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Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid. Chris Marcoux The College of William and Mary Christian Peratsakis University of Texas. Augmenting Available Data. Improving the breadth of coverage - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Do the Strong Receive What They Can?
Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid
C H R I S M A R C O U XT H E C O L L E G E O F W I L L I A M A N D M A R Y
C H R I S T I A N P E R AT S A K I SU N I V E R S I T Y O F T E X A S
Augmenting Available Data
I. Improving the breadth of coverage Adding multilateral and bilateral donors not reporting to OECD DAC Moving beyond ODA by including other types of aid flows Adding additional years of data for existing donors (e.g. IDA)
II. Improving the depth of coverage Adding more detail for existing project records
Documents Descriptions Co-financiers
Getting the Data
OECD CRSDonor Documents: Annual Reports, Project Factsheets
Historical Data Often not digitized
Webscraping: Online donor data Reliable; Quick; Automatically updated New information captured readily
Direct from Donors: Phone; Email; Site Visits Official; Primary source Difficulties of winning donor cooperation
$0
$20,000,000,000
$40,000,000,000
$60,000,000,000
$80,000,000,000
$100,000,000,000
$120,000,000,000
$140,000,000,000
$160,000,000,000
$180,000,000,000
$200,000,000,000
CRS CRS Augmented Non Dac
Total Development Flows in AidData by YearMillions (2000 USD)
List of FieldsBlue = New in AidData
AidData 1.0 has 67 variables: Donor Project ID Donor Code/Name Beneficiary Location Recipient Code/Name Source Source Detail Source Type Contacts/Role of Contact Financing Agency Implementing Agency Other Organization Commitment Date (not available
in online version of CRS) End Date Start Date Year Commitment Original Currency Disbursement Original Currency Total Cost Commitment Constant Commitment Current Flow Code Grace Period Grant Element Interest Rate
Investment Marker Date of first/last repayment Number of repayments per year Type of repayment Status Tied Aid, Partially Tied Aid, Untied Aid Description (long) Description, original language Short description Title Title, original language Biodiversity Marker Climate Change Marker CRS Purpose Code/Name (partially new, we imputed
values for the data we added) Environmental Impact Assessment Marker Freestanding Technical Cooperation Gender Equality Marker PDGG Marker Sector Name/Code Sector Programme Aid AidData Activity Codes/Descriptions AidData Dominant Sector Code/Name AidData Feasibility Study Marker AidData Technical Assistance Marker Notes
Aid From Recipient Perspectives
When Small Donors Matter: Small donors can still have a
big impact in specific countries
Example: Mauritania in 2007 Existing sources of data
misses 61% of the flows Mauritania received.
Existing Data 39%
New AidData
Data61%
Total Aid given to Mauritania in 2007 (in USD 2000):
Existing Data vs. PLAID Augmented Data
Composition of Flows to Africa
•0%=All Aid from Traditional Donors•100%=All Aid fromNon-Traditional Donors
Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid
Annual reports and websites of donor agencies emphasize the high levels of environmental degradation experienced by recipient countries.
Recipient governments complain of donor-dominated environmental agendas that focus on regional and global threats and neglect development (as well as local environmental needs).
Who is right?
Categorizing Environmental Assistance
5-point ordinal scale
Environmental, Strictly Defined (ESD)
Environmental, Broadly Defined (EBD)
Neutral (N)
Dirty, Broadly Defined (DBD)
Dirty, Strictly Defined (DSD)
Categorizing Environmental Benefit
All environmentally friendly projects (ESD or EBD) are further coded by scope:
Green Global or Regional Environmental Problemsex: climate, ozone depletion, biodiversity
Brown Local / National Environmental Problemsex: drinking water treatment, soil erosion
Tracking Environmental Aid
19801981
19821983
19841985
19861987
19881989
19901991
19921993
19941995
19961997
19981999
20002001
20022003
20042005
20062007
2008$0
$20,000,000,000
$40,000,000,000
$60,000,000,000
$80,000,000,000
$100,000,000,000
$120,000,000,000
$140,000,000,000
$160,000,000,000
Dirty
Neutral
Environmental
Environmental Aid & Additionality
19801981
19821983
19841985
19861987
19881989
19901991
19921993
19941995
19961997
19981999
20002001
20022003
20042005
20062007
2008$0
$20,000,000,000
$40,000,000,000
$60,000,000,000
$80,000,000,000
$100,000,000,000
$120,000,000,000
$140,000,000,000
$160,000,000,000
$180,000,000,000
$200,000,000,000
EnvironmentalNeutralDirty
Green|Brown Aid & Additionality
19801981
19821983
19841985
19861987
19881989
19901991
19921993
19941995
19961997
19981999
20002001
20022003
20042005
20062007
2008$0
$2,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$12,000,000,000
$14,000,000,000
$16,000,000,000
$18,000,000,000
GreenBrown
Green|Brown Aid & Additionality
19801981
19821983
19841985
19861987
19881989
19901991
19921993
19941995
19961997
19981999
20002001
20022003
20042005
20062007
2008$0
$2,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$12,000,000,000
$14,000,000,000
$16,000,000,000
$18,000,000,000
GreenBrown
Environmental Aid: Bilateral & Multilateral
19801981
19821983
19841985
19861987
19881989
19901991
19921993
19941995
19961997
19981999
20002001
20022003
20042005
20062007
2008$0
$2,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$12,000,000,000
Bilateral DonorsMultilateral Donors
Environmental Aid Type: Bilateral Donors
19801981
19821983
19841985
19861987
19881989
19901991
19921993
19941995
19961997
19981999
20002001
20022003
20042005
20062007
2008$0
$2,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$12,000,000,000
GreenBrown
Environmental Aid Type: Multilateral Donors
19801981
19821983
19841985
19861987
19881989
19901991
19921993
19941995
19961997
19981999
20002001
20022003
20042005
20062007
2008$0
$1,000,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$3,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000
$7,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
GreenBrown
Top Recipients of Environmental Aid
1980s ($5.08) 1990s ($2.80) 2000s ($2.26)1. Brazil $134.97 1. China $2.09 1. China $2.78
2. Egypt $9.50 2. Brazil $5.40 2. India $2.92
3. India $5.36 3. India $2.57 3. Russia $0.64
4. Philippines $1.21 4. Philippines $1.43 4. Vietnam $2.75
5. Indonesia $1.50 5. Mexico $10.17 5. Brazil $3.81
6. Korea $195.36 6. Indonesia $1.86 6. Morocco $4.83
7. Bangladesh $0.43 7. Egypt $5.89 7. Indonesia $1.22
8. Turkey $142.34 8. Argentina $11.25 8. Mexico $4.88
9. Algeria n/a 9. Turkey $10.85 9. Iraq $113.02
10. Mexico $6158.76 10. Thailand $4.83 10. Bangladesh $2.01
Namibia Aid Portfolio
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008$0
$50,000,000
$100,000,000
$150,000,000
$200,000,000
$250,000,000
Namibia Aid Portfolio (cont’d)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008$0
$5,000,000
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
$20,000,000
$25,000,000
$30,000,000
Next Steps
Develop and test a model of environmental aid allocation that accounts for recipients’ interests and power. Since these may vary by issue, I focus on environmental transfers
related to biological diversity – one of the two major treaties negotiated at UNCED.
Examine how much aid is given under the umbrella of MEAs (financial transfers) and assess success of financial transfers in building capacity (completeness of nat’l reporting)
“Greening Aid” allocation model
1. Ecofunctionalism1. Aid correlates with environmental significance of recipients2. Donors will target recipients with poor environmental quality
2. Institutionalism1. Donors will target recipients based on revealed preferences2. Donors will favor governments that provide credible/verifiable information
about environmental performance
3. Realpolitik1. “Loyal” recipients will receive more aid2. Donors will disproportionately favor large recipients
4. Liberalism1. Donors will favor trading partners