ANASTACIA QUIMEN VS. COURT OF APPEALS G .R. NO. 112331

Facts:

Private respondent Yolanda Oliveros bought the lot belonging to his uncle Antonio Quimen, a land without access to the road public, with an inducement by her petitioner Aunt Anastacia that she will give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200 per square meter. When Yolanda offered Anastacia the payment, the latter refused to accept denying the promise of right of way to her once she bought the property. Yolanda filed an action with a prayer of right of way through Anastacia’s property. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the space at the back of her father’s house which a store was situation was the better right of way because it is shorter than that of Anastacia’s property. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying that respondent has the right of way through petitioner’s property and as it was the one which will cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent has a right of way through petitioner’s property.

Held:

The Court held that she has. Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the right of way must be the one which has the shortest route and which will cause the least damage and detriment to the servient state. Though the easement to petitioner’s property in the case at bar is longer than the one located at the back of respondents house which has a store blocking it, the requirement that it can bring the least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortness of the route to the public highway. The less damage will be incurred not as when the store made of strong materials should be removed. More so, the conditions for a valid grant of right of way through petitioner’s property, which are: 1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to public highway 2. the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity 3. the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate 4. the right of way being claimed is the least prejudicial to the servient estate are met by the circumstances at hand.

FRANCISCO VS. IAC

An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation must not be due to his own acts.

FACTS:Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-owners. On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided 1/3 portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia Dila. A partition was then executed.

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dila’s lot came to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and thus effectively isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila.

Despite that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos.Ramos asked for a right of way through Francisco’s land but negotiations failed. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.

Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dila’s lot. Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby closing the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted.

Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him asserting his right to a legal easement.

ISSUE:Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land belonging to Francisco

HELD: NO.The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.

FLORO v. LLENADO

A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience of the dominant estate. The owner must prove that the easement is absolutely necessary and least restrictive on the servient estate.

FACTS:Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The subdivision has its own access roads from the MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Another fellow, Llenado, owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when it was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, Llenado Homes was bounded on the south by the Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. To the west sat the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy brewed since Llenado Homes did not have any passage to the MacArthur Highway.

However, a proposed access road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was approved by the HLURB.

Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the Llenados sought, and were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park . At this point, remember that the agreement was merely provisional as the parties were still drafting a contract.Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy machinery. He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones. He essentially implied Llenados to keep out off property.

Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the request. On appeal by LLenado, and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC

ISSUE:Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the same against Mr. Floro.

HELD: NO.As in the earlier case, the court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These include:that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision development plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo to create a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the Floro property.

The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience. Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and pursue an access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary detriment of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance his behavior.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 71393 June 28, 1989

FACTS:Nazario Crisostomo and Maria Escusar owned a parcel of land with an area of 5,216.60 square meters, situated in Cainta, Rizal at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and the road leading to the town center of Cainta, covered by O.C.T. 4416, issued in 1931. Upon the death of both, the property passed on to their daughter Bibiana Crisostomo Vda. de Eladio Leyva, whose title was evidenced by TCT 8144. Ultimately, the property was inherited by the LEYVAs who were the children of Bibiana.

Prior to the issuance of OCT 4416, in the name of Nazario Crisostomo between 1929 and 1930, MERALCO erected thereon two transmission steel towers numbered 86 and 87, later renumbered 76 (situated in Lot 1-K which is owned in common by the LEYVAs and covered by TCT No. 297168) and 77 (situated in Lot 2-V-6, which is also owned in-common by the LEYVAs and covered by TCT No. 338524), (par. 3, Partial Stipulation of Facts, quoted in CA Decision, p. 39, Rollo). In 1931, when O.C.T. 4416 was issued, no encumbrance was annotated thereon.

On August 4, 1973, the LEYVAs sued MERALCO for damages and sum of money with prayer for attorney's fees and exemplary damages for its continued use of the LEYVAs' property, claiming that the property became off limits because of the high voltage of electric current running in the cable lines.

