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FinalTechnicalReport:

EconomicImpactAnalysisofCommercialandRecreationalBillfishFisheriesintheWesternCentral

Atlantic:GrenadaandtheDominicanRepublic

Authors:

BradGentner(GentnerConsultingGroup,LLC)andPabloObregon(ConservationInternational)

InsupportofthebusinesscasedevelopmenteffortsintheCaribbeanledbytheFoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO).

DevelopedaspartoftheGEF-funded,WorldBank-implementedOceanPartnershipsforsustainablefisheriesandbiodiversityconservation(OPP),asub-projectoftheCommonOceans

ABNJProgramledbyUN-FAO.

August25,2018

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ExecutiveSummaryThemainobjectiveoftheEconomicImpactAnalysiswastoassessthebusinesscasevaluepropositionassociatedwithfisheryinterventionsthatreducebillfishmortalityinGrenadaandintheDominicanRepublic(DR).TheinitialinterventioncandidatesproposedbytheCBMCincluded(1)examiningcompensationand/orvaluetransferpathwaysbetweenthecommercialandrecreationalsectors(2)outlininghowsuchvaluetransferscouldbeeffectivelyusedtofinanceinnovationsthatimprovethesustainabilityandmanagementofbillfishcapturingfisheries,and(3)investigatethepotentialfortransitioninglow-valuecommercialartisanalbillfishfishersinthepilotcountriestowardsahigher-valuerecreationalfishery.Inordertoassessthebusinesscasevaluepropositionassociatedwiththeseinterventions,amorein-deptheconomiccharacterizationofthesefisherieswascarriedout,includingcollectingdataonfirm-leveljobs,revenues,operationcosts,profitability,supplychainpathways,supplychainmarginsandmarkets.ThelattereffortswerecomplementarytotheFisheryPerformanceIndicator(FPI)assessmentscarriedoutpreviouslyinGrenadaandintheDR,enablingthedevelopmentoffisherysupply-chainmapsandcashflowmodels;thesemodelsweresubsequentlyusedtoidentifythefullextentofpotentialrentthatcouldbecapturedunderarangeoffisheryinterventionscenariosinGrenadaandDR.ThemainfindingsfromthefisherycharacterizationaresummarizedinTableAbelow,withadditionaldetailsaboutfisheryrevenues,operationcosts,andrecreationalexpendituresdetailedintheDataCollectionsectionbeginningonpage18.

TableA.CashFlowcharacteristicsoftherecreationalandcommercialbillfishfisheriesinGrenadaandin

theDominicanRepublic

PilotCountry UserGroup SectorCashFlowper

Year*

Grenada

Commercial

FAD $243,027

TypeI&IILongline $2,093,727

TypeIIILongline $4,625,084

EntireSupplyChain $15,778,628

RecreationalTotalExpenditures $10,221,579

For-HireBusinessCashFlow $5,475,973

DominicanRepublic

CommercialFAD $314,950

EntireSupplyChain $424,993

RecreationalTotalExpenditures $45,116,709

For-HireBusinessCashFlow $36,319,120

Asillustratedabove,thecommercialfishingsectorinGrenadageneratesconsiderablyhighercashflows($22.7millionUSD)relativetotherecreationalfishingsector(15.7millionUSD).Bycontrast,therecreationalfisheryintheDominicanRepublicismuchmoreeconomicallyimportant,generating$36.3millionUSDinannualcashflows,comparedtothecommercialfishingsector,whichgenerateslessthan$0.75millionUSDannually.

