8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
1/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
Korea Economic
Institute of America
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
By Yeh-chung Lu, Byung Kwang Park, and Tung-chieh Tsai
Abstract
Security and polical issues over the Taiwan Strait and the
Korean Peninsula remain as ashpoints in East Asia since WWII.
In the aermath of the Cold War, these two cases share certain
similaries: each government wishes to maintain a relavely
stable relaonship with its adversary, namely, China and North
Korea, despite ideological dierences. Research in Internaonal
Relaons (IR) has shed light on how certain rivals gradually
reconciled with each other throughout history. Rapprochement
makes conict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Tai-
wan and mainland China relaons, economic interdependence
and posive polical and societal interacons contributed
to rapprochement between the two under the Ma Ying-jeou
administraon, while North Korea connued to threaten the
existence of South Korea in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the
laers provision of economic assistance.
The authors argue that economic interdependence, together
with negoaons and the polical will of top leaders to pursue
peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across the Taiwan
Strait. This research further explores whether these condions
exist in inter-Korean relaons.
With idencaon of the condions under which peace was
maintained through these years, this comparave study pro-
vides policy suggesons for not only Korea and Taiwan, but also
for the United States. Trustpolik, as proposed by President
Park Geun-hye, seems to be the right direcon in which region-al stability is more likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due
to its emphasis on nurturing goodwill with the North. This co
parave study also provides lessons learnt from each other.
Key words:Cross-Strait Relaons, Inter-Korean Relaons, Tru
polik, Rapprochement, Economic Interdependence
1. Introducon
Security and polical issues over the Taiwan Strait and t
Korean Peninsula remain as ashpoints in East Asia since WW
In the aermath of the Cold War, these two cases share certa
similaries: each government wishes to maintain a relavely sta
relaonship with its adversary, namely, China and North Kore
despite ideological dierences. This paper aims to explore a
compare how the policy choices adopted by the two governmen
contributed to regional peace and stability, or the lack thereof.
Research in Internaonal Relaons (IR) has shed light on ho
certain rivals gradually reconciled with each other througho
history. The concepon of rapprochement, dened as a proce
to reestablish cordial relaons between two previously hos
countries, is central to this research. Rapprochement mak
conict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Taiwan a
mainland China relaons, economic interdependence and posi
polical and societal interacons contributed to rapprocheme
between the two under the Ma Ying-jeou administraon, wh
North Korea connued to threaten the existence of South Kor
in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the laers provision of econmic assistance. In other words, globalizaon and trust work
Yeh-chung Luis Assistant Professor in the Department of Diplomacy, Naonal Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. ByungKwang Parkis Research Fellow, Instute for Naonal Security Strategy, Seoul, Korea. Tung-chieh Tsai is Professor andDirector of Graduate Instute of Internaonal Polics, Naonal Chung-Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan. Please contactDr. Lu at [email protected]. Their paper is the sixeth in KEIs Academic Paper Series. As part of this program, KEI com-missions and distributes approximately ten papers per year on original subjects of current interest to over 5,000 Koreawatchers, government ocials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States and the world. At the end ofthe year, these papers are compiled and published in KEIs On Korea volume.
For more informaon, please visit www.keia.org/aps_on_korea .
Korea Economic Instute of America
1800 K Street, NW Suite 1010
Washington, DC 20006
www.keia.org
July 31, 2013
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
2/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
2
together to achieve rapprochementacross the Taiwan Strait, but
were lacking in the case of the Korean Peninsula during the period
of me under scruny.
Then, what are the factors behind a seemingly virtuous circle
between Taiwan and China, in which economic interdependence
seems to take roots in shaping top leaders mindset and result in
the absence of war since the 1990s? This is a queson central to
this research. The authors argue that economic interdependence,
together with negoaons and the polical will of top leaders
to pursue peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across the
Taiwan Strait. This research further explores whether these
condions exist in inter-Korean relaons.
With idencaon of the condions under which peace was
maintained through these years, this comparave study providespolicy suggesons for not only Korea and Taiwan, but also for
the United States. Trustpolik, as proposed by President Park
Geun-hye, seems to be the right direcon through which regional
stability is more likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due to
its emphasis on nurturing goodwill with the North. This strategy
in turn may create constuencies within the authoritarian North
Korean regime.
2.Rapprochementin Cross-Strait and
Inter-Korean RelaonsThe study of war and peace has been central to IR scholarship. If a
government believes that war is a constant in internaonal aairs,
then preparaon for war and investment in defense seems to be
the opmal policy choice. If peace is considered more likely to
exist, then more trade and other economic acvies are expected
to follow.
One school of thought in IR, realism, has tended to deem war as
the constant in world polics, and balance-of-power as a means
that can help maintain peace. How to acquire and resort to guns
rather than buer becomes crucial to understand and explain a
world from a realist perspecve. In other words, trade would giveway to polical antagonism between rivalries.
However, others in IR emphasize that maintaining peace despite
war seems to be a constant in world aairs. In broader literature on
peace research, rapprochementis dened as the reestablishment
of bilateral relaons between two rivals aer a conict. A school of
thought in IR scholarship suggests that economic interdependence
helps to sustain peace in the post-Cold War era.1 Economic
interdependence, as Richard Rosecrance maintains, could help
foster peace among trading states, that usually see trading mo
protable than invading.2 And, the increase of communica
resulted from trade would consequently nurture mutual trusttheir dyadic relaons. Thus, buer seems to be the main them
in world polics and the leadership of any given country shou
cooperate for mutual benets.
Scholars who side with Rosecrance seem more sanguine
argue that the growing trade volume has played a crucial ro
in prevenng direct conict in the dyadic relaons between tw
antagonist countries and the high volume of trade has helped
forge a strong interest in peace.3Though this sort of stateme
seems logically sound, many crics are suspicious of assero
of a causal relaonship between trade and peace. While liber
argue that trade could lead to peace, the evidence also sugges
that, in the face of deep trade relaons with other Europe
countries, Germany sll engaged in WWI and WWII. In addio
by considering a snapshot of the level of trade relaons at a sing
point in me, the causal arrow could be reversed so as to sugge
that it is peace that leads to trade.
Cross-Strait and inter-Korean relaons provide the case in po
to test the validity of the realist and liberal respecve argumen
about war, peace, and economic interdependence. For on
if realism holds true that polical and security considerao
trump economic ones, then polical antagonism would prece
economic interdependence and there should not have be
economic interacons between mainland China and Taiwa
If liberals are right about the posive eect that trade leads
peace, then both sides of the Korean Peninsula should have be
closer with less degree of polical antagonism. Neverthele
these two cases seem to provide a way of thinking that can furth
integrate the liberal and realist perspecves. In other words, the
two paradigms are not inherently in conict with each oth
especially when we are conducng problem-solving research th
aims to respond and deal with war and peace the real wor
problem. The arguments of economic interdependence a
societal exchanges t in to liberal thinking, and issues regardi
polical will of leadership relate to the realist tradion. Only w
a mutually complementary view of these two paradigms, can w
beer understand war and peace.
