Fall 2016 Tu Th 9:20 – 10:35 MG 103

IR 335-010: 4 credit hours (CRN: 42426)Intervention

Chaim Kaufmann – revised 10/16/2016

CourseSite: IR-335-010-FL16 Research guide: http://libraryguides.lehigh.edu/ir335Librarian: Brian Simboli brs4@lehigh.edu (8-5003) E-mail: ck07Office hours (MG 207a): MW 12:45-2:00; Tu 10:45-2:00; and by appointment.

Learning Objectives:States commonly intervene in the politics and economics of other, usually weaker,

states (since 1945 the record holder is the United States). This is done both for narrow national security purposes (e.g., counterinsurgency, overt or covert regime change efforts) and for broader humanitarian purposes (e.g., disaster relief, refugee protection, peacekeeping or peace enforcement; some would also count efforts to spread human rights or democracy). Sometimes several rationales are offered for the same intervention, as in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In the United Nations era, however, international legal norms favoring sovereignty mostly bar interventions not requested by the target state, at least theoretically—targets are sometimes coerced to “request” intervention and the Security Council can and has authorized interventions. More recently, the emerging legal doctrine of “responsibility to protect” has weakened the sovereignty norm for at least some humanitarian emergencies.

In addition, effectiveness of and best practices for both counterinsurgency and humanitarian interventions remain much contested.

Students completing this course should be able to:-Analyze and evaluate scholarly and policy arguments and evidence concerning

intervention and social science topics broadly;-Effectively communicate such evaluations as well as their own arguments verbally

and in writing.-Design and carry out substantial social science research projects on intervention

or other international relations or political science subjects.

Prerequisites:IR 010. One or more intermediate-level core courses is desirable, as are skills in

other social science and humanities disciplines and regional or language expertise.

Requirements:Note that our schedule will not be entirely regular. There are several dates on

which we will not meet, and two when we will meet at different times: On Tuesday Sept. 20 we will meet twice, once for an invited lecture by Jacqueline L. Hazelton of the naval War College. On Sunday October 2 we will meet for a simulation that cannot be fit into a regular class slot. Reserve these dates now.

1. There are about 19 sessions with reading assignments. As our progress may not match the planned schedule, you are responsible for keeping track.

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The course format is mainly seminar, although depending on special technical or historical issues not fully covered in readings, I may lecture for a minute or several at a time; do interrupt with questions.

You should engage each other, not just me, and can and should seize control of the direction of discussion. Active contribution is part of your responsibility to educate not only yourself but also your colleagues and me.

No electronic devices except laptops (for note-taking or immediate research only). 2. A policy-relevant research paper on an intervention case, maximum length 25

pages, produced in four stages over the course of the semester. See “IR 335 Main Assignment” and detailed charges for each part under ‘Assignments’ on our CourseSite.

3. Four simulation sessions.

Due Dates: 1st assignment (Proposal) TRAC: 9/8, 4:00 P.M. Instructor: 9/20, in class2nd assignment (Research Tools) Instructor: 9/15, in class3rd assignment (Lit. Rev.) TRAC: 10/21, 4:00 P.M. Instructor: 10/31, Noon4th assignment (Final) TRAC: 12/2, 4:00 P.M. Instructor: 12/21, 4:00 P.M.

Grading: Seminar 30Research project

Proposal 2Research Tools 3Literature review 20Final Paper 45

Extra credit opportunities: (maximum 5% of course grade).If you attend a non-course lecture and discussion (at Lehigh or elsewhere) on a

topic related to this course, you may submit a reaction paper worth 1% of the final course grade. You are also invited to submit suggestions to improve Lehigh’s library holdings. Memos under ‘Assignments’ provide details for each.

Intellectual Integrity:The Department of International Relations Policy on Academic Integrity and

Plagiarism is hereby incorporated into this syllabus. A copy is posted on the CourseSite.

Accommodation for Students with Disabilities:Students who have a disability for which you are or may be requesting

accommodation should contact both the instructor and the Office of Academic Support Services, University Center 212 (610-758-4152) as early as possible in the semester.  You must obtain documentation from Academic Support Services before accommodation can be granted.

Required Textbooks: 1.. Ari Folman and David Polonsky, Waltz with Bashir: A Lebanon War Story (New York:

Henry Holt, 2009). Not in the bookstore: I recommend Alibris or Amazon.2. Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University

Press, 2008).

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3. Nick Turse, Kill Everything That Moves: The Real War in Vietnam (New York: Metropolitan, 2013).

4. Kate L. Turabian et al., A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 8th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013) or Modern Language Association, MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 7th ed. (Modern Language Association, 2009).

5. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Schedule and Reading Assignments:Each session includes questions that you may want to keep in mind while preparing.

These are not meant to be exhaustive or to constrain class discussion.* = reading item on CourseSite under ‘Course Documents;’ others in textbooks (films on

reserve in the Media Center). Contact me promptly if you discover a corrupt file or any other problem.

Films are on reserve at Fairchild; you can watch them solo or in groups.

