East Asia at the Crossroads 2013

8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013

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ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES

Korea Economic

Institute of America

East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and

Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries

By Yeh-chung Lu, Byung Kwang Park, and Tung-chieh Tsai

Abstract

Security and polical issues over the Taiwan Strait and the

Korean Peninsula remain as ashpoints in East Asia since WWII.

In the aermath of the Cold War, these two cases share certain

similaries: each government wishes to maintain a relavely

stable relaonship with its adversary, namely, China and North

Korea, despite ideological dierences. Research in Internaonal

Relaons (IR) has shed light on how certain rivals gradually

reconciled with each other throughout history. Rapprochement

makes conict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Tai-

wan and mainland China relaons, economic interdependence

and posive polical and societal interacons contributed

to rapprochement between the two under the Ma Ying-jeou

administraon, while North Korea connued to threaten the

existence of South Korea in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the

laers provision of economic assistance.

The authors argue that economic interdependence, together

with negoaons and the polical will of top leaders to pursue

peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across the Taiwan

Strait. This research further explores whether these condions

exist in inter-Korean relaons.

With idencaon of the condions under which peace was

maintained through these years, this comparave study pro-

vides policy suggesons for not only Korea and Taiwan, but also

for the United States. Trustpolik, as proposed by President

Park Geun-hye, seems to be the right direcon in which region-al stability is more likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due

to its emphasis on nurturing goodwill with the North. This co

parave study also provides lessons learnt from each other.

Key words:Cross-Strait Relaons, Inter-Korean Relaons, Tru

polik, Rapprochement, Economic Interdependence

1. Introducon

Security and polical issues over the Taiwan Strait and t

Korean Peninsula remain as ashpoints in East Asia since WW

In the aermath of the Cold War, these two cases share certa

similaries: each government wishes to maintain a relavely sta

relaonship with its adversary, namely, China and North Kore

despite ideological dierences. This paper aims to explore a

compare how the policy choices adopted by the two governmen

contributed to regional peace and stability, or the lack thereof.

Research in Internaonal Relaons (IR) has shed light on ho

certain rivals gradually reconciled with each other througho

history. The concepon of rapprochement, dened as a proce

to reestablish cordial relaons between two previously hos

countries, is central to this research. Rapprochement mak

conict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Taiwan a

mainland China relaons, economic interdependence and posi

polical and societal interacons contributed to rapprocheme

between the two under the Ma Ying-jeou administraon, wh

North Korea connued to threaten the existence of South Kor

in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the laers provision of econmic assistance. In other words, globalizaon and trust work

Yeh-chung Luis Assistant Professor in the Department of Diplomacy, Naonal Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. ByungKwang Parkis Research Fellow, Instute for Naonal Security Strategy, Seoul, Korea. Tung-chieh Tsai is Professor andDirector of Graduate Instute of Internaonal Polics, Naonal Chung-Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan. Please contactDr. Lu at [email protected]. Their paper is the sixeth in KEIs Academic Paper Series. As part of this program, KEI com-missions and distributes approximately ten papers per year on original subjects of current interest to over 5,000 Koreawatchers, government ocials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States and the world. At the end ofthe year, these papers are compiled and published in KEIs On Korea volume.

For more informaon, please visit www.keia.org/aps_on_korea .

Korea Economic Instute of America

1800 K Street, NW Suite 1010

Washington, DC 20006

www.keia.org

July 31, 2013




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together to achieve rapprochementacross the Taiwan Strait, but

were lacking in the case of the Korean Peninsula during the period

of me under scruny.

Then, what are the factors behind a seemingly virtuous circle

between Taiwan and China, in which economic interdependence

seems to take roots in shaping top leaders mindset and result in

the absence of war since the 1990s? This is a queson central to

this research. The authors argue that economic interdependence,

together with negoaons and the polical will of top leaders

to pursue peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across the

Taiwan Strait. This research further explores whether these

condions exist in inter-Korean relaons.

With idencaon of the condions under which peace was

maintained through these years, this comparave study providespolicy suggesons for not only Korea and Taiwan, but also for

the United States. Trustpolik, as proposed by President Park

Geun-hye, seems to be the right direcon through which regional

stability is more likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due to

its emphasis on nurturing goodwill with the North. This strategy

in turn may create constuencies within the authoritarian North

Korean regime.

2.Rapprochementin Cross-Strait and

Inter-Korean RelaonsThe study of war and peace has been central to IR scholarship. If a

government believes that war is a constant in internaonal aairs,

then preparaon for war and investment in defense seems to be

the opmal policy choice. If peace is considered more likely to

exist, then more trade and other economic acvies are expected

to follow.

One school of thought in IR, realism, has tended to deem war as

the constant in world polics, and balance-of-power as a means

that can help maintain peace. How to acquire and resort to guns

rather than buer becomes crucial to understand and explain a

world from a realist perspecve. In other words, trade would giveway to polical antagonism between rivalries.

However, others in IR emphasize that maintaining peace despite

war seems to be a constant in world aairs. In broader literature on

peace research, rapprochementis dened as the reestablishment

of bilateral relaons between two rivals aer a conict. A school of

thought in IR scholarship suggests that economic interdependence

helps to sustain peace in the post-Cold War era.1 Economic

interdependence, as Richard Rosecrance maintains, could help

foster peace among trading states, that usually see trading mo

protable than invading.2 And, the increase of communica

resulted from trade would consequently nurture mutual trusttheir dyadic relaons. Thus, buer seems to be the main them

in world polics and the leadership of any given country shou

cooperate for mutual benets.

Scholars who side with Rosecrance seem more sanguine

argue that the growing trade volume has played a crucial ro

in prevenng direct conict in the dyadic relaons between tw

antagonist countries and the high volume of trade has helped

forge a strong interest in peace.3Though this sort of stateme

seems logically sound, many crics are suspicious of assero

of a causal relaonship between trade and peace. While liber

argue that trade could lead to peace, the evidence also sugges

that, in the face of deep trade relaons with other Europe

countries, Germany sll engaged in WWI and WWII. In addio

by considering a snapshot of the level of trade relaons at a sing

point in me, the causal arrow could be reversed so as to sugge

that it is peace that leads to trade.

Cross-Strait and inter-Korean relaons provide the case in po

to test the validity of the realist and liberal respecve argumen

about war, peace, and economic interdependence. For on

if realism holds true that polical and security considerao

trump economic ones, then polical antagonism would prece

economic interdependence and there should not have be

economic interacons between mainland China and Taiwa

If liberals are right about the posive eect that trade leads

peace, then both sides of the Korean Peninsula should have be

closer with less degree of polical antagonism. Neverthele

these two cases seem to provide a way of thinking that can furth

integrate the liberal and realist perspecves. In other words, the

two paradigms are not inherently in conict with each oth

especially when we are conducng problem-solving research th

aims to respond and deal with war and peace the real wor

problem. The arguments of economic interdependence a

societal exchanges t in to liberal thinking, and issues regardi

polical will of leadership relate to the realist tradion. Only w

a mutually complementary view of these two paradigms, can w

beer understand war and peace.

