiil be providedmost times by the Aerial Measurement System~AMS).

5-D-2

The initial AMS data will be available four-five hoursafter completion of survey flights. The AMS plot requiresinterpretation by trained analysts. Ground survey datais required to validate and support analysis of the plot.Some of the supporting ground data may be providedby the initial perimeter survey. Ground surveys tosupport decontamination planning will be performedwith FIDLERs. Usually some form of grid survey willbe used with the grid size determined by the desiredaccuracy of estimated activity between grid points andmeasurement errors associated with the instruments.From several days to over a week may be required tocomplete a ground survey of the entire area. Groundsurveys validating decontamination effectiveness mayrequire several months to complete due to the low levelsof contamination remaining, and the desired precision.

(7) Building Surveys.

(a) Radiological surveys of buildings within thecontaminated area will be required to determine theappropriate decontamination actions. Alpha instru-ments may be used on most building surfaces, however,use of FIDLERs may be necessary on surfaces whichmay damage alpha instruments, or on materials suchas carpets where contamination maybe below the surfaceand screened from alpha instruments. The amount ofremovable contamination present must be determinedby wiping surfaces with a piece of material, or swipe,which is then monitored for contamination it absorbed.Laboratory counting equipment should be used todetermine the amount of removable contaminationabsorbed by the swipe. Initial building surveys shouldbe performed only on the exterior unless the buildingis in use.

(b) Civil authorities should establish proceduresfor either building owners and/ or tenants, or anappropriate civil authority, such as a policeman, toaccompany monitors when surveying building interiors.If interiors are surveyed before the surrounding areahas been decontaminated, methods which minimizetracking of contamination into ,buildings should be used(for example, cover shoes with plastic bag immediatelybefore entering buildings and ensure gioves areuncontaminated). Interior contamination levels will varybecause of the time of year, the t ype of heating or coolingsystem used, and whether or not people were in thebuilding at the time of, or following the accident. Interiorcontamination levels will be only a fraction of theexterior levels at the same location. The primary sourceof interior contamination are expected to be airbornecontaminants entering the building through heating orcooling systems, and doors, windows, or other openingsduring the initial cloud passage; or contaminationtracked or carried into the building by people or animals.The sealing of doors, windows, chimneys; and ventilatorson evacuated buildings in highly decontaminated areasmay minimize further contamination of the interiorduring contamination of the surrounding area. Whenmonitoring the interior of a building, initial monitoringshould be on the floor in the main traffic pattern(doorways, halls, and stairs), and on top of horizontalsurfaces near heating or cooling duct outlets, windowsand other openings into the building. If no contami-nation is found at these locations it is very likely nocontamination entered the building. If contaminationis found, additional monitoring should be performed.Monitoring results from furnace and air conditioningfilters should be included in building survey records.

.

5-D-3

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 5-E

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, MEASUREMENT,

AND CONTROL FORMS

Accurate records should be maintained of exposure times and levels of exposureexiting the accident area. Additionally, a complete radiological history should be

for all personnel entering andmade for each individual who

is actually contaminated. This appendix contains examples of forms that may be used to document and recordthis information.

Form 1 -

Form 2 -

Form 3 -

Form 4 -

Form 5 -

Form 6 -

Form 7 -

Form 8 -

Personal Data FormThis form contains data which should be obtained from all personnel who enter the radiologicalcontrol area.

Radiological Control Area LogThis form is for use at the contamination control station.

Bioassay Screening LogThis form is for maintaining a record of all necessary bioassay screening performed andused for both response force personnel and civilians who may have been contaminatedof the accident.

Radiation Health HistoryThis form is to assist in the screening of civilians who may have been contaminatedof the accident.

Field Monitoring Data LogThis form is to assist in documenting field monitoring measurements by survey teams.

TLD MeasurementsThis form is to be used to document TLD readings.

Weapons Accident Environmental RadiationThis form is to be used to log samples taken from the surrounding environment.

FIDLER Data FormThis form is used when logging readings from the FIDLER.

as

as

may bea result

a result

5-E-1

5-E-2

FORM 1

PERSONAL DATA FORM

(P/em print or place “X” in boxes as appropriate)

Sa Ravarm for Additional Inarructlons

‘l) SOCSEC NO ‘2)NAME ‘3) BIRTH OATE

IIasr) (firrtl [m.i.l (dw)(month)(vr)

‘4) MALE0 o r FEMALE ❑

‘5 A) MILITARY ❑ or ‘5 B) CIVILIAN m

(6) “SA m ‘7 } GFIAOE (9A)

[ B]

(9B) “SA

USAF

U S A F D (8) C#EC, ALITy CfJOE 000 ❑ USN (10) GRAOE (111.jERIEs

or uSMC

USN m NEC/DESIGNATOR

( -jUSMC D ‘JOE cl---”~”n-n

OTHER D OTHER D–––––––

ISpwlfv)

(121HAv E YOU E1/ERWIJRN A FILM BAOGE OR OTHER 00 SIMETRIC 0EVICE7

(13~HAVE yf)u EVER BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A’”RAOIATION WORKER”?

‘14) HAVE YOU HAO TRAINING IN RESPIRATORY PROTECT IO NEOUIPMENT (MASK)?

(15)”Av Ey0uw0RKE0 1~ *NT,. contamination CLOT” ING ANO Respirators?

116) HAVE YOU RECE,VEO AS, GN, F,CANT OIJsE OF RADIATION WITHIN THE LAST YEAR?

(17)” AvEy0u BEEN BRE, FEO ONp RIJCEL)u REs FOR wORKING IN A CONTAMINATE AREA?

~181youR ORGAN IZATION/BUSINESs AOORESS:

(Yes)

c1c1c1nnn

I3RAOE SERIES

PROFESSION AGENCY

(No)

c 1

c 1

n

n

un

lUmt/Emplow Nnmo or Svmbol) lStraat, P.O. Box. Mail Stop, etc.l

.>

(CIrV or Milirw Base) [State or County) (ZIP Code)

(19) UNIT RESpONS, ELE FOR RECOROING yOu R RAIJIAT]ON OI)SIMETRY RESULTS[Place “X” if unknown}

(201y0u R ORGANIZATION/BUSIN ESs TELEPHONE(Area Code tmd Number)

(signature) IOa!e)

FOR RAO HEALTH CENTER USE

FILM BAOGENO

EXTERNAL OOSE

INTERNAL 00SE

PERSONAL OATA FORMACCOUNTING NUMBER

T H I S FOWM SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT.

,-

Figure 5-E-1. Personal Data Form.

5-E-3

INSTRUCTIONS FOR NON-SELF EXPLANATORY ITEMS

ITEM

3

5

6

7

8

9B

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

19

20

Show day and year as numerical and

COMMENT

month as alphabetical; e.g., 23 Jan 65 or 01 Jun 42.

Check either 5A

Foreign military

or 50,

and US Coast Guard check “OTHER. ”

Show alphabetical/numerical grade; e.g., E3 or 05, rather than rank; e.g., PFC or CDR.

Show “MOS,” “NE C,” “AFSC, ” etc., of your current duty assignment.

Civilians with DOD agencies check “DOD” and appropriate service or “OTHER. ”

DOD and DOE employees show pay schedule and level; e.g., GS-10, SES-79.

US government civilians other than DOD or DOE, show grade and series for profession; other

civilians give short title for profession; e.g., health phys, rad monitor, or comp programmer.

Check “YES” if you were monitored by thermoluminescent dosimeter; i.e., TLD; check “YES”

if you worked with soft beta emitters and were monitored by some means other than film”

badge or TLD.

Check “YES” if an occupationally exposed individual or radiation worker.

Check “YES” if trained in use of Ml 7 or M 17A protective masks..

Check “YES” if anti-C work was participation in training courses with or without actualradioactive contamination.

Check “YES” if you underwent medical treatment involving radiation or radioactivematerials, if your occupational exposure is near permissible limits and/or if an accident

response dose report is necessary to continue your regular radiation work.

Following codes may be used: “R” for Radiological Safety Officer or Radiological Protection

Officer, “M” for Medical Department, “C” for Commander, “F” for USAF Master Radiation

Registry.

In’lieu of commercial number, show “AVN” for AUTOVON or “FTS” for Federal Tele-communications System.

5-E-4

r

v FORM 2

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG

OP. TE FAG=— ~F—

T I M E

.E CORDER

5sN

50C S E C NO NAM E( LAST, FIHST, MI)

;oNTROL

NUMBER

5 46 47 48 49

I 5 46 4 7 484

F6LM

❑ A D G E

NUMe ER

s 51 5

565 1

m

59 60(

T I ME

#N

i ?6 3 6 4(

Ou T

—s 67 60 6

66 768[

lM, S FOI+M 5UL3JECT 10 THE PR, VACV &CT.

Figure 5-E-2. Radiological Control Area Log.

WI

h&

I

●,

lxu D A T E P A G E — O F _

oE

S T A R T S T O P

oRADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG (CONTINUATION SHEET)

u R E C O R D E R

wu’

SSN

\

4T H I S FORM S U B J E C T T O T H E P R IV A C Y ACT.

yl

mL

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

9.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA LOG

Column 71 should be marked with an X if the person was wearing full anti-contamination clothing and a respirator.

Column 72 should be marked with an x if the person was wearing anti-contamination clothing without a respirator, or street clothingwithout a respirator.

Column 73 should be marked with an X if the person was wearing street clothing.

Column 75 should be marked with a Y if contamination was found on body or personal clothing when exiting the control area

contamination was detected state “none. ”

Column 76 should be marked with a ‘f if all detected contamination was removed from the person, N if not and remarks are

mandatory. If no contamination was detected state “none. ”

If no

Any unusual incidents or additional data deemed important for radiological safety should be described in the remarks section and

sequentially numbered. The number should be inidcated in Columns 77. 80. Remarks may also be used to indicate when recorders

change in mid sheet. If Personal clothing was confiscated during decontamination, articles taken should be noted in remarks.

Each day should be started with a new form and the total ”number of pages entered on each sheet of the previous days forms.

5-E-8

y“’m

‘b L

vFORM 3

BIOASSAY SCREENING LOG,

D Am PhGE OF_

T I M E●a

*ECORDERc :w

I I

In:

SSN: ; Xz

~ o ~ xl.v ~ o t?; o ; <u

SOC S E C N O L A S T N A M E- ● w !4z e e 1 “ ,

D E TECTEO

I

cOu NT

:ONTROL

NUMBER

I .1 I

THIS FOFt M S U B J E C T T O T H E P!?, vACY ACT

Figure 5-E:3. Bioassy Screen Log.

IAY I DAT~ pAGE —OF~

E S T A R T STOP. BIOASSAY SCREENING LOG (C O N T I N U A T ION S H E E T): R E C O R D E Rw

K S S N

,....,L

ti 1Ii 1

I

4

1 IT H I S F O R M S U B J E C T T O T H E P R I V A C Y A C T ,

J

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE BIOASSAY SCREENING LOG

y)

mA

a,

t).

c.

d,

e.

f,

9.

h,

i,

j.

k,

1.

m.

Columns

Column ;

O-23. If more than 14 characters in last name truncate as necessary.w

1 indicate with M or C,

Column 25 should be marked with Y if person is normally classified as a radiation worker by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,leave blank for all others.

Column 26 should be marked Y if person is not associated with a DC)D, Federal or state accident response organization, leave blank

for all others.

Column 27. Insure all persons marked Y in Column 26 have completed a Radiation I+ealth History form and check, leave blank for

all others.

Columns 28-39 should be marked Y where appropriate if contamination was found and column number and associated readingrecorded in the remarks section. All personal articles and clothing retained for decontamination or disposal should be recorded in the

remarks section. If no contamination was detected leave blank,

COIUmn 40 should be marked Y if all detected contamination was removed from the person, N if not and remarks are mandatory, Ifno contamination was detected leave blank,

Columns 41, 46, and 47 mark with Y if bioassay samples collected, N if not.

Columns 42-45, 48-51, 52-56, and 57-61 enter units used in column headers and measurements in appropriate columns.

Columns 62-65 enter time bioassay sample was collected.

Column 71 mark Y if additional bioassay samples or other data is required and specify in remarks section.

Any unusual incidents or other data deemed important should be described in the remarks section and sequentially numbered, The

number should be indicated in Columns 77-80, Remarks may also be used to indicate when recorders change in mid sheet.

Each day should be started with a new form and the total number of pages entered on each sheet of the previous days forms.

y

qll .

FORM 4

RADIATION HEALTH HISTORY

(Please print or place “X” in boxes as appropriate)

(1) SOCSEC N O (2) NAME

(last) (first)

(3A) BIRTH DA-

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

TEMPORARY ADDRESS

(m.i.)

E (3B) M A En o r FEMALEU

sfaylrnolyr

TELEPHONE “

PERMANENT AIICIRESS

TELEPHONE

NAME& AD ORESSOF EMPLOYER

HAVE YOIJ EVER BEEN TREATED WITH X-RAYS OR RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES?‘Escl ‘on

(7A) REASON FOR TREATMENT

(7B) DATE OF TREATMENT

mo/yr

(7C) PLACE OF TREATMENT

HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY CANCER OR OTHER MALIGNANCY? YKI Non

(8A) INDICATE TYPE-.

LEUKEMIAD BREAST ❑ THYROID ❑ LUNG ❑ STOMACH ❑ BONE ❑I N T E S T I N E S O OTHER ❑

Specify type

(8B) DATE OF OIAGNOSIS

molyr

T H I S F O R M S U B J E C T TO T H E P R I V A C Y A C T .

,-

Figure 5-E-4. Radiation Health History.

S-E-13

(9)

(lo)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(161

(17)

(18)

HAVE ANY BLOOD RELATE D MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY (G RANDPARENTS, PARENTS, BROTHERS OR SISTERS)

EVER HAD CANCER OR LEUKEMIA? YES ❑ NO ❑ TYPE

ARE YOU NOW TAKING MEDICATION? YES ❑ NO O

(1OA) WHAT MEDICATION

DO YOU HAVE ANY ALLERGIES? YES D NO ❑

(11A) WHAT ALLERGIES

NAME & ADDRESS OF FAMILY PHYSICIAN

OATE & TIME OF POSSIBLE OR ACTUAL EXPOSURE -,. -.-,.- , -.,--.,-. . ., .,.-,-.! . ..n . . ..n

DURATION OF EXPOSURE HOURS

ACTIVITIES DURING PERIOD OF EXPOSURE (Meals, type work, bathing, sleeping, etc. )

IU HAUIAI lUN&UNIAMINAll UN AM u or r~u

day/mo/yr t i m e

MINUTES

LOCATION OURING PERIOO OF EXPOSURE — —

DO YOU OWN A PET? YES D ho ❑ TYPE

LOCATION

WHO WAS WITH YOU WHEN YOU MAY HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATEO?

NAME AODRESS TELEPHONE

5-E-14

Form 5

u!

hLL/l

Page _ _ _ . . . . 0 1 _ — _

Incldenl _

Time Olspalched:

llme Returned: . .–——

TIME

.—. _

,,, ,.7!

toclllonGrid Coordinalas.Crossroads. tic.

Orlg Ilnam Ref. No,

0?18 - NAMES

Or $:rial !i8 !. ——

2.

FIELD MONITORING DATA 10GNOTE: REPORT ACTUAL BACKGROUND LEVEL OR MOL

mWindow Maiohl

Momr Open 4 In.Meler Rcadlng ReadlnQ Closed 3 II Mtler TImdlng

==H=H=

Alfl MONITORING SAMPLE COILICTION

_ CIMI _ M i n . S#mplo

Gross CPM Crou C?Mwllh wllhoul Type. Ou8ntlty

Background Pl{llc”la16 Parllc”lala Ttg Soil. Milk andICPMI Filler Filler No. Wmr Unlta

I I I I t

I 1 1 f I

.

SMEM

CPM Pet100 CM1UnlessNoled

COMMINTSflfidlcate Flclors Such k: PeIk

Ileadlng, CIOUO PassageInslrumenl ml Wtalh!r

Condillons, and Olher OaIeI

IFigure 5-E-5. Field Monitoring Data Log.

.

5-E-16

Form 6

TLD MEASUREMENTSCOLLECTION ANO ANALYSIS

--J

I

INCIDENT ‘ -,PAGE ______ OF ______

——

LOCATION[BE SPECIFIC, GRIDCOORDINATES, ETC. I

–--’————l——~

TEAMIORGANIZATION

----1I—- —.. . .. —.—— __

—. ..—-1‘----t--‘--’_i—---—–––4–––

I-“------+

A.-_— ._. ..— —I.—— —— —-—

------+-

—____—l.—II

1 PLACEO FIETRIEVEO

TIME OATE TIME

— — —

.— .—— .—.—

——— ..— — —c

-. .—. .-— . _____ ._

— . —

—

I

-LASSUMEDFIEAEIING BACK.

GROUNO

I

d—. ——.-1-

1

LABORATORY

LAB MANAGER

ROUTETO _OEA

READOUTNET UNITS

REAIJINGOATE TIME

—

— —

—.—— _ _ _ . . . . . . . . . .

.—-—

“RANSITI)TORAGE COMMENTS

OOSE

I

Figure 5-E-6. TLDMeasurement Collection and Analysis Form.

5-E-18

WEAPONS ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATIONALPHA PROBE DATA FORM

NOTE: REPORT ACTUAL BKG OR MDL

Incident

Agency /Org.

Detector Type

Instrument BKG _

Instrument MDL

Date Data Type: Alpha _ _ B e t a _. Gamma —

T e a m / M o n i t o r _

Model No.

Calibration

Serial No.

Date Conversion Factor

Sample COlleciiOn CommenlsLocations Type: Soil. [Indicates Factors Such As Peak

Grid Coordinates. Milk. Waler, Reading. Cloud Passage, InslrtimenlTime Crossroads. etc. Reading Units Tag No. Air Filter and Weather Conditions. and Olher Data]

-%

. ’

Figure 5-E-7. Weapons Accident Environ”mental Radiation Alpha Probe Data Form,

5-E-19

,

5-E- 20

.

Form 8

FIDLER DATA FORM

Incident D a t e _ _ FIDLER SItd

Agency /Org. __ Team/Monitor — Check One: — Scaler –— Rate Meter

Calibration Date Radionuclide Check Source: Quantity – pCi

Background Counting Time: —_ M i n u t e s RC Time Constant: _ M i n u t e s

Energy Window Background[keV)

Check Source K-FactorICPM) [CPM] [rrrz]

17

60

Other

Self Shielding (17 keV) (O -1: 0 = No Absorption in Check Source, 1 = 100% Aborption)

Source-to-Detector Height cm 1 pCi Am-241 = Alpha pCi Pu Mix

CPM orTime Location Reading Counts

.

(excludes PI-I-241 (Beta))

If Scaler Alpha Activity Mix

Coun~{$Ume $ &~2 Comments

1

.

Figure 5-E-8. FIDLER Data Form.

5-E-2 1

.,

5-E-22

Del) 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 6

RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION

6-1 GENERAL

This chapter addresses protective clothing and respira-tory protection including protection factors, protectiveaction guide and resuspension factors.

6-2 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION

Plutonium and uranium particulate are the most serioussource of airborne radioactivity at an accident site. Theseparticulate may be present in the cloud and smoke froma breached or burning weapon, but settle to the groundshortly thereafter. The radioactive particles may becomeresuspended in the air by surface winds and by soildisturbing operations including vehicular traffic.Resuspension is highly dependent upon specificconditions (for example, type and condition of soil orsurface, vegetation, moisture present, and time sincedeposition) and is difficult to measure and predict.Respiratory protection prevents airborne contaminationfrom entering the lungs and is provided by self containedbreathing apparatus (SCBA), or respirators which filterparticulate out of the ambient air. Respiratoryprotection devices adversely affect productivity andeffectiveness, and their use is not recommended exceptwhen airborne ~ontamination is present or expected. Inhot climates; respiratory protection devices can resultin heat injuries, including death, and a heat injuryprevention program as discussed in paragraph 14-5should be implemented when temperatures exceed 70°F.

a. Protection Factors (PF). The amount of protectionfrom inhaling airborne particulate contaminantsprovided by a given device is called its protection factor.Protection factors vary primarily as a function ofanthropometrical data, mask fit and mask design.Protection factors are determined by dividing theambient air concentrations (AAC) of a contaminant by

“ the inhaled concentration (IC) or amount of contaminantwhich enters the mask; thus PF = AAC/IC. A testfacility/ chamber using probe equipped test masks in achamber containing a nontoxic contaminant is requiredfor quantitative tests to determine the PF for eachindividual. A deployable fit test facility may be obtained

through JNACC. PF’s of up to 2,000 can be achievedwith properly fitted respirators. If the mask passes aqualitative smoke test around the edges of the maskit is assumed a PF above the nominal value is achieved.Demand type SCBA (air supplied on inhalation) causenegative mask pressure during inhalation and provideno more protection from contaminants than a respirator. .Pressure demand SCBA (i.e., always under positivepressure) provide a nominal PF of 10,000.

b. Protective Action Guidelines (PAG). PAG aredeveloped to identify protective devices to limit exposureto the lungs from inhalation of contaminants to agreedupon limits. The guidelines provided are intended foruse until health physics personnel at the scene candevelop situation specific instructions. In deriving theguidelines, a PF of 100 was assumed and the maximumpermissible concentration (MPC) of activity in the airbeing inhaled was based on a MPC for radiation workersof 40 picocuries/ cubic meter (pCi/ mj) per 40 hour week.This calculation assumes possible exposures at this rateover the period of a year and is approximately ten (10)times greater than the one (1) pCi/ m3/ 168 hour weekMPC for the general public. Radiation dose is a functionof level of activity and exposure time. Therefore, ifexposure time of workers is being tracked, a person couldbe permitted to enter an area of higher activity withoutadequate respiratory protection for a shorter period oftime without exceeding dose limits. The time versus doseapproach should be applied in emergencies as approp-riate, that is, if a person suffers heat stroke the respiratorshould be removed immediately to meet the urgentmedical requirement to cool the person since the shortunprotected exposure during evacuation from the areafor treatment will limit the amount of contaminant whichis inhaled. Table 6-1 provides respiratory protectionguidelines to use when air sampling data provides a basisfor assessing airborne contamination levels. Calculated

‘activity levels should be corrected for backgroundactivity before entering the table.

6-1

TABLE 6-1. Recommended Respiratory Protection Levelsfor Emergency Workers as a Function ofAirborne Contamination

Airborne Alpha Activitydpm/ m3 above background Respiratory Protection

Below 100 dpm/ m3 No respiratory protectionneeded.

100-10,000 dpm/m3 Full-face respiratory (M-seriesProtective Mask or civilianequivalent)

Above 10,000 dpm/ m3 Pressure demand SCBA orlimited entry restricted to essen-tial personnel wearing a full-face respiratory. Source ofcontamination should be fixedas soon as possible.

Air sampling data is unavailable until some time afterresponse personnel have arrived on-scene. During theinitial response, and when working in areas whereavailable air sampling data may not be applicable. Table6-2 provides guidelines for protective requirements basedon measurements of surface contamination levels. Table6-2 is based upon surface contamination leveis whichcould produce the airborne contamination levels in Table6-1 assuming a resuspension factor of 10-S per meter(m-’). Conversions from microcurie per meter squared@Ci/ mz) to counts per minute (CPM) were made usingthe equation in Appendix 5 conversion factor chartsfor measurements on soil. Using Table 6-2 is appropriateduring the initial approach to the area when usingrespirators in uncontaminated areas may create unduepublic alarm. If contamination levels detected duringthe initial approach-in#icate high levels of contaminationcan be expected, wearing of respirators by peopleentering the contaminated area is recommended untilair sampling data is available to assess the actual airbornehazard. Table 6-2 guidelines should not be used in the

downwind area until after the contamination cloudreleased by the accident has dispersed (several hoursafter the fire is extinguished or the explosion).

c. Air Sampler Equipment. TF-1 A Air Particles.Commonly referred to as a STAPLEX, the TF-I A iscapable of sampling air for particles down to 0.01microns in diameter depending on the filter paper used.A flow meter is used to determine rate of air flow.Cellulose filters are used normally and retained forlaboratory analysis. Field estimates of airbornecontamination can be derived from measurement of filtercontamination with field survey instruments.

d. Resuspension Factors. Other than during the initialrelease of contamination, airborne radioactivity is causedby resuspension. One means of estimating the potentialairborne hazard caused by a given level of surfacecontamination is by using resuspension factors. Theresuspension factor is defined as the activity in the air@Ci, pCi, dpm, etc.) per unit volume (usually mg) dividedby the activity on the ground below expressed in thesame activity unit per unit area. The dimension of theresuspension factor is then inverse length, usually m-l.

airborne activity dpm/ mgRF = — = m-lground activity – dpm/ mz

The method of computing airborne contamination levelsis contained in the air sampling appendix. In theory,the surface is assumed to have an infinite plane ofuniform texture with a uniform level of contamination.In practice, the contaminated area has varied levels ofcontamination, is finite in size, and may contain a varietyof surfaces with different resuspension characteristics.For wind speeds below 20 miles per hour (mph), onlythose surfaces within approximately 200 meters cancontribute to the airborne contamination. For windspeeds over 30 mph, surfaces as much as 900 meters

TABLE 6-2. Protective Devices for Emergency Worker as a Function of Surface Contamination

FIDLER Determined Alpha Reading CPMContamination pCi/m2 60cmz Probe 17cmZ Probe Protection

Below 4.5 Below 10,000 Below 2,500 Shoe covers; gloves recommended

4.5-450 10,000- 2,500- Anti-contamination clothing;1,000,000 250,000 full-face respirator.

Above 450 Above 1,000,000 Above 250,000 Pressure demand SCBA, or limitedentry restricted to essential personnelwearing a full-face respiratory. Source

.-of contamination should be fixed assoon as possible.

6-2

away may contribute. Averaging of ground activity levelsfrom these areas may be considered when computingresuspension factors. Resuspension factors may providea method of roughly estimating airborne contaminationlevels for use with Table 6-1 in areas where air samplingdata is unavailable. When using resuspension factorsto estimate airborne contamination Ievels,the types andlevels of contamination on surfaces in the area wherethe resuspension factor was computed and those in thearea of interest should be considered. Resuspensionfactors may vary from 10-5 to 10-7 for plutonium newlydeposited on soil and up to 10-3 on pavement.Resuspension factors are affected by the following:

(1) Soil Disturbing Operations. Mechanical distur-bance, such as vehicular traffic may increase resuspen-sion factors by as much as 100 times in the vicinityof the disturbance.

(2) Wind. Resuspension factors vary proportionallyto the cube of the wind speed.

(3) Rain or Moisture. Leaching of plutonium intothe soil by rain or sprinkling may reduce resuspensionfactors by 10 to 100 times or more. Surface and airbornealpha contamination levels may not be measurable withan alpha meter for some time after rain or sprinklingdue to the shielding action of the moisture.

6-3 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Protection from contamination can be provided by anyclose weave cotton material or disposable suits. Theoutfit includes: The standard anti-contaminationcoveralls, boot covers, gloves, mask and hood. The outfitopenings should be taped using masking or otherappropriate adhesive tape. Disposable suit or the battledress uniforms or equivalent with a hood and mask maybe used provided the outfit openings are taped. Foridentification, the person’s name and team should bewritten on tape and placed on their back and chest.

.

6-3

.

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 7

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

7-1 CONTAMINATION CONTROL

a. General. Contamination control minimizes thespread of contamination; therefore, rigid, establishedoperating procedures must be followed to achieve theobjective of contamination control. It consists of

(1) Initial monitoring upon arrival.to determine thepreliminary site characterization and personnelcontamination.

(2) Anti-contamination procedures to minimize thespread of contamination.

(3) Strict contamination control line procedures tocontrol contamination spread during response/ recov-ery/ restoration operations.

b. Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination.Personnel who were potentially exposed during theaccident, subsequent cloud passage, or post-accidententry into the contaminated area should be given a highpriority in response actions. People to be consideredinclude casualties; bystanders and sightseers; militaryand civilian response personnel; and residents, businessemployees and customers in the contaminated area.Initial definition of the perimeter of the contaminatedarea was discussed previously. Early definition of theperimeter is jrnportant so potentially contaminatedpeople may be identified, and measures taken to preventthe contamination of additional people. Initially, themilitary may have the only effective radiation detectioninstruments at :he scene and may monitor potentiallycontaminated clvdians. Responsibility for monitoringcivilians will shift to the DoE, state radiation controlpersonnel or civilian authorities/ representatives as theyarrive on-scene with appropriate instruments. Monitor-ing of personnel is normally done at a ContaminationControl Station (CCS), however during the initialresponse when the number of radiation detectioninstruments and monitoring personnel is limited,alternative procedures must be devised if large numbersof people are involved. Depending on resources andrequirements, the OSC may decide to establish morethan one CCS. If sufficient resources exist to support

a station separate from that used for response forcepersonnel.

(1) Monitoring and Decontaminating PotentiallyExposed Medical Treatment Facilities. Immediatelyfollowing an accident, injured personnel maybe removedfor medical treatment, or fatalities may be moved toa hospital or morgue without being monitored forcontamination. The potential contamination of amedical treatment facility or ambulance could presenta health problem for the staff and other patients.Therefore, judgments must be made as to whethercasualties have been removed from the contaminatedarea and, if so, what facilities are involved. Thosefacilities and the transportation resources used shouldbe notified of the potential problem. Paragraph 14-5describes procedures a medical facility may use to controlthe spread of contamination. Dispatch of a radiologicalmonitoring team to check the vehicles and facilitiesinvolved for contamination, and to assist in decontam-ination or other measures, as appropriate, to preventthe spread of contamination should be given the highestpriority.

(2) Contamination Control Station (CCS).

(a) The CC$ employs a contamination reductionarea (CRA) c&cept. The CRA is used to eliminate (orreduce to an acceptable level) contamination ofpersonnel operating in the contaminated area. With theprocessing of personnel through the CCS, there is thepossibility of a movement of contamination upwindthrough the CCS. Therefore, the CCS should be set upin a facility or tent to minimize dispersing by the windof contaminants on boots, gloves, or anti-contaminationsuits. The CCS employs kraft paper, plastic, or dropcloths to collect contamination that may fall from anti-contamination clothing. Also, the CCS uses supervised,structured, and meticulous anti-contamination suitsand /or clothing removal procedures to preclude amechanical transfer of contamination outside the CCS.

(b) Persons present at the accident site or inknown contaminated areas must be identified andscreened to determine whether decontamination or other

multiple stations, processing contaminated or potentially Corrective action is required. Normally this action is donecontaminated civilian residents may be desirable through at a CCS. Casualties should be monitored and

7-l

decontaminated to the extent injuries permit, however,urgent medical treatment has priority and exceptionsmay be necessary. Procedures for handling contaminatedcasualties are in paragraph 14-5. An example of a CCSis shown in Figure 7-1. When processing a large groupof people, this type station will process a person aboutevery four minutes if no contamination is found. Ifequipment and monitors are available, additional linesshould be established in the station to process largenumbers of people. When processing people whosepersonal clothing is contaminated, the clothing shouldbe bagged separately and a receipt issued for thosearticles retained. A priority system should be establishedto permit immediate processing of EOD personnel,monitor team leaders, and others whose presence orinformation is needed to facilitate other responseoperations. The location of the contamination controlstation should be governed by the following constraints:

J. It must be located in an area free ofcontamination.

~. It ideally will be located directly upwind ofthe accident, but terrain or other considerations maydictate another location. If not upwind, it must be farenough away to prevent airborne or resuspendedcontamination from entering the CCS.

~. Initially, it should be located outside thefragmentation zone as well as beyond the perimeter ofthe contaminated area. After all explosives have beenrendered safe, the CCS may be moved closer to theaccident site if appropriate.

~. It should be in an area relatively free ofweeds, bushes, and rocks. A paved or flat, compactedsurface is recommended.