I: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

1. Tues. August 30: Social Science Research [26]

Is Walt right that efforts at building theory in I.R. should focus on policy relevance? Should policy be guided by theory? Why have efforts at policy-relevant theory had relatively little impact on actual policy? How should we categorize types of intervention? Is there a bright line between

different types of intervention, especially between counterinsurgency and humanitarian intervention?

How should we categorize tools of intervention? Is there a bright line between military and non-military tools? Between unilateral and multilateral?

How should we assess ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of interventions?

*This syllabus; main course assignment; first three assignments (Proposal, Research Tools, Literature Review); look through other memos under ‘Assignments.’

*Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations”, Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005), 23-48.

Also of interest (not assigned):Will Strunk, Jr., The Elements of Style (New York: Tribeca, 2012) or earlier edition (Strunk

& White).

2. Thurs. September 1: Qualitative Research Methods [61]

What does SVE mean by “antecedent conditions” (9-10)? Of SVE’s features of a good theory (17-21) which seem most important and why? What is the relationship between a theory and an explanation?

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We can’t conduct controlled experiments (28). What do we do about that? Which of controlled comparison vs. process tracing (55ff.) should we prefer? Of the suggested case selection criteria (77ff.), the most useful to you are likely to be

#s 3, 4, 5, and 7. (Note that what Van Evera calls within-case variation (#3) I usually call “independent observations” or simply “cases.”)

Your paper will be of type 2, 4 (evaluative), 5, or 6 (88-95) since our charge rules out the others. To what extent are these types really distinct?

Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7-21, 27-30, 40-67, 77-88, 89-93. Keep p. 88 close as you work.

Also of Interest (not assigned):David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative

Research,” World Politics 49:1 (October 1996), 56-91.Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and

Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7 (Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137.

Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," Political Analysis 2:1 (1990), 131-50.

Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8:2 (Autumn 1977), 281-313.

Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," International Organization 37:1 (Winter 1983), 73-91.

Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 38-55, 87-136.

David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security 29:1 (Summer 2004), 49-91. 24 cases; borderline between comparative case study and quantitative.

Bruce E. Moon, “Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq,” International Security 33:4 (Spring 2009), 111-48.

Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” International Security 33:4 (Spring 2009), 9-51.

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25:3 (Winter, 2000-2001), 5-53. See also correspondence in the Spring 2002 issue.

Miriam Fendius Elman, “Finland in World War II: Alliances, Small States, and the Democratic Peace,” in Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 191-232. Can a case be critical if its historical importance is low?

Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). British policy towards Egypt.

John S. Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

Chaim Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making," International Studies

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Quarterly 38:4 (December 1994), 557-86. Are qualitative and quantitative methods fundamentally different?

3. Tues. Sept. 6: Research Tools Meeting with Brian Simboli (FM 292, in computing center under Maginnes)

*Chaim Kaufmann, “‘Chaining’ Sources in Social Science Research” (September 6, 2012).*Familiarize yourself with the course research guide.

Do not be absent.

September 8: First assignment (Proposal) due to TRAC Fellow 4:00 P.M.

4. Thurs. September 8: How to Prepare a Literature Review [57]

What issues should a literature review cover? Do these do their tasks adequately? Come in ready to discuss the main issues that your literature review should cover. What is the difference between a literature review (MacDonald’s chapter) and a review

essay (Brownlee’s article)? In objectives? In style? Although your paper will include a literature review, it will be a research paper, not a

review essay; what does that mean for ways in which you should and should not follow Brownlee’s structure or style?

*Third Assignment (Literature Review).*Douglas MacDonald, Adventures in Chaos (Harvard University Press, 1992), chapter 3,

44-73.*Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?” World Politics 59:2 (January 2007), 314–

40.

Also of interest (not assigned):Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a

Bomb,” International Security 21:3 (Winter, 1996-97), 54-86; and Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18:4 (Spring, 1994), 66-107.

Stephen Walt, “Revolution and War,” World Politics 44:3 (April 1992), 321-68.Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.:

Cornell University Press, 1991), 21-65.Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting

Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44:2 (Spring 1990), 137-68.

Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12-38.

John Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” International Relations 23:2 (June 2009), 241-56.

Jack Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” World Politics 36:1 (October 1983), 76-99; and Levy, “Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40:1 (October1987), 82-107. These

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are “review essays:” entire articles devoted to describing—and assessing—the state of a field.

II: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

5. Tues. September 13: What is Civil War? [59]

What are the main types of civil wars? What conditions promote the rise of insurgencies? Is insurgency inherently a rural phenomenon? Can it succeed in moderately or highly

urbanized societies? Economic models centered on individual motives of greed and survival, in which

politics and identity play little role, have gained currency recently. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such models? If they leave out a lot, why might they be gaining?

Why would a foreign state intervene for or against an insurgency? What are the main means of intervention?

*Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 990-1992 (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), part of chapter 3, 68 (bottom)-70.

*Chaim Kaufmann, “Intervention in Ethnic and in Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can’t,” Security Studies 6:1 (Autumn 1996), 62-100.

*Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October 21, 2001), 1-17.

Also of interest (not assigned):Robert Taber, War of the Flea (Dulles, Va.: Potomac, 2002; originally 1965). Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambidge, England: Cambridge

University Press, 2006). It’s mainly local score-settling.Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., Understanding Civil War: Evidence and

Analysis, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005). Collection of case studies; preface partially retracts the earlier Collier and Hoeffler claims.

John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’,” International Security, 25:1 (Summer 2000), 42-70; and Anna Simons and John Mueller, Correspondence: The Dynamics of Internal Conflict, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), 187-92.

September 15: Second assignment (Research Tools) due to instructor 9:20 A.M.

6. Thurs. September 15: Ethics and Law of Counterinsurgency [71]

Is intervention based on political or strategic interest justifiable? On an interest in governance? On humanitarian grounds, even if that is not the intervener’s only motive?

Can counterinsurgents maintain a level of discipline that avoids large-scale collateral damage and/or war crimes? If not, does that delegitimate the entire enterprise?

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If counterinsurgency necessarily requires use of terror, does that delegitimate it entirely?

Does the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort depend on what conditions the interveners leave behind?

*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 4th ed., 2006), ch. 11 and parts of chs. 9 and 19, 151-159, 176-96, 306-322.

*Edward Luttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Harpers Magazine 314 (February 2007), 33-42.

*Rebecca Johnson, “Jus Post Bellum and Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Military Ethics, 7:3 (2008), 215-30.

Also of interest (not assigned):Walzer chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 19.Alex P. Bellamy, “The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War,”

Review of International Studies 34:4 (October 2008), 601-625.Sergio Koc-Menard, “Just War Tradition, Liberalism, and Civil War,” Philosophy in the

Contemporary World 11:2 (Fall/Winter 2004), 57-64.

September 15: First assignment (Proposal) due to instructor 9:20 A.M.

7. Tues. September 20: Counterinsurgency [74]

Guest seminar leader: Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Naval War College

Although Nagl, Kaufmann, Hazelton, and most others identify two main approaches to COIN, they don’t always call them by the same names. Can you match them?

What is the logic of each approach? Kaufmann argues that the most important determinants of outcomes vary by conflict

type. Nagel argues that military ‘learning’ is always the most critical factor. To what extent does Hazelton agree or disagree with either?

How much of what Race describes fits one or another of these approaches and what doesn’t?

If Engelbert and Tull’s diagnosis is correct, how much of the mainstream COIN theory is still relevant and what are beside the point?

*Kaufmann, “Intervention in Ethnic and in Ideological Civil Wars,” is relevant again here.*Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 55 (last para)-63 (2nd para), 67- (2nd para)-73 (3rd para).

*Jacqueline L. Hazelton, “Governing by Violence: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” September 2016, unpub.

*John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 169-81. *David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.:

Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, December 2006). Nagl is said to have been the main

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intellectual force. No fixed assignment—as much as you are willing to stand. Good to read together with friends.

*Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States,” International Security, 32:4 (Spring 2008), 106-139.

Also of interest (not assigned):John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, rest of book. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, Conn.:

Praeger, 2006; originally published 1964).Julian Paget, Counter-insurgency Campaigning (London, Faber, 1967).Bard E. O’ Neill, from Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency and Terrorism, 2nd. ed.,

revised (Dulles, Va.: Potomac, 2005).David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); also Counterinsurgency (Oxford, 2010), intended as a manual.

Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Malaya and Singapore (London: Faber & Faber, 1973).

Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communication in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1958).

Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1966).

Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962.Matthew J. Connolly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the

Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002).Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era (New York: Free Press, 1977).Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: the U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan,

and Central Asia with a new final chapter (New York: Penguin, 2009). Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan with a new

afterword (New York: Norton, 2010).

8. Tues. September 20, 4:10 P.M., MG 113

Lecture and Q&A on her own research by Jacqueline Hazelton.

9. Thurs. September 22: Vietnam , I: War Comes to Long An [c. 88]

What grievances motivated formation of the Viet Cong or made them attractive to South Vietnamese?

What were the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Cong in Long An? What were the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the government forces in Long

An? What were the important decisions of each side, and how much were these influenced

for good or ill by higher authority or outside forces?

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Can you name other factors that seem to have mattered? What factors were decisive in the trajectory of the contest in Long An up to the early

1960s?

*Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), maps; setting, 1-2; part of chapter 3, 120-140; chapter 4, 141-209. The rest of chapters 2 and 3 will also repay, although you can skip most of the administrative details and correspondence.

Also of interest (not assigned):Nagl, chapter 6.

Tues. September 27: No class

10. Thurs. September 29: Vietnam, II: The Americans Arrive [56]

What were central elements of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam? Which elements were productive and which counterproductive?

How were U.S. Army and Marine COIN approaches different? Was the difference important? What are these two approaches called now?

Long An was in III Corps (an Army area of responsibility), quite close to Saigon. How well or badly would you expect U.S. COIN methods to have functioned there compared with elsewhere in Vietnam?