Most current studies adopt this complementary view to explo

how to facilitate peace between two rivals. Miles Kahler a

Sco Kastner invesgated the condions under which econom

engagement strategies worked best to change target countri


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policy behavior.4 They suggested that economic engagement

policies are more likely to succeed in changing the target countrys

policy when there is a broad consensus within the iniang

country, along with the fact that the target is a democracy. In otherwords, regime type maers when economic interdependence is

considered a tool to achieve polical goals. Cross-Strait and inter-

Korean relaons between 2000 and 2006 were the main focus of

their research.

As part of the analysis of bilateral interacons, other scholars

and analysts employ dierent IR theories to demonstrate how

economic cooperaon between Taiwan and mainland China has

steadily led to peace across the Taiwan Strait, while realism seems

to dominate, once and again, in the inter-Korean relaons under

the Lee Myung-bak administraon.5 According to Hyug-baeg

Im and Yu-jeong Choi, funconalism and neo-funconalism arecontribung to stabilizing cross-Strait and inter-Korean relaons,

and yet construcvism in the former and realism in the laer are

responsible for setbacks.6In other words, the paradigm shi in top

leaders mindset is a necessary condion for rivals to escape the

security dilemma and to facilitate cooperaon.

A more nuanced evaluaon on Taiwans mainland China policy

under Ma Ying-jeou and South Koreas North policy under Lee

Myung-bak advised that the two-level game theory constuted an

indispensible part. Both countries need to deal with the regional

context set by the United States while leaders are required to

respond to domesc challenges from opposion pares.7 SteveChan and his colleagues put greater emphasis on the internaonal

seng than domesc polics, wherein Mas mainland China

policy worked to preserve peace because the U.S. preferred a

relavely stable relaonship with China, and Lees policy was

highly constrained by Bushs hosle policy toward the North.

Nevertheless, U.S. support also helped both governments to ward

o domesc opposions and cricisms.

From the aforemenoned research, the relaonship between

war, peace, and economic interdependence deserves further

exploraon in considering overall cross-Strait and inter-Korean

relaons in recent years. This essay accepts the liberal assumponthat economic interdependence can serve to change state

preferences and to raise costs of conict, thus potenally altering

state behavior. However, while the liberal view adopts a snapshot

analysis that focuses on a single point of me in which trade

coexists with peace between two players, we argue that polical

will for cooperaon as another variable may also serve to stabilize

the current cross-Strait relaons. Economic interdependence,

along with negoaons and the polical will of top leaders

pursue peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across t

Taiwan Strait and may shed light on inter-Korean relaons.

3.Rapprochementin Taiwan-China Relaons, 1987-201

Since late 1987, societal level interacons have contributed

gradually transform the cross-Strait relaons. These interaco

have two major components: trade and personal visits. Econom

es remain crucial to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Figure

indicates the trading relaonship between Taiwan and Chi

from 1979 to 2012. The increase of trade volume between t

two foes creates a common interest across the Taiwan StraWhen mainland China began to reform economically in late 197

cross-Strait economic relaons improved signicantly. From 19

to 1987, Taiwans export to mainland China has increased fro

US$21.47 million to US$1,226.5 million. Total trade betwe

Taiwan and China increased from US$77.76 million in 1979

US$1,515.4 million in 1987. This number reached US$127.

billion in 2012.



Figure 2: Visits Across the Taiwan Strait

Year

Source: Mainland Aairs Council, Summary of the Exchanges across the Taiwan Strait,2013.4 (hp://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/364179671.pdf, accessed 2013/6/5).*Taiwans visit to China in 1992 is not available.

6,000,0005,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

0

Taiwan to China

China to Taiwan

Person-

Trips

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Figure 1: Cross-Strait Trade Relaons, 1979-2012

Year

Source: Data compiled from Mainland Aairs Council, Cross-Strait Economic StascMonthly (various years).

140,000

120,000100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

Exports from Taiwan to China

Imports from China to Taiwan

Total trade

US$million

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2 0 1 2


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Appendix 1: Chronology of Meetings between Taiwan and Mainland China, 1991-2013

No. Name of Meeting Date Place SubjectChief

NegotiatorsResults

1 1stC hen-Tang Talks Apr. 28 -May 4, 1991 Beijing Discussion of

procedural issues

related to cross-Strait

joint prevenon of

marime crime

C.V. Chen,

Tang Shubei

Established a cross-Strait communicaons chann

and exchanged opinions on relevant issues

2 2ndChen-Tang Talks

(Meeng on Procedural

Issue Related to Cross-

Strait Joint Prevenon of

Marime Crime)

Nov. 4-7, 1991 Beijing Discussion of

procedural issues

related to cross-Strait

joint prevenon of

marime crime

C.V. Chen,

Tang Shubei

The two sides extensively exchanged views

on cooperaon areas and held substanve

discussions on the place and me, without

achieving concrete results

3 Koo-Wang Talks Apr. 27-29, 1993 Singapore Discussion and

nalizaon of the

four agreements to

be signed by SEF

and ARATS

Koo Chen-fu,

Wang Daohan

The two sides sign four agreements: the

Agreement on the Use and Vericaon of

Cercates of Authencaon Across the Taiwan

Straits; Agreement on Maers Concerning

Inquiry and Compensaon for [Lost] RegisteredMail Across the Taiwan Straits; Agreement on

the System for Contacts and Meengs between

SEF and ARATS; and Joint Agreement of the

Koo-Wang Talks

4 1stChiao-Tang Talks Jan. 31-Feb. 5, 1994 Beijing Discussion of how to

implement the Joint

Agreement of the Koo-

Wang Talks and issues

for follow up roune

meengs

Chiao Jen-ho,

Tang Shubei

1. The two sides issue the joint press release b

Mr. Chiao Jen-ho and Mr. Tang Shubei.;

2. Measures on Facilitang the Entry and Exit o

SEF and ARATS Personnel are nalized

5 2ndChiao-Tang Talks Aug. 4-7, 1994 Taipei Discussion of SEF and

ARATS aairs and

roune consultaon

issues

Chiao Jen-ho,

Tang Shubei

The two sides issue the joint press release on

the SEF and ARATS Taipei Talks

6 3rdChiao-Tang Talks Jan. 21-28, 1995 Taipei Discussion of SEF and

ARATS aairs, roune

meeng issues, and

cross-Strait exchanges

Chiao Jen-ho,

Tang Shubei

The two sides extensively exchange views

7 Shi-Zhang Talks (Talks

between ocials in charge

at SEF and ARATS to

decide the agenda of the

Koo-Wang Meeng)

