Early Warning – Delayed Response? · delayed, taking many months (4-6 or more) from first signals, assess- ... new vision (the 2020 strategy), the development of an unusual regional

Early Warning – Delayed Response?Lessons from IFRC Horn of Africa Appeals 2008–2010

www.ifrc.orgSaving lives, changing minds.

Cover photo: IFRC.

www.ifrc.orgSaving lives, changing minds.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society’s work is guided by Strategy 2020 which puts forward three strategic aims:1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disaster and crises.2. Enable healthy and safe living.3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace.

© International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, 2011.

Copies of all or part of this study may be made for noncommercial use, providing the source is acknowledged The IFRC would appreciate receiving details of its use. Requests for commercial reproduction should be directed to the IFRC at [email protected]@ifrc.org.

The opinions and recommendations expressed in this study do not necessarily represent the official policy of the IFRC or of individual National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies. The designations and maps used do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the International Federation or National Societies concerning the legal status of a territory or of its authorities. All photos used in this study are copyright of the IFRC unless otherwise indicated.

P.O. Box 372 CH-1211 Geneva 19 Switzerland Telephone: +41 22 730 4222 Telefax: +41 22 733 0395 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http://www.ifrc.org

Report by:Nisar Majid Food Security Specialist Independent Consultant

ContentsForeword 5

Introduction 7

Key findings 7Early warning … delayed response 7Well organised at point of distribution 8Capacity and institutional learning 8Coordination confusion 8What does the RCRC stand for and do? 9Strategic clarity 9Responding to needs and relevance to branch 9Innovation 10

Emerging issues and recommendations 11Overarching recommendation 11The role of food aid (or timeliness and scale)? 11Recommendation 1 11Large-scale v small-scale appeals? 12Recommendation 2 12Vision, Strategy and Organisational Change 12Recommendation 3 13Structural issues 13Recommendation 4 13

Background to the region 14Conditions in 2008 15

Analysis of appeals 16Summary of Intervention 16Analysis of Appeal 16Summary of Intervention 17Analysis of the Assessment and the Appeal 18Coordination 19Ethiopia Red Cross 19The Moyale Intervention 20Summary of Seed Distribution 21Analysis of Intervention 21Summary of Intervention (East Hararghe) 22Analysis of Appeal 23

Annex 1 List of interviewees 25

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Project report Early Warning – Delayed Response? Lessons from IFRC Horn of Africa Appeals 2008–2010

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Between 2008 and 2010, the IFRC launched four international appeals to respond to drought and food insecurity in the Horn of Africa. The results were decidedly mixed. In some cases, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies did manage to use these Appeals to good effect, and relevant and sustainable support was the result. In other cases, the relief support was slow to mobilise, and was delivered too late to be of relevant assistance. For the most part the Appeals themselves failed to generate significant donor support, and the largest of the Appeals was only 9% funded.

Some of the challenges highlighted in this review are commonly attrib-uted to donor fatigue in the Horn of Africa and the inherent logistical challenges of managing relief operations in the region. While acknowl-edging these issues are pertinent, this report attempts to dig deeper in identifying the causes of success and failure in the IFRC response in the Horn of Africa, and to draw out lessons from the analysis, reasoning and decisions that motivate the IFRC to launch Appeals in the region.

The lessons are important because we will be faced with these same challenges again. The first lesson, which is by no means new but under-lies the consequent recommendations, is that droughts are natural and recurring in the Horn of Africa, and therefore sudden, large scale relief operations are often less relevant than addressing the long term chal-lenge of supporting communities to become more resilient to the cycles of drought. The challenge for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is therefore to focus on the capacity building of Branches and com-munities in risk reduction relative to drought. Secondly, the review acknowledges the advances that the wider humanitarian sector (and some National Societies) have made in the use of early warning sys-tems and analysing food security trends. The humanitarian response in the region has become more sophisticated, and so must the Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, if their interventions are to remain relevant. Which leads to a third lesson, that protecting livelihoods should be a core principle of responding to drought, and food aid is often not the best option to achieve that end. Therefore more attention needs to be given to innovating with cash responses, protecting livestock and addressing health as well as food security threats. A final challenge that remains prominent for all humanitarian actors operating in the Horn of Africa is to advocate for increased investment in community resilience work, even when the rainfall is good, as this can provide opportunities to engage in long term solutions.

Foreword

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Chapter number Foreword

The process of the review itself is worth noting. Although conducted and written by an independent consultant, the review was motivated and supported by a consortium of implementing and donor Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, who met regularly during the review and helped guide its progress. Collectively, we are committed to taking its lessons into our responses in the future.

Alexander MatheouRegional Representative for East Africa

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Introduction

This report is based on a review of four international Appeals of the IFRC in the Horn of Africa, from 2008 to 2010.1 The review took a food security lens to broadly assess the whole ‘Appeal’ process, from assess-ment and analysis, project/programme design, resource mobilisation, coordination, implementation and impact. Over fifty interviews were conducted with RCRC staff, in Geneva, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, as well as by telephone. Branches and beneficiary communities were also visited in Kenya and Ethiopia.

The scope of this review is broad given the number of issues, actors, institutional layers and different contexts within the Movement (dif-ferent branches, NS’s, PNS’s, IFRC and ICRC). As such, and in order to maximise the potential readership and impact of the report it has been kept short and with the purpose of attempting to bring out emerging issues of relevance to the wider Movement. It is structured into 4 sections: Key Findings; Emerging Issues and Recommendations; Background to the Region; Analysis of Appeals.