(3) Alternative Procedures. If an accident occursnear a populated area and several hundred people arepotentially contaminated, available radiation detectioninstruments and monitoring personnel may be inade-quate to process the people fully and quickly. Theassumption is that the potentially contaminated peopleare not response personnel. [f only a few radiationdetection instruments are available, use of an abbreviatedmonitoring procedure may be considered to expediteprocessing. Contamination of the hands, seat, and shoesor lower legs may be caused by handling contaminatedobjects or moving and sitting in contaminated areas.

Contamination of the upper chest or neck and headarea is indicative of exposure to airborne contamination.If radiation detection instruments are unavailable tomonitor the people involved, procedures to decontam-inate all people coming from the contaminated areashould be used immediately. Provisions should be madeto monitor them later when instruments are available.Such a procedure would require provisions to collectand receipt for clothing, shower and shampoo the people,and issue replacement clothing. Each article of clothingshould be bagged separately, if feasible, and all clothingplaced in a single large bag and a receipt issued. Watches,jewelry, and the contents of pockets and pocketbooksshould not be highly contaminated, if at all, and shouldbe retained by the individual. Although the contami-nation may be retained wjth the clothing, an over-ridingneed exists to assure the people that they are being caredfor. Therefore, a gym or other facility with dressingrooms and high capacity showers may be appropriatefor processing people. Soap, shampoo, towels, andstocks of replacement clothing must be obtained. Peopleprocessed in this manner, and their collected clothing,should be monitored as soon as possible. Uncontam-inated clothing should be returned at the ear!iest possibletime.

c. Vehicle Monitoring. Vehicles used by the responseforce in the contaminated area will remain there forfuture use and not require immediate monitoring ordecontamination. If members of the public in thecontaminated area are sent, or go, to the CCS or otherprocessing points using their own vehicles, the vehicleshould be monitored before being moved away fromthe area. An example of a vehicle CCS is shown inFigure 7-2. All outer surfaces and the air filter may havebeen contaminated by airborne contamination, whilewheel wells, tires, and the rear end may be contaminatedfrom driving across contaminated areas. Unless thewindows were down, or ventilators open, detectablecontamination of the interior is most likely on thosesurfaces in contact with the vehicle occupants, forexample, floorboards and seats. If only external surfacesof a vehicle are contaminated, decontamination shouIdbe relatively easy to perform, if done before bondingbetween the contaminant and the vehicles paint occurs.Also, rapid decontamination and return of privatevehicles may reassure the public “that consideration isbeing given to their interests and property.

7-2

Windt

Contamination Area Line

Direction I Contaminated

mEquipment

DroD

“cl

Chair Shoe Covers Chair

❑ o m o(Hot Line)

ClothingR t

AirSampler

Chair Chair

❑ n—100-6 )M .

(1Masks20M

Decontamination IS t a t i o n

Sump

Water \

BWash Station

I.n -Soap

TowelsContaminatedWaste

contamination Control Line

t El- Medical Station

61 O-1OOOM(2000’-3000’)

5

Instrument

CLEAN AREARepair

~ Buffer Zone~

Disaster Cordon

Figure 7-1. Contamination Control Station (Example).

7-3

Contamination Area Line

Wind Direction

EParkingArea

Hot Line

Contamination Control Line

InitialMonitoring

u

WashingArea

L

FinalMonitoring I

)’Sump

Vehicle Exit

CLEAN AREA

nParkingArea

Figure 7-2. Vehicle Contamination Control Station Example.

74

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 8

BIOASSAY PROCEDURES

8-1 BIOASSAY

a. Bioassays are procedures which estimate theamount of radioactive material deposited in the body,either by direct measurement, using sensitive x-raydetectors placed over the chest (lung counting) and/ orother organs, or by detection of radioactivity in theexcreta (feces and urine). Therefore, a number of factorsmust be known in addition to the quantity and isotopicdistribution of the material to make an accurate estimateof the dose.

Chemical formRoute of intakeElapsed time from intakeOrgan(s) containing the materialDistribution patternOrgan(s) mass(es)Biological half-lifeParticle size of the original materialDecay scheme of the radioisotope

Complex mathematical models have been developed thattake each of these into account.

b. Three methods are used to determine the amountof material present in the body. Each method has specificadvantages and disadvantages and the specific methodsin any given situation will be determined by the healthphysicists.

(1) Fecal Sampling. Fecal sampling is an effectivebioassay method which has the advantage that samplescan be evaluated in the field. Samples should not betaken until at least 48 hours after exposure to permitpassage of the contamination through the intestinal tractand should be submitted in well-sealed plastic bags. Lowenergy gamma radiation sensors such as the FIDLERcan be used to estimate the plutonium content. For moredefinitive results, chemical separation and low levelcounting techniques must be used. Fecal sampling isespecially effective during the first few days, but canbe done at any time during the first year after exposure.Figure 8-1 may be used to estimate the frst year dosecommitment to the lungs based on contaminationdetected in feces.

(2) Urine Sampling. Urine sampling is a lesssensitive indicator of plutonium exposure; only a tinyfraction of the amount inhaled is excreted through urine.This fraction also depends on volubility of the plutoniumin the original aerosol. Samples taken during the firstfive days after the exposure will not reflect the quantityof plutonium inhaled due to the time requir:d formovement through the body. Urine samples taken upto 200 days after the exposure can be used for analysis.Urine samples must be processed in a chemistrylaboratory before quantification is possible, butscreening for very high levels can be done in the field.Samples should be submitted in plastic or glass bottleswith well-sealed tops.

(3) Lung Counting. Lung counting is the directmeasurement of emitted x-rays and gamma radiationfrom the body with a sensitive low energy photondetector. Probably, lung counting is the most accuratemethod of determining internal exposure. Lung countersare used at National Laboratories, commercially, andat some hospitals and universities. Most lung countersare immobile systems using large shielded rooms (specialtrailer mounted systems can be obtained through theDepartment of Energy (DoE) in a few days), and thepatient must be sent to the facility. Plutonium is retainedin the lung for a very long time.

8-2

a.

BIOASSAY PROCEDURES

Administration of a bioassay program for effectedcivilians may be the responsibility of the state or Federalagency or effected country. The guidelines in Table 8-1 are provided to assist the response force or civiiianauthorities conducting initial screening in advisingindividuals contaminated when requested to provideurine or fecal samples for analysis. Advisors explain thatsample analysis will determine if the individual receiveda detectable radiation dose when contaminated. Thebioassay procedures used will be established by healthphysicists responding to the accident. When bioassaysamples are collected, every effort should be made to

.- keep samples and their containers free of contaminationfrom the environment, clothing, or skin. Since tritium

8-1

FIRST YEAR DOSE COMMITMENT TO LUNG

r-—--’ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘–—

1

I FCCAL .wmrs, s

INTAKE ASSUMPTIONS

L.JEAPONS GRAOE PLUTONIUM

I 1

5 10

T

Am-at IWJRITY 1200 pm.PARTICLE SIZE 3.0 W-l AMAO25X U VOLUBILITY CLASS75X Y VOLUBILITY CLASS

OTHER ASSUMPTIONS

1 1 1

URINE ANALYS[S = OFECAL ANALYSIS = OIN-VIVO LUNG COUNTFACTOR FOR ALPHA =

ICRP-30 METABOLIC MOOELDOSE CALCULATED FOR MINIMUM

DETECTABLE LEVEL (MDLI fN BIOASSAYMOL FORMOL FORMOL FOROUAL 1 TY

1 1

095 PC1 /SAMPLE95 PCI/SAMPLE= 500 PC I AM-2+1?0

I 1

15 20 2 5 30 35 40 95 50

ME OF S A M P L E (DAYS A F T E R I N T A K E )

Use ofChart.

1. Enter chart with the time ofsample.2. Draw vertical line tocumefor sample type.3. Draw horizontal iineto Dose Equivalent scale.4. Divide thevalueobtained from theDose Equivalent scalebytheMDL for the sample type and multipiy this vahreby the

contamination level of thesrsmple inpicocuries to get theestimatedfust year dose to the lung.

Example: Measurement ofafecd nmpletaken 5daystiter theaccident read lOOO~i.1. Steps 1-3 give a Dose Equivalent Scale value of 4 x 10-4.2. TheMDLforfecal samplesis.45pCi.3. 4 x 10-4

x 1000= .889 rem (The estimated fust year dose to the lung.). 4 5

Andy@ ofawmple taken from themmeperson (mmefirst yeadow) 10daysafter theaccident would beexpected to read only20 ~i, assuming the individual inhafed contamination only on the day of the accident.

.-

Figure 8-1. Estimated First-Year Dose Commitment to the Lungs.

TABLE 8-1. Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling.

FecesSuspected Optimum Sampling

Radioactive Time AfterMaterial Exposure

Plutonium 2 daysUranium 2 daysTritium N / A

contamination cannot be detected by CCS monitoring,anyone suspected of having been exposed to tritiumshould follow the guidelines in Table 8-1. A bioassayprogram is recommended for all individuals withoutrespiratory protection and found to be contaminated.This program will determine if any dose was receivedand provides assurance to those who did not receivea dose that their health was not effected. To providesimilar assurance to all people in the contaminated area,bioassays may be appropriate even for people whoweren’t found to be contaminated; moreover, somepeople never in contaminated areas will request teststo ensure they were not effected by the accident.

(1) Bioassay Priorities. If a nuclear weapon accidentoccurs near a populated area, obtaining bioassay samplesfrom large numbers of people may be necessary.

NOTE: Since it is virtually impossible for a significantamount of plutonium to be incorporated into the bodywithout gross contamination of skin or clothing alsooccurring, initial alpha monitoring which identifiescontaminated personnel also can provide a method for

assuring that those with the greatest possibility ofradiation exposures which may affect their health aregiven priority treatment.

Table 8-2, applicable only to people not wearingrespiratory protection, provides recommended guide-lines for the assignment of priorities for bioassayanalysis. Response force personnel will normally beequipped with protective clothing and respirators, whenrequired. Bioassays for response force personnel will beperformed in accordance with Service regulations andas directed by the On-Scene Commander.

Personnel falling in the HI priority category in Table8-2 may have had a substantial plutonium intake.Conversely, exposure to airborne contamination whichproduces a surface contamination level in the LOcategory will be less likely to result in a significantdeposition in the lungs, To ensure alpha meter readingsprovide a valid guide for assignment of priorities,individuals should be asked, during screening, if theyhave bathed or changed clothes since the time of possiblecontamination. A record must be made and retainedfor future reference of all personnel screened and the

UrineOptimum Sampling

Time After SampleExposure @.?!@l!

2-3 weeks 24 hours total24 hours 24 hours total4-8 hours 1 voiding .

results of both alpha meter screening and bioassays. Useof the Radiation Health History and Bioassay ScreeningForms contained in Appendix 5-E should be considered.

(2) Nasal Smears. If initial alpha meter screeningindicates probable plutonium inhalation, a nasal smearshall be collected for analysis by specialized teams whenthey arrive on-site. Contamination on a wipe (Q-Tip)from inside the nasal passage is a possible indicator ofplutonium inhalation. Due to the biological half-life ofnasal mucus, a nasal smear is a reliable indicator onlyif collected during the first hour after t he exposure. Whenmedical personnel collect nasal smears, the Q-tip mustbe free from any gels or other material that will prohibitalpha particle counting.

b. Personnel Exposure and Bioassay Records.Documentation should be maintained on all personnelwho enter the radiological control area, or who mayhave been contaminated prior to establishment of aradiological control area. Examples of forms used forrecording data on personnel working in the radiologicalcontrol area, or who may have been exposed tocontamination downwind from the accident, arecontained in Appendix 5-E. To ensure appropriatefollow-up actions are completed on all exposed, orpotentially exposed people, a copy of all CCS logs, otherprocessing station records, bioassay data, and otherdocumentation identifying people who were or were notcontaminated should be provided to the Joint HazardEvaluation Center for consolidation into a single datafile. This data file is subject to Privacy Act regulations,and must be retained as part of the permanent accidentrecords. Therefore, procedures for handling dataobtained on non-DoD personnel should be coordinatedwith the OSC’S legal officer. Data obtained on DoDpersonnel will be needed to satisfy Service-specificrequirements contained in AR 40-14, Control andRecording Procedures for Occupational Exposure toIonizing Radiation; NAVMED P-5055, RadiationHealth Protection Manual; AFR 161-8, Control andRecording Procedures Occupational Exposure toIonizing Radiation; AFR 161-28, Personnel DosimetryProgram and the USAF Master Radiation ExposureRegistry, references (q), (r), (s), and (t). These records

- shall be retained and become part of the individual’spermanent medical record.

8-3

E!@.@

TABLE 8-2. Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays.

Alpha Contamination Level on Clothing or Skin

HIMED

LO

60 cmz probe

Above 300,000 Cpm50,000-300,000 cpmBelow 50,000 cpm

17 cmz probe

Above 75,000 Cpm12,500-75,000 cpmBelow 12,500 cpm

8-4

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 9

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, CHARACTERISTICS,

HAZARDS AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS

9-1 PLUTONIUM (Pu)

a. General Characteristics. Plutonium is a heavy metalwith a shiny appearance (similar to stainless steel) whenfreshly machined. After exposure to the atmosphere fora short period of time, it will oxidize to a dark brownor black appearance.

b. Radiological Characteristics. The radiological half-lives of the plutonium isotopes and significant daughterproducts present in a nuclear weapon containingplutonium are as follows:

&!.!!PS Half-life (years)Pu-239, 2.41 X 104Pu-240 6.57 X 103Pu-241 14.4Pu-242 3.76 X 105Am-24 1 432

(1) All of the isotopes listed above are primarilyalpha emitters except Pu-241, which is primarily a betaemitter. Pu-241 is an important consideration becauseof its daughter product, americium-241 (Am-241).

(2) Weapons grade plutonium (including ameri-cium) will emit two detectable photons, a 17 keV x-ray and 60 keV gamma ray. Surveys plotting the 17keV x-ray data must be done within the fust five days.After this time, or after rain, the measurable low energyradiation may be shielded as the contaminant migratesinto the ground. Am-24 1 provides the 60 keV gammaradiation which is detectable even after such migration.Gamma radiation can be detected at distances of severalmeters by many survey instruments.

(3) A critical mass can range from several hundredgrams, to several thousand grams, depending on thegeometry of the container and the material surrounding,or near, the plutonium. Therefore, recovery personnelshould consult EOD technical publications and/orcoordinate with knowledgeable scientific advisors fromthe DoE ARG to ensure a critical mass is not beingassembled.

c. Hazards and Health Considerations: Plutonium isconsidered the most significant radiological hazardassociated with an accident involving nuclear weaponscontaining plutonium. The primary hazard of pluto-nium, an alpha emitter, results from-entry into the bodyby inhalation and subsequent deposition in the lungs.Most of the plutonium that eventually enters the bloodstream is deposited in the bone and liver. Bone depositionmay produce bone diseases (including cancer) manyyears later. Because both the physical and biologicalhalf-lives of plutonium are extremely long, it willessentially be held within the body for a lifetime. Thehazards from americium taken inside the body arecomparable to those of plutonium.

(1) The elimination of plutonium from the bodyis a very slow process. However, if a person is givenprompt hospital treatment with a chelating agent, someof the plutonium retained in the body may be reducedsignificantly.

(2) A properly sized and fitted protective mask andstandard anti-contamination clothing will protectpersonnel against levels of plutonium contaminationexpected at an accident site.

9-2 URANIUM (U)

a. General Characteristics: Uranium is a heavyelement which occurs in nature in significant quantities.When first machined, it has the appearance of stainlesssteel. When exposed to the atmosphere for a short period,it will oxidize to a golden-yellow color and from thatto black.

b. Radiological Characteristics: Three forms ofuranium have been used in nuclear weapons—naturaluranium, depleted uranium, and enriched uranium.

“ (1) Natural Uranium - When uranium is separatedfrom its ore, the resulting mixture of uranium is referred .

9-1

to as “natural uranium. ” Natural uranium consists ofthe following three alpha-emitting isotopes:

E!wPs Abundance Half-life (years)

U-238 99.284 4.5 x 109U-235 0.710 7.1 x 108U-234 0.006 21.5 X IOs

Natural uranium in a metal form has been called“tuballoy”.

(2) Depleted Uranium - Uranium with someamount of its U-235 extracted is known as “depleteduranium” (for example, depleted in U-235). Depleteduranium is called “DU*’ and “D-38”.

(3) Enriched Uranium - “Enriched uranium” isuranium containing more than the naturally--occurringamount of U-235. It is manmade and the enrichment--that is the concentration of the U-235 in the uranium--may vary up to over 90 percent U-235. Enricheduranium has been used as the nuclear material in someweapons and is called “oralloy” at certain enrichmentpercentages (for example, 40 percent and 93 percent).Like plutonium, care must be taken during the recoveryof enriched uranium so that a critical mass is notassembled. Depending on the material associated withthe uranium and the geometry of the container, a criticalmass of enriched uranium can range from severalhundred to several thousand grams. Therefore, recoverypersonnel should consult EOD technical publicationsand/or coordinate with knowledgeable scientificadvisors from the DoE ARG to ensure that a criticalmass is not being assembled.

c. Hazards and Health Considerations The radiolog-ical hazards associated with any of the isotopes ofuranium are less severe generally than those ofplutonium. If uranium is taken internally, a type of heavymetal poisoning may occur, and lung contamination dueto inhalation can cause a long term hazard. In general,when involved in a fire, uranium will melt and forma slag with only a portion of it oxidizing. However,the possibility of hazardous airborne contaminationexists and protective measures must be taken to protectagainst inhalation or ingestion. An M 17 protective maskand standard anti-contamination clothing will protectpersonnel adequately against uranium hazards.

9-3 TRITIUM (T)

a.. General Characteristics: Tritium is a radioactiveisotope of hydrogen and diffuses very rapidly in the air

with a measurable diffusion rate even through very densematerials such as steel. Tritium combines chemically witha number of elements liberating heat in the process, andlike normal hydrogen, can combine combustively withair forming water and release great amounts of heat.Metals react with tritium in two ways by plating (theprocess by which a thin film of tritium is deposited onthe surface of the metal) and by hydriding (the chemicalcombination of tritium with the metal). In eitherreaction, the surface of the metal will become contam-inated with radioactive material.

b. Radiological Characteristics: Tritium has aradiological half-life of 12.26 years and decays into astable helium-3 atom by emission of a weak beta particle.With the proper catalyst i.e., fire, tritium combinesspontaneously with oxygen in the air and will also replaceordinary hydrogen in water or other hydrogenousmaterial (grease or oil), causing these materials tobecome radioactive.

c. Hazards and Health Considerations: Tritiumconstitutes a health hazard when personnel are engagedin specific weapon render-safe procedures, whenresponding to an accident that has occurred in anenclosed space, and during accidents which haveoccurred in rain, snow, or in a body of water. In itsgaseous state, tritium is not absorbed by the skin toany significant degree. The hazardous nature of tritiumis due to its ability to combine with other materials.Tritium water vapor (TO or HTO) is readily absorbedby the body, both through inhalation and absorptionthrough the skin. The radioactive water that enters thebody is chemically identical to ordinary water and isdistributed throughout the body tissue. Although it takesa relatively large amount of tritium to be a significantradiation hazard, caution should be taken. Tritium whichhas plated out on a surface or combined chemically withsolid materials is a contact hazard. The human bodynormally eliminates and renews 50 percent of its waterin about 8-12 days. This turnover time or biologicalhalf-life varies with the fluid intake. Since tritium oxideis water, its residence time in the body may besignificantly reduced by increasing the fluid intake.Under medical supervision, the biological half-life maybe reduced to about three days. If forced-fluid treatmentis deemed necessary, and medical supervision isunavailable, a recommended procedure is to have thepatient drink one quart of water within one-half hourafter exposure. Thereafter, maintain the body’s watercontent by imbibing the same amount as that excreteduntil medical assistance can be obtained. Medicalassistance should be obtained as soon as possible.

9-2

Although the biological half-life of tritium is short,personal hazard results because of the ease with whichtritium water vapor is absorbed and its rapid distributionthroughout the body tissue. A self-contained breathingapparatus and protective clothing will protect personnelagainst tritium absorption for short periods of time. Afilter mask such as M 17 has no protective value fortritium.

9-4 THORIUM (Th)

a. General Characteristics: Thorium is a heavy, densegray metal which is about three times as abundant asuranium. Thirteen isotopes are known, with atomicmasses ranging from 223 through 235.

b. Radiological Characteristics: Thorium-232 is theprincipal isotope. It decays by a series of alpha emissionsto radium-225, whose radiological half-life of 14.1 billionyears. Thorium-232 is not fissionable, but it is used inreactors to produce fissionable uranium-233 by neutronbombardment. A non-nuclear property of thorium isthat when heated in air, it glows with a dazzling whitelight, Because of this property, one of the major usesof thorium has been in the Welbach lantern mantel usedin portable gas lights. An unburned mantle will providean alpha indication of approximately 15,000 CPM on

standard alpha survey instruments. Mantle ash from asingle mantle will provide even higher readings.

c. Hazards and Health Considerations: Thoriumpresents both a toxic and radiological hazard. Toxico-logically, it causes heavy metal poisoning similar to leador the uranium isotopes. Biologically, thorium accum-ulates in the skeletal system where it has a biologicalhalf-life of 200 years, the same as plutonium. An M 17protective mask and standard anti-contaminationclothing will adequately protect against thorium.

9-5 FISSION PRODUCTS

The materials considered thus far are used in weaponsin pure forms and in combinations with other elements.Due to weapon design, the probability of a nucleardetonation as a result of an accident is unlikely. If fissionoccurs, the products of the reaction may pose a severehazard. In general, fission products are beta and gammaemitters and are hazardous, even when external to thebody. To predict and estimate the quantity of fissionproducts is difficult since the amount of fission isunknown, and to further complicate the situation, therelative isotopic abundances will change with time asthe shorter lived radioisotopes decay. An estimate ofthe hazard may be obtained by beta and gammamonitoring.

.-

9-3

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 10

SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE

10-1 GENERAL

A shipboard nuclear weapon accident differs from land-based scenarios in severai aspects. A fire or explosionassociated with the accident has the potential to causeloss of the ship. Results of shipboard fires are well knownand documented in Repair Party Training and Proce-dures Manuals. Explosions, whether from a nuclearweapon or some other source (for example, petroleumfuels or conventional weapons) can cause severe damageeffecting the safety and seaworthiness of the ship.Although the initial response by shipboard personnelwill be the same wliether an accident occurs at sea orin port, the frequent lack of immediate assistance atsea increases the importance of correct and adequateresponse by shipboard personnel. A significant differenceis that the ship may, depending on the damage sustained,be directed to another location for weapon recoveryoperations and decontamination.


In a nuclear weapon accident, the Commanding Officer(CO) will focus attention on saving the ship and crew,protecting the public from health hazards, and keepingthe chain-of-command informed of the situation. Thischapter provides guidance concerning aspects of anuclear weapon accident response unique to theshipboard environment.

10-3 RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

A ship’s damage control organization will provide theinitial response to a shipboard nuclear weapon accidentand will be augmented by the following.

a. Explosive .Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment- Composed of one officer and four enlisted EODspecialists or detachments are embarked ‘on CVs/ CVNS,AEs, and AOES during deployments. Also, detachmentsare permanently assigned to major U.S. port facilitiesthroughout the world and are trained to respond to anuclear weapon accident.

b. Weapon Safing Team - Composed of members ofthe ship’s crew, this team performs emergency weaponsafing procedures in the absence of an EOD team.

c. Radiation Monitoring Team - Comprised ofmembers of the ship’s crew, this response element istrained to operate RADIAC instruments and man the .contamination control stations or decontaminationstations.

d. The Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team- This team is located at NAVSEADET RASO,Yorktown, VA and can provide on-scene advice whenradioactive contamination is released. The ability of thedetachment to respond rapidly depends on the ship’slocation at the time of the accident. Again dependingon the remoteness of the accident, the same responseorganizations described in Chapters 3 through 14 maybe tasked to respond.

10-4 EQUIPMENT

The AN/ PDR-73 and IC/T2-PAB(M) are used to detecttritium. The AN/ PDR-56 alpha survey instrument isthe ship’s primary RADIAC instrument used in nuclearweapons accident response. The AN/ PDR-27 low rangebeta-gamma survey instrument is used primarily byinitial entry teams to determine gamma dose rate andis carried by all ships. The AN/ PDR-43 high range beta-gamma survey instrument is also available and may beused to determine high beta-gamma dose rates, ifrequired. The functions of these instruments arediscussed in Appendix 1O-B. The availability of airmonitoring equipment to a ship depends on the ship’sweapons maintenance capability for airborne radioactivematerial detection equipment. EOD teams haveequipment for detection of gaseous radioactivity.

10-5 PRE-ACCIDENT PREPARATION

-The key to responding to a nuclear weapon accidentis planning, training, and adhering to precautionarymeasures during critical stages. In addition to possessing

iO-1

a well exercised shipboard ‘Nuclear Weapon Accidentbill, ships should take the following preventive measuresduring weapons movements when the chance for anuclear weapon accident is at its peak:

a. Have Damage Control parties alerted withprotective equipment, calibrated RADIAC, andfirefighting equipment.

b. Station security forces in the immediate area ofthe movement.

c. Ensure that the medical department and EODdetachment (when available) are on alert.

d. Establish a sound powered phone link betweenDamage Control Central, Damage Control parties andweapons handling personnel.

10-6 ACCIDENT

a. When an accident occurs in port, it shouId behandled similar to the one that occurs ashore. The initialresponse force will be derived from the activity in whichthe accident occurred (in this case the ship) andaugmentation will be provided by a SRF. Theseprocedures have been established in previous chapters.The major differences in port lay in the flexibilityprovided by the ship.

b. At sea, the possibility of augmentation by a ServiceResponse Force will be diminished and the action bythe ship’s forces in effecting the response will be critical.Some additional assistance by specialized units may beprovided by ships in the vicinity. Also, EOD detachmentsmay be parachuted into the area.

(1) Initial Response Procedures. These proceduresare the most crucial in gaining control of a nuclearaccident or incident. Accordingly, all ships forc~personnel who, by the nature of their official duties,may become directly or indirectly involved in a nuclearaccident or incident are trained to perform the followingprocedures:

(a) When a nuclear accident or incident occurs,the senior person present shaIl take charge at the sceneand direct available personnel to:

~. Attempt to save the lives of personnelinvolved.

~. Attempt, when required, to extinguish a fireinvolving weapons or radioactive material using the

firefighting guidance provided in S WOP 20-11 andAppendix 1O-A.

j. Establish a security perimeter surroundingthe accident scene, limiting access to authorizedpersonnel only. The security perimeter aboard ship maybe defined by securing hatches to a compartment,passageway, or hangar deck. In all cases, once the hatcheshave been secured, only personnel authorized by thesenior person present shall be allowed at the accidentscene.

~. Direct all personnel at the scene to takeemergency breathing precautions. As a minimum,personnel shall cover their noses and mouths with ahandkerchief or similar item to minimize inhalation ofhazardous materials and smoke.

~. Notify Damage Control Central, via mostexpedient means, that an accident has occurred incompartment/ passageway/ hangar deck (by compart-ment and frame number).

(b) Upon notification of an accident or incident,Damage Control Central shall:

~. Notify the bridge of the accident locationand recommend to the commanding officer the stateof readiness and heading to which the ship should bebrought.

~. Initiate routine announcements over the1 MC as follows:

“NO EATING, DRINKING OR SMOKING ISALLOWED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.”

~. Initiate standard shipboard damage controlprocedures including initiating a radiation plot,identifying route(s) to DECON station, recommendchanges to ships heading to vent smoke, toxic gases,and contaminated firefighting water. Near shore releasesshould be done as a last resort action.

4. Prepare to initiate battle dressing anddecontamination station procedures.

(c) The bridge/strike operations center, uponnotification of an accident or incident shall:

~. Initiate initial OPREP-3 report.~. Make preparation if in an in-port status for

assisting the OSC designated by the Fleet Commander.~. Bring the ship to appropriate condition of

readiness.~. Act, as appropriate, on Damage Control

Central recommendation..- 5. Continue OPREP-3 situation reports, as

required.

~. Request if required, helicopter/parachuteinsertion of nearest EOD Detachment.

(2) Follow-on Response Procedures. These proce-dures are an extension of the initial response procedures.However, they include more detailed procedures forproviding positive control of an accident scene. Theresponsibility of executing these procedures rests withthe senior person at the scene until relieved byappropriately qualified damage control personnel or, inthe case of an in-port accident, the shore establishmentsdesignated OSC.

(a) As soon as practicable after notification ofan accident or incident, damage control RADCONshould conduct beta/gamma detection operations.RADCON AN-/ PDR-27 monitors should then proceedto the extremities of the accident scene, maintainingconstant surveillance of the instrument to detectincreases in gamma radiation. Any radiation readingabove normal background shall be reported immediatelyto Damage Control Central.

(b) In the absence of EOD personnel, the ship’sWeapon Safety Team may perform emergency proce-dures outlined in applicable SWOPS or technicalpublication, as directed by the CO, providing theweapons are not too severely damaged.

J_. Enter the compartment where the accidentoccurred and render the weapons/ materials safe usingapproved procedures and equipment.

~. Identify the types of containers/materialsaccredited for packaging explosives and radioactivematerials.

~. Report via sound powered telephonecompletion of EOD procedures to Damage ControlCentral and be available to assist and advise repairparties in the decontamination of affected areas.

(c) Public Affairs. At sea, Public Affairs will bethe responsibility of the Fleet Commander. TheCommanding Officer is responsible for informing theship’s crew regarding public affairs releases and priorto their debarking or using MARS, on procedures forresponding to requests for information from the pressor from families. When the ship is in port, public affairswill be coordinated by Fleet Commander or hisdesignated area’ coordinator.

(d) Security. Unless accident damage to the shipand/ or weapon(s) has destroyed the normal securityprovisions for the weapon(s), additional security will notbe needed. Additional security is provided if required,..

to ensure continued weapon protection and to preventunauthorized access.

(e) Debriefings. All ship’s crew members withinformation as to the cause of the accident, andparticularly those personnel who observed the extentof damage to the weapon(s), should be identified to assistin the accident investigation and debriefed to assesspotential internal damage to the weapon.

(f) Follow-on Response at Sea. Weather and seaconditions, the extent of damage to the ship, remaininghazards to the ship and crew, and the time requiredto get either expert assistance onboard or move the shipto suitable facilities, will all effect the specific follow-on response actions which the Commanding Officermight direct while at sea. Also, guidance will be providedby the Fleet Commander and the higher authority musthave estimates of damage to the ship and weapon(s).Moreover, the ship must be provided information onthe estimated time of arrival, the nature of any technicalassistance being sent, and be directed to an appropriateport. Much of the technical assistance discussed inChapters 5 and 17 may be airlifted to the accident ship,or a suitable ship in the vicinity for direct assistanceat sea, when dictated, due to damage, contamination,or other conditions.

j. Logistics. Resources will be limited to thoseonboard. Priority should be given to performingoperations to minimize any hazards to ship’s personneland damage to critical equipment, including RADIACS.

2. Ship Decontamination. The amount ofdecontamination ship’s personnel will be able to performwill be limited by the number of RADIACS availableto monitor and remonitor surfaces being decontaminatedand to operate the Contamination Control Station.Simple cleaning techniques are frequently effective inreducing, if not removing, contamination from manyof the surfaces on a ship. Decontamination techniquesare described in Chapter 19.

(g) Follow-on Response in Port. The follow-onresponse in port will be the responsibility of the shoreestablishment, and will follow procedures described inChapters 4 through 19.

(3) Claims. Any contaminated personal propertybelonging to ship’s personnel should be collected andmarked with the owner’s identification. The propertymust be replaced if it cannot be decontaminated. Ingeneral, decontamination of high value items, or itemswhich the owner cannot easily replace, must not be

‘ ~ttempted by ships personnel.