Sep. 22-24, 1998 Beijing Discussion of the

agenda for the Koo-

Wang Meeng

Shi Hwei-you,

Zhang Jincheng

The two sides reach a decision on the agenda fo

the Koo-Wang meeng

8 Koo-Wang Meeng Oct. 14-18, 1998 Shanghai,

Beijing

Dialogue with Wang

Daohan, Chen Yunlin,

Qian Qichen and

Jiang Zemin

Koo Chen-fu,

Wang Daohan

Consensus is reached on strengthening

dialogue between the two sides to promote the

resumpon of instuonalized negoaons,

agreement between the two sides on

enhancing promoon of the exchange acvies

between SEF and ARATS personnel at all levels,

agreement between the two sides to acvely

provide mutual assistance in resolving cases

involving the rights and interests of the people,

inving Mr. Wang Daohan to visit Taiwan and

Mr. Wangs agreement to visit Taiwan at an

appropriate me.


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9 1stChiang-Chen Meeng June 11-14, 2008 Beijing Negoaons on cross-

Strait charter ights

and allowing Chinese

tourists to visit Taiwan

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

1. SEF and ARATS ocially restore mechanisms

for instuonalized dialogue and negoaons.

2. The two sides sign the Minutes of Talks on

Cross-Strait Charter Flights and Cross-Strait

Agreement on Travel by Mainland Residentsto Taiwan. 3. Arrangements are made for

following up on the issues negoated between

SEF and ARATS. 4. A course is set for future

cross-Strait exchanges and cooperaon. 5.

Dialogue and exchanges between SEF and ARAT

are strengthened. 6. Chen Yunlin agrees to visit

Taiwan at an appropriate me.

10 2ndChiang-Chen Talks Nov. 7-11, 2008 Taipei Negoaons on cross-

Strait air transport,

sea transport, postal

services, and food

safety

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

1. The two sides sign the Cross-Strait Air

Transport Agreement, Cross-Strait Sea

Transport Agreement, Cross-Strait Postal

Service Agreement and Cross-Strait Food

Safety Agreement. 2. The two sides reviewed

the results and implementaon situaon

of the two agreements signed last me. 3.

Arrangements are made for following up on theissues negoated between SEF and ARATS. 4.

It further conrms the instuonalized contact

and exchange approach between personnel of

the two organizaons.

11 3rdChiang-Chen Talks April 25-29, 2009 Nanjing 1. Negoaons on

cross-Strait joint crime-

ghng and mutual

judicial assistance,

cross-Strait nancial

cooperaon, regular

cross-Strait ights and

allowing mainland

investment in Taiwan. 2.

Arrangements for issues

that SEF and ARATS

should acvely plan and

prepare for in the next

phase.

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

1. The two sides signed Agreement on Joint

Cross-Strait Crime-Fighng and Mutual Judicial

Assistance, Cross-Strait Financial Cooperaon

Agreement and Supplementary Agreement o

Cross-Strait Air Transport. They also reached a

consensus on maers pertaining to promong

mainland investment in Taiwan. 2. The two

sides re-examined the results and progress of

implementaon of the six agreements the two

organizaons have signed since last year. 3.

Arrangements are made for following up on the

issues negoated between SEF and ARATS. 4.

SEF and ARATS further consented to promong

exchanges in various areas.

12 4thChiang-Chen Talks Dec. 21-25, 2009 Taichung Negoaons on cross-

Strait cooperaon

in inspecon and

quaranne of

agricultural products;

avoiding double

taxaon and improving

cooperaon on tax

operaons; cooperaon

in respect of standards,

metrology, inspecon

and accreditaon; and

cooperaon in shingcrew aairs.

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

1. The two sides signed three agreements:

the Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperaon

in Inspecon and Quaranne of Agricultural

Products; the Cross-Strait Agreement on

Cooperaon in Respect of Standards, Metrolog

Inspecon and Accreditaon; and the Cross-

Strait Agreement on Cooperaon in Fishing Cre

Aairs. 2. Re-examined the results and progres

of implementaon of the nine agreements the

two organizaons have signed since last year.

3. Arrangements are made for following up on

the issues negoated between SEF and ARATS.

4. The two organizaons further consented topromong exchanges in various areas.




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13 5thC hiang-Chen Talks June. 28-30, 2010 Chongqing 1. Negoaons on the

Cross-Strait Economic

Cooperaon Framework

Agreement and the

Cross-Strait Agreementon Intellectual Property

Rights Protecon and

Cooperaon;

2. Arrangements for

the priority issues of

next stage

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

1. The two sides signed two agreements: the

Cross-Strait Economic Cooperaon Framework

Agreement and the Cross-Strait Agreement

on Intellectual Property Rights Protecon

and Cooperaon; 2. Re-examined the resultsand progress of implementaon of the 12

agreements the two organizaons have signed;

3. Consensus reached on the priority issues

of the next stage; 4. The two organizaons

further consented to promong exchanges in

various areas.

14 6thChiang-Chen Talks Dec. 20-22, 2010 Taipei 1. Negoaons on the

Cross-Strait Agreement

on Medical and Health

Cooperaon and

Cross-Strait Agreement

on Investment

Protecon;

2. Arrangements for

the priority issues ofnext stage

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

1. The two sides signed the Cross-Strait

Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperaon

2. Staged consensus reached on the Cross-

Strait Agreement on Investment Protecon;

3. Re-examined the results and progress of

implementaon of those agreements the two

organizaons have signed; 4. Established the

mechanism for re-examining the implementao

of those cross-Strait agreements; 5. Consensusreached on the priority issues of the next stage;

6. The two organizaons further consented to

strengthening exchanges.

15 7thChiang-Chen Talks Oct. 19-21, 2011 Tianjin To conduct negoaons

concerning a possible

cross-Strait agreement

on nuclear power

safety cooperaon,

investment protecon

and industrial

cooperaon

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

Signed the Cross-Strait Nuclear Power Safety

Cooperaon Agreement

16 8thC hiang-Chen Talks Aug. 8-10, 2012 Taipei To conduct negoaons

concerning a possible

cross-Strait agreement

on investmentprotecon and customs

cooperaon

Chiang Pin-kung,

Chen Yunlin

Signed the Cross-Strait Investment Protecon

and Promoon Agreement and the Cross-Stra

Customs Cooperaon Agreement

17 9thRound of Cross-Strait

High-Level Talks

Jun. 20-22, 2013 Shanghai 1. The rst meeng

to be held between

the two sides since

new leaders of SEF

and ARATS took oce.