Most current studies adopt this complementary view to explo
how to facilitate peace between two rivals. Miles Kahler a
Sco Kastner invesgated the condions under which econom
engagement strategies worked best to change target countri
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
3/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
3
policy behavior.4 They suggested that economic engagement
policies are more likely to succeed in changing the target countrys
policy when there is a broad consensus within the iniang
country, along with the fact that the target is a democracy. In otherwords, regime type maers when economic interdependence is
considered a tool to achieve polical goals. Cross-Strait and inter-
Korean relaons between 2000 and 2006 were the main focus of
their research.
As part of the analysis of bilateral interacons, other scholars
and analysts employ dierent IR theories to demonstrate how
economic cooperaon between Taiwan and mainland China has
steadily led to peace across the Taiwan Strait, while realism seems
to dominate, once and again, in the inter-Korean relaons under
the Lee Myung-bak administraon.5 According to Hyug-baeg
Im and Yu-jeong Choi, funconalism and neo-funconalism arecontribung to stabilizing cross-Strait and inter-Korean relaons,
and yet construcvism in the former and realism in the laer are
responsible for setbacks.6In other words, the paradigm shi in top
leaders mindset is a necessary condion for rivals to escape the
security dilemma and to facilitate cooperaon.
A more nuanced evaluaon on Taiwans mainland China policy
under Ma Ying-jeou and South Koreas North policy under Lee
Myung-bak advised that the two-level game theory constuted an
indispensible part. Both countries need to deal with the regional
context set by the United States while leaders are required to
respond to domesc challenges from opposion pares.7 SteveChan and his colleagues put greater emphasis on the internaonal
seng than domesc polics, wherein Mas mainland China
policy worked to preserve peace because the U.S. preferred a
relavely stable relaonship with China, and Lees policy was
highly constrained by Bushs hosle policy toward the North.
Nevertheless, U.S. support also helped both governments to ward
o domesc opposions and cricisms.
From the aforemenoned research, the relaonship between
war, peace, and economic interdependence deserves further
exploraon in considering overall cross-Strait and inter-Korean
relaons in recent years. This essay accepts the liberal assumponthat economic interdependence can serve to change state
preferences and to raise costs of conict, thus potenally altering
state behavior. However, while the liberal view adopts a snapshot
analysis that focuses on a single point of me in which trade
coexists with peace between two players, we argue that polical
will for cooperaon as another variable may also serve to stabilize
the current cross-Strait relaons. Economic interdependence,
along with negoaons and the polical will of top leaders
pursue peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across t
Taiwan Strait and may shed light on inter-Korean relaons.
3.Rapprochementin Taiwan-China Relaons, 1987-201
Since late 1987, societal level interacons have contributed
gradually transform the cross-Strait relaons. These interaco
have two major components: trade and personal visits. Econom
es remain crucial to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Figure
indicates the trading relaonship between Taiwan and Chi
from 1979 to 2012. The increase of trade volume between t
two foes creates a common interest across the Taiwan StraWhen mainland China began to reform economically in late 197
cross-Strait economic relaons improved signicantly. From 19
to 1987, Taiwans export to mainland China has increased fro
US$21.47 million to US$1,226.5 million. Total trade betwe
Taiwan and China increased from US$77.76 million in 1979
US$1,515.4 million in 1987. This number reached US$127.
billion in 2012.
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
Figure 2: Visits Across the Taiwan Strait
Year
Source: Mainland Aairs Council, Summary of the Exchanges across the Taiwan Strait,2013.4 (hp://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/364179671.pdf, accessed 2013/6/5).*Taiwans visit to China in 1992 is not available.
6,000,0005,000,000
4,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
0
Taiwan to China
China to Taiwan
Person-
Trips
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Figure 1: Cross-Strait Trade Relaons, 1979-2012
Year
Source: Data compiled from Mainland Aairs Council, Cross-Strait Economic StascMonthly (various years).
140,000
120,000100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
Exports from Taiwan to China
Imports from China to Taiwan
Total trade
US$million
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2 0 1 2
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
4/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
4
Appendix 1: Chronology of Meetings between Taiwan and Mainland China, 1991-2013
No. Name of Meeting Date Place SubjectChief
NegotiatorsResults
1 1stC hen-Tang Talks Apr. 28 -May 4, 1991 Beijing Discussion of
procedural issues
related to cross-Strait
joint prevenon of
marime crime
C.V. Chen,
Tang Shubei
Established a cross-Strait communicaons chann
and exchanged opinions on relevant issues
2 2ndChen-Tang Talks
(Meeng on Procedural
Issue Related to Cross-
Strait Joint Prevenon of
Marime Crime)
Nov. 4-7, 1991 Beijing Discussion of
procedural issues
related to cross-Strait
joint prevenon of
marime crime
C.V. Chen,
Tang Shubei
The two sides extensively exchanged views
on cooperaon areas and held substanve
discussions on the place and me, without
achieving concrete results
3 Koo-Wang Talks Apr. 27-29, 1993 Singapore Discussion and
nalizaon of the
four agreements to
be signed by SEF
and ARATS
Koo Chen-fu,
Wang Daohan
The two sides sign four agreements: the
Agreement on the Use and Vericaon of
Cercates of Authencaon Across the Taiwan
Straits; Agreement on Maers Concerning
Inquiry and Compensaon for [Lost] RegisteredMail Across the Taiwan Straits; Agreement on
the System for Contacts and Meengs between
SEF and ARATS; and Joint Agreement of the
Koo-Wang Talks
4 1stChiao-Tang Talks Jan. 31-Feb. 5, 1994 Beijing Discussion of how to
implement the Joint
Agreement of the Koo-
Wang Talks and issues
for follow up roune
meengs
Chiao Jen-ho,
Tang Shubei
1. The two sides issue the joint press release b
Mr. Chiao Jen-ho and Mr. Tang Shubei.;
2. Measures on Facilitang the Entry and Exit o
SEF and ARATS Personnel are nalized
5 2ndChiao-Tang Talks Aug. 4-7, 1994 Taipei Discussion of SEF and
ARATS aairs and
roune consultaon
issues
Chiao Jen-ho,
Tang Shubei
The two sides issue the joint press release on
the SEF and ARATS Taipei Talks
6 3rdChiao-Tang Talks Jan. 21-28, 1995 Taipei Discussion of SEF and
ARATS aairs, roune
meeng issues, and
cross-Strait exchanges
Chiao Jen-ho,
Tang Shubei
The two sides extensively exchange views
7 Shi-Zhang Talks (Talks
between ocials in charge
at SEF and ARATS to
decide the agenda of the
Koo-Wang Meeng)
Sep. 22-24, 1998 Beijing Discussion of the
agenda for the Koo-
Wang Meeng
Shi Hwei-you,
Zhang Jincheng
The two sides reach a decision on the agenda fo
the Koo-Wang meeng
8 Koo-Wang Meeng Oct. 14-18, 1998 Shanghai,
Beijing
Dialogue with Wang
Daohan, Chen Yunlin,
Qian Qichen and
Jiang Zemin
Koo Chen-fu,
Wang Daohan
Consensus is reached on strengthening
dialogue between the two sides to promote the
resumpon of instuonalized negoaons,
agreement between the two sides on
enhancing promoon of the exchange acvies
between SEF and ARATS personnel at all levels,
agreement between the two sides to acvely
provide mutual assistance in resolving cases
involving the rights and interests of the people,
inving Mr. Wang Daohan to visit Taiwan and
Mr. Wangs agreement to visit Taiwan at an
appropriate me.