In Nagl’s terms, how well or badly did US. institutions learn? How much did it matter?

*Race, War Comes to Long An, chapter 5, 211-66.

Also of interest (not assigned):Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Henry Holt, 1977).Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1986).Nagl, chapter 7, first part.Jacqueline L. Hazelton, “The Client Gets a Vote: Good Governance, Counterinsurgency

Warfare, and the U.S. Military Advisory Mission in South Vietnam, 1954-1965,” 2016, unpub.

Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). We were winning.

11. Sun. October 2. 10:00 A.M.-4:00 P.M., IR Commons Room: Counterinsurgency Simulation #1

*Kaufmann, “Search & Destroy Simplified for Classroom Use,” September 28, 2016.

Tues. October 4: No Class (Rosh Hashanah)9

12. Thurs. October 6: The Problem of Reform [47+]

What reforms did the U.S. want the Diem regime to make? Were the reforms essential to achieving U.S. ultimate goals?

Could the Diem regime (and later South Vietnamese regimes) have reformed if they wanted to?

Why couldn’t the U.S. get Diem (or later regimes) to reform? Is the same problem present in Iraq or Afghanistan? How serious is it? What can/should interveners do about this issue?

*Douglas MacDonald, Adventures in Chaos (Harvard University Press, 1992), chapters 3

(assigned earlier), 9, part of 10; 44-73, 213-48, 259-67, 278-81.

Also of interest (not assigned):Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Choice for Afghan Spy Chief Worries West,” New York Times,

September 12, 2012.

13. T ues. October 11: Discipline and Atrocities, I [75]

Why did U.S. forces commit so many atrocities in Vietnam? Are large-scale atrocities inherent in counterinsurgency, or were they due to features

of this case, or to U.S. institutional arrangements or strategy, or to something else? What would Luttwak, Nagl, Race, or McDonald say?

How destructive are atrocities of the ends of counterinsurgency? What can/should interveners do about this? Can they achieve standards that Taber,

Nagl, or Kaufmann say are required? Were the VC better? Why or why not?

Nick Turse, Kill Everything That Moves: The Real War in Vietnam (New York: Metropolitan, 2013), 1-75.

Also of interest (not assigned):Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri (New

York: Henry Holt, 2001), 119-46 and photographs/photocopies. Note the orders to fire on refugees shown on the 6th, 7th, and 10th pages of photos.

Mark Danner, “The Truth of El Mozote,” New Yorker, December 6, 1993. U.S.-trained Salvadoran troops.

Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final

Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).

14. Thurs. October 13 : Atrocities, II, plus film discussion [64]

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Why did the U.S. military and U.S. society spend so little effort on investigating atrocities in Vietnam?

How much or little has changed—about atrocities or our responses to them—in Iraq and Afghanistan? Or in Israeli behavior in Lebanon?

Should the “they are just as bad” or “they are worse” argument affect our judgments? Why or why not?

What should we do?

Ari Folman and David Polonsky, Waltz with Bashir: A Lebanon War Story (New York: Henry Holt, 2009).

Nick Turse, Kill Everything That Moves: The Real War in Vietnam (New York: Metropolitan, 2013), 222-62.

*Dexter Filkins, “The Fall of the Warrior King,” New York Times, September 24, 2005.*David Axe, “The U.S. Gunship that Slaughtered Doctors and Patients in Kunduz,” Daily

Beast, October 5, 2015. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/05/how-a-u-s-gunship-slaughtered-doctors.html. If you need to clear your stomach contents, search “AC 130 wedding party Afghanistan;” no need to stop with the first.

Also of interest (not assigned):Human Rights Watch, A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq,

October 3, 2005.Colin Kahl, “How We Fight,” Foreign Affairs 85:6 (November/December 2006), 83-102.

U.S. compliance with international legal standards is good and improving.Eric Schmitt, “Three in 82nd Airborne Say Beating Iraqi Prisoners Was Routine,” New

York Times, September 24, 2005.Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S.

Abuse of Detainees, April 24, 2005. Also report on 82nd Airborne Division, September 24, 2005.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili and 11 other generals and admirals, “Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee,” January 4, 2005.

Ghali Hassan, “The Resort to Indiscriminate Killings,” Aljazeera.com, August 15, 2007. Arab media is full of such stories—with gory photos.

Seymour M. Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” New Yorker, May 10, 2004. William Langewiesche, “Rules of Engagement,” Vanity Fair.com, November 2006.

Haditha.“Apache Gunship Video” (July 12, 2007; released by wikileaks.org April 5, 2010).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo22QlP6NgQ. Note that there are three separate engagements whose legal or ethical statuses you might judge differently. 38 mins.

Analyses of the gunship video, including Anthony Martinez, A Look Inside blog entry on Apache video, April 5, 2010, http://blog.ajmartinez.com/2010/04/05/wikileaks-collateral-murder/; Chaim Kaufmann, “Evaluation of ‘Apache Video’,” April 12, 2010 (rev. October 12, 2012); Comment thread on Martinez blog, April 7, 2010 (my pick as the most interesting of > 200); Timothy Hsia, “Reaction on Military Blogs to the Wikileaks Video,” New York Times blog, April 7, 2010; Benedict Carey, “Psychologists Explain Iraq Airstrike Video,” New York Times blog, April 8, 2010.