Key findings

Early warning … delayed responseIn spite of good early warning signals at the Branch level, the RCRC emergency responses to periods of community stress are typically delayed, taking many months (4-6 or more) from first signals, assess-ments, to the actual response. These delays are not all particular to the RCRC (many are systemic, reflecting the humanitarian system in general and the nature of slow onset crises)2. However, this may mean that the crisis itself has passed by the time of the response or, if the crisis has not passed an opportunity to intervene much earlier has been missed. The reasons for these delays vary but include:

1 These were the Ethiopia International Appeal May 2008; the Horn of Africa Appeal December 2008; the Kenya Drought Appeal September 2009; the Ethiopia International Appeal February 2010.

2 For an interesting analysis of these systemic problems as applicable to the region, see HPG Briefing Note, May 2006, ‘Saving lives through livelihoods: critical gaps in the response to the drought in the Greater Horn of Africa’ at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdf;

http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdf


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1 Introduction

n Limited food security analytical capacity to anticipate the scale, severity and seasonality of a crisis

n Limited contingency funds and institutional options for quick responses

n A reliance on slow/delayed assessment and appeal processes (either internal or external to the Movement)

n An over-reliance on food aid as the major response

n Inappropriate administrative procedures

Well organised at point of distributionAt the point of distribution, emergency relief (and recovery) activities are generally effective, well organised and well implemented and usu-ally appreciated by communities on the ground. The Movement’s role at the point of distribution is however subject to the influence of other actors, e.g. Government or WFP or local community dynamics, which can be either positive or negative, depending on the local context, and indicate some limits of NS influence at the local level.

Capacity and institutional learningAmbitions and motivations of NS’s and the IFRC at the senior manage-ment levels to scaling up or ‘doing more, doing better, reaching further’, while laudable, are not fully matched with the required institutional capacity or the availability of resources to the RCRC in the region. In this respect a culture of institutional learning, decentralised decision-making and investment in staff quality and staff retention are impor-tant organisational issues but are problematic within many parts of the RCRC. The consultant was hugely impressed by the commitment, quality and desire to do more at the branch level and recognises the huge and under-utilised potential that exists there. The consultant also notes a tremendous interest and desire from the majority of staff interviewed to discuss and debate technical and organisational issues.

Coordination confusionThe period under review was associated with IFRC restructuring and its new vision (the 2020 strategy), the development of an unusual regional Appeal and the creation of an office for the coordination of the Horn of Africa operation, in Addis Ababa. Time and other pressures to pursue this vision led to a lack of consultation and buy-in within the move-ment that ultimately led to considerable tension and confusion within the IFRC, and in terms of its relations with NS’s and PNS’s. This was widely commented upon and is detrimental to the IFRC’s potential role. While it is recognised that this period of restructuring is largely over and coordination and relations are already much improved, there remain concerns over the appropriate technical, logistical, coordination

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and donor relations capacity at the regional level (i.e. Nairobi), and in support of the Ethiopia Red Cross.

What does the RCRC stand for and do?There is a lack of clarity within the Movement at all levels about the distinctive identity and role of the RCRC. These include:

n Its ‘emergency’ and/or ‘development’ role

n Its understanding of and commitment to food security; how the RCRC movement balances smaller-scale, ongoing work in areas such as Disaster Risk Reduction with capacity and opportunities associ-ated with larger-scale responses

n What its niche and community-based position means in practice? Tensions between the attractions of external funding and internal priorities

n In a highly complex region such as the Horn of Africa where there is a considerable blurring of ‘chronic’ and ‘acute’ issues, where crises are permanent and hunger is seasonal, and where PNS’s and NS’s are implementing relief and development programmes, this confusion is problematic and can serve to undermine a clear strategic direction

Examples of good practiceWhile the review necessarily adopts a critical lens there are several examples of good practice to draw upon from throughout the region.

Strategic clarityAt the strategic level the Somalia Red Crescent (SRCS) and the Tigray branch of the Ethiopia Red Cross (ERCS) stand out as having clear strategic approaches, recognising their own capacity limitations and concentrating on building their own capacity. This kind of direction obliges PNS’s and IFRC support NS or Branch approaches and priorities. Interestingly, neither used food aid as part of their strategies within the review period.

Responding to needs and relevance to branchThe Wolaita, Ethiopia emergency relief and recovery intervention of 2008, provided food and water interventions in a critical and excep-tional emergency situation, as well as crucial sweet potato and haricot bean seeds to promote recovery and a successful animal re-stock-ing programme. The branch has capitalised on this intervention to hugely increase its visibility, credibility and membership as a result.

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1 Introduction

Coordination between the ERCS, Austrian and Finnish PNS’s and the IFRC was relatively good.

InnovationThe Kenya Red Cross (KRCS) was innovative in identifying the potential of El Nino rain predictions to implement a timely and highly effective seed distribution in Ukambani areas that were severely affected by a drought. It is also currently using predictions of poor La Nina rains to survey borehole capacity in advance of a possible drought.

The KRCS and the ICRC have developed a strategic partnership based around ICRC’s tracking system (identifying different interventions for different phases in the crisis cycle). The IFRC in Nairobi is also piloting disaster preparedness activities with Kenya Red Cross with the sup-port of ECHO. These initiatives are part of the KRCS’s evolution from its strong capacity in logistics and emergency relief towards a more diversified institutional capacity.

The Djibouti Red Crescent implemented a food-for-work programme in peri-urban areas in partnership with WFP and with funds from the HoA Appeal. An innovative recovery programme based on cash loans was developed between the Djibouti Red Crescent and the British Red Cross, in coordination with the IFRC, and was based on a significant investment in relationship building.

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Emerging issues and recommendations

Overarching recommendationThe RCRC (NS’s, PNS’s and IFRC) in the Horn of Africa should focus its activities around a Community Risk Management Approach based on integrating its technical support areas. This should be done while strengthening long-term relationships between the various parts of the movement and prioritising branch development where possible.