I o-3

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1O-A

SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING

1O-A-I

a. Normal shipboard firefighting and damage controlprocedures will apply to fires involving nuclear weaponswith the following provisions:

(1) Extinguishing the fire has priority.(2) Cooling of any weapons involved in the fire

or in close proximity should be performed to themaximum extent that fire hoses permit.

(3) Cooling should be continued after the fire isextinguished until the weapon is at ambient temperature.

b. The primary suppressant for a fire involving anuclear weapon is high velocity water fog (low velocityfog for submarines). The propellants used in any weapon,conventional or nuclear, produce oxygen once ignited.They cannot be extinguished with smothering agents,and some may cause the retention of heat within theweapon. This factor does not preclude the use of foam,C02, Purple-K, Aqueous Filming Forming Foam(AFFF) or other suppressants on aircraft fuel, NavyStandard Fuel Oil (NSFO), or other petroleum fuel fireswhich involve a nuclear weapon.

c. High velocity water fog, or a firefighting agentshouid be sprayed over the complete length of theweapon(s) and/ or both sides in a sweeping motion tocool the weapon and its high explosive contents untilthe weapon is at ambient temperature. When using foamto fight a fire surrounding an intact weapo~ water shouldnot be used to cool the weapon because water will floatthe foam away which could allow reignition of the fire.

d. For weather-deck fires, the nozzleman and numberone hoseman will wear OBA’S. Other hosemen andresponse personnel will be equipped with OBA’S or gasmasks. For below deck fires, all response personnel goingbelow decks will wear a self-contained breathingapparatus (for example, OBA and Scott Air Pack); topside personnel will wear gas masks. Any firefightersresponding initially without respiratory protectionshould be relieved as soon as possible. Repair partypersonnel will wear protective clothing as specified inNSTM 079-39.137, reference (p). Involvement of anuclear weapon does not require additional protectiveclothing for firefighting personnel. A backup firefighting

team, with appropriate respiratory protection, will beprepared to relieve, or rescue, teams at the scene.

e. Ordnance magazine sprinkling systems in or nearthe affected area shall be manned and made ready tobe activated;” however, the magazine sprinkling systemmust not be activated without specific orders from theCommanding Officer.

f. During firefighting actions, the flow of potentiallycontaminated water should be noted and the wettedsurfaces considered contaminated until monitoring canbe performed. The flow of potentially contaminatedwater should be controlled to the extent possible, anddewatering operations should not be performed in portuntil testing determines if the water is contaminated.The best method of controlling the potentiallycontaminated water will be ship and situation unique.

g. Fires involving nuclear weapons in enclosedshipboard spaces should be vented to the atmosphereas soon as practical to deplete toxic, caustic, and thepresence of radioactive gases. When venting shipboardspaces, care should be taken to minimize the possiblecontamination of the exterior of the ship. In the eventof a magazine accident, the normal exhaust system shallbe secured and emergency ventilation procedures used.Portable blowers (for example, Red Devil Blowers)should be used if there is no installed blowout system.Recommend use of “snorkel hosing” with high capacityfilters in conjunction with portable blowers to reducepossible contamination to portable blowers and ensurecontamination in smoke exhausted is directed outsidethe skin of the ship. In all cases, the exhaust vent shouldbe on the leeward side of the ship. After the fire isextinguished and when in port, unfiltered venting shouldnot be done if it results in contamination being spreadto nearby shore establishments or communities.

h. Upon extinguishing a fire involving a nuclearweapon, a reflash watch will be set to provide animmediate response to any reoccurrence of the fire.

i. Potentially contaminated equipment used to fightthe fire should be placed in a designated area untilmonitoring and necessary decontamination can beperformed.

IO-A-1

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 1O-B

SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL

1O-B-1

Monitoring for radioactivity is performed initially toidentify radioactive material. If radioactivity is found,monitoring continues to determine the extent of thecontaminated area. Personnel monitors are to identifycontaminated personnel who require decontamination,and to prevent the spread of “radioactive material touncontaminated parts of the ship.

a. Control of Contamination. Standard damagecontrol procedures should be used to limit damage andthe spread of contamination. Fire boundaries shall beset and maintained to prevent the spread of fire, andmaterial conditions ZEBRA and Circle WILLIAM setto prevent the spread of contamination and minimizethe effects of structural damage. Additionally, at theoutset of an accident, the ship should be maneuvered,if possible, so the wind is on the beam and carryingany contamination away from the ship.

(1) Ship Monitoring. If contamination was releasedduring the accident, it should be confirmed that portionsof the ship thought to be uncontaminated are in fact“clean.” Monitors should be directed initially to checkpassageways at hatches, doors, ladders, and otherlocations where most personnel would place their handsor feet. If contamination is found, its location shouldbe marked for decontamination and remonitoring.Contamination tracked, or carried, onto hard surfacescan be usually removed with soap and water, or by wipingwith a clean, damp cloth. Then monitors should bedirected toward the expected contaminated area. Theboundaries of the contaminated area should be defined.Then personnel should be advised of these boundariesand the procedures for crossing them if required foressential ship operations.

(2) Air Monitoring. Airborne radiological moni-toring shall be conducted to the extent instrumentationwill allow. However, many ships are not equipped withair samplers. Monitoring surfaces for loose surfacecontamination will be the most reliable indicator ofairborne contamination. If Table 6-2, Protective Devicesfor Emergency Workers as a Function of SurfaceContamination, is used, table values should be divided

by 100 to correct for the higher resuspension factors(0.001 vice the 0.00005 used to develop the table) whichcan be expected from shipboard surfaces.

b. Contamination Control Station (CCS). Thecontamination control station will be normally locatedat a compartment entrance for topside accidents andat a fire boundary for below deck accidents. Most shipswill have insufficient RADIAC instruments to supportmore than one CCS. If potentially contaminatedpersonnel are both above and below decks, routes tominimize their movement through clean areas shouldbe established. Access to the CCS must be possible fromboth contaminated and uncontaminated areas. A showerand wash basin should be designated for use indecontamination procedures. The wash facilities neednot be in the immediate vicinity of the CCS althoughsuch a location is preferable.

(1) Until the absence of gamma radiation isconfirmed by monitoring at the accident site, personnelshould be monitored at the CCS with the AN/ PDR-27 and the AN/ PDR-56. Once the absence of gammaradiation is confkmed, use of the ANI PDR-27 is nolonger necessary. The use of earphones with RADIACSis required. This practice results in easier, more accuratemonitoring. The user’s attention is not focused on theRADIAC’S meter movement, lessening the possibilityof damage or inadvertent probe contamination duringthe monitoring process.

(2) Personnel monitoring should include: the frontand backs of hands, forearms, torso, and legs; a thoroughcheck of the forehead, cheeks, nose and mouth are%and finally the ankles and feet. The preliminary readingsin the areas most likely to be contaminated (for example,the hands and feet) should be made with the probe 1/8-1 / 16th inch from the monitored surface. If the personis not obviously contaminated, contact readings maybe used for the remainder of the monitoring. If clothingis damp, inaccurate alpha contamination evaluation anddetection is probable. Damp clothing should be removed,assumed contaminated, and the person’s skin dried priorto evaluation for the presence of alpha contamination.

(3) To conserve the expenditure of protectivecfothing, initial personnel monitoring must be performed

prior to the removal of the clothing. If no contamination,

IO-B-1

or contamination below the acceptable emergencyremaining levels of contamination identified inOPNAVINST 3440.15, reference (u), are found on theprotective clothing, it should be removed and placedin containers for clothing to be reused. Booties and glovesshould be kept separate. If contamination levels greaterthan those levels shown in reference (u) are found, theprotective clothing should be removed and placed ina container marked for contaminated clothing.

(4) Personnel who had contamination on theirprotective clothing should be remonitored afterremoving the protective clothing. If contamination isalso on their personal clothing, the clothing should beremoved, placed in a plastic bag labeled as contaminatedclothing, and the fact noted in the CCS log. Ifcontamination is on the skin, it can normally be removedby washing with nonabrasive soap and water. Whenwashing, be sure not to puncture or abrade the skinthrough excess scrubbing. Following each washing, theskin should be thoroughly dried before monitoring todetermine if the procedure removed the alpha contam-ination. Shampoo contaminated hair several times. Finalmonitoring should be made with the probe in contactwith the skin. If two washings do not reduce contam-ination levels on the skin or hair, individuals shouldbe referred to the Medical Department for furtherdecontamination under medical supervision. BUME-DINST 6470.10, reference (r), provides detailed guidanceon personnel decontamination procedures and shouldbe available to the Medical Department. When allcontamination cannot be removed, the residual levelshould be recorded in medical records, the CCS log,and the Commanding Officer should be advised.Disposition of the contaminated individual(s) will bedetermined by the Medical Department cooperating withBUMED.

c. Protective Clothing. Any close knit clothing shouldprevent contamination of the skin and provide protectionfrom alpha contamination. If anti-contaminationclothing is unavailable, coveralls are recommended forpersonnel entering the contaminated area to repairdamage or perform decontamination operations.Openings in the clothing should be taped. When workingin a wet environment, waterproof clothing should beused for anti-contamination clothing if possible. Muchof the protection provided by coveralls will be lost ifthe material becomes soaked. Liquids soaking theclothing can carry contamination from the outer surfaceof the clothing. When removing contaminated clothing,care should be taken to prevent the outside of the clothingfrom contacting the skin.

d. Clothing Decontamination. The limited stock ofprotective clothing on board a ship may be exhaustedrapidly during decontamination operations at sea. Atsea, protective clothing and other launderable equipmentcan be laundered, if necessary, without damage to theequipment or the washing machine. Automatic washingmachines should be clean and free of soap scum toprevent deposition of contamination. If decontaminatingagents are used, they will aid in keeping washers freeof contamination. After laundered items have completelydried, they must be checked for any remainingcontamination. Items contaminated above acceptableemergency levels given in reference (u) and that do notshow any appreciable contamination reduction afterthree successive launderings should be packaged fordisposal as radioactive waste. Machines used to Iaundercontaminated clothing should not be used for normallaundry until after they have been fully cycled empty,allowed to dry, and monitored to ensure they are freefrom contamination.

10-B-2

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 11

CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS

GRADE PLUTONIUM

Assumptions:

1. Conversions are for weapons grade plutonium only with no Americium

2. Density of soil 1.5 g/cmj. “

3. Specific activity (alpha only) 0.075 Ci/g.

4. Contamination of soil is to the depth of 1 cm.

TABLE 11-1. Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium.

To Convert

,uCi/ m2

pCi/mzflCi/m2pCi/ mzpCi/ m2

pCi/ m2

Pgl m2

Pgl m2

Pgl m2

flgl m2

Pg/ m2

t.fgl m2

dpm/m2dpm/m2dpm/ m2dpm/m2dpm/m2dpm/m2dpm/cm2dpm/cm2dpm/cm2 ‘dpm/cm2dpm/cm~dpm/cm2dpm/gdpm/gdpm/g

~

W m2dpm/m2dpm/cm2dpm/gflCi/gpCi/gpCi/ m2

dpm/ m*dpm/cm2dpm/gpCi/gpCi/g

#Ci/ m2

t.fgl m2

dpm/cm2dpm/gpCi/g”pCi/gpCi/ m2

Pg/m “dpm/nizdpm/gpCi/gpCi/gpCi/m2,Lfg/ m2

dpm/mZ

Multiply by

132.2 X 10-62201506.7 X 10-5

670.0751.7X 10517115x 10-’5

4.5 x 10-76.1 X 10-610-46.7 X 10-53.0 x IO-113.0 x 10-54.5 x 10-36.1 X 10-2

104

0.67 .3.0 x 10-70.3

. - 6.8 x 1030.0911.5X 104

11-1

TABLE 11-1: Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium (Continued)

To Convert

dpm/gdpm/gdprn/g

,uCi/gflCi/gflCi/gpCi/ gflCi/gpCi/g

pCi/ gpCi/gpCi/gpCi/gpCi/gpCi/g

p unitsunits

Into Multiply by

dpm/cmz 1.5flCi/g 4.5 x 10-7pCi/g 0.45

flCi/m21.5 x 104

pg/m2 2 x 105

dpm/mZ 3.3 x 10IOdpm/cmz 3.3 x 106dpm/g 2.2 X 106pCi/g lo6

pCi/ m2 1.5 x IO-2W m2 0.20dpm/mz 3.3 x 10”dpm/cmZ 3.3dpm/g 2.2flCi/g ] 0-6

units 10-6

# units 106

The conversion of alpha instrument readings in cprn into quantifiable units is affected by the type of surface and

meter efficiency. For accurate conversions, a surface sample from the area measured should be analyzed with laboratory

equipment and the conversion factor for that area computed. The table below provides approximate factors for

conversion of alpha readings in cpm into ~gi mz for various surfaces using the following equation:

/Jg/ m2 - correction factor x c p m

I TYPE OF SURFACE CORRECTION FACTOR

Soil .006

Concrete .005

Plywood .004

Stainless Steel .0025

The correction factors consider unit and area conversions, nominal instrument efficiency during field use, and assumea 60 sq cm probe area (AN/ PDR-60 or PAC- 1 S). Correction factors should be multiplied by 4 for use with the

ANI PDR-56. Tables 11-2 and 11-3 were prepared from the .pre.ceding conversion table and equation for users

of the ANI PDR-56 and AN I PDR-60, respectively.

11-2

TABLE 11-2. Conversion Table (CPM to pg/mz or pCi/mz) AN/PDR 56 Alpha Meter.

STAINLESSCPM

50 1.2100 2.4200 4.8400 9.6600 14.4800 19.21,000 24.01,200 28.81,500 36.01,000 43.22,200 52.82,500 60.02,800 67.23,000 72.04,000 96.05,000 120.08,000 192.010,000 240.011,000 264.012,000 288.025,000 600.050>000 1200.075,000 1800.0100,000 2400.0150,000 3600.0200,000 4800.0300,000 7200.0

SOIL

pCi/m2Pu-239

.09

.18

.36

.721.081.441.802.162.703.243.964.505.045.407.209.0014.4018.0019.8021.6045.0090.00135.00180.00270.00360.00540.00

mUm2Pu-239

1.02.04.08.012.016.020.024.030.036.044.050.056.060.080.0100.0160.0200.0220.0240.0500.01000.01500.02000.03000.04000.06000.0

CONCRETE

pCi/m2Pu-239

.075

.15

.30

.60

.901.201.501.802.252.703.303.754.204.506.007.5012.0015.0016.5018.0037.5075.00112.50150.00225.00300.00450.00

Wfn2Pu-239

.81.63.26.49.612.816.019.224.028.835.240.044.848.064.080.0128.0160.0176.0192.0400.0800.01200.01600.02400.03200.04800.0

NOTE: To convert pCi/ mz to Becquerels/ mz (Bq/ mz) multiply by 3.7 x 10IJ.

.-

11-3

PLYWOOD

flCi/m2Pu-239

.06

.12

.24

.48

.72

.961.201.441.802.162.643.003.36 “3.604.806.009.6012.0013.2014.4030.0060.0090.00120.00180.00240.00360.00

@m2Pu-239

.51.02.04.06.08.010.012.015.018.022.025.028.030.040.050.080.0100.0110.0120.0250.0500.0750.0IOoo.o1500.02000.03000.O

SIEEL

pCi/m2Pu-239

.038

.075

.15

.30

.45

.60

.75

.901.131.351.651.882.102.253.003.756.007.508.259.0018.7537.5056.2575.00112.50150.00225.00

TABLE 11-3. Conversion Table (CPM to pg/ml or pCi/ml) AN/PDR 60 or AN/PDR 54 Alpha Meter

CPM

AN/ PDR 60 fig/mlAN/ PDR 54 Pu-239

501002004006008001,0001,2001,5001,8002,2002,5002,8003,0004,0005,0008,00010>000I I ,00012,00025,00050,00075,000100,000150,000200,000300,000

0.30.61.22.43.64.86.07.29.010.813.215.016.818.024.030.048.060.066.072.0150.0300.0450.0600.0900.01200.01800.0

SOIL

flCi/m2Pu-239

.023

.045

.09

.18

.27

.36

.45

.54

.68

.81

.991.131.261.351.802.253.604.504.955.4011.2522.5033.7545.0067.5090.00135.00

bgl m2Pu-239

.25

.50I .02.03.04.05.06.07.59.011.012.514.015.020.025.040.050.055.060.0125.0250.0375.0500.0750.01000.01500.0

CONCRETE

pCi/ mzPu-239

.019

.38

.075

.15

. 2 3

.30

.38

.45

.56

.68

.83

.941.051.131.501.883.003.754.134.509.3818.7528.1337.5056.2575.00112.50

flg/m2Pu-239

.2

.4

.81.62.43.24.04.86.07.28.810.011.212.016.020.032.040.044.048.0100.0200.0300.0400.0600.0800.01200.0

NOTE: To convert #Ci/mz to Becquerels/ mz (Bq/ mz) multiply by 3.7 x 10IJ.

11-4

PLY WOOD

gCi/m2Pu-239

.015

.03

.06

.12

.18

.24

.30

.36

.45

.54

.66

.75

.84

.901.201.502.403.003.303.607.5015.0022.5030.0045.0060.0090.00

m/m2Pu-239

.125

.25

.51.01.52.02.53.03.84.55.56.37.07.510.012.520.025.027.530.062.5125.0187.5250.0375.0500.0750.0

STAINLESSSIEEL

pCi/m2Pu-239

.009

.019

.038

.075

.i13

.15

.19

.23

.28

.34

.41

.47

.53

.56

.75

.941.501.882.062.254.699.3814.0618.7528.1337.5056.25

70006000500040003000

2000I 000900800700

600500400300200

10090807060

5040

TABLE 11-4. Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and uCi).

mCi

189.162.135.108.81.

54.27.24.21.618.9

16.213.510.88.15.4

2,72,42.161.891.62

1.351.08

30201098

76543

210.90.80.7

0.60.50.40.30.2

0.1

TABLE 11-5. Conversion To S1 Units.

1 Ci = 3.7 x 10!’2 Bq1 Bq = 2.7 x 1O-II Ci

1 REM = 10J Sv1 Sv = 100 REM

1 RAD = 10-2 Gy1 Gy = 100 RADs

S1 Units:Becquerels (Bq)Sieverts (Sv)Grey (Gy)

11:5

uCi

810540270240220

189 .162135108

81

54272421.618.9

16.213.510.88.15.4

2.7

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 12

COMMUNICATIONS

12-1 GENERAL

a. Fast, reliable and accurate communications areessential for nuclear weapon accident response opera-tions. Moreover, securing adequate internal commun-ications to support activities at the accident scene is atime-sensitive operation. Equally critical to effectivecommand and control is the timely establishment ofexternal communications to higher echelons, particularlyin the Washington arena. Therefore, the communicationsofficers of the Initial Response Force (IRF) and ServiceResponse Force (SRF) must take immediate action toensure that appropriate communications equipment isidentified and requested early in response operations.

b. Effective response to a nuclear weapon accidentrelies heavily on a communications officer knowledgeabout secure and non-secure tactical, strategic, andcommercial communications systems. He or she mustbe able to apply conventional and imaginative methodsand ensure that required communications are available.He or she should be equally adept at establishingcommunications support in remote locations, or in areasnear existing communications systems.

c. In addition to military communications at theaccident site, the DoE, FE MA, State and/or civilianofficials establish their own communications. Carefulattention must be afforded these installations to ensuremutual support and eliminate interference.


This chapter provides guidance for establishingcommunications systems and capabilities to supportresponse operations. The requirements of both the IRFand SRF are “discussed, including personnel at theaccident scene (internal communications) and at longdistances (external corhmunications). Also included aretreatments of various capabilities and hardware(telephone, radio, satellite, and visual signal) that are.available.


The On-Scene Commander (OSC) requires internalcommunications with the operations center and withforces in the field to control and keep abreast of responseactivities. External communications with higher echelonsof command are necessary to keep key personnelinformed. Many initial communications requirementscan be met by unsecure voice communications; however,both secure voice and record communications arerequired early in the response.

Communication requirements:

a. Establish internal communications.

(1) Telephone communications between fixed sitelocations, for example, the operations center and theJoint Information Center (JIC).

(2) Field phones for EOD operations (securephones are desirable).

(3) UHF/VHF nets. Several minimum nets,command (secure desirable), weapons recovery opera-tions (secure), radiological operations (secure desirable),security, public affairs will be required.

b. Establish external communications.

(1) Telephone communications with the Serviceoperations center, the National Military CommandCenter, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Public Affairs). Conferencing may suffice earlyin the response.

(2) Multiple telephone lines to support responseforce elements.

(3) Secure voice via satellite, telephone, .or HF.(4) Access to the Defense Communications System

for record communications.

c. Coordinate frequency usage of all responseorganizations to prevent interference and radiooperations in areas where electromagnetic emissions mayCreate explosive hazards or affect electronic and fieldlaboratory instruments.

. .

12-1

d. Obtain frequency clearances, as necessary.

e. Prepare a Communication-Electronics OperatingInstruction for use by all response organizations.

12-4 RESOURCES

The communications capabilities and resources fornuclear weapon accident recovery operations varywidely. Resources are as familiar as the telephone oras sophisticated as satellite capable secure voice radio.Communications assets must be capable of deploymentto, and operation in, remote locations. The followingpresents a variety of communications resources forresponse organizations. Because the same equipmentsupports numerous contingencies, only those assetsrequired for a specific nuclear weapon accident responseeffort should be requested. Resources are available fromthe DoD, other Federal organizations, or commercialsources.

a. Service Assets. The Military Services maintaincommunications assets organic to combat support unitsas well as for contingency assets. Information aboutspecific assets as well as procedures for requesting andtasking Service assets can be obtained from the respectiveService operations centers, or operational commanders.Telephone numbers are contained in Appendix l-G.

(1) U.S. Army. U.S. Army signal units havecommunications assets to support battalion, brigade,and division operations including wire/ telephoneswitchboards, multichannel radios, and record commun-ication systems.

(2) U.S. Air Force. Tactical communications assetsare available from both Combat Communication Groupsand HAMMER ACE as described in paragraph (a)below. “

(a) HAMMER ACE. HAMMER ACE is arapidly deployable team of engineers and techniciansequipped with advanced technology communicationsequipment. The team can deploy within three hours andestablish communications within 30 minutes of arrivalon-site. HAMMER ACE equipment can be transportedon C-21, or equivalent-type aircraft, or commercialairliners. Capabilities include secure satellite system forvoice, facsimile, and limited data communications. Thesecure satellite link can interface with AUTOSEVOCOM,STU-11, AUTOVON, and commercial telephone systemsthrough the HAMMER ACE operations center at ScottAFB, Illinois. Record communications can be “air-

gapped” to AUTODIN through the HAMMER ACEoperations center. Other capabilities include air-to-ground communications and a privacy feature, landmobile radio network with a repeater/base station forlocal communications. The land mobile radios caninterface with the secure satellite system. The limitedcapability provided by HAMMER ACE is an initialcapability only. For this reason, HAMMER ACEpersonnel, in conjunction with the OSC, evaluate thesituation and determine what, if any, additionalcapabilities are required. HAMMER ACE equipmentis capable of battery operations, and enough batteriesare deployed to sustain 72-hour operation. A follow-on deployment of generators or additional batteries isrequired for longer operations.

~. Requests for emergency HAMMER ACEsupport should be made directly to HQ AFCC/COXC(AFCC Command Center) or through the JNACC.Phone numbers are listed in Appendix 20-A. Anyavailable communications media may be used to submitthe request; however, verbal requests must be followedin writing within 24 hours. The requesting agency mustprovide the following information with the request.

a. Deployment location, including coordi-nates if avaiiabie.

~. Situation, including type of emergency.c. Points of contact.~. Remarks concerning any unusual condi-

tions for wh~ch the team should prepare.

~. Requests for additional information should“be directed to HQ AFCC/ DOXZ, Special Commun~’ications Division, Scott AFB, Illinois. Phone numbersare listed in Appendix 20-A.

(3) U.S. Navy. Each U.S. Navy Fleet Commanders-in-Chief has control of ashore mobile contingencycommunication units. These units are maintained in astate of readiness to permit deployment within 24 hoursby COMMNAVSTA Philippines and NAVCAMSLANTNorfolk, VA, respectively.

(a) Ashore Mobile Contingency Communica-tions (AMCC). The AMCC van is . a small mobilecommunications unit contained in one. transportableequipment shelter with two separately configured 55 kwmobile diesel generators. The van contains sufficientequipment to maintain the following circuitssimul~aneously:

~. Two secure full duplex teletype circuits (onevia HF radio; or alternatively, two via HF radio).

12-2

~. One narrow band secure voice (CV-3333)via satellite with KG-36 security equipment.

~. Two UHF secure voice circuits with KY-28 voice security equipment.

~. HF High Command (HICOM) net.~. UHF satellite fleet broadcast receiver (AN/

SSR-I receiver only).~. One PARKHILL narrow band secure voice

circuit via HF or UHF satellite.~. Two VINSON secure voice devices.

(b) When deployed, the AMCC uses local powerwhere available. Power source must be 440V, three phase,60 Hz. Otherwise, mobile generators supplied with theAMCC units will be used. A complete AMCC unit canbe transported via one C-130 aircraft, one CH-53helicopter, or one 6x65-ton truck. The mobile generatorsfor the AMCC, if needed, requires an additional liftif transported by helicopter. When transported via truck,an additional prime mover is required.

(c) The AMCC units are, at all times, under theoperational control of the respective Fleet Commanders-in-Chief (CINCS). All deployments of the AMCC areapproved by the Fleet CINC based on requests submittedby subordinate commands. Contingency requests shouldbe forwarded to the Fleet CINC as expeditiously aspossible. When the AMCC is deployed, and until itreturns to its host command, it is under the custodyand operational control of the designated supportedcommand.

(4) U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The USMC signalunits have multichannel radio, wire, and recordcommunication systems.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Controlled Assets.JCS contingency support communications resources arerequested according to procedures contained in“Mobile/ Transportable Communications Assets Con-trolled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (CJCS MOP 3)and in Allied Communications Publication 134,Supplement 1, references (w) and (x). Additionalinformation regarding these assets can be obtained fromthe JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division.

(1) Joint Communications Support Element(JCSE). Details of the JCSE deployment/employmentconcepts capabilities and logistics requirements,reference (y), can be obtained by contacting the JCSEat McDill AFB, Florida. The JCSE is a contingencysupport unit consisting of Army, Navy, Air Force, andMarine Corps personnel and a variety of communica-tions equipment including:

(a)(b)(c)(d)

secure).(e)

Switchboards.HF radio.Microwave/ troposcatter radios.UHF and VHF radios (secure and non-

Secure record communications terminals.(f) Weather dissemination equipment.(g) UHF and SHF satellite terminals.(h) Secure TELEFAX (DACOM 412).(i) KY-65, KY-70 and KY-75 secure voice devices,

and(j) The AN/ URC Joint Airborne Communica-

tions Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP).

~. The Joint Airborne Communication& Cen-ter/ Command Post (JACC/ CP), commonly referred t’oas JACKPOT, consists of several pieces of equipmentmounted in air transportable vans. The JACC/ CP hasfour major components—operations center, commun-ications control, generator, and an air conditioner/accessory trailer.

~. The JACC/CP can provide one highfrequency, single sideband (HF/ SSB) voice or teletypecommunication channel over its one-kilowatt transceiv-ers or high frequency, double independent sideband(HF/ ISB) with a total of four independent three-kilohertz (3 SPKHZ) voice or teletype channels over its10 kw system. The 10 kw system is limited to groundoperations only. The JACC/ CP also contains threeradios, a AN/ARC-73 (VHF/AM), AN/ARC-54(VHF/FM) and AN/ ARC-51BX (VHF/AM), forground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications.

3. The voice radio system may be connected.to a 10-fine, 20-line, or 30-line, four-wire/two-wiretelephone switchboard. The switchboard can connectany telephone subscriber to another telephone or aJACC/CP radio.

~. The complete JACC/ CP can be transportedin a winch equipped C-130 or larger aircraft. A widelowboy trailer must be used to transport the vans anydistance or over other than paved/gravel roads.

~. The JACC/ CP can be deployed within 24hours from the time the JCS issues deployment approvalmessages.

(2) JCS-Joint Controlled Tactical Communica-tions Assets. Details on the JCCSA are In the U.S. Armyplans for deployment of mobile/transportable commun-ications assets controlled by the JCS. During normalduty hours, additional information can be obtained from

,the U.S. Army Information Systems CommandContingency Branch, Ft Huachuca, Arizona, or fromtheir EOC. Phone numbers are in Appendix 20-A. The

12-3

JCCSA consists of heavy mobile/transportable equip-ment which can be deployed separately or in packagesby C-141/ C-5 aircraft. Equipment includes:

(a) Switchboards(b) HF radio(c) Troposcatter radios(d) Medium speed AUTODIN terminals(e) Manual secure voice switch and terminals(f) SHF satellite terminals

(3) Other JCS Controlled Assets. Most SHFsatellite terminals are under JCS deployment control.These terminals include the Ground Mobile Forces(GMF) te~minals assigned to the military Services. TheU.S. Army 235th Signal Company, Ft. Monmouth, NewJersey, maintains UHF and SH F research and devel-opment satellite terminals which can be deployed forcontingency operations and exercises. Also, the U.S. AirForce has communication assets similar to those in theJCCSA. They are located at 3rd Combat Communi-cations Group (CCG) and the 281st CCG, Air NationalGuard, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Equipment in the vanincludes a secure cord switchboard (SECORD), KY-3secure voice terminals, and a narrow band (HY-2) trunkwhich will interface with AUTOSEVO(DM. The vanis outsized and requires C-5 aircraft transport.

c. DoE Assets. The DoE maintains emergencyresponse, air transportable communications services andhardware. Systems include a multi-point telephoneswitch, facsimile, HF/ VHF radio networks (withpagers), video teleconferencing, a point-to-pointmicrowave system, and data communications to includelocal area networks and high speed transmission. Amulti-channel satellite system is available to providelong-haul transmission capability. Single-channelINMARSAT terminals, with data interface, are includedfor advance party use and emergency backup. Securecommunications include voice, facsimile, data, teletype,and still video operations.

d. FEMA Assets. Deployable communication assetsused by FEMA response groups are maintained at theFEMA regional office level. Although the specificequipment varies between FEMA regions, the FEMAresponse contingent usually arrives with the followingcapabilities:

(1) HF Radio (voice only) for external commun-ication to their regional office, the State disaster responseheadquarters, and the Emergency Information andCoordination Center (EICC) in Washington, DC.

(2) VHF radio to support on-scene FederalResponse Center (FRC) (internal) communications.Equipment includes hand-held radios, suitcase repeaterand suitcase base station with telephone interconnect.The quantities of these assets will vary depending onthe size of the FEMA response contingent.

e. Commercial Assets. In the CONUS, acquisition ofsupporting communications systems from commercialcarriers (for example, American Telephone andTelegraph AT&T) is possible. Commercial carriers canprovide communications to a remote area via transpor-table microwave, carrier systems, or cable. Leasedservices, including telephone, data TeletypewriterExchange (TWX), Telephone Exchange (TELEX), andWide Area Telephone Service (WATS), are available inmost locations.


Nuclear weapon accidents present a variety of technical,logistical, and operational. communications problems.Several factors, including the location of the accident,the response force involved, and the command andcontrol arrangements of those forces, contribute to thecomplexity of the problems. This concept of operationsfocuses on the actions of the military response force(s)”communications officer(s). The approach is to presentitems of concern sequentially without regard to whetherthe IRF or the SRF communications officer takes theaction. Incumbent upon the SRF communicationsofficer is the responsibility to ascertain what has beenaccomplished prior to arrival, and to carry on from thatjuncture.

a. Initial Actions. The initial task of the response forcecommunications officer is to determine the commun-ications assets at, or close to, the accident site. The localtelephone company, State/ local officials, or civilianauthorities can provide information on the commun-ication infrastructure near the accident scene, and thecapabilities for long haul and local communications.Once existing capabilities are determined, the commun-ications officer should use these resources with deployedassets to establish an effective communications network.