Battle for Haditha (dir. Nick Broomfield, 2007). A ‘mock documentary’ said to capture well the events as well as the psychological environment in which they took place.

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Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. Military Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October 5, 2010.

Charlie Savage, “Case of Accused Soldiers May Be Worst of 2 Wars,” New York Times, October 4, 2010.

Taimoor Shah and Alissa J. Rubin, “Relatives Tell of Civilians Killed by U.S. Soldiers,” New York Times, October 5, 2010.

V ietnam Film Discussion—not included 2016

Is the use of the plot of Heart of Darkness a comment on Vietnam specifically or on counterinsurgency generally? In what way?

What other elements of the film speak to Vietnam specifically or to counterinsurgency generally?

Are important features of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam conspicuously absent or misrepresented?

Francis Ford Coppola, dir., Apocalypse Now Redux (Lions Gate, 2001), 153 mins. Not the original release (1979) which omits the sequence at the French-owned plantation.

Also of interest (not assigned):Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (London: Blackwood’s Magazine [serial], 1899).Michael Cimino, dir., The Deer Hunter (MCA, 1978), 182 mins.Brian de Palma, dir., Casualties of War (Sony, 1979), 119 mins.John Wayne and Ray Kellogg, dirs., The Green Berets (1968), 142 mins., esp. first main

section on defense of a firebase and a village; second half is on exposing Communist traitors.

Stanley Kubrick, dir., Full Metal Jacket (1987), 117 mins., esp. second main section, at a base in Vietnam, and third, part of the Battle of Hue in 1968. First section is on how basic training dehumanizes recruits and why this is necessary.

15. Thurs. October 20 : How Did Iraq and Syria Get So Bad?

Why did communal relations in Iraq begin deteriorating again after 2008? Is Panetta right that obtaining a SOFA in 2011 was feasible and might have helped? Can we tell to what extent ISIS’s rise has been due to events in Iraq vs. in Syria? Is ISIS different from earlier jihadist movements in any important way?

*“Iraq Profile—Timeline,” BBC News, June 7, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14546763

*“Syria Profile—Timeline,” BBC News, September 20, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995

*Islamic State and the Crisis in Syria in Maps, BBC News, October 10, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034

*Tim Arango, “Dozens Killed in Battles across Iraq as Sunnis Escalate Protests against Government,” New York Times, April 23, 2013.

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*Ahmed Rashid, “Iraqi Shi'ite Militias Use Hit Lists to Pick Off Foes – Police,” Reuters, July 31, 2014.

*Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” Atlantic, March 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/

*Ian Fisher, “In Rise of ISIS, No Single Missed Key but Many Strands of Blame, New York Times, November 18, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/middleeast/in-rise-of-isis-no-single-missed-key-but-many-strands-of-blame.html

*Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “How Mosul Fell: A General’s Story,” Reuters special report, October 14, 2014.

*Leon Panetta, “How the White House Misplayed Iraqi Troop Talks,” Time Online oped, October 1, 2014. 

*Michael Brenner, “Who 'Lost' Iraq? The Panetta Fantasy,” Huffington Post oped, October 6, 2014.

*“Who Backs Whom in the Syrian Conflict,” Guardian graphic, October 9, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/oct/09/who-backs-whom-in-the-syrian-conflict

*”A Strategy of Spectacle: His Willingness to Act Abroad Gives Putin a Big Boost at Home,” Economist, March 19, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21694997-his-willingness-and-ability-act-abroad-gives-vladimir-putin-big-boost-home-strategy

*Ali Alfoneh and Michael Eisenstadt, “Iranian Casualties in Syria and the Strategic Logic of Intervention,” Washington Institute.org, March 11, 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-casualties-in-syria-and-the-strategic-logic-of-intervention

Also of interest (not assigned):Randall Parker, several blog posts on ethnic cleansing in Iraq, 2004-2008.

http://www.parapundit.com/archives/cat_iraq_ethnic_cleansing.htmlMaps of changing ethnic composition of Baghdad neighborhoods, 2003-2009. 3rd

through 7th entries under “Ethnographic and Cultural/Ethnicity” at http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml.

Austin Long, “the Anbar Awakening, Survival 50:2 (April-May 2008), 67-94.Iraq Elections Report Graphic, 2010 elections, New York Times, January 2010. 2014

provincial elections changed little; no new national elections.“Six Iraqis Killed during Arrest of Sunni Protest Leader,” Guardian.com, December 12,

2013.Anne Barnard, “Disillusionment Grows among Syrian Opposition as Fighting Drags On,”

New York Times, November 29, 2013.David E. Sanger, Thom Shanker, and Eric Schmitt, “West Faces Challenge in Moving

Syrian Chemical Arms through Battlefields,” New York Times, November 18, 2013.