2. Trade in Service

agreement is the rst

free trade agreement to

be concluded between

the two sides on the

basis of the Economic

Cooperaon Framework

Agreement (ECFA) and

the WTOs General

Agreement on Trade in

Services (GATS).

3. To facilitate

negoaons on possible

agreements on trade

in goods and dispute

selement.

Lin Join-sane,

Chen Deming

1. Signed the Cross-Strait Trade in Services

Agreement; 2. A Joint Opinion on the Kinmen

water supply issue.

*ARATS was not yet established at this me. Tang Shubei aended the talks as deputy director of the Taiwan Aairs Oce under the State Council.


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Tourism is another person-to-person interacon that contributes

to stabilizing cross-Strait relaons. Since 1988, the Taiwanese

government has allowed Taiwanese people to visit mainland

China for humanitarian reasons. In that single year, there were437,700 trips made from Taiwan to China. In the same year, 386

trips were made from China to Taiwan, for cultural exchanges

and humanitarian needs. Through the end of 2012, this number

accumulated to 70,319,789 from Taiwan to China, and to 8,946,850

from China to Taiwan, including Chinese tourists that were granted

aer 2002. The stascs regarding visits across the Taiwan Strait

are demonstrated as Figure 2.

With trade and more people-to-people interacons, there

emerged the need for cooperaon between both governments

across the Taiwan Strait to cope with the issues resulng from

these interacons. As a result, the Taiwanese governmentestablished the Strait Exchange Foundaon (SEF) to cooperate

with its counterpart on mainland China, the Associaon for

Relaons across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). To date, there a

more than 40 rounds of meengs between SEF and ARATS, w

the signicant Koo-Wang Talks authorized by both governmen

These meengs are symbolic and substanve, funconing as

plaorm for both sides to iron out dicules or concerns such

trans-border crimes. Appendix 1 indicates 17 rounds of meen

conducted by heads and high-level ocials of SEF and of ARA

from 1991 to July 2013.

These talks and negoaons on roune issues, we argue, play

a facilitang role in locking in the posive interacons betwe

both sides across the Strait. Economic interdependence increas

the costs of waging a war against each other, and negoao

and talks spread the dividends to other groups in the socie

level, which contributes to nurture constuencies favorable tostable relaonship between both sides (the doves). This is a cruc

component of the mechanism of two-level games.8

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Figure 3. Taiwans Percepon of Mainland Chinas Hoslity, 2002-2012 (Unit: %)

Hoslity toward ROC government

Hoslity toward ROC people

Survey conducted by: (a) Elecon Study Center, Naonal Chengchi University, Taipei (886-2-29387134) (b) Burke Markeng Research, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-25181088)(c) China Credit Informaon Service, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-87683266)(d) Center for Public Opinion and Elecon Studies, Naonal Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung (886-7-52520000) (e) Survey and Opinion Research Group, Dept. of Polical Science, Naonal Chung Cheng University, Chiayi (886-5-2720411)(f) e-Society Research Group, Taipei (886-2-27213658) (g) Center for Public Opinion and Public Policy, Taipei Municipal University of Educaon, Taipei (886-2-23113040)

Respondents: Taiwanese adults aged 20-69 accessible to telephone interviewers

Source: Mainland Aairs Council (MAC) of Republic of China (Taiwan), released April 2012, hp://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Aachment/24249412649.gif (accessed 2012/5/30).

Feb02(a)(1081)

Apr02(a)(1091)

July02(a)

(1091)

Dec02(f)(1076)

May03(a)

(1082)

Aug03(a)

(1149)

Nov03(a)

(1100)

Apr04(a)(1083)

July04(a)

(1153)

Dec04(b)

(1067)

May05(a)

(1084)

Aug05(a)

(1096)

Nov05(a)

(1102)

Apr06(a)(1055)

Sep06(a)(1065)

Dec06(a)

(1073)

Apr07(a)(1072)

Aug07(a)

(1095)

Dec07(b)

(1067)

Mar08(c)

(1068)

Aug08(a)

(1094)

Oct08(c)(1081)

Dec08(c)(1068)

Apr09(a)(1132)

Sep09(a)(1091)

Dec09(g)

(1092)

Apr10(a)(1087)

Sep10(a)(1072)

Dec10(a)

(1070)

May11(a)

(1099)

Sep11(a)(1069)

Nov11(a)

(1069)

Mar12(a)(1079)




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8

Economic interdependence and businesslike talks provide the

incenves for rapprochement, and yet, these two factors are not

a guarantee to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Polical will of top

leaders is the key to shaping polical agendas, with support fromdoves on both sides. Nevertheless, if a polical leader believes that

his power base does not come from the doves, then it becomes

more likely he will pursue a more hawkish policy to sasfy those

who hold a hosle view on cross-Strait relaons (the hawks).

It is important to take this component into account. Mainland China

delivered a plan for peaceful unicaon in as early as 1979, and this

plan was further formalized by Chinese Marshal Ye Jianying, the

Chairman of the Naonal Peoples Congress, in 1981. It was dubbed

Yes Nine-Point Proposal, in which Taiwan was able to maintain

its social and economic system, and even military forces, if it were

to rejoin the mainland. This proposal was in line with mainland

Chinas need for larger investment from abroad. This argument of

polical will also helps us understand why mainland China turned

to a hawkish policy under Jiang Zeming from 1995 leading up to

Taiwans rst presidenal elecon in 1996, despite the growing

numbers in economic and societal exchanges across the Taiwan

Strait. On the Taiwan side, Lee Teng-huis two-state theory and

Chen Shui-bians one country on each side statement aimed to

boost their own popularity domescally but had a negave impact

on cross-Strait relaons. In the meanme, as illustrated in Figure

1, Taiwan has been promong economic es to increase its gains

from trading with mainland China, while also hoping that moreinteracons might someday change mainlands at-whatever-it-

costs mindset for unicaon. Mainland China is also exerng the

economic carrot as leverage to raise the cost for Taiwans de jure

independence. In other words, economics rst, polics later has

served the interests of both sides. President Lee Teng-huis no

rush, be paent and President Chen Shui-bians acve opening,

eecve management eorts, aimed at slowing down the pace

and scope of Taiwans es on trade and investment with mainland

China, has turned out to be fule.

