Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of Iran's President Hassan Rouhani

7/28/2019 Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of Iran's President Hassan Rouhani

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The Domestic and

Foreign Policy

Challenges of the New

Iranian President,

Hassan Rouhani

The views of 25 experts from the

Middle East, Europe,

and the United States

V i ewp o i n t s

No . 30

June 2013

M i dd l e Ea st

P r og r am

SPECIAL EDITION


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Table of Contents

Haleh Esfandiari 2

Michael Adler 3

Roksana Bahramitash 3

Daniel Brumberg 4

Malcolm Byrne 5

Houchang Chehabi 6

Shahram Chubin 6

Kaveh Ehsani 7

Farideh Farhi 8

Jubin Goodarzi_ 8

Fatemeh Haghighatjoo 9

Bernard Hourcade 10

Meir Javedanfar 11

Bijan Khajehpour 12

John Limbert 12

Valentine M. Moghadam 13

Afshin Molavi 14

Rouzbeh Parsi 15

Trita Parsi 16

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani 16

Barbara Slavin 17

Nayereh Tohidi 18

Roberto Toscano 19

Ali Vaez 20

Robin Wright 20


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Haleh Esfandiari, d irec to r, Midd le Ea st Prog ram , Wo od row Wilson Internationa lC en ter for Sc ho la rs

On the occasion of the Iranian presidential elec tions and the victory of Hassan Rouhanito be the seventh president of Iran, the Wilson C enters Middle East Program invited anumber of Iran experts in the United States and abroad to share their views regardingthe challenges President Rouhani will face.

Hassan Rouhani is the fourth cleric to hold the presidency. He is an insider, part of theruling establishment of the Islamic Republic. One should not expect a turn-around whenit comes to fundamental political dec isions.

Rouhanis election victory came as a surprise. Among the six candidates allowed tocompete for the presidency, he was the only centrist. The other candidatesrepresented different shades of conservatism. Pre-elec tion polls antic ipated a run-offbetween Rouhani and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, not an outrightRouhani win. But when former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatamiendorsed Rouhani, reformists and moderates initially inclined to sit out the elec tionturned out for Rouhani in large numbers, sealing his success in the first round with 50.7percent of the votes.

The president-elect faces major challenges at home and abroad. He inherits from theoutgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a dysfunctional government based on

cronyism and corruption and an economy in deep doldrums due to sanctions fromabroad and mismanagement at home. Inflation is rising rapidly; unemployment is high,especially among the younger generation; domestic industries are shutting down dueto the difficulty of obtaining raw material, spare parts, or credit; and banks havedifficulty opening letters of credit.

Rouhani also needs to ease the interference in the lives of Iranians by the morals policeand the political watchdogs without alienating the powerful Revolutionary Guards andsecurity agencies. He needs to persuade the Leader and the hardliners toaccommodate the desire of Iranians for more freedom, to release political prisonersand the leaders of the Green Movement, to adopt a new approach to Irans nuclear

negotiations with the West, and to moderate Irans foreign policy.

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Michael Adler, p ub lic p ol ic y sc hola r, Wilson C en ter

Iranian president-elect Hassan Rouhani inherits an ailing economy at home and a hostof problems on the international front. And the domestic and foreign issues are directlyrelated.

The Iranian economy is reeling from sanctions that are crippling its ability to trade. Thesanctions, which are against Irans nuclear work, include collective interdictions fromthe United Nations and even tougher measures from individual countries such as theUnited States. The sanctions limit travel by senior Iranian officials, cut into oil sales thatare Irans main source of revenue, and impede the ability of the central bank tofinance Iranian business abroad. This comes at a time when Iran has undertaken areform of its domestic subsidies, reduc ing Iranians buying power.

All eyes are on whether Rouhani will present a more conc iliatory approach ininternational talks on Irans nuclear program, which Washington fears is directed tomaking nuclear weapons. The talks have broken down due to the irreconc ilablepositions of the two sides. Iran wants sanctions lifted as a first step and its right to makenuclear fuel acknowledged without reserve. The United States and its five negotiatingallies want Iran first to stop medium-level enrichment, which makes fuel closer to whatIran would need to have bomb material, and then to suspend all enrichment until thereare guarantees Tehran will not seek atomic arms.

During the campaign, Rouhani and others blamed outgoing President MahmoudAhmadinejad for a confrontational attitude that torpedoed the nuclear talks. The bigquestion is whether Rouhani will have the green light from Irans Supreme Leader andultimate decision maker, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to stress engagement over hardlinetac tics so that Iran can end its isolation and get the foreign trade and investment itneeds to grow its economy.

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Roksana Bahramitash, form er fel low , Wilson C en te r, an dd irec tor of resea rc h,

C a na d a Resea rc h C ha ir in Isla m , Plura lism , a nd G lob a liza t ion , University o fMon t rea l

The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, J ohn Baird, initially described Irans recentelection as meaningless. It took him a few days to understand that he had, in fact,insulted the Iranians and had it all wrong. Shortly thereafter, Baird apologized. Yet, whilethis incident is indicative of his lack of understanding, it is also true that Irans politica lscene is far from simple. Events in Iran continue to take the world by surprise. This began


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with the 1979 revolution and the ousting of the shah, then Mohammad Khatamislandslide victory in 1997 (which felt like another revolution), and was followed by themajor upheaval of 2009, only four years ago. And now with the result of the most recentelection and the forthcoming presidency of Hassan Rouhani, who is clearly a moderateand seeks peace rather than confrontation with the West, one might argue that apage has just turned. Hitherto, this is not a clean slate.

Some commentators have argued that this was an attempt to save Velaya t-e- Fa q ih ,i.e., the rule of religious authority of the grand ayatollah. They say that AyatollahKhamenei permitted Rouhanis presidency bec ause only a moderate can guaranteethe survival of the supremacy of religious leadership. Others view Rouhanis win as aresult of the Iranian peoples eagerness for democracy. There are many other views. Forexample, some note that in a country like the United States, where there is no religiousGuardian Council to vet presidential candidates, those who become presidentialcandidates need access to power and resources, monetary and otherwise. So what isthe big deal? Opinions are varied indeed.