October 21: Third assignment (Literature Review) due to TRAC Fellow 4:00 P.M.

16. Tues. October 25 : Intervention against ISIS?

What are U.S. and human interests in the outcomes of the wars in Syria and Iraq? Who should we be seeking to aid? Against whom? With what partners?

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What can be accomplished?

*Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria,” Insight Turkey 15:2 (Spring 2013), 57-68.

*Caitlin Talmadge and Austin Long, “Why the U.S. Still Can’t Train the Iraqi Army,” Washington Post blog, September 22, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/22/why-the-u-s-still-cant-train-the-iraqi-military/

*Tom Kutsch, “Gulf States Increase Arms to Syrian Rebels in Counter to Russia Airstrikes,” Ajjazeera.com, October 8. 2015. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/8/gulf-states-increase-arms-to-syrian-rebels-over-russian-intervention.html.

*Marc Pierini, “In Search of an EU Role in the Syrian War,” carnegieeurope.eu, August 18, 2016, bullet points; more as interested. http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/08/18/in-search-of-eu-role-in-syrian-war/j3q3

*Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” New York Times, October 10, 2015.

*Arman Grigoryan, “Why the U.S. is Impotent before Russian Aggression in Syria,” U.S. News & World Report oped, October 7, 2015. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/10/07/why-the-us-is-impotent-before-russias-aggression-in-syria

*Associated Press, “Turkey Slams Clinton for Hinting Support to Syrian Kurds,” New York Times, October 11, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/10/11/world/europe/ap-eu-turkey-us-campaign.html

*Mark Landler and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Presses for Truce in Syria, With Its Larger Policy on Pause,” New York Times, September 5, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/05/world/middleeast/obama-syria-foreign-policy.html

*Ramzy Mardini, “Don’t Defeat ISIS, Yet,” New York Times oped, September 28, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/opinion/dont-defeat-isis-yet.html

*Michael Gordon and Tim Arango, “Kurdish Troops Advance on ISIS-Held Villages East of Mosul,” New York Times, October 17, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-mosul-battle.html

Also of interest (not assigned):Ben Hubbard, “Syrian Forces Press Rebels with Gains,” New York Times, November 29,

2013. Anne Barnard, “Disillusionment Grows among Syrian Opposition as Fighting Drags On,”

New York Times, November 29, 2013.David E. Sanger, Thom Shanker, and Eric Schmitt, “West Faces Challenge in Moving

Syrian Chemical Arms through Battlefields,” New York Times, November 18, 2013.Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, “R2P after Syria: To Save the Doctrine, Forget Regime

Change,” Foreign Affairs.com, March 26, 2013.Several authors, “Room for Debate: A Missing Ally Against ISIS,” New York Times,

updated October 15, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/10/14/a-missing-ally-against-isis?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A13%22%7D

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Marc Lynch, “The Tourniquet: A Strategy for Saving Syria and Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, October 2014.

Aliza Marcus and Andrew Apolostolou, “To Save Iraq, Arm the Kurds,” New York Times oped, October 12, 2015.

Frederic Wehrey,”Gulf Calculations in the Syrian Conflict,” carengieendowment.org, June 9, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/gulf-calculations-in-syrian-conflict-pub-55865

Tim Arango, “With Operation in Syria, Erdogan Shows His New Power over Turkey’s Military,” New York Times, August 26, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/europe/turkey-tanks-syria.html

II: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

17. Thurs. October 27: Ethics and Law of Humanitarian Intervention [67]

Is humanitarian intervention ever mandatory? Or mandatory but impractical? Or optional?

When do (or should) norms of state sovereignty block intervention? Should we recognize a “responsibility to protect” that can require action despite

sovereignty norms? When does it apply? Should interveners worry about re-creating colonialism, or the appearance of it? Why do we see so many pious words and so few and puny deeds?

*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 4th ed., 2006),

parts of chs. 4 and 6, 53-66, 101-108.*Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs

81:6 (November December 2002), 99ff.*Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” Ethics and International

Affairs, 19:2 (Summer 2005), 55-72.*Rajan Menon, “Pious Words, Puny Deeds: The International Community and Mass

Atrocities,” Ethics and International Affairs (Fall 2009), 235-45.Optional 2013: Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, new edition (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 3-15.

Also of interest (not assigned):United Nations Charter, Chapters VI and VII. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) and

Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1997), both in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179-88, 481-98.

The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5?OpenDocument

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Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) in Malcolm Evans, ed., Blackstone’s International Law Documents, 3rd ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 1991), 73-85.

Anne Ryniker, “The ICRC’s Position on ‘Humanitarian Intervention’,” International Review of the Red Cross 83:842 (June 2001), 527-532.

Bartram Brown, “Statute of the ICC: Past, Present and Future,” in Sarah Sewall and Carl Kaysen, eds., The United States and the International Criminal Court (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 61-84.

Stanley Hoffmann, “The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention,” Survival 37:4 (Winter 1995-1996), 29-51.

Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics & International Affairs 6 (1992), 95-117.