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
5/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
5
9 1stChiang-Chen Meeng June 11-14, 2008 Beijing Negoaons on cross-
Strait charter ights
and allowing Chinese
tourists to visit Taiwan
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
1. SEF and ARATS ocially restore mechanisms
for instuonalized dialogue and negoaons.
2. The two sides sign the Minutes of Talks on
Cross-Strait Charter Flights and Cross-Strait
Agreement on Travel by Mainland Residentsto Taiwan. 3. Arrangements are made for
following up on the issues negoated between
SEF and ARATS. 4. A course is set for future
cross-Strait exchanges and cooperaon. 5.
Dialogue and exchanges between SEF and ARAT
are strengthened. 6. Chen Yunlin agrees to visit
Taiwan at an appropriate me.
10 2ndChiang-Chen Talks Nov. 7-11, 2008 Taipei Negoaons on cross-
Strait air transport,
sea transport, postal
services, and food
safety
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides sign the Cross-Strait Air
Transport Agreement, Cross-Strait Sea
Transport Agreement, Cross-Strait Postal
Service Agreement and Cross-Strait Food
Safety Agreement. 2. The two sides reviewed
the results and implementaon situaon
of the two agreements signed last me. 3.
Arrangements are made for following up on theissues negoated between SEF and ARATS. 4.
It further conrms the instuonalized contact
and exchange approach between personnel of
the two organizaons.
11 3rdChiang-Chen Talks April 25-29, 2009 Nanjing 1. Negoaons on
cross-Strait joint crime-
ghng and mutual
judicial assistance,
cross-Strait nancial
cooperaon, regular
cross-Strait ights and
allowing mainland
investment in Taiwan. 2.
Arrangements for issues
that SEF and ARATS
should acvely plan and
prepare for in the next
phase.
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed Agreement on Joint
Cross-Strait Crime-Fighng and Mutual Judicial
Assistance, Cross-Strait Financial Cooperaon
Agreement and Supplementary Agreement o
Cross-Strait Air Transport. They also reached a
consensus on maers pertaining to promong
mainland investment in Taiwan. 2. The two
sides re-examined the results and progress of
implementaon of the six agreements the two
organizaons have signed since last year. 3.
Arrangements are made for following up on the
issues negoated between SEF and ARATS. 4.
SEF and ARATS further consented to promong
exchanges in various areas.
12 4thChiang-Chen Talks Dec. 21-25, 2009 Taichung Negoaons on cross-
Strait cooperaon
in inspecon and
quaranne of
agricultural products;
avoiding double
taxaon and improving
cooperaon on tax
operaons; cooperaon
in respect of standards,
metrology, inspecon
and accreditaon; and
cooperaon in shingcrew aairs.
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed three agreements:
the Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperaon
in Inspecon and Quaranne of Agricultural
Products; the Cross-Strait Agreement on
Cooperaon in Respect of Standards, Metrolog
Inspecon and Accreditaon; and the Cross-
Strait Agreement on Cooperaon in Fishing Cre
Aairs. 2. Re-examined the results and progres
of implementaon of the nine agreements the
two organizaons have signed since last year.
3. Arrangements are made for following up on
the issues negoated between SEF and ARATS.
4. The two organizaons further consented topromong exchanges in various areas.
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
6/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
6
13 5thC hiang-Chen Talks June. 28-30, 2010 Chongqing 1. Negoaons on the
Cross-Strait Economic
Cooperaon Framework
Agreement and the
Cross-Strait Agreementon Intellectual Property
Rights Protecon and
Cooperaon;
2. Arrangements for
the priority issues of
next stage
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed two agreements: the
Cross-Strait Economic Cooperaon Framework
Agreement and the Cross-Strait Agreement
on Intellectual Property Rights Protecon
and Cooperaon; 2. Re-examined the resultsand progress of implementaon of the 12
agreements the two organizaons have signed;
3. Consensus reached on the priority issues
of the next stage; 4. The two organizaons
further consented to promong exchanges in
various areas.
14 6thChiang-Chen Talks Dec. 20-22, 2010 Taipei 1. Negoaons on the
Cross-Strait Agreement
on Medical and Health
Cooperaon and
Cross-Strait Agreement
on Investment
Protecon;
2. Arrangements for
the priority issues ofnext stage
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed the Cross-Strait
Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperaon
2. Staged consensus reached on the Cross-
Strait Agreement on Investment Protecon;
3. Re-examined the results and progress of
implementaon of those agreements the two
organizaons have signed; 4. Established the
mechanism for re-examining the implementao
of those cross-Strait agreements; 5. Consensusreached on the priority issues of the next stage;
6. The two organizaons further consented to
strengthening exchanges.
15 7thChiang-Chen Talks Oct. 19-21, 2011 Tianjin To conduct negoaons
concerning a possible
cross-Strait agreement
on nuclear power
safety cooperaon,
investment protecon
and industrial
cooperaon
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
Signed the Cross-Strait Nuclear Power Safety
Cooperaon Agreement
16 8thC hiang-Chen Talks Aug. 8-10, 2012 Taipei To conduct negoaons
concerning a possible
cross-Strait agreement
on investmentprotecon and customs
cooperaon
Chiang Pin-kung,
Chen Yunlin
Signed the Cross-Strait Investment Protecon
and Promoon Agreement and the Cross-Stra
Customs Cooperaon Agreement
17 9thRound of Cross-Strait
High-Level Talks
Jun. 20-22, 2013 Shanghai 1. The rst meeng
to be held between
the two sides since
new leaders of SEF
and ARATS took oce.