However, one point is clear: Iranian women and young people took to the ballot box ingreat numbers, to express their support for Rouhani. Nonetheless, the future is mixed,and there are a lot of questions and not easy answers. How can the newly elec tedpresident exercise moderation without alienation? How can he deal with demands thatall political prisoners be released immediately; address an economy crippled bydraconian sanctions; navigate Irans international political negotiations in a regionburning with political unrest from its neighboring countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey,and Iraq, to Syria, and not stumble on international and national landmines? These arethe buzzing questions; consuming a ll commentators with what belies the future of thecountry, which could be c ritical to the region. Meanwhile, perhaps the best answer fornow is to say that Rouhani is faced with a daunting task, and let us all be optimistic, and

wait and see.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Daniel Brumberg, senior p rog ra m o f f ic er , Ce nter for C onf lic t Ma na g em ent,United Sta te s Institute o f Pe a c e

One key challenge fac ing Irans leaders, and president-elect Rouhani in particular, willbe to find a way back to some kind of political consensusone that will allow voices

that were excluded or silenced over the last four years to reenter the formal politicalarenas and to express themselves through the media. I am not talking ambitiously hereabout politica l reform writ large, much less democratization. But if there is going to beany hope for bridging the ideological and soc ial gap between Irans youthparticularly those who occupy the vast but alienated urban middle c lass centersandthe regime, this must begin with some political decompression. One central obstacle tosuch a dynamic has been the growing political and ec onomic power of theRevolutionary Guard Corps and its key allies, not least of whom is the Supreme Leader.


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Post-June 2009, the exclusion of the Islamic left, led first by Khatami and then briefly byMousavi, and the Republican right, led by Hashemi Rafsanjani, not only created adangerous polarization, it destabilized the political system by excluding camps whosebalancing by the leader was key to the system itself. Moreover, it also allowed theformer president and his allies to pursue disastrous economic policies. Although he is tothe right of Khatami, Rouhani might use his credibility with pragmatic principlists to helpnegotiate some kind of accommodation. The latter would hardly pac ify many Iranians.But under the difficult domestic and political conditions Iran is now fac ing, the leaderhimself might not oppose such an effort, and what is more, as Khatami himselfput it toa group of university students, even a modest political opening would c reate space fora Reformist discourse that strives to make politics moral and not to make religion ormorality politica l.

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Malcolm Byrne, fo rm er pub lic p o l ic y sc holar , Wilson C ente r, and d ep uty d irec tor ,

Na tion a l Sec urity Arc hive , Ge orge Wa shing ton University

Hassan Rouhani says he is prepared, in principle, for a dialogue with Washington.Experience has shown what a high-risk move this can be domestically for an Iranian (oran American) leader, and it will be met with some skepticism abroad. His challenges willbe to show hardline Iranians they have nothing to fear and prove to the world he is inearnest. A low-key but valuable first step would be to encourage Iranians andAmericans jointly to come to grips with the historical roots of the current stalemate.Some of the reasons for our mutual enmity are obvious. Yet former U.S. officialsacknowledge that Irans policy process is largely a black box. It stands to reason manyin Tehran feel similarly about the United States. This is the kind of ignorance that canlead and has led to conflicts far better avoided. By tac itly permitting unofficial (i.e. low-risk) exchanges based on reasonable access to the historical record and mutualrespect for opposing viewpoints, Rouhani could help make possible a series of non-polemical, cooperative explorations of Iranian and U.S. policymaking over the past 35years that would benefit decision-makers and publics alike. In fact, meetings of this sorthave taken place (in which this author was involved), including a groundbreaking 2000conference in Tehran on the Mosaddeq period and more recent sessions in the UnitedStates on post-revolutionary crises, with Iranians in attendance. These have producedconc lusions highly germane to todays environment, as well as published volumes (mostrecently Bec om ing Enem ies, on the Iran-Iraq War) that have been praised by

Americans and Iranians. What such inquiries provide, above all, is the opportunity tochallenge distorted perspectives and c larify national narratives so that each side canlearn from their shared experiences andinsha lla hbegin to derive more clear-eyedpolicies as a result.

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http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/06/2252/khatami-warns-of-misplaced-expectations/http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/06/2252/khatami-warns-of-misplaced-expectations/


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Regionally, especially since the Arab Spring, the resistance axis has beenmarginalized. The dominant schism in the region has become sec tarian, and Iran andits allies face a Sunni world that is arrayed aga inst them in Syria as elsewhere. There islittle room for normalization here.

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Kaveh Ehsani,a ssista nt p ro fesso r, Inte rna tiona l Stud ie s De p a rtme nt, DePaulUniversity

Hassan Rouhani begins his presidency from a position of unusual strength, as his elec tionis welcomed by an unprecedented positive domestic and international consensus. Thisis as much an expression of universal relief at seeing the back of his predecessor as it isa sign of general recognition by Irans elec torate, political elites, and international

adversaries, headed by the United States, that resolving Irans internal and internationalproblems through negotiations rather than coercion and confrontation is in everyonesinterest.

First, domestic issues: the elec tions debunk yet again the myth of Iran as a totalitariansystem. This is effec tively a republican (though hardly democratic) system where no onehas hegemony and popular opinion does mediate political distribution of power. Since1979, futile attempts to monopolize power by single factions keep failing, and thepopular vote has had to be ac knowledged as the means to divide power among afragmented elite. As Ayatollah Khamenei and Irans Revolutionary Guard C orpsacknowledged their setback, these elections can be seen in the long run as anothertentative but significant step toward more political pluralism. The challenge facingRouhani is to rebuild trust in vital state institutions where meritoc racy and competencehave been severely undermined. Tac kling corruption, unemployment, inflation, andpolitical intolerance are priorities. International sanctions are blamed as unjust and, solong as Rouhani can manage to restore effec tive governance and maintain aninclusive and c ivil tone, he will succeed in gluing back together a divided society andapproach international challenges from a position of strength.

On the international front, Rouhani is better positioned to use his political capital thanhe is domestically. Despite its rhetoric, the Iranian establishment has always expressedwillingness to enter negotiations, but not from a position of weakness. Attempts atnormalizing relations with the United States have been torpedoed by various opponents

who have feared capitulation or their own marginalization. In acknowledging thepopular vote, conservatives have accepted a major setback, and they seem willing togamble on Rouhanis ability to handle sensitive dossiers such as the nuc lear file andSyria. Their gamble should be acknowledged and welcomed by the United States.

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Farideh Farhi, fo rm er pu b lic p ol ic y sc ho la r, Wilson Ce nte r, andi n d ependen t

resea rc her a nd Aff ilia te G ra d ua te Fa c ulty , University of Ha w a i i a t M a noa

Rouhani himself has articulated three major problems that Iran faces: poormanagement of an economy, which is under a feroc ious sanctions regime; Iranstroubled relationships with significant players in the region and the world; and a highlysecuritized domestic environment, which hampers the governments capacity toaddress the countrys other two c hallenges.

The last challenge goes to the core of Irans domestic politics, where factional rivalriesstruggle to control levers of power and significant differences regarding the direc tion ofthe country have combined to create a political impasse. A security-oriented outlookand approach has brought tight control over the streets, universities, civil soc iety, thepress, etc., but has also polarized the political environment and underwritten gridlock indec ision-making. It is noteworthy, for instance, that in the past two years the parliamentand president have not been able to pass an annual budget on time. This year it was

done a lmost three months after the fiscal year had begun.

