Econ 522Economics of Law

Dan Quint

Spring 2010

Lecture 2

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If you’re still trying to get into the class, see me after lecture

Sample exam questions posted online

TA sections begin this Friday

“Fake homework”

Logistics

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defined law and economics

saw some brief history of the common law

and the civil law

and discussed ownership of dead whales

Last week, we…

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what is efficiency?

is efficiency a good goal for the law?

Today: efficiency

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What is“efficiency”?

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a Pareto improvement is any change to the economy which leaves… everyone at least as well off, and someone strictly better off

example of a Pareto improvement your car is worth $3,000 to you, $4,000 to me I buy it for $3,500

an outcome is Pareto superior to another, or Pareto dominates it, if the second is a Pareto improvement over the first

First concept: Pareto improvement

Vilfredo Pareto(1848-1923)

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Pareto improvements are “win-win” but most new laws create some winners and some losers so the Pareto criterion usually can’t tell us whether one policy is

“better” than another even the car example might not be a true Pareto-improvement

so we need another way to compare outcomes

Pareto superiority is not that useful a measure for evaluating a legal system

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a Kaldor-Hicks improvement is any change to the economy which could be turned into a Pareto improvement with monetary transfers also called potential Pareto improvement

car example again your car is worth $3,000 to you and $4,000 to me government takes your car and gives it to me

I’m better off, you’re worse off but if we combined this with me giving you $3,500, it becomes a Pareto

improvement so me getting your car is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement

a Kaldor-Hicks improvement may create winners and losers, but gains outweigh the losses

Next concept: Kaldor-Hicks improvement

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You and I are neighbors, you want to throw a party The party would make me $100 worse off… …and make you $50 better off… …and make each of your 30 guests be $5 better off

Is the party a Pareto improvement? No – it makes you and your guests better off, makes me worse off

Is the party a Kaldor-Hicks improvement? Yes – because the party, combined with the appropriate money transfers,

would be a Pareto improvement (Example: you throw the party, you give me $40, each of your guests gives

me $3 – that’s a Pareto improvement)

Example

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To check if something is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, we can…

look for transfers that turn it into a Pareto-improvement…

…or, just count up the gains of the winners and the losses of the losers, and see which is bigger

Kaldor-Hicks improvements may make some people worse off, but the gains outweigh the losses if you have the party… I’m $100 worse off You’re $40 better off 30 guests are each $3 better off – $100 + $40 + 30 X $3 = $30 > 0 Gains outweigh losses, so party is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement

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So…

A Kaldor-Hicks improvement is any change that“creates value…”

But, value is equated with willingness to pay That is, we said the party made me $100 worse off We equated my disutility from you making noise with the amount

of money that would replace the inconvenience If you threw the party and gave me $100, I’d be just as well off as

before By equating utility with money, we create a way to compare

utility across individuals But assuming that how badly you want something is equal to

how much you’d pay for it has problems of its own…

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a situation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or just efficient, if there are no available Kaldor-Hicks improvements

In other words, efficiency is when there’s no way to make some people in the economy better off, without making some others worse off by more we’re already getting maximal value out of all available resources

We’ll also say A is “more efficient” than B if moving from B to A is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement

Efficiency

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Example: is it efficient for me to drive to work instead of taking the bus?

Bus to school from where I live is free

Driving is more convenient, but costs me $1 (gas)

Driving also imposes costs on other people: there’s more traffic, less parking, more pollution Suppose when I drive to work, it makes 1,000 other people worse off

by $0.01 each

If the benefit to me of driving to work is at least $11, it’s efficient for me to drive; if it’s less than $11, it’s not

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our definition of efficiency: all possible Kaldor-Hicks improvements have already been made

Ellickson: “minimizing the objective sum of

(1) transaction costs, and

(2) deadweight losses arising from failures to exploit potential gains from trade”

Posner: “wealth maximization”

Polinsky: “Efficiency corresponds to ‘the size of the pie’”

Some other, similar measures

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What forces lead to inefficiency

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To see whether something’s efficient…

Compare gains to everyone in society (total social benefit)…

…to costs to everyone (total social costs)

Example we just saw (me driving to work): Total social benefit = whatever the benefit is to me Total social cost = $1 (gas) + 1,000 X $0.01 = $11 So we just said: it’s efficient for me to drive to campus whenever

the value I get from driving is more than $11

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But what do people actually do?