2. Trade in Service
agreement is the rst
free trade agreement to
be concluded between
the two sides on the
basis of the Economic
Cooperaon Framework
Agreement (ECFA) and
the WTOs General
Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).
3. To facilitate
negoaons on possible
agreements on trade
in goods and dispute
selement.
Lin Join-sane,
Chen Deming
1. Signed the Cross-Strait Trade in Services
Agreement; 2. A Joint Opinion on the Kinmen
water supply issue.
*ARATS was not yet established at this me. Tang Shubei aended the talks as deputy director of the Taiwan Aairs Oce under the State Council.
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
7/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
7
Tourism is another person-to-person interacon that contributes
to stabilizing cross-Strait relaons. Since 1988, the Taiwanese
government has allowed Taiwanese people to visit mainland
China for humanitarian reasons. In that single year, there were437,700 trips made from Taiwan to China. In the same year, 386
trips were made from China to Taiwan, for cultural exchanges
and humanitarian needs. Through the end of 2012, this number
accumulated to 70,319,789 from Taiwan to China, and to 8,946,850
from China to Taiwan, including Chinese tourists that were granted
aer 2002. The stascs regarding visits across the Taiwan Strait
are demonstrated as Figure 2.
With trade and more people-to-people interacons, there
emerged the need for cooperaon between both governments
across the Taiwan Strait to cope with the issues resulng from
these interacons. As a result, the Taiwanese governmentestablished the Strait Exchange Foundaon (SEF) to cooperate
with its counterpart on mainland China, the Associaon for
Relaons across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). To date, there a
more than 40 rounds of meengs between SEF and ARATS, w
the signicant Koo-Wang Talks authorized by both governmen
These meengs are symbolic and substanve, funconing as
plaorm for both sides to iron out dicules or concerns such
trans-border crimes. Appendix 1 indicates 17 rounds of meen
conducted by heads and high-level ocials of SEF and of ARA
from 1991 to July 2013.
These talks and negoaons on roune issues, we argue, play
a facilitang role in locking in the posive interacons betwe
both sides across the Strait. Economic interdependence increas
the costs of waging a war against each other, and negoao
and talks spread the dividends to other groups in the socie
level, which contributes to nurture constuencies favorable tostable relaonship between both sides (the doves). This is a cruc
component of the mechanism of two-level games.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Figure 3. Taiwans Percepon of Mainland Chinas Hoslity, 2002-2012 (Unit: %)
Hoslity toward ROC government
Hoslity toward ROC people
Survey conducted by: (a) Elecon Study Center, Naonal Chengchi University, Taipei (886-2-29387134) (b) Burke Markeng Research, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-25181088)(c) China Credit Informaon Service, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-87683266)(d) Center for Public Opinion and Elecon Studies, Naonal Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung (886-7-52520000) (e) Survey and Opinion Research Group, Dept. of Polical Science, Naonal Chung Cheng University, Chiayi (886-5-2720411)(f) e-Society Research Group, Taipei (886-2-27213658) (g) Center for Public Opinion and Public Policy, Taipei Municipal University of Educaon, Taipei (886-2-23113040)
Respondents: Taiwanese adults aged 20-69 accessible to telephone interviewers
Source: Mainland Aairs Council (MAC) of Republic of China (Taiwan), released April 2012, hp://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Aachment/24249412649.gif (accessed 2012/5/30).
Feb02(a)(1081)
Apr02(a)(1091)
July02(a)
(1091)
Dec02(f)(1076)
May03(a)
(1082)
Aug03(a)
(1149)
Nov03(a)
(1100)
Apr04(a)(1083)
July04(a)
(1153)
Dec04(b)
(1067)
May05(a)
(1084)
Aug05(a)
(1096)
Nov05(a)
(1102)
Apr06(a)(1055)
Sep06(a)(1065)
Dec06(a)
(1073)
Apr07(a)(1072)
Aug07(a)
(1095)
Dec07(b)
(1067)
Mar08(c)
(1068)
Aug08(a)
(1094)
Oct08(c)(1081)
Dec08(c)(1068)
Apr09(a)(1132)
Sep09(a)(1091)
Dec09(g)
(1092)
Apr10(a)(1087)
Sep10(a)(1072)
Dec10(a)
(1070)
May11(a)
(1099)
Sep11(a)(1069)
Nov11(a)
(1069)
Mar12(a)(1079)
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
8/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
8
Economic interdependence and businesslike talks provide the
incenves for rapprochement, and yet, these two factors are not
a guarantee to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Polical will of top
leaders is the key to shaping polical agendas, with support fromdoves on both sides. Nevertheless, if a polical leader believes that
his power base does not come from the doves, then it becomes
more likely he will pursue a more hawkish policy to sasfy those
who hold a hosle view on cross-Strait relaons (the hawks).
It is important to take this component into account. Mainland China
delivered a plan for peaceful unicaon in as early as 1979, and this
plan was further formalized by Chinese Marshal Ye Jianying, the
Chairman of the Naonal Peoples Congress, in 1981. It was dubbed
Yes Nine-Point Proposal, in which Taiwan was able to maintain
its social and economic system, and even military forces, if it were
to rejoin the mainland. This proposal was in line with mainland
Chinas need for larger investment from abroad. This argument of
polical will also helps us understand why mainland China turned
to a hawkish policy under Jiang Zeming from 1995 leading up to
Taiwans rst presidenal elecon in 1996, despite the growing
numbers in economic and societal exchanges across the Taiwan
Strait. On the Taiwan side, Lee Teng-huis two-state theory and
Chen Shui-bians one country on each side statement aimed to
boost their own popularity domescally but had a negave impact
on cross-Strait relaons. In the meanme, as illustrated in Figure
1, Taiwan has been promong economic es to increase its gains
from trading with mainland China, while also hoping that moreinteracons might someday change mainlands at-whatever-it-
costs mindset for unicaon. Mainland China is also exerng the
economic carrot as leverage to raise the cost for Taiwans de jure
independence. In other words, economics rst, polics later has
served the interests of both sides. President Lee Teng-huis no
rush, be paent and President Chen Shui-bians acve opening,
eecve management eorts, aimed at slowing down the pace
and scope of Taiwans es on trade and investment with mainland
China, has turned out to be fule.
President Ma Ying-jeou took oce in 2008, and Taiwan began to
adopt the approach of viable diplomacy, in which Taiwan willnot pursue the increase of diplomac allies at the expense of
naonal resources and of its relaons with China. This approach
demonstrated Taiwans unilateral accommodaon to build trust
with mainland China. The Ma administraon connued eorts
to restore mutual polical trust with mainland China. With the
statement no unicaon, no independence, and no use of force
as the utmost guiding principle for cross-Strait relaons, President
Ma restored meengs between SEF and ARATS. President M
further proposed to instuonalize cross-Strait relaons w
the signing of the Economic Cooperaon Framework Agreeme
(ECFA) in 2010. In return, China also showed reciprocal se
restraint not to compete with Taiwan via dollar diplomacy. Figu
3 indicates Taiwans percepon of China overme.