Without a doubt, Rouhanis first challenge is to oversee a degree of politicalreconciliation at the national level. Without this, movement in other areas will againface gridloc k. His campaign message of moderation and prudence suggests that heunderstands the importance of moving the country away from a hard securityapproach to Irans problems and challenges and toward the center of Irans politicalspectrumthe only place where a degree of reconciliation can occur at this moment.From there his challenge is to negotiate between the demands of those pushing forfaster changeas the post-election street celebrations are showing, the GreenMovement is far from a spent forceand the resistance of many institutional players.

This is while facing external powers that may continue to increase the pressure on Iranrather than relieve it.

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Jubin Goodarzi, a ssista nt p rofesso r a nd rese a rc he r, Inte rna tiona l Re la tions

Dep a rtm en t, We b ster University, G en ev a

Barring a swift resolution in the coming weeks, the greatest foreign policy challenge in

the Middle East that Iranian president-elect Hassan Rouhani will have to deal with uponassuming office will be the 27-month-old Syrian c risis. For the past 34 years, Tehran haslooked upon Damascus as its closest and most valuable regional ally. Rouhani is fullyaware of Syrias importance since he has held key government posts, including servingas head of the Supreme Nationa l Security Counc il (SNSC) between 1989 and 2005.

There is no doubt that the situation in Syria will be a major concern and preoccupationfor Rouhani.


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The president-elect realizes that if Bashar al-Assads government is overthrown, it wouldsignify the greatest setback for the Iranian regime in the Middle East since at least 1988,when Tehran was forced to end the war against Saddam Husseins Iraq and settle forpeace. Baathist Syria has been key in serving Islamist Irans ideological and foreignpolicy interests in the region. The alliance with Damascus has enabled Tehran to projectits power into the Levant by being an actor in the Arab-Israeli theater and by providingsupport to the Lebanese Hezbollah movement. Besides the obvious offensivecomponent in Tehrans rationale for propping up Damascus since the outset of thecurrent crisis, there is also a defensive logic. From the Iranian perspec tive, the ongoingunrest in Syria is part of an effort by the regional and extra-regional enemies of the axisof resistancecomposed of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollahto dismantle the nexus by firstoverthrowing Assad and then focusing their efforts on the Islamic Republic. Hence, Syriais seen as the frontline of defense against an eventual onslaught on Iran. Secondly, Iranis extremely concerned about the recent spillover of the Syrian conflict into Lebanonand Iraq, especially the latter. Tehran fears that the growing Sunni insurgency againstthe Iraqi state (inspired and supported by the Syrian opposition) may eventually result inthe collapse of Nouri al-Malikis government and the subsequent ascendance to power

of a new Iraqi government that is hostile to Iran. In fact, regime change in both Syriaand Iraq would represent the mother of all nightmares for Iran.

Since 2012, Iran has been pursuing a two-pronged approach vis--vis Syria. It hascontinued to provide military, material, and financial support to the Assad regime;however, in parallel, it has welcomed and tried to be part of any diplomatic initiativesby third parties and the United Nations to find a politica l solution to the crisis. HassanRouhani will in all likelihood soften the political rhetoric emanating from Tehran and putgreater emphasis on pursuing a negotiated settlement to the Syrian c risis, knowing fullwell that the Revolutionary Guards and hardline elements in Tehran aim to maintaintheir steadfast support for Damascus. It is definitely conceivable though that Iran, under

the new leadership, would be amenable to ac cepting a political compromise, whichwould entail the formation of a national unity government in Syria that would not behostile to Tehran, but would no longer be its close a lly either.

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Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, fo rmer m em b er of 6th Ira n ia n Pa rlia m ent ; CEO,No nviolen t Initia t ive for Dem oc ra c y; and Fa c ulty of University of M a ssa c husett s,

Boston

One of the main challenges of Iranian president-elec t Rouhani is making a deal on thenuclear issue with the P5+1, outlining the frame of recognition of Iranian domesticenrichment and the lifting of nuclear sanctions on Iran. Rouhani is well-suited for the job.

Rouhani must deal both with the regimes elite to build a national consensus and withthe West. Irans Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has responsibility for nucleartalks. The president chairs this council and appoints its secretary. Its members include


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the heads of three branches of the government, three military chiefs, three ministers,the presidents deputy, and two representatives of the Supreme Leader.

Rouhani is in a unique position for consensus dec ision-making with all parties, includingpolitica l and military figures. While the supreme leader takes the ultimate decision, thepresident and his SNSC team set tac tics of negotiation and leverage the direc tion ofthe talks.

Irans recent approach to the nuclear talks had been c riticized by six out of the eightcandidates during the presidential debates. This was one of the reasons Saeed J alilihad little support (4 percent of Irans 70 million), showing that Iranians want a change inthe direction of negotiations. This will give Rouhani the upper hand.

Also, Rouhani has good relations with the military and security community and Speakerof Parliament Ali Larijani, so he can gain their support. Larijani led the talks from 2005-2007, so he understands the P5+1.

To succ eed, Rouhani must portray any future gain as a victory for all engaged parties.

Rouhani is an opportunity for the West. The West knows Rouhanis negotiation style. He isa deal broker who can address Irans rights and obligations, while assuring that therewill be no nuclear bomb diversion while saving face for Iran. This was outlined by sevenformer members of parliament in aletter(written on J anuary 7, 2013) to PresidentObama, Lady Ashton, and Ayatollah Khamenei.

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Bernard Hourcade, forme r p ub lic p ol ic y sc hola r, Wilson C en ter, a nd sen iorresea rc h fellow , C en treNa tiona l de la rec herc he Sc ien tif iq ue (CNRS), Pa ris

Hassan Rouhani will be a respectable and an honorable president, able to shake handswith other heads of states, and also a powerful policymaker inside Iran since he wasable to c reate a minimum national consensus and unity, on a very specific but majoroccasion, under his name. However, these capacities are very fragile since theinternational and domestic oppositions have reached a paroxysm. After hope andconsensus, the main danger is disappointment and the comeback of radicaloppositions: 49.3 percent of the population did not vote for him.

The first challenge for the new president is to make his position stronger and sustainable.At the same time, symbolic measures have to be taken immediately for confidencebuilding, for the satisfac tion of the opposing soc io-political ac tors, and for bringingIranian policy into a new track: providing freedom for political prisoners and the media,giving the Revolutionary Guard Corps and veteransespecially Mohammad BaqerQalibaf, the mayor of Tehrantop-level positions, accepting a provisional compromiseon the nuclear issue by implementing the Additional Protocol of the Nuc lear Non-
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/jan/16/letter-appeals-obama-khamenei-former-iran-parliamentarianshttp://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/jan/16/letter-appeals-obama-khamenei-former-iran-parliamentarianshttp://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/jan/16/letter-appeals-obama-khamenei-former-iran-parliamentarianshttp://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/jan/16/letter-appeals-obama-khamenei-former-iran-parliamentarians


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Proliferation Treaty, and traveling abroad to Saudi Arabia first in order to stop the warthat the new twin gendarmes of the Persian Gulf are doing in Syria.