In its answer, MERALCO claimed that it had acquired a grant from the original owner of the land, Nazario Crisostomo, for a perpetual easement of right of way for the erection and operation of the transmission steel towers for which it had paid Crisostomo the total sum of $12.40. Moreover, even without the grant of perpetual easement, the LEYVAs' complaint is deemed barred by prescription and laches, because of MERALCO's open, continuous and uninterrupted enjoyment of the easement for a period of 43 years.

MERALCO did not present any proof regarding the alleged contract/grant with Nazario Crisostomo. Instead, it presented a deposition of a certain Leland Gardner, a retired MERALCO field auditor, who testified on the alleged payment by MERALCO of the sum of $12.40 for the grant of right of way, claiming thus, that in the absence of the original document, Lelands deposition must be admitted as secondary evidence of an original document, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not MERALCO acquired a perpetual easement of right of way, over subject property.

HELD:Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueño) or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that MERALCO never acquired any easement over the LEYVAs' property to construct and operate the steel towers. Consequently, the LEYVAs must be compensated and awarded temperate damages, attorney's fees and annual compensation for the loss of use and deprivation of opportunity to profit and benefit from their lands. As respondent court pointed out (pp. 44-45, Rollo):

In this case, there is no doubt that plaintiffs' property has been practically off-limits to its entirety because of the danger posed by the high voltage electric current being conducted through cable lines hanging through the steel transmission towers, thereby prejudicing plaintiffs from reaping profits and benefits from their lands. Aggravating the situation, plaintiffs remain as owners only to be liable to payment of real estate taxes and other related dues and levies. Meanwhile, the MERALCO does nothing except to reap benefits and profits in its business concern to the prejudice of plaintiffs; or as Manresa has pined — 'to the annulment of right' of ownership of plaintiffs. For this plaintiffs should not be without redress.

AMOR v. FLORENTINO

FACTS:

Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.

RULING:

Yes.

Easement is established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different persons and the “service” (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is established.

VALISNO VS ADRIANO, 161 SCRA 398FACTS:Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT No. NT-16281. He bought the land from the respondent’s sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the respondent Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long, traversing the Respondent's land.In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.

Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights.

A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of Public Works and Communications. A reinvestigation was granted.

In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.

Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that he suffered damages when he failed to plant his fields that year for lack of irrigation water, and when he reconstructed the canal.Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves.

ISSUE:Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the easement of water over Respondent’s land.

RULING: Yes.The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondent’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of Apparent Sign):

Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.

The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property. According to the Plaintiff, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is

supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

RONQUILLO ET AL VS. ROCO, 103 PHIL 84

FACTS:

FACTS:Petitioners’ parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.

(The plaintiffs alleged that they have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of the former. On May 12, 1953, the defendants and their men constructed a chapel in the middle of the said right of way which, accordingly has impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way. On July 10, 1954 defendants planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and their right of way against the plaintiff’s protests and opposition. This prevented them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.)

ISSUE:Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No.Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.

An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is,nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot beacquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under the NewCivil Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous (intermittent),apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or lesslong intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 615). Continuousand apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription,continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whetherapparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 620 and622)

TANEDO VS BERNAD, 165 SCRA 86

An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S estates to different persons is not a ground for extinguishment of easements absent a statement extinguishing it.

FACTS:Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He constructed an apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he constructed an apartment, house, bodega and a septic tank for common use of the occupants of the two lots.

Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Tañedo (pet). He also agreed that should be decide to sell Lot B he would sell it to Tañedo. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to Spouses Sim (resp). Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank. He also asked Tañnedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching Lot B.

Tañedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps. Cardenas admitted that he had agreed to sell the lot to pet and claimed by way of cross claim against spouses Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC dismissed the complaint and the cross claim.

ISSUE:Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners.

RULING: NO.The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law as provided in Art 624 because no abolishment or extinguishment was provided in the deed of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim cannot impair, in any manner, the use of the servitude.

COSTABELLA CORP. VS. CA, 193 SCRA 333