The role of food aid (or timeliness and scale)?1

While food aid remains an important option, where availability is lim-ited and in times of extreme food insecurity, unless it can be delivered in a timely and short duration fashion, there are also considerable risks identified in its use. It is part of the political and institutional context in the region and is subject to corruption and manipulation. It is a bulky and expensive commodity to source and distribute, which can contribute to significant delays in its distribution and therefore in its impact. There is considerable existing capacity – alternative to the RCRC – within the region to deliver emergency food relief, with organisations who have stronger internal systems and who are better known to external donors. It is often difficult for communities on the ground, as well as agencies, to distinguish the purpose of food aid between addressing acute and chronic malnutrition.

Recommendation 1The RCRC in the region should develop regional and country specific guidance on food security policy and practice (including food aid). This guidance should link to RCRC global food security thinking in Geneva.2 Guidance could include discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of food aid, criteria for choosing appropriate responses, piloting of other options (e.g. cash), integration with other sectors e.g. nutrition, water and health.

1 See Kenyan Sunday Standard, 3rd October 2010, and KRCS’s Press Release in Response, 4th October, 2010, for an example of the complications of food aid. This review takes no position on this particular issue but merely highlights it as an example of the sensitivities and risks of being involved in food aid in the region.

2 A global food security strategy document is being prepared.

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2 Emerging issues and recommendations

Large-scale v small-scale appeals?The large-scale appeals in the region have not been well funded and significant funding has in the end come from regional or country spe-cific donors outside of the Appeal process i.e. ECHO. Reasons include:

n Poor timing of Appeals

n Competition for limited resources

n Lack of prior consultation with PNS’s and external donors

n Differing perceptions of the capacity of NS’s; long periods between assessments and appeals; the appropriateness of the Appeal docu-ment to capture short, medium and long-term issues

n Over-ambitious targets; a lack of evidence (documentation) of the experiences and impact of RCRC interventions

n A perception that such appeals have been driven from the top

n Loss of Movement identity and local relevance as local assessments are scaled up to more generic national appeals

As a result of this experience as well as the nature of the ‘chronic crisis’ in the Horn and the current global financial situation, it would seem safe to assume that such large-scale appeals are not going to be effective for the foreseeable future. However, there is an opportunity to develop better packaged appeals (that may be scaled up over time) which demonstrate a better, locally informed understanding of the problem, that challenge assumptions and inertia around emergency responses in the HoA and are better related to branch level strategic development. This would appear to fit very well with current donor interest in community-based approaches to Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction.

Recommendation 2Develop and expand upon smaller-scale community based approaches to Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction that exist in the region and document experience.

Vision, Strategy and Organisational ChangeThere is a very obvious demand for debate and discussion within the Movement about the principles and practicalities of RCRC strategy and direction, as applicable to the Horn of Africa. This applies at all levels, from Branch to senior management levels within NS’s, as well as within PNS’s, the IFRC and ICRC. Many organisations within the Horn of Africa have gone through processes of internal change in order to adapt to the complex and fluid ‘relief to development … and back’ context.

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Recommendation 3The IFRC in the region should develop a discussion document and training/awareness raising materials to bring out policy and program-matic issues around operating within the chronic and acute context in the Horn of Africa for the RCRC. Concepts and linkages between nutrition, food security, livelihoods, health and sanitation, as well as between relief and development could be brought out. Exploring a stra-tegic partnership with ICRC in the region and the Kenya Red Cross may accelerate this process.

Structural issuesThe ending of the newly created HoA operational coordination office and the arrival of new staff in the regional office signal the start of the new structures in the region and new relationships that are forming. There is a clear demand for a strong coordination and technical sup-port role for the IFRC office in the region. Nairobi is a key hub for both the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, in terms of logistical, technical, coordination and resource mobilisation issues.

Ethiopia is not directly served by the Nairobi regional office yet it is a huge and hugely diverse country with deep poverty and recurring emergencies. Food security related issues are complex and are a fun-damental component of understanding Ethiopia and its policy and programmatic environment.3 Ongoing technical support based on long-term relationship building is an important component of supporting the Ethiopia Red Cross.

Recommendation 4The RCRC in the region should assess these capacity requirements and coordination mechanisms, including allocating adequate support to the Ethiopia Red Cross.

3 See Haan, Majid and Darcy, 2006, for an analysis of Ethiopian food security and livelihood complexity and implications for assessments and food aid interventions, at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/602.pdf;



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Background to the region

The Horn of Africa provides an extremely complex developmental and humanitarian context with which to engage. Political structures in the region range enormously from stateless Somalia to the highly centralised Ethiopian state. Political volatility is high and conflict is recurrent. In terms of livelihoods and food security conditions, the variability of local conditions is also enormous. There are hundreds of different livelihood groups each with different combinations of crops, livestock, market opportunities, social systems, access to markets, coping strategies, and so on.1 Extremely high levels of poverty and vulnerability to natural and man-made shocks are evident. Seasonal hunger and seasonal stress occur to varying extents virtually every year and many or most large-scale crises have a slow-onset character.

As a result of this extremely volatile and complex environment there have been large investments in early warning and food security infor-mation systems across the region. The FSNAU2 of Somalia, the ARLMP3 of Kenya and the LIU4 of Ethiopia are examples of cutting edge informa-tion systems. These exist partly to manage the misinformation and politics around emergency related figures in the region as well as to help prioritise scarce resources.5 There have also been innovative pro-grammes and projects from the large-scale food and cash Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia to emergency cash interventions to pastoralists in southern Somalia. Underlying these investments is a recognition that crises are recurrent, and emergency (acute) and devel-opmental (chronic) conditions are often blurred and inter-changeable. Most major donors and agencies have invested in significant regional technical and managerial capacity, in Nairobi, in order to monitor and respond to these conditions, absorb best practice and maintain insti-tutional memory.