The main challenge for Rouhani is to manage this new stage in the history of the IslamicRepublic of Iran. The dream of radical regime c hange is no longer realistic sincedomestic and foreign constraints have imposed a new national consensus: a c learmajority fac ing a strong opposition, as it is the case in most democratic countries. Thisregime has reached a stage of maturity, where national, Islamic, and internationalvalues are interacting in a more pacific way. Taking into account this new politicalculture is a difficult but possible challenge for the Iranian political factions but also forthe international community.

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Meir Javedanfar, Ira nian p o lit ic s lec turer, Inte rdisc iplina ry Ce nte r, He rzliya,a nd Irania n-Isra eliM idd le Ea st a na lyst

Upon entering office in August, Iran's newly elec ted president, Hassan Rouhani, is goingto face numerous challenges, some more urgent than others.

In my opinion, those challenges, listed below in descending order of importance, areto:

1. Control inflation: this is the most urgent challenge that will need Rouhani'simmediate a ttention. Ahmadinejad's populist expenditure policies such ascheap loans, which have flooded Iran's economy with cash, havepushed upinflation to almost 30 percent.

2. Reform parts of the subsidies reform program: this will include investing parts ofthe government savings from this program in Iran's industrial sector, as originallyplanned. Parts of the program may also need to be postponed, as the cashhandout given to Iranians as an alternative to subsidies have contributed to thehigh level of inflation.

3. Normalize Iran's file at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): recenteconomic sanctions have compounded Iran's economic problems and areunlikely to be removed until Iran answersIAEA questionsregarding allegedweapons-related activities.

4. Improve relations with Saudi Arabia: Iran's support for Bashar al-Assad andHezbollah has strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is onereason why Saudi Arabia and the majority of its Persian Gulf allies have beenproponents of sanctions and isolation against Iran.

5. Reinstate the Management and Planning Organization of Iran (MPO): thisorganization, whose main task included preparation of medium- and long-termeconomic development plans, economic policies, and budgets, was dissolved in2007 by President Ahmadinejad. Its dissolution took away one of the most
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important economic performance and planning supervisory bodies in thecountry. This allowed the implementation of recent damaging populisteconomic policies by Ahmadinejad.

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Bijan Khajehpour, ma na ging p a rtner, At ieh In ternat iona l

Hassan Rouhanis main domestic challenge will be to satisfy the Iranian peoples desirefor tangible change. His campaign, the support from the reformist and moderatesections of the Iranian political elite, and his consequent election have generated apopular excitement that may present the most serious challenge to him. Evidently, hewill initially benefit from the popular momentum, and most politica l power centers willcooperate with him to respect the will of the people. However, to introduce reforms

that can tangibly change the political, economic, and cultural realities on the groundwill take longer than the average c itizen will have the patience for. This is also whyformer president Mohammad Khatami has urged everyone not to communicateunrealistic expec tations and to have patience for political progress.

The second critical challenge will be to reverse the patterns of corruption andmismanagement and put an end to the favoritism that the Ahmadinejad years haveingrained in the Iranian government. To address the unemployment issue, he isdependent on a business environment that will attract the private sector. However, thevery same private sector players have lost their confidence in governmentinstitutions. The Rouhani administration will have to establish a more professional andtransparent relationship with the private sector, improve the competitiveness of theeconomy, and put private capital to productive use in the economy.

Finally, Rouhani needs to find ways to ease tensions in Irans external relations. He has tonavigate through the complex power structure, especially considering the multiplicity ofpower centers influencing foreign policy, and come up with creative solutions to easetensions and build confidence in the countrys international relations, particularly innuclear negotiations. His ultimate goal in foreign policy will be to secure sanctions reliefand attrac t the needed c apital and technology to the Iranian market.

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John Limbert,Disting uishe d Profe sso r, Inte rna tiona l Affa irs, U.S. Na va l Ac a d em y

What is President Hassan Rouhani going to do with a post that has seen its previousoccupants sidelined, ignored, humiliated, ridiculed, deposed, exiled, and assassinated?Of all Irans presidents since 1980, only Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) made something


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of the job, and his unique accomplishment helped earn him disqualification from the2013 voting. Even Ali Khamenei, president from 1981 to 1989, reportedly chafed underhis lack of power compared to Ayatollah Khomeini and Prime Minister Mir HosseinMousavi.

The realitywhich Rouhani should know wellis that power in the Islamic Republic liesoutside the republican institutions of ministers, presidents, and parliaments. Since 1979,power has resided in a network of unelec ted senior clerics and their allies who controlIrans justice, security, economic, and propaganda organs, which George Orwell in1984(still the best work written on the Islamic Republic) ironically called the ministries oflove, peace, plenty, and truth.

So what c a nRouhani do? First, he can make an all-important shift in tone. He canabandon his predecessors outrageous and divisive rhetoric about Israel, the Holocaust,homosexuals, and other matters. Such statements might have been crowd-pleasers,but they did not help the Islamic Republic earn the international respec t it insists is itsdue. In Washington, for example, Ahmadinejads statements made him so toxic that no

official could pay attention to him. It did not matter whether he spoke sense ornonsense. No one listened.

Second, he can make some small but important changes in how the Islamic Republicdeals with the outside world. He can end the sterile rec ital of old grievances, real orimagined, that has too often been the total of Iranian diplomac y. He can end theinsistence on maximalist positions that no negotiating partner can accept. And he canexplore ending Irans 34-year refusal to talk direc tly to the United States about issuesthat matter to both sides. If Washington and Tehran cannot be friends, they should atleast be able to manage their disagreements without resorting to a war that will dogreat harm to both sides.

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Valentine M. Moghadam, forme r fel low , Wilson C en ter,a nddirec tor ,

Inte rna tiona l Affa irs Prog ram , Northe a ste rn Unive rsity

The Islamic Republic of Iran has installed a gender regime that has shifted over time interms of policies and laws but has nonetheless remained remarkably entrenched in itsmasculinist nature. In previous research, I have identified shifts in the gender regime

over three periodsthe highly ideological Khomeini era in the 1980s, the period ofreform under Rafsanjani and Khatami, and the neo-fundamentalist Ahmadinejad era.