Rapprochement seems to take roots in cross-Strait relaons,
indicated from the above discussion. Economic interdependen
as manifested in Chinas aim for economic development and
Taiwans need for connuous prosperity, plays a signicant ro
in stabilizing this dyadic relaonship. And, the polical will of t
leaders also factors into rapprochement.9
4.Rapprochementin South Korea-North Korea
Relaons, 1989-2012
South Korea, like Taiwan, needs to reconcile with its adversary f
beer economic development and other naonal goals. Besid
South Korea and Taiwan are both eager to maintain superiority
social and economic terms as a role model to their counterpar
so that they can lead the process of rapprochement.
Unlike the course in cross-Strait relaons, post-Cold War inte
Korean relaons began with South and North Koreas accession
the United Naons concomitantly on September 17, 1991. Bo
sides signed the Agreement on Reconciliaon, Nonaggressio
and Exchanges and Cooperaon in 1992. However, this seeminpromising rapprochementwas soon challenged by North Kore
nuclear gambit in the early 1990s. Under the Clinton administrao
pares concerned reached the 1994 Agreed Framework in whi
North Korea agreed to a gradual, step-by-step approach that wou
ulmately lead to a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, t
construcon of two light-water reactors (LWR) in the North, a
normalized es between Pyongyang and Washington.
Economic interdependence and
businesslike talks provide theincentives for rapprochement,and yet, these two factors arenot a guarantee to peace acrossthe Taiwan Strait.
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
9/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
9
Appendix 2: Chronology of Meetings between South and North Korea, 2000-2007
No. Name of Meeting Date Place SubjectChief
NegotiatorsResults
1 1stInter-Korean Summit June 13-15, 2000 Pyongyang Discussion of
unicaon, Inter-
Korean communicaon,
family reunion
Kim Jong-il,
Kim Dae-jung
Signed the June 15th North-South Joint Declarao
2 2ndInter-Korean Summit Oct. 2-4, 2007 Pyongyang Rearmed the
spirit of the June 15
Joint Declaraon
and discussion on
various issues related
to realizing the
advancement of South-
North relaons
Kim Jong-il,
Roh Moo-hyun
Signed Peace Declaraon (eight-point agreemen
3 1stInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
July 29-31, 2000 Seoul Emphasized the great
signicance of the
historic summit talksbetween the heads of
South and North Korea
and the June 15 Joint
Declaraon
Cheon Kum-jin,
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including resuming the
operaons of the South-North Liaison Oce
at Panmunjeom, rehabilitang the Seoul-Shinuiju Railway
4 2ndInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Aug. 28- Sep. 1, 2000 Pyongyang Emphasized anew
the great signicance
of the June 15 Joint
Declaraon
Cheon Kum-jin,
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including family reunion
holding talks between South and North
Korean military authories, establishing a legal
framework for economic cooperaon
5 3rdInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Sep. 27 -30, 2000 Jeju Island Rearmed the points
agreed to aer the
announcement of
the June 15 Joint
Declaraon
Cheon Kum-jin,
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including family reunion
establishing a Commiee for the Promoon of
Inter-Korean Economic Cooperaon, expanding
exchange and cooperaon in academic, cultura
and athlec areas
6 4thInter-KoreanMinisterial Talk
Dec. 12-16, 2000 Pyongyang Assessed the projectsundertaken during
the last six months to
implement the June 15
Joint Declaraon
CheonKum-jin,
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, includingestablishing and operang Inter-Korean
Economic Cooperaon Promoon Commiee,
cooperang in the shing industry
7 5thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Sep. 15-18, 2001 Seoul Discussion of the
family reunions and
developing dialogue
and cooperaon
between the two sides
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Hong
Soon-yong
Joint Press Statement, including revitalizing Mt.
Geumgang tourism, connecng railroads among
the South, the North and Russia, construcon of
the Gaeseong Industrial Complex
8 6thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Nov. 9-14, 2001 Mt.
Kumkang
Discussion on the
changing internaonal
aairs aer 9/11
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong
Se-hyun
No Joint Press Release because South and
North Korea failed to reach an agreement
9 7thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Aug. 12-14, 2002 Seoul Conrmed the
willingness to carry outfaithfully the June 15
Joint Declaraon
Kim Ryeung-
sung, JeongSe-hyun
Joint Press Release, including the military
assurance measures for the reconnecon of theinter-Korean railways and roads, family reunion
North Koreas parcipaon in the 14thAsian
Games in Busan
10 8thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Oct. 19-22, 2002 Pyongyang Discussion on recent
inter-Korean relaons
and conrmed the
basic spirit of the June
15 Joint Declaraon
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including making common
eorts to guarantee peace and security on the
Korean Peninsula, construcon of the Seoul-
Sinuiju and East Sea railways and roads
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
10/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
10
11 9thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Jan. 21-24, 2003 Seoul Exchanged each
others views on the
nuclear issues
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including agreeing to hold
the 10thInter-Korean Ministerial Talks from Apr
7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang
12 10th
Inter-KoreanMinisterial Talk
April 27-29, 2003 Pyongyang Discussed maers ofcommon concern in
connecon with the
implementaon of June
15thJoint Declaraon
Kim Ryeung-sung, Jeong
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including agreeing to holdthe 10thInter-Korean Ministerial Talks from Apr
7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang
13 11thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
July 9-12, 2003 Seoul Discussion on the
issues of mutual
concern related to the
promoon of peace on
the Korean Peninsula
and of the inter-Korean
reconciliaon and
cooperaon
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including discussing fully
the other partys posion regarding the nuclea
issue on the Korean Peninsula and connual
cooperaon
14 12thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Oct. 14-17, 2003 Pyongyang Discussion on current
issues, agreed to
connue cooperaonin promong peace on
the Korean Peninsula
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, but without specic
agreements except seng a date for the next
talk
15 13thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Feb. 3-6, 2004 Seoul Discussion on the
prosperity of the
Korean people and
all problems to make
substanve progress in
inter-Korean relaons
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including cooperang for a
fruiul second round of the Six-Party Talks, holdin
a military authories meeng, reunion of
separated families
16 14thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
May 4-7, 2004 Pyongyang Shared the view that
inter-Korean relaons
should be developed
based on the basic
spirit of the June 15
Joint Declaraon
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong
Se-Hyun
Joint Press Release, but without signicant
results due to the Norths nuclear weapons
17 15thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
June 21-24, 2005 Seoul Assessed the
accomplishments made
over the past ve years
since the June 15 Joint
Declaraon and agreed
to promote peace
and prosperity on the
Korean Peninsula
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong
Dong-yong
Joint Press Release, including family reunions,
the ulmate goal of the denuclearizing the
Korean Peninsula, to hold the 3rd inter-Korean
General-level Military Talks, agreed to allow
North Korean civilian vessels to pass through th
Jeju Strait
18 16thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Sep. 13-16, 2005 Pyongyang Praised successful hosts
of the June 15 Naonal
Unicaon Fesval
held in Pyongyang and
the August 15 Grand
Naonal Fesval held
in Seoul
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong
Dong-yong
Joint Press Statement, including agreed to give up al
face-saving pracces and to take praccal measures
to promote naonal reconciliaon, agreed to take
acve measures to remove obstacles to economic
cooperaon and facilitate investment and exchange
between the two sides
19 17th Inter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Dec. 13-16, 2005 Jeju Island Made a posive
assessment of
developments in
inter-Korean relaons
during this year which
marked a turning point
in the implementaon
of the June 15 Joint
Declaraon
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong
Dong-yong
Joint Press Statement, including sharing a view
that the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of
the Six-Party Talks should be implemented at an
earliest possible date for the denuclearizaon
of the Korean Peninsula, agreed to expand and
develop inter-Korean economic cooperaon
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
11/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
1
20 18thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Apr. 21-24, 2006 Pyongyang Evaluated
accomplishments made
since the June 15 Joint
Declaraon, agreed to
make proacve eortsto advance inter-Korean
relaons to a higher level
Kwon Ho-
woong, Lee
Jong-suk.