President Ma Ying-jeou took oce in 2008, and Taiwan began to

adopt the approach of viable diplomacy, in which Taiwan willnot pursue the increase of diplomac allies at the expense of

naonal resources and of its relaons with China. This approach

demonstrated Taiwans unilateral accommodaon to build trust

with mainland China. The Ma administraon connued eorts

to restore mutual polical trust with mainland China. With the

statement no unicaon, no independence, and no use of force

as the utmost guiding principle for cross-Strait relaons, President

Ma restored meengs between SEF and ARATS. President M

further proposed to instuonalize cross-Strait relaons w

the signing of the Economic Cooperaon Framework Agreeme

(ECFA) in 2010. In return, China also showed reciprocal se

restraint not to compete with Taiwan via dollar diplomacy. Figu

3 indicates Taiwans percepon of China overme.

Rapprochement seems to take roots in cross-Strait relaons,

indicated from the above discussion. Economic interdependen

as manifested in Chinas aim for economic development and

Taiwans need for connuous prosperity, plays a signicant ro

in stabilizing this dyadic relaonship. And, the polical will of t

leaders also factors into rapprochement.9

4.Rapprochementin South Korea-North Korea

Relaons, 1989-2012

South Korea, like Taiwan, needs to reconcile with its adversary f

beer economic development and other naonal goals. Besid

South Korea and Taiwan are both eager to maintain superiority

social and economic terms as a role model to their counterpar

so that they can lead the process of rapprochement.

Unlike the course in cross-Strait relaons, post-Cold War inte

Korean relaons began with South and North Koreas accession

the United Naons concomitantly on September 17, 1991. Bo

sides signed the Agreement on Reconciliaon, Nonaggressio

and Exchanges and Cooperaon in 1992. However, this seeminpromising rapprochementwas soon challenged by North Kore

nuclear gambit in the early 1990s. Under the Clinton administrao

pares concerned reached the 1994 Agreed Framework in whi

North Korea agreed to a gradual, step-by-step approach that wou

ulmately lead to a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, t

construcon of two light-water reactors (LWR) in the North, a

normalized es between Pyongyang and Washington.

Economic interdependence and

businesslike talks provide theincentives for rapprochement,and yet, these two factors arenot a guarantee to peace acrossthe Taiwan Strait.


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9

Appendix 2: Chronology of Meetings between South and North Korea, 2000-2007

No. Name of Meeting Date Place SubjectChief

NegotiatorsResults

1 1stInter-Korean Summit June 13-15, 2000 Pyongyang Discussion of

unicaon, Inter-

Korean communicaon,

family reunion

Kim Jong-il,

Kim Dae-jung

Signed the June 15th North-South Joint Declarao

2 2ndInter-Korean Summit Oct. 2-4, 2007 Pyongyang Rearmed the

spirit of the June 15

Joint Declaraon

and discussion on

various issues related

to realizing the

advancement of South-

North relaons

Kim Jong-il,

Roh Moo-hyun

Signed Peace Declaraon (eight-point agreemen

3 1stInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

July 29-31, 2000 Seoul Emphasized the great

signicance of the

historic summit talksbetween the heads of

South and North Korea

and the June 15 Joint

Declaraon

Cheon Kum-jin,

Park Jae-kyu

Joint Press Statement, including resuming the

operaons of the South-North Liaison Oce

at Panmunjeom, rehabilitang the Seoul-Shinuiju Railway

4 2ndInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Aug. 28- Sep. 1, 2000 Pyongyang Emphasized anew

the great signicance

of the June 15 Joint

Declaraon

Cheon Kum-jin,

Park Jae-kyu

Joint Press Statement, including family reunion

holding talks between South and North

Korean military authories, establishing a legal

framework for economic cooperaon

5 3rdInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Sep. 27 -30, 2000 Jeju Island Rearmed the points

agreed to aer the

announcement of

the June 15 Joint

Declaraon

Cheon Kum-jin,

Park Jae-kyu

Joint Press Statement, including family reunion

establishing a Commiee for the Promoon of

Inter-Korean Economic Cooperaon, expanding

exchange and cooperaon in academic, cultura

and athlec areas

6 4thInter-KoreanMinisterial Talk

Dec. 12-16, 2000 Pyongyang Assessed the projectsundertaken during

the last six months to

implement the June 15

Joint Declaraon

CheonKum-jin,

Park Jae-kyu

Joint Press Statement, includingestablishing and operang Inter-Korean

Economic Cooperaon Promoon Commiee,

cooperang in the shing industry

7 5thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Sep. 15-18, 2001 Seoul Discussion of the

family reunions and

developing dialogue

and cooperaon

between the two sides

Kim Ryeung-

sung, Hong

Soon-yong

Joint Press Statement, including revitalizing Mt.

Geumgang tourism, connecng railroads among

the South, the North and Russia, construcon of

the Gaeseong Industrial Complex

8 6thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Nov. 9-14, 2001 Mt.

Kumkang

Discussion on the

changing internaonal

aairs aer 9/11

Kim Ryeung-

sung, Jeong

Se-hyun

No Joint Press Release because South and

North Korea failed to reach an agreement

9 7thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Aug. 12-14, 2002 Seoul Conrmed the

willingness to carry outfaithfully the June 15

Joint Declaraon

Kim Ryeung-

sung, JeongSe-hyun

Joint Press Release, including the military

assurance measures for the reconnecon of theinter-Korean railways and roads, family reunion

North Koreas parcipaon in the 14thAsian

Games in Busan

10 8thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Oct. 19-22, 2002 Pyongyang Discussion on recent

inter-Korean relaons

and conrmed the

basic spirit of the June

15 Joint Declaraon

Kim Ryeung-

sung, Jeong

Se-hyun

Joint Press Release, including making common

eorts to guarantee peace and security on the

Korean Peninsula, construcon of the Seoul-

Sinuiju and East Sea railways and roads




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10

11 9thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Jan. 21-24, 2003 Seoul Exchanged each

others views on the

nuclear issues

Kim Ryeung-

sung, Jeong

Se-hyun

Joint Press Release, including agreeing to hold

the 10thInter-Korean Ministerial Talks from Apr

7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang

12 10th

Inter-KoreanMinisterial Talk

April 27-29, 2003 Pyongyang Discussed maers ofcommon concern in

connecon with the

implementaon of June

15thJoint Declaraon

Kim Ryeung-sung, Jeong

Se-hyun

Joint Press Release, including agreeing to holdthe 10thInter-Korean Ministerial Talks from Apr