The RCRC is one of hundreds of agencies in the region responding to both disasters and development needs. It has a relatively low profile and is not known for generating and documenting best practice in a region

1 See livelihood baselines and outputs of the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit of Somalia, the Livelihoods Integration Unit in Ethiopia and FEWSNET Regional and Country offices for examples; http://www.dppc.gov.et/Livelihoods/Livelihoods_Integration_Unit.htm; http://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reports; http://www.fsnau.org/; http://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=en;

2 Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit3 Arid lands Resource Management Project4 Livelihoods Integration Unit5 See Haan, Majid and Darcy 2006 again.

http://www.dppc.gov.et/Livelihoods/Livelihoods_Integration_Unit.htm

http://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reports

http://www.fsnau.org/

http://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=en

http://www.fews.net/Pages/livelihoods.aspx?loc=6&l=en

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that produces much institutional learning. The ICRC is the exception to this general position of the movement in the region.

Conditions in 2008 2008 onwards arguably provided a more complex environment than usual with a combination of internal and external factors from inter-national food and fuel price rises (2007-2008; stabilising by mid to late 2008), soon followed by the global financial crisis (September 2008 onwards); post-election violence in Kenya (December 2007); election preparations in Ethiopia (May 2010) and severe conflict and displace-ment around Mogadishu, Somalia (2007 onwards). Disruptions to mar-kets and trade were high in general though there were very different factors in different parts of the region.6 Food aid pipeline problems were also occurring in 2008 and 2009 due to production shortfalls in key areas e.g. Rift Valley in Kenya. This was compounded by poor rains and disease outbreaks in many areas. These conditions had followed a severe and widespread regional drought in 2006.7

The four Appeals analysed for the review covered the period 2008-2010. The Ethiopia Food Insecurity Appeal (Wolaita) of May 2008 was generated by the Ethiopia Red Cross and the IFRC in Nairobi. It was a modest response to a clear crisis. The Horn of Africa Appeal was particularly unusual for the region in terms of its scale and the resul-tant processes and structures that were mobilised (i.e. the FACT team and the HoA8 operational coordination office in Addis Ababa). It was very poorly funded. The HoA Appeal was also significant for affect-ing country specific resource mobilisation processes. For example, the Kenya Red Cross was initially part of the HoA Appeal, then had a large and poorly funded National Appeal in early 2009, followed by a more modest International Drought Appeal in September 2009. Finally, there was an Ethiopia specific Severe Food Shortage International Appeal in February 2010, which was again significant in scale and poorly funded. The purpose of the review was therefore to try and learn lessons from this set of unusual internal and external factors within the region.

6 See Food Security & Complex Livelihoods in the Horn, East and Central Africa, June 2008, at www.ebpdn.org/download/download.php?table=resources&id=2118;

7 See HPG Briefing Note, May 2006, ‘Saving lives through livelihoods: critical gaps in the response to the drought in the Greater Horn of Africa’ at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1381.pdf;

8 Horn of Africa

http://www.ebpdn.org/download/download.php?table=resources&id=2118



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Analysis of appeals

Ethiopia Appeal(May 2008; Euros 1.2m; 35% funded through Appeal, 65% funded through ECHO in-country; increased to Euro 5m, 81% funded, 75,000 beneficiaries).

Summary of InterventionAn international appeal was launched in May 2008 for the Ethiopia Red Cross to support 40,000 beneficiaries for four months in Wolaita zone, Ethiopia. This following an assessment by the ERCS and the IFRC zonal office in Nairobi. Funds were raised primarily by the Finnish and Austrian PNS’s, as well as from ECHO in-country and through the IFRC. Food relief distributions began in late June. Water rehabilitation and seed distributions were also carried out as well as targeted animal re-stocking in 2009.

Analysis of AppealFirst signals of problems in Wolaita occurred in December 2007 – the branch sent pictures of malnourished children and a letter to the ERCS head office in Addis Ababa. Internal ERCS assessments were mobilised and the zone DM office was called upon and arrived in April 2008. The food security and nutrition conditions were clearly extremely serious with a nutrition survey by GOAL confirming this.1 FEWSNET confirmed the exceptional situation. The Appeal document itself provided detailed local specific explanations of the nature of the problem and justifica-tions for a range of responses. The time between the April assessment, the May Appeal and the late June response was good in comparison to other examples seen (2-3 months; although this was 6 months after the branch first reported the situation). The initial response to the Appeal was limited and the Finnish and Austrian PNS’s found addi-tional resources through ECHO funds in addition to their own. There was concern within some ECHO quarters of different PNS’s requesting resources for the same problem. Coordination through the IFRC was considered relatively good.

1 12.1% GAM, 2.1% SAM, under-5 mortality of 2.24%, in March/April 2008, in Damot Gale woreda.

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The interventions themselves were all appropriate and effectively car-ried out. All interviewees (community beneficiaries and woreda offi-cials) had extremely positive feedback. People had clearly been deplet-ing their assets and reducing their consumption for some time. Water was also a major problem that was addressed through rehabilitation of water points. Full rations were received with no specific targeting criteria (reflecting the widespread nature of the crisis). Water points were still functioning at the time of the visit. The woreda officials com-mented that they now ‘knew’ the Red Cross and that they had learned from the organisation about good distributions.