(1) In remote or sparsely populated areas, the initialcommunication capability may consist of only hand held,short range VHF/ FM radios, portable HF radios, orwire (field phones). Conversely, if an accident occurs.close’to a populated area, a coin operated telephone,or even a business or private telephone may be available

12-4

immediately for emergency use. In either case, additionalleased communications such as WATS can be obtainedto augment available communications. Naturally, moretime is required to provide leased assets to remote areas.Therefore, the requirements must be identified andrequested at the earliest possible time. Follow-ondeployment of mobile communications provides theresponse force with additional local telephone and radio,as well as long haul secure voice and record capabilities.

(2) Another method of communications forexternal (long haul) communications, particularly ifassets are limited, is the telephone conferencingcapability of Service operations centers and/or theNational Military Command Center (NMCC). Further,if communication can be established from the site tothe DoD JNACC, the DoD JNACC will assist by relayinginformation or coordinating with other forces/agencies.When requested by the Services, DoD JNACC arrangesfor transportation of specialized communicationsresources.

(3) The OSC may spend considerable time awayfrom the command post. The response force commun-ications officer must, therefore, plan communicationmethods to support the mobility of the OSC. Radionets provided for OSC communications should havesufficient range and be capable of frequent use. Ifpossible, the net should be secure and have a radio/wire integration capability into the local switchboardand long haul voice circuits. The staff directors forsupport and operations, and the special staff advisorsshould be included in this net.

(4) The communications officer must take promptaction to obtain frequency clearances. Radio frequenciesare managed at the national level by the MilitaryCommunications:Electronics Board (Joint FrequencyManagement Office). Each Service@s membership onthe board. Moreover, each military department has afrequency management office, but in most cases theseoffices have delegated the authority to assign frequenciesto area coordinators. Additional details maybe obtainedfrom U.S. Army FM 24-2, “Radio Frequency Manage-ment,” or U.S. Air Force Regulation 700-14, Air ForceRadio Spectrum Frequency Management, references (z)and (aa). DoE and FEMA communications personnelshould coordinate frequency requirements through theirown channeIs and keep the military communications .officer advised. Failure to obtain valid frequencyauthorizations could result in interferenw with othercritical communications. The use of unauthorized.frequencies could lead to embarrassment for the U.S.Government.

a Communications-Electronic Operating Instruction(CEOI). The CEOI should be an easy-to-use instructioncontaining the capabilities and limitations of equipmentand detailed “how-to-use” procedures for all availablesystems. The instructions should be unclassified, ifpossible, and widely distributed. As a minimum, theyshouId include system descriptions (charts and diagramsare helpful), an on-site telephone directory, dialing andtelephone routing instructions, message addresses,message handling instructions and routing indicators,radio procedures and call signs, secure voice procedures,and communications security (COMSEC) operationssecurity procedures including essential elements offriendly information (EEFIs). An outline of a typicalCEOI is at Figure 12-1.

(6) Although COMSEC instructions are a part ofthe CEOI, COMSEC deserves additional emphasis.Enemy or dissident elements may be able to interceptand exploit command and control communicationssystems and traffic used for response to nuclear weaponaccidents. Compilations of individually unclassifieditems concerning weapons communicated duringrecovery procedures may well be classified, andunfriendly elements may be able to compile these items.Therefore, the communications officer must plan todefeat this threat by determining the EEFI for theoperation, and then by acting to preclude interceptionor exploitation of this information. COMSEC actionsto prevent exploitation of EEFIs may include usingsecure transmission facilities, communications disci-pline, codes and authenticators, and changing call signs.

b. Follow-On Actions. As additional response forcesdeploy to the accident scene, and a support base campis established”, additional communication resources willbe deployed or acquired concurrent with the build-up.As this build-up occurs, the response force commun-ications officer should establish and maintain a list ofcommunications assets and capabilities on-scene. Thelist should include assets and frequencies belonging tonon-DoD agencies identifying potential mutual inter-ference, and should ensure that all possible assets areconsidered when meeting overall communicationrequirements. Coordination should be made with theappropriate representative from Federal and civilianauthorities/ officials agencies possessing on-scenecommunication systems.

(1) As emphasized throughout this chapter,increasing the quantity of communications assets androuting those assets into the appropriate users hands

(5) One of the more complex problems facing the ~ “ is of primary importance as the response organizationresponse force communications officer is preparation of grows. Additional communication assets, primarily in

12-5

Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI)

(Sample Contents)

SECTION 1- Communications Security . . . . .

SECTION ? - Telephone Communications . . .

Figure 2- I : Telephone Routing DiagramFigure 2-2: Hot Line Routing Diagram .

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SECTION 3- Message Communications Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3-1: Message Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-?: Eyes Only Message Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SECTION 4- Radio Communications Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANN EXA-Response Force Traffic Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANNEX B - Telephone Numbers and Message Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . .

B-1 - Tie Line Network Dialing Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-2- On-Site Telephone Diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-3 - Off-Site Contact Telephone Numbers and Message AddressesB-4 - Intercom Systems

ANNEX C -

ANNEX D -

Intercom #1 .[ntercorn # 2 .Intercom #3 . .Intercom #4 . .

Radio Call Signs

Net #1 GraderNet #2 LookerNet #3 CatcherNet #4 Ivory .Net #.5 Blue . .N e t # 6 AngelNet #7 Red . .

DISTRIBUTION

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.>

Figure 12-1. Communications-Electro;cs Operating Instruction (CEO).

12-6

the form of telephones and VHF/FM radios, are neededfor effective operation of the JIC, and to supportradiological monitoring and site restoration operations.

(2) As the response operations peak, so will thecommunications support required. As the responsetransitions into site restoration, the primary commun-ications should be routine situation reports, supply(MILSTRIP) messages, and other administrativemessages. After the weapon(s) and weapon componentsare removed from the site, little or no need will existto communicate by secure voice. However, recordcommunications support provided on-site during theearly response and weapon recovery should continuethrough site restoration.


Procedures and information appropriate for thecommunications annex to the accident response planinclude:

a. A description of actual or projected requirementsand the location of assets to fill requirements.

b. Procedures for establishing communications linkswith the NMCC and Defense Communications Systemfrom remote locations.

c. Procedures for obtaining leased commercialcommunications.

d. Procedures for obtaining Service and JCSdeployable communications assets.

e. Procedures for establishing local radio nets andassignment of call signs.

f. Procedures for obtaining frequency cleara~ces.

g. Procedures for coordinating communications withnon-DoD agencies.

h. Procedures for using secure/clear fax resources.

i. Prepare an integrated communications plan.

,-

12-7

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 13

SECURITY

13-1 GENERAL

The presence of nuclear weapons or components at anaccident site requires implementation of an effectivesecurity program as soon as possible. When an accidentoccurs at a military installation, security assistance mayneed to be obtained from civil authorities/officials untilsufficient military forces arrive. Additionally, off-installation accidents could require the establishment ofa National Defense Area (NDA) to permit control ofcivilian land by military forces. Even after establishmentof the NDA, close coordination with civil lawenforcement agencies is essential to an effective securityprogram. The equivalent DoE area for an incident/accident involving DoE equipment/ materials is a NSA.Overseas, there is no equivalent to the NDA. The On-Scene Commander will establish a disaster cordon orSecurity Area, to restrict entry and to provide for publicsafety.


This chapter provides guidance for planning andconducting security operations at the scene of a nuclearweapon accident and discusses security requirements,many unique to a nuclear weapon accident. Also, thechapter outlines a concept of operations to satisfy theserequirements.


The security program at the accident scene should meetthe following requirements:

a. Provide effective control of the accident area.

b. Protect nuclear weapons and components.

c. Protect other classified materials and information.

d. Protect government property.

e. Provide effective coordination with civil- enforcement agencies/ host nation law agencies.

law

f. Provide necessary operational security (OPSEC).

g. Counter potential terrorist and/or radical groupactivities or intelligence collection efforts.

13-4 RESOURCES

a. Initial Response Force (IRF). The IRF will havea security element for perimeter security, entry and exitcontrol, and protection of classified information andproperty. “Since sufficient personnel will not likely beincluded in the IRF security elements responding to anuclear weapon accident, augmentation may be required.Security forces can expect to encounter large numbersof people attracted to the accident scene, and care shouldbe exercised to ensure that only experienced securitypersonnel are in supervisory positions. Installations witha nuclear weapon capability should maintain equipmentto control an accident site. This requirement shouldinclude rope and stanchions for barricading the accidentsite, NDA and entry control point signs, and portablelights. The IRF should provide security personnel withanti-contamination clothing and protective masks in theevent that security requires their presence within theradiological control area. Riot control gear should beavailable if crowd control is required. Normally, securitypersonnel possess equipment such as weapons andammunition, cold weather gear, protective masks, hand-held radios, canteens, and helmets.

b. Service Response Force (SRF). The SRF securityofficer should assess manpower requirements and ensurethat sufficient additional security personnel are includedin the SRF. IRF security personnel may become partof the SRF security element. The security officer shouldbe prepared to meet all security requirements on a 24hour basis without degrading the alertness and capabilityof his or her personnel to respond.

c. Civilian Response. Civilian law enforcementresponse depends on the location of the accident site.If the accident occurs off a military installation near

‘a populated area, local police, fire, and rescue units willbe notified and may be on-scene when the IRF arrives.

13-1

Civilian law enforcement personnel may augmentmilitary security personnel if requested.

d. Department of Energy. The DoE Nuclear Emer-gency Search Team (NEST) communications pod isequipped with a slow scan TV system. This system maybe very useful in surveillance operations; however, caremust be taken to ensure that classified components oractivities are not transmitted in the clear.


a. Accident Assessment. Upon arrival at the accidentsite, the security officer must assess the situation. Thisassessment includes an evaluation of ongoing emergencyresponse operations and actions of local law enforcementagencies, and provides the foundation for the securityprogram. While the assessment is made, security shouldbe established at the accident site in cooperation withcivil authorities. When overseas, the civilian authorities/officials will be requested to establish a Security Area(Disaster Cordon) to ensure public safety and approp-riate security. This must be done in close coordinationwith the DoS Chief of Mission. Fragmentation hazarddistances and the possibility of contamination shouldbe considered when posting initial security personnelaround the scene. This initial security is not to beconfused with the National Defense Area (NDA) whichmay not yet be established and may be different in size.The security officer should consider the followingelements in his assessment:

(1)area).

(2)(3)

Threat (real and potential danger to the secure

Location (on or off military installation).Demographics and accident environment

(remote, rural, suburban, urban).(4) Terrain characteristics (critical or dominating

features).(5) Contamination (radiation intensity and extent

and other hazardous materials).(6) Accident hazards (high explosives, rocket

motors, or toxic chemicals).(7) Local meteorological conditions (include

prevailing winds).(8) Transportation network in accident area (access

routes, types and quantities of vehicles).(9) Structures in accident area (type and quantity).(10) Safety of security personnel (fragmentation

distances, contamination, cold/ hot weather).

b. National Defense Area (NDA).

(1) An NDA may be required any time an accidentinvolving nuclear weapons or components occurs onnon-Federal property. The NDA may, or may not,encompass the entire radiological control area. Securityof any portion of the radiological control area existingoutside the NDA is a matter of public safety and shouldbe provided by civilian authorities/officials; however,military assist ante may be requested.

(2) DoD Directive 5200.8, and Section 21 of theInternal Security Act of 1950, references (e) and (ah),provides the basis for establishing an NDA only in theUnited States. This area is established specifically toenhance safeguarding government property located onnon-Federal land. Only IRF and SRF OSCS areauthorized to designate an NDA, and then only tosafeguard government resources, irrespective of otherfactors. The OSC should seek legal advice on anydecisions regarding establishment, disestablishment, ormodification of the NDA.

(3) The OSC designating the NDA must clearly “define and mark its boundary. Area boundaries areestablished to minimize interference with other lawfulactivities on and uses of the property. Initially, thedimensions of the NDA may be quite large, which isnecessary until more specific information is availableregarding the location of the government material. Theboundary is defined by some form of temporary barrier,for example, rope and wire. Warning signs as describedin DoD 5210.41-M should be posted at the entry controlstation and along the boundary and be visible from anydirection of approach. In areas where languages otherthan English are spoken, bilinguaI signs should beconsidered.

(4) The OSC who establishes the NDA shouldadvise civil authorities/ officials of the authority and theneed for the NDA and the security controls in effect.If possible, the OSC should secure the landowners’consent and cooperation. However, obtaining suchionsent is not a prerequisite for establishing the NDA.

(5) In maintaining security of the NDA, militarypersonnel should use the minimum degree of controland force necessary. Sentries should be briefedthoroughly and given specific instructions for dealingwith civilians. All personnel should be aware of thesensitive nature of issues surrounding an accident.Moreover, controls should be implemented to ensurethat public affairs policy is strictly adhered to, and thatrequests for interviews and queries concerning theaccident are referred to public affairs personnel. Civiliansshould be treated courteously, and in a helpful, butwitcfiful manner. No one should be allowed to removeanything, nor touch any suspicious objects.

13-2

(6) Local civil authorities/ officials should be askedto assist military personnel in preventing unauthorizedentry and in removing unauthorized personnel who enterthe NDA. Apprehension or arrest of civilian personnelwho violate any security requirements at the NDA shouldnormally be done by civilian authorities. If local civilauthorities are unavailable, or refuse to give assistance,on-scene military personnel should apprehend and detainviolators or trespassers. Disposition should be completedquickly following coordination with the legal officer.The Senior FEMA Official (SFO) should be notifiedof each apprehension and the actions taken. The securityofficer must ensure that actions of on-scene militarypersonnel do not constitute a violation of the PosseComitatus Act which prohibits use of DoD personnelto execute local, State, or Federal laws, unless authorizedby the Constitution or an Act of Congress.

(7) When all government resources have beenlocated, the OSC should consider reducing the size ofthe NDA. When all classified government resources havebeen removed, the NDA could be disestablished. Earlycoordination with State and local officials permits anorderly transfer of responsibility to State and localagencies when reducing or disestablishing the NDA.

c. Accidents Overseas. In the event of a nuclearincident/ accident in a country outside the United States,the U.S. Government respects the sovereignty of thegovernment of that country. Civil authorities there willbe asked to establish a Security Area (Disaster Cordon)to restrict access and to provide for public safety. Onand off-site authority at a nuclear weapon accidentjincident rests with such Government officials/ represen-tatives except that the United States shall maintaincustody of the weapon(s) and/or classified components.

d. Security Procedures.

(1) Sentry posts around the NDA should be inlocations that enable guards to maintain good visualcontact. This action prevents unauthorized persons fromentering the NDA undetected between posts and ensuresthat none of the guards violate the two-man rule.Lighting should be provided, or guard spacing adjusted,to ensure that visual contact can be maintained at night.Each guard should have a means of summoningassistance, preferably a radio, or be in contact withsomeone who does. Consideration should be given inobtaining portable intrusion detection system sensors.This type of equipment will reduce security personnelrequirements and the possibility of radiation exposureto them.

(2) During the initial emergency response, entry and “exit of emergency units and other personnel may be

largely uncontrolled. The security officer shouldrecognize that during initial response, necessary lifesaving, fire suppression, and other emergency activitiesmay temporarily take priority over security procedures.However, as response operations progress, standardsecurity measures specified in DoD Directive 5210.41,reference (ad), must be enforced. As soon as possible,an entry control point should be established. Whenpersonnel from various Federal and/ or civilianauthorities/ agencies arrive at the control point, leadersof the groups should be escorted to the operations center.An identification and badging system should beimplemented, entry control logs established, and a recordof all personnel entering the accident area made andret ained.

(3) A security operations center or control pointshould be established as the focal point for securityoperations and be located close to the entry control point.Its location should be fixed so that personnel becomefamiliar with the location. Representatives of” allparticipating law enforcement agencies should be locatedat the security operations center and able to commun-icate with their personnel.

(4) A security alert force should be considered,although early in the accident response, sufficientpersonnel may be unavailable to form such a force.

e. Security Considerations.

(1) Some components in nuclear weapons mayreveal classified information by their shape, form, oroutline. Specified c~assified components must beprotected from sight and overhead photographicsurveillance.

(2) Individuals with varying degrees of knowledgeand appreciation for security requirements will assistin response operations. A comprehensive and effectiveinformation security program is available as outlinedin DoD Directive 5200. l-R, reference (se), and shouldbe promulgated in coordination with the DoE TeamLeader. The content of the information security programshould be briefed to everyone in the weapon recoveryeffort.

(3) Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information(CNWDI) access verification may have to be waivedtemporarily during the initial phases of accidentresponse. When the urgency of the initial response isover and order has been established, compliance withDoD Directive 5210.2, AR 380-150, OPNAVINST5510.IF, and AFR 205-1, references (af), (ag), and (ah),should prevail.

(4) The two-person policy is addressed in DoD andService directives, and defined in the GLOSSARY. The

13-.3

security officer must ensure that procedures provide fortwo-man rule compliance for all nuclear weapons andapplicable components at the accident site.

(5) In the initial emergency response, PersonnelReliability Program (PRP) requirements may have tobe waived due to a lack of PRP certified personnel.When certified personnel are available, they should beused in security positions which require them. Securitypersonnel assigned to directly guard nuclear weaponsand components must be PRP certified. PRP personnelshould be used on the perimeter if available.

(6) An area should be available within the securityperimeter where EOD and DoE personnel can discussCNWDI related to weapon(s) recovery operations. Also,areas will be established for storage of classifieddocuments, recovered weapons, and weapon compo-nents. The security officer must ensure that adequatesecurity is provided for these areas.

(7) If a base camp is established to support theresponse operation, traffic control signs should beposted, law enforcement procedures developed, and abase camp entry control point established. Verificationof vehicle trip authorization, restriction of curiosityseekers, access to the camp, and maintaining order anddiscipline within the camp may be parts of base campsecurity functions.

f. Military Intelligence. Intelligence personnel shouldbe used to the fullest extent and incorporated activelyin the overall security posture, including, but not limitedto:

(1) Advice and assistance in counterintelligence tothe OSC and security staff.

(2) Liaison and coordination with Federal, State,and local agencies and civilian authorities{ officials, onthreats to response operations (for example, hostileintelligence collection efforts and terrorist activities).

(3) Coordination and advice to the OSC andsecurity staff regarding operations security.

(4) Investigating and reporting incidents ofimmediate security interest to the OSC and the securitystaff (in cooperation with the local Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI).

(5) Advice and assistance to the OSC and thesecurity staff on matters of personnel and informationsecurity necessary to maintain high standards of security.

(6) Requests for large scale photographic coverageof the accident site.


The security annex should describe the responsibilitiesand procedures of the security forces. IRF and SRFforces may prepare an annex in advance which couldbe modified to fit the circumstances. The security annexshould include:

a. Security operating procedures to include perimeteraccess/ entry procedures, establishing and- maintaininga National Defense Area or Security Area, informationsecurity, rules of engagement, and use of deadly force.

b. Descriptions of the interface with Federal, State,and civilian law enforcement officials. Specific pointsof contact and phone numbers may be contained in aseparate appendix to be expanded in the event of anaccident.

c. Procedures for locating and operating the securityoperation center.

d. Guidance for handling unprotected personnelencountered in contaminated areas.

e. Procedures for coordinating with radiologicalcontrol personnel to ensure that sentry posts outsidethe radiological control area are not affected by theresuspension of contaminants during wind shifts.

f. A description of the subversive/unfriendly threat,including an impact assessment on response operations;this and related information may be included in aseparate intelligence annex.

g. Administrative and logistic requirements: forexample, maintenanw of entry logs and badges, expectedamounts of rope, stanchions, and signs to establish andmaintain the NDA, Security Area, such as specialcommunications and clothing requirements.

134

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 14

MEDICAL

14-1 GENERAL

a. Radioactive contamination may be a result of anuclear weapon accident. In instances when radioactivecontamination is not dispersed (for example, theSeptember, 1980, TITAN 11 explosion at Damascus,Arkansas), the medical requirements were greatlysimplified. Specifically, emergency life saving proceduresin any major disaster are applicable to a nuclear weaponaccident where radioactive contamination is not a factor.Even without the presence of radioactive contamination,other weapon specific nonradioactive toxic hazards mayexist. However, life-saving procedures should not bedelayed or omitted due to radiation contamination.

b. If radioactive contaminants are dispersed, difficultproblems result, and medical personnel must now treatpeople who may be contaminated. Treatment ofcontaminated patients requires special techniques andtraining as done for highly contagious patients. In someinstances, these special techniques can be applied by theaccident response force medical personnel. On otheroccasions, sophisticated treatment available only atspecial medical facilities will be required. As with anyresponse function, training must be conducted prior toan accident.


This chapter provides guidance concerning the medicalrequirements resulting from a nuclear weapon accident.In addition to recommended procedures, availableresources, their location, and how to obtain them arediscussed also.


Medical personnel will assist in accident relatedemergency medical treatment and in establishing healthand safety programs to support response operations overan extended period of time. To accomplish this, medic,alpersonnel will be required to:

a. Promptly treat accident casualties and injuries, orillnesses.

b. Assess and report the magnitude of the accident;for example, numbers and categories of injuries,su$pected contamination, and priority for transport toa medical facility.

c. Advise medical facilities receiving casualties, incoordination with radiological personnel, of possiblecontamination, and measures which can be taken toprevent its spread.

d. Implement the collection of bioassay samples fromresponse personnel, and ensure that bioassay andexternal exposurerecords.

e. Establish aprogram.

data becomes part of the ‘health

heat/cold exposure prevention

f. Assist in casualty decontamination and supervisethe decontamination of personnel when initial decon-tamination efforts fail to achieve desired results.

g. Assist in obtaining radiation health history of allpersonnel involved in accident response, includingcivilians in the surrounding community exposed toradiation or contamination as a result of the accident.

14-4 RESOURCES

Medical support assistance, specialized in radiologicalhealth matters, is available from the Department ofDefense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DoE)through the DoD Joint Nuclear Accident CoordinatingCenter (JNACC). Although numerous resources areavailable, all may not be required for response to a givenaccident. Resources discussed in the following para-graphs should be studied and reviewed in advance.””an accident occurs, assets should be requestedneeded.

. a. U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical(RAMT). RAMTs are located at Walter Reed.

w nenwhen

TeamArmy

14-1

Medical Center, Washington, D. C., and the lothMedical Laboratory, Landstuhl, FRG. The teams arespecially trained to assist and furnish guidance to theOn-Scene Commander (OSC) or other responsibleofficials at an accident site and to local medicalauthorities concerning radiological health hazards.

(1) The RAMT provides the following functions:

(a) Guidance relative to the potential healthhazards to personnel from radiological contamination,or exposure to ionizing radiation.

(b) Evaluation of survey data to provide technicalguidance to the responsible officials utilizing radiolog-ically contaminated areas.

(c) Monitoring medical facilities and equipmentwhere contaminated patients have been evacuated.

(d) Advising the commander regarding thepotential health hazards from exposure to sources ofionizing radiation and the decontamination of personnel,medical treatment facilities, and medical equipment.

(e) Advising on early, and follow-up, laboratoryand clinical procedures.

(f) Assisting the OSC with the bioassay program.

(2) Each RAMT is comprised of a team leader,who is a nuclear medical science officer with trainingin monitoring and radiation dose evaluation, and amedical officer with appropriate training and experience.Also, two qualified technicians are on the team withexperience and training in radiation detection andmeasurement techniques. All team members have aminimum security clearance of SECRET and attendrequired training. The RAMT can be augmented forextended operations.

(3) Additional information can be obtained fromthe Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center,HSHL-QHP/ RAMT, Washington, D. C., 20307 or byreferring to AR 40-13, reference (ai). RAMT servicesshould be requested through the Army OperationsCenter, or the JNACC.

b. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute.The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institutemaintains a Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team(MRAT) to provide state-of-the-art medical radiobiol-ogy advice supporting a nuclear accident response. Thisteam consists of physicians and scientists working inradiobiology research. Their mission is to provide themedical groups responding to radiobiological emergen-cies with the most current medical guidance regardingthe treatment of radiation casualties. This advice is

derived from validated, military-relevant radiobiologyresearch and is within reasonably accepted standardsof care. Subject areas of expertise include, for example,hematology, biological response modifiers, infectiousdisease, dosimetry and behavioral analyses. If needed,liaison with other medical centers and laboratoriesspecializing in radiobiology can be facilitated. Throughmeans of telephone communications (available 24-hoursa day), the MRAT provides radiobiology advice tomedical staffs and OSCS within a response time of 4hours. In addition, within 24 hours, the team is preparedto deploy and provide advice at an accident site ormedical treatment facility. Upon request of the OSCor responsible medical officials, the physician membersof the MRAT supplement the designated primarymedical treatment teams in the treatment of radiationinjuries. Additional information about the MRAT canbe obtained by contacting the Director, Armed ForcesRadiobiology Research Institute, Bethesda, MD 20814-5145. The MRAT is deployed with the DNAAT.

c. Department of Energy. Major DoE installationshave medical support capabilities which, if needed, mayassist. Additionally, DoE facilities that handle radio-logical material routinely are equipped to administermedical treatment for radiological casualties. TheRadiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site(REAC/TS), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is prepared to dealwith all types of radiation exposure and can provideexpert advice and assistance. REAC/TS personnel willnormally deploy to the accident site with an initial stockof chelating agents as a part of the DoE AccidentResponse Group (ARG). Until REAC/ TS personnelarrive, advice on the treatment of contaminated patientsmay be obtained through the REAC/TS center.Additional REAC/TS assistance can be requestedthrough either the DoE Team Leader, or JNACC.


Medical problems resulting from a nuclear weaponaccident vary in complexity depending primarily on thepresence, or absence, of radioactive contamination.Other factors such as a delayed initial response time(that is, a remote accident) or nonavailability of medicalpersonnel can add to the difficulty of proper medicalresponse. This concept of operations is directed towardthe medical response function, and is applicable to boththe Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service ResponseForce (SRF).

a.. Pre-Accident Preparation. Before an accidentoccurs, the response forces (IRF or SRF) medical officer

14-2

is identified, supporting medical personnel assigned andequipment identified. Generally, the IRF is equippedand manned to provide emergency medical treatment,while the SRF should be equipped and manned tosupport a long term response effort. The proximity ofexisting medical treatment facilities to the accident siteis a factor in determining the size and capabilities ofthe medical support element actually deployed. Allmedical personnel at the accident site shall be trainedon the hazards and procedures for treatment of radiationaccident victims. In addition to radioactive materials,several other weapon specific substances may be presentwhich are toxic hazards to personnel. Of primary concernare Beryllium (Be), Lithium (Li), Lead (Pb) and smokeor fumes from various plastics. A discussion of thegeneral characteristics, hazards, and health considera-tions associated with these substances is presented inAppendix 14-A.

b. Emergency Rescue and Treatment. A high priorityat any accident is the rescue and treatment of casualties.The probability of response force involvement in theinitial rescue and treatment procedures depends onresponse time. The longer it takes to get to the accident,the greater the probability that casualties will have beentreated and removed by civilian authorities. If possible,Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and/orradiation monitors should mark a clear path, oraccompany emergency medical personnel, into theaccident site to assist in avoiding radioactive, explosive,and toxic hazards. However, weapon render safeoperations may preclude EOD personnel from accom-panying medical personnel into the accident site.Protective clothing shall be worn by emergency medicalpersonnel. Respiratory protective devices shall be wornbased on the non-radiological hazards (smoke or fumes)or as required by the guidelines in Chapter 5 whenentering the accident area. Respiratory protection shouldnot be required when treating patients outside thecontaminated area, but care should be exercised inremoving and handling patient’s clothing. Suggestedcasualty handling procedures for emergency responseto a nuclear weapon accident follow:

(1) Assess and assure an open airway, breathing,and circulation of the victims. Administer CPR ifnecessary, using a bag-mask, positive pressure ventilator,or, mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.

(2) Move victims if possible, away from thecontaminated area by scoop stretchers. Take routineprecautions. Do not delay customary life savingprocedures (drugs, MAS Trousers) because of radio-logical contamination.

(3) Administer intravenous fluids for shock.(Prophylactic precautionary IV’s should be delayedbecause of possible contamination of the skin).

(4) Control hemorrhage and stabilize fractures.(5) If a victim is unconscious, consider medical

or toxic causes since radiation exposure does not causeunconsciousness or immediate visible signs of injury.

(6) Triage or sort the casualties by priority of lifeor limb threatening injury. Categories for emergent orimmediate evacuation, delayed and dead should beutilized by the on-site medical team.

(7) After the immediate medical needs are met,monitor the victim for possible contamination beforetransporting to the hospital. Note and record the locationand extent (in cpm) of the contamination on a fieldmedical card. Then place this card in a plastic bag andattach to the patient’s protective mask or in anotherfashion that will prevent loss. Also ensure that openwounds are covered with a field dressing to keep outcontamination if the wound is uncontaminated or tocontain the contamination if the wound is contaminated.Removal of contaminated clothing is advisable providedthe medical authority decides that their removal is notcontraindicated. Finally, wrap the patient in a clean sheetto contain any loose contamination during evacuation.Casualty decontamination, particularly wound decon-tamination, of seriously injured patients is bestperformed in a medical treatment facility.

(8) Determine if corrosive materials were presentat the accident scene, since these materials can causechemical burns. Take all possible precautions to preventintroduction of contaminated materials into the mouth.

(9) No medical personnel or equipment shouldleave the contaminated area without monitoring forcontamination. However, transporting the seriouslyinjured victim should not be delayed to monitor ordecontaminate him.

(10) Attendant medical personnel will then processthe patients through the Contamination Control Line.AS LONG AS THE PATIENT REMAINS WRAPPEDIN THE SHEET, HE DOES NOT POSE A THREATOF SPREADING CONTAMINATION AND COM-PROMISING THE CONTAMINATION CONTROLLINE. Hence, the NAICO will allow these patients tobe evacuated without decontamination. The patient willthen be transferred” to the “clean” side of the hot lineand placed in the charge of “clea~’ medical personnelresiding on the uncontaminated side of the Contam-ination Control Line. The patient can then be loaded

“into the ambulance or evacuation vehicle, and betransported to the receiving medical facility.

14-3

(11) To ensure that the receiving facility is preparedfor the arrival of the victims, notify the facility of thefollowing:

(a) Number of victims.(b) Area of injuries, vital signs (if known), and

triage category.(c) Extent of contamination, if known.(d) Areas of greatest contamination.(e) Any evidence of internal contamination.(f) The radionuclide and the chemical form, if

known, and by what instrument it was measured.(g) Any exposure to non-radiological toxic

materials.

Note: Procedures listed in above paragraphs (c), (d),and (e) may be determined enroute to themedical facility if radiation detection instru-ments are available, but not at the expense ofmedical care. Use of a single medical facilityfor contaminated casualties should be consi-dered if a facility has sufficient capacity.

(12) Upon arrival at the hospital, take patientsimmediately to the area designated for the receipt ofcontaminated patients. If no such area exists then takethe patients to the emergency room. Prior to entry ofthe patient into the hospital, attendant medical personnelwill ensure that the hospital has instituted the properprecautions. These precautions include, but are notlimited to:

(a) The room used has an isolated air supply.(b) Covering the area with plastic sheeting or

“chucks” to contain loose contamination.(c) Ensuring that personnel have the appropriate

radiation detection instrumentation, i.e., alpha scintil-lation detectors, and they are versed in the use of thisequipment.

(d) That personnel are wearing proper protectiveclothing. For this type of accident scenario, surgicalgowns, gloves, shoe covers, and masks, should beappropriate for protection against alpha contamination.

(13) The decontamination of the patients may thenbegin. These measures include:

(a) Carefully opening the sheet or plasticwrapping surrounding the patient avoiding spreadingany contamination.

(b) Removing clothing by cutting away thesleeves and trouser legs and folding the contaminationin on itself. This method parallels the standard methods

of removing patient clothing in an NBC environment.These articles of clothing will then be bagged to containthe contamination. The removal of contaminatedclothing may remove up to 90 percent of thecontamination.