Joint Press Statement, including connue their
endeavors for the denuclearizaon of the Korean
Peninsula, agreed to make eorts for the naona
unity, cooperang in an economic eld
21 19thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
July 11-13, 2006 Busan Discussion on missile
launch, return to Six-
Party Talks
Kwon Ho-woong,
Lee Jong-suk
No Joint Press Statement because South and
North Korea failed to reach an agreement
22 20thInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
Feb 27-Mar. 2, 2007 Pyongyang Shared a view that the
two should normalize
inter-Korean relaons
expediously and the
relaons ought to
be upgraded to a
higher level
Kwon Ho-woong,
Lee Jae-jung
Joint Press Statement, including agreed to
resume joint projects in the humanitarian areas
and endeavor to praccally resolve separated
family issues, and agreed to expand and develo
economic cooperaon for common developme
and prosperity of the Korean people
23 21stInter-Korean
Ministerial Talk
May 29-June 1, 2007 Seoul No real praccal
discussion
Kwon Ho-woong,
Lee Jae-jung
Joint Press Statement
Source: Ministry of Naonal Unicaon of ROK, hp://eng.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000586 (accessed 2013/10/8), and compiled by the authors.
With a relavely calm relaonship between North Korea and the
United States, President Kim Dae-jung extended an olive branch
to the North under the name of the Sunshine Policy in 1998. In
other words, the view of doves seemed to take root not only in
South Korea but also in the North, with no evident opposion from
the United States. With supporters, especially business groups
within the South, trade volume between South and North Korea
began to grow in the same period of me as indicated in Figure 4.
Although the trade volume is considered small compared to
that in cross-Strait relaons, many sll expect that economic
interdependence between the two Koreas would lead to peace.
South Korea sees these trade es as indirect economic exchanges
in essence, no taris for these intra-Korean exchanges.
addion to economic interacons, people-to-people exchang
started with a relavely slow pace, partly due to the nature
North Koreas authoritarian regime.
Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that both Kim Dae-juand Kim Jong-il agreed to hold a summit meeng in 2000, w
the remarkable June 15th North-South Joint Declaraon. Bo
sides agreed to have ministerial talks and military working-lev
talks, and President Kim Dae-jung received the Nobel Pea
Prize for staging the summit. Appendix 2 indicates 23 roun
of meengs conducted by the heads and high-level ocials
South and North Koreas from 2000 to 2007.
Figure 4: Volume of Inter-Korean Trade
Year
Source: Data management (Korean Stascal Informaon Service Team), Ministry of Unicaon, Republic of Korea.
US$Thousand
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
Imports from NK
Exports to NK
Total
1989 1991 1993 19971996 2000 20011990 1992 1995 19991994 1998 2002 2003 2005 2007 201120102004 2006 20092008 2012
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
12/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
12
Figure 5: Number of Visitors from South Korea to North Korea
Year
Source: Data management (Korean Stascal Informaon Service Team), Ministry of Unicaon, Republic of Korea.
NumberofVisitors
1989
200,000
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
1991 1993 19971996 2000 20011990 1992 1995 19991994 1998 2002 2003 2005 2007 201120102004 2006 20092008 2012
However, the U.S. labeling of North Korea as part of the axis
of evil put an end to the amicable atmosphere between
South and North Korea. Toward the end of 2002, North Korea
had adopted a more hosle policy toward other countries,
including missile tests and even withdrawal from the Nuclear
Nonproliferaon Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. While facing
nuclear tensions, South Korea priorized aid for peace as a
strategy to persuade North Korea to retreat from its nuclear
confrontaon with the U.S.
President Roh Moo-hyun assumed oce in February 2003 and
connued a polics rst, economics later policy. He iniated
a more proacve South Korean role in inter-Korean relaons to
somewhat contradict Washingtons hawkish stance. This was in
sharp contrast to the U.S. stance on the nuclear issue, to which
North Korea even resorted to the rst nuclear test in October
2006. President Roh, under these circumstances, sll iniated a
second summit with the North in October 2007. Nevertheless,
in spite of North Koreas connuing provocaons, conciliatory
policies adopted by Presidents Kim and Roh were perceived as
a failure.
President Lee Myung-bak assumed oce in 2008, wherein
inter-Korean relaons were about to enter a new phase given
the changing internaonal environment and the polical power
shi from a liberal to a relavely conservave government. To
respond, the Lee Myung-bak administraon proposed the Vision
3000: Denuclearizaon and Openness iniave, in which South
Korea was willing to create an environment for the North to
denuclearize and for both Koreas to prosper economically.
However, North Koreas truculent behavior made it mo
dicult, with only limited to no reciprocaon. With the sam
analycal framework, inter-Korean trade started in 1989, a
the total volume connued to grow under the Kim Dae-Ju
and Roh Moo-Hyun years. Economic cooperaon improv
over the years, especially in the aermath of the June 15th jo
communiqu made in Pyongyang in 2000. The Mt. Kumka
sightseeing project, Gaesung industrial complex project, a
other inter-Korean trade iniaves have signicantly contribut
to improved bilateral relaons. Nevertheless, this tradi
relaonship remains unidireconal, with South Korea impor
more from North Korea.