October 31: Third assignment (Literature Review) due to Turnitin and to instructor Noon.

18. Tues. November 1: Practices of Humanitarian Intervention [62]

When should ethical imperatives be sufficient to motivate humanitarian interventions? Should intervention decisions always adhere to international law and proper IGO

authorization, or are there circumstances where emerging norms such as R2P or other factors should trump these?

What do we do about the fact that it is often difficult to generate domestic or international support for interventions unless national security interests, narrowly defined, are also at stake?

Is reputation as a responsible member of the society of nations a national security interest? If yes, why doesn’t this issue often get traction in intervention debates?

What have we learned about better and worse practices for humanitarian intervention?

*Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 75:1 (January/February 1996), 16-32.

*Linda Polman, The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid? (Metropolitan Books, 2010), 114-22. Optional (2nd essay if desired): 13-47, 123-38, 172-79.

*Chaim Kaufmann, “See No Evil: Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide,” Foreign Affairs 81:4 (July/August 2002), 142-49. Review essay on Power and Kuperman books.

*Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73:6 (November/December 1994), 20-33.

*Peter Gourevitch, “Alms Dealers,” New Yorker, October 10, 2011, 103, 105-106, 108.*Ruben Bolling, “‘The Wizard of Oz:’ The Aftermath,” Funny Times, November 2013, 24.

Also of interest (not assigned):Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs 78:4 (July/August 1999), 36-44.Warren Strobel, “The CNN Effect,” American Journalism Review, May 1996, 32-34. William Demars, “Waiting for Early Warning: Humanitarian Action after the Cold War” and

responses by Alex De Waal and Larry Minear, Journal of Refugee Studies, 8:4 (1995), 390-417.

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David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2003).

Linda Polman, The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid? (Metropolitan Books, 2010).

Sarah Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).Kelly Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement. Coercion, and Foreign

Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).Barry R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” International Security 21:1

(Summer 1996), 72-111. Daniel Byman and Taylor Seybolt, “Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars,”

Security Studies 13:1 (Autumn 2003), 33-78.James Fearon and David Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,”

International Security 28:4 (Spring 2004), 5-43.Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization

51:1 (Summer 1997), 335-364.Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York:

Basic Books, 2002).Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda,

(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001). Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention,

and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995). Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Thurs. November 3—No class. Paper meetings this week and next

19. Tues. November 8: Film discussion

An XC reaction essay on As If I am Not There is invited.

Larysa Kondracki, dir., The Whistleblower (2010), 112 mins.

Also of interest (not assigned):Juanita Wilson, dir. As If I am Not There (2010), 105 mins. Danis Tanovic, dir., No Man's Land (MGM, 2001), 98 mins.Pjer Zalica, dir., Days and Hours (2004), 94 mins.Michael Winterbottom, dir., Welcome to Sarajevo (Walt Disney, 1997), 103 mins.Sabina Vajarca, dir. Back to Bosnia (Alternate Plan Productions, 2005), 75 mins.

Documentary.Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: New American

Library, 2001).

Thurs. November 10: No class

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20. Tues. November 15: Darfur, I: Origins [61]

Who are the important actors and their conceptions of their identities and interests? How have broader Sudanese and international politics affected Darfur? What, exactly, is the conflict about? Do the causes and course of this case resemble any other genocides, e.g., the

Armenians, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, or others familiar to you?

Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), vii-xii, 25-80, map.

*David Schoeman, “Trends in Land and Ocean Temperatures, 1965-2014, oC” (University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland), Economist. November 28, 2015, supplement, 4. See if you can find Darfur.

21. Thurs. November 17: Darfur, II: Disaster [78]

Why did matters get so much worse in 2003? Why was foreign intervention so slow in coming? Why has the intervention had so little effect? Could any of this have been handled better? Who would have had to act differently,

what should they have done, and how could they have been persuaded to do it?

Prunier, 81-158.

November 20: Progress report on fourth assignment (Final Paper) due to TRAC Fellow 4:00 P.M.

22. Tues. November 22: Darfur film discussion [40]

Do you trust the content entirely? How would you think about how to evaluate claims in a documentary that has an obvious political agenda?

What do films offer that texts and class discussion have not?

Prunier, 159-98.Ricki Stern, dir. The Devil Came on Horseback (Break Thru Films, 2007); 85 mins.

Documentary.

Also of interest (not assigned):Juanita Wilson, dir. As If I am Not There (2010), 105 mins. Danis Tanovic, dir., No Man's Land (MGM, 2001), 98 mins.Pjer Zalica, dir., Days and Hours (2004), 94 mins.Michael Winterbottom, dir., Welcome to Sarajevo (Walt Disney, 1997), 103 mins.Sabina Vajarca, dir. Back to Bosnia (Alternate Plan Productions, 2005), 75 mins.

Documentary.

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Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: New American Library, 2001).