(c) Remaining contamination can be located withthe use of monitoring equipment and then removed bywashing with soap and water. Suspect areas include thehair, face and neck, and hands, as well as other exposedareas of the body due to injuries or torn clothing.

(14) The ambulance or evacuation vehicle willnot be returned to normal service until it is monitoredand decontaminated and such efforts have beenconfirmed by the RAMT team.

c. Liaison With Civil Authorities. Emergencyevacuation of contaminated casualties may haveoccurred prior to the arrival of response force personnelat an off-base accident. Additionally, some may havearrived from the contaminated area before appropriatecontrols were implemented. If so, liaison must beconducted with area medical facilities to ensure thatproper procedures are taken to prevent the spread ofcontamination. It must be determined if local medicalfacilities have the ability to monitor and decontaminatetheir facilities or if assistance is required. The followingprocedures may be used by medical facilities notprepared for radiological emergencies and to reduce thespread of contamination.

(1) Use rooms with an isolated air supply.(2) Use scrub clothes, shoe covers, and rubber

gloves, and bag them and any other clothing, sheets .or materials which may have come in contact with thepatient when leaving the room.

(3) Obtain radiation monitoring assistance fordetecting plutonium or uranium.

(4) Use plastic sheeting on floors to facilitatedecontamination and cleanup.

(5) Use contagious disease control procedures (forexample, limiting the access and numbers of peopleinvolved in the treatment of patients).

d. Processing of Fatalities. The remains of deceasedaccident victims should, in general, be treated with thesame respect and procedures used in any accident.However, all fatalities must be monitored for contam-ination, and decontaminated if necessary, prior to releasefor burial. The determination of whether decontamina-tion is to be done before an autopsy, should be madeby the examining authorities. Any radiological supportfor au?opsies should be arranged on a case-by-case basis.Service procedures for handling casualties are contained

14-4

in AR 600-10, AFR 30-25, and BUPERS Manual Article4210100, references (aj), (ak), and (al). Civil authoritiesmust be notified of any civilian casualties as quicklyas possible, and if required, aid in identification of thedeceased prior to decontamination. Additional technicalguidance concerning the handling of radioactivelycontaminated fatalities can be found in the NationalCouncil on Radiation Protection and Measurements(NCRP) Report, Number 37, reference (am).

e. Medical Clearing Facility. A medical clearingfacility should be established near the contaminationcontrol station with supplies for medical treatment ofresponse force injuries, and to assist in decontaminationof skin. Minimum response force medical staffing afterthe initial emergency response should include a medic,with a physician, and medically trained health physicist,on call. Should an injury occur within the radiologicalcontrol area and injuries permit, the injured personshould be brought to the contamination control stationand clearing facility by personnel and vehicles alreadyin the area. A separate first aid station may be neededto support the base camp.

f. Collection of Bioassay Samples. Bioassay programsand techniques are discussed in Chapter 8. Collectionof required bioassay samples from response forcepersonnel is normally a responsibility of medicalpersonnel. Procedures for collecting and markingsamples should be coordinated with the Joint HazardEvaluation Center (JHEC). The JHEC will also provideguidance on where samples should be sent for analysis.Depending on Service procedures, urine samples maybe required of all personnel who enter the radiologicalcontrol area, or of those who have a positive nasal wipe.

g. Hot/Cold Weather Operational Conditions.

(1) The reduction in natural cooling of the bodycaused by wearing full anti-contamination clothing withhoods and respirators increases the probability of heatinjuries. Heat injuries (stroke, exhaustion, or cramps)can occur with the ambient air temperature as low as

700 when wearing full protective gear. Preventivemeasures to reduce heat injuries include acclimatization,proper intake of salt and water, avoidance of predis-posing factors to heat illness, monitoring of tempera-tures, scheduling of adequate rest or cooling periods,and educating the work force on heat injury symptomsand remedial actions. Adequate water intake is the singlemost important factor in avoidance of heat injuries.Frequent drinks are more effective than the samequantity of water taken all at once. Although ambienttemperature may be used, Wet Globe Temperature, orBotsball temperature, is a more effective method ofmonitoring heat conditions. Table 14-1 is taken fromDA Circular 40-82-3, reference (an), and providesguidelines as a function of Botsball temperature. Theseguidelines assume fully acclimatized and fit personnelwho are normally dressed and working at a heavy rate.The circular recommends subtracting ten (10) degreesfrom the measured Botsball temperature when protectiveclothing is’ worn, and using the adjusted Botsballtemperature to determine preventive actions to be taken.

(2) Specialized personnel cooling equipment (forexample, cooling vest) should be used to allow additionalstay-time for personnel in extreme heat conditions.

(3) The use of cold weather gear, anti-contamination clothing, and respiratory equipmentpresents severe demands on personnel. Personnel mustbe monitored closely to prevent frostbite and other coldweather effects.

h. Public Affairs Considerations. All medical staffpersonnel should be aware of the sensitive nature ofissues surrounding a nuclear weapon accident. All publicrelease of information should be approved by the OSCand coordinated with the JIC as discussed in Chapter16. Medical personnel should ensure that public affairspersonnel are informed of medical information providedto medical facilities receiving potentially contaminatedpatients and that queries for non-medical informationare referred to public affairs personnel.

i. Base Camp Medical Support. Base camp supportrequirements include treatment of on-the-job injuries

BotsballTemperature

80-8383-8686-88Above 88

TAB,LE 14-1. Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines.

Heat Water IntakeCondition (qts/hr)

Green 0.5-1.0Yellow 1.0-1.5Red

. -1.5-2.0

Black 2.0

Work/restCycle (rein)

50/ 1045/ 1520/ 302 0 / 4 0

14-5

and sickness; inspection of field billeting and messingfacilities, and evaluation of the adequacy of latrinefacilities, sewage disposal; and water supply. Thosepersonnel treated for cuts or open sores should beprohibited from entering the contaminated area and theirsupervisors notified of the restriction.


The medical annex shouId describe responsibilities andspecial procedures used by the medical staff. This annexshould include procedures for:

a. Differentiating between medical and radiologicalsafety/ health physics personnel. o

b. Receiving and treating contaminated patients.

c. Establishing and operating a medical clearingfacility at the accident scene, including isolation ofcontaminated patients.

d. Identifying and locating facilities for treatingradiological health problems.

e. Evacuating contaminated casualties to majormedical facilities.

f. Decontaminating and processing the remains ofdeceased.

g. Establishing the relationship of the response forcemedical staff and specialized medical teams respondingto the accident.

14-7 SPECIALIZED COURSES FOR MEDICALRESPONSE PERSONNEL

a. Nuclear Hazards Training Course. Several classesare scheduled each year at the Interservice NuclearWeapons School, Kirtland AFB, NM. The courseprovides training in the organization and functions ofIRF Teams and in techniques in monitoring contam-inated areas. This training includes the principles ofnuclear devices, related hazards in a nuclear weaponaccident or incident, hazards of explosive materials, andIRF operation.

b. Medical Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Week-longclasses are scheduled each year by the Armed ForcesRadiobiology Research Institute at various locations.Topics include biological effects of ionizing radiation,medical operations in a nuclear environment, andmedical treatment of nuclear and nuclear-relatedinjuries.

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DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 14-A

NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS

14-A-1 GENERAL

Several weapon specific non-radiological hazards maybe present as a result of a nuclear weapon accident.

14-A-2 PURPOSE

This appendix provides information useful in implement-ing training programs for medical personnel respondingto nuclear weapon accidents.

14-A-3 NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS

a. Beryllium (Be).

(1) Beryllium is a light, gray-white non-radioactivemetal, hard and brittle, and resembles magnesium.

(2) Hazards and Health Considerations. Inhalationis the most significant means of entry into the body.Because it oxidizes easily, any fire or explosion involvingberyllium liberates toxic fumes and smoke. Whenberyllium enters the body through cuts, scratches orabrasions on the skin, ulceration often occurs. One ofthe peculiarities of beryllium poisoning is that no specificsymptoms are apparent. The most common symptomis an acute or delayed type of pulmonary edema orberylliosis. Other commonly occurring signs andsymptoms are ulceration and irritation of the skin,shortness of breath, chronic cough, cyanosis, loss ofweight and extreme nervousness. Beryllium or ‘itscompounds, when in finely divided form, should everbe handled with the bare hands but always with rubbergloves. An M 17, or equivalent protective mask/respirator, and anti-contamination clothing must beworn in an area known, or suspected, to be contaminatedwith beryllium dust. Self-contained breathing apparatusis necessary when beryllium fumes or smoke are present.Decontamination of personnel, terrain, or facilities willbe similar to radiological decontamination. An effectivemethod, when applicable, is vacuum cleaning, using acleaner with a high efficiency particle air (HEPA) filter.Since beryllium is not radioactive, its detection requireschemical analysis in a properly equippedDirect detection in the field is impossible.

laboratory.

b. Lithium (Li).

(1) Lithium and its compounds, normally lithiumhydride, may be present at a nuclear weapon accident.Due to its highly reactive nature, naturally occurringlithium is always found chemically with other elements.Upon exposure to water, a violent chemical reactionoccurs, producing heat, hydrogen, “oxygen, and lithium.hydroxide. The heat causes the hydrogen to burnexplosively, producing a great deal of damage.

(2) Hazards and Health Considerations. Lith@mcan react directly with the water contained in the bodytissue causing severe chemical burns. Also, lithiumhydroxide is a caustic agent which affects the body,especially the eyes, in the same manner as lye (sodiumor potassium hydroxide). Respiratory protection and firefighters clothing are required to protect personnelexposed to fires involving lithium or lithium hydrides.A self-contained breathing apparatus is necessary iffumes from burning lithium components are present.Protection for the eyes and skin is necessary foroperations involving these materials.

c. Lead (Pb). Pure lead and most of its compoundsare toxic. Lead enters the “body through inhalation,ingestion, or skin absorption. Inhalation of leadcompounds presents a very serious hazard. Skinabsorption is usually negligible since the readily absorbedcompounds are seldom encountered in sufficientconcentration to cause damage. Upon entry into thebody, lead will concentrate in the kidneys and bones.From the bone deposits, lead will be liberated slowlyinto the bloodstream causing anemia and resulting ina chronic toxic condition. Lead poisoning displaysseveral specific characteristics and symptoms. The skinof an exposed individual will turn yellowish and dry.Digestion is impaired with severe colicky pains, andconstipation results. With a high body burden, theexposed individual will have a sweet, metallic taste inhis mouth and a dark blue coloring of the gums resultingfrom a deposition of black lead sulfide. Lead concen-trations within the body have been reduced successfully

- by using chelating agents. An M 17 Mask will protectpersonnel against inhalation of lead compounds.

14-A.- I

d. Plastics. When involved in a fire, all plastics presentvarying degrees of toxic hazards due to the gases, fumes,and/ or minute particles produced. The gaseous orparticulate products may produce dizziness andprostration initially, mild and severe dermatitis, severeillness, or death if inhaled, ingested, placed in contactwith the skin, or absorbed through the skin. Any fireinvolving plastics which are not known to be harmlessshould be approached on the assumption that toxicfumes and particles are present. This includes all nuclearweapon fires.

e. High Explosives (HE). Information on pressed,cast, and insensitive HE will be extracted from EODTraining Publication 60-1, reference (so), after a DoEclassi!lcation review.

f. Hydrazine. Hydrazine is used as a missile fuel oras a fuel in some aircraft emergency power units.Hydrazine is a colorless, oily fuming liquid with a sIightIyammonia odor. It is a powerful explosive that whenheated to decomposition emits highly toxic nitrogencompounds and may explode by heat or chemicalreaction. Self-igniting when absorbed on earth, woodor cloth, the fuel burns when a spark producescombustion; any contact with an oxidized substance suchas rust can also cause combustion. When hydrazine ismixed with equal parts of water, it will not burn; howeverit is toxic when inhaled, absorbed through the skin ortaken internally. Causing skin sensitization as well assystemic poisoning, hydrazine may cause damage to theliver or destruction of red blood cells. The permissibleexposure level is 0.1 parts per million and a lowerconcentration causes nasal irritation. After exposure tohydrazine vapors or liquids, remove clothing imme-diately and spray exposed area with water for 15 minutes.

Self-contained breathing apparatus is required in vapor/liquid concentrations.

g. Fuming Red Nitric Acid. Red nitric acid is anoxidizer for some missile systems. It is reddish brown,highly toxic corrosive liquid with a sharp, irritating,pungent odor. Dangerous when heated to decomposi-tion, it emits highly toxic fumes of NOX and will reactwith water or steam to produce heat and toxic corrosiveand flammable vapors. The permissible exposure levelis two parts per million, although a lower concentrationcauses nasal irritation, severe irritation to the skin, eyes,and mucous membranes. Immediately after exposure,wash acid from skin with. copious amounts of water.Self-contained breathing apparatus is required in vapor/liquid concentrations.

h. Solid Fuel Rocket Motors. Rocket motors(composed of Dymeryl diisocyanate (DDI), curedhydroxyl terminated polybutadine (HTPB) polymer,ammonium perchlorate and aluminum powder or othercyanate, butadiene, perchlorate or nitrate basedcompounds) present severe explosive hazards uponaccidental ignition. If rocket motors ignite or catch fire,evacuate to a safe distance.

i. Composite Fibers (CF). CF are carbon, boron, andgraphite fibers that are milled into composite epoxypackages which are integral aircraft structural members.Upon fire or breakage of the epoxy outer layer, CFstrands can be emitted into the environment. The CFstrands do not present a health hazard. However, inthe immediate accident area or location where acomposite package has broken open, the fibers can causesevere arcing and shorting of electrical equipment.

.-

14-A-2

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 15

WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATION

15-1 GENERAL

A mixture of weapons, weapon components, contam-inants, and other hazardous debris may be at a nuclearweapon accident site. The number and type of weapons,the extent of damage, and the location of weapons,weapon components, and hazards are of primaryconcern. If the weapons appear to be intact, andradioactive contaminants have not been dispersed, thecomplexity of the problem is lessened considerably.However, even intact weapon(s) may pose significantrecovery problems with potential explosive andcontamination hazards. A continuing assessment of thesituation is needed to determine the best method forconducting weapon recovery.


This chapter provides information about weaponoperations following a nuclear weapon accident. Also,requirements and planning are discussed to developoperational plans for recovery of nuclear weapons,weapon components, and other hazardous materials.


Service responsibilities for weapon recovery operationsinclude all actions through transfer of weapon custodyto a designated Department of Energy (DoE) represen-tative. During weapon recovery operations, personnel:

a. Determine the status and location of the weapon(s),including whether high explosive detonations occurred.

b. Assess weapon(s) damage.

c. Perform render safe procedures on the weapon(s).

d. Initiate a systematic search until the location forthe weapon(s) and all weapon components is known.

e. Establish an area and develop procedures forprocessing/ packaging contaminated weapon(s) andcomponents.

f. Perform necessary actions for transport or shippingof the weapon(s) and components for interim storageand/ or final disposition.

15-4 RESOURCES

The On-Scene Commander (OSC) can request manytypes of support during the acc;dent response operation.The principal resources available to meet weaponrecovery responsibilities are Explosive OrdnanceDisposal (EOD) Teams and the DoE Accident ResponseGroup (ARG).

a. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. EOD personnel areresponsible for the actual performance, supervision, andcontrol of hands-on weapon recovery operations. Thefollowing guidelines apply to the employment of EODteams:

(1) The Service or Unified Commander havingprimary responsibility for command and control on-siteat the accident provides, or obtains from the appropriateService, EOD teams that are Service certified on theweapon(s).

(2) All Service or Unified Command EOD teamsprovide emergency support until the designated EODteam arrives.

(3) Navy EOD teams recover weapons locatedunder water because only Navy EOD personnel aretrained in diving techniques.

(4) EOD personnel, officer and enlisted, aregraduates of the Navy School, Explosive OrdnanceDisposal at Indian Head, MD. They are trained in accesstechniques and are the only personnel qualified toperform render safe procedures. Also, they are trainedto identify, detect, contain and/or eliminate explosive,radiological and toxic hazards associated with nuclearweapons. Intensive training is conducted on render safeprocedures for weapons unique to their individualService. .

(5) The EOD team provided, or obtained, by theService having primary command and control respon-sibility will safe the weapon(s). If an extremely hazardoussituation exists, the initial responding EOD team with

15-I

the publications and capabilities to safe the weaponshould do so. The continuation of any render safeprocedures are conducted by an EOD team qualifiedon the particular weapon(s) involved.

(6) The organization of EOD teams varies amongServices as does the number and seniority of personnelassigned; however, all teams have the same basiccapabilities and are trained in radiological control andmonitoring techniques applicable to their operations.They have the necessary communications and personalsafety equipment to operate in an accident environment.Moreover, teams have a background in weapon designinformation enhanced by coordination with DoEscientific advisors on arrival at the accident scene. NavyEOD teams maintain a complete inventory of all U.S.nuclear weapon “publications, and Army EOD unitsmaintain publications for render safe procedures (RSP)for all Services nuclear weapon systems. While tasksassigned to EOD personnel are clearly in the realm ofweapon safing and disposal, they must operate withinthe framework of the overall response group and conductoperations only as directed by the OSC.

(7) The EOD teams actions, by priority are:

(a) Prevention of nuclear detonation.(b) Prevention of a nuclear contribution or a high

explosive detonation.(c) Identification, detection, containment and, if

required, the elimination of explosive and radiologicalhazards resulting from the accident or incident.

(d) Protection of personnel against hazards notedin (a) through (c) above.

b. Department of Energy. The DoE ARG includesweapon design personnel and explosive experts familiarwith weapons and associated hazards. The ARGprovides technical advice and assistance in the collection,identification, decontamination, packaging, anddisposition of weapon components, weapon debris, andresulting radioactive materials; and technical advice andassistance to EOD teams in render safe and recoveryprocedures. Each nuclear weapon has render safeprocedures developed, evaluated, coordinated, andauthenticated as binding jointly by the DoD and DoE.Since weapons may have been subjected to extreme stressduring an accident, consideration may be given to theDoE unique equipment to assess the applicability of theseprocedures.

(1) DoE radiographic capabilities are available forfield diagnostics of damaged weapons in the event ofan incident/ accident. The Los Alamos NationalLaboratory (LANL) has fieldable radiographic units

with accompanying film, film processing, and viewingequipment. LLNL has an equivalent radiographiccapability which serves as a back-up to the LANL unit.

(2) DoE aerial radiological surveys by the AerialMeasurement System (AMS) assist in locating weaponsand weapon components. This capability is addressedin Appendix 5-C.

(3) Additional information concerning the ARG,DoE radiographic capabilities, the AMS, and other DoEcapabilities may be obtained from the .JNACC.


Weapon recovery begins with the initial reconnaissance,proceeds through the conduct of render safe procedures,and ends with hazard removal and disposal of theweapons and components. These operations arediscussed in this concept of operations. The two-personpolicy must be strictly enforced when working withnuclear weapons. In the early stages of accident response,personnel may find it difficult to follow all of the requiredsecurity measures however, the OSC should implementnecessary security procedures as soon as possible.

a. Initial Entry. During the initial entry, weapons andthe aircraft, vehicle, or missile wreckage present severalhazards. Nuclear weapons and some components containconventional explosives and other hazardous materials.Nuclear material may have been dispersed on impact,during detonation of explosives, or by combustion ina fire. Weapons may need stabilizing to prevent furtherdamage or explosions. Other explosive items which maybe encountered include conventional munitions, aircraftfire extinguisher cartridges, engine starter cartridges,pyrotechnics, and egress or extraction devices. Leakingfluids, liquid oxygen, propellants, oxidizers, shreddedor torn metals, and composite materials/fibers presentadditional hazards. The initial reconnaissance teamshould mark hazards clearly.

b. Render Safe Procedures. The OSC is responsibleultimately for the proper implementation of any rendersafe procedures. The EOD team evaluates and analyzesthe accident situation and advises the OSC of the safestand most reliable means for neutralizing weaponassociated hazards. Render safe procedures may begin,if required, as soon as the reconnaissance has beencompleted. Handling of nuclear weapons in an accidentmust be done according to written procedures. If theweapon is in a stable environment, no immediate actionsshould occur until a coordinated weapon recoveryprocedure has been developed by EOD personnel and

15-2

DoE ARG representatives. These procedures must beapproved by the OSC after coordination with the DoETeam Leader and the senior member of the EOD Team.Consideration must be given to the following whendetermining a course of action:

(1) Explosive ordnance and accident debris areinherently dangerous, but some minimum number ofpersonnel may have to be exposed to hazards to completethe mission.

(2) Consequences should be evaluated beforeexposing personnel to hazards.

(3) When available, DoE radiographic equipmentis used to assess internal damage and aid standard EODprocedures. ARG capabilities and knowledge, combinedwith EOD team procedures and experience in rendersafe procedures under hazardous conditions, provide thebest method of determining a weapon’s condition beforeit is moved.

(4) Staging, decontamination, packaging, and themethod, type, and final disposition of shipment shouldbe an integral part of the RSP planning phase.

(5) The high priority given to weapon recoveryoperations does not inherently imply a need for rapidaction. Personnel and public safety must never besacrificed solely for speed.

c. Nuclear Weapon Security. The two-man rule mustbe enforced strictly when working with nuclear weapons.The OSC should ensure that all personnel are familiarwith the rule and that it is strictly enforced. Physicalsecurity safeguards required to prevent unauthorizedaccess to classified information and proper control anddisposition of classified material must be strictly enforcedduring all operations involving the weapon(s) or weaponcomponents. Because of the technical informationrequirements during nuclear weapon operations, somedocuments at the accident scene may contain criticalnuclear weapon design information (CNWDI). Thesensitive information contained in these documentsrequires that security measures be implementedconsistent with the highest classification assigned.Personnel working in an area containing CNWDI shouldbe properly cleared and authorized until recoverydiscussions are complete and the items have been coveredor removed.

d. Search Techniques. The location of all weaponsand components must be determined. Depending uponthe accident circumstances, weapons and weaponcomponents may be scattered and/or buried over a largearea. A systematic search may be required over a large,.area until accountability for all the weapons and weapon

components is re-established. The search may becomea time consuming operation requiring numerouspersonnel. The search method used by the OSC dependson many factors including the number of personnelavailable, topography, and environmental conditions.Metal detectors and RADIAC equipment maybe neededto locate all weapons and components. As componentsare found, their location should be marked, the positionrecorded on a map, and photographed. The items shouldbe removed to a storage area after coordination withaccident investigators, safety and security permitting. Ifall components are not found, the EOD team leadershould coordinate with the ARG and make recommen-dations to the OSC concerning additional searchprocedures which can be tried, and at what point thesearch for components will cease. Search techniques thatmay be employed are:

(1) Coarse Search. A search in loose crisscrossingpatterns designed to locate weapon components rapidly.This technique is used by EOD and radiologicalmonitoring personnel to search the accident area soonafter the accident has occurred.

(2) Aerial Radiological and Photographic Survey.This technique is used to identify areas of signitlcantradioactive intensity to assist in locating missing weaponcomponents and to provide high resolution pho-tography.

(3) Instrument Search. Metal and radiationdetectors monitor those areas where weapons orcomponents were found previously. This method maysupplement the visual search.

(4) Visual Search. A search normally conducted bya slow-moving line of personnel positioned abreast atvarious intervals dependent upon the object to belocated.

(5) Scarifying Procedure. Components may havebeen buried during the accident or subsequently coveredby wind action. A road grader equipped with scarifies(large steel teeth) is used to plow a surface. Search teamsshould follow the graders and conduct a visual and/or instrument search for missing components. Thissystem has proven successful in past search operations.Coordination must be made with the Joint HazardEvaluation Center (JHEC) prior to implementingtechniques to asseis personnel protection requirementsdue to resuspension and the potential impact on sitedecontamination and restoration.

e. Hazard Removal. Another major step in weaponrecovery begins with the removal of identified hazards.The OSC establishes priorities for removing all hazardsso that other response personnel may conduct opera-

15-3

tions. It is unsafe for anyone but task trained personnelunder EOD supervision to clear an area of broken,scattered, or resolidified high explosives.

f. Disposal. After the weapons are evaluated by EODand DoE as safe for movement and in coordination withaccident investigators, weapons are moved to adesignated weapon storage area.

(1) On-site disposal of high explosives depends onavailable space and hazards presented, includingresuspension of contaminants. Storage area or disposalsites should be large enough to minimize hazards topersonnel in the event of a detonation. The distancesthat storage areas are separated from other operationsis determined by the type and amount of explosives

“ stored. An isolated and segregated area should be setaside for the exclusive storage of exposed or damagedexplosives.

(2) If open storage is used, protection from theelements and information sensors, including satellitesurveillance, must be provided for weapons and weaponcomponents.

g. Storage of Explosives. If explosive items cannotbe stored separately, a balance of safety and practicalconsiderations requires assignment of each item to astorage group based on compatibility characteristics.

h. Custody. Each Service has publications thataddress the storage, security, and safety aspectsassociated with nuclear weapons, these publications alsoaddress requirements for the custody of nuclear weaponsand weapon components. Moreover, performance ofEOD procedures does not, in itself, constitute transferof custody to the EOD team. Final disposition ofdamaged weapon(s) and/ or components involves returnof these devices to the DoE. Therefore, close coordi-nation between the OSC and the DoE team leader isnecessary throughout the weapon recovery phase.Custody of damaged weapon(s) and components istransferred to the DoE at a point determined jointlyby the OSC and the DoE team leader.

i. Packaging and Marking. Transportation specialistconsultation is required for weapon(s), weaponcomponents, and/ or explosives damaged or subjectedto extreme forces during accidents. Before weapon(s),

weapon components, and/ or explosives are shipped,they must be packaged to ensure that no contaminationbreaches the container and that the environmentexperienced during shipment will not cause furtherdamage or explosions. To ensure this requirement,special packing, shipping, marking and safety instruc-tions must be obtained to comply with transportationregulations from the DoD, DoE, and DoT.

j. Shipment. When the disposition decision has beenmade, DoD or DoE may be assigned the primaryresponsibility for moving the weapons. Nuclear weaponswill be moved by the safest means and over the safestroutes. Movement should be kept to a minimum.Shipments of weapons/weapon components will berouted to a DoE facility for examination, analysis, andfinal disposition.


The weapon operations annex/ recovery plan shouldestablish the procedures used during weapon operations.This annex should include:

a. Definition of the relationship between EODpersonnel and DoE weapon experts and their respectiveresponsibilities.

b. Procedures for locating and identifying weaponcomponents and debris.

c. Procedures for establishing a secure staging/storage area.

d. Procedures for moving weapons and componentsto the secure staging/storage area.

.e. Procedures for packaging weapon components.

f. Procedures for shipping weapons and components.

g. Guidelines for establishing electromagnetic radia-tion hazard areas.

h. Procedures for re-establishing accountability forweapons and weapon components.

15-4

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 16

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

16-1 GENERAL

a. A nuclear weapon accident, whether in a remoteor populated area, has immediate public impact. Publicaffairs activities during the initial accident response areperhaps among the most critical aspects of the entireresponse effort. Within hours of the accident, news mediawill be at the scene. Local citizens will seek informationas to how the accident affects them. Given the public’sapprehension and the news media’s widespread coverageof radiation incidents/accidents, a dynamic, comprehen-sive public affairs program must be conducted to ensurecredibility of the response effort. Timely, accurateinformation and frequent updates are essential to keepthe public informed and to maintain credibility.

b. All Department of Defense (DoD) responseelement commanders will face a wide range of complexpublic affairs issues which require immediate attention.The On-Scene Commander (OSC) communicates orensures communication with the Office, AssistantSecretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)). TheOSC should devote considerable time to meetings withnews media, public officials, and private citizens. Togain the public confidence, public information andcommunity relations programs must be established.

c. An internal information program should beconducted to provide information about policies anddaily operational status to all response elements.Cognizant public affairs staffing is required to assist thecommander with these programs.

d. The Joint DoD, Department of Energy (DoE), andFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)Agreement, reference (a), contains public affairs relatedinformation. If conflicts exist between guidancecontained in this manual and DoD directives andagreements, guidance in the DoD document(s) shouldp r e v a i l .


scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident(occurring in the United States, its territories andpossessions or overseas). Included are contingency pressreleases extracted from the DoD Directive 5230.16,reference (b), and fact sheets on radiation.


The OSC has specific public affairs responsibilities asindicated below. The military Services may have imposedadditional requirements contained in appropriateService regulations. The OSC will:

a. Establish or ensure direct communications withOASD(PA) from the accident scene.

b. Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC)coordinating with DoS, and/or FEMA, DoE, state, andlocal authorities at the scene of the accident.

c. Provide news media support at the accident scene.

d. Protect classified information.

e. Assess public understanding and identify concernsabout nuclear issues.

f. Provide internal information/guidance.

g. Identify and respond to community relation needs.

16-4 RESOURCES

The DoD response element commander should havequalified public affairs officers from the supportinginstallation and/ or staff as members of the responseforce. These PAOS form part of the DoD element ofthe JIC. Other public affairs support is available fromthe following:

a. Department of Defense: The OASD(PA), as thesenior DoD public affairs organization, coordinates withthe White House Press Office and other departments

This chapter provides public affairs guidance on ~~ a;d agencies at the national level. The OASD(PA) mayprocedures and issues which may be encountered at the be represented at the Crisis Coordination Center (CCC)

16-1

or the accident scene during emergencies. Members ofthe military Service headquarters and major commandpublic affairs staffs may augment the OSC’S public affairsstaff. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) PAO isknowledgeable on nuclear weapons issues and will assistas a part of the DNA Advisory Team.

b. Department of Energy: A DoE public affairs officerwill accompany the DoE Team Leader to the accidentscene and be present in the JIC. Other DoE public affairspersonnel from DoE field operation offices, nationallaboratories, and DoE contractors may also be requestedto augment the JIC operations. DoE PAOS areknowledgeable in nuclear weapons matters.

c. Department of State: The DoS exercises diplomaticcontrol of the U.S. response to a nuclear weapon(s)accident outside the U. S., its territories, and possessionsor if the accident has trans-boundry implications. TheU.S. Chief of Mission (COM) will be the focal pointfor diplomatic and political decisions of the U.S.government. The COM will provide significant publicaffairs expertise and information on the host country’spublic reaction. The COM will be assisted by a teamfrom the embassy’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC)with augmentation as required by the situation.Additionally, liaison officers will be provided to the OSCand the JIC.

d. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Publicaffairs personnel will accompany the senior FEMAofficial to the accident scene. They will be present inthe JIC and provide a wide variety of skills in all publicaffairs operations dealing with disaster and emergencyoperations. Additional FEMA resources are availablefrom FEMA headquarters, regions, and FEMA’s corpsof reserve PAOS.

e. Other: Public affairs officers from other Federalagencies involved in the Federal response effort (forexample, Health and Human Services, Department ofTransportation) also may be present at the scene, andshould be integrated into the JIC. Local and state publicaffairs personnel, although not part of the responseelement, should be invited to participate in the JIC toprovide coordinated responses to the media and generalpublic.


A nuclear weapon accident and subsequent responseoperations, “whether in a remote or a populated area,

will generate immediate public interest. The public mustbe notified immediately in the event their safety orwelfare is endangered. All senior Federal officials, bothmilitary and civilian, and responsible State and localauthorities and foreign government officials must be fullyinformed of conditions and actions at the accident sceneso they maybe prepared to respond accurately to queriesfrom the media and the public. To gain the confidenceof the public, a credible public affairs program shouldbe implemented immediately. The public affairspersonnel must handle media and public inquiries aboutthe accident and its consequences, provide internalinformation to the members of the response force, andimplement community relations support to the affectedcommunities. Information released about the accidentmust be both accurate and consistent. .hformation tobe released should be coordinated with the OSC’S legalrepresentative (or oflicer) to ensure that legal implica-tions are considered. The OSC should use technicaladvisors to respond to and/or address unclassified issuesof a technical nature.

a. Policy. DoD policy is stated in DoD Instruction5230.16, reference (b), which outlines specific proceduresfor announcements of accidents in the U. S., its territoriesand possessions or overseas. It is the DoD policy toprovide effective public affairs activities at the scene ofa nuclear weapon accident. It is also the DoD policyto neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclearweapons or nuclear components at any specific location.Two exceptions to this policy are:

(1) The OSC is required to conjh the presenceof nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear componentsin the interest of public safety. Notification of publicauthorities is required if the public is, or may be, indanger of radiation exposure or other danger posed bythe weapon or its components. The OASD(PA) will beadvised of the notification as soon as practical if thisexception is used.