There does seem to be a kind of feminization of civil soc iety and, of course, of highereducation. But if we examine such measures as the female share of seats in parliament(2 percent) or of jobs in the salaried labor force (16 percent), the masculine nature ofthe gender regime becomes manifestly clear. The question then is whether the newpresident can change the gender regime in a manner consistent with the globalwomens rights agenda, the demands of Iranian women for equality, and the


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imperatives of democratization and economic growth. The idea that Irans polity is ademocracy is undermined not only by political restrictions but also by the exclusion ofwomen from meaningful political representation and decision-making. The Iranianeconomy probably also suffers from the marginal role of women in the labor force.Historical studies of the U.S. economy and more recent cross-national research showthe positive effects of womens economic participation on economic growth. The newpresident has declared his intention to address womens rights. For this to occur, heneeds to overturn discriminatory laws; introduce affirmative action to integrate Iranshighly-educated female population into dec ision-making positions across variousdomains; fac ilitate maternal employment of working-class women through paidmaternity leaves covered by soc ial insurance, a long with childcare fac ilities; releasewomen political prisoners including womens rights activists; and welcome back thosein exile.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Afshin Molavi, forme r p ub lic p ol ic y sc ho la r, Wilson C en ter, a ndse nior re sea rc hfe llow , New Am eric a Found a t ion

To understand the most important challenge fac ing Iran, president-elec t HassanRouhani should turn to the map of world growth in the International Monetary Funds(IMF) 2013 World Economic Outlook. In that color-coded map, varying shades of bluedenote positive growth, and red indicates negative growth. The emerging world is asea of blue: from Latin America to Asia to Africaexcept Iran, standing alone, bleedingred. The economy will contract for the second year in a row, according to the IMF.Iranians experience the worst inflation in the Middle East and among the worst in theworld. Unemployment is rising; under-employment is chronic.

Part of the reason for Irans slow-brewing ec onomic c risis are the populist, erraticpolicies of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But the main reason is simple: sanctions. Historicsanctions have crushed Irans oil exports. In May, Iran exported less than 800,000 barrelsper day, a two-thirds dec line compared to pre-sanctions. Oil accounts for some 80percent of hard currency earnings and more than ha lf of fiscal revenues. Further, theweb of sanctions have hit every major sector: banks, shipping, heavy industry, evenagricultural products.

Irans reserves position is certainly under stress. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president

and power broker, openly admitted, We are running out of money. Iran has thehighest break-even oil price in the world: it needs oil to trade at $140 per barrel to meetits budget. This will not happen. Deficits will grow.

Rouhani must find a way to ease sanctions for Iran to achieve its enormous potential.The only way to do that is a nuclear deal. Thus, nuclear politics have becomeeconomic policy. An Iran free of sanctions would flourish. It could become an emerging


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market star rather than a sub-merging market laggard. Absent a deal, it will continue tofall behind, bleeding red, in a sea of blue.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Rouzbeh Parsi, rese a rch fellow , Europ e a n Unio n Institute for Sec urity Stud ie s

Hassan Rouhanis list of problems in need of addressing is very long, and on most ofthem he will need substantial and sincere cooperation of a principlist-dominatedparliament and the Supreme Leader. They range from the ec onomy and the domesticpolitical tensions to regional conflicts, the negotiations on the nuclear issue, and thenon-relationship with the United States. They are often also entwined in ways that makethe distinction of domestic/foreign more theoretical than real. He will hopefully havethe cautious goodwill of some, if not all, Western countries and the enthusiasm and

partly unrealistic expectations of his own domestic electorate.

In foreign policy he needs to take a more holistic and sophisticated view than hispredecessor managed to. Two areas where this is both necessary and of similarstrategic importance are in Europe and the Persian Gulf. In both cases, a moresystematic approach that squarely positions Iran as a reliable interlocutor, withprospec ts of being a stakeholder if its interests are sufficiently taken into account, wouldbe of benefit for all parties.

Europe and Iran have a lot of common interests and historic ties, but the presenttrajec tory points to a semi-permanent estrangement. Here a persistent engagementand willingness to open channels on a ll levels can help c reate a more positiveatmosphere with multiplier effects.

Similarly a more systematic approach to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf is needed todecelerate the violence spiral of the region. While both President Rafsanjani andKhatami managed to c reate and maintain a certain dtente with Saudi Arabia, this is atall order today with the developments in Iraq and Syria. It will require more than someconciliatory noises from both sidesmuch better would be a significant step toward agenuine strategic dialogue. The topics are inevitable, and the longer the parties waitthe more people will die.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~


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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Trita Parsi, fo rmer p ub lic p o l ic y sc holar , Wilson Ce nter , a nd found er andp resid ent , Na t iona l Ira n ia n Am eric a n C ounc il

Contrary to the clear efforts by the ruling elite to secure a conservative victory, the onlymoderate c andidate in the race won a stunning victory. This necessitates areassessment of the Washington narrative stating that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and IransRevolutionary Guard Corps are all-powerful.

It also reminds us that the dismissal of the Green Movement as dead was prematureand misguided. The foc us should not have been on the surface indicators of themovement, per se, but on the underlying sentiments of a majority of the Iranian publicthat gave birth to it. The Green Movement was simply a manifestation of thesesentiments the discontent with the direc tion of the country, repression,

mismanagement, etc. While the manifestation may change, die out, and re-emerge,the underlying sentiments have remained intact. Four years ago, they manifestedthemselves in the Green Movement. This year, they manifested themselves in a vote forRouhani.

Though hardliners remain in control of key aspects of Iran's political system, the centristsand reformists have proven that even when the cards are stacked against them, theycan still prevail due to their support among the population.

If Iran moves in a positive direction, the reaction of the West will be critical to determinehow far that change can go. The Iranians missed a major opportunity in 2009 when theyassumed that President Obama would be no different from previous U.S. leadersandthen acted according to that assumption. Tehran's nonresponsiveness renderedObama's job to change the relationship more difficult. Washington should be c arefulnot to commit that mistake.

J ust as the extent of Obama's outreach to Iran depended on Tehran's willingness torec iprocate, any effort by Rouhani to change the relationship with Washington willdepend on America's willingness to tango along.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, p rofe ssor o f e c on om ic s, Virg in ia Tec h

The first task for Mr. Rouhani is to stabilize Irans volatile macro-economy. He needs tobring inflation down before he can address other important issues of investment and

job creation. The immediate culprit for high inflation41 percent last yearis thegovernment budget deficit, which increased the money supply by 37 percent last year.


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Rouhanis administration will have little control over inflation in the short run because, forthe remainder of this Iranian year that ends on March 20, 2014, he will have to work withthe existing budget, which is in deficit. He has promised to continue, in some form, twoof Ahmadinejads programs that are responsible for a large part of the deficit: the cashtransfer program connected with energy subsidy reforms and the low-cost housingprogram.

To stabilize the macro-economy with limited control, the president-elect needs toinfluence economic expectations. He can lower inflationary expectations, which willhelp to stabilize two of the most important markets, for foreign exchange and credit.Appointing a unified and credible economic team and announcing realistic plans forthe near future will go a long way in channeling money away from the markets for goldand foreign currencies and into bank deposits, where they are badly needed to getindustry moving.