Humanitarian concerns also play a great role in South Kore
policy with the North. Reunions of separated families, abduct
issues, and disaster relief, among others, deeply impacted L
Myung-baks policy design vis--vis the North. However, No
Koreas launch of long range missiles in 2009, together w
other belligerent behavior such as the 2010 Cheonan incide
proved once again the shiiness of North Koreas policy. In oth
words, trust between the two Koreas becomes an illusion.
In this aermath, the Vision 3000 iniave, which contain
the ideas of peaceful co-existence and mutual respect, ga
way to a new peace iniave: a more comprehensive idea th
required the North to abandon nuclear weapons as the rst st
to build mutual trust between North and South Korea. Howev
this New Peace Iniave for the Korean Peninsula was de
before too long.
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
13/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
13
Table 1: Major Comparison on Political Issues between Cross-Strait and Inter-Korean Relations
Cross-Strait Relations Inter-Korean Relations
Reason for Separaon Civil war between the Naonalists and the Communists Confrontaon between the U.S. and the Soviet Korean War
Plan for Unicaon Prior to 1980, each side was devoted to the exncon of
the other.
Since the 1980s, peaceful unicaon has emerged to become
a more aracve proposal, while mainland maintains the use
of force as the last resort.
Since 1996, most Taiwanese people prefer status quo
instead of immediate unicaon/independence.
Prior to 1973, each side was devoted to the exncon of
the other.
Since the 1980s, mutual non-denial.
In 1992, both sides reached the agreement for co-existence
In 2000, both sides agreed to seek for common ground
for unicaon.
Posions on Internaonal Recognion Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has pragmacally accepted
co-existence between both sides.
Mainland China, however, has connued to see itself as
the sole legimate government of China and Taiwan a
renegade province.
Both sides have accepted dual recognion since the
late 1980s.
The concept of one naon-state connues and both see
inter-Korean relaons as a special relaonship within the
same naon.
Posions on Internaonal Parcipaon Taiwan has accepted co-existence with mainland in major
internaonal organizaon since the early 1990s.
Mainland China has connued to reject this idea but begun to
accommodate ad hoc arrangements for Taiwans meaningful
parcipaon in certain organizaons since 2008.
Both sides joined the United Naons in 1991.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
The low intensity of the trade relaonship together with the
Norths truculent behavior, made it dicult for both sides to
build trust over me. In regards to the economic interacon and
incenves for both North and South Korea, however, with the
increase of imports from North Korea, this relaonship seems
lopsidedly in favor of the laer. We argue that a third party such
as China needs to be considered. Since China has been the largest
trade partner for North Korea over the past ten years, North
Korea has become less movated to increase trade es with the
South. This makes it even more dicult to nurture the doves in
the North who prefer stability on the Korean Peninsula. A lack of
doves prevents North Korea from further economic reform.
In addion, societal integraon and business negoaons
resulng from people-to-people exchanges are less salient in
inter-Korean relaons. This lack of integraon is demonstrated
through North Korean refugees in the South. There are thousandsof refugees living in South Korea today and they face extremely
dicult situaons due to their lack of educaon, severe
compeon, and some level of discriminaon. Also, the cultural
similarity between the North and South has widened, which in
turn has made the refugees feel like outsiders. Furthermore, a
generaon of new narraves and idenes is dicult to nd in
Korea as societal integraon and cultural exchanges between
the two Koreas are lacking resulng in a vicious, not virtuo
circle. Therefore, making stable peace through societal exchang
seems very unlikely for the Korean Peninsula.
Strong polical will, as revealed in inter-Korean relaons, is n
a guarantee to generang peace. In other words, even thou
South Korea under Kim and Roh iniated rapprochement w
North Korea, a polics rst, economics later approach witho
strong economic and social es rendered it very dicult
complete a virtuous circle and fule to sustain a posive int
Korean relaonship.
5. Lessons Learned
With the above discussion on cross-Strait and inter-Kore
relaons, certain similaries can be drawn. Beyond the histori
reasons, rst and foremost, Taiwan and South Korea are taki
the leading role for rapprochementin the dyadic relaonship w
their respecve rivals. The backbone to sustain such policy is th
strength in economy vis-a-vis mainland China and North Korea.
the past, Taiwan and South Korea were among the Four Tigers, a
now the GDP per capita in each country has exceeded $20,00
Superiority in economic strength seems to be leading the way.
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
14/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
14
Second, with strength in economy and as full-edged
democracies, both Taiwan and South Korea are willing to
reach out to their counterparts. And yet, North Korea has not
reciprocated to South Korea as mainland China has done withTaiwan, which makes it dicult to generate a virtuous circle in
inter-Korean relaons.
Third, the role of the United States is important in ensuring a
relavely stable external environment for Taiwan and South
Korea to pursue rapprochementwith their counterparts. Though
the U.S. does not formally ally with Taiwan, its indispensible
role has been evident in 1995-1996 when mainland China
exerted coercion over Taiwan and was at last deterred by the
deployment of U.S. aircra carriers. Both sides of the Taiwan
Strait have become more pragmac ever since. By the same
token, the U.S. has assisted South Korea, its ally, in deterring
North Koreas truculent behaviors, although these eorts are
oen compromised by other internaonal pares.
Having said that, dierences exist in our close examinaon of
these two cases. First, Taiwan and South Korea have dierent
emphases in dealing with their counterparts. Taiwan adopts an
economics rst, polics later approach, in which economic
interdependence comes rst and helps consolidate the bilateral
relaonship across the Taiwan Strait. Also, this approach provides
Taiwans leaders an opportunity to distance themselves if cross-
Strait relaons do not evolve posively. As illustrated in Figures
1 and 3, in 2004-2005 when mainland China adopted the an-
secession law against Taiwan, most Taiwanese people perceived
hoslity against Taiwans government and less to the people, and
trade and societal interacons connued to grow.
For South Korea, a polics rst approach does help to
demonstrate the leaderships resolve in forging a peaceful
Korean Peninsula, nevertheless, it leaves lile to no room for
the South to distance itself from the North during mes of
belligerence. In other words, the economics rst approach
helps Taiwans leadership to demonstrate exibility in dealing
with mainland China.
Second, how their counterparts respond also dierenates Taiwan
from South Korea. Mainland China has priorized economic
development as the chief naonal task since the late 1970s,
therefore when Taiwan reached out to establish trade relaons,
it became less dicult for the two to reconcile polically. North
Korea, however, has yet to demonstrate its willingness to reform
economically and polically, which constutes a great barrier for
peace to take root in inter-Korean relaons because no dove
can voice in a repressive polical regime.