7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang

13 11thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

July 9-12, 2003 Seoul Discussion on the

issues of mutual

concern related to the

promoon of peace on

the Korean Peninsula

and of the inter-Korean

reconciliaon and

cooperaon

Kim Ryeung-

sung, Jeong

Se-hyun

Joint Press Release, including discussing fully

the other partys posion regarding the nuclea

issue on the Korean Peninsula and connual

cooperaon

14 12thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Oct. 14-17, 2003 Pyongyang Discussion on current

issues, agreed to

connue cooperaonin promong peace on

the Korean Peninsula

Kim Ryeung-

sung, Jeong

Se-hyun

Joint Press Release, but without specic

agreements except seng a date for the next

talk

15 13thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Feb. 3-6, 2004 Seoul Discussion on the

prosperity of the

Korean people and

all problems to make

substanve progress in


Kim Ryeung-

sung, Jeong

Se-hyun

Joint Press Release, including cooperang for a

fruiul second round of the Six-Party Talks, holdin

a military authories meeng, reunion of

separated families

16 14thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

May 4-7, 2004 Pyongyang Shared the view that


should be developed

based on the basic

spirit of the June 15

Joint Declaraon

Kwon Ho-

woong, Jeong

Se-Hyun

Joint Press Release, but without signicant

results due to the Norths nuclear weapons

17 15thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

June 21-24, 2005 Seoul Assessed the

accomplishments made

over the past ve years

since the June 15 Joint

Declaraon and agreed

to promote peace

and prosperity on the

Korean Peninsula

Kwon Ho-

woong, Jeong

Dong-yong

Joint Press Release, including family reunions,

the ulmate goal of the denuclearizing the

Korean Peninsula, to hold the 3rd inter-Korean

General-level Military Talks, agreed to allow

North Korean civilian vessels to pass through th

Jeju Strait

18 16thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Sep. 13-16, 2005 Pyongyang Praised successful hosts

of the June 15 Naonal

Unicaon Fesval

held in Pyongyang and

the August 15 Grand

Naonal Fesval held

in Seoul

Kwon Ho-

woong, Jeong

Dong-yong

Joint Press Statement, including agreed to give up al

face-saving pracces and to take praccal measures

to promote naonal reconciliaon, agreed to take

acve measures to remove obstacles to economic

cooperaon and facilitate investment and exchange

between the two sides

19 17th Inter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Dec. 13-16, 2005 Jeju Island Made a posive

assessment of

developments in


during this year which

marked a turning point

in the implementaon

of the June 15 Joint

Declaraon

Kwon Ho-

woong, Jeong

Dong-yong

Joint Press Statement, including sharing a view

that the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of

the Six-Party Talks should be implemented at an

earliest possible date for the denuclearizaon

of the Korean Peninsula, agreed to expand and

develop inter-Korean economic cooperaon


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1

20 18thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Apr. 21-24, 2006 Pyongyang Evaluated

accomplishments made

since the June 15 Joint

Declaraon, agreed to

make proacve eortsto advance inter-Korean

relaons to a higher level

Kwon Ho-

woong, Lee

Jong-suk.

Joint Press Statement, including connue their

endeavors for the denuclearizaon of the Korean

Peninsula, agreed to make eorts for the naona

unity, cooperang in an economic eld

21 19thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

July 11-13, 2006 Busan Discussion on missile

launch, return to Six-

Party Talks

Kwon Ho-woong,

Lee Jong-suk

No Joint Press Statement because South and

North Korea failed to reach an agreement

22 20thInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

Feb 27-Mar. 2, 2007 Pyongyang Shared a view that the

two should normalize


expediously and the

relaons ought to

be upgraded to a

higher level

Kwon Ho-woong,

Lee Jae-jung

Joint Press Statement, including agreed to

resume joint projects in the humanitarian areas

and endeavor to praccally resolve separated

family issues, and agreed to expand and develo

economic cooperaon for common developme

and prosperity of the Korean people

23 21stInter-Korean

Ministerial Talk

May 29-June 1, 2007 Seoul No real praccal

discussion

Kwon Ho-woong,

Lee Jae-jung

Joint Press Statement

Source: Ministry of Naonal Unicaon of ROK, hp://eng.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000586 (accessed 2013/10/8), and compiled by the authors.

With a relavely calm relaonship between North Korea and the

United States, President Kim Dae-jung extended an olive branch

to the North under the name of the Sunshine Policy in 1998. In

other words, the view of doves seemed to take root not only in

South Korea but also in the North, with no evident opposion from

the United States. With supporters, especially business groups

within the South, trade volume between South and North Korea

began to grow in the same period of me as indicated in Figure 4.

Although the trade volume is considered small compared to

that in cross-Strait relaons, many sll expect that economic

interdependence between the two Koreas would lead to peace.

South Korea sees these trade es as indirect economic exchanges

in essence, no taris for these intra-Korean exchanges.

addion to economic interacons, people-to-people exchang

started with a relavely slow pace, partly due to the nature

North Koreas authoritarian regime.

Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that both Kim Dae-juand Kim Jong-il agreed to hold a summit meeng in 2000, w

the remarkable June 15th North-South Joint Declaraon. Bo

sides agreed to have ministerial talks and military working-lev

talks, and President Kim Dae-jung received the Nobel Pea

Prize for staging the summit. Appendix 2 indicates 23 roun

of meengs conducted by the heads and high-level ocials

South and North Koreas from 2000 to 2007.

Figure 4: Volume of Inter-Korean Trade

Year

Source: Data management (Korean Stascal Informaon Service Team), Ministry of Unicaon, Republic of Korea.

US$Thousand

2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

0

Imports from NK

Exports to NK

Total

1989 1991 1993 19971996 2000 20011990 1992 1995 19991994 1998 2002 2003 2005 2007 201120102004 2006 20092008 2012




12/16


12

Figure 5: Number of Visitors from South Korea to North Korea

Year

Source: Data management (Korean Stascal Informaon Service Team), Ministry of Unicaon, Republic of Korea.

NumberofVisitors

1989

200,000

180,000

160,000

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

1991 1993 19971996 2000 20011990 1992 1995 19991994 1998 2002 2003 2005 2007 201120102004 2006 20092008 2012

However, the U.S. labeling of North Korea as part of the axis

of evil put an end to the amicable atmosphere between

South and North Korea. Toward the end of 2002, North Korea

had adopted a more hosle policy toward other countries,

including missile tests and even withdrawal from the Nuclear

Nonproliferaon Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. While facing

nuclear tensions, South Korea priorized aid for peace as a

strategy to persuade North Korea to retreat from its nuclear

confrontaon with the U.S.

President Roh Moo-hyun assumed oce in February 2003 and

connued a polics rst, economics later policy. He iniated

a more proacve South Korean role in inter-Korean relaons to

somewhat contradict Washingtons hawkish stance. This was in

sharp contrast to the U.S. stance on the nuclear issue, to which

North Korea even resorted to the rst nuclear test in October

2006. President Roh, under these circumstances, sll iniated a

second summit with the North in October 2007. Nevertheless,

in spite of North Koreas connuing provocaons, conciliatory

policies adopted by Presidents Kim and Roh were perceived as

a failure.