(2) The OSC may conjhm or deny the presenceof nuclear weapons lo reduce or prevent widespreadpublic alarm. Any statement confirming the presenceof nuclear weapons should contain information aboutthe possibility of injury from high explosive weaponcomponents and/ or potential radiation exposure. Ifinjury or radiation exposure is unlikely, it should alsobe stated. The OASD(PA) should be notified in advance,if practical, or as soon as possible thereafter, if thisexception is used.

(j) In locations outside the U. S., its territories andpossessions, unless bilateral agreements exist, the OSCmust have the concurrence of the appropriate theater

16-?

CINC, and the host government, through the U.S. Chiefof Mission, prior to exercising the exceptions above.

(4) Contingency releases for the above exceptionsare contained in Appendix 16-A.

(5) Radiation information fact sheets for thegeneral public and medical personnel are in Appendix16-B.

b. Public Affairs Responsibilities. The OSC hasspecific public affairs responsibilities. These are:

(1) Establish communications with OASD(PA).The OSC should ensure that the public affairs officeestablishes direct communications with OASD(PA) asexpeditiously as possible (Area Code (202) 697-5131,AV 227-5131). Any means available should be used (forexample, the pay telephone if military communicationis unavailable). Communications are essential since theOSC is the senior DoD representative at the scene andmust have access to current policy guidance andstatements issued at the national level. Moreover, theService chief of public affairs must be kept fullyinformed. Also, direct communications ensures thattimely, accurate information can be provided at thenational level.

(2) Establish a JIC. The OSC establishes a JIC incoordination with DoS, DoE, FEMA, state and localagencies officials, as appropriate. Local officials shouldbe invited to provide representatives to the JIC. Allpublic affairs activities should be coordinated in advancewith DoS and/ or FEMA, DoE and other agenciesrepresented in the JIC. Located in an area near theaccident scene, the JIC serves as the focal point forinformation about the accident. A location in apermanent facility (for example, hotel, motel, officebuilding) is preferred due to support requirements. TheOSC should provide dedicated administrative, commun-ications, and logistical support for the JIC. The minimumcommunications required by DoD in the JIC are twodedicated telephone lines and a facsimile reproductioncapability. However, intense media interest likely willnecessitate the installation of additional phone lines. TheOSC provides primary leadership and direction to theJIC until such time as responsibility may transition tothe appropriate agency and/ or affected country tocomplete the near and long-term follow-up monitoringduties.

(3) Provide Support for News Media. The OSCis authorized to provide support to the news mediacovering a nuclear weapon incident/accident. Supportwill be the same as that authorized on a militaryreservation (for example, transportation, logistical, andadministrative). Specific support will depend upon thesituation and available resources. The media should bebriefed on the extent of support available.

(4) Protect Classified Information. The OSC isresponsible for reviewing all material, news releases, andinformation released to the public. Information onnuclear weapons and their storage is classified RestrictedData/ Formerly Restricted Data and is very sensitive (forexample, information concerning design of nuclearweapons and components, disclosing whether or not aweapon contains tritium, and its physical state andchemical form). If declassification of information isneeded, it should be referred to DoD for considerationand coordinated with DoE, as required. When the JICresponsibility and authority is transferred to FEMA,to an agency following a U.S. territory accident or tothe involved government following an overseas accident,all public affairs matters pertaining to the technicalresponse are coordinated in advance with the OSC, whohas final clearance responsibility in the classificationarea.

(5) Assess Public Understanding. The OSC shouldidentify public concerns about DoD nuclear matters andtake appropriate action in the public affairs arena. Thisis a continuing effort, before, during, and after anaccident. During the accident, the JIC should beresponsible for public affairs planning and analyzingfeedback received from the media, the general publicand through community relations programs to ensurethat the public affairs program is meeting the needs ofthe affected public. Programs should be initiated,modified, or stopped based on the data obtained.

(6) Personnel Guidance. The OSC should ensurethat all response force personnel (including civilianpersonnel working with the response force) are briefedon accident response and public affairs policy throughan internal information program. Specific guidanceshould be provided to response force personnel,especially those who may come in contact with thegeneral public (for example, security personnel, medicalpersonnel, and radiological survey or monitoring teams)on how to respond to queries about the accident andresponse operations.

c. The OSC should consider forming a CommunityEmergency Action Team (CEAT) composed of publicaffairs, legal, medical, security, communications,administrative, logistics, and other personnel from DoDand civil resources. The CEAT should function underthe OSC and operate out of the JIC to facilitatecoordination. The purpose of the team is to make expertsin various functional areas available to assist the affectedcivilian community. The CEAT activities should becoordinated through the Senior FEMA Official (SFO)and/ or U.S. Chief of Mission to assure a unifiedjipproach in working with the community. Phone lines

should be established with a published number for publicquestions and information.

16-3

APPENDIX 16-A

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

CONTINGENCY RELEASES

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 1

“No Danger to the Public”(Confirms to reduce public alarm)

(Format of sample release to be used when no dangerexists to the public from contamination or blast, butwhen confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weaponor nuclear components significantly prevents or reduceswidespread public alarm).

A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation)carrying hazardous material (classified cargo or unarmednuclear weapon(s), for example) crashed (or othercircumstances) approximately (location and time).

The public is requested to stay out of the area undersurveillance by guards to preclude any remote possibilityof hazard from the accident (or conventional highexplosives detonation) and to aid removal operations.There is no need for evacuation. There is no dangerof nuclear detonation.

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2-A

“To notify local and State officialsWhen Public is Possibly in Danger”

(Neither confirms nor denies)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safetyconsiderations require notifying local and State officialsthat hazardous cargo has been involved in an accident,the possibility exists for contamination due to fire orexplosion, and details are unknown).

MINIMUM ANNOUNCEMENT

A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation)carrying hazardous material crashed (or other circum-stances) approximately (location) at (time).

Visitors are warned to stay out of the area of the accidentin the interest of public safety. Fire, rescue, and otheremergency services personnel should approach the areawith caution from upwind and be equipped withprotective clothing and breathing apparatus. Use ofwater directly on the aircraft should be avoided unlessneeded to save property or lives. Any local official atthe scene of the accident who can provide details onthe situation should make a telephone call to this number(local phone). Current information from the accidentscene will assist in evaluating the accident and providingadditional public safety guidance. 1

EXPANDED ANNOUNCEMENT

——

Ilf contact with the accident scene is established. determine the followin~.—Condition of aircraft (burning, evidence of explosion, extent of damage, etc.)–Condition of accident site (fire, blast, or damage)—Evidence of obvious cargo (shapes or containers) .-

If there is no immediate threat to life, and the fire cannotbe extinguished immediately (5 minutes), the fire shouldbe contained and allowed to burn out. Water as afirefighting agent should be used with caution due topossible adverse reaction with materials involved in thefire.

Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorizedpersonnel from entering the site and picking upfragments of the plane (vehicle) or its cargo. If anyfragments have been picked up already, avoid furthercontact or handling. Notify (authorities) for retrievaland proper disposition.

Determine the need for a public announcement of nuclear weapons involvement based on the responses to the above

16-A-1

Military personnel have been dispatched (will bedispatched) and will arrive (are scheduled to arrive) soonat the site.

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2-B

To notify the general public“When Public is Possibly in Danger”

(Neither confirms nor denies)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safetyconsiderations require making a PUBLIC RELEASEthat hazardous cargo was involved in an accident, thepossibility exists for contamination due to fire orexplosion, and details are unknown).

A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation)carrying hazardous material crashed (or other circum-stances) approximately (location) at (time). The publicis warned to stay out of the area (under surveillanceby guards) in the interest of safety and to aid operationsat the accident scene.

A U.S. (Military Service) team from (name ofinstallation) is enroute to (has arrived at) the scene ofthe accident.

We have no details yet on civilian or military injuriesor property damage.

Further announcements will be made as more informa-tion is known.

CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 3

“When Public is Probably in Danger”(Does confirm)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safetyconsiderations require announcement that a nuclearweapon has been involved in an accident and contam-ination is likely because of fire or conventional highexplosive detonation of the weapon. Make the followingstatement locally or from competent authority if no localauthority is available).

An/ a (aircraft/ railroad train/truck/ other) accidentoccurred (state time and location). The accident involveda nuclear weapon that contains conventional highexplosives and radioactive material.

There is no danger of a nuclear detonation.

The public is warned to stay out of the area (or indicatethe area) (now under surveillance by guards) becausethe conventional high explosives in the weapon (havedetonated, are burning, may detonate). Again, there isno danger of nuclear detonation, but there is a dangerfrom the conventional high explosives in the weaponthat (have detonated, are burning, may detonate).

An experienced Federal response team has been orderedto the scene of the accident.

The most immediate danger in an accident of this kindis the effect of the blast caused by detonation of theconventional high explosives in the weapon. Localscattering of nuclear material in the form of finely divideddust may have resulted near the accident site anddownwind from the explosion (fire). This poses littlerisk to health unless taken into the body by breathingor swallowing, and it is considered unlikely that anyperson would inhale or swallow an amount that wouldcause illness. As a precaution and until furtherevaluations are made, anyone within a (to be filled inby OSC or Deputy Director of Operations (DDO),NMCC) radius of the accident site, particularlydownwind from this site, (specify boundary wherepossible) is encouraged to remain indoors.

(NOTE: If applicable, the following shall be includedin the release.)

The following precautionary measures are recommendedto minimize the risk to the public.

The most appropriate initial action is to remain calmand inside homes or office buildings. Turn off fans, airconditioners, and forced-air heating units. Drink andeat only canned or packaged foods that have been inside.Trained monitoring teams will be moving through thearea wearing special protective clothing and equipmentto determine the extent of any possible contamination.The dress of these teams should not be interpreted asindicating any special risk to those indoors. If you areoutside, proceed to the nearest permanent structure. Ifyou must go outside for critical or lifesaving activities,cover your nose and mouth and avoid stirring up andbreathing any dust. It is important to remember thatyour movement outside could cause yourself greaterexposure and possibly spread contamination to thosealready supervised and protected.

(If plutonium is involved): One of the materials involvedis plutonium. Plutonium is both a poison and a radiationhazard. The radiation given off consists of alpha particles

16-A-2

which do not have sufficient energy to penetratebuildings, most clothing, or even the outer skin.Therefore, short-term exposure to contaminationoutside the body will pose negligible health risk.

(If uranium is involved): One of the materials involvedis uranium. Contamination by uranium fragments orsmall particles dispersed by conventional (chemical)explosions or burning of a weapon is primarily achemical health hazard (heavy metal poisoning similarto the lead poisoning associated with some paints), nota radiological hazard.

The public is asked to stay out of the area (undersurveillance, or closed off by guards) (and, if true) untila monitoring team, now enroute to the site of theaccident, can survey the ground and determine the exactarea affected by the accident. As a result of the explosion(fire), any fragments found near the scene of the accidentmay be contaminated and should be left in place. Iffragments have been picked up, avoid further handlingand notify (authorities) for proper retrieval anddisposition.

Continuous announcements will be made as moreinformation is known. It is expected that these immediate

protective precautionary actions will be required for thenext 4-6 hours.

A U.S. (Service) team from (name of installation) isenroute to (has arrived at) the scene of the accident.

We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties(or give number only of civilian and military casualties)or property damage.

The (type of carrier) was enroute from (name of facility)to (name of facility).

The cause of the accident is under investigation.

IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY:

Question: “Are nuclear weapons stored at (name offacility) or (name of facility)?”

Reply: “It is Department of Defense policy neither toconfirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at anyparticular location.”

16-A-3

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 16-B

RADIATION FACT SHEETS

FACT SHEET 1

CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDS AND HEALTHCONSIDERATIONS OF PLUTONIUM

(For release to

The accident at has resultedin the release of the radioactive substance plutonium.Persons who are downwind from the accident maybecome exposed to this substance by coming into contactwith contamination (radioactive material which hascoated or fallen upon the surfaces of structures, theground, or objects) from the mishap. Also, very smallamounts of plutonium may have been spread by thewinds to adjacent areas. Radiological survey teams aremonitoring these suspected areas to determine thepresence of plutonium and to measure the levels ifpresent. No immediate danger exists to anyone, and nomedical intervention is necessary. However, some actionsmay help prevent further contamination or minimizeits spread to clean areas.

Plutonium, which is abbreviated Pu, is a heavy metalwhich has a shiny appearance, similar to stainless steel,when freshly machined. After exposure to the atmos-phere for any period of time, it will oxidize to a darkbrown or black appearance. When released from aweapons accident, plutonium may not be readily seenby. the naked eye, but in areas close to the accident,its presence may be assumed in dust and dirt on theground or on flat surfaces, and from ash resulting fromthe accident fire.

Plutonium is an alpha radiation emitter. That is, itradiologically decays by the emission of an alpha particle,a very heavy radioactive particle. Alpha particles do notpenetrate materials very substantially. Their range inair is only a few inches at most. This means that alpharadiation is not a.hazard to people as long as it remainsexternal to the body. The epidermis, or outer dead layerof the skin, is sufficient protection for exposure to thisisotope from sources external to the body. No external

the general public)

however, represent an internal radiation hazard whenplutonium is taken into the body by inhalation ofcontaminated air, eating contaminated food or gettingcontamination into a wound or cut. In actuality,contamination from ingestion is unlikely to be a problem,since plutonium is very poorly absorbed through theintestines. Less than .02 percent will be absorbed, ortwo (2) of every 10,000 atoms eaten. Likewise, absorptionfrom wounds is not a probable means of significantcontamination either, since contamination of a cut orlaceration will likely introduce only very small amountsof plutonium into the body. Because of its poorabsorption, only inhaling plutonium particles is likelyto result in any amount of internal radiation exposure.

Inhaled plutonium is retained in the lungs in much thesame manner that people in a dust storm inhale dust.This “dust” settles in the lungs. Once in the lungs, alow percentage of plutonium may be translocated bythe bloodstream to the liver and the bones. Thisdeposition can be prevented by using “chelation”compounds, such as ethylene diamine trichlor acetic acid(EDTA) or diethylene triamine pent acetic acid (DTPA),which hasten the excretion of plutonium from the bodyvia the urine. The use of these chelating compoundsis not without some medical hazard to the individual,since they are administered intravenously, and shouldbe performed by a physician who has been in contactwith appropriate agencies to coordinate the use of thesedrugs.

Plutonium in a weapon has a radiological half-life (thelength of time it takes for the plutonium to lose onehalf of its radioactivity) of over 24,000 years. This longhalf-life means that its radioactivity does not decreasesubstantially by nuclear decay or disintegration.

hazard exists to people walking through an area ~~ Likewise, elimination of plutonium from the body iscontaminated with plutonium. Alpha radiation can also a very slow process. Biological elimination of

16-E-1

plutonium can be improved significantly by the use ofthe chelating agents mentioned above.

Therefore, until the limits of contamination aredetermined, the public is advised to follow a few simpleguidelines to minimize the spread of contamination, andthere will be little if any hazard. Remain inside andminimize opening doors and windows. Turn off fans,air conditioners, and forced air heating units that bringin fresh air from the outside. Use them only to recirculate

air already in the building. Children should not playoutdoors. Fruits and vegetables grown in the area shouldnot be eaten. Individuals who think they have inhaledsome plutonium, should not be unduly concerned. Theinhalation of plutonium is not a immediate medicalemergency. Very sensitive monitoring equipment is beingbrought into this area to survey the inhabitants ofsuspected contamination area(s) for inhaled radiation,and once established, this will be made available to allthose who need it.

.

16-B-2

FACT SHEET 2

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET ON PLUTONIUM

(Use with Characteristics, Hazards and HealthConsiderations of the

Plutonium is a highly reactive element, which can exhibitfive oxidation states, from 3 to 7. The principal routesinto the body are via inhalation and contaminatedwounds; ingestion and contaminated intact skin areunimportant.

Inhalation is probably the most significant route ofcontamination in a nuclear weapons accident. Retentionin the lungs depends on particle size and the chemicalform of plutonium involved. Generally, in a weaponsaccident, plutonium will be in the form of an oxide,which has a pulmonary retention half-time of up to 1,000days.

Absorption via wound contamination will result in atranslocation of some of the material to the skeletonand liver. The majority will remain in the vicinity ofthe wound, and may result in the formation of a fibrousnodule, within months to years. The possible develop-ment of a sarcoma or carcinoma in such nodules is amatter of concern, although there have been no reportsof such in the literature.

After entry into the body, some of the plutonium issolubilized by the body fluids, including blood, and isredistributed within the body. Ultimately, it will bedistributed by the blood to the skeleton (45 percent),liver (45 percent), and the other tissues (10 percent).The retention half-times are estimated to be 200 years(whole body), 100 years (skeleton) and 40 years (liver).

All medical treatment for plutonium contamination orinhalation should be coordinated with the appropriateService medical department or with Radiation Emer-gency Assistance Center/ Training Site (REAC/ TS)because of the hazard of the substances involved. DTPAcompounds are defined as investigational new drugswhich require the advice and concurrence of REAC/TS before administration. REAC/ TS can be contactedat the following 24-hour number: (615) 481-1000.

Treatment of plutonium contaminated wounds shouldinvolve copious washing and irrigation to attempt to..dislodge the contamination. If possible, washings should

Plutonium Fact Sheet)

be saved for later counting to determine contaminationlevels. More extensive treatment by excision requiresjudgment in assessing the area involved, the difficultyof excision and the total quantity in.the wound. Greaterthan “4 nCi of Pu embedded in a wound would beconsidered a candidate for such treatment. It is notexpected that the physician will need to make thisdetermination, since a specialized team to perform suchmonitoring can be made available from the OSC or hisor her representative. Immediate chelation therapy withDTPA (consult REAC/TS for protocol) should beaccomplished prior to surgical excision to preventpossible systemic absorption of Pu. In burn cases,flushing with sterile saline or water will remove a greatdeal of contamination. The remainder will likely beremoved when the eschar sloughs off.

DTPA treatment given immediately following woundor burn treatment has been shown to remove up to 96percent of the remaining plutonium. In the case ofinhaled plutonium, the results have been relativelydisappointing, since the oxide forms of Pu are transferredat a relative slow rate from the lungs into the systemiccirculation. Thus little systemic burden of Pu is availablefor chelation in the early period after exposure and thereis never a time when a sizable systemic burden is availablein the extracellular spaces for effective chelation.

In spite of this, DTPA should be used as soon as possibleafter significant inhalation exposures since the oxides .may not be the only compound present. Attempts tostimulate phagocytosis and the mucociliary response orto use expectorant drugs have not been successful inanimal studies, however, this may not be true in humans.

The only demonstrated useful procedure in enchasingthe clearance of insoluble particles, such as plutoniumoxides, from the lung is bronchopulmonary Iavage. Therisk of this procedure versus the risk of future healtheffects from the estimated lung burden must be verycarefully weighed. The use of repeated lavages shouldremove 25 to 50 percent of the plutonium that wouldotherwise be retained in the lung. Again, advice shouldbe sought from Service medical command andREAC/TS.

:fj-f3.3

FACT SHEET 3

PLUTONIUM FACT SHEET

(For Operational Commanders)

As Operational Commander, you will be assaulted bymany needs at once in determining the actions to betaken in coping with a nuclear weapons accident. Youshould have had the opportunity to review the precedingfact sheets for the general public and medical personnel.Several facts are important to keep in mind, as generalguidance. . .

By the time you have arrived at the scene, the weaponswill generally have suffered low order detonations if theyare going to do so. This low order detonation producesa cloud of finely dispersed plutonium which falls outover the area downwind, depending on particle size, winddirection and speed, and amount of explosives in thedetonation. A very worst case situation is shown onthe Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC)plots which are made available to you. The initial ARACplots show the detonation of all weapons involved,utilizing all the available explosives. The actual scenarioshould be less, perhaps 10 to 100 times less, based onthe actual survey data from the site.

The cloud will deposit its radioactive material withinminutes of the accident. Unless it happens on base, oryou are at the scene, there is little you can do to preventinhalation from the cloud passage. After initial cloudpassage, the inhalation of material from the accidentis by resuspending the plutonium by operations in thearea of cloud passage, such as walking. Department ofEnergy (DoE) can calculate a dose equivalent for personsin the area of the initial cloud passage. Generally, thesepeople will be in the area of hundreds of rem of exposureto the lungs. Note that this is only from the cloud passage!Doses from resuspension will be on the order of 100to 1,000 times less.

The important point is that the ARAC plot generallyoverestimates the total dispersion of plutonium, and thedose estimate is based only on cloud passage, not laterresuspension of the plutonium. Therefore, basing yoursheltering plans on these numbers can easily result ina significant overestimation of the real problem.

Sheltering should be recommended for the downwindpopulation, but you must be careful to avoid theimpression of extreme hazard from the plutonium. Yoursheltering advisory should indicate that there is a

contamination hazard and a slight inhalation hazard.Care should be taken not to increase tension over theincident. You and your Public Affairs Office (PAO)should emphasize that people should remain indoorsas much as possible, keep houses closed to preventcontamination, and other ideas as outlined in the publicrelease.

Generally, the resuspension of plutonium in the originalareas of contamination is not severe, except for the areavery close to the accident site. To prevent the spreadof material in this area, early thought should be givento spraying with some sort of fixative to preventresuspension/ spread of the plutonium. Something assimple as hand sprayers with vegetable oil may be usedto bind the plutonium into the soil/surface around thesite. A secondary advantage is that this method lowersthe airborne hazard for the workers inside the controlboundaries and may help in making the eventual cleanup process move faster. It will, however, mask theplutonium from some alpha detection RADIACS, suchas the AN/ PDR 56. Generally, these types of instrumentsare used only for monitoring people or material leavingthe site, not site contamination surveys.

In dealing with a nuclear weapons accident, some ofthe concepts which are generally employed in handlinginjuries and/ or fatalities on board ship do not hold true,or may be counterproductive. Such an example wouldbe keeping the population under tight shelteringrequirements or restricting traffic from the contamina-tion area downwind. Any recommendation for thecivilian populace will be just that, recommendations.The military has no authority in the contamination areasunless they are military areas anyway, or are within theNational Defense Area (NDA). Utilize the localauthorities, and have the FEMA representative assistin this function.

Some concept of the exact magnitude of the risk peopleexperience from the incident can be compared with therisks outlined in the Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8.29,reference (ap). The Service/ DoE health physicists shouldbe consulted to give the best approximation of the public,risk, and this can be compared with the risks in theguide.

1 6-B-4

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 17

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

17-1 GENERAL

The military Service or agency providing assistance orresponding to a nuclear weapon accident will fund costsinitially incurred within existing funds. The militaryService or agency having possession of the nuclearweapon or nuclear weapons components at the time ofthe accident is responsible for reimbursing, upon request,the military Service or agency providing assistance orresponse. These costs are in addition to normal operatingexpenses, and which are directly chargeable to, andcaused by, the incident/ accident. DoD 4000.25. l-M,reference (aq) is used, as feasible, and supplemented bylocal service contracts. The amount of logistics supportdepends upon the location of the accident and the extentof contamination, if any. If an accident results inextensive contamination, decontamination and restora-tion operations involving up to 1,000 people may requiresix months or more to complete.


This chapter provides guidance on logistics supportmatters peculiar to a nuclear weapon accident. Includedare discussions for establishing a project code, base campsupport, transportation, and some radiological support.


Commanders and logistics officers of forces respondingto a nuclear weapon accident should determine theavailability of assets and facilities at, or near, the sceneof the accident and initiate actions to obtain supportto satisfy the following requirements:

a. Messing and billeting facilities for response forcepersonnel and news media.

b. Sufficient water, potable and/or non-potable, tosupport personal by response force personnel, equipmentand personnel decontamination stations, temporaryfixation of contamination by sprinkling, and leachingoperations.

c. Sanitation facilities for response force personneland news media.

d. Laundry facilities for contaminated and uncontam-inated clothing.

e. Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

f. Transportation.

g. Maintenance support. .

h. Heavy equipment for base camp construction andrecovery/ restoration operations.

i. Electrical power.

j. Anti-contamination and other specialized clothingclimate dependent).

k. Packaging and shipping materials for weapons,components, and contaminated waste.

1. Rapid transport (air or ground) from the airheador the nearest military installation during early stagesof accident response.

m. Documentation of accident-related costs.

n. Logistical support unique to the Joint InformationCenter (JIC) (see Chapter 16, Public Affairs).

o. Airhead cargo support for air delivery of suppliesto remote sites.

p. Medical evacuation of acute casualties.

17-4 RESOURCES

Response to a nuclear weapon accident is a high priorityoperation, and all required resources from the Depart-ment of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE),and other Federal agencies with a radiological or disaster;esponse capability are normally available to the accidentresponse forces. Use of local facilities and equipment

17- I

near the accident scene, such as National Guard armoriesand vehicles, gymnasiums, and hotels, may be viablesolutions to some of the logistic problems. Militaryinstallations near the accident site may provide a supplypoint, messing, and billeting for response forcepersonnel.

a. Base Camp Support. If accident location dictatesthe establishment of a base camp for response personnel,HARVEST EAGLE, a mobile messing and billetingpackage maintained by the Air Force, may be used.Details on HARVEST EAGLE capabilities and requestprocedures are in Appendix 17-A.

b. Anti-Contamination Clothing. Sources of anti-contamination clothing are in Appendix 17-A.

c. Contaminated Laundering Facilities. A listing ofDoE contaminated laundering facilities is in Appendix17-A.

d. General Services Administration (GSA) Support.A GSA representative may accompany Federal Emer-gency Management Agency (FEMA) personnel and canassist in obtaining telephone service, office and otherbuilding spaces, and other administrative and supportservices.


The importance of the logistics staff officer’s involvementin the development of the accident response plan fromits conception cannot be overemphasized. It is a basicresponsibility to ensure that decontamination andrestoration operations are supportable. Base camplogistics support represents a rather routine situationand is almost totally dependent on the number ofpersonnel involved and the duration of the operation.

a. Planning. Planning is initiated to identify thelocation and availability of items not organic to theresponse organization and that might be a limiting factorto the response effort. Such items may include mylarfor radiation instrument probe faces, protective masks,mask filters, and” anti-contamination clothing. Thelogistics staff at the accident site should be tailored tosupport requirements, but as a minimum should consistof the following:

(1) A materiel control officer.(2) Three or four administrative supply personnel

to maintain the document register and submitrequisitions.

b. Project Code Generation. Immediately uponnotification of a nuclear weapon accident, the ServiceResponse Force (SRF) logistics staff officer shouldrequest assignment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)project code from the Joint Material Priorities andAllocations Board, an Agency of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, through the On-Scene-Commander (OSC), JointStaff (JS), military Service Headquarters, or unified orspecified command headquarters, as appropriate. Onceapproved, all response-related requisitions shouldcontain the JCS project code. For processing purposes,requisitions with a JCS project code will be ranked aboveall other requisitions with the same priority designator.Upon assignment of a JCS project code, the DefenseLogistics Agency will disseminate implementinginstructions to all concerned. The JCS -project coderequest includes the following information:

(1) The type of project code required (always 9Alpha Alpha).

(2) Project name.”(3) Service monitor or coordinator.(4) Proposed effective date.(5) Proposed termination.(6) Force/ activity designator.(7) Brief narrative background on the nature of the

requirement.(8) Where available, units and forces using the

project code should be included.

c. Installation Support. The logistics staff officeridentifies military installations nearest the accident siteand establishes liaison to determine their supportcapabilities. The installations should be alerted ofpotential support requirements. If the nearest installationis not within two to three hours driving distance,consideration should be given to requesting helicoptersupport to assist in meeting urgent logistic requirementsduring the early days of the accident response.Procedures for submitting requisitions and picking upsupplies from nearby military installations should beestablished.

d. Base Camp Establishment. The accident locationdetermines if a base camp is needed for feeding andbilleting response force personnel, or if local facilities “can be used. Any military base within acceptable drivingdistance, and available local facilities, should beconsidered before establishing a base camp. If required,HARVEST EAGLE may be requested from the AirForce. When establishing a base camp, water supplyand <anitation facilities must be considered. If a powergenerating facility is required, it should be positioned

17-2

so that it can provide power for both the base campand operations center areas.

e. Vehicular Support. A wide variety of vehicles, bothin tonnage and purpose, are required to support responseoperations. If operations continue more than 30 days,equipment maintenance may become a major consid-eration. To reduce the number of maintenance personnelon-site to a minimum, rotation of vehicles with theproviding organization is recommended. As an alter-native, consideration may be given to replacing tacticalvehicles with GSA rental vans with six-nine passengerand cargo carrying capacity when an off-road capability

‘or vehicle mounted radio is not a specific requirement.A sufficient supply of GSA general use credit cardsshould be held or readily available for refueling vehiclesused in areas where government fueling facilities maynot be available. Vehicles in contaminated areas shouldnot be removed for maintenance or returned to theowning organization until after they have beendecontaminated. Minor on-site maintenance of contam-inated vehicles may, therefore, be necessary. Base campconstruction and/ or site restoration may also requireheavy equipment. If resources are obtained through acontract, and work will be done in the contaminatedarea, decontamination criteria and hazardous workingconditions should be addressed in the contract.

f. Support for the Department of Energy, The DoDis responsible for providing logistics support to the DoEAccident Response Group (ARG). OSCS should beprepared to support from 7-12 persons in the ARCadvance party who arrive within 12-24 hours after theaccident. Up to 70 ARG personnel may be at the sitewithin 48 hours following the accident, depending onthe level of DoE support required. Early coordinationwith the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center(JNACC) will help identify numbers of personnel andtype of support required by the ARG. The ARG hasa support coordinator who will work with the logisticsstaff to ensure that all ARG requirements are identified.The support coordinator will normally accompany theadvance party of the ARG to the accident site. Otheragencies should arrive on-site with an organic capabilityto support their personnel and operations a minimumof three days.

g. Local Service Contracts. Use of local servicecontracts to facilitate logistics support is recommendedfor the following services:

(1) Petroleum, oil , and lubricants (POL).(2) Water.

. .

(3) Sanitation.(4) Maintenance.(5) Laundry of non-contaminated clothes.

h. Contaminated Laundry Support. Decontaminat-ing and cleaning anti< ontamination clothing is a criticalrequirement supporting accident response operations.Additionally, it may be necessary for the response forceto assist in decontamination of area residents’ clothing.Appendix 17-A provides a reference list of DoEcontaminated laundry facilities. Assistance in arrangingfor work by these facilities, additional information ontheir capabilities, and information on commercialfacilities may be requested from the JNACC. Phonenumbers are listed in Appendix l-G.

i. Dissemination of Procedures. Provisions should bemade to ensure that all personnel or units respondingto the accident are provided written informationdescribing procedures to follow in requesting logisticalor administrative support. This information shouldindicate clearly to whom requests should be submitted,and who the approval authority is. The status of allrequests should be monitored and any problemsencountered reported to the requesting person ororganization.

j. News Media and JIC Support. Advance planningshould take into account the possible billeting, messing,and transportation support for news media as authorizedby DoD and Service directives. The number of mediapersonnel could vary from a small number to hundredsdepending upon the severity of the accident. Closecoordination is requued with the Public Affairs Office(PAO) to determine specific requirements. The JointInformation Center (JIC) should be provided fulllogistical support including transportation, expendableand non-expendable equipment, and supplies. Specificrequirements will be determined by the PAO.