Oncetheaboveinformationwascollected,cashflowmodelsweredevelopedfortherelevantpartsoftherecreationalandcommercialfisherysupplychains,inordertoevaluatethebusinesscasevalue

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propositionassociatedwitharangeoffisheryinterventionscenarios.Scenario1,forinstance,evaluatestheimpactsofBlueandWhiteMarlinharvestreductionsonfoodsecurityandrevenues,includinganassessmentofhowmuchfishermenwouldhavetobecompensatedforlostincomeassociatedwiththoseharvestreductions.Scenario2examinesthecashflowimpactsofa10%,20%and30%reductioninsailfishharvestsinbothpilotcountries.Scenario3assessestheeconomicimpactsofexpandingtherecreationalfishingsectorineachpilotcountry,includingtheadditionalcashflowsandemploymentthatwouldresultfromseveraltourismgrowthscenarios.Finally,scenario4assessestheviabilityofconvertingcommercialfishermentofor-hirechartercaptainsineachpilotcountry.Thefindingsforeachscenarioaresummarizedbelow.NotethatthesecashflowmodelswerealsousedbyWildernessMarketstodrafttheOPPbusinesscasesintheCaribbean(Inamdaretal.in-development).

SupplyChainMapping:

DuringtheFPIassessmentsinGrenadaandintheDR,theteamwasabletogathersomebasicdataontheharvestersandthesupplychainincludingthebasicstructureofthesupplychains,whichwasfurthersupplementedthroughthecurrentEconomicImpactAnalysis.Inbothpilotcountries,thesupplychainsareverysimple,generallyonlyincludingafirstbuyerand,insomecases,awholesalerorimporter.Thesupplychainisoftentimesvertically-integrated,withthefirstbuyingowningtheboatandactingasthewholesalerand/orretailer.TheFPIswereveryimportanttothisprojectastheyleveragedthecostsofeachstageofthisprojecttoavoidduplicationofeffortandtoinitiatestakeholderrelationships.

FigureAdetailstheLongline(LL)fisherysupplychaininGrenada,inwhichaproportionofthefishlandedisretainedbythevesselforpersonalandfamilyconsumption.Theremainingportionislandedatthefirstdealer,whothenexportsallthetunathatgradestwoorbetterintermsofqualitytotheUnitedStates,whereastherestiseithersentdirectlytothelocalmarket,orsoldtoalocaldistributor.

FigureA.GrenadaLonglineFisherySupplyChain.

FigureBdetailstheGrenadianFishAggregatingDevice(FAD)fisherysupplychain,whichconsistssolelyoftheharvesterandfirstdealer.

FigureB.GrenadianFADFisherySupplyChain.

Harvester FirstDealer

LocalMarket

Distributor Hotel/Restaurant

Export

Harvester FirstDealer/RetailMarket

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FigureCdisplaysthesupplychainforpelagicFADfisheriesintheDR,whereinfishissoldtoafirstdealerwhoisoftenalsothelocalretailmarket.Alternatively,thefishmovesthroughadistributortorestaurantsormarketsinthelargercitiesandresorttowns.FigureC.DominicanRepublicFADFisherySupplyChain.

Thesebasicsupplychainmapswereusedtoinformmodeldevelopmentandthedatacollectionprocessgoingforward.Thesupplychainmapsandcashflowmodelingwassubsequentlyusedtoidentifyfisheryinterventionoptionsforthebusinesscases,aswellastoassessthecashflowimpactofeachthroughthescenarioanalysis.FigureDoutlinesthesupply-chaininterventionrecommendationsidentifiedforGrenada,whichweresubsequentlyusedtodeveloptheGrenadianbusinesscase.

FigureD.SupplyChainBusinessCaseRecommendationsforGrenada.1

1FigureDgeneratedbyWildernessMarkets.