Besides, Taiwan under the Ma Ying-jeou administraon has be
striving to instuonalize cross-Strait relaons, with econom
and societal interacons as the basis to connue rapprocheme
North Korea, however, has been using interacon as a bargain
chip vis-a-vis South Korea. The Norths on again, o aga
atude on cooperaon with the South is leading inter-Kore
relaons nowhere.
Third, North Koreas development of nuclear weapons mak
the U.S. reluctant to support South Koreas policy to the Nor
especially under the Kim and Roh administraons. On the contra
the U.S. expresses appreciaon for posive developments ov
the Taiwan Strait and thus helps the Ma administraon in Taiw
to pursue an instuonalized relaonship with mainland Chin
Economic interdependence, societal interacons with busine
like negoaons, and the polical will of top leaders to pu
relaons forward, constute a virtuous circle for peace acro
the Taiwan Strait. For inter-Korean relaons to evolve peacefu
it is important for the South to revise its previous polics r
approach to an economics rst, polics later approach. Al
for Taiwan to further instuonalize its relaons with mainla
China, it should reconsider the polical dierences over t
Taiwan Strait. As opposed to the two Koreas pursuit of a uni
Korean Peninsula, how to cope with mainland China over poliissues in which China maintains a relavely rigid one Chin
principle becomes a paramount task for Taiwan. The existen
of a virtuous circle is essenal to peace over the Taiwan Stra
nevertheless, Taiwan should note that domesc consens
and internaonal support are prerequisites to direct poli
negoaons with mainland China an important lesson fro
inter-Korean relaons.
6. Conclusion
For the me being, cross-Strait relaons seem to connue tpath for stability, and a virtuous circle composed of econom
interdependence, business-like negoaons, and polical w
between two rivalries is taking root in Taiwan-mainland Ch
relaons. This virtuous circle has not yet emerged in int
Korean relaons.
In 2013, President Park Geun-hye declared that she wou
pursue a relavely modest but pragmac course to cope w
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
15/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
15
North Korea. With the concept of trustpolik, Park Geun-
hye aims to reach out to North Korea with economic aid and
cultural contacts and expects goodwill in return. This approach,
according to Park, is essenal to gradually reshape North Koreastruculent behavior for the past decades and to ensure peace and
prosperity in East Asia. The goal of this approach is twofold: on
the one hand, it aims to re-establish economic and cultural es
in exchange for more responsible behavior from North Korea;
on the other hand, it can sustain, if not help, President Parks
popularity domescally by punishing the North if the laer
decides not to cooperate. To ensure stability, Madame Park
contended, this approach should be applied consistently from
issue to issue based on veriable acons. In other words, South
Korea and the internaonal community will closely monitor
North Koreas conduct to make sure it is well intended, and then
provide a reward accordingly.
This paper argues that economic interdependence, follow
by societal exchanges and business-like negoaons betwe
two rival governments, constute a necessary condion f
rapprochement. Nevertheless, the doves as a constuencan give support for polical leaders to further stabilize t
relaonship. From the experience of cross-Strait relaons, Sou
Korea may need to make a policy shi. Step-by-step econom
and societal exchanges are the foundaon, and lower-le
ocial talks might help to generate consensus and to create
larger constuency in both South and North Korea to priori
stability. From inter-Korean relaons, Taiwan shall be advis
that in lack of domesc and internaonal support, it would
premature for high-level talks or summit meengs across t
Taiwan Strait.
East Asia at the Crossroads: A Comparative Study on Taiwans and
Koreas Reconciliation with Adversaries
8/13/2019 East Asia at the Crossroads 2013
16/16
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
16
KEI Editorial Board
KEI Editor:Nicholas Hamisevicz | Contract Editor:Gimga Group | Design:Gimga Group
The Korea Economic Instute of America (KEI) is a not-for-prot policy and educaonal outreach organizaon focused on promodialogue and understanding between the United States and Korea. Established in 1982, KEI covers all aspects of the alliance, includieconomic, trade, naonal security, and broader regional issues through publicaons, forums and conferences across North Americ
KEI is an aliate with the Korea Instute for Internaonal Economic Policy, a public research instute in the Republic of Korea.The views expressed in this publicaon are those of the authors. While this paper is part of the overall program of the Korea EconomInstute of America endorsed by its Ocers, Board of Directors, and Advisory Council, its contents do not necessarily reect tviews of individual members of the Board or of the Advisory Council.
Copyright 2013 Korea Economic Instute of America Printed in the United States of America.
1800 K St. NW, Suite 1010 | Washington, DC 20006
T.202.464.1982 | F.202.464.1987 | www.keia.org
Endnotes
1 E.g. Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Polics, American Polical Science Review 80:4 (December 1986), pp.1151-1169; Bruce Russe and John Oneal, TheClassic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conict, 1950-1985, Internaonal StudiesQuarterly 41:2 (June 1997), pp. 267-294.
2 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World(NY: Basic Books, 1986); and A New Concert of Power, ForeignAairs71:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 64-82. I should point out that Rosecrances argument is actually originated from the Cobden-Angell thesis that was rst made populain the 1850s and then prior to WWI. Also see Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism(NY: WW Norton & Company, 1997), ch. 8For more rened views on whether trade could promote peace, see Edward Manseld and Brian Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and Internaonal ConicNew Perspecves on an Enduring Debate(Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2003), pp. 207-221.
3 For how trade aects internaonal relaons in Asia, see James Richardson, Asia-Pacic: The Case for Geopolical Opmism, Naonal Interest, no. 38 (Winter1994/95), pp. 28-39.
4Miles Kahler and Sco Kastner, Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait, Journal Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 5 (2006), pp. 523-541.
5 Hyug-baeg Im and Yu-jeong Choi, Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relaons through the Window of Regional Integraon Theories,Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 5 (201pp. 785-811.
6 Hyug-baeg Im and Yu-jeong Choi, Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relaons through the Window of Regional Integraon Theories,Asian Sur vey, Vol. 51, No. 5 (201pp. 785-811.
7 Steve Chan, Richard Hu, and Injoo Sohn, Polics of Detente: Comparing Korea and Taiwan, The Pacic Review, Vol. 26, No. 9 (2013), pp. 199-220.
8 It should be noted here that the doves may be domesc constuencies, or the third party such as another country who also favors and benets from a stable cross-Strait relaonship.
9 A caveat here is that rapprochementdoes not always come without a cost. Some people are skepcal of Chinas growing economic and polical cloud over Taiwan,in the sense that Taiwans economy is being hollowed-out while internaonal parcipaon being dependent on Chinas goodwill. How to manage these possible sideects is crucial to Taiwans top leaders now and for the years to come.