He can affect expectations also by signaling that he can put the stalled nuclear

negotiations on a more positive course. This is nec essary in order to stem capital flight,strengthen Irans currenc y, and lower inflation, as well as help reignite privateinvestment that can create jobs. To do this he obviously needs help from the West,which he might get if he can convince them that a weaker economy will not increasethe chance of reaching a solution on the nuclear issue; it will lessen it.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Barbara Slavin, se nior fel lo w , Atlan t ic C ou nc il'sSou th A sia C en ter, a ndWa shing ton c orresp ond ent , Al-Mo nitor .c om

Given the fates of the last three Iranian presidents, it is fair to ask why anyone wouldaspire to this job. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, president from 1989 to1997, wasstripped of much of his power and saw two of his children jailed. Mohammad Khatami,in office from 1997 to 2005, was barred from leaving Iran and his reformist party waslargely sidelined. His successor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was summoned to court twodays after the recent elections and faces an uncertain fate after falling afoul ofSupreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei two years ago. Now it will be the turn ofHassan Rouhani. The beneficiary of a last-minute surge of popular support, the 64-year-

old cleric appears to be the most qualified person for the presidency since Rafsanjani.But the challenges Rouhani will inherit are so daunting that its hard to foresee succ ess.While he appears particularly well-equipped to negotiate a nuclear compromise withthe West given his background as a senior national security official and former nuclearnegotiator, Rouhani will have to wa lk a tightrope between making the concessionsdemanded by the international community and upholding Iranian pride. Already, he isbeing attacked by neoconservatives in the United States and Israel as a tool ofKhamenei, a sham moderate, and an accessory to terrorism. The Obama
http://www.acus.org/program/south-asiahttp://www.acus.org/program/south-asia


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administration has reacted positively, if cautiously, to Rouhanis dec isive win. But giventhe cursed history of U.S.-Iran relations, it is quite possible that yet another opportunityfor reconciliation will be lost. Yet Iran needs relief from economic sanctions desperately,and Rouhani has the requisite relationship with Khamenei to reach a deal if the UnitedStates will meet him halfway. The ball is in both our courts.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Nayereh Tohidi, form er fellow , Wilson Ce nte r, a nd p rofe ssor an d forme r c ha ir a t

the Dep a rtm ent of G end er a nd Wom en Stud ies, Ca lifo rn ia Sta te University ,

Northridge

To show that Irans polity is indeed breaking away from ideological extremism andrepression at home and hostility and belligerence on the international scene, the newly

elected president needs to move beyond the style and mannerisms he has displayedthus far. He needs to bring about some substantial changes and reforms on thedomestic, regional, and international levels. But after the surprise victory of HassanRouhani, a moderately conservative c leric, the ruling ultra-conservatives have beentrying to confiscate his mandate. Therefore, if Rouhani genuinely wants to make someprogressive changes, the big challenge for him is to maintain a delicate balancebetween the demands of the reformers and progressives (to whose votes he owes hisvictory) and the structural constraints of a non-democ ratic regime that has grantedlimited power to the presidenc y. This is in contrast to the absolute and lifelong rule ofthe supreme jurisprudence, the supreme leader, who, through a close alliance with theRevolutionary Guards Corps, can control the process and outcome of elections.Together, they have maintained a chokehold on Irans political and economicinstitutions.

Domestically, some conc rete improvements in the state of human rights, especiallywomens rights and civil liberties, including the rights of religious and ethnic minorities,are on the top of the demands commonly raised not only by the majority of peoplewho voted for Rouhani, but also by the c oalition of reformers. A widely expected tokenof goodwill, as reflected in peoples slogans for many years now, is releasing all politicalprisoners and ending the house arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karubi, and ZahraRahnavard, the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement.Economic improvement is a primary domestic concern, but any success by the new

president in this area has become increasingly tied to his success in improving Iransforeign policy and its regional and international relations. As the third presidentialdebate that focused on foreign policy clearly indicated, peoples vote for Rouhaniindicated a strong No to the governments approach to international relations andforeign policy, including the nuclear issue. Many attribute the poor economic conditionand international sanctions to the hardliner approach, mismanagement, and recklessgovernment spending in Iran.


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One thing that the new president cannot afford to dismiss is the voice and demands ofIrans majority: the youth and women, many of whom want substantial change. In apost-elec tion gesture, president-elect Rouhani invited Pegah Ahangarani, a popular 29-year-old actress to the first post-elec tion gathering on J une 21. Ahangarani wasarrested twice for her work in support of the pro-democ racy movement. WhenAhangarani came close to the podium to present her speech, Rouhani (a 64-year-oldcleric) stood up in respect. In such an unprecedented setting, Ahangarani, a secular

frankgave a daring andtraditional and colorful attire,-young woman dressed in noncorrupt,-lease appoint qualified, nonpthat included a simple demand:speech

competent, and ac countable people to management and administration positions. Ifthe new president can take Pegah Ahangarani seriously and can manage to, at theleast, follow the simple yet profound demand made by her, he can reset Irans politicalcourse in a hopeful direc tion. This would be a direc tion capable of gradual, non-violentchanges toward a secular, democratic, and pluralistic soc iety that would pursuepeaceful international relations with all countries based on mutual respect andcommon interests.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Roberto Toscano, form er p ub lic p ol ic y sc ho la r, Wilson C en ter; p resid en t,Inte rc ultura Fou nd a tion, Ita ly; a nd forme r Ita lia n Am b a ssa d or to Ira n a nd Ind ia

Iranians have voted in a way that proved their decision to make the best out of a verybad situation by exercising their right to vote within the limited, one could say crippled,electoral choice produced by the vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council.

The president in Iran is more like a prime minister, since the supreme leader is the truehead both of the state and of the government. And yet history proves that thepresident is certainly not irrelevant. Otherwise, why should we have welcomed Khatamiand deplored Ahmadinejad?

Limitation does not mean irrelevance.

The focus should now be on policy. The two issues that are of real concern for allIranians are the economy and relations with the external world. They happen to berelated, insofar as sanctions are an important component of the dismal economicsituation of the country.

Iranians aspire for a better life and would like for their country not to be isolated. Eventhe conservatives, evidently, were not so happy with Ahmadinejads provoc ations tothe world, which would have found a high degree of continuity in Saeed J alili, if not anincrease in terms of stubborn ideological radicalism.

Rouhani campaigned on a platform of moderation. He is not a reformist, but, being arealist, knows that some degree of change is necessary in order to avoid the risk ofinternal collapse and devastating confrontations with the outside world.
http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/news1/46231http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/news1/46231http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/news1/46231http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/news1/46231http://www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/news1/46231


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His non-paranoid style turned out to be refreshing, and one might also expect somesoftening of the repression. Finally, the economy might be freed from the plague of alethal combination of populism and incompetence, as well as a lessening of sanctions.