It is interesting to note that the two woredas targeted are not emer-gency prone areas and do not usually receive either emergency or safety net support, therefore food aid has not become ‘institution-alised’ in these areas. They are woredas of high population density, with likely chronic food insecurity problems but are not drought prone (recurrent emergency prone areas are in the lowlands within the zone2). Supporting this hypothesis is the fact that recovery has been good, with good rains since then and, for example, all beneficiaries that had received sheep still had them and were looking to convert them to milking cows3. The crucial failure of the sweet potato crop was addressed through distribution of cuttings and haricot beans were also distributed. They appear to have been highly appropriate and valued. The branch has significantly increased its membership and profile as a result, now counting approximately 50% of the population of the zone as members. This proportion is much higher in the districts where this intervention has taken place.

Discussions at the branch level suggested that if funds i.e. contingency funds, were available, they would have been able to respond many months earlier and would not have had to wait for the government’s national Appeal, suggesting that early, local level responses can take place outside of the national level government appeal process.

Horn of Africa Appeal(December 2008; Euro 72.8m; DREF of Euro 86,000; Exceptional advance of Euro 6.6m from the Federation; 12% funded)45

Summary of InterventionThe large scale of the Appeal was targeted at supporting 2.2m ben-eficiaries over 5 years. It signified the activation of the 2020 strategy of senior management in Geneva and their interest to scale up and reach out to more beneficiaries. The Appeal was preceded by a large, multi-disciplinary FACT team which was in the region from October

2 A ‘zone’ in Ethiopia is an administrative area that comprises of several woredas or districts. 3 In the author’s experience, animals provided in re-stocking projects may often be sold again

to generate income. 4 Figure from Operations Update, 19/05/2009.5 A revised and updated appeal was published in June 2009, with an appeal figure of Euros

50m.

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4 Analysis of appeals

to December 2008.6 A special HoA operational structure was created to support a potentially large-scale response. DREF funds and an excep-tional advance were released - the majority of which was allocated to food aid. Funding for the HoA Appeal was limited and priority was ultimately given to Ethiopia. The Moyale emergency relief intervention was one of the priorities within Ethiopia and interviews were con-ducted in Addis Ababa and Harar to develop this case study.7 140,000 people, primarily pastoralists received emergency relief, interventions to control Acute Water Diarrhroea (AWD)8 and water interventions from April to July 2009.

The Kenya Red Cross and Somali Red Crescent received little money through the appeal. The KRCS had already prepared an appeal prior to the Horn of Africa appeal, which was then subsumed within that Appeal. Djibouti received some funds through the Appeal for a food-for-work programme with WFP. The HoA assessment and appeal also catalysed a bilateral initiative from the British Red Cross, to support a cash-loan recovery programme.

Analysis of the Assessment and the AppealThe timing of the assessment and the appeal was considered anything from 6 months to 1 year late in terms of the peak of the problem and the availability of funds.9 From the middle to the end of 2008, inter-national and regional food prices were stabilising or coming down, particularly as much of the regional harvest was coming in to markets, although prices were still significantly higher than long-term averages. The assessment and appeal was therefore out of synch with the global and regional early warning and resource mobilisation processes that had already taken place. For example, WFP had launched its appeal for funds to cover global food price rises in March 2008 and had obtained its target of $755m two months later.10 The process associated with the HoA Appeal was considered rushed which did not allow crucial time to generate buy-in within the wider movement. The FACT team itself did not comprise of many experts with up-to-date knowledge of the region. The Appeal document drew largely on existing reports reflect-ing known areas of concern but without adding any level of critical

6 Team composition changed during this time, with many members not continuing for the full period.

7 In order to cover as many sites as possible within the timeframe, the consultant and ERC staff agreed to interview staff in Addis Ababa and Harar that had been involved in the intervention. The long distance (time factor), Ramadan period and uncertainty of finding beneficiaries contributed to this decision.

8 AWD is used instead of cholera in Ethiopia. 9 For example, in mid-2007, FEWSNET was both reporting on the impact of drought, floods,

Rift Valley Fever (RVF) and conflict (in Somalia) in 2005 and 2006, where 10m people were reported to have been affected, and at the same time was already predicting worsening humanitarian conditions in late 2007/early 2008, as a result of a combination of factors, including rising prices, drought, conflict and disease.

10 US$500m of this came from the Saudi government.

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analysis.11 Donors in the region are wary of emergency figures and potentially exaggerated claims for assistance, including those from the United Nations.12 The majority of DREF/Exceptional funds were used for the purposes of food aid. In retrospect this was problematic as it did not signify a commitment to implementing different types of interventions for some PNS’s and also meant that there was an ongoing pressure to obtain funding (for food aid) to repay this loan. Interestingly, the largest contribution to the appeal came through the Swedish Red Cross and was the result of an end of year under-spend, available at short notice, from SIDA.

The assessment and appeal document is generally acknowledged for its attempt to combine short-term, medium term and long-term issues, however it was neither able to do this persuasively nor was the Appeal document considered the appropriate place for it. For many donors the Appeal document is there to raise emergency funds as quickly as possible. The British Red Cross for example, conducted a second assessment, mobilising several experts, in order to develop a recovery proposal.

CoordinationCreating a new operational structure in Addis Ababa was viewed prob-lematically by virtually all interviewees. While such a structure may have been considered necessary to support a very large-scale interven-tion, lines of communication between Geneva, Addis Ababa, Nairobi and later Johannesburg were unclear, contributing to less than con-structive relations within the IFRC and poor perceptions by the NS’s and PNS’s. The Horn of Africa office was left in a very difficult posi-tion, trying to reclaim advanced funds as well as credibility, following the rushed start through the initial FACT team and the poor resource mobilisation that resulted.