When people decide how to act…

…they consider the cost and benefit to themselves, not to everyone private benefit and private cost

Driving only costs me $1 in gas – so I’ll drive whenever value to me is more than $1

On days where my benefit from driving is more than $1 but less than $11, I drive to work even though that’s inefficient

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So externalities cause inefficiency

Efficiency depends on whether social benefit > social cost

I’ll do it whenever private benefit > private cost

If I’m the only one affected by my choices, then social benefit = private benefit and social cost = private cost so my choices will be efficient

But when my choices affect other peoples’ payoffs… social benefit private benefit, or social cost private cost so actions I choose to take may not be efficient

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A classic example of this: the Tragedy of the Commons

Hardin (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons”

Picture a small fishing village on a lake The more fish I catch, the fewer

fish are left in the lake… …and the harder it is for everyone

else in the village to catch fish So my fishing imposes an

externality on everyone else This means everyone ends up

fishing more than the efficient amount

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Tragedy of the Commons – example

Suppose the town has 20 fishermen The cost (disutility, effort) of fishing is 4 fish per hour Notation

h = how many hours a day I fish H = combined hours a day everyone in town fishes (including me) H = combined hours a day everyone but me fishes

Fishermen catch 130 – H fish per hour

(a) Left to their own devices, how much will each person fish? How much utility will each person get?

(b) Is this efficient?

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So, externalities cause inefficiency

Fishing imposes a negative externality on other fishermen Each one ignores this externality when deciding how much to fish… …so they all end up fishing more than the efficient amount

Same thing happens with other communal resources Cattle grazing, whaling, overhunting, oyster beds Elinor Ostrom, who shared this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics, studies

how different societies solve this problem

Positive externalities work the opposite way Activities which create positive externalities are done less than the

efficient amount

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Other forces which lead to inefficiency

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Without some sort of intervention… Activities which impose a negative externality will be done an

inefficiently high amount… …and activities which impose a positive externality will be done

an inefficiently low amount

One theme we’ll see in this class:

if we want the law to lead to efficient outcomes,

we can try to design the law to eliminate externalities!

So we know externalities can lead to inefficiency

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Cuban cigars Suppose I’d pay $15 each for Cohibas They cost $2 each to make Clearly, it’s efficient for me to smoke Cohibas But trade embargo on Cuba makes it illegal for me to buy them

Anything that prevents me from buying something I want can be a source of inefficiency One approach to property law: make it as easy as possible for people to

trade among themselves (This may seem like an obvious point; but then, there are lots of things

we’re not allowed to sell…)

Another thing that leads to inefficiency:barriers to trade

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I value my free time at $40/hour

Working in a factory, I can build things worth $50/hour

Clearly, it’s efficient for someone with a factory to hire me

But if income tax is 25%, then it won’t happen Factory owner can’t pay me more than $50/hour I won’t accept less than $53.33/hour pre-tax

And another: taxes

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CS

Profit

Example Demand for some good

given by P = 100 – Q Monopolist can produce

good for $40/unit Monopoly price is 70,

demand is 30 Deadweight loss is

inefficiency Customers willing to pay

more than marginal cost but unable to trade

Another: monopoly

P* = 70P = 100 – Q

Q* = 30

MC = 40DWL

(or private information)

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For example we just said taxes lead to inefficiency but without taxes, there’s no way to fund public goods, and not

having public goods is also inefficient

But also, we’ve defined “efficient”, but we haven’t claimed that “efficient = good”

Which brings us to…

But, saying these things lead to inefficiency doesn’t automatically mean they’re bad

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Is efficiency a good goal for the law?