The rock of the regime is still massive and dry, but what is certain is that Iranians, with anact of wisdom and hope, have planted a seed in one of its crac ks.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Ali Vaez, Senio r Ira n Ana lyst, Int e rna tion a l C risis G rou p

It is often said that you campaign in poetry, but govern in prose. This is the bitterreality that Irans new president, Hassan Rouhani, will likely face when he assumes officeon August 3, 2013. Although he is well-positioneddue to his pedigree, pragmatism,

and popularityto grasp the nettle from day one, Rouhani will confront a tall order ofthorny dilemmas. He will have to bring harmony to a system that has been rattled bydisarray for eight years; effect change in a complex power structure that inherentlyfavors continuity; take bold steps without antagonizing competing power centers;narrow divisions in a polity where fratricidal factionalism is endemic; accept that he hasbut one voice amongst many who can veto his; temper expectations while avoidingdisillusionment; bring vital reprieve to an economy that has no option other thanundergoing painful structural reform; alleviate the pressure of smothering sanctions,which are so intricately woven that they lack elasticity; ascertain that Irans standoffwith the West neither comes to a horrible end, nor becomes a horror without an end;build trust where distrust is marrow deep; compromise without being seen as toocompromising; devise a stable regional strategy in a region bristling with instability; and,above all, deliver on his promise of hope and prudence in service of a nation that hashoped against all hope.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Robin Wright, Wilso n C ente r-USIP Disting uishe d Sc ho la r

Hassan Rouhani's election has produced greater expectations for change in both

domestic and foreign policy than any time since 1997, the beginning of the reform era.Many Iranians are looking for Rouhani, the former chief nuclear negotiator, to helpproduce a breakthrough in talks with the world's major powers that will in turn ease thegrowing toll of ec onomic sanctions.

Rouhani faces a tough fall, especially as momentum builds toward a new round of talksin August and the United Nations General Assembly in September. Rouhani's electionmay have produced a flicker of hope in the international community. But the world's six


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major powersor P5+1also know that the supreme leader has the supreme powerover Iran's controversial nuclear program, so they will want to see something tangibleeven if short of a dealcome out of the fifth round of negotiations. Patience is runningthin, and skepticism is growing over Iran's interest in a diplomatic deal.

The new government will also face growing pressure at home over serious economicwoes, from unemployment to inflation and the by-products of international sanctions.

The president's main portfolio is the economy, since the supreme leader effectivelycontrols foreign policy and defense issues. During the c ampaign, the one commonposition among the six presidential candidates was criticism of President MahmoudAhmadinejad's mismanagement of the economy.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the Woodrow Wilson Center.


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Hassan Rouhanis Biography

Hassan Rouhani was born on November 12, 1948 in Sorkhe near Semnan, in north

central Iran.

1960: Started religious studies at Semnan Seminary

1961: Moved to Qom Seminary

1969-1972: Studied at Tehran University and received his bachelors degree in judicial

law

1980: Was elected to parliament (Majlis)

1980-1988: Served as the head of the Defense Committee in parliament

1989-2005: Served as the first sec retary of the Supreme National Security Counc il (SNSC)

1989-1997: Was the national security advisor to President Hashemi Rafsanjani

1991: Was appointed as head of the Political, Defense, and Security Committee of the

Expediency Counc il and has kept the position up to the present

1992-2000: Served as the Deputy Speaker of parliament as well as the head of the

Foreign Policy Committee

1995: Received his M.Phil. from Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland

1999: Received his Ph.D. in constitutional law from Glasgow Caledonian University inScotland

2000-2005: Served as the nationa l security advisor to President Khatami

2000: Was elected to the Assembly of Experts from Semnan Province

2001-2006: Served as the head of the Political and Soc ial committee of the Assembly of

Experts

October 2003-August 2005: Was Irans chief nuclear negotiator

2006: Was elec ted as Tehrans representative to the Assembly of Experts and has served

in that capac ity up to present

March 2013: Was elected as a member of the Assemblys Commission for investigating

ways of protecting and guarding Velayat-e-Faqih


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About the Middle East Program

The M idd le Ea st Prog ram wa s la unc he d in Feb rua ry 1998

in lig ht o f inc rea sed U.S. eng a g em ent in the reg ion a nd

the p ro found c hang es swe ep ing ac ross m any M id d le

Ea ste rn sta tes. In a d d it ion t o sp otl ig ht ing d a y-to-da y

issue s, the Prog ra m c on c en tra tes on lon g -term

ec ono m ic , soc ia l, a nd p ol it ic a l d eve lop m ents, a s w el l a s

re la tions w ith the United Sta te s.

The Midd le Ea st Prog ram d ra ws on d om est ic a nd fore ig n

reg ion a l e xp erts for its m ee ting s, co nferenc es, an d

oc c a siona l pa p ers. Co nferenc es a nd m ee t ing s a ssess

the p ol ic y im p lic a t ions of a ll asp ec ts of d eve lop m ents

w ithin the reg io n a nd ind iv id ua l sta te s; the M id d le Ea st 's

role in the interna tio na l a ren a ; Am eric a n inte rests in the

reg ion ; the th rea t o f terrorism ; arm s p rol iferat ion; a nd

stra teg ic threa ts to a nd from the reg iona l sta te s.

The Prog ra m p a ys sp ec ia l at tent ion to the ro le of

w om en, you th, c ivil soc iety institutio ns, Isla m , an d

d em oc ra t ic a nd a u toc ra t ic tend enc ies. In a dd it ion , the

M idd le Ea st Prog ram ho sts m ee tings o n c ultural issue s,

inc lud ing c onte m p orary a rt an d lite ra ture in the reg ion

Since Ja nua ry 2011, MEP ha s c on ve ne d 170 me eting s on

the M id d le Ea st w ith o ve r 90 sp ea kers from the reg ion ,

Europ e, a nd the United Sta te s. MEP p ub lished 40 p a p ers

in o urViewpointsa ndOccasional Paper se rie s d e a ling

w ith va riou s a sp ec ts of the reg ion.