President Lee Myung-bak assumed oce in 2008, wherein

inter-Korean relaons were about to enter a new phase given

the changing internaonal environment and the polical power

shi from a liberal to a relavely conservave government. To

respond, the Lee Myung-bak administraon proposed the Vision

3000: Denuclearizaon and Openness iniave, in which South

Korea was willing to create an environment for the North to

denuclearize and for both Koreas to prosper economically.

However, North Koreas truculent behavior made it mo

dicult, with only limited to no reciprocaon. With the sam

analycal framework, inter-Korean trade started in 1989, a

the total volume connued to grow under the Kim Dae-Ju

and Roh Moo-Hyun years. Economic cooperaon improv

over the years, especially in the aermath of the June 15th jo

communiqu made in Pyongyang in 2000. The Mt. Kumka

sightseeing project, Gaesung industrial complex project, a

other inter-Korean trade iniaves have signicantly contribut

to improved bilateral relaons. Nevertheless, this tradi

relaonship remains unidireconal, with South Korea impor

more from North Korea.

Humanitarian concerns also play a great role in South Kore

policy with the North. Reunions of separated families, abduct

issues, and disaster relief, among others, deeply impacted L

Myung-baks policy design vis--vis the North. However, No

Koreas launch of long range missiles in 2009, together w

other belligerent behavior such as the 2010 Cheonan incide

proved once again the shiiness of North Koreas policy. In oth

words, trust between the two Koreas becomes an illusion.

In this aermath, the Vision 3000 iniave, which contain

the ideas of peaceful co-existence and mutual respect, ga

way to a new peace iniave: a more comprehensive idea th

required the North to abandon nuclear weapons as the rst st

to build mutual trust between North and South Korea. Howev

this New Peace Iniave for the Korean Peninsula was de

before too long.


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Table 1: Major Comparison on Political Issues between Cross-Strait and Inter-Korean Relations

Cross-Strait Relations Inter-Korean Relations

Reason for Separaon Civil war between the Naonalists and the Communists Confrontaon between the U.S. and the Soviet Korean War

Plan for Unicaon Prior to 1980, each side was devoted to the exncon of

the other.

Since the 1980s, peaceful unicaon has emerged to become

a more aracve proposal, while mainland maintains the use

of force as the last resort.

Since 1996, most Taiwanese people prefer status quo

instead of immediate unicaon/independence.

Prior to 1973, each side was devoted to the exncon of

the other.

Since the 1980s, mutual non-denial.

In 1992, both sides reached the agreement for co-existence

In 2000, both sides agreed to seek for common ground

for unicaon.

Posions on Internaonal Recognion Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has pragmacally accepted

co-existence between both sides.

Mainland China, however, has connued to see itself as

the sole legimate government of China and Taiwan a

renegade province.

Both sides have accepted dual recognion since the

late 1980s.

The concept of one naon-state connues and both see

inter-Korean relaons as a special relaonship within the

same naon.

Posions on Internaonal Parcipaon Taiwan has accepted co-existence with mainland in major

internaonal organizaon since the early 1990s.

Mainland China has connued to reject this idea but begun to

accommodate ad hoc arrangements for Taiwans meaningful

parcipaon in certain organizaons since 2008.

Both sides joined the United Naons in 1991.

Source: Compiled by the authors.

The low intensity of the trade relaonship together with the

Norths truculent behavior, made it dicult for both sides to

build trust over me. In regards to the economic interacon and

incenves for both North and South Korea, however, with the

increase of imports from North Korea, this relaonship seems

lopsidedly in favor of the laer. We argue that a third party such

as China needs to be considered. Since China has been the largest

trade partner for North Korea over the past ten years, North

Korea has become less movated to increase trade es with the

South. This makes it even more dicult to nurture the doves in

the North who prefer stability on the Korean Peninsula. A lack of

doves prevents North Korea from further economic reform.

In addion, societal integraon and business negoaons

resulng from people-to-people exchanges are less salient in

inter-Korean relaons. This lack of integraon is demonstrated

through North Korean refugees in the South. There are thousandsof refugees living in South Korea today and they face extremely

dicult situaons due to their lack of educaon, severe

compeon, and some level of discriminaon. Also, the cultural

similarity between the North and South has widened, which in

turn has made the refugees feel like outsiders. Furthermore, a

generaon of new narraves and idenes is dicult to nd in

Korea as societal integraon and cultural exchanges between

the two Koreas are lacking resulng in a vicious, not virtuo

circle. Therefore, making stable peace through societal exchang

seems very unlikely for the Korean Peninsula.

Strong polical will, as revealed in inter-Korean relaons, is n

a guarantee to generang peace. In other words, even thou

South Korea under Kim and Roh iniated rapprochement w

North Korea, a polics rst, economics later approach witho

strong economic and social es rendered it very dicult

complete a virtuous circle and fule to sustain a posive int

Korean relaonship.

5. Lessons Learned

With the above discussion on cross-Strait and inter-Kore

relaons, certain similaries can be drawn. Beyond the histori

reasons, rst and foremost, Taiwan and South Korea are taki

the leading role for rapprochementin the dyadic relaonship w

their respecve rivals. The backbone to sustain such policy is th

strength in economy vis-a-vis mainland China and North Korea.

the past, Taiwan and South Korea were among the Four Tigers, a

now the GDP per capita in each country has exceeded $20,00

Superiority in economic strength seems to be leading the way.




14/16


14

Second, with strength in economy and as full-edged

democracies, both Taiwan and South Korea are willing to

reach out to their counterparts. And yet, North Korea has not

reciprocated to South Korea as mainland China has done withTaiwan, which makes it dicult to generate a virtuous circle in

inter-Korean relaons.

Third, the role of the United States is important in ensuring a

relavely stable external environment for Taiwan and South

Korea to pursue rapprochementwith their counterparts. Though

the U.S. does not formally ally with Taiwan, its indispensible

role has been evident in 1995-1996 when mainland China

exerted coercion over Taiwan and was at last deterred by the

deployment of U.S. aircra carriers. Both sides of the Taiwan

Strait have become more pragmac ever since. By the same

token, the U.S. has assisted South Korea, its ally, in deterring

North Koreas truculent behaviors, although these eorts are

oen compromised by other internaonal pares.