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positive statements are statements of fact “economics of what is” can be descriptive: “in 2007, U.S. GDP was $13.8 trillion” can be theoretical predictions: “if prices rise, demand will fall”

normative statements contain value judgments “economics of what ought to be” for example, “less inequality is better” or, “government should encourage innovation”

Important distinction: positive versus normative economics

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Predicting behavior, and outcomes, that follow from a law or legal system is positive analysis “Law X will lead to more car accidents than law Y” “Law X will lead to more efficient outcomes than law Y”

But in the background, we’d like some sense of what is the normative goal of the legal system “Law X is better than law Y”

Posner, and many others, argue that efficiency should be that goal

Most of this class will be positive

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Richard Posner (1980), The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication

Starts with the observation: if you buy a lottery ticket and don’t win anything, you can’t complain

Imagine before we all started driving, everyone in the world got together and negotiated a liability rule for traffic accidents

If one rule is more efficient than another, we’d all vote for that rule ex-ante – ex-ante consent

Posner gives us one argument why the law should aim to be efficient

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Even ex-ante, bad drivers might prefer a less efficient system if it meant drivers weren’t responsible

Posner deals with heterogeneity with a different example

And of course, this consent is all hypothetical

Posner’s basic argument: if we choose the most efficient legal system, everyone is “compensated ex-ante” for the choice, and should willingly accept the outcome they get

Things are a little more complicated…

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The “lottery ticket” analogy requires risk neutrality 50% chance at $1,000,000 is just as good as 50% chance at

$900,000 and 50% chance at $100,000 If $100,000 is “worth more to you” when you’re broke than when

you already have $900,000, this argument doesn’t work

Counterpoint to Posner: Hammond (1982) Efficiency is really a special case of utilitarianism, and subject to

the same limitations “Value” = “willingness to pay” $1 worth the same to everyone

Posner’s argument does have its limitations…

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efficiency is not equity efficiency is not fairness efficiency is not maximizing happiness

“Suppose that pituitary extract is in very short supply… and is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child who will be a dwarf if he doesn’t get some of the extract, but the family cannot afford the price [or borrow the money].

A rich family has a child who will grow to normal height, but the extract will add a few inches more, and his parents decide to buy it for him.

In the sense of value used in this book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich family… because value is measured by willingness to pay, but the extract would confer greater happiness in the hands of the poor family.”

- Posner, Economic Analysis of Law

This highlights some of the things efficiency is not

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Cooter and Ulen (textbook ch. 1)

Efficiency should not necessarily be the goal of society

But efficiency should be the goal of the legal system

If redistribution is desirable, it’s better to make the legal system efficient, and address distribution through taxes Cooter and Ulen offer four reasons why the tax system is a better

way to redistribute wealth than the legal system

A more pragmatic defense of efficiency as a goal for the law

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1. Taxes can target “rich” and “poor” more precisely than the legal system can

2. Distributional effects of legal changes are harder to predict

3. Lawyers are more expensive than accountants

4. More narrowly-targeted taxes cause greater distortion than broad-based taxes

Four reasons the tax system is a better way to redistribute wealth than the legal system

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We’ve seen two arguments in favor Posner: it’s what we all would have agreed on ex-ante C&U: if you want to redistribute, it’s better to do it through taxes

But there are definitely some problems with efficiency Distribution matters; not everything is monetizable; people might care

about procedural fairness

My take In this class, we’ll mostly focus on the positive questions But in the background, I think of efficiency as a “pretty good”, but

definitely imperfect, measure of “goodness”

So, summing up… is efficiency a good goal for the law?

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“The central question [in this book]… is a simple one: what set of rules and institutions maximize the size of the pie? What legal rules are economically efficient?

There are at least three reasons why that is the question we ask.

The first is that while economic efficiency… is not the only thing that matters to human beings, it is something that matters quite a lot to most human beings.

The second reason is that there is evidence that considerable parts of the legal system we live in can be explained as tools to generate efficient outcomes… It is a lot easier to make sense out of a tool if you know what it is designed to do.

A final reason is that figuring out what rules lead to… efficient outcomes is one of the things economists know how to do –

and when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”

- Friedman, Law’s Order, p. 312

(Friedman has his own take on why we should study efficiency)

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One argument from C&U for why law should focus on efficiency, redistribution should be done through taxes:

“narrow taxes cause more distortion than broad taxes” Wednesday, we’ll work through an example of this “Optional homework problem”

If you want to read something for Wednesday:

Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”

See me if you’re not yet registered

Finally…

That’s it for today – see you Wednesday