23. Tues. November 29: Darfur, III: Should Broader Intervention Have Been Considered? [c. 53]

What should be our criteria for deciding when humanitarian intervention is necessary? Although the crisis in Darfur is not over, the worst was in 2003-2006. Is it too late? What about the border war and refugee crisis in South Sudan? When a target state opposes intervention, how much weight should be given to

sovereignty? If we do consider overriding state sovereignty, can we set a boundary around situations where this should be permissible?

Should U.N. Security Council authorization be a sine qua non for a new intervention in Sudan—i.e., should great power politics (the views of Russia and China) be decisive? Or would some lesser degree of international sanction or a “coalition of the willing” be sufficient?

What goals and what instruments would be appropriate?

Note that many terms and acronyms used in all these documents can be found in Prunier pp. xii-xxi.

*Department of Peace Keeping Operations, United Nations, Sudan political map, April 2007.

*Michael S. Miller, Ethnolinguistic map of Darfur, in Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleaning by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,” May 6, 2004, page after table of contents. Remainder of interest but not assigned.

*Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Sudan Atrocities Summary, August 2004.

*Humanitarian Information Unit, U.S. Department of State, “Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed Villages” by year 2003-2009, April 5, 2010.

*Department of Field Support, United Nations, UNAMID deployment map, March 2010.*Sudan mined roads map, source unknown, August 2010.*Medecins sans Frontieres, “MSF Activities in Darfur and Northern Sudan,” January 21,

2010.*“NCP Describes the AU as a 'Frail' Organization after Bashir's Exclusion from Summit,”

AllAfrica.com, November 29, 2010. *Sudan oil map, Africa Confidential.com, September 11, 2009.*“Old Wounds and Ethnic Rivalries Stoke Sudan War Fever,” AlArabiya.net, April 23,

2012. History.*Andrew M. Mwenda, "Sudan Conflict a Series of Internal Divisions Complicated by Oil

Riches," BBC Monitoring Africa, April 24, 2012. Economics.*David Adams, “Sudanese Refugees' Fate in Hands of the West,” Irish Times oped,

August 23, 2012.

Also of interest (not assigned):Human Rights Watch, “Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design,” September 19, 2007.

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/19/darfur-2007-chaos-design, esp. “Lessons Learned,” 61ff.

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Human Rights Watch, “The Way Forward: Ending Human Rights Abuses and Repression across Sudan,” October 6, 2009. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/10/06/way-forward.

Human Rights Watch, “End Continuing Repress of Darfur Human Rights Activists,” November 2, 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/02/sudan-end-continuing-repression-darfur-activists.

Country of Origin Information Centre, LandInfo, “Female Genital Mutilation in Sudan and Somalia,” December 10, 2008. http://www.landinfo.no/asset/764/1/764_1.pdf. Estimated rates 85%+ in Northern Sudan except Darfur, c. 65% in Darfur which may indicate lower support among “Africans.” No data for Southern Sudan.

International Committee of the Red Cross, “Mission Statement,” October 29, 2010.International Committee of the Red Cross, “ICRC in Sudan: Facts and Figures,” March 12,

2010. http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/africa/sudan/index.jsp. First two links under “highlights” provide more recent updates.

Medecins sans Frontieres, “Mission Statement,” November 6, 2009.“Why Does Sudan Fool the United Nations Security Council With Lies All the Time?” The

Citizen (Dar es Salaam) oped, January 2, 2012.Rona Peligal, “Sudan: Halt Wave of Attacks on Civilians in Darfur,” Human Rights Watch,

November 11, 2010. Bridget Johnson, “Sudan Caucus Members Ask Obama to Send Clinton, Powell to Help

Keep Peace,” thehill.com, December 5. 2010. Jeffrey Gittleman, “Born in Unity, South Sudan is Torn Again,” New York Times, January

13, 2012. Navi Pillay, statement reported as “Pillay Welcomes South Sudan Commitment to Human

Rights But Says Much Still to Be Done in World's Newest State,” African Press Organization, May 11, 2012. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Al-Tijani Sisi, statement reported as “Darfur Official Says both Sudan, South Sudan Have to Withdraw from Region,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 11, 2012. Leader of Darfur Liberation and Justice Movement,

Luka Biong Deng, “Abyei - A Test of Good Relations between the Two Sudans,” The Citizen (Dar es Salaam) oped, August 20, 2012. Co-Chair of Abyei Joint Oversight Committee Representing South Sudan.

Readings below this point are tentative.

24. Thurs. December 1: Humanitarian Intervention Simulation, I Do not be absent for any of these.

*Chaim Kaufmann, “Data and Roles for IR 335 Darfur Simulation.”

December 2: Fourth assignment (Complete Paper) due to TRAC Fellow, 4:00 P.M.

25. Tues. December 6: Humanitarian Intervention Simulation, II

*Chaim Kaufmann, “Data and Roles for IR 335 Darfur Simulation, Updated”.

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26. Thurs. December 8: Humanitarian Intervention Simulation, III

*Chaim Kaufmann, “Data and Roles for IR 335 Darfur Simulation, Updated.”

December 21: Fourth assignment (Complete Paper) due to Turnitin and to instructor (mailbox, MG 207) 4:00 P.M.

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