Having said that, dierences exist in our close examinaon of

these two cases. First, Taiwan and South Korea have dierent

emphases in dealing with their counterparts. Taiwan adopts an

economics rst, polics later approach, in which economic

interdependence comes rst and helps consolidate the bilateral

relaonship across the Taiwan Strait. Also, this approach provides

Taiwans leaders an opportunity to distance themselves if cross-

Strait relaons do not evolve posively. As illustrated in Figures

1 and 3, in 2004-2005 when mainland China adopted the an-

secession law against Taiwan, most Taiwanese people perceived

hoslity against Taiwans government and less to the people, and

trade and societal interacons connued to grow.

For South Korea, a polics rst approach does help to

demonstrate the leaderships resolve in forging a peaceful

Korean Peninsula, nevertheless, it leaves lile to no room for

the South to distance itself from the North during mes of

belligerence. In other words, the economics rst approach

helps Taiwans leadership to demonstrate exibility in dealing

with mainland China.

Second, how their counterparts respond also dierenates Taiwan

from South Korea. Mainland China has priorized economic

development as the chief naonal task since the late 1970s,

therefore when Taiwan reached out to establish trade relaons,

it became less dicult for the two to reconcile polically. North

Korea, however, has yet to demonstrate its willingness to reform

economically and polically, which constutes a great barrier for

peace to take root in inter-Korean relaons because no dove

can voice in a repressive polical regime.

Besides, Taiwan under the Ma Ying-jeou administraon has be

striving to instuonalize cross-Strait relaons, with econom

and societal interacons as the basis to connue rapprocheme

North Korea, however, has been using interacon as a bargain

chip vis-a-vis South Korea. The Norths on again, o aga

atude on cooperaon with the South is leading inter-Kore

relaons nowhere.

Third, North Koreas development of nuclear weapons mak

the U.S. reluctant to support South Koreas policy to the Nor

especially under the Kim and Roh administraons. On the contra

the U.S. expresses appreciaon for posive developments ov

the Taiwan Strait and thus helps the Ma administraon in Taiw

to pursue an instuonalized relaonship with mainland Chin

Economic interdependence, societal interacons with busine

like negoaons, and the polical will of top leaders to pu

relaons forward, constute a virtuous circle for peace acro

the Taiwan Strait. For inter-Korean relaons to evolve peacefu

it is important for the South to revise its previous polics r

approach to an economics rst, polics later approach. Al

for Taiwan to further instuonalize its relaons with mainla

China, it should reconsider the polical dierences over t

Taiwan Strait. As opposed to the two Koreas pursuit of a uni

Korean Peninsula, how to cope with mainland China over poliissues in which China maintains a relavely rigid one Chin

principle becomes a paramount task for Taiwan. The existen

of a virtuous circle is essenal to peace over the Taiwan Stra

nevertheless, Taiwan should note that domesc consens

and internaonal support are prerequisites to direct poli

negoaons with mainland China an important lesson fro

inter-Korean relaons.

6. Conclusion

For the me being, cross-Strait relaons seem to connue tpath for stability, and a virtuous circle composed of econom

interdependence, business-like negoaons, and polical w

between two rivalries is taking root in Taiwan-mainland Ch

relaons. This virtuous circle has not yet emerged in int

Korean relaons.

In 2013, President Park Geun-hye declared that she wou

pursue a relavely modest but pragmac course to cope w


15/16


15

North Korea. With the concept of trustpolik, Park Geun-

hye aims to reach out to North Korea with economic aid and

cultural contacts and expects goodwill in return. This approach,

according to Park, is essenal to gradually reshape North Koreastruculent behavior for the past decades and to ensure peace and

prosperity in East Asia. The goal of this approach is twofold: on

the one hand, it aims to re-establish economic and cultural es

in exchange for more responsible behavior from North Korea;

on the other hand, it can sustain, if not help, President Parks

popularity domescally by punishing the North if the laer

decides not to cooperate. To ensure stability, Madame Park

contended, this approach should be applied consistently from

issue to issue based on veriable acons. In other words, South

Korea and the internaonal community will closely monitor

North Koreas conduct to make sure it is well intended, and then

provide a reward accordingly.

This paper argues that economic interdependence, follow

by societal exchanges and business-like negoaons betwe

two rival governments, constute a necessary condion f

rapprochement. Nevertheless, the doves as a constuencan give support for polical leaders to further stabilize t

relaonship. From the experience of cross-Strait relaons, Sou

Korea may need to make a policy shi. Step-by-step econom

and societal exchanges are the foundaon, and lower-le

ocial talks might help to generate consensus and to create

larger constuency in both South and North Korea to priori

stability. From inter-Korean relaons, Taiwan shall be advis

that in lack of domesc and internaonal support, it would

premature for high-level talks or summit meengs across t

Taiwan Strait.




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KEI Editorial Board

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Endnotes

1 E.g. Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Polics, American Polical Science Review 80:4 (December 1986), pp.1151-1169; Bruce Russe and John Oneal, TheClassic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conict, 1950-1985, Internaonal StudiesQuarterly 41:2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294.

2 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World(NY: Basic Books, 1986); and A New Concert of Power, ForeignAairs71:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82. I should point out that Rosecrances argument is actually originated from the Cobden-Angell thesis that was rst made populain the 1850s and then prior to WWI. Also see Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism(NY: WW Norton & Company, 1997), ch. 8For more rened views on whether trade could promote peace, see Edward Manseld and Brian Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and Internaonal ConicNew Perspecves on an Enduring Debate(Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2003), pp. 207-221.

3 For how trade aects internaonal relaons in Asia, see James Richardson, Asia-Pacic: The Case for Geopolical Opmism, Naonal Interest, no. 38 (Winter1994/95), pp. 28-39.

4Miles Kahler and Sco Kastner, Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait, Journal Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 5 (2006), pp. 523-541.

5 Hyug-baeg Im and Yu-jeong Choi, Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relaons through the Window of Regional Integraon Theories,Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 5 (201pp. 785-811.

6 Hyug-baeg Im and Yu-jeong Choi, Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relaons through the Window of Regional Integraon Theories,Asian Sur vey, Vol. 51, No. 5 (201pp. 785-811.

7 Steve Chan, Richard Hu, and Injoo Sohn, Polics of Detente: Comparing Korea and Taiwan, The Pacic Review, Vol. 26, No. 9 (2013), pp. 199-220.

8 It should be noted here that the doves may be domesc constuencies, or the third party such as another country who also favors and benets from a stable cross-Strait relaonship.

9 A caveat here is that rapprochementdoes not always come without a cost. Some people are skepcal of Chinas growing economic and polical cloud over Taiwan,in the sense that Taiwans economy is being hollowed-out while internaonal parcipaon being dependent on Chinas goodwill. How to manage these possible sideects is crucial to Taiwans top leaders now and for the years to come.

Documents

East Asia at the Crossroads 2013