The Logistic Support annex should provide proceduresfor establishing and maintaining support for response “force operations. This annex should include:

a. Procedures for obtaining appropriate JCS and/orService project codes.

.b. Procedures for establishing and supporting a base

camp in remote areas.

c. Procedures for establishing maintenance support e. Sources of anti-contamination clothing.or equipment rotation during extended operations.

d. Procedures for laundering contaminated clothing, f. Procedures for delivery of requisitioned materialincluding shipping, if required. to the accident site.

.-

174

DoD 51 OO.52-M

17-A-1 HARVEST EAGLE KITS

APPENDIX 17-A

LOGISTICS RESOURCES

a. HARVEST EAGLE kits are air transportableoperations support sets for supporting units that operatein remote locations where propositioning is notpolitically or economically feasible. The kits includetents, field kitchens, cots, and similar housekeepingitems. Additional equipment includes generators, NF-2 “Lightalls”, shower and laundry facilities, water storagebladders, and water purification equipment. The kitsdo not include vehicles, personal equipment items (suchas parkas, bedding or sleeping bags) or expendable (suchas food, fuel or medical supplies). HARVEST EAGLEkits are designated war reserve materials and maintainedin a ready-to-deploy status in CONUS by the 4400Mobility Support Flight, Robbins AFB, Georgia. Thesekits are under the operational control of HQ TAC/ LGX.

b. Each kit can support 1,100 people, and the totalkit can be transported on 14 C-141 B aircraft. Kits areconfigured in four separately deployable packages, eachdesigned to support 275. people. If HARVEST EAGLEkits are required at an accident scene, the on-scene staffmust make arrangements for personnel to unpack andassemble the equipment, and to manage billeting spaceand operate the field kitchens. Special teams, such asUSAF PRIME BEEF and PRIME RIB units can berequested to provide additional support.

c. HARVEST EAGLE kits are designated war reservematerial and are maintained by TAC, USAFE, andPACAF. Each command has four kits.

17-A-2 ANTI-CONTAMINATION CLOTHINGSOURCES

a. Either permanent or disposable anti-contaminationclothing is used for nuclear accident response.

b. Disposable Anti-Contamination Clothing. Sources

for disposable anti-contamination clothing area as

follows:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

I

Defense Apparel

247 Addison Road

Windsor, CT 06095

Comm (800) 243-3847

Nuclear Power Outfitter

P.O. Box 737

Crystal Lake, IL 60014

Comm (815) 455-3777

Euclid Garment Manufacturing Company

333 Martinel Drive

Kent, OH 44240

Comm (216) 673-7413

Durafab Disposable, Inc.

P.O. BOX 658

Cleburne, TX 76031

Comm (817) 645-8851

Elwood Nuclear “Safety

2180 Elmwood Ave

Buffalo, NY 14216

Comm (7 16) 877-6621

c. Permanent Anti-Contamination Clothing.

. National stock numbers (NSN) for permanent anti-

contamination clothing are:

17-A-I

ITEM

Coveralls, RadioactiveCoveralls, RadioactiveHood, Radioactive ContaminantHood, M6A2Gloves, ClothGloves Shells, RadioactiveContaminant 10

Shoe Covers

Overshoe, Combat

17-A-3 CONTAMINATED LAUNDERINGFACILITIES

SIZE NSN

Small/ MediumLarge, Extra Large

8 through8415-00-782-2814Small throughExtra LargeSmall

a. The Department of Energy (DoE) operates facilitiescapable of laundering plutonium contaminated clothingat the following locations:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Savannah River Operations OfficeSavannah River Plant (DuPont)Aiken, SCContamination Limit 200 dpm/ cm2Capacity: 12,000 suits/ dayRichland Operations OfficeRockwell HanfordRichland, WAContamination LimiP 667 dpm/ cm2Capacity: Very large quantities (currentlyservicing 3-5,000 radiation workers per day)Chicago Operations OfficeBrookhaven National LaboratoryBrookhaven, LI New YorkContamination Limit: Case-by-case basisCapacity: 15 suits/ hr

(4)

(5)

(6)

8415-00-782-28158415-00-782-28168415-00-782-28084240-00-999-04208415-00-634-50268415-00-782-281

8430-01-712-28728430-01-721-28768430-01-048-6305

Nevada Operations OfficeReynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.Las Vegas, NVContamination Limit: 33 dpm/ cm2Capacity: 1,800 suits/dayAlbuquerque Operations OfficeMound FacilitiesMiamisburg, OHContamination Limit: 100,000 dpm (average)Capacity: 1,500 suits/dayPANTEX Plant (Mason& Hanger-Silas Masonco)Amarillo, TXContamination Limih None establishedCapacity: 1,000 suits/day

b. Commercial contaminated clothing laundryfacilities may be used at various locations throughoutthe United States. The DoD JNACC assists in identifyingany commercial facilities near an accident site.

Note: DoE laundry services should be arranged throughthe DoE JNACC.

. .

NOTE: Additional information on Radiac Equipment and assets can be found in DNA 5100.52.1 L, reference (ar).

17-A-2

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 18

LEGAL

18-1 GENERAL

The occurrence of a nuclear weapon accident will presenta myriad of complex legal problems for the On-SceneCommander (OSC) of the Initial Response Force (I RF)and the Service Response Force (SRF). The OSCrepresents the U.S. Government to the general public,state, and local officials, the Executive departments, andother federal agencies. Legal issues range from complexquestions regarding jurisdiction and authority to excludethe general public from specific areas, to payment ofsimple personal property claims. The response forceorganization should include a legal element to adviseand assist the OSC in resolving these issues. The Seniormilitary member of the legal element responding withthe staff of the OSC is the Department of Defense (DoD)Principal Legal Advisor (PLA) to the OSC.


This Chapter identifies specific requirements, resources,and actions to resolve legal issues. Also it provides areference list of statutory authorities, regulations, andinstructions.


The PLA will:

a. Advise the OSC and functional staff elements onany matters related to the accident.

b. Organize and supervise the legal functional elementat the site of the accident, including establishing andoperating a claims processing facility.

c. Coordinate technical legal matters with a higherauthority when required.

d. Coordinate legal issues with the principal legaladvisors of other participating departments or agenciesas required.

e. Provide legal advice and assistance to other Federal.officials upon request.

f. Review operational plans to identify potential legalproblems and to ensure that they are legally sufficient,with emphasis on security, radiological safety, anddocumentation of factual evidence for use in resolvingclaims or in litigation.

g. Review proposed public statements for legalsufficiency and implications.

18-4 RESOURCES

a. The provision of timely and sound legal advice andassistance is dependent upon adequate personnel andcommunication among functional elements. Thedesignated legal element of the SRF response forceshould include, at a minimum, two attorneys and onelegal clerk. The legal element of the IRF response forceshould remain at the site as an additional resource.Depending upon the nature of, and circumstancessurrounding an accident, additional personnel may berequired. Predesignated response forces should ensurethat the assigned legal element is aware and capableof addressing the complex and politically sensitivenational defense issues which evolve from a nuclearweapons accident as well as managing and administeringa claims processing facility.

b. Other Federal Departments and Agencies mayinclude a legal advisor as an element of their responseforce. To assure consistency, all legal advice andassistance should be coordinated jointly through theDoD PLA.

c. The General Counsel, Defense Nuclear Agency(DNA), is a member of the DNA Advisory Team(DNAAT), and will deploy to the accident site to provideexpert advice and assistance to the PLA.


This concept establishes guidelines for the operation ofthe PLA and his or her staff. Circumstances surroundingan accident are the driving force of the sequential order.

“ a. Planning. The PLA must be knowledgeableconcerning the authority and responsibility of the DoD

18-1

as well as that of the various other Federal departmentsand agencies in a nuclear weapon accident. Inherent inthis event are the relationships between local, State,national, and international authorities, as well asjurisdictional principles, security requirements, andclaims administration. Inasmuch as requests for legaladvice require immediate response, and adequateresearch facilities are unlikely to be available on-site,designated legal elements should prepare a handbookof references, including those listed at Appendix 18-A.These references provide the authority and some

fication of responding forces and civilians at or nearthe accident scene, and appropriate recording andreceipting of property.

(6) The PLA must identify and establish liaisonimmediately with local law enforcement officials, legalauthorities, and local and state emergency responseorganizations.

(7) To ensure that legal advice is timely, responsive,and consistent, the PLA should establish liaison withlegal advisors representing other federal agencies at theaccident site.

background for subject areas, such as establishment ofthe National Defense Area (NDA), law enforcement, c. Follow-on Actions. The PLA, or a representative

use of force, evacuation of civilians, and damage to remains at the scene until the response operation is

public or private property. The handbook should be complete. The PLA advises the OSC when the claims

tailored to the respective Service or Agency. processing facility should cease operation.

b. Initial Actions

(1) The OSC and staff must have immediate accessto the PLA; accordingly, the legal element should belocated in or near the operations center/command post.

(2) The provision of timely and legally sound adviceand assistance is based primarily upon communication;therefore, liaison must be established with all of themajor functional elements of the OSC’S staff to makeall elements aware of the need for coordination ofplanned actions.

(3) The claims processing facility should beestablished at a location easily accessible to the publicand mutually agreeable to local officials. Dependentupon circumstances, more than one claims facility maybe required. When possible, the claims processing facilityshould be collocated with the civil emergency relief andassistance office. As soon as the claims processing facilityis established, information regarding the location shouldbe provided to the Joint Information Center (JIC) forinclusion in a news release.

(4) Claims processing personnel should be awareof the sensitive nature surrounding the accident. ThePLA ensures that any information provided to claimantsis according to established policies, and that queries forany information other than claims procedures arereferred to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO).

(5) Response efforts may necessarily result in thedisturbance and/ or destruction of physical evidencewhich may prove later to be significant in resolutionof claims or litigation. Accordingly, the PLA shouldtake immediate action to ensure preservation of factualand evidentiary information for both safety investiga-tions and claims resolution. This includes photographsand/ or videos, interviews with witnesses, documentationof radiological hazards and safety procedures, identi-

d. Public Affairs. Adverse publicity is inherent to anuclear weapon accident simply by its occurrence.Mishandling of public affairs-may impact on claims andlitigation, result in a loss of confidence by the publicin the actions of the U.S. Government in the cleanupprocess, or have long-term political and financialimplications that could undermine support for thenation’s nuclear deterrent capability. It is thereforeessential that:

(1) Public statements are coordinated prior torelease to ensure that no hidden legal implications willimpact on response efforts.

(2) All personnel involved in the response effortare required to refer all queries for information to thePAO.


Accident response plans should include a Legal Annexwhich:

a. Identifies the resources to be deployed with thelegal element.

b. Provides a checklist or synopsis of the actions tobe taken by the PLA immediately upon arrival at thesite.

c. Establishes a policy requiring all functionalelements to coordinate actions with the PLA.

d. Provides guidelines for documentation of physicalevidence which may be significant in “the resolution ofclaims or litigation.

e. Describes procedures for establishing and operatinga claims processing facility.

f. Identifies technical channels of communication.

18-2

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 18-A

PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS

AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT

1. Executive Order (EO) 12656, “Assignment ofEmergency Preparedness Responsibilities.”

2. White House Memorandum, 19 January 1988,Subject “National System for Emergency Coordination. ”

3.42 U. S.C.A. Sec. 5121 et. seq., (Public Law 93-288,amended by Public Law 100-107), “The Robert T.Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.”

4. EO 12148, “Federal Emergency Management. ”

5. EO 12241, “National Contingency Plan.”

6. 50 Fed. Reg. 46542, “Federal Radiological Emer-gency Response Plan (FRERP).”

7. DoD Directive 5100.52, “DoD Response to anAccident or Significant Incident Involving RadioactiveMaterials.”

8. DoD Directive 3025.1, “Use of Military ResourcesDuring Peacetime Civil Emergencies Within the UnitedStates, Its Territories, and Possessions.”

9. DoD Directive 5230.16, “Nuclear Accident andIncident Public Affairs Guidance.”

10. DoD Directive 5410.14, “Cooperation with U.S.News Media Representatives at the Scene of MilitaryAccidents Occurring Outside Military Installations.”

AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH RESTRICTED AREATO PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

1. 50 U. S.C.A. Sec. 797, “Security Regulations.”

2. 42 U. S.C.A. Sec. 2271, “General Provisions.”

3. DoD Directive 5200.8, “Security of Military,Installations and Resources. ”

4. DoD Directive 5210.2, “Access to and Disseminationof Restricted Data.”

5. DoD Directive 5210.41, “Security Criteria andStandards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons.”

6. DoD Directive 5210.56, “Use of Force by PersonnelEngaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties.”

CRIMINAL STATUTES

1. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 111, “Assaulting, Resisting orImpeding Certain Officers or Employees.”

2. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 231, ” Civil Disorders.”

3. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 241, “Conspiracy Against Rights.”

4. 18 U. S.C. A. Sec. 245, “Federally ProtectedActivities.”

5. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 372, “Conspiracy to Impede orInjure Officer.”

6. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 641, “Public Money, Property orRecords.”

7. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 793, “Gathering, Transmitting, orLosing Defense Information.”

8. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 795, “Photographing and SketchingDefense Installations.”

9. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 796, “Use of Aircraft for Photo-graphing Defense Installations.”

10. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 797, “Publication and Sale ofPhotographs of Defense Installations?

11. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 831, “Prohibited TransactionsInvolving Nuclear Materials.”

18-A-1

12. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 1361, “Government Property orContracts.”

13. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 1362, “Communication Lines,Stations or Systems.”

14. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 1382, “Entering Military, Navalor Coast Guard Property. ”

15. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 1385, “Use of Army and Air Forceas Posse Comitatus. ”

a. 10 U. S.C. A. Sec. 331, “Federal Aid for StateGovernments. ”

b. 10 U. S.C.A. Sec. 332, “Use of Militia and ArmedForces to Enforce Federal Authority.”

c. 10 U. S.C.A. Sec. 333, “Interference with State andFederal Law.”

16. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 2101, “Riots.”

17. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 2231, “Assault or Resistance.”

18. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 2381, “Treason.”

19. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 2384, “Seditious Conspiracy.”

AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL BUREAU OFINVESTIGATION

1. 18 U. S.C.A. Sec. 3052, “Powers of Federal Bureauof Investigation.”

2. 42 U. S.C.A. Sec. 227 l(b), “General Provisions.”

AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY ACQUISITIONOF LAND AND JUST COMPENSATION FORPROPERTY

10 U. S.C. A. Sec. 2672a, “Acquisition: Interests inLand When Need is Urgent. ”

Amendment V - Constitution

AUTHORITY FOR PAYMENT OF CLAIMS

1. 10 U. S.C.A. Subset. 2733-2737, “Property Loss;Personal Injury or Death: Incident to NoncombatActivities of Department of the Army, Navy or AirForce.”

2. 28 U. S.C.A. Sec. 2672, “Administrative Adjustmentof Claims. ”

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

1. 42 U. S.C.A. Sec. 4321, et. seq., “National Environ-mental Policy Act.”

2. 42 U. S.C.A. Sec. 9601 et. seq., “ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response, Compensation, and LiabilityAct of 1980.”

3. EO 11514, as amended by EO 11991, “Protectionand Enhancement of Environmental Policy. ”

4. EO 12580, “Superfund Implementation.”

5. DoD Directive 5100.50, “Protection and Enhance-ment of Environmental Policy. ”

6. DoD Directive 6050.1, “Environmental Effects in theUnited States of DoD Actions.”

MISCELLANEOUS

1. 5 U. S.C.A. Sec.Information Act.”

552, as amended, “Freedom of

2. 5 U. S.C.A. Sec. 552a, as amended, “privacy Act.”

3. 5 U. S.C.A. Sec. 552b, “Government in Sunshine Act.”

18-A-2

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 19

SITE RESTORATION

19-1 GENERAL

a. Developmentthe accident area to

of a site restoration plan to returna technically achievable/acceptable

condition begins early in the nuclear weapon ac~identresponse effort. However, site restoration becomes thedominant task only after classified weapons, weapondebris, classified components, and other hazards areremoved, or more precisely, when the National DefenseArea (NDA) or National Security Area (NSA) isdisestablished, or when overseas the Security Area isdissolved.

b. Several factors have significant influence on siterestoration decisions and procedures. Some of the moreprominent factors are: size of the contaminated area,its topography/ demographics, and the civil authorityand prerogatives once the NDA is disestablished, oroverseas, the Security Area is dissolved.

c. Some actions otherwise performed in support ofthe basic response effort are vital in site restoration.One example would be determining the extent ofcontamination. Such actions should be recognized,therefore, during development of the site restoration planand the results incorporated into the plan.


This chapter provides guidance for accomplishing therestoration of a nuclear weapon accident site contam-inated with radioactive materials. In this section, severaldecontamination considerations are discussed as well asthe reoccupation of contaminated areas and follow-upactivities.

19-3 SPECIFIC REWIIREMENTS

The accidents at Thule, Greenland, and Palomares,Spain, taught us that site restoration of an areacontaminated with radioactive materials, though noteasy, can be accomplished. The following actions will.be required:

a. Coordination between responsible civil andmilitary organizations.

b. Determination of agreed-upon cleanup andtechnically achievable/ financially acceptable levels.

c. Determination and plotting of contaminated areas.

d. Completion of environmental assessment(s).

e. Completion of decontamination, fixing, reducingthe concentration, or removing the contaminant.

f. Restoring the contaminated area to normal use.

g. Development of plans for post restoration radiationmonitoring “and assessment.

19-4 RESOURCES

a. Material resources necessary for site restorationwill range from heavy equipment for soil and vegetationremoval, to materials such as soaps and detergents forscrubbing lesser amounts of contamination from surfaceareas. These resources are, for the most part, availableboth commercially and within DoD. A specific list ofall possible resources at this juncture could be misleadingand is, therefore, not included. The precise resourcesrequired will depend on the specific contaminationproblem and the decontamination method(s) selected.

b. As described in other sections, each response force.staff element will contribute to the site restoration effort.However, four response force elements are the key tothe On-Scene Commander’s (OSCS) effort to plan andexecute site restoration. The four elements are theRadiological Safety, Logistics, Legal, and Engineerresponse elements. In addition to site restoration, theRadiological Safety, Logistics, and Legal officers eachhave extensive responsibilities described in Chapters 5,17, and 18, respectively. Specifically, the Staff Engineer@ovides expert advice on the, capabilities of variouspieces of heavy equipment to accomplish specific types

19-1

of decontamination, recommend procedures, determinesupport requirements for restoration tasks, andcoordinate the conduct of engineering surveys discussedlater in this chapter. Supporting Staff Engineersresponsibilities in this area, DNA provides the modelsite restoration computer program which operates in aninteractive mode on an IBM PC or IBM compatibleand requires 256K RAM. This program was designedto address a radiological contamination problemproviding information ranging from methods/costs toefficiencies. The primacy and rights of civil authorities/officials concerning site restoration cannot be overem-phasized. Accordingly, the Senior FEMA Official (SFO),a Department of Energy (DoE) representative, and Stateand local authorities or foreign government officials arecritical in planning site restoration as well as to theaccomplishment of site restoration.


The OSC’S responsibilities do not end with disestab-lishment of the NDA or overseas the dissolution of theSecurity Area. Specifically, the OSC must continue toassist in protecting the public from radiological hazardsand support the DoD contribution to returning the areato an acceptable condition.

a. Coordinated Activities. Site restoration activitiesare undertaken in coordination with the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA), State, andlocal authorities or foreign government officials. Thereare no guidelines, national or international, forrestoration of areas contaminated with radioactivenuclear materials, which means technically achievable/acceptable cleanup levels vary from locale to locale.

(1) The OSC will develop various restorationstrategy options. These options should be derived fromhis staff and advisors. Consideration is given to requestthe DNA Advisory Team to assist in preparing theseoptions. The team will use data from the Joint HazardEvaluation Center (JHEC), Federal RadiologicalMonitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), and localdemographics with a Site Restoration computerProgram (S RP) to develop restoration options. Oncethese options are developed on-site, they should beforwarded for national-level review. Specifically, toqtilize the SRP mentioned above, the advisoiy team mustbe provided extensive information in the foilowing area:

(a) RADIOLOGICAL.

~. Detailed mapping of the contaminated area(Aerial Measurement System (AMS), Ground Surveys).

2. Listing of any fixatives used to minimizeresuspension.

~. Established cleanup level.

(b) DEMOGRAPHIC/TOPOGRAPHIC.

~. Size of affected area (m2).~. Population/ Household size.j. Land use.$. Land value.

(c) The information provided by the computerincludes

1.Z

applied. –

~.~.5.~.

DECON method used on each surface.Rate at which the DECON method is

Type of labor used in the method.Type of equipment used in the method.Major materials required.Efficiency of the method in reducing

inhalation and external dose.~. Dose to radiation workers.~. Dose commitment from surface exposure.

(2) An ad hoc committee at the national level isestablished which includes representatives from DoD,FEMA, DoE, DoS, state and local governments, EPA,and other Federal agencies and representatives whichmay have statutory responsibilities with regard to siterestoration. This committee will formulate the scope,policies, and concepts to be included in site restoration.The OSC should provide the committee through theSFO the strategy options along with radiological mapdata for negotiations and final governmental resolution/approval.

(3) The final set of strategy options will be usedby the OSC and staff to build the final site restorationpl’an.

b. Radiological Safety Standards. In the absence ofFederal guidance, DoD has adopted the policy thatradiological contamination resulting from accidentsinvolving U.S. nuclear weapons or devices posing anactual or potential threat to populations, or to theenvironment, shall be reduced to a minimal practicallevel or at least to a level which recognized scientificpractite and knowledge indicates is safe for current andreasonable projected use.

19-2

c. Procedures. The procedural recommendations inthe following paragraphs are limited to site restorationactions dealing with the locating, handling, and disposingof radioactive contamination. Because site restorationdepends heavily on civil engineering procedures, the staffengineer plays a major role in development of the siterestoration plan.

(1) Identifying the Contaminated Area. The firststep in site restoration identifies the contaminated oraffected area. This step is accomplished by conductingsystematic radiological surveys and engineering studies.Data used in determining the contaminated area maybe obtained during initial ground monitoring, aerialmeasurement surveys, follow-on ground monitoring, andair sampling.

(a) The outer perimeter of the contaminated areais determined by measuring either low energy gammaradiation, or alpha radiation, and corroborated bylaboratory radioanalysis. Initial techniques employedmay involve both ground monitoring and aerialmeasurement survey to determine the main areas ofcontamination. All initial measurements should becompleted in the first few days of the response operationbefore contamination migrates into the soil or surfacesand becomes difficult to measure. Control measuresshould be implemented immediately if there is anypossibility that the contaminants may be spread, or assoon as the initial radiological survey has beencompleted. As additional information becomes availa-ble, re-evaluation must be made of the situation forpossible modification of control measures in effect.

(b) Soon after the perimeter of the contaminatedarea has been established, detailed surveys should beconducted to accurately determine the location ofvarious intensities of radiation. Such surveys mayinvolvecollecting samples of air, soil, water, plants, andanimals for laboratory analysis, as well as obtainingdetailed ground radiation measurements. These detailedsurveys provide additional data from which siterestoration planning can be initiated. Further surveys,including collection of samples and radiation measure-ments, should continue to be made until site restorationhas been completed.

(2) Environmental Assessment. The principalobjectives of the environmental assessment are to identifythe effects on the ecosystems at the accident site andto identify various decontamination techniques used inrestoring the accident site. Radiological surveys are key.to the environmental assessment because they establish

the level and extent of contamination and are the basisfor determinat ion of possible decontaminat iontechniques.

(3) Decontamination Considerations. A substantialportion of the site restoration effort will be to removeor reduce the level of contamination to return the affectedarea to an achievable/acceptable condition. If thecontamination is contained exclusively on governmentproperty, the decontamination effort is planned andsupported solely by military assets. If, however, thecontamination is on public or private property, thedecontamination effort must be planned jointly by theOSC, local and/or State officials and the Federalagencies or foreign government officials concerned. Inall situations, the SRF can expect- to be involved inthe initiation of site restoration.

(a) In accidents, the bulk of the contaminationis contained normally in the upper stratum (within oneinch of the surface); therefore, immobilizing or “fixing”contamination may be necessary to prevent spreadingand/ or to facilitate removal. Specifically, immobilizingthe contamination in heavily contaminated areas, (forexample, craters) will decrease significantly thesubsequent spread of contamination. Other methodsmay be used such as spraying with water or fixativeand/ or covering the concentration with plastic sheeting.Covering the concentration with fresh earth couldprovide a temporary fixative. Advice should be obtainedfrom the Radiological Safety Officer and Staff Engineerabout using a particular fixative and its impact on boththe environment and on subsequent site restorationoperations. Constructing physical containment featuresmay be necessary, such as dams, dikes, or ditches, toprevent the contaminants from spreading or beingeroded.

(b) Decontamination methods used to cleanupan accident area may vary widely. Some factors thatwill influence the method chosen are type and use ofthe soil, type and amount of vegetation in the area, typeand level of contamination present. Other factors aretype and number of buildings. Effective decontaminationbegins with the use of the simplest method. For example,when high levels of contamination are present, repetitiveuse of a simple method may be effective, or a moresophisticated technique may be required to remove thecontamination. Normally, lower levels of contaminationare removed first, but under certain environmental~onsiderations, removing the highest level first may beadvisable to reduce the spread of contamination.

I 9-3

~. Vegetation in the area should be washed orremoved. Decomposition of plant material can beaccelerated by shredding and using quicklime. Ifshredders are used, care must be taken to controlresuspension.

~. Scraping is probably the most effectivemethod for removing contamination from land surfaces.This method should be used when high contaminationlevels will not permit use of other methods. Contam-inated soil removed by this method should be processedthrough a mechanical and/or chemical separator forremoval of the contaminant to achievable/ acceptablelevels. The soil may then be returned to the locationfrom which removed; however, if difficulty is encoun-tered in removing the contaminant, it must betransported from the site to an acceptable radiologicaldisposal facility. The quantity of material packaged andshipped may also create a large scale logistic problem.The logistics officer and/ or DoE personnel assist inidentifying and locating suitable shipping containers.

~. In areas with lesser contamination levels,plowing may be an effective method of achievingpermissible levels of contamination in the proximatesurface. The depth of the proximate surface varies evenwithin similar environments. The proximate surface maybe within one or two inches of the surface in a forestor field, not planned for development, while theproximate surface for agricultural land generally isgenerally defined by the depth of agricultural plowing.If dilution within the proximate surface is contemplated,burial action of plowing is enhanced further if the areais wetted before plowing as surface dust will be keptfrom rising and collecting on previously turned furrows.Wetting and plowing will also tend to mix thecontaminant in depth so that it is not left in a singlestratum.

4 . Contaminated buildings and other struc-tures sho~d be decontaminated and, in severe cases,removed and re-built.

~. Table 19-1 provides guidelines on thepermissible levels of fixed and removable contamination.The fixation and/ or decontamination efficiency of themethods discussed above, when used singly or incombination, are contained in Tables 19-2. Methods todecontaminate various surfaces are contained in Table19-3.

(4) Contaminated Waste Disposal. The methodsand procedures for disposing of contaminated wastematerial will require coordination between the OSC, theSFO and appropriate civilian authorities/ officials.

(a) Early identification of a waste disposal siteand its acceptance criteria are necessary to determinepackaging and transportation requirements.

(b) Contaminated soil and building materialsmay require packaging in containers. The type ofcontainer selected depends on the material to bepackaged and the mode of transportation. Containersused must meet the requirements of applicable DoD,DoE, and Department of Transportation (DoT)regulations and/ or country involved. Containers varyingin size from 55-gallon drums to large containers, forexample, 5,000-gallon fuel tanks, have been used inprevious restoration efforts. Because the shipments willconsist of contaminated materials, advice must beobtained from transportation specialists. Moreover, themethod of shipment selected should ensure that thematerials are moved in a safe and efficient manner andthat all regulations/ requirements are followed.

(5) Reoccupation of Evacuated Areas. Levels ofsurface and airborne contamination remaining in an areawill be factors determining when the ~ea is safe forreoccupation.

(a) Resuspension, and resuspension factors, willbe major considerations. In light of this, the NuclearRegulatory Commission guidance states that airborneactivity may be averaged over all of the air inhaled fora whole year to determine the annual dose to the lung.Recognizing that cleanup will continue, and that themagnitude of resuspension will decrease with time,reoccupation may be possible at a time when airborneactivity is still two to three times the maximumpermissible steady state concentration.

(b) Surface contamination on objects with whichpeople come in contact must be at acceptable levelsbefore the items can be released for unrestricted use,or before reoccupation can be permitted. Surfacecontamination is divided into two categories: “fixed”and “removable,” when determining if personalpossessions may be released to their owners. Fixedcontamination is that which has settled into a surfaceand cannot be wiped off, removable is that which canbe expunged if the surface is rubbed.

(6) Follow-Up Activities. After site restoration iscomplete, the site should be inspected to ensure thatall aspects of the site restoration plan have beenaccomplished. Continued monitoring and analysis ofmaterial, such as soil and vegetation, and people isnecessary for long periods to ensure that radiation,environmental, and health standards have beenpermanently and successfully achieved. Normally, a civilag&n;y will be responsible for long term radiologicalmonitoring.

. .

I 9-4


A separate Site Restoration Plan (SRP) will bedeveloped in coordination with representatives fromFederal, State, and local agencies, or the host country,government officials/representatives. The Site Restora-tion annex of the accident response plan should identifypossible methods to restore an accident site andcontaminated areas..lnformation and procedures whichmay be appropriate for the Site Restoration annex to

a. Procedures for collection of environmental samplesrequired to support restoration operations.

b. Procedures for decontamination and/or fixationof contaminated areas.

c. Procedures for the disposal of contaminatedmaterial.

d. Identification of requirements for site restorationplanning with State, Federal, and civil authorities and

the accident response plan include: host government officials.

TABLE 19-1. Radioactive Contamination Guides.

Contamination Level

Alpha Beta-gamma 1 /

Fixed or dpm per dpm per mrad/hr dpm per Method ofContaminated Items and Indications for Actions Removable I 00 cm~ 100 cmz (@ I in. 100 cm~ Measurement

1. Containers. Prior to nonradioactive use, should be F 200 0.2 Probe

decontaminated if above: R None 100 Smear 2/2, Facilities and Equipment 3/ 4

a. Uncontrolled. Requires decontamin~tion F I 000 0.2 Probe

[f above: R I 00 100 Smear 2/

b. Controlled:( I ) Facilities F I 000 .05 Probe

R 200 400 Smear 2/(2) Equipment Items: F 1000 2.0 Probe

R 200 2000 Smear 2/

I / Measured through not more than 7 milligrams per square centimeter of total absorber and averaged not more than 1 square meter2/ Smears analyzed with a calibrated counting system.3/ For U-natural, U-depleted, and U-238; levels for alpha contamination should be increased by factors of 5.

(In accordance wih NRC guidelines4/ If Radium 226 is a contaminant, levels for alpha contamination should be reduced by a factor of 2.

F—FixedR—Removed

TABLE 19-2. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources

The table includes decontamination efficiencies for the following land areas and resources.

Vacant Land Exterior Wood Walls/ Brick WallsAgricultural Fields Concrete/ Wood Floors

“ Wooded Land/ Lawns Interior Concrete Walls and Wood/ Plaster WallsOrchards Carpeted and Linoleum FloorsAsphalt Streets/ Parking and other Paved Asphalt R?ofsConcrete Streets/ Parking and Other Paved Concrete ~~ ‘Automobiles, Auto Tires, Engine Drive Train, and Interior

19-5

TABLE 19-2. Efficiencies for Decontamination of Land Areas and Selected Resources (Continued)

DECONTAMINATION OF VACANT LAND

EFFICIENCYDECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION

—..———. . . .

