Difficult & overlooked institutional issues in natural resource management

- examples from fisheries co-management

Roger LewinsProject & Institutional Analysis

Outline

• Theoretical approaches to the “institution” – NIE and CPR theory

• Introduced institutions (structures) in the NRM project context

• Informal institutions in rural Bangladesh• The Oxbow Lakes Project – Bangladesh• The Participatory Fisheries Management Programme

– Malawi• Why informal institutional processes are

underreported / difficult • Problems & opportunities associated with this

complexity• Summary

Theoretical approaches to the “institution” - definitions

2 main branches have shaped NRM institutions thinking… from mid-1980’s

New Institutional Economics

Douglas North

Common Property Resource Theoryespecially Elinor

Ostrom

“institutions” exist to minimise transaction costs…..

we can design suitable institutions, just need rational rules & structures

(helpful) Legacy

”institutions” are the rules setting the way organisations

can work

(helpful) Legacy

Some starting conditions are preferable (i.e. “design

principles”)

A simple definition of Institutions…

The legacy of the New Institutional Economics definition …?

”institutions” are the rules setting the way organisations can work

Institutions are more than just organisations

They are the rules that shape everyday decisions

“Rules of the game in society” - (1990)

However, is it tautologous?...

“existing institutions minimise transaction costs because transaction cost minimisation is their function”.” Harriss et al (1995:7) paraphrased by Leach et al, 1999.

It implies the “right” rules & structures are the key to sustainable NRM

Institutions can function to ensure rational use…….

and prevent ruin, Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons

Sometimes interpreted as a recipe book for “good” institutions

The legacy of CPR theory definitions …?

Looking at starting conditions & Ostrom’s eight design principles (1990)…

Clearly defined boundaries

Site specific rulesActive participationEffective monitoringGraduated sanctionsConflict resolution

A degree of autonomyNested organisation

The legacy of CPR theory definitions …?

“... the prescriptions that humans use to organise …repetitive & structured interactions including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms ….. at all scales.”

Ostrom (2005)

Does CPR theory downplay the role of society, community power relations & the changing link between society & the environment?

Often viewed as static & prescriptive – focus on “getting the rules right.”

Leach 1997, Mehta 1999“….institutions of various kinds, ranging from the informal (e.g. social norms) to the formal (e.g. the rule of law), interlock to form a matrix within which people live their lives.” Leach 1999

Changing perspectives of theoryProblems implementing / interpreting CPR

theory

It does not think about motives / power differences… & is not anthropological

Lasting Rules and Structures are difficult to introduce….

pre-exiting “ways of doing things” often still operate, regardless

It attempts to “craft institutions” in relation to technical units & boundaries…. not overlapping services, traditional uses

Changing perspectives of theory

Introduced structures vulnerable to collapse or exploitation by elite

Lasting NRM (esp. project-based) often works with pre-existing “ways of doing things”e.g. legitimacy through traditional village heads etc.

These systems can strengthen or erode new (introduced) institutions

De facto NRM is an outcome of the mixture of institutions – new, pre-existing or modified (e.g. Cleaver & Franks (2002), Cleaver, 2012).

Cleaver sees a mosaic - “bricolage” - of new and old interacting institutions and processes

“If structures (organisations etc.) can be thought of as hardware, then processes can be thought of as software”

SL Guidance Sheets

Institutions and the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach

Greater attention on…

Policies, Institutions and Processes (PIPs)

“Ways of getting things done”

Later manifestations of the SLA worked in greater political & institutional

aspects

Formal Informal

• Federal Ministries• State Government • Local Government

Authorities

• Farmer co-operatives, CSOs

• local political pressures

• local power relations

• traditional access rules

• patronage etc.

Government, NGO & “community

organisations”

Non-organisation impacts on management

There is a need for simple definitions of the “Institution” that relate to real world experience

of those facilitating NRMVisible vs Invisible

However, “institutional analysis” has focussed on organisations

“Culture” of Government

& organisations Corruption

Patron-Client networks

Markets

Traditional & neo-traditional

rules & objectives

Gender roles & relations

Tribal roles & prejudices

Federal Government

(policy & projects)

State Governments

Local Government Authorities

District Development Authorities

Donors &International

NGOs

National NGOs & Civil Society

Organisations

CBOs

Agricultural Development Programmes

Traditional Structures

Formal Institutions

Set structures &

responsibilities

Informal Institutions

Political economy& social norms

de facto management &

governance

“…. the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, however, is not to propose the existence of a dual system, i.e. tradition vs. modernity or a ‘higher practice’ vs. a ‘local practice’. Rather, …[it] emphasises that formal and informal institutions function not as opposites, but together. The relationship between the formal and informal reveals the ways in which informal institutions have adapted to and now permeate democratic forms of governance. As such, focusing on the relationship between formal and informal institutions sheds light on the ways in which local configurations of power operate.”

(Bode, 2002)

A simple, workable distinction between formal & informal

This interaction is very dynamic locally, especially where new opportunities and structures are introduced….

Introduced institutions in the NRM project context

CBO Community-Based Organisation

RMI / RMO / RMC …….. Resource Management Institution

Resource Management OrganisationResource Management Committee

resource user platforms

farmer groups

water user groups

village fisheries committee

Generic & project-specific terminology

Often based on Western notions of “good” institutional characters ……

transparency, accountability, gender equality, management structures (chairperson, treasurer etc.)

Each sector has a different model / purpose / approach

Provide a participatory element (decision-making)

An interface between community & project (legitimacy / responsiveness?)

Fisheries sector >>>> recipients of inputs/training

Water sector >>>> decision-making (sluice-gate management)

Environment sector >>> recipients of awareness-raising activities

Agriculture sector >>>> technical, credit & marketing training

An overview of sectors – DFID project Bangladesh, (Lewins, 2005)…..

Fisheries Water Sector Environment

Facilitator DoF BWDB National NGOs

Interaction Groupformation & light support

Group formation & planning

Continuous, advisory

Purpose Increased fish prodn.

Flood management / agric. protection

Habitat management

Structures Fixed groups

Fixed, hierarchical groups

Resource management & AIGA groups

Each sector has a different model / purpose / approach

RMOs are a convenient lens through which to view the institutions that really matter…….

They are the interface between multiple interests / stakeholders…….

target groups / GO & NGO implementing agencies / local government & service providers

Projects introduce new opportunities …..these are then contested (who has interest in maintaining the status quo etc.?)

The way RMO structure & function is modified can reveal where the influence lies…..

and help inform future “design”

RMOs are of interest to wide range of stakeholders - it is easy to initiate discussion & debate

Actual RMO structure &

function

OutcomesInstitutional sustainability?Pro-poor & equitable?Participation?Replicability?Financial viability?Environmental sustainability?

New project structures are immersed in existing institutional environment……usually overlooked

Intended RMO structure &

function

Pre-existing formal & informal institutions

Intended beneficiaries

Biophysical setting

or, as in the Bangladeshi proverb:

'Kazir guru ketaba acheye, kintu goaleye nei‘

(Kazi's cow is in the book, but not in the shed').

Usually a discrepancy between expected (or reported outcomes) & actual outcomes

For example, CBOs may have been established & recorded …but what is their quality / what do they really do?

Informal institutions in rural Bangladesh

Many institutions that affect NRM - collective action, access to (and exclusion from) NRs and their benefits – are not directly linked to NRM.

Samaj –

“an institutional space for collective worship” sometimes reliant on “coercion or manipulation according to …. notions of honour and shame” (Islam, 2002)

Can influence voting behaviour but also access political support (Bertocci, 1996)

Salish –

Village-level & traditional court system chaired by mathbor elders.

Publicly legitimate decision-making that by-passes state structures.

Some NGOs have targeted the salish as potentially legitimate platforms for decision-making (Islam, 2002)

Mosque-committee (masjid) rules –

Operational rules for access to NRs can both raise revenues for mosques & regulate NR use (Amin & Islam, 2004)

Informal institutions in rural Bangladesh

Example of an unforeseen informal institution in the project context.

Participatory Action Plan Development in the charlands of Bangladesh

(DFID-funded, 2003-2005)

PAPD designed to engage the range of livelihoods groups (women, fishers, share-croppers, landless and secondary stakeholders) - it is assumed the interests & positions of these stakeholders influence decision-making - leading to “win-wins”

Previous success but in charlands there was an impasse – the community did not negotiate along livelihoods lines but instead between family (clan) groups – gusthi

These communities relatively recently settled but came from 2 distinct gusthi

The project staff were encouraged to record invisible and “off-stage” issues and permitted the planning process to work across this divide

Co-management in Bangladesh – the Oxbow Lakes Projects

(1988-97)Stocking carp species in closed water bodies (baors) in SW Bangladesh

Partnership between DANIDA, BRAC & DoF

Early obsession (1970s-80s) with stocking, flood control & technical inputs

BRAC expert in group formation, credit provision etc.

Targeting “genuine” fishers – it took 5 years to “exclude” others (membership criteria developed by project – Hindu jele, <0.5 hectares land)

23 Lake Management Groups formed – record-keeping & decision-making

Lake Fishing Teams

Fish Farming Groups for women – khas land adjacent to lakes

Oxbow Lake project areas

DFID-funded institutional study (2005)

What was the institutional legacy of the project?

Built a “contextual” picture by consulting a wide range of stakeholders….together and separately

Project staff DoF & BRAC personnel

CBO members Lake Management Group (male) & Female Fisher Groups

Non-participants other villagers

Triangulation of Feedback

Fish Farmer Groups

Other villagers

DoF staff

we provide supportthere is no conflictprofits are enjoyed

benefits not sharedmastaan in Groupsthreat of violenceDoF cannot help

profitable activity male/female conflict

DoF provide little helpsome BRAC staff corrupt

fixed membershipbaor threatened

Triangulation of Feedback

Combining & cross-referencing……

• Stocking is profitable for the group

• Benefits are concentrated

• Membership is rarely transferred

• Mastaan influence Group (Hindu targets marginalised)

• Previous conflict with some BRAC staff

• Conflict between male & female Groups

• DoF support limited

• Other uses threaten baor

Summary of Institutional Significance

Formal processes

• Leaseholds for male and female ponds secured via DoF

• DoF facilitate technical but routine meetings

• No scope for DoF to address or investigate power issues

• BRAC involvement reduced since 1997

• Groups sought professional advice over NGO corruption

• Group size is fixed by DoF.

Summary of Institutional Significance

Informal processes

• Women’s project activity now better respected (status / social capital)

• Women’s families have special interest in status quo

• Muslim mastaan use threat of violence to control Groups

• Otherwise conflict within groups is low

• Group members do not relinquish membership

Assessment, framed in relation to objective of project

Support for OLP ended

1997

OLP tried to maximise

catch

OLP tried to create self-funded groups

Project activities now institutionalised

Production from stocked baor still high

Male & female groups require minimal support

However…..

“…there was local political pressure to drop women from leases and replace them with young men who supported the new ruling party.” Lewins (2005)

‘..grabbing productive assets or looting the income of women requires a number of factors, which men alone have in Bangladesh'

Nathan and Apu (2002)

The situation in 2005 represented a three-way, sub-optimal pact that marginalised the vulnerable & resisted changeThe constraints to women particularly disappointing - their husbands made the real economic decisions

What made OLP economically viable (closed water body, subsidised inputs & exclusive rules of use) – attracted unwanted attention & made it hard for poor to secure gains

…a feature of many “technical” fisheries initiatives in Bangladesh

Co-management in Malawi – the Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (1991 - )

Objective to improve regulation of Lake Malombe & Upper Shire fisheries in response to serious decline

31 Beach Village Committees as interface between community & DoF……

Purpose, to improve compliance to new technical controls & regulations

BVCs to enforce rules (largely designed by DoF) & publicise impact of illegal fishing

, (Sources include: Hara, 2001; Donda, 2001; Allison et al, 2002)

UK-funded with DoF as key partnerRunning parallel to national decentralisation process

Co-management in Malawi – the Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (1991 - )

Some problems…

30% of BVC members were non-fishers

Primary stakeholders entrusted with very narrow range of responsibilities.

Lack of legitimacy & power struggles with traditional leaders ‘…there is some input from government but the overall picture is that there is dominance of control of resource access by chiefs’ (Njaya, 2006).

There remains confusion over the precise roles of BVCs and their relationship to decentralised structures such as District Assemblies.

Decentralisation Policy (1998) has seen each sector transfer authority at different rates – the fisheries sector slowest to decentralise real responsibility (Njaya et al. 2011).

Failure to establish explicit roles for traditional authorities & to draw on their potential to demarcate socially legitimate fishing areas or to mediate disputes and violations.

, “..scepticism undermined the initial success of the co-management arrangement”.

Co-management in Malawi – the Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (1991 - )

,

‘.. [constraints] … relate to confusion & conflict over the roles & responsibilities of the various management structures & the nature of the relationships between them. These relationships, in turn, are a function of the informal institutional landscape – the struggle between traditional leaders, appointed individuals (BVC etc) & government stakeholders seeking patronage & influence (Béné et al. 2009)’.

Lewins et al 2014

International financial support withdrawn since the beginning of the 2000s.

Legacy?

‘Quite resilient local level structures, not wholly representing the interests of local fishers & contesting their role with the DoF & the public’ (Njaya et al. 2011).

Informal institutional effects & processes are underreported …..why?

Project staff can be fixated on log-frame activities & predetermined indicators (visual) ---an emphasis on the visible, quantifiable things.

e.g. The number of committees, the apparent membership, a signed planLocal field staff drawn from wide range of technical backgrounds (agriculture extension, fisheries management, engineering etc.)

But may lack socio-political expertise

Modus operandum of each sector - the legacy of past interventions and “ways of doing things”

Informal institutional issues are seen as a messy distraction & infer failure of implementing agencies (donors & those on the ground)

Some social norms (e.g. fixed local “roles” for women & the poorest) can be viewed as undesirable & embarrassing to development stakeholders

However, informal institutional & processes can represent opportunities! Why re- invent the wheel….

In Bangladesh, some water projects recognised “Local Initiatives” to manage water & used them instead of setting up new rules & structures.

(public meetings chaired by mathbor elders to decide when to flood & drain fields)

Powerful local individuals can act as champions of local plans / needs – communicating them to service providers and seeking funds on behalf of public

Local people can shape structures and project activities to make them more relevant - not necessarily as desired by the project

There is evidence of successful planning in Bangladesh where communities explore options independently of project facilitators……

Planning works well when it publicly acknowledges power differentials (public pressure on government officials)

In summary, these processes may be viewed as socially legitimate …introduced ones often are not viewed this way

• Production-oriented projects are prone to manipulation (especially interventions that subsidise access or inputs)

• Sector-specific interventions can widen differences between livelihoods groups, creating conflict

• RMI design cannot be viewed in isolation from “approach” (i.e. the purpose & approach of RMIs can be as significant as the form & design of the committee)

• RMIs can fail because the incentive for participation & support does not exist

• Participation levels relate to perceived value & legitimacy

• GO or NGO staff & local stakeholders can develop their own informal institutions (“ways of doing things”) that can consolidate management arrangements (e.g. Oxbow Lakes Project)

Institutional performance issues in Bangladesh (Lewins 2005) The way the existing institutional environment interacts with projects depends on their design (purpose, approach, activities)

Opportunities

• Relate participation to co-learning & awareness rather than formation of RMIs with set roles & functions (“blue-print” approach)

• All stakeholders should understand the problem of assuming homogenous & harmonious “communities”

• Project staff must be aware of the type of processes that can evolve (socio-economists & social scientists could play a key role in the entire process, not just the scoping & inception phase).

• Relevant tools to map relationships & institutional performance (e.g. “process documentation”) should be communicated to local staff & be integral to M&E

• Staff should be aware of the potential of existing institutions (such as the mosque committee) in supporting sustainability & pro-poor objectives

• Tools like institutional mapping may reveal “platforms” such as the salish or mosque committee that already perform similar function to intended RMIs

• The “elite” should not always be avoided or confronted – they can operate as powerful brokers & add legitimacy, gain additional political & financial support

Cycle Stag

e

Frequent problems Potential strategies

1Local

Support

Pre-intervention indifference

Post-intervention decline in support

Simple, public examples (sanctuaries, field demonstrations etc.) Cost-effectiveness for participants & broad beneficiary range (see stage 3 below).

2Facilitation

Declining dialogue & interaction

Limited group organisation, participation & RMI-formation skills

Roles for pre-existing institutionsVetting of local NGO partnersTraining of local level staff (community organisation, power issues & the approaches below)

3EquitableOutcomes

Resource capture by non-targets

Negative impacts on some stakeholders

Ensure early inclusive planning Increase facilitator awareness of power issues (“processes”, training in RMI formation etc.) Avoiding strongly subsidised inputs for production Avoided strongly subsidised access arrangementsLow-cost, smaller scale interventionsReduced geographic coverage (smaller participant clusters) Working with pre-existing informal institutions (LIs, samaj, salish etc.).A change from a sectoral to a livelihoods focus (stressing delivery & interaction across groups)

4Consensus

Intervention-induced conflict

Early use of participatory planning & consensus building Dispute-resolution as an integral function of project RMIsUtilisation of salish

Summary

NRM policies and projects evolve in unpredictable ways

This is largely a product of informal institutional processes (attitudes in organisations, social norms, pre-existing “rules”).

The outcomes are not always negative & are sometimes quite resilient…….(e.g. OLP groups & Malawi BVCs)

“[outcomes comprise]…..some form of bricolage of existing and evolving institutions linked together in complex and fluid networks, in which institutional design principles are only partly applicable.”

Cleaver & Franks 2002'institutional 'DIY' rather than engineering or design.

Useful reading:Development Through Bricolage -Rethinking Institutions for Natural Resource Management (Cleaver, 2012)

Difficult & overlooked institutional issues in natural resource management

- examples from fisheries co-management

Roger LewinsProject & Institutional Analysis

Thank you

Discussion topics

Specific

Special features of fisheries (physical, livelihoods / socio-economic, psychological(!) & institutional)

How does this theory relate to other sectors - examples (rangelands, forest, agriculture etc.)?

Is the concept of “community” still useful in the context of decentralised NRM?

General

The consequence for decentralised NRM

Parallels outside of NRM? The arrogance of “institution building”?