LocalRetail

Distributor

Restaurant

Market

Exporter1 Exporter2 Co-Op1 Co-Op2

TargetMarketDevelopment

DigitalOrderRouting

AlignedSupplyChain

LocalValueAddProcessing ColdChain

Improvements ColdChain

Improvements ColdChain

Improvements MarketCertification

DigitalOrderRouting

AlignedSupplyChain

LocalValueAddProcessing ColdChainImpoments

CurrentlyGood NotNecessary NeedsImprovement

DigitalReceivingandReporting

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Scenario1:ImpactsonFoodSecurityandonRevenuesofBlueandWhiteMarlinHarvestReductionsinGrenada

Basedontypicalactionshistoricallytakenwithothernewmembers,ICCATwilllikelyseta10tbluemarlinquotaanda2twhitemarlinquotaforGrenada.Theanalysisofthisreductionrevealedthatfoodsecuritywouldnotbesignificantlyimpactedbyimplementingthesecountrylevelquotas,foranumberofreasons.First,blueandwhitemarlinlandingscombinedrepresentonly1.6%ofthetotalsupplyofseafoodinGrenada.Furthermore,billfishmeatiseitherequivalent($2.63/lbs.USD)ormoreexpensivethanotherreadily-availableprotein-richfoodsources,suchasimportedchickenlegs($1.19/lbs.USD),localfreshwholechicken($2.41/lbs.USD),andotherseafood(seeTableB).

TableB.PricecomparisonofmajorseafoodproductsandotherproteinsourcesinGrenada

SpeciesAveragePrice(USD/lbs.)

Chickenlegs(frozen/import) $1.19

Shark $1.42

Blackfintuna $1.76

Bonito $1.87

Wholechicken(fresh/local) $2.41

FlyingFish $2.46

SkipJackTuna $2.48

Butterfish $2.50

KingMackerel $2.53

Albacore $2.62

Cavalli(misc.jacks) $2.62

Billfish $2.63

Chickenbreast(frozen/import) $5.49

Ontheotherhand,theaboveharvestreductions,representinga75%reductioninmarlinharvestsforGrenada,wouldreducecashflowsby$4.7millionovertenyears.Atthevessellevel,thelosseswouldbeequivalentto$1,678perTypeIIIvesselannually,and$2,571perTypeI&IIvesselsannually,assumingthattheremainingquotaareallocatedtowardsubsistencefisheries(i.e.“consumed”or“givenaway”).

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Fortheabovescenario,itisthereforerecommendedthatadditionalinvestmentsbemadetopromoteadoptionofcirclehooksbytheentirefleet,andtomakesupplychainimprovements,sothatfisherscanbecompensatedforbillfishharvestreductionsthroughaccesstohigherpriced,andlessvulnerablespecieslikeyellowfintuna.

Scenario2:CashflowimpactsofSailfishHarvestReductioninGrenadaandintheDominicanRepublic

Scenario2examinedtheimpactsoncommercialfishermencashflowsofahypothetical10%,20%,and30%reductioninsailfishharvestinbothcountries.Theintentionhereistoanticipatepotentialfuturesailfishquotareductionsandforecastcashflowchangesbasedonthosereductions.CurrentlytheICCATsailfishstockassessmentishighlyuncertainand,whileICCAThasnotdeclaredthestockoverfishednorthatoverfishingisoccurring,theseresultsareinconclusiveforanumberofreasonsincludingalackofgoodlandingsdataforsailfish.SailfishisasourceofrevenueforcommercialfishermeninGrenadaandintheDominicanRepublic,withhigherlandedvaluethanblueandwhitemarlincombined(TableC).

TableC.SailfishPrice,VolumeandValuebycountry

SailfishPricePaidtoHarvester(USD)

LandedVolume(pounds)

LandedValue(USD)

Grenada $1.89 211,361 $398,937DominicanRepublic $1.40 262,350 $367,290

TheNetPresentValue(NPV)ofa10%reductioninsailfishharvestovertenyearswouldcostfishermeninGrenadaatotalof$1,882,293USD,whereasthecashflowlossesintheDominicanRepublicwouldreach$743,625USDoverthesametimeperiod(TableD):