Clear; HarvestSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleav HarvestSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Clea~ Harvest-Scrape 4“ to 6“Low Pressure WaterLow Pressure Water (x2)Low Pressure Water (x3)Low Pressure Water (x4)Surface Sealer/ Fixative, PlowSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Deep PlowSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Clear Harvest Double ScrapeSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Clear; Harvest Double Scrape, Scrape 4“ to 6“3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ SoilSurface Sealer/ Fixative, 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ SoilLow Pressure Water, 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ SoilCIeaq Harvest, 3“ Asphak & Cover with 6“ SoilSurface Sealer/ Fixative, CleaC Harvest 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ SoilLow Pressure Water (x2), 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ SoilLow Pressure Water (x3), 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ SoilSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Plow 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ SoilSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Deep Plow, 3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ SoilSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Cleaq Harvest, Double Scrape 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ Soil3“ Asphalt& Cover with 6“ Soil (x2)Surface Sealer/ FixativePlowSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Cleaq Harvest, Double Scrape (x2)

DECONTAMINATION OF AGRICULTURE FIELDS

Low Pressure WaterLow Pressure Water (x2)Low Pressure Water (x3)Low Pressure Water (x4)Surface Sealer/ FixativeLeaching, EDTAClean HarvestScrape 4“ to 6“PlowDeep Plow “Surface Sealer/ Fixative-CIea~ HarvestSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleaq Harvest-Double ScrapeSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Cleaq Harvest-Double Scrape-Scrape 4“ to 6“Three-Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Low Pressure Water-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Leaching, FeCIj-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Scrape 4“ to 6“-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Plow-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Deep Plow-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) ‘Clean Harvest-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)

3040965579.890.995.969298.599.4499.92608682727691.996.496.899.499.7884659899.99

5579.890.995.9 “65923 08690984099.4499.926084.789.597.694.49799.472

EXl”liKNAL

4040962543.857.868.4556599.4499.92404255586466.374.7737999.6664009599.99

2543.7557.868.40035308650604099.4499.924055427091.6919758

19-6


DECONTAMINATION OF VACANT LAND

DECONTAMINATION METHOD

Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil(No Trees) (x2)Three inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees) (x3)Low Pressure Water (x2)-Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Scrape 4“ to 6“Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Double ScrapeSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Double Scrape, Scrape 4“ to 6“Surface Sealer/ Fixative-PlowSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Deep Plow

DECONTAMINATION OF ORCHARDS

Low Pressure WaterLow Pressure Water (x2)Low Pressure Water (x3)Low Pressure Water (x4)Scrape 4“ to 6“PlowSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Scrape 4“ to 6“Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Double ScrapeSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Scrape 4“ to 6“Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Defoliate-Scrape 4“ to 6“ - Low Pressure WaterSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Remove and Replace-Scrape 4“ to 6“Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane, Scarify; Radical PruneSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane, Scarify; Radical Prune-PlowSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Remove and Replace-Scrape

4“ to 6“ - Three Inch Asphalt and Cover with 6“ Soil (No Trees)Cover with 6“ Soil (Trees in Place)Surface Sealer/ Fixative-Cover with 6“ Soil Trees in PlaceLow Pressure Water, Cover with 6“ Soil (Trees in Place)Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove & Replace Scrape 4“ to 6“, P1OW

Surface Sealer/ FixativeSurface Sealer/ Fixative-Plane, Scarify; Radical Prune-Plow

DECONTAMINATION OF WOODED LAND

. .

Surface Sealer/ Fixative, DefoliateSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Clear; HarvestSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Clear; Harvest Scrape 4“ to 6“Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Clear; Harvest Double ScrapeSurface Sealer/ Fixative: High Pressure WaterSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Defoliate, High Pressure WaterSurface Sealer/ Fixative, clear; Harvest, 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ SoilSurface Sealer/ Fixative, High Pressure Water, 3“ Asphalt & Cover with 6“ SoilSurface Sealer/ FixativeSurface Sealer) Fixative, Scrape 4“ to 6“ .-

Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Clear; Harvest High Pressure Water

EFFICIENCYINHALATION EXTERNAL

8896.493.99699.4499.929298.5

3347.954.557.548518090.327577.393.672.593.3

95303347.995.75093.3

48658589.2567.577.570725067.585

6478.466.39699.4499.925565

1526.334.74148276878517193.61845

94.562425.23395.1045

00408589.2542.569.5 ~6045.50042.585

19-7


DECONTAMINATION OF EXTERIOR WOOD WALLS

EFFICIENCYDECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION

Low Pressure WaterWash and ScrubLow Pressure Water, Wash and ScrubVacuumVacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, Wash and ScrubHigh Pressure WaterVacuum, High Pressure WaterSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, FoamStrippable CoatingDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Foam, Remove and ReplaceSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove StructureVacuum, Strippable CoatingSurface Sealer/ FixativeVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative

DECONTAMINATION OF EXTERIOR BRICK WALLS

VacuumDouble VacuumL o w P r e s s u r e W a t e rVacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, High Pressure WaterDouble Vacuum, High Pressure WaterDouble Vacuum, Foam, High Pressure WaterStrippable CoatingVacuum, HydroblastingDouble Vacuum, HydroblastingVacuum, Wash and ScrubDouble Vacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, Plane, ScarifyDouble Vacuum, Place, ScarifyVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove StructureSurface Sealer/ FixativeFoam

19-8

9095949999.399.69899.799.999.9899.9999.88599.8399.9499.9999.66599.5

2936.19091.4892.992.9791.6999.7299.7499.8691.4891.6995.784096.4596.4992.1992.3399.2999.3099.726592

EXTERNAL

859090.25949495.59397.999.999.9899.9998.58498,6599.6

“99.9997.300

2530.258586,588.7588.8486.7599.799.7299.9387.2587.4592.753592.592.6788.3888.4999.2599.2699.70087


DECONTAMINATION OF LINOLEUM FLOORS


VacuumDouble VacuumWash & ScrubVacuum, Wash & ScrubVacuum, FoamDoub[e Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceStrippable CoatingVacuum, Strippable CoatingSurface Sealer/ Fixative

DECONTAMINATION OF WOOD FLOORS

VacuumDouble VacuumWash and ScrubVacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Surface Sealer/Fixative, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, ResurfaceStriPpable CoatingVacuum, Strippable CoatingSurface Sealer/ FixativeHigh Pressure Water

DECONTAMINATION OF CARPETED FLOORS

VacuumDouble VacuumVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Foam (x2)Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, Steam CleanVacuum, Wash and ScrubDouble Vacuum, Steam Clean ./

Double Vacuum. Wash and Scrub


9999.39799.8599.999.999.8699.9999.9999.999899.680

9094.5 “929597.598.0895.999.9799.9899.9999.9699.9899.9980978595

60728083.286.5699.5299.6372.87678.1679.9

9596.25959999.2599.2599.0699.9999.9999,999797,8500

8591879195.596.492.899.9699.9799.9999.9499.9699.987594.500.90

5566.2575.2578.0681.3599.4699.5667.270.87273

19-9


DECONTAMINATION OF CONCRETE FLOORS

EFFICIENCYDECONTAMINATION METHOD

VacuumDouble VacuumWash and ScrubVacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, ResurfaceStrippable CoatingVacuum, HydroblastingDouble Vacuum, HydroblastingVacuum, High Pressure WaterDouble Vacuum, High Pressure WaterVacuum, Strippable CoatingDouble Vacuum, Strippable Coating

INHALATION—..—-—. . . .

7483.18594.897.497.6395.7899.7999.8699.979598.9698.9996. I96.7996.6297.30

DECONTAMINATION OF 1NTER1OR WOOD/PLASTER WALLS

VacuumDouble VacuumWash and ScrubVacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceStrippable CoatingVacuum, Str.ippable CoatingSurface Sealer/ Fixative

DECONTAMINATION OF INTERIOR CONCRETE WALIS

VacuumDouble VacuumWash and ScrubVacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Wash and ScrubVacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Surface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and ReplaceStrippable CoatingVacuum, High Pressure WaterDouble Vacuum, High Pressure WaterVacuum, HydroblastingDouble Vacuum, HydroblastingVacuum, Strippable CoatingDouble Vacuum, Strippable Coating

9999.39“199.8599.999.999.8699.9999.999899.680

70798092.595.595.893.799.7699.8399.96909494.9697.397.6991.393.28

liX’l”EKNAL

6978.618092.5695.6696.1594.0199.7588,8399.969097.5297.6594. i 195.2994.4295.5

9596.25959999.2599.2599.0699.9999.999797.85

6574.17589.9593.3594.0491.4399.4199.7999.948591.693.0 I95.4595.6188.4590.6

19-10


EFFICIENCYDECONTAMINATION METHOD INHALATION EXTERNAL

DECONTAMINATION OF ASPHALT STREETS/PARKING

VacuumDouble VacuumLow Pressure WaterVacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, ResurfaceStrippable CoatingVacuum, Thin Asphalt/ Concrete LayerDouble Vacuum, Thin Asphalt/ Concrete LayerVacuum, 3“ Asphalt with Cover with 6“ SoilDouble Vacuum, 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ SoilVacuum, Strippable CoatingSurface Sealer/ FixativeDouble Vacuum, Strippable CoatingFoamDouble Vacuum, Strippable Coating, Foam

DECONTAMINATION OF CONCRETE STREETS/PARKING

VacuumDouble VacuumLow Pressure WaterVacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, ResurfaceStrippable CoatingVacuum, Thin Asphalt/ Concrete LayerDouble Vacuum, Thin Asphalt/ Concrete LayerVacuum, 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ SoilDouble Vacuum, 3“ Asphalt and Cover with 6“ SoilVacuum, Strippable CoatingSurface Sealer/ FixativeDouble Vacuum, Strippable CoatingFoamDouble Vacuum, Strippable Coating, Foam

5067.59595.597.598.0595.7899.599.6899.9899.2599.5199.9797.59999.3599.2599.519897.7598.389799.84

5067.59595.597.598.0595.7899.599.6899.9899.2599.5199.9797.59999.3599.2599.519897.7598.389799.84

4561.58586.2591.7591.9286.5399.4599.6299.9298.999.2399.849349.464.5871.479.9896.150293.469098.36

4561.58586.2591.7591.9286.5399.45 ‘99.6299.9298.999.2399.849353.867.6671.479.9896.150293.469098.36

i9-11


DECONTAMINATION OF ROOFS


VacuumSandblastingHigh Pressure WaterFoamStrippable CoatingLow Pressure WaterLow Pressure Water (x2)Remove and ReplaceVacuum, High Pressure WaterVacuum, Low Pressure WaterSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and Replace

DECONTAMINATION OF LAWNS

Double VacuumLow Pressure WaterLow Pressure Water (x2)Low Pressure Water (x3)Low Pressure Water (x4)Close MowingRemove and ReplaceLeaching, FeCIJSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and Replace, Low Pressure WaterSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and Replace, Leaching, FeCIJSurface Sealer/ Fixative, Remove and Replace

DECONTAMINATION OF OTHER PAVED ASPHALT


VacuumDouble VacuumLow Pressure WaterVacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, FoamDouble Vacuum, Low Pressure WaterVacuum, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Remove and ReplaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, Remove and ReplaceVacuum, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, ResurfaceDouble Vacuum, Foam, ResurfaceStrippable CoatingVacuum, Thin Asphalt/ Concrete Layer “Double Vacuum, Thin Asphalt/ Concrete LayerVacuum, Strippable CoatingSurface Sealer/ FixativeDouble Vacuum, Strippable CoatingFoamDouble Vacuum, Strippable Coating, Foam

.

6099979385909899.9989299.94

308591939465988599.999,9299

5067.59595.597.598.0595.7899.599.6899.9899.2599.5199.9797.59999.359897.7598.389799.84

50969390808596.25999587.599.81

20758486.8888.0665988099.799.999

4561.58586.2591.7591.9286.5399.4599.6299.9298.999.2399.849349.464.5896.150293.469098.36

19-f2


ENGINE-DRIVE TRAIN AND INTERIORS AUTO EXTERIORS



Water Wash 85 80

Water Wash (x2) 96.25 93

Wash & Scrub 95 94

Wash and Scrub (x2) 99.5 99.28

Repaint 99.9 99.8

ENGINE-DRIVE TRAIN

Steam CleanSteam Clean (x2)Clean Engine with SolventSteam Clean, Clean Engine with SolventSteam Clean, Clean Engine with 4 Solvent (x2)

VacuumDouble VacuumDetailed Auto CleaningDetailed Auto Cleaning (x2)Replace/ ReupholsterVacuum, Remove Interior/ Clean/ Replace

Water WashWash and ScrubReplaceSandblasting

INTERIORS

TIRES

75 6592.5 8695 9097.5 94.7599.63 98.95

75 7092.5 89.595 9096 9299 9998 97

809099.995.9

508599.988

19-13

TABLE 19-3. Decontamination Methods

METHOD

CAUSTICS:Lye (sodium

hydroxide)Calcium

hydroxidePqtassiurn

hydroxide

Trisodiurnphosphate

ABRASION

\SANDBLASTING

VACUUMBLASTING

VACUUMCLEANING

WATER

SURFACE

Painted surfaces(horizontal)

Painted surfaces(vertical, overhead)

Nonporous surfaces

Nonporous surfaces

Porous and non-porous surfaces

Dry surfaces -----

All nonporous sur-faces (metal, painted,plisstics, etc.)

ACTION

Softens paint(harsh method)

Softens paint (mildmethod)

Removes surface

Removes surface

Removes surface;traps and controlscontaminatedwaste.

Removes contaminateddust by suction

Dissolves and erodes

TECHNIQUE

Lye paint removal solution:10 gal. water, 4 lb lye, 6 lbboiler compound, 0.75 lbcornstarch. Allow lye paintremover solution to remainon surface until paint issof’tened to the point whereit may be washed off withwater. Remove remainingpaint with Ionghandledscrapers.

Apply hot 10% solution byrubbing and wiping pro-cw-ture (see DETERGENTS)

Use conventional procedures,such as sanding, filing, andchipping; keep surface dampto avoid dust hazard.

Keep sand wet to lessenspread of contamination.Collect used abrasive...orflush away with wate~.’

Hold tool tlush to surfaceto prevent escape of con-tamination.

Use conventional vacuumtechnique with efficientfilter

Hose with high pressurewater at an optimumdistance of 15 to 20 feet.Spray vertictil surf’wxs at

ADVANTAGES

Minimum contact withcontaminated surfaces.Easily stored.

Contamination may bereduced to tolerancein one or two appli-cations.

Contamination may bereduced to as low alevel as desired.

Practical for largeXrrface areas.

~ontaminated wasteready for disposal.Safest abrasionmethod.

Good on dry porousmrfaces. Avoids waterreactions.

All water equipmentmay be utilized. Allowsoperation to be carriedout from a distance.

DISADVANTAGES

Personnel hazard (willcause burns). Reactionslow; thus, it is notefficient on vertical oroverhead surfaces.Should not be used onaluminum or magnesium.

Destructive effect onpaint. Should not beused on aluminum ormagnesium.

Impractibie for poroussurfaces because ofpenetration by moisture.

Contamination spreadover area must be re-covered. Contaminateddust is personnel hazard,

Contamination ofequipment.

All dust must be filteredout of exhaust. Machineis contaminated.

Drainage must be con-trolled, Not suitablefor porous materials.Oiicd surfaces cannot

TABLE 19-3. Decontamination Methods (Continued)

METtIOD

WATER(Continued)

STEAM

z DETERGENTSLWI

\

SURFACE

Nonporous surfaces(especially paintedor oiled surfaces)

Nonporous surfaces(metal, painted, glass,plastic, etc.)

“ ACTION

Dissolves and erodes

Emulsifies contami-nant and increaseswetting power ofwater and cleaningefficiency of steam

TECHNIQUE

an angle of incidence of300 to 45”; work from topto bottom to avoid recon-tuminiition. Work fromupwind to avoid spray.Determine cleaning rate,experimentally, if possible;otherwise, use a rate of4square feet per minute.

Work from top to bottomand from upwind. Cleansurface at a rate of 4square feet per minute.The cleaning efficiency ofsteam will be greatly in-creased by using deter-gents.

Rub surface 1 minute witha rag moistened with deter-gent solution; then wipewith dry rag. Use clean sur-face of the rag for eachapplication.

Use a power rotary brushwith pressure feed formore efficient cleaning.

Apply solution from adistance with a pressureproportioned,

Do not allow solution todrip onto othel surfaces.

Moist application is allthat is necessary,

ADVANTAGES

Contamination may bereduced by 50%. Waterequipment may be usedfor solutions of otherdecontaminating agents.

Contamination may bereduced by approxi-mately 90% on paintedsurfaces

Dissolves industrial filmand other materialswhich hold con lamina-tion. Contaminationmay be reduced by 90%.

DISADVANTAGES

be decontaminated.Not applicable on drycontaminated surfaces(use vacuum). Notapplicable on poroussurfaces such as wood,concrete, canvas.Spray will be contam-inated.

Steam subject to samelimitations as water.Spray hazard makes thewearing of waterproofoutfits necessary.

May require personnelcontact with surface.May not be efficienton long-standingcontamination.

METHOD

COMPLETINGAGENTS

OxalatmCiirbonOtesCitrates

ORGANICSOLVENTS

INORGANICACIDS

‘L

ACID MIXTURES:HydrochloricSulfuricAcetic AcidCitric AcidAcctutcsCitrates

S“URFACE

Nonporous surfaces(especiuily unweath-ered surfaces, i.e., norust or calcareousgrowth).

Nonporous surfisces(greasy or waxedsurfaces, paint orplastic finishes, etc.)

Metal surfaces(especially withporous deposits,i.e.. rust or cal-careous growth);circulistory pipesystems.

Nonporous surfaces(especially withporous deposits);circulatory pipesystems.

TABLE 19-3. Decontamination Methods (Continued)

ACTION

Form soluble complexeswith-contaminatedmaterial

Dissolves organicmaterials (oil, paint,etc.)

Dissolves porousdeposits

Dissolves porousdeposits

TECHNIQUE

Completing agent solutionshould contain 3% (byweight) of agent. Spraysurface with solution. Keepsurface moist for 30 min.utes by spraying with solu-tion periodically. After 30minutes, flush material offwith water. Completingagents may be used onvertical and overhead sur-faces by adding chemicalfoam (sodium carbonateor aluminum sulfate).

Immerse entire unit insolvent or apply by wipingprocedure [see DETER-GENTS).

Use dip-bath procedure formovable items, Acid shouldbe kept at a concentrationof from I to 2 normal (9 to18% hydrochloric, 3 to 6%sulfuric acid). Leave onweathered surfaces for Ihour. Fhssh surface withwater, scrub with a water-detergent solution, andrinse. Leave in pipe circu-latory systems 2 to 4hours; tlush with plainwater, a water-detergentsolution, then again withplain water.

Same as for inorganic acids.Mixture consists of O.1 gal.hydrochloric acid, 0.2 lbsodium acetute, and I gal.water,

ADVANTAGES

Hokfs contamination insolution. Contaminationmay be reduced by 75%in 4 minutes on unweath-ered surfaces. Easilystored. Carbonates andcitrates are nontoxic,noncorrosive.

Quick dissolving action.Recovery of solventpossible by distillation.

Corrosive action on metaland porous deposits.Corrosive action may bemoderate by additionof corrosion inhibitorsto solution.

Contamination may bereduced by 90% in 1hour (unweatheredsurfaces). More easilyhandled than inorganicacid ”solutions.

DISADVANTAGES

Requires application for5 to 30 minutes. Littlepenetrating power; ofsmall value on weatheredsurfaces.

Requires good ventila-tion and tire precautions.Toxic to personnel.Material bulky.

Personnel hazard. Weargoggles, rubber boots,gloves, and aprons. Goodventilation required becauseof toxicity and explosivegases. Acid mixturesshould not be heated.Possibility of excessivecorrosion if used with-out inhibitors. Sulfuricacid not effective oncalcareous deposits.

Weathered surfaces mayrequire prolonged treat-ment. Same safety pre-cautions as required forinorganic acids.

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 20

SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES

20-1 GENERAL

Numerous units and organizations with specializedcapabilities are discussed throughout this document.This chapter summarizes these units and organizationsand the capability or service they offer.


This chapter provides a ready reference to units andorganizations that maintain specialized capabilities.Each unit or organization is organized by title,specialized capability, or service.

20-3 UTILIZATION

A summary of the capabilities of organizations andspecialized units is provided. Table 20-1 lists functionsand services provided by organizations or specializedunits. Appendix 20-A provides telephone numbers forrequesting services, or additional information onorganizational or specialized unit capabilities discussedin this document.

20-4 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Controlled Assets.

(1) Joint Communications Contingency StationAssets (JCCSA). JCCSA is a communications assetconsisting of heavy mobile/transportable equipmentdeployable by C-141/ C-5 aircraft.

(2) Joint Communications Support Element(JCSE). The JCSE is a contingency support unitconsisting of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corpspersonnel and a variety of communications equipment.A part of this equipment, the AN/ URC Joint AirborneCommunications Center/ Command Post (JACC/ CP),consists of several pieces of equipment mounted in airtransportable vans.

(3) Defense Nuclear Agency’s (DNA)s Nuclear

Commander (OSC) and his staff in the managementof recovery operations following a nuclear weaponaccident. A part of the DNA capability is the ArmedForces Radiobiology Research Institute’s MedicalRadiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT). This team canassist medical personnel and commanders by providingstate-of-t he-art medical radiobiology advice by tele-phone or at the accident scene.

(4) Other Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ControlledCommunication Assets. Super High Frequency satelliteterminals, Ground Mobile Force terminals, and othercommunications assets can also be deployed on request.

b. United States Air Force.

(1) U.S. Air Force Air Transportable RADIACPackage (ATRAP). ATRAP is a collection of RADIACequipment, spare parts, and trained instrument repairtechnicians.

(2) HARVEST EAGLE Kits. HARVEST EAGLEkits consist of air transportable operations support setswith tents, field kitchens, collapsible cots, and o’therhousekeeping items.

(3) Occupational and Environmental HealthLaboratory (OEHL). This organization has a deployableteam of health physicists, health physics technicians andequipment, collectively called the Air Force RadiationAssessment Team (AFRAT), AFRAT provides assista-nce in radiological health matters.

(4) HAMMER ACE. HAMMER ACE consists ofa rapid deployment team of engineers and techniciansequipped with advanced technology communicationsequipment. See Chapter 12 for further discussion.

c. United States Army.

(1) Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT).This team is trained specially in radiological problemsand can assist and furnish guidance to the OSC, otherofficials, and local medical authorities.

(2) Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. Thisteam is or~anized to ~rovide technical assistance and

Weapon Accident Advisory ~eam~ The DNA Advisory - advice to the OSC in all kinds of radiologicalTeam was established and trained to assist an On-Scene emergencies.

20-1

TABLE 20-1. Organization/Team Capabilities/Service Matrix

Listed down the left side of this matrix are paragraph references in Chapter 20. Across the top are capabilities and services that may be needed to respond to a nuclearweapons accident. An X at the intersection of a line and column indicates that the capability or service may be provided by the referred to organization or team.

ncDArsnactd7 nc nccracc

d. United States Navy. The RADCON Team canprovide expert health physics (radiation control andsafety) assistance to the OSC at a radiological accident.

20-5 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DoE)

a. Department of Energy Accident Response Teams.

(1) Accident Response Group (ARG). The ARGis the primary DoE response element for a nuclearweapon accident and will be composed of the DoE TeamLeader, a senior scientifw advisor (assigned by the designlaboratory), design specialists, high explosive specialists,health physicists, packaging, and other technicalspecialists as needed.

(2) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). Thisteam is the primary DoE response element for threatincidents involving improvised nuclear devices and lostor stolen nuclear weapons. NEST assets maybe includedas part of the DoE ARG.

b. Other DoE Accident Response Resources.Requests for these services should be coordinated withthe DoE ARG Team Leader.

(1) Aerial Measurement System (AMS). A systemthat can provide aerial radiological surveys and aerialphotography.

(2) Contaminated Laundering Facilities. DoEoperated facilities are capable of laundering plutoniumcontaminated clothing.

(3) Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability(ARAC). This unit can provide computer generatedestimates of the distribution of radioactive contaminantsreleased to the atmosphere.

(4) Mobile Accident Response Mobile Laboratory(HOT SPOT). Two air transportable trucks and trailerswith equipment to analyze,” identify, and documentradioactive contamination.

(5) Radiolographic Response Capability. Two unitscapable of taking and developing radiographs ofweapons using cobalt or x-ray sources.

(6) The Radiation Emergency Assistance CenterTraining Site (REAC/TS). A DoE facility specializingin treatment of all types of radiation exposure andcapable of providing advice and assistance.

(7) RANGER. A ground based system used forenvironmental monitoring sample tracking, and archivepurposes.

(8) Mobile Decontamination Station. Equipmentto perform field personnel decontamination.

(9) RASCAL. An air sampling system containedwithin a cargo van.

20-6 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENTAGENCY (FEMA)

FEMA is responsible for coordinating the overallFederal response in support of State and localauthorities. FEMA will dispatch a Senior FEMA Official(SFO) (or designate a FEMA Region Official to actas the Deputy SFO) and an emergency response team(ERT) to ;ornplete interface requirements.

20-7 OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

a. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDAhas the responsibility and the ability to determines thesafety of meat and poultry products for humanconsumption.

b. Department of Health and Human Services(DHHS). The DHHS has the capability to analyze foodand environmental samples for radioactivity content andprovide radiological advice.

c. Department of Transportation (DoT). The DoTcan arrange special transportation activities andassistance in contacting consignors and consignees ofshipments.

d. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA hasmonitoring teams to measure and evaluate contamina-tion and to advise of actions to be taken for the protectionof the public health and safety.

e. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBIis responsible for recovery of off-site classified nuclearweapon material. The FBI is the lead federal agencyfor improvised nuclear devices, incidence, and terroristnuclear-related activities in the U.S, territories, amdpossessions.

20-3

DoD 51 OO.52-M

APPENDIX 20-A

POINTS OF CONTACT

20-A-1 MILITARY COMMAND CENTERS:

National Military Command Center (NMCC)

U.S. Air Force Operations Center

U.S. Army Operations Center

U.S. Navy Operations Center

U.S. Marine Corps Operations Center

20-A-2 COORDINATION CENTERS:

Office of the Secretary of Defense Crisis Coordination Center

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating CenterDepartment of Defense*

Department of Energy

FEMA Emergency Information & Coordination Center

FEMA National Emergency Coordination Center

20-A-3 INFC)RMATION ON DoI) SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES:

JCS Contingency and Crisis Management Division(JCS-Controlled contingency communications)

Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE)

JCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets

U.S. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team (0800-1630)(1 630-0800

U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT)

AUTOVON 227-6340Commercial 703-697-6340





AUTOVON 364-9320/22Commercial 202-769-9320/ 22

Commemial 703-697-5131

AUTOVON 221-2102/2103/2104Commercial 703-325-2102/ 2103/ 2104

*DoD organizations should normally use DoD numbers even though requested services or information may relate to DoE.


FTS 844-4667

Commercial 202-646-2400FTS 646-2400


AUTOVON 227:0007

AUTOVON 968-4141968-385 1/ 3852

AUTOVON 879-6591 /6925



20-A- 1

AFRRI Medical Radiobiological Advisory Team (MRAT) Commercial 202-295-3909

U.S. Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team

U.S. Air Force Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP)InformationEmergency Request

SA-ALC/ MAW Emergency Operations Center

U.S. Air Force Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory (OEHL)

Headquarters Air Force Communications Command (HAMMER ACE)Emergency Operations RequestsInformation

Headquarters Tactical Air Command/ LGX (HARVEST EAGLE)

20-A-4 OTHER AGENCIES:

Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REAC/TS)Oak Ridge Associated UniversitiesREAC/TSP.O. Box 117Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 37830

Department of Health and Human Services**Food and Drug AdministrationCenter for Devices and Radiological Health5600 Fishers LaneRockville, Maryland 20857

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)**EPA HeadquartersOffice of Radiation ProgramsWaterside East Tower401 M Street S. W.Washington, DC 20460


AUTOVON 945-6906AUTOVON 945-6906 ~

AUTOVON 945-3046

AUTOVON 240-2001



AUTOVON 432-5435/5436

Commercial 615-482-3131(24 Hours) Commercial 615-481-1000

Pager 241

(Duty Hours) 301-443-1241(24 Hours) 202-857-8400

Commercial 703-557-2380(24 Hours) 202-475-8383

.. .

● “Accident response services should be requested through the FEMA EtCC. Points of contact are provided fOr coordination and reque$ts for info~ ation

20-A-2

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 21

TRAINING

21-1 GENERAL

The Services have the responsibility to ensure thataccident response personnel are efficiently trained. Themanagemcxtt of nuclear weapon accident responsedepends on the availability of well trained and skilledpersonnel. To achieve and maintain a posture capableof responding well to a nuclear weapon accident,commanders of designated response forces should ensurethat their personnel have the knowledge and trainingnecessary to fulfill their responsibilities; therefore,designated On-Scene Commanders (OSCS), and otherkey personnel should attend appropriate courses offeredby the Interservice Nuclear Weapon School (INWS) andthe respective Services at the earliest opportunity.


This section informs senior staff planners and potentialOSCS about training courses available in nuclear weaponaccident response.

21-3 ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING

When organizational nuclear weapon accident responsetraining exercises are conducted, consideration shouldbe given to inviting external organizations, with whichthe exercising unit would expect to interface in an actualaccident, to observe or participate in the exercise. Theseexercises can provide the basis for developing draftrecoveryspecific.

plans/ portions of plans that are not accidentThe Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating

Center (JNACC) is willing to participate in organiza-tional training, operational commitments permitting.

21-4 TRAINING COURSES

a. Interservice Nuclear Weapons Sc_hool. The INWSat Kirt land AFB, New Mexico, offers a variety of coursesdesigned to develop and maintain a nuclear weaponemergency response capability. These courses areavailable h all Service personnel and employees of theFederal government whose positions require specialskills and knowledge in nuclear weapon emergencysituations. A list of available courses at the INWS isin Table 21-1.

b. Service Schools. Specific course information forService schools is found in the following

(1) Department of the Army Pamphlet 351-4, U.S.Army Formal Schools Catalog.

(2) Catalog of Navy Training Courses (CAN-TRAC),VO1.SP11, NAVEDTRA 10500.

(3) Air Force Regulation 50-5, Vol. 11, USAFFormal Schools Catalog.

(4) DoD Directive 5010.16, Defense ManagementEducation and Training Catalog, July 28, 1972.

(5) Course Catalog, U.S. Army Defense Ammu-nition Center School, Savanna, 111.

c. The Federal Emergency Management Agency,National Emergency Training Center, Emmittsburg,Maryland offers the Federal Radiological EmergencyResponse Plan Workshop (Course E358).

21-1

w

L

\

TABLE 21-1. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses

SPECIALCOURSE GIVEN TO GRADE * DURATION FEATURES

Flag Officers Nuclear Service response force on-scene o-7+ 2 days ● 4 hour CPXAccident Course commander and appropriate staff ● 2 hour field

(FONAC) personnel as participants. orientation

Senior Officers Nuclear On-scene commander’s immu.iiate O-4 to O-6 3 days ● 3 hour CPXAccident Course staff ● 1 day field

(SONAC) exercise

Nuclear Hazards Medical personnel E-4 to O-4 4 days .2 hour CPXTraining Course

(NHTC)● 1 day field

exercise

Nuclear Emergency Initial response twn leader and E-3 to o-3 9 days ● 3 hour CPXTeam Operations members .4 day field

(NETOPS) exercise

Nuclear Emergency Team Training E-3 to 0-s 4 days ● 3 day fieldTeam Exercise exercise

(NETEX)

*Grade waivers will be considered.Information concerning class schedules and quotas for these lnttrscrvice Nuc]ear WeaponsSchool courses can be obtained from Headquarters, Air Training Conlmand//TTPP//,Randolph AFB, Texas, 78148.

Documents

US Department of Defense - Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures