BALANCED ASPIRATIONS WITH UNSTABLE RESULTS

THE EFFECTS OF CONSCRIPTION ON CIVIL-MILITARY

RELATIONS IN LEBANON

Dissertation supervisor: Philip Sabin

MA War Studies

Fernande van Tets

Candidate Number N10582

August 2011

Words: 14.902

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Acknowledgements

The Dutch Embassy in Beirut has been instrumental in allowing this research to take place. My

internship there provided me with access to insights and individuals I had little hope of reaching

on my own. Ambassador Hero de Boer has been kind enough to allow me to accompany him on

official visits. I am grateful to HP van der Woude for his advice, and ‘promoting’ me to attend

Army Day; a great insight into how the Lebanese military perceives itself. I have Sana to thank

for her skill in extracting mobile phone numbers from secretaries, as well as the endless

manouche. Gratitude must be extended to all those who were willing to be interviewed for this

paper; General Hanna, Hilal Khashan, Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Taylor, Jeremy Chivers and

others who have preferred to remain anonymous. Their insights have proved invaluable. I am

grateful to my dissertation advisor and tutor Philip Sabin for his guidance throughout the year.

Words cannot express my gratitude towards my parents, Elsbeth and Rijnhard, and my twin

sister Victoria, who have been so supportive of my lengthy academic endeavours. I am grateful

to Sarah Clark for introducing me to Beirut and George Asseily for his introductions and

hospitality. Lastly I would like to thank Ernst for his patience and advice and, notwithstanding

that any errors are my own, Jan for setting me straight on my language.

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ContentsAcknowledgements.....................................................................................................................2

Introduction ................................................................................................................................5

Literature review and concepts ....................................................................................................7

Civil-Military relations ............................................................................................................7

Concordance theory.................................................................................................................9

Conscription ..........................................................................................................................10

Methodology .........................................................................................................................11

History of the Lebanese Armed Forces......................................................................................12

Founding of the state of Lebanon...........................................................................................12

Early history: a weak institution.............................................................................................13

The Civil War 1975-1991: Desertion and disintegration ........................................................14

Political decision making process..............................................................................................16

Legal framework for civil-military relations in Lebanon ........................................................16

Budget...................................................................................................................................17

Political military relationships ...............................................................................................18

The Army’s military role .......................................................................................................18

External actors.......................................................................................................................20

The ‘elephant in the room’: Hezbollah...................................................................................21

Military style.............................................................................................................................23

Social composition of the officer corps......................................................................................25

Promotions ............................................................................................................................26

Recruitment ..............................................................................................................................28

Involuntary enlistment: conscription......................................................................................29

Goals of conscription.............................................................................................................30

Effects of conscription...........................................................................................................31

Effective fighting force ......................................................................................................32

Politically unifying effects .................................................................................................34

Termination of conscription...................................................................................................34

Inadequate resources ..........................................................................................................35

Lack of persuasion .............................................................................................................36

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Ideological failure ..............................................................................................................37

Lack of strategy .................................................................................................................38

Effects of ending conscription ...............................................................................................38

Military effects...................................................................................................................39

Unity..................................................................................................................................41

Neutrality...........................................................................................................................42

Conclusion................................................................................................................................45

Bibliography .............................................................................................................................47

List of Tables

Table 1: Size of the Lebanese Armed Forces 1990-2011…………………………………..……32

Table 2: Confidence in State and Army ………………………………………………………....41

Table 3: Relationship religious background and sectarianism in LAF………………………..…42

A note on transcription

The Latin spelling of Arabic geographical and personal names is based on the most common

Latin spelling in Lebanon itself. These forms will be more familiar to the average reader than

ones in scientific transliteration.

Used Abbreviations

LAF Lebanese Armed Forces

CAF Commander of the Armed Forces

ISF Internal Security Forces

IDF Israeli Defence Forces

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Introduction

After the Civil War of 1975-1989, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) found itself under a unique

set of circumstances. Not only did it have little legitimacy following mass desertion and

disintegration, but there were three rival military powers operating within its territory. The South

was still occupied by Israel following its invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Even though the Ta’if

Accords of 1989, which officially ended the Civil War, called for the disbanding of all militias,

the Israeli presence had been seized upon by Hezbollah to legitimise its continued armed

presence in order to resist this occupation. The same Ta’if Accords had also awarded Syria a

special role in Lebanon’s affairs which amounted to a de facto occupation, giving them a large

role in Lebanese foreign, economic and defence policy, and a right to post a significant amount

of troops on Lebanese territory.

In addition to the government being unable to exercise a monopoly on violence, according to

Weber the ultimate characteristic of the state,1 it is also weak and fractured due to its political

system based on confessionalism. This quasi-democratic construction awards each of Lebanon’s

18 different religious confessions power according to their demographic strength, with the

Christians allocated an advantage.2 This practice also extends to the military, with administrative

posts being divided along confessional lines. Lebanon’s various confessions operate like states in

a system of anarchy, constantly struggling to maintain the security of their own religious sect and

preserve their respective identity.3

Despite these less than ideal circumstances, the LAF managed to regain a large degree of popular

support and play an exemplary role in the rebuilding of Lebanon, becoming a symbol for

Lebanon’s unity, the so-called ‘heart of the nation.’ Two post-war Commanders of the Armed

Forces (CAF) have been elected President. In order to keep order in a divided society, the Army

has strived to create a unity, both within in its forces, and externally through influencing public

perception. In the process of this balancing act, it has refused orders from its legal civilian

1 Weber (1985) 8222 These are Maronite, Greek-Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Sunni, Twelver Shi`a, Druze, Armenian Apostolic,Armenian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Assyrians, Chaldean, Copts, Roman Catholic, Protestants,Alawi, Isma`ili and Israelite (Jewish). The first six groups are the largest and divide most of the power in thesectarian system between them.3 Yacoub (2008) 20-27

6

master, previously the President, currently the Cabinet, on a number of occasions. Despite this

large and unusual role, the LAF is severely understudied.

This paper considers Lebanese civil-military relations; who decides what the military should do

and how this should be achieved? A theoretical model which allows for Lebanon’s unique set of

circumstances is Schiff’s theory of concordance, which aims to look beyond a more traditional

separation of the civilian and military sphere towards concordance between three actors; the

political elite, the military and the citizenry. This partnership is based on four indicators;

recruitment, social composition of the officer corps, military style and political decision making.

The model advocates agreement between the people, military and state on the military’s

composition, what image it projects, as well as the structures that govern it, as a vehicle for

understanding civil-military relations and the absence of domestic military intervention.

Through the model of concordance this paper will aim to answer a number of questions. Firstly,

is the LAF able to create the unity necessary for guarding internal security? Is it capable of

performing its official external role of protecting Lebanon’s borders? The introduction of

universal conscription following the Civil War in 1991 was supposed to contribute to both these

goals. There will thus be a large focus on the recruitment indicator, in order to find out how

conscription contributed to the achievement of these two goals.

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Literature review and concepts

In the West, the subordination of the military to its civilian commanders has been

institutionalised legally as well as practically for decades now. In other parts of the world

however, the distinction is less clear. Many developing nations, especially in the Arab world,

have a recent history where the military is particularly present as an independent political actor.

Despite this there is a severe lack of research into Arab militaries, particularly in smaller states

such as Lebanon.4 Their large role in the region warrants the study of Arab militaries and could

prevent policy pitfalls. One such pitfall was the US decision to disband the Iraqi Army, which

could have been prevented by recognising the potential of the Army in helping to rebuild the

country.5 The studies of the past decades have confined themselves to the size, equipment and

technical capabilities of Arab armies, rather than analysing the relationship of these institutions

with the state, politics and society.6

Civil-Military relations

Civil-military relations describe the interplay between the civil society and the military

organisations designed to protect it. Topics include the legal framework set out to govern the

relationship between the military and civilian sphere, as well as the informal connections

between acting and retired security personnel and politicians. As Barak and Assaf point out,

“these informal interactions, which are very common in the non-Western regions, defy the

separation into distinct civilian and security sphere that is found in the established states of North

America and Western Europe.”7

This separation into distinct civilian and security spheres was first advocated by Huntington in

the 50s, based upon the experience of the US military. In Huntington’s standard work The

soldier and the state, the concept of professionalism is key. A professional military, whose

profession is a special type of vocation based on expertise, similar to a lawyer, a responsibility to

society and a feeling of distinction Huntington brands corporateness, will be detached from

political ambitions. It will restrict itself to an advisory position to the laymen civilians, and not

be involved in decision making. Its main responsibility is to defend the nation, and in answering

4 Barak and Assaf (2010) 807-115 Ibid. 804-56 Ibid. 8077 Ibid. 813

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to that call when necessary the professional Army carries out its responsibility.8 However, this is

a two sided coin, because in return the statesman respects ‘the integrity of the profession and its

subject matter’ and exerts political guidance in the form of setting the goals the military is to

accomplish, as well as allocating the necessary resources to achieve that goal.9

However, this model cannot apply to Lebanon for two reasons. First of all, it pre-supposes two

strong institutions, similarly to the United States. This model is not always applicable to

countries with weaker, less centralised political institutions, such as Lebanon’s confessionalm.

For these sorts of society, professionalisation of the Army is not always the answer to attaining a

separation between the civil and military sphere. Picard has even claimed that ‘[a]s far as Arab

armies are concerned; there is no evidence of any link between increase in professional skill and

de-politicisation.’10

Secondly, Huntington’s theory assumes that politicians are able to formulate a coherent end

policy to pursue. As we will see, in the case of Lebanon this is anything but the case; there is no

national defence policy and the role given to the Army’s role on paper; external security, is not in

line with its capabilities, and hence different to its actual modus operandi; internal security.

Other literature on civil-military relations recognises the large role played by Arab militaries, but

still largely focuses on military coups or degrees of military intervention during a coup.11 Such

models, however, do not allow for states in which the government does not exercise a monopoly

on violence.12 Similarly, more recent Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature, which has

endeavoured to expand good governance in the military beyond civilian oversight, also presumes

that the military is part of a centralised power structure that regulates society, thereby ignoring

the challenges to SSR in divided societies with weak state institutions and strong neo-patrimonial

networks.13 Seyigh has pointed out the problems the SSR framework faces in Lebanon, where

‘the sectarian and political struggle for control over the security sector is compounded by the

presence of dual military forces in Lebanon’, namely the presence of Hezbollah.’14

8 Huntington (1957) 7-119 Ibid. 7210 Picard (1990) 9411 Norton and Alfoneh (2008) 812 Ibid. 1313 Nerguizan (2010) 414 Seyigh (2009) 8

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Concordance theory

A different framework, which takes into account institutional weakness, is offered by Schiff

through the concordance model. This model advocates an alternative to the separation between

the civil and military spheres, namely a system of concordance in which the military, the

political elite and the citizenry “should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not

involve separation [of the civil and military sphere] but does not require it.”15 The model

overcomes the limitations of mere institutional analysis by incorporating particular historical and

cultural experience. Granting that such concepts are vague, and often difficult to operationalize,

Schiff identifies four indicators which the three actors should agree on in order to prevent

military intervention from occurring: the social composition of the officer corps, the political

decision-making process, recruitment method and military style.

The composition of the officer corps is self-explanatory; due to the role of the officer corps as

the leaders of the Army it forms a critical link not only between the citizenry and the military but

also between the citizenry and the government. The political decision-making process involves

the institutional organs of society that determine the military’s budget, materials, size and

structure. All these aspects of the military depend on the goals of the Army and what role it

should fulfil in society. Although Schiff’s definition does not include who is technically in

control of the military, this should also be included as who can decide what to do with the above

capacity surely is part of the political decision-making process too. Recruitment refers to the

method of enlistment, specifically whether it is coercive; forced cooperation against a citizen’s

will, or persuasive; citizens recognize the need for members of society to voluntarily or

involuntarily enlist.16 This factor will be most important in this study, as Lebanon saw a shift in

recruitment method; from voluntary to involuntary persuasive enlistment following the civil war,

and then the return to voluntary enlistment in 2007. Military style refers to ‘the external

manifestation of the military and the inner mental constructions associated with it: what it looks

like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it?’ 17

15 Schiff (1995) 716 Ibid. 1517 Ibid.

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The novelty in this approach is that it is that it introduces context through the consideration of

cultural issues, such as historical development and the structure of society.18 In this it is

constructivist in nature. The model has successfully been used to analyse other militaries where

the institutional balance is less equal than under Huntington’s model, for example in exploring

civil-military relations in Turkey.19

The concordance model does not ‘require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or

decision-making process.’20 Therefore it is suitable for Lebanon, which cannot exercise a

monopoly on violence, due to the presence of a competing armed militia, Hezbollah, and whose

state institutions have been hollowed out by the system of confessionalism. The divided nature of

Lebanese society makes it difficult to qualify ‘citizenry’, as different groups have different

interests. Support by the citizenry will thus be based on research which has found agreement

across confessional differences.

Conscription

Conscription has dual aims; nation building and the creation of an effective fighting force.

Nation building aims to create a common national identity and idea of citizenship among the

population. 21 An effective military fighting force is capable of protecting its territory’s external

borders. These goals, however, are not necessarily compatible. The political goals of establishing

a national identity might contribute to the creation of an effective fighting force through

strengthening morale, but the two goals only come together during the state of war. As

Clausewitz pointed out, passion is a vital ingredient in ensuring victory in warfare, and

nationalism and patriotism are one form of this.22 But due to the diverging nature of these goals,

the success of conscription must be measured for both aims as one might be more successfully

achieved than the other.

18 Schiff (1996) 28219 Narli (2011)20 Schiff (1995) 221 Barak and Assaf (2010) 81222 Clausewitz (1932) 32

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Methodology

The Army, with up to 70,000 forces, will be the primary focus as the Navy and Air force are

insignificant because of their small number of recruits.23 There are three ways I have gone about

collecting my data. The first is qualitative literature research, focusing on Lebanon’s post- civil

war period. The second is the consideration of statistical data on the military’s composition and

the public’s perception of it. To supplement these two sources, I have also conducted interviews

with a variety of (former) senior military figures, European defence attaches, academics,

politicians and journalists in Lebanon. The lack of accessible resources, as well as the

discrepancy between the written laws and practice has made these contributions invaluable. I was

hoping to talk to those currently at military headquarters, but my requests for access were not

granted.

23 IISS Military Balance, various editions 1990-2011

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History of the Lebanese Armed Forces

Founding of the state of Lebanon

The country of Lebanon, as it is known today, was established as a UN Mandate under France in

1920. Prior to this, the area now known as Lebanon was part of the Syrian province of the

Ottoman Empire. The state of Greater Lebanon suffers from a paradox of origin, due to the

conflicting three principles on which it was based; Maronite dominance, geo-strategic viability

and confessionalism. Maronite dominance was ensured, in order to allay Christian fears of

Muslim hegemony and Syrian dominance. The borders signified the desire to create an artificial,

enlarged geographic space to ensure the economic, demographic and strategic viability of the

new state. This territory was to be ruled by the quasi-democratic system of confessionalism,

through which power, and eventually the state itself, was divided amongst Lebanon’s numerous

sects.24 Despite supposedly being temporary in nature, the 1932 census which this division was

based on remains the last official census to this day.

Based on these three principles, in November 1943, Lebanon gained its independence. Its first

two political leaders, President Bechara al-Khoury and prime-minister Riad Solh, created an

understanding; ‘a number of mutual renunciations and guarantees, a compromise formulation on

the identity of the country and on power-sharing between the religious communities.’25 This so-

called National Pact, which was never written but has been institutionalised over time, saw the

Christians renouncing Western protection and accept Lebanon as an Arab affiliated country, and

the Muslims in turn renouncing possible unity with Syria or any pan-Arab state. The agreement

stipulated the power-sharing mechanism, with the President always being a Maronite Christian,

the Prime Minister a Sunni and the President of the National Parliament a Shia. Parliamentary

seats, as well as all other administrative posts, were to be divided on a 6:5 ratio in favour of the

Christians.26 In terms of civil-military relations, this inhibited military intervention by having

political parties accept the authority of the state, and creating a moral barrier by legitimising

civilian institutions in the eyes of the general public.27

24 Yacoub (2008) 925 Hanf (1973) 7226 Binder (1966) 27627 Beshara (2005) 78-79

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Early history: a weak institution

The Troupes Spéciales du Levant (Levantine Special Forces) were established by the French in

1920. Following growing pressure by the Lebanese to command their own forces, the French

turned the 3000 strong force, which was to become the core of the Lebanese Army, over in June

1943. The political nature of Lebanon prevented the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from

growing. Both Muslims and Christians were wary of strengthening the institution, fearing that

the other side would use the LAF’s military might to strengthen its own political position. The

Muslims felt that the LAF should be strong enough to play a significant role in the Arab-Israeli

conflict, while the Christians were keen to avoid such embroilment. Due to this lack of political

consensus, the LAF was awarded neither the funds nor the manpower throughout its early history

to play a significant role in external security; during the 1950s and 60s Lebanon’s military

spending never exceeded 4 per cent of GDP.28

The individual who was most influential during the early history of the LAF was its first

Commander; Fuad Chehab, who fulfilled the post from 1945 until the end of the first civil war of

1958. Under Chehab, the Army, while kept too weak to play a role in external conflicts with

Israel, played an important role in the domestic arena. It provided humanitarian assistance after

natural disasters but also managed conflicts in the periphery, particularly in the tribal areas of the

north and the Bekaa valley.29 When a civil war broke out in 1958, however, the Army remained

neutral. Chehab refused an order from President Chamoun, responsible for the LAF at the time,

to fight anti-Chamoun forces. Chehab felt the crisis was ‘a contest over the personality of the

president rather than the challenge to the state’ and feared that the Army’s involvement would

threaten its cohesion.30 He was consequently elected president and oversaw a militarisation of

society, which led to increased prosperity as well as an intensive, and disputed, role for the

deuxième bureau (the military intelligence services).31 This trend of heavy military involvement

in politics would continue under his successor Charles Helou (1964-1970), and during these

twelve years some have even claimed that the Army was the ‘behind the scenes ruler’ of

Lebanon.32

28 Collelo (1989) 240, Barak (2009) 21-2229 Barak (2001) 6930 Kechechian (1985) 1631 Barak (2006) 7832 Ibid.

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The Civil War 1975-1991: Desertion and disintegration

The Civil War proved that, despite its prominent role in the 60s, the institution still had the same

trouble with its internal cohesion as in 1958. When in 1975 a civil war broke out again, the Army

had little legitimacy and ‘long standing concerns that the Army would disintegrate if it were

called into action were vindicated when intense fighting broke out between Maronite and

Muslim Army recruits.33 Bereft of a commander as charismatic or commanding as Chehab, the

Army almost immediately disintegrated; only ten per cent remained in their positions, fifteen per

cent defected and joined various militias while the rest returned to their homes in anticipation of

the end of the conflict.34

In 1982 president Amin Gemayel attempted to bolster the LAF, announcing plans to create a

60,000 strong and unified Army to rebuild the nation, trained under auspices of the Unites States

through the so called Lebanese Army Modernization Program. However, despite the initial

successes in bolstering national morale, the homogenous nature of the brigades proved to be a

problem. An attack on the Druze area in the Chouf Mountains was the start of the first cracks,

with 800 Druze deserting in September 1983.35 A 1984 attack on the (Shi’a) Southern Beirut

suburbs proved too much. The Shi’a sixth brigade refused their orders and the Shi’a Fourth

brigade defected to the opposition. Thus the Army was facing mass defections, with as much as

‘40 percent of the Army’s 27000 active fighting men’ refusing to fight their co-religionists, or

having joined the Muslim militias.36 By 1987, the Lebanese Armed Forces were only the sixth or

seventh most powerful military organisation in the nation.37

Ever since 1984 the Army had been split into two units. General Michel Aoun, Commander of

the Armed Forces (CAF), politicised a number of these units through promotion of junior

officers and creation of an elite unit loyal to him. Following an impasse over the presidential

elections of 1988, Aoun assumed the prime-minster ship over the Christian enclave while Salim

al-Hoss was accepted by all factions outside of East-Beirut.38 The final blow to the LAF’s

cohesion came at the end of the Civil War after the Ta’if Accords, officially ending the war, had

33 Collelo (1989) 24734 Barak (2001) 7235 Kechechian (1985) 3136 ‘Civilians Leaving: Shiite and druse Leaders Call for a Cease-Fire – Marine Wounded’, New York Times,February 8, 198437 Collelo (1989) 17838 McLaurin (1991) 549-550

15

been signed by various political leaders. Aoun refused to accept the Accords, through which the

Christians would lose significant powers formerly given to the Presidency. This forced CAF

Emile Lahoud, a fellow Maronite who was appointed by the government run by al-Hoss, to fight

and defeat Aoun, which he managed with significant help from the Syrians. Following this last

episode the Army not only had to rebuild its forces, but also reintegrate the majority of Aouns

Army, who formed the majority of the LAF’s best fighters as well as the greater part of its

Christian component, in order to ensure a rebalancing of ethnic groups.39

The LAF has been kept weak from its inception due to the nature of sectarian politics. The

system of confessionalism was institutionalised, albeit at an adjusted ratio of 50-50 Christian and

Muslim quotas, by the Ta’if accords. This confessional nature, which as we shall see also seeped

into the Army, has ensured the Army was kept weak in terms of resources as well as internal

structure. Despite a period of significant military influence in the 60s, the LAF emerged out of

the civil war neutral, but severely weakened through desertion and splits.

39 Gaub (2007) 7

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Political decision making process

Following the destruction of the Civil War, the Army needed to be restructured and rebuild, and

this was recognised in the Ta’if Accords which ended the war in 1989. The restructuring of

sectarian relations also affected the relationship between politicians and the Army. This section

will first compare which institutionalised mechanisms exist on paper; who is in charge, how the

LAF’s budget is decided and what its role is, with its actual modus operandi. As we shall see,

there is no concordance on these issues. External actors, and their proxies such as Hezbollah,

exerting pressure on the already fractionalised political system complicates the situation even

further.

Legal framework for civil-military relations in Lebanon

Both the Constitution (1926) and the Ta’if Accords (1989) enshrine that the President is the

Supreme Commander of the LAF.40 He also presides over the Supreme Defence Council, which

also includes the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and the ministers of defence, foreign

affairs, interior and finance and is responsible for adopting ‘stipulations and measures necessary

to carry out defence and security policy.’41 However both documents also stipulate that the

armed forces fall under the authority of the Council of Ministers.42 Initially the President had

large executive power over the LAF,43 since the Ta’if Accords the authority over the LAF rests

with the Council of Ministers, who are to define defence policy; including ‘the goals to be

attained’ and ‘determination of the general goals of the army.’44 All power for ‘implementing the

military aspect of defence policy’ however, is invested in the Minister of Defence. He is

‘responsible for preparing the army for combat by mobilizing, training and equipping it and

supervising execution.’45 The budget for this is approved by parliament.

The official distinction between the government and military which exists on paper is different to

its modus operandi. The minister of defence is a political appointment with little power or

autonomy. His job is confined to meeting foreign diplomats, rather than actually deciding on

military affairs. Part of the reason is that those occupying the post often possess little to no

40 Constitution (1926) Article 49, Ta’if Accords (1989) Article II.B and II. B.2 and II.D.341 New Defence Law (1978) Article 6 and 742 Constitution (1926) Article 65, Ta’if Accords (1989) Articles II.D.343 Decree No 66 of April 1953 states that the Armed Forces are “at the disposal” of the President of the Republic.44 New Defence Law (1978) Article 545 New Defence Law (1978) Article 17

17

knowledge of military affairs, and this is the way the military prefers it.46 The person in control

is the Commander of the Armed Forces (CAF), who some say enjoys more power even than the

other top Maronite post, the President.47 The Ministerial Council headed by the Prime Minister,

who de jure has authority over the LAF, has been overruled in the past by the CAF. Recently this

was the case in 2005, when an order to act against anti-Syrian protestors was refused. A symbol

of the weakness of the ministry of defence vis-à-vis the Army can be found in its presence

online; it is non-existent. Instead, one is referred to the website of the LAF.

Budget

Although the parliament is constitutionally authorised to study and approve the military budget,

in reality it plays a minor role in determining how money is spent.48 All decisions concerning

salaries, arms procurement and so forth are made at the military headquarters in Yarze. While the

Army’s budget increased 1,534 % between 1990 and 2010, in comparison to what others spend

in the region it is very low. Regionally it lags behind its neighbours, with Jordan spending 8.6%

of its GDP on defence and Syria 5.9% in 2005, in comparison to Lebanon’s 3.1%. This, in

combination with the high cost of salaries and perks awarded to the large amount of high ranking

officers in Lebanon, has led to a severe lack of arms procurement. The situation is so dire that the

Minister for Defence even seriously suggested opening a Central Bank account to which citizens

could voluntarily contribute funds for arms procurement.49 The fact that such an account can

legally only be opened by the Cabinet, who the minister failed to consult, betrays the lack of

knowledge on Lebanon’s legal framework, as well as a failure to grasp basic principles of

defence expenditure.

Due to the lack of a clear framework of relations between the two and the large influence the

military exerts over the ministry of defence, concordance is more in acceptance of the status quo.

Politicians are worried about sacrificing power to state institutions, or strengthening them in case

they are utilised by a rival sect. Therefore there is no political desire to address the structural

fallacies of the LAF and its budget.

46 All those interviewed agreed on the weakness of the Minister of Defence.47 Interview European Defence Attaché, interview Elias Hanna48 Baaklini et al. quoted in Luethold (2004) 1349 Hasbani (2010)

18

Political military relationships

The political decision making process is also affected by the myriad of informal ties which exist

between the military and the political elites, in the form of marital ties and personal interests

intertwining.50 Most political leaders have inherited the mantle from their father and in the Army

there is a similar trend. Emile Lahoud and Fuad Chehab, both Commanders of the Armed Forces

and later Presidents, had ancestors who were the first officers in the LAF.51 However, on the

issue of ties between military and political actors, there is concordance between all three actors.

This is no more present than in the acceptance of the military fielding candidates for the

Presidential Elections, which are decided in Lebanon’s Parliament. Former Commander of the

Armed Forces Emile Lahoud became President in 1998, with legislators amending the law to

allow him first, to extend his term as Commander and later to run for President despite a

constitutional ban on senior military officers ascending to the presidency within two years of

their leaving their military offices. The ascent of a former Army commander to the presidency

obviously resulted in a larger political role for the military, with the Army establishing a network

of political relations in the state council, the bank of Lebanon and parliament.52 Although

Lahoud’s candidacy was heavily supported by the Syrians, even more so upon his re-election in

2004, after Syria’s departure in 2005, the Lebanese again have a president who is a former CAF;

Michel Suleiman was elected in 2008. Word is that the current Commander, Jean Kahwaji, is

lining himself up for the post.

The Army’s military role

Apart from a lack of clarity over who exercises power over the armed forces, the formulation of

the Army’s military role is a constant struggle. Officially determined by the Council of

Ministers, there is a lack of agreement on the fundamentals, such as the Army’s role in society.

Thus he military in practice is allowed to run its own affairs. Officially, the role allocated to the

LAF by the Ta’if accords was to protect Lebanon from external foes, stipulating that ‘the

fundamental task of the armed forces it to defend the homeland’ and should be ‘unified,

prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in

confronting Israeli aggression.’ In reality it confines itself to what was supposed to be a

50 For example Elias Murr, the Defence Minister, was married to Emile Lahoud’s daughter during his tenure as CAF51 Barak (2006) 8352 Habib (2002) quoted in Koekenbier (2005) 109

19

secondary role; supporting the Internal Security Forces (ISF) until they are ready to assume

security tasks. 53

The Army itself formulates its mission as: ‘Facing the Israeli occupation and its perpetual

aggression in South Lebanon and West Bekaa and supporting the steadfastness of Lebanese

citizens to ensure the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces to internationally recognized

borders’ as well as defending the country, its citizens and its ‘vital interests’ against all threats.

The legal basis for this protection of ‘vital interests’ is Law 102/1983 (the National Defence

Act), which provides that, if the State of Lebanon is threatened in one or more of its regions by

acts which may be harmful to its security or its interests, the Army is entrusted with maintaining

order.54 As to the protection of ‘vital interests’ of Lebanon, it is unclear when the vital interests

are being threatened, thereby providing the military free reign in determining when they choose

to overrule the politicians formally in charge. The Army also counts internal security among its

responsibilities, as well as social, development and humanitarian operations ‘according to

national interests.’55

However, the external role stipulated by Ta’if immediately failed to materialise due to

Hezbollah’s control of the South. The only ‘external task’ which in practice firmly falls in the

realm of the military is that of the Palestinians, who are perceived by the government as an

external security threat and therefore the responsibility of the Army.56 Thus the Army returned

to its traditional role of providing internal security, including the provision of humanitarian

assistance and helping in development projects.

Politicians, the military and citizenry agree on the necessity of this internal role. The ISF lack

legitimacy, and even though the population is aware of the expected roles of the two institutions,

a vast majority do not think this theoretical distribution of powers and duties is feasible in

Lebanon.57 The lack of the clear definition of the Army’s external role is an obstacle which the

Army encounters time and again. The lack of concordance between political sectarian actors on

53 Ta’if Accords (1989) section III.C.1-454 UN covenant on political and civil rights (1996), Article 455 Mission of the LAF - http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/Mission.asp.56 Long & Hanafi (2010) 757 Harris et al. (2010) 15

20

what it would like the Army to do, and consequently attribute the necessary resources for this, is

a troubling feature of Lebanese civil-military relations.

External actors

Throughout Lebanon’s history external actors have used Lebanon as a battle ground. During the

Cold War, the US aligned itself with various presidents, and interfered on behalf of Chamoun in

1958. Later it played a role through the establishment of the Lebanese Army Modernisation

Programme in 1983. Furthermore other contributors to the multi-national force established to

patrol the border between Israel and Lebanon since the 80s have also tried to help the Lebanese

state assert sovereignty over its territory.

Syria has always had a heavy presence in Lebanese relations, due to its belief that the larger part

of Lebanon should be part of Syria, as it was during Ottoman times, excluding the province of

Mount Lebanon. Syria interfered at multiple times during the Civil War, allying itself with

Christians and Shi’a factions depending on strategic convenience. The civil war only ended due

to heavy Syrian pressure, a result of which the ‘special relationship’ between the two was

mentioned in the Ta’if Accords and solidified through the Agreement on Brotherhood,

Cooperation and Coordination signed in 1991. Syria had a heavy presence in all forms of policy

until its exit in 2005, and was responsible for a large part of restructuring the Army and training

many of its officers. All appointments to leadership-level posts in Lebanese state institutions,

including the LAF, were influenced by the Syrians between 1990 and 2005.58 Thus it managed to

promote figures which were friendly towards Syrian policy, as well as towards the proxy it

simultaneously supported: Hezbollah. 59. Consequently any concordance between the three actors

would need Syrian approval during the period of conscription; 1991-2005. Syria acted as a de

facto national arbiter, and there was no need for a national defence policy as Syria provided this.

The effects of the ending of conscription must therefore also be placed in the larger context of

the decline of Syrian influence. Iran has also given ideological and financial guidance to

Hezbollah since its creation, thereby severely undermining Lebanese sovereignty

58 Nerguizan (2010) 859 Barak (2009) 179, Salloukh (2005) 19

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The ‘elephant in the room’: Hezbollah

In addition to the pressures from external actors such as Syria, the formulation of any role for the

Army in terms of national security is complicated by the existence, and acceptance, of

Hezbollah. Although the Ta’if accords officially called for the dismantling of all militias,

Hezbollah was allowed, under Syrian tutelage, to continue its presence in the South in order to

combat the Israeli occupation. Subsequent to the ending of the Israeli occupation in 2000, it

seized upon the continued occupation of the Shebaa farms, according to the UN part of Syrian

territory, to justify its continued armed presence in the South.

The fact that the state and the LAF do not exercise a monopoly on violence in Lebanon further

complicates the civil-military relations. The LAF is, still today, structurally, militarily but most

of all politically incapable of disarming Hezbollah. Hezbollah is better armed, and a highly

skilled fighting force. But more importantly, 30% of the LAF’s officer corps is Shi’a, and almost

40% of the Lebanese population.60 If the LAF was used against Hezbollah ‘it's not only the Shias

who would leave the army, 70 per cent of the Sunnis and half the Christians are with the

resistance [Hezbollah] at the moment as well."61

Despite a lot of verbal bluster from politicians, there is concordance about the unwritten nature

of the status quo; with the military performing a mostly internal security role and relying on

Hezbollah to provide Lebanon’s external defence. The slogan of Hezbollah has become the

strategy of Lebanon: the Resistance, the Army and the People. This bastardisation of

Clausewitz’s trinity of the Army, the People and the State,62 goes to show the weakness of the

state in this formulation. In terms of national defence it is absent. The Army has accepted this,

referring to Hezbollah as ‘the hand of the Army.’63 Official Army propaganda, such as bulletins

and speeches incorporate Hezbollah victories as their own, thus blurring the line between the

two.64 The Army’s own mission statement accepts Hezbollah’s presence, ‘supporting the

steadfastness of Lebanese citizens’ is a transparent reference to supporting Hezbollah.

60 CIA World Fact Book, Nerguizian (2009)61 Former general Hteit in ‘Sending in the troops’, Al-Ahram weekly, 17-23 August 200662 Clausewitz (1832) 2463 Interview former LAF General64 Recent statements underscoring this are a document published on the LAF’s 60th anniversaryhttp://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/article.asp?cat=7&ln=en and folders distributed during Army Day 2011.

22

This awkward co-existence between the Army and Hezbollah also affects civil-military relations.

During Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel the Army refused to challenge the loyalty that many

Lebanese felt for Hezbollah. Furthermore, it deviated from government policy by verbally

issuing direct support for Hezbollah, even calling them ‘brothers’.65

However, any formalisation of the duopoly of violence, through a long overdue national defence

strategy, seems impossible. Such an agreement would constrain Hezbollah, and it would lose its

autonomy to the LAF. But more importantly, it would sacrifice its ‘denial ambiguity’;

Hezbollah’s fluidity is what allows it to operate at times as the vanguard of Lebanon,

successfully resisting and expelling the Israeli occupation while at other times protecting its own

interests, as it did when it took over West-Beirut in 2008. This was a response to a perceived

threat to its communications infrastructure by the government’s replacement of a Hezbollah

minister for telecommunications, as well as the replacement of the General in charge of the

airport, perceived by the ruling coalition at the time to be a Hezbollah sympathiser.66

65 Henry (2007) 130-13166 ‘Hezbollah Pledges to Pull Its Forces Out of Beirut’, Bloomberg News, 10 May 2008http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aqf3zxx_..5I&refer=home

23

Military style

The military’s style concerns how the LAF interacts with society; its ethos, the image it projects

of itself and how this is received. The LAF’s image is mostly centred on unity in the form of

overcoming sectarian differences for the higher goal of the nation. This is strived for through

outwards shows of unity, propaganda and displays of military might laced with valiant rhetoric,

such as Army Day.

The inclusion of military style allows for the definition of its ethos. Lebanon can be firmly

categorised as what Khuri calls a tribally based model; the Army establishes a semblance of

institutional cohesion; but fragments under crisis into sectarian or religious fragments.67 This has

happened twice during the civil war, and a repeat is the LAF’s greatest fear.

The military style is still heavily influenced by its colonial past. The French character and its

ethnic composition were two obstacles to overcome on the way to unity.68 Almost 70 years later

neither has completely succeeded, as its structure is still European and, as we shall see later, it

has still not established a balanced ethnic composition. The LAF structure is, like most post-

colonial armies, similar to European armies. A large number of its officers have been trained,

and still do train, in Europe and the US. The European character of the Army was echoed by its

trainers in the 80s, and is again today; ‘it basically is a European Army.69 The European structure

and appearance can also be attributed to the dependency on Western donors for a lot of its

equipment and training.70 For example, military uniforms are supplied by the US and are

consequently a form of Woodland camouflage. The British train anti-terrorism units in the North

of Lebanon.

From its inception there been a large emphasis on creating a cohesive whole out of an Army of

divided personnel. When President al-Khuri asked Fuad Chehab to command the Army he

described it as not united by any national sentiment and told him: “Make a genuine, strong and

national Lebanese army out of this rabble.”71 The LAF makes great effort to exalt its unity at

every possible turn. This starts with its founding myth, the battle of Malikiyya, indeed the only

67 Khuri (1982) 1368 Barak (2001) 6569 Interview Giles Taylor70 Owen (2004) 17971 Riyashi (1961) quoted in Barak (2001) 63-4

24

offensive battle ever fought by the LAF, and which is still propagated by the LAF today.72 A

contemporary journalist proudly remarked:

These are the genuine Lebanese, moulded by the military in one melting pot and

transformed by it into one community whose only purpose is the service of the

homeland and the flag. Their sight elicited pride: …strict obedience of order and

love and loyalty for the commander of the Army (my italics).

This quote not only showcases the perceived uniting nature of the battle, but also the role of the

commander. Fuad Chehab is a figure of almost mythic proportions within the Army and the

desire to unite the Army is known by his name as Chehabism.73 Due to the divisive nature of

society, with a lack of one uniting party or figure, the Army has always been very dependent on

charismatic leaders. The ascendancy to the presidency of those who proved successful in

improving the Army’s image shows the strong desire, as well as lack of availability, in Lebanon

of such figures.

Through Army propaganda, this image is reinforced time and again among the military itself.

Externally, the military makes similar gestures, through large scale parades, as well as articles in

the press emphasising the unity of the institution and its role in protecting Lebanon. During the

Civil War it continued to organise parades and press coverage was overwhelmingly positive.74

Throughout the 90s the Army conducted a propaganda campaign on TV and billboards

emphasising the unity of the institution.75

This focus on creating an image of unity is largely determined by politics, which, in reality,

keeps the institution weak. Furthermore, the basis for this unity is centred on the only external

enemy everybody can agree on: Israel. Shows of strength, such as the biting the head of a snake -

a standard ritual during parades - stand in stark contrast to the Army’s actual capabilities. A

second basis for the unity of the LAF is its internal ethnic composition, which it has strived to

balance throughout the years. It is to this process that we now turn.

72 Barak (2001) 7373 Gaub (2007) 1774 ibid, p. 7275 Gaub (2011) 22

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Social composition of the officer corps

Ever since its creation, the LAF has struggled with the composition of its officer’s corps. When

speaking of social composition in Lebanon, this regards sect as well as socio-economic

background. The LAF has created a greater balance on both fronts, mostly through the

introduction of an artificial quota stipulating a 50-50 division between Muslims and Christians

throughout its officer corps.

Due to their supremacy in the Troupes Spéciales du Levant created by the French, when the

LAF came into existence in 1943 the overwhelming majority of the officer corps was Christian.76

Even though up until 1958 recruitment was technically based on merit alone, a variety of

socioeconomic and political factors ensured that the majority of those accepted into the military

academy were Christian and from the higher echelons of society.77

Following Lebanon’s first civil war in 1958, part of President Chehab’s efforts to strengthen the

state’s institutions was to distribute all administrative posts, including the LAF (except for senior

posts) equally among Christians and Muslims, rather than on the previous 6:5 ratio in favour of

the Christians. Oren Barak’s research in this area shows that this parity was only attained during

Lebanon’s second civil war, after the first wave of ‘retirements’ in 1977-8.78 Such ‘retirements’

encouraged high level officers, especially Christian ones, to leave their positions in order to

benefit a more balanced demographic composition of the officer corps.

The restructuring of the Army after the Ta’if accords saw another wave of ‘retirements’, and

subsequently an even greater effort was made to enforce the parity. Officially the quota is still in

place, but attendance of Army Day of 2011, which coincides with the graduation ceremony of

the military academy, revealed that the new officer’s corps is not as equally distributed as

claimed. Based on a rough sample of names called out, which in Lebanon can often indicate

one’s religion,79 far less than half were Christian, perhaps closer to one third. When confronting

a former Army general about this, he stated that this was ‘readjustment’ for greater numbers of

Muslims ‘falling in battle or leaving the Army.’80 However, other sources confirmed 30% Sunni,

76 McLaurin (1984) 83-8477 Barak (2006) 80, McLaurin (1984) 83-478 Barak (2006) 8679 Eg. Joseph and Anthony for Christians, Mohammed for Muslims80 Interview with former LAF general

26

30% Shi’a and 30% Christian was a more realistic estimate.81 Oren Barak puts the figure for the

post-civil war period at 47.1% Christian, 27.2 Shi’a and only 16.1 Sunni, with the rest being

Druze.82 This seems to be in line with demographic trends in Lebanon. The Shi’as, who had

trouble passing tests to enter the military academy, seem to have benefitted from their increased

socio-economic position. There is a low number of Sunni officers, but this can also be attributed

to education; Sunni’s are far better represented in the rank and file.

Apart from a shift in the sectarian composition of the officer corps, the corps has also become

more representative of various social levels. While initially almost three quarters hailed from

favoured or elite, mostly Christian families, it has now become more middle-class. Officers are

increasingly hailing form the, poorer, northern region and the Bekaa.83 The officer corps has

become a vehicle for social mobility, especially for the Shi’a.

When the quota was enforced in the 90s it was to encourage Christian recruits to apply, as they

had a lesser desire to pursue a military career. However, instead of producing greater ethnic

balance and unity, it is a source of frustration, as enthusiasm is greater among Muslims, yet the

number of places remains the same.84 The parity it enforces is artificial, and out of touch with

demographics and demand. Furthermore, the quota seems to contradict the idea of unity it is

meant to promote. Hence calls for its abolishment are frequent, especially among Muslims.85

The quota also undermines the principle of merit, as can be seen from the promotions system.

Promotions

The highest positions of the military are governed by the National Pact. The Commander in

Chief is traditionally a Maronite Christian. The New Defence Law of 1978 changed the

command structure to include a chief of staff, traditionally a Druze, and four deputy chiefs of

staff; a Sunni, Shi’a, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. Furthermore, within the division

between Muslims and Christians there are also positions secured for all of Lebanon’s 18

recognised religious sects. These are divided through a complicated system ensuring

representation of religious groups at a horizontal and vertical level ‘like a Rubik’s cube’. For

81 Interviews with European Defence Attachés82 Barak (2006) 8983 Ibid.84 Gaub (2011) 1285 Ibid.

27

example, if a company is commanded by a Sunni, he must have a Christian deputy, a Greek

Orthodox perhaps. The commander of the brigade then may not be a Christian of the same sect.86

The New Defence Law of 1978 stipulated that the Military Council, consisting of the head of all

the different departments of the Defence Ministry, should advise on promotions. As a result

promotions were very subjective, and mostly expressions of political favouritism. A series of

exams was introduced in 1994 in order to ensure some form of meritocracy.87 Although this

ensures the best cadets securing positions within their sectarian quota, ultimately the sect still

takes precedence over performance, with a majority of positions thus reserved for the dominant

Maronite sect. Furthermore, this division of posts along sectarian rather than meritocratic lines

leads to inflation in the officer’s corps. Estimates put the current number of generals around 400,

as well as thousands of colonels, for an Army comprising 56,000 personnel.88 In comparison,

Britain has 46 officers of three star rank – lieutenants general, vice admirals and air marshal – for

of a force of 109,500.89

Despite being inhibited by a lack of meritocracy in terms of military capabilities, the officer’s

corps does have a sense of unity, instilled primarily during the three year training programme.

Political issues are discussed, but smoothed over. For example, when questioned, cadets hardly

acknowledge the effects of the split between the Lahoud and Aoun factions of the Army, stating

that it has always been one.90 Officers perceive themselves as above sectarianism and able to act

in the greater interest of Lebanon.91 Upon entering the military academy one signs an agreement

foreswearing allegiance to any political party or militia, and declaring allegiance to Lebanon

alone.92 There seems to be an instalment of constitutive norms, resulting in officers constructing

an artificial Lebanese identity which allows thinking in terms of ‘what should a Lebanese officer

do?’93 How these norms are instilled and the organisational culture which accompanies this

process would be an interesting topic for further research.

86 Ibid. 687 Koekenbier (2005) 10888 Hasbani (2010), interviews with defence attachés and former generals89 ‘Generals and Admirals to be culled in defence cuts’, The Daily Telegraph, 3 February 201090 Gaub (2007) 891 See several biographies of officers eg. Lahoud (1976), Lahad (2003)92 ‘New conditions for admission’ http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/English/CollegesMilitarySchoolMain.asp#condition193 Based on Farrell (1998) 411

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Recruitment

The composition of the LAF has been a problematic issue throughout its history, with accusation

of it being a ‘Christian Army’ levelled against it on a number of occasions. In order to combat

this perception, not only the officer corps has changed in composition, but the rank-and-file has

too. Over the years, Lebanon’s recruitment process has changed from voluntary enlistment, to

conscription during and after the civil war. Recently, since 2007, enlistment is voluntary again.

Following Lebanon’s independence, the sectarian imbalance in favour of the Christians and

Shi’a among the foot soldiers deemed to be solved in line with the National Pact, thus

establishing a 6:5 ratio favouring the Christians. This communal balance prerequisite, combined

with the unpopularity of military service among the Christian population, made it difficult to fill

quotas. By 1951 only 700 out of 4000 candidates were being accepted, despite a desire to recruit

800.94 Any initiative to change the status quo was hampered by the Christians, who were fearful

of losing their dominance over the security sector. This fear was only aggravated by the growth

of the Muslim population, which had made the 1932 census out dated. Nevertheless, by 1975,

despite the image of the Army being Christian due to the high representation of Christians at

officer level, 60% of the rank and file were, in fact, Shi’a.95

The sectarian composition, and especially allegiance is a problem which has plagued the military

since its inception and military commanders have struggled to overcome. Even Fuad Chehab,

who was an extremely uniting leader to his forces, did not dare use his forces in 1958, telling the

US ambassador: ‘I have a very brittle instrument in my hand. If I strike too hard, it will break.’96

The large number of desertions and the disintegration of the Army during the civil war show that

it was not, at that time, a unified force internally. The perception of the Army as a Christian one

shows that that unity did not exist externally either. Changing the nature of recruitment to

universal conscription would have the potential to deal with both this internal weakness and

external perception of weakness.

94 Barak (2009) 19-2095 Gaub (2011) 496 Barak (2009) 55

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Involuntary enlistment: conscription

Although many Lebanese, including former generals,97 are under the impression that

conscription under the so-called ‘Flag Service Law’ was introduced following the Civil War, the

practice is much older. The idea of a mandatory draft was first proposed by a Sunni MP in 1974,

but Christians opposed it, afraid of losing their dominance, and thereby strengthening the

perception of the Army as a Christian institution in the wake of the civil war.98 ‘Compulsory

enlistment’ was introduced by the 1978 New Defence Law, stipulating a serving period of 2

years for every Lebanese male between the age of 18 and 22, with the opportunity to defer and

specialist positions for those holding university degrees.99 The ‘Flag Service Law’ (102/83) was

implemented in 1983 by President Amin Gemayel, as part of a larger effort to re-balance the

LAF’s confessional composition, by expanding its forces to 60,000 and the forced retirement of

140 officers.100 Despite the Army controlling little more than the area around Beirut, ‘potential

draftees flocked to the colors’ within the first months of its enactment. So great was the

enthusiasm, even from areas controlled by the Syrian and Israeli armies, that it strained the

Army’s ability to process them.101 However, despite this initial interest, barely a year later the

Army disintegrated under battle.102 During the rest of the civil war the policy was no longer

implemented.

Yet following the Ta’if accords the LAF underwent large scale re-organisation in order to create

a greater sectarian balance. This was achieved by mixing brigades, integrating militias and

expanding the LAF by introducing conscription.103 Outnumbered by militias during the Civil

War at a ratio of 2:1, the Army urgently needed to be enlarged. Rather than relying on veterans,

the Army leadership preferred enlisting new recruits.104 Thus law 97/91, re-establishing the

Service of the Flag Law was approved on 21 September 1991.

97 A former general was unaware of its existence prior to 1993, despite joining the army in 1975.98 Barak (2009) 2999 New Defence Law (1978) Articles 34, 37-43100 Ignatius (1985) 1151101 Dunn (1983) 18102 Kechechian (1985) 28103 For an in-depth look at the mixing of brigades and re-integration of militias, see Gaub (2007), Koekenbier(2005), Dupont (1999)104 Barak (2009) 178

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Goals of conscription

Following Ta’if, the government wanted the Army to be able to restore the state’s authority. In

order to do this the Army needed to ‘reunite its scattered remnants, restructure the religion-based

brigades, increase its size, integrate former militias, get rid of the Christian image and impose

itself as the one and only source of coercion’105 A leitmotif through all these goals is establishing

the Army as an institution of unity for all Lebanese, regardless of sect. Changing the nature of

recruitment by introducing conscription would fulfil a number of these goals; increasing its size

as well as eradicating its Christian image, both of which would allow for a greater presence on

the ground, thereby eventually leading to the LAF fulfilling its goal of external defence.

The Ta’if Accords declared the abolishment of political sectarianism to be a ‘fundamental

national objective.’ A national council was to be formed which was to ‘examine and propose the

means capable of abolishing sectarianism.’ In the interim the sectarian representation base in

‘public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions’ was to be

abolished ‘excluding the top-level jobs…which shall be shared equally by Christians and

Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.’106 The introduction of universal

conscription was in line with this objective. Eradicating the confessional quota for its rank and

file marked a fundamental change in the functioning of the Lebanese military. Recruitment was

now based on Lebanese citizenship rather than religious sect, and should therefore prove far less

divisive. Overcoming this obstacle to internal cohesion should allow for the projection of greater

outwardly cohesion too. The Army intended to play a unifying role in Lebanon, and had started

to re-organise its officer corps to be more representative as early as 1977.107 This desire is

reflected in the way it perceived the goals of conscription.

Even though the primary goal of conscription, as stated by the Army, is ‘preparing conscripts to

serve in the LAF’, the next eleven all focus on instilling patriotism, citizenship and national pride

and faith in the state’s institutions, cumulating in conscripts being ‘preachers carrying a message

to spread throughout their community’ following completion of the Flag Service.108 Thus the

105 Gaub (2007) 7106 Ta’if, Articles II.G and II.G.a107 Barak (2006) 90108 ‘The First Flag Service Center’, LAF website,http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/english/collegesmilitaryservicemain.asp

31

Army sees a large role for itself in nation building and the creation of a national identity. This is

unsurprising, as the Lebanese Army has long viewed itself as a supra-sectarian institution,

holding itself to a higher standard, and has created a number of myths to reinforce this image

(see previous two sections). The Army bulletin Al-Jaysh [the Army] went to great lengths to

underscore the potential of conscription as a melting pot of Lebanese youth. For example, the

Flag Service Law vowed to “help the youth, particularly in the post-war period, to escape the

narrow partisanship and blind sectarianism into a broader loyalty to the homeland alone.’109

As explained there is a dichotomy between the social and military goals of conscription. The

majority of the goals of conscription in Lebanon are of a ‘nation-building’ rather than military

nature. In evaluating the effects of conscription, the military and social effects of the policy will

be analysed before turning to its effects on civil-military relations.

Effects of conscription

Yet the initial drafting of the law and its political goals conflicted, as the pool of recruits was far

too large, covering all men born between 1966 and 1973 (all 18-25 year olds), a group

comprising over 260 000 individuals.110 In contrast, in 1990, the LAF comprised a mere 21 000

soldiers, and thus the establishment would be completely overwhelmed, on a far bigger scale

than in 1983 when it had already struggled with 3000 recruits. A solution was found in the

possibility of paying a sum of 1,500 000 Lebanese pounds (around $1000) to evade the draft.111

While this provided the military with a tidy sum, it contradicted the Army’s above goals of

installing national sentiment and creating an integrated national military; the sentiment would

only be instilled in the poor. Hence in 1993, law 245/93 decreed that military service was to be

served for one year by all males attaining 18 years of age. This decreased the pool of recruits to a

much more manageable 25, 000 recruits annually (see table 1).

109 Al-Jaysh 74 (june 1991) quoted in Barak (2009) 178110 Taqi al-Din (1994) 213111 Dupont (1999) 65

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Table 1: Size of the Lebanese Military (1990-2011)

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999-

2000

2002 –

2003

2004-

2007

2008-

2009

2010-

2011

Total

military size

21,800112 36,800 44,300 48,900 55,100 67,900 72,100 72,100 56,000 59,100

Army size 21,000 35,700 43,000 47,500 53,300 65,000 70,000 70,000 53,900 57,000

Navy size 0 400 500 600 1,000 1,200 1,100 1,100 1,000 1,000

Air force

size

800 800 800 800 800 1,700 1,000 1,000 1,100 1,100

Number of

conscripts

25,000 27,400 22,600 22,600 0 0

Percentage

of conscripts

58.1% 40.4% 31.3% 31.3% 0.0% 0.0%

Source: The Military Balance 1990-1991 / 1992-1993 / 1994-1995 / 1996-1997 / 1998-1999 / 1999-2000 /

2002-2003 / 2004-2005/2005-2006, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, Taqi al-Din (1994)

Effective fighting force

The introduction of conscription led to a huge increase in troops, doubling its size within the first

three years (see table 1). But this increase in troops did not allow for the Army to achieve what is

traditionally an Army’s primary goal, protection of external borders. What were the effects of

this surge of troops on its fighting capabilities? Let us first consider the operations carried out by

the LAF during the years of conscription.

As stipulated before the task of external security was mostly performed by Hezbollah. The LAF

moved into some villages in the South following a retaliatory action against Hezbollah by Israel

in 1993 (Operation Accountability), but remained passive during the fighting. The same was the

case during Israel’s 1996 operation ‘Grapes of Wrath.’113 Much more significantly, in the wake

of Israel’s withdrawal from the South after 2000, it took the LAF until 2006, and even then only

under the auspices of the UN, to be deployed to the South. Even though the LAF is currently

formally in control of the South, the area is by no means under the LAF’s sole authority, and all

brigades stationed there need to be cleared by Hezbollah.114

112 Combined Aoun and Lahoud forces113 Koekenbier (2005) 117114 Interview European Defence Attaché

33

The two most significant actions against the Palestinians, in Sidon in July 1991 and in Nahr el

Bared in 2007, both fall outside the realm of conscription, and are not relevant for this section.

The clashes with Islamists in Denniye, outside Tripoli in 2000 were significant in that it was a

first test of unity for the Army, as the fight was against Sunni Islamic militants. A large scale

operation, with 1500 personnel was deployed to fight the 150 insurgents.115 However, the

insurgents attacked the Army first and Sunni politicians immediately voiced their support for the

Army. The operation was over within 8 days and was not controversial.

Apart from this most of the LAF’s operations throughout the period of conscription concerned

the guarding of elections, in 1992, 1996 and 2000, as well as other internal security matters such

as the clearing of stockpiles of weapons. With increasing strength the Army also started to

interfere more in internal situations. The first example of this was in July 1995, when the Army

beat down trade union protests against rising prices, especially petrol. Then, in August 2001, the

Army launched an operation against anti-Syrian protests organized by the supporters of the

Christian leaders Michel Aoun and Samir Gaegea, in the wake of Maronite patriarch Sfeir’s visit

to the Chouf Mountains.

None of these actions by the military sincerely tested the loyalty of conscripts to the nation,

rather than the sectarian allegiance, and so it is impossible to say whether the military created an

effective fighting force in terms of idealistic cohesion. While the Islamist uprising in Denniye, in

2000, was a test in terms of Sunni soldiers fighting against other Sunnis, the encounter was too

brief and the power balance too skewed for it to be considered a threat to the national survival of

the Sunnis.116 In 2005, when the Army would have seen a severe test of its soldiers' loyalty if

deployed, the Army refused to play a role, with CAF Michel Suleiman refusing orders to act

against the March 14 anti-Syrian protestors.117 This neutrality, although sold as solely preventing

further bloodshed and preserving unity,118 is closely linked to an intense fear of the Army

splitting. The effects of the social aspect of conscription thus clearly were not as strong as

intended in advancing internal cohesion. Nevertheless, the Army was effective in carrying out its

115 ‘Sending in the troops’, Al-Ahram weekly, 17-23 August 2006116 Interview Jeremy Chivers117 Kechechian (2008) 2, Nerguizian (2009) 9118 ‘Suleiman Profile’, APS Diplomat News Service, 2 June 2008

34

other internal duties, helping reconstruction, and managed to extend its sovereignty over

Lebanon, albeit with help from the Syrian Army and excluding the South, and ensured the

elections were peaceful.

Politically unifying effects

As for the aspirations for the Army being a melting pot of all sects, again it is difficult to draw

clear conclusions. Two different 2002 studies into whether conscript’s time in the service

improved the image of the ‘other’ come to opposing conclusions. Abla found that the initial three

months of training did instil cohesion, but 90 per cent of draftees felt that there was no link

between national identity and military service.119 Some recruits even felt they had become more

sectarian due to the behaviour of their superiors, as ‘generals cooperate more between them than

with generals of other religions.’120 By contrast, a study by Messara states that the draft fulfils its

goals in every way; the service is a positive experience which instils discipline, and daily contact

created bonds of friendship and patriotism among the recruits.121 The answer probably lies

somewhere in the middle; while recruits no doubt were confronted with ‘the other’ during their

time in military service, it is unclear whether this contributed to a national identity as such. Many

recruits would cluster along confessional lines. There was even one incident of a Muslim soldier

shooting his fellow Christian recruits, though this was an anomaly.122 The reasons for the lack of

success of the policy will be discussed later.

Termination of conscription

In 2005 conscription was terminated by law 664/2005, which amended the 1983 national defence

law to reduce conscription to 6 months immediately, and abolish the practice completely after 2

years. Accordingly from 2007, recruitment into the LAF has been on a voluntary basis. The

reasons for this change can be found in a lack of concordance between the three parties.

Recruitment in Lebanon has always been of a persuasive, rather than coercive nature. Although

at times it has been involuntary, enlistment is based on the recognition by the population that

119 Abla (2002) 46 note 26120 Recruit quoted in Gaub (2007) 13. This sentiment was echoed by various European Defence Attaches and formergenerals this author spoke to.121 Messara (2002), quoted in Gaub (2007) 12122 Interview Hilal Khashan

35

military service is worthwhile, for patriotic or security reasons.123 Despite still recognising the

necessity of the Army, all actors no longer saw the need for conscription to staff it, as voluntary

enlistment would suffice. There were two main reasons for abolishing conscription. Firstly, the

Army did not have the resources, financially or structurally, to properly use the recruits

according to their potential. As a result of this, the practice was unpopular among the population;

it contributed to brain drain and was seen as a ‘wasted year.’ Consequently in the end, parliament

decided to abolish it, a decision which was difficult for then President Emile Lahoud, who had

overseen the introduction of the policy as CAF, and saw great potential in it as a melting pot for

all Lebanese.124

Inadequate resources

The last few years of the civil war had led to a complete collapse of the Lebanese economy, with

militias usurping the state’s role and collecting taxes in their respective enclaves.125 As a result

the state had limited funds at its disposal and the allocated budget did not allow the Army to

properly pay, train and equip its recruits. As a result of this, recruits were terribly paid, with

Khishan even describing most recruits as working ‘under conditions of slavery.’126

Apart from the financial difficulties, the military did not possess adequate resources, structurally

or administratively, to integrate such a large number of recruits each year. There was often a gap

between conscripted recruits and regular soldiers in terms of education, with the recruits being

better educated, but their intelligence not being properly utilised.127 Conscripts were generally

used as officer’s mess waiters, guards of buildings or chauffeurs to officers. Indeed, most

conscripts were positive about their initial twelve week training, but felt useless during the rest of

the nine months due to the lack of stimulation of such duties.128 Many recruits perceived the

experience to be a waste of time and one study found that as many as 80 per cent of recruits had

an overall negative impression of the Army following completion of their Service of the Flag.129

123 Based on Samuel Finer (1975), quoted in Schiff (1995) 15124 ‘Lebanese Army looks ahead to new challenges as conscription ends’, Daily Star, 13 February 2007125 Picard (2000) 292126 Interview Hilal Khashan127 Interview Elias Hanna128 Gaub (2007) 13129 Abla (2002) 46 note 26

36

Lack of persuasion

This negative perception by the conscripts themselves had a ripple effect on the popularity of

conscription among the population. Apart from the unfulfilling nature of the Service of the Flag,

many were also forced to postpone (often much better paying) jobs in order to fulfil their military

obligation. Additionally, the Lebanese, traditionally weary of state interference in the private

sphere, perceived it as government interference in their personal lives.130 Lastly, it has been

argued that conscription contributed to Lebanon’s brain drain. Exemption was granted to those

living abroad for more than five years in 2001. The measure was introduced to reduce brain drain

and encourage Lebanese to return to Lebanon.131 However the measure had a reverse effect,

promoting emigration by highly educated (mostly Christian) men for whom the Lebanese job

market never had been the most appealing option.132 Furthermore, some men used their wasta

(political influence) to gain exemption, thereby undermining the Service’s national character.133

These factors and the unpopularity of conscription thus diminished the Army’s prestige rather

than enlarging it. The political elite verbally threw its full weight behind rebuilding the Army

through conscription, with the President stating that the Army carried ‘the legitimate government

on its shoulders’ and if the Army would fall it would bring the government down with it.134 But

the concordance between the military and the citizenry on the issue of recruitment was declining.

Notwithstanding unpopularity, if there is still concordance on the necessity of conscription,

militarily speaking or in terms of patriotism, as a means of recruitment the practice can continue.

But due to the small role of the LAF in defending Lebanon against external foes (this being the

de facto responsibility of Hezbollah) many Lebanese found it unnecessary for their sons to be in

the Army. An exchange from a 2010 report into perceptions of the LAF proves illustrative. In

response to a question what she thought about the ending of conscription a 33 year old mother

from the South answered: ‘Fulfilling your military service is unnecessary. They waste 1 year of

their lives, and then they come back home.’ When confronted with her previous opinion that

130 Interview Hilal Khishan131 ‘Lebanon relaxed conscription rules’ BBC News, 2 April 2001132 Gaub (2007) 13133 ‘Army battles resistance to conscription’, Daily Star, 20 March 1999134 Barak (2009) 179

37

Israel was a threat the woman answered: ‘My son is in the Resistance, and has been receiving

military training from Hezbollah since he was 16.’135

Ideological failure

This lack of an external role also proved problematic in crafting an effective identity. The only

identity to be crafted was one of unity against Israel; it is disseminated in all of the Army’s

literature, such as its bulletins, as well as during speeches. Commemoration speeches during the

annual Army day, for example, never fail to mention a long list of the army’s achievements over

Israel, but this is contradicted by the LAF’s actions. A year proved too short to instil the values

of national unity, and many recruits simply returned to their old sectarian beliefs after leaving the

Army.136 This is unsurprising due to several reasons. Firstly, there is no agreement in Lebanon

on a common past, history, or identity. Although the Army has proved quite successful in

installing a sense of unity into its officer corps, it discouraged its draftees from debating super-

sensitive sectarian divisions and banned all talk of religion in the barracks.137

Furthermore, the ideological component of conscription, which was only discernable during the

few months of training, was not embedded in a larger programme of national reconciliation.

Even though the Ta’if accords called for a national effort and the establishment of a committee,

the practical policy of de-confessionalisation largely remained confined to paper. Thus any

lessons learned during their brief time in the Army were easily forgotten once draftees returned

to the political anarchy of Lebanese society, where sects fought for their own interests as hard as

ever. Within the Army itself, recruits even noticed that sectarianism was still rampant.

Not only the deconfessional message took place in isolation, the idea of citizenship is also not

present in civilian society. Lebanese politics do not encourage civic participation, as voting is

done on a basis of clientelism and done in blocks of political alliances, mostly decided by

religious leaders. The hollowing out of the state by different sects has led Lebanese to expect

very little from the state, and consequently abhor taxes. The Lebanese are unwilling to bear the

financial cost of statehood and the Army that goes with it.138 Therefore any kind of national

citizen created by conscription is a product of only those few months. Despite Ta’if calling for

135 Harris et al. (2010) 16136 Interviews with former LAF Generals137 Kechechian (2008) 3 note 7138 Yacoub (2008) 17 note 12

38

the development of a national curriculum to strengthen national belonging, Lebanon has no

national education system, as the state cannot agree on what to teach its children. The failure to

produce a national modern history book for it schools bears witness to the multitude of narratives

concerning Lebanon’s past. This decreased the likelihood of the educative aspects of

conscription ever working in the long term.

Lack of strategy

Finally, the lack of a clearly defined goal for the LAF made it difficult to support keeping the

policy in place. Without a clearly defined goal, and in the absence of national strategy

envisioning how to train, equip and use a large standing Army (see section politics) to achieve

that goal, the policy was let go. Some said that the ending of conscription was in order to

professionalise the force as a smaller, adaptable Army would prove more useful and financially

efficient.139 Lebanon’s primary foe, Israel, cannot be deterred by a large standing Army, as it will

simply be no match in terms of equipment or manpower. To illustrate, the LAF had 70,000

soldiers at its disposal at the height of conscription, while Israel currently has 176,500 active

members.140 Furthermore, Israel outspends Lebanon on a factor of 16:1.141

Effects of ending conscription

Although Law 95 abolishing conscription was passed in 2005, it only came into effect in 2007.

That year the Army saw a drop of 16,500 in personnel. The law allowed for recruits to stay on

for an additional five years, and initially over 10,000 did.142 This explains the discrepancy

between the actual drop and the number of conscripts (see Table 1).

Through the introduction of universal conscription, it was to be expected that the Army would

become a more realistic representation of Lebanese society. However, the abolishment of

conscription and the opening up of the military profession to anybody who desired to serve

risked skewing the balance in favour of certain groups. Though one would expect the Shi’a, the

largest population group, to be well represented, in 2008 the total number of Shi’a soldiers was

under 20%. In fact, the bulk of the LAF is composed of Sunni recruits, predominantly from the

139 ‘Lebanese Army looks ahead to new challenges as conscription ends’, Daily Star, 13 February 2007140 IISS Military Balance (2010) 255141 ‘Defence budget gets additional NIS 260M’, ynetnews, 4 April 2011http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4054947,00.html142 Interviews with European Defence Attachés

39

northern ‘Akkar region (55-60%), followed by Shi’a (18-20%), Christians (15-18%) and Druze

(3-5).143

The reason for this spread of demographic representation can be attributed to socio-economic

factors. The northern region of ‘Akkar is poor, with a lack of opportunities. The primary driver

for this group is economic rather than patriotic, which is reflected by their choice of role in the

Army; Sunni’s are overly represented in the logistics department. Maronites, who often come

from better education and backgrounds, opt for the infantry.144 This is in line with armies all over

the world, for example in the US blacks are overrepresented in service and support functions 145

Another reason for the North being so well represented is family structure, with the military

being the profession of choice for decades among many families. This especially used to be the

case for the Christians from the North; however they currently aspire to better paying civilian

careers, thereby forsaking their ‘traditional’ military careers.146 The lower level of education

among the Sunnis makes this a less viable option for them.

The decline of the Shi’a percentage can be attributed to opposite social factors. Historically the

Shi’a are better represented in the military than the Sunnis, which can be attributed to them

embracing the Lebanese state at an earlier stage as well as their rapid demographic growth. The

Shi’a, on the other hand, have transformed from a disenfranchised class which saw the military

as an opportunity for social mobility to a more established middle class, which seeks

opportunities elsewhere. Also, Shi’as who are concerned about national security have the option

of joining Hezbollah. In the South, many do while also practicing a civilian career.147

Military effects

But what has demographic shift and loss of personnel meant for the military in terms of

capability? Opinions are mixed. Although the move towards a smaller, more professional Army

was welcomed by many, especially western donor countries, the execution was imperfect. ‘There

is no strategy’ complains one European Defence Attaché. ‘The LAF wants to keep all its

equipment, even though a smaller professional Army might not need it and benefit from

143 Kehchechian (2008) 5. Giles Taylor confirmed these figures.144 Interview Giles Taylor145 Clark (1988) 70146 Interview Elias Hanna147 Norton (2000) 26-27

40

alternative purchases.’148 In terms of numbers the Army still has large numbers of recruits that it

can recall if it feels the necessity. In 2006 it did this, increasing its size from the usual 70,000 to

160,000.149

Internally, it can be argued that the Army is now stronger. Armies are most effective when

participation is voluntary, especially in terms of troop morale. A voluntary Army is a better

fighting force due to higher morale, increased experience due to a smaller turnover and hence

more capability; is for these reasons that conscription was abolished in many countries.150

The post-conscription Army was first tested during the offensive at the Palestinian camp of Nahr

el-Bared in 2007. The LAF fought a 3 month battle, ending victorious with the Islamic militants

defeated, though at a high cost to the LAF in equipment and personnel; 169 LAF soldiers were

‘martyred’. Some warned that the ending of conscription could enlarge and deepen the Army’

operational problems as it has not been counter-balanced by enhanced equipment and material

capabilities.’151 Despite its success, Nahr el-Bared confirmed this assessment by revealing the

Army’s operational weakness; it disposed of too few resources to provide air support and thus

had to improvise through use of its helicopters and months of shelling. Due to it running out of

ammunition very soon into the fight, the US had to provide ammunition aid.152

Some hail Nahr el-Bared as a turning point for the internal cohesion of the LAF, as for the first

time Sunni soldiers were fighting Sunni insurgents.153 However, the fact that the insurgents were

Palestinian rather than Lebanese dilutes the argument; it was ‘an extremist Sunnite faction that

was viewed as a supra-sectarian target in the eyes of the various confessionalist factions in

Lebanon.’154 The post-conscription Army has so far avoided embroiling itself in situation where

Lebanese fight Lebanese as it still is not sure that it can rely on its internal cohesion, even post-

conscription. This can be most clearly seen in the events of May 7-14 of 2008, when the LAF did

nothing to stop Hezbollah from occupying West-Beirut. The Army played a non-military role in

negotiating a deal advising the government to reverse its decision to fire the Hezbollah head of

148 Interview with European Defence Attaché.149 IISS Military Balance (2007)150 http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Conscription.html151 Belloncle (2006) 5152 Parrein (2009) 10-11153 Interview Giles Taylor154 Parrein (2009) 10-11

41

the airport, and reverse its decision to declare Hezbollah private telephone network, vital in its

operations, illegal. But it was not able to use its military capabilities for fear of a split.

Unity

Gaub predicted that it was unlikely that conscription would be abolished completely. ‘Too much

symbolism is attached to it, and too much of the Army’s positive image depends on the

draftees.’155 In 2002 the population had a very high level of trust in the Army, especially

compared to the state and other institutions (see table 2).

Table 2: Confidence in State and Army

Lebanese trust State and its

institutions

Lebanese trust their Army

Druze 62.5% 75.1%

Shi’a 43.7% 80.6%

Sunni 53.1% 83.1%

Catholic 46.9% 73.0%

Maronite 15.5% 65.4%

Orthodox 26.7% 75.1%

Lebanese total 41.7 % 75.3%

Source: Gaub (2007) based on Fabiola Azar and Etienne Mullet, ‘Muslims and Christians in Lebanon:

common Views on Political Issues’, Journal of Peace Research 11 (2002)

The reasons for this are difficult to pin down. Gaub attributes the trust people have in the Army

to its supra-religious image, and points to the positive effects conscription has had on this.

‘The sheer presence of draftees in the Army contributes to an important change in

the institution’s image. Because sons of all religious groups and of all regions are

serving in it, Lebanese feel that the Army embodies the idea of Lebanon itself; it

no longer has a ‘Christian’ image, but symbolises the country, and by the same

token the slowly growing Lebanese nation.156

155 Gaub (2007) 14156 Ibid.

42

But a more recent study found that although 84% of the Lebanese expressed support for the

Army as an institution, nearly half agreed or strongly agreed that ‘sectarianism is a problem

which plagues the LAF today (see table 3).’157

Table 3: Relationship between religious background and agreement with the statement:

‘Sectarianism is a problem which plagues the LAF today’

Sunni n=112 Shi’a n=74 Christian n=158

Strongly agree 43,8% 29.7% 29.1%

Agree 8.9% 9.5% 16.55

Neither agree nor disagree 12.5% 13.5% 19.6%

Disagree 4.5% 10.8% 4.4%

Strongly Disagree 30.4% 36.5% 30.4%

Source: Harris et al. (2010) 27

Therefore this supra-religious explanation fails to account for the bigger picture, for an

organisation which is perceived as sectarian cannot base its legitimacy on the absence of said

sectarianism. The positive image can be attributed to the unity of the officer corps, which does

act in line with what they perceive the public will see as Lebanon’s national interest, but posts at

this level are still divided among sectarian lines, and thus attributions to the supra-sectarian

nature of the Army are contradictory to reality (see previous section).

Neutrality

Rather than the demographic representation the reason for the Army’s perceived unity is its

neutrality, exercised through the LAFs refusal to shoot at Lebanese, overriding its civilian

commanders if need be to prevent this.158 There are two possible reasons for this neutrality. The

first is that this ‘neutral role’ is enshrined firstly by the Army’s allegiance to the constitution, and

as the keeper of a balance of power between the sects. This can be traced back to the refusal of

Chehab to follow orders in 1958. At several moments in Lebanese history, including the post-

Ta’if period, CAFs have chosen to disobey orders. A recent example of this was in 2005, when

CAF Michel Suleiman refused to follow orders from the government of Prime Minister Omar

157 Harris et al. (2010) 2158 All those interviewed mentioned neutrality as the LAFs greatest asset

43

Karami to act against millions of anti-Syrian demonstrators.159 This inaction had the added

benefit of restoring widespread Lebanese support to an institution which was starting to be

viewed as pro-Syrian; the rejection by the public of the Army investigating the death of Rafik

Hariri after his assassination in February 2005 also disputes the neutrality of the LAF.

Kechechian’s assessment of this event; that ‘the LAF redefined civil-military relations in

Lebanon, which was new to Lebanese politicians who were aghast at the last commander’s

[Suleiman] audacity but remained speechless nonetheless’160 is a bit of an overstatement. The

military has always been on hand to defend what they perceive the interest of Lebanon (see

officer section) and this has sometimes left the government out in the cold. Some attribute this

neutrality to the presidential aspirations of the CAF (for both posts are reserved for Maronites),

who do not wish to upset either side in order to avoid thwarting their presidential bid later in

their careers.161.

One can see this neutrality as a symbol of professionalism, and indeed this does contribute to the

popular image of the Army.162 However, another reason is fear for the cohesion of the LAF, and

so far the LAF Command has been apprehensive of employing its military force in domestic

disputes. The brittle nature of the Army which Chehab admitted to in 1958 seems to still plague

the Army today. The LAFs hesitation to deploy in 2008, when it was clearly being challenged

within territory over which is had been exercising complete sovereignty since the departure of

the Syrians, is a clear example of this. Even though the public do not approve of the passiveness

of the LAF, they are aware that taking sides poses risks to the unity of the Army.163

The neutrality of the Army is thus the safest option. This argument extends to a lack of explicit

domestic interference, rather than inaction. Action perceived to be on behalf of a particular sect

would lead to an armed confrontation with a Lebanese actor, contradicting the LAFs mantra and

possibly leading to disintegration. Rather than a danger of the Army deliberately interfering in

domestic politics, the danger is of the Army splitting. The huge effort to create unity, both

internally and externally, betrays this vulnerability.

159 Kechechian (2008) 2, Nerguizian (2009) 9160 Kechechian (2008) 3161 Interview Hilal Khashan, Interview Elias Hanna162 Gaub (2011) 30163 Harris et al. (2010) 20

44

It is impossible to predict whether the ending of conscription, and the narrative of unity, have

made the Army strong enough to survive an intervention such as was necessary in West-Beirut in

2008. Several top military commanders, from a variety of sects, wished to resign following the

episode, questioning what the purpose of the Army was if it could not interfere in such

situations.164 Indeed, recently, in February 2011, when faced with possible Hezbollah action, the

LAF took the uncharacteristic step of presenting a counterplan, defending sectarian lines and

government buildings.165 This is a step in the right direction.

Conscription was terminated after Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This has removed a third

party national arbiter, and has returned Lebanon to the state of anarchy it was in before. No

single sectarian actor has control over the LAF, or a monopoly on violence. This makes it

‘useless’ in terms of political gain to support the Army.166 Western military support, restarted

after the departure of the Syrians in 2005, is currently in limbo following the formation of a

cabinet which is more pro-Syria and Iran than pro-Western, and includes many Hezbollah

members.167

The absence of a larger defence strategy and a monopoly on violence, in combination with the

sectarian nature of the state, make it unlikely that civil-military relations will change much in the

short term. There is concordance amongst all three actors that the status quo works. In the media

one will often hear cries for sovereignty, but the Lebanese public is unwilling to pay the costs

associated with this, and the politicians are wary of relinquishing power and funds in order to

strengthen a, perceived rivalling, state institution. This expresses itself in a lack of oversight and

a lack of allocation of funds. Thus despite being ruled on paper by the politicians, the Army is

likely to continue pursuing its independent acquisition policy through donations, ruled mostly by

the fancy of its military commander, rather than the strategic interest of Lebanon. Recently, the

current COF extended enthusiasm for the delivery of 10 MiGs donated by the Russians,

regardless of the fact that by the time such vessels had taken off, they would have left Lebanese

airspace.168

164 Interview Giles Taylor, interview Elias Hanna165 Interview Giles Taylor166 Nerguizan (2010) 10167 Kahwaji (2011)168 Interview European Defence Attache

45

Conclusion

There is concordance among all three actors concerning the necessity of the LAFs internal role,

due to the lack of legitimacy of the Internal Security Forces (ISF). The internal unity to

effectively execute this role is present in the officer’s corps, instilled through the military

academy and through its representative composition. But the sectarian quota also hampers

meritocracy and military performance. The unity conscription was supposed to install in the

conscripts was less of a success. This is due to the difficulty of defining Lebanese identity, and

that the creation of such an identity in the Army was an isolated process. There was no national

re-integration programme, nor is citizenship installed through the education system.

The LAF has, however, been successful at projecting an image of unity through its military style.

The Army enjoy a high degree of trust and popular support, especially compared to other state

institutions. Contrary to expectations, the introduction of conscription did not contribute to this;

the policy was unpopular, led to a negative perception of the Army among recruits and failed to

eradicate the idea of the Army being sectarian.

The reason for the LAF’s popularity is its perceived neutrality. This can be attributed to the

professionalism of the officer corps, which acts to preserve Lebanon’s ‘vital interests’, or to the

CAF’s presidential ambitions. However, the Army’s neutrality also betrays its inherent weakness

in terms of cohesion. This neutrality bestows the legitimacy necessary to carry out several

internal operations. Nevertheless, the successes of the LAF to date are confined to non-military

intervention, or military offensives against groups which are considered supra-sectarian targets

such as Islamist extremists and Palestinians. Any military confrontation which would see LAF

fighting Lebanese factions is avoided. Conscription, as well as its abolishment, has failed to

overcome this internal lack of cohesion, as can be discerned from the non-action by the LAF in

2005 and 2008.

This neutrality also prohibits the LAF from fulfilling its external role. This situation is also aided

by the political decision making process; the sectarian political actors are wary of allocating

resources to a military which is non-aligned, and consequently will not bring any tangible

political gain, as well as dreading the power such a strengthened institution could have.

46

These circumstances have led to a tacit acceptance of a duopoly of violence, with Hezbollah in

charge of defending Lebanon’s borders against Israel. All three actors are aware of the danger of

challenging the status quo, and thus have, uneasily, embraced it. The strength of the Israeli

Defence Forces in relation to the LAF means that all are painfully aware in terms of conventional

force, the LAF is no match. The swelling of the LAFs forces through conscription has no impact

on this imbalance of military power. This imbalance allows the absence of a monopoly on

violence to exist, frustrating any attempts at creating a national defence strategy.

In civil-military relations most are concerned with prohibiting military intervention. The lack of

cohesion in the Army prohibits intervention beyond inaction and verbal interference; any more

pronounced military action could lead to a sectarian clash which military, neither politics nor

citizenry are sure it would survive. Rather Lebanon is in the unique situation that, if its

politicians would ever reach consensus on the need for domestic or external military action, the

LAF would be unable to provide it.

47

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52

Interviews

Hilal Khashan, Professor Political Science at American University Beirut – Beirut, 28 July 2011

Anonymous European Defence Attaché to Lebanon – Beirut, 29 July 2011

Anonymous former LAF General – Beirut, 2 August 2011

Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Taylor, British Defence Attaché to Lebanon – Beirut, 3 August 2011

Former LAF General Elias Hanna – Beirut, 4 August 2011

Jeremy Chivers, Stabilisation Advisor British Embassy, Lebanon – Beirut, 15 August 2011