TableD.AnnualCostsandNPVlossesassociatedwitha10%reductioninsailfishharvests

Country Fleet AnnualCost NPVOver10Years

Grenada

FAD -$508 -$3,922

TypeI&II -$66,847 -$516,172

TypeIII -$79,875 -$616,773

Labor(CaptainsandCrew) -$783 -$6,046

Exporters -$63,694 -$491,828

RetailMarkets -$32,059 -$247,551

Total -$1,882,293

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DominicanRepublic

FAD -$53,390 -$412,262



Total -$743,625

Similarly,a20%reductioninSailfishharvestwouldresultina$3.8millionUSDand$1.5millionUSDlossforGrenadaandDRrespectivelyovera10-yearperiod.A30%reductionwouldsimilarlyresultina$5.6millionlossforGrenadaanda$2.2millionlossfortheDominicanRepublic.

Basedonthelossesidentifiedabove,nosailfishharvestreductionsshouldbeundertakenuntilthestockmodelssupportsuchanaction,especiallyifviablemechanismstocompensatefishermenincomelossesarenotavailable.Inordertodemonstratestockimpactsfromharvestreductions,bettertemporalandspatialdataonharvestswouldbeneededtoimprovestockmodels,highlightingtheneedtoimprovethequalityandtimelinessoffisherydatacollectioninGrenadaandDR.Additionally,bothcountriescurrentlylackHarvestControlRules(HCRs),andalsolackthemeanstosupporteffectivemonitoring,controlandsurveillance.Thefocusofanyinvestmentinthefisheryshouldthereforebeonimprovingtheseenablingconditions.HCRsshouldbeestablishedaccordingtothefindingsofrobuststockassessments,whicharecurrentlyunavailableattheAtlantic-widelevelbyICCAT.Thecurrentstockmodelisthereforeincapableofprovidinglevelsofsurplusproductionthatcouldthenbeassignedtomembernations.Currently,onlyGrenadaisamemberofICCAT,anditismakingprogressiveeffortstosetagoodCaribbeanexampleasthepremiumsustainabletunaexporterintheLesserAntilles.

Scenario3:EconomicimpactsofincreasingtourismgrowthinGrenadaandDR,andoptionsforfundingbillfishco-managementtruststhroughrecreationalfishinguserfees

Recreationalfishingforbillfishisanimportanteconomicdriverforbothislands,particularlyfortheDominicanRepublic.TheDominicanRepublicisoneofthemostpopularandbestrankedbillfishingdestinationsintheworld,andcertainlythetopdestinationintheCaribbean.Asaresult,userfeesfromtherecreationalfishingsectorhavebeenhighlightedasanimportantvalue-driverforsomeoftheOPPbusinesscases.Scenario4thereforeevaluatedtheeconomicimpactsthatwouldresultfroma3%,5%,and10%increaseintourismgrowthineachpilotcountry,includingtherolethatuserfeescouldplayinfundingbillfishconservation.Forbothcountries,anyincreaseintourismyieldssignificanteconomicreturns.Under3%,5%and10%tourismgrowthscenarios,Grenadacouldseeexpendituresincreaseby$2.6million,$4.9millionand$30.3millionUSD(TableF).IntheDominicanRepublic,3%,5%,and10%increasesintourismcouldgenerateexpenditureincreasesamountingto$7.4million,$13.5millionand$83.9millionUSD.

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TableF.EconomicImpactsof3%,5%,and10%tourismgrowthinGrenada(lower-boundestimates)

NPVEstimates 3%Growth 5%Growth 10%Growth

CharterBusinessCashFlow $1,437,048 $2,607,606 $16,217,993

PrivateStampRevenue $13,666 $24,798 $154,231

GovernmentStampRevenue $15,250 $27,671 $172,101

Expenditures $2,682,427 $4,867,419 $30,272,887

GDP $6,649,237 $12,065,423 $75,040,842

Notethatthemodeledincreasesintourismgrowthareconsistentwiththecurrentgrowthtrajectoryinbothcountriesoverthelastfewyears,andcouldbefurtheracceleratedthroughmarketingstrategies