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Viewpo in tsSeries

Tunisias Islamists Struggle to RuleViewpoints No. 1 (April 2012) by David Ottaway

Fostering the Next GenerationViewpoints No. 2 (April 2012) by Moushira Khattab

Algerias Islamists Crushed in First Arab Spring Elec tionsViewpoints No. 3 (May 2012) by David Ottaway

Syrian Refugees: Lessons from Other Conflicts and Possible PoliciesViewpoints No. 4 (updated August 2012) by Rochelle A. Davis

Moroc cos Islamists: In Power Without PowerViewpoints No. 5 (August 2012) by David Ottaway

The Arab Awakening: Is Democracy a Mirage?Viewpoints No. 6 (August 2012) by Roberto Toscano, Moushira Khattab, Fatima Sbaity Kassem, andDaniel Brumberg

Iran is Reversing its Population PolicyViewpoints No. 7 (August 2012) by Farzaneh Roudi

Voting as a Powerful Tool for WomenViewpoints No. 8 (October 2012) by Hanin Ghaddar

The Uncertain Fate of U.S.-Egyptian Relations

Viewpoints No. 9 (November 2012) by David Ottaway

The Demons Besieging Lebanon: Irans Tighter GripViewpoints No. 10 (November 2012) by Hanin Ghaddar

Irans Nuclear Program: A C hange in the Winds?Viewpoints No. 11 (November 2012) by Shaul Bakhash

Has the Arab Spring Lived Up to Expectations?Viewpoints No. 12 (December 2012) by Various Authors

Reflections on the Adoption of UNGA Resolution Banning Female Genital MutilationViewpoints No. 13 (January 2013) by Moushira Khattab

In 2013, Rise of the Right in Elections Across the MideastViewpoints No. 14 (J anuary 2013) by Robin Wright

Womens Rights Under Egypts Constitutional DisarrayViewpoints No. 15 (January 2013) by Moushira Khattab

Repressions Diminishing Returns: The Future of Politics in EgyptViewpoints No. 16 (J anuary 2013) by Joshua Stac her
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/tunisia%E2%80%99s-islamists-struggle-to-rulehttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/fostering-the-next-generationhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/algeria%E2%80%99s-islamists-crushed-first-arab-spring-electionshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/syrian-refugees-lessons-other-conflicts-and-possible-policieshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/morocco%E2%80%99s-islamists-power-without-powerhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-arab-awakening-democracy-miragehttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/iran-reversing-its-population-policyhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/voting-powerful-tool-for-womenhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-uncertain-fate-us-egyptian-relationshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-demons-besieging-lebanon-iran%E2%80%99s-tighter-griphttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-program-shift-the-windshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/has-the-arab-spring-lived-to-expectationshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/reflections-the-adoption-unga-resolution-banning-female-genital-mutilationhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/2013-rise-the-right-elections-across-the-mideasthttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/women%E2%80%99s-rights-under-egypt%E2%80%99s-constitutional-disarrayhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/repression%E2%80%99s-diminishing-returns-the-future-politics-egypthttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/repression%E2%80%99s-diminishing-returns-the-future-politics-egypthttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/women%E2%80%99s-rights-under-egypt%E2%80%99s-constitutional-disarrayhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/2013-rise-the-right-elections-across-the-mideasthttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/reflections-the-adoption-unga-resolution-banning-female-genital-mutilationhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/has-the-arab-spring-lived-to-expectationshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-program-shift-the-windshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-demons-besieging-lebanon-iran%E2%80%99s-tighter-griphttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-uncertain-fate-us-egyptian-relationshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/voting-powerful-tool-for-womenhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/iran-reversing-its-population-policyhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-arab-awakening-democracy-miragehttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/morocco%E2%80%99s-islamists-power-without-powerhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/syrian-refugees-lessons-other-conflicts-and-possible-policieshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/algeria%E2%80%99s-islamists-crushed-first-arab-spring-electionshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/fostering-the-next-generationhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/tunisia%E2%80%99s-islamists-struggle-to-rule


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Mali: The Time for Dithering is OverViewpoints No. 17 (J anuary 2013) by David Ottaway

Irans Pivotal Presidential Election

Viewpoints No. 18 (January 2013) by Shaul Bakhash

Young Saudis and The Kingdoms FutureViewpoints No. 19 (February 2013) by Caryle Murphy

Sanc tions and Medical Supply Shortages in IranViewpoints No. 20 (February 2013) by Siamak Namazi

The Nuclear Issue: Why is Iran Negotiating?Viewpoints No. 21 (February 2013) by Bijan Khajehpour, Alireza Nader, Michael Adler

The Syrian Refugee C risis is Pushing Lebanon to the BrinkViewpoints No. 22 (February 2013) by Amal Mudallali

The Resistible Rise of Islamist PartiesViewpoints No. 23 (March 2013) by Marina Ottaway

As Islamists stumble in Egypt and Tunisia, the Arab Spring turns winteryViewpoints No. 24 (March 2013) by Adeed Dawisha

Violence Unsettles Tunisias Democratic TransitionViewpoints No. 25 (April 2013) by David Ottaway

Learning Politics in TunisiaViewpoints No. 26 (April 2013) by Marina Ottaway

Morocco: Advanced Decentralization Meets the Sahara Autonomy InitiativeViewpoints No. 27 (May 2013) by Marina O ttaway

Rouhanis Surprising Elec tionViewpoints No. 28 (June 2013) by Shaul Bakhash

Lebanons Existential ThreatsViewpoints No. 29 (J une 2013) by Amal Mudallali

Edited by Kendra Heideman, Laura Rostad, and Afarin DadkhahDesigned by Kendra Heideman

Middle East Program

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/mali-the-time-for-dithering-overhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/iran%E2%80%99s-pivotal-presidential-electionhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/young-saudis-and-the-kingdom%E2%80%99s-political-futurehttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sanctions-and-medical-supply-shortages-iranhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-nuclear-issue-why-iran-negotiatinghttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-syrian-refugee-crisis-pushing-lebanon-to-the-brinkhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-resistible-rise-islamist-partieshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/islamists-stumble-egypt-and-tunisia-the-arab-spring-turns-winteryhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/violence-unsettles-tunisia%E2%80%99s-democratic-transitionhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/learning-politics-tunisiahttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/morocco-%E2%80%9Cadvanced-decentralization%E2%80%9D-meets-the-sahara-autonomy-initiativehttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/rouhanis-surprising-electionhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/lebanons-existential-threatshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/lebanons-existential-threatshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/lebanons-existential-threatshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/rouhanis-surprising-electionhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/morocco-%E2%80%9Cadvanced-decentralization%E2%80%9D-meets-the-sahara-autonomy-initiativehttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/learning-politics-tunisiahttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/violence-unsettles-tunisia%E2%80%99s-democratic-transitionhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/islamists-stumble-egypt-and-tunisia-the-arab-spring-turns-winteryhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-resistible-rise-islamist-partieshttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-syrian-refugee-crisis-pushing-lebanon-to-the-brinkhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-nuclear-issue-why-iran-negotiatinghttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sanctions-and-medical-supply-shortages-iranhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/young-saudis-and-the-kingdom%E2%80%99s-political-futurehttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/iran%E2%80%99s-pivotal-presidential-electionhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/mali-the-time-for-dithering-over

Documents

Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of Iran's President Hassan Rouhani