Ethiopia Red CrossThe ERCS was the largest beneficiary of funds through the HoA Appeal. Senior management, the board of the ERCS were apparently interested to build up capacity to cover up to 10% of emergency needs in-country. In addition, pipeline concerns at the time were affecting WFP (and therefore the GoE, its main partner). There was a likely interest by the GoE in looking for alternative sources of food aid to meet needs in a pre-election year. Covering up to 10% of the emergency case-load equated to over 600,000 beneficiaries. It appears therefore that there

11 The author of this report was brought in to the region by a major British NGO in June 2008 in order to conduct an analysis of the situation at the time. The problem was identified as a complex livelihood crisis with many contributory factors and areas of uncertainty, including domestic drivers of price inflation, regional trade disruptions, food aid supply problems, unreliable figures, unclear timing of acute crisis.

12 See Haan, Majid and Darcy, 2006, for an analysis of Ethiopian food security and livelihood complexity and implications for assessments and food aid interventions,at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/602.pdf;



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was an overlapping interest between the IFRC (Geneva), the ERCS and the GoE that all contributed towards an interest in scaling up.

The Moyale InterventionMoyale is a politically complicated area of intervention as it sits on the border of two ethnic groups, the Somali and the Oromiya. It is a drought prone area, the scene of recurrent emergencies and lies close to the border of Kenya and Somalia. The ERC had operated there during the severe regional drought of 2006. The Kenya Red Cross operates on the Kenyan side of the border. There is no Moyale branch of the ERC and the nearest branch is in Negelle, several hours drive away. Moyale was identified as a priority area for intervention by the GoE and the FACT team was keen to intervene in lowland areas due to concerns about functioning market mechanisms and food supply. The ERCS generally follows the GoE’s national system for identifying food insecure areas which is generally good although ultimately identifies relative needs and does not distinguish easily between chronic and acute needs. The IFRC and ERCS were directed to the Somali side of the border by the GoE, in spite of a reluctance on their side. In terms of the needs at the time, officials reported that while the situation was difficult it was not as severe as in 2006. In addition, one of the major issues in the area is a chronic water problem with a shallow aquifer becoming easily contaminated, particularly in times of water shortage. At the time of the interventions most families had moved to the Kenyan side of the border, coming back when they heard about the relief distributions. A subsequent assessment resulted in part of the relief being directed to the Oromia side as well.

The actual distributions took place during the rainy season. The time of greatest hardship for pastoralists is usually the end of the dry sea-son and beginning of the wet season. Some trucks were reported to have become stuck due to muddy roads. These difficulties were recog-nised by the community who was reported to have asked ERCS staff why cash was not brought in as it is easier to transport. Distributions themselves were well organised although ERCS staff generally point out that targeting and distributing is more difficult in pastoral areas than agricultural areas due to the strength and salience of the clan system for managing resource distributions. PHAST and AWD interventions took place in Moyale urban areas (KRCS frequently requests support of ERCS in terms of coordination in Moyale, as the town is divided between Kenya and Ethiopia).

The ERCS had to manage very tense and difficult relations with the Oromiya side (particularly the woreda administration) as they were perceived to be biased towards Somalis. Following the relief distribu-tions, water rehabilitation was planned for both communities. In the end this was abandoned as the Somali officials claimed that all of the resources were for their area. Communities in both areas were sup-

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portive of the interventions. There was no opportunity to build on the intervention due to the lack of permanent presence in the area.

Kenya International Appeal(September 2009; Euros 5.7m; 25 % funded13)

The Kenya International Appeal followed a preliminary National Appeal of CHF 28m in January 2009. This was not well funded. Funding received through the HoA Appeal for Kenya was also very limited. The September International Appeal aimed to cover 1.7m beneficiaries for 6 months, through school feeding, community health care services and seed distributions.

Summary of Seed DistributionThe consultant visited the Machakos Branch that supported a seed distribution in Yatta and other districts. The branch carries out a range of activities and had been involved in local fundraising in response to the emergency conditions prior to the seed distribution.

Analysis of InterventionDrought conditions in the Ukambani areas were very severe in 2008 and 2009. Cattle losses were high and a WFP EMOP had started in June 2009, following early interventions supported by the British Red Cross. Incomes had been stretched and the seed intervention was developed due to the expected good El Nino rains. The seed intervention was a highly effective, pro-active, response to aid recovery in light of an

13 The initial appeal was 6% funded within 2 months. The amount sought appears to have been revised downwards with CHF 2,047,020 received by August 2010 and 100% coverage reported – this figure is used to provide the 25% estimated coverage.

Box 1. PNS’s - Who funds who, what and why?PNS’s have different policies and priorities of their own and as a result of their back donors, which create a confusing resource mobilisation environment. For example, the German Red Cross has a policy of co-ordinated bilateralism, obtaining funds from the German Government and the EU and rarely contributes to International appeals. The Spanish Red Cross are predominantly bilateral and do not have Africa as a priority area, obtaining funding for the region through some of their own city municipalities. The Japanese Red Cross only use their own internal funds and have a policy to support all international appeals based on fixed criteria. The Swedish Red Cross do prioritise Africa and work multilaterally and were able to mobilise funding opportunistically due to end of year funds available by SIDA at virtually a day’s notice. Some PNS’s have formed informal groups to share information with regard to funding decisions. Some PNS’s acknowledge these different factors and suggest that there should be more transparency and co-ordination around fund-raising issues within the movement to transform a fragmented competitive environment into a mutually supportive one.

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exceptional rainy season. The hybrid seeds were expensive in the mar-ket and beyond the means of most farmers. Farmers were appreciative of the seeds but did plant their own traditional varieties as well as the hybrids. Yields of farmers varied greatly in the three sites visited from 3 to 10 bags. Lack of draught power meant that land preparation was compromised which in turn affected productivity. Yields may have been better in other districts. Overall maize production in the wider area was exceptional suggesting that the good rains and the wide-spread seed distributions contributed to good harvests.

However, it is worth recognising that Yatta is a marginal agricultural area, not best suited to maize, and the Government is correctly trying to promote drought resistant varieties of crops. This seed intervention therefore while having an overall positive impact is perhaps best seen as an opportunistic response to exceptional circumstances.

Ethiopia International Appeal(February 2010; $28.7m; 16% funded14)

Summary of Intervention (East Hararghe)The GoE released a Humanitarian Requirements Report in October 2009 several months after its Belg assessment and seven months before the May 2010 elections. The IFRC regional food security advi-sor was requested by the ERC to support an appeal and arrived in November 2009. A FACT team was mobilised in December 2009 and the International Appeal was released in February 2010. East Hararghe was the priority area identified and interventions (food relief and seeds) were planned to begin in March 2010 arrived in East Hararghe in August 2010.

14 Approximately 50% of funding was obtained from ECHO within the region, therefore not directly through the Appeal process.

Box 2. The Kenya Red Cross and collaboration with ICRCThe KRCS has built its reputation around a formidable logistics capacity, to respond to emergencies, and advocacy around emergencies. It has been, until recently, responsible for 13 districts that WFP covers (recently reduced to 5). These attributes while important are different from those required to build de-centralised, institutional capacity to manage more complex projects. Interestingly, the KRCS and ICRC have recently developed a close relationship involving considerable capacity building elements. This includes using the ICRC’s tracking system for identifying the types of interventions appropriate to the different phases of a crisis. The IFRC office has also rebuilt its relationship with the KRCS following a tense period in 2008 and 2009. It seems there are now major synergies that could be developed between the KRCS, ICRC and the IFRC, adopting a community-based approach to Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction.

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Analysis of AppealThe visit of the regional food security advisor followed GoE/ERC target-ing procedures to identify Shashamene and Seraro as the priority areas. The ERC branch in Shashemane was keen to know why malnutrition was appearing when it had not been seen there before. Discussions with government staff identified that water was the most important issue and was a chronic problem. People normally have to buy water which accounts for 70% of expenditure. When pushed to discuss the cost-benefit of using funds for water or food, government staff quickly realised that the greater value was in water interventions. However, the position of food aid in Ethiopia means that it was agreed that 30% of a potential budget should go towards food aid. Water interventions discussed included subsidising water trucking and using food to free up income for water. Food relief would have been short-term (2-3 months). Recovery interventions could include water infrastructure expansion. Soft pledges of approximately $3m were already available according to the regional food security advisor who felt confident that up to $5m could be obtained.

Senior management decisions taken in Addis Ababa and Geneva deter-mined that such an appeal was too small. A target of up to 10% of national ‘needs’ was again identified equating to approximately 300,000 people. In order to generate a bigger appeal a FACT team was necessary. In light of the experience of the HoA Appeal, there was an understand-able reluctance in Addis Ababa to mobilise another large, expensive FACT team and a more specific skill set was identified including a nutritionist, and experts in food security, early recover and resource mobilisation.

However, gathering the right combination of people at the right time proved difficult and a food security expert was not identified. Finally four assessment teams were mobilised to Awassa, N Wollo, Tigray and East Hararghe. Interviewees who were on the FACT assessments raised concerns about the appropriate expertise on the team, especially in the area of food security. They also noted that it was very difficult to turn four different local assessments, with different technical expertise and with very different local issues into a consolidated Appeal. There was also a perception that the Appeal would be poorly funded based on the HoA Appeal experience. In spite of the varied expertise and inputs food aid was prioritised. The timing of the Appeal was complicated by the approaching Christmas and New Year holiday period. The launch of the Appeal in February was preceded by the Haiti earthquake in January.

Distributions have been delayed due to complications around procure-ment. At the time of the visit 200MT (5 trucks) of food relief were stuck on muddy roads. Food was being distributed long after a very good rain season had begun and early harvests were already available. Food distributions themselves were well organised (logistics team there at the time confirmed this). People appreciated the food as a free resource distributed during Ramadan but there was little apparent need or

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hunger at the time. The Harare office has faced much criticism from local communities and government officials, none of its own making, for both failing to deliver on their promises and thereby not allowing alternatives (e.g. resources, organisations) from being approached at the time.

From the time of the assessment in late 2009 to the time of actual distribution was approximately 8 months.

Box 3. ECHO food distributions – North Shoa (2009/2010)ECHO funding for food aid obtained in-country accounts for over 50% of the February 2010 Ethiopia Appeal. ECHO is motivated by its interest in finding alternative outlets for food aid that are otherwise dominated by WFP and the GoE. The consultant visited Ankober woreda in N Shoa zone, the site of these food distributions. Approximately 25,000 people were targeted with full rations. Food planned for delivery in June and July 2009 became available only in November 2009. Woredas originally planned for distributions were changed due to a changed situation on the ground by the time food aid was available. Many complaints were received about the original distribution list drawn up by kebele officials and passed to the woreda. Follow-ups by the ERCS and the woreda administration before and after the first distribution addressed some of these complaints. Good storage facilities were only available in two sites according to woreda officials. These were in the highland areas some distance away from targeted lowland areas within the same woreda.

The woreda is a mountainous area and beneficiaries had to walk up and down these hills for half to one day to reach either of the two sites. Distributions took place over three days meaning that people had to stay close to the distributions sites, away from home, for this time. As well as the physical effort involved in this the costs incurred were estimated to be a minimum of 20Birr/day, for food during the stay. The consultant was advised that costs in terms of transport and accommodation would have been subsidised by friends and neighbours in the towns – people would have ‘begged and borrowed’ for accommodation and for animals to transport their goods back home. Beneficiaries may have paid for some of this support through sharing their rations. As well as the physical effort of reaching the distribution site it is estimated that 10-15% of the value of the ration would have been used to cover the costs of obtaining it. Distributions themselves were well organised however there was little relationship to branch strategy or development. This example raises a number of issues, from delays in the overall process, the dignity of those targeted, the relative priorities of ECHO, the HoA operational coordination office and the ERCS.

Although not strictly part of the HoA Appeal, all parties agreed at the time of the review that it would be useful to look at for comparative purposes.

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Annex 1 List of interviewees

Geneva

Mohamed Omer Mukhier

Head, Disaster Policy and Preparedness Department IFRC

Simon Missiri Head of Resource Mobilisation and Government Relations IFRC

Josse Gillijns Head of Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Department IFRC

Kiflemariam Amdemariam

Senior Officer, Food Security IFRC

Robert Fraser Senior Officer, WATSAN/EH Unit IFRC

Ina Schonberg Senior Officer, Livelihoods, Nutrition & Food Security IFRC

Pierre de Rochefort Senior Officer, Training and Information Management IFRC

Geri Lau Head, OD Department IFRC

Kenya

Juhani Alanko Regional Delegate Finnish Red Cross

Christoph Muller Regional Delegate German Red Cross

Nan Buzard Senior Director, International Response and Programs American Red Cross

Ingrid Kristiansen Regional Programmes Officer Norwegian Red Cross

Karen Peachey East Africa Representative British Red Cross

Nancy Balfour-Smith Head, Disaster Management, Zonal Office IFRC

Stephen McDowell Food Security Advisor, Zonal Office, IFRC

Brennan Banks Disaster Operations Manager IFRC

Alexander Matheou Head, Regional Office, Nairobi IFRC

Piers Simpkin Regional Livestock Specialist ICRC

Christoph Luedi Head of Nairobi Regional Delegation ICRC

Dr. James Kisia Deputy Secretary General Kenya Red Cross

Abdi Shakur Head Disaster Management Kenya Red Cross

Gerald Bumbe Regional Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross

John Balu Branch Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross

Martin Kiilu (Hassler) Volunteer and Relief Coordinator, Machakos Kenya Red Cross

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Annex 1 List of interviewees

Raquel Fernandez Community Development Delegate in Kenya Spanish Red Cross

Maki Igarashi Health Delegate Japanese Red Cross

Yuji Matsubara Deputy Director, Development Cooperation Division, International Department, Operations Sector

Japanese Red Cross

Gideon Myandiricha Oyagi,

Kithueni District Administrator, Government of Kenya

Beneficiary communities visited in Mamba, Kithueni, Ikombe

Somalia Red Crescent

Dr Ahmed Hassan Mohamed

President Somalia Red Crescent

Ahmed Gizo Somalia Country Representative IFRC

Ethiopia

Fasika Kebede Secretary-General Ethiopia Red Cross

Afework Teshome Head Disaster Management Ethiopia Red Cross

Gedlu Bayene Disaster Response Team Leader Ethiopia Red Cross

Kefay Bey Food Security Officer Ethiopia Red Cross

Sudi Alemu Acting Branch Secretary, Somali Regional Branch (Project Coordinator, Moyale)

Ethiopia Red Cross

Bayu Tadesse Programme Head, Oromiya Regional Office (Field Operation Coordinator, Wolaita)

Ethiopia Red Cross

Beshe Beneburu Branch Secretary, Harar Office, East Hararghe Ethiopia Red Cross

Haile Birhane Relief Coordinator, East Hararghe (Health and Sanitation Officer, Moyale) Ethiopia Red Cross

Seifu Worku Branch Secretary, Soddo Branch, Wolaita Ethiopia Red Cross

Tadess Fekyibellu, Ankober Woreda Administrator, North Shoa Government of Ethiopia

Niguse Abiye Tefera, Branch Secretary, North Shoa Ethiopia Red Cross

George Gigiberia Ethiopia Country Representation IFRC

Seifu Demeke Dele Project Coordinator Austrian Red Cross

Juergen Herbig Country Delegate German Red Cross

Kai Mikael Kettunen Regional Logistics Delegate, UAE IFRC

Beneficiary communities visited in Damot Pulassa, Damot Gale, Fedis and Mehal Meda.

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Telephone Interviews

Roger Bracke Regional Representative, Indian Ocean Islands

IFRC

Gorkhmaz Huseynov Head of Support Services, Africa Zone, Johannesburg, South Africa

IFRC

Amin Wais Programme Coordinator

Djibouti Red Crescent

Nina Paulsen Disaster Response and Preparedness

Swedish Red Cross

Staffan Wiking Regional Programme Coordination (East Africa)

Swedish Red Cross

Johan Kohler Programme Officer, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

Swedish Red Cross

Mary Atkinson Food Security & Livelihoods Adviser

British Red Cross

Pete Garratt Relief Operations Manager

British Red Cross

Liz Hughes Early Recovery Manager

Ex-British Red Cross

Humanity / The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without dis-crimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alle-viate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the hu-man being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

Impartiality / It makes no discrimination as to nation-ality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Neutrality / In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Independence / The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

Voluntary service / It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

Unity / There can be only one Red Cross or Red Cres-cent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its ter-ritory.

Universality / The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in help-ing each other, is worldwide.

The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

For Further Information:Stephen McDowellFood Security AdvisorE-mail : [email protected] East Africa RegionBP 41275-00100; Nairobi, KenyaE-mail: [email protected] site: www.ifrc.org Fe

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www.ifrc.org Saving lives, changing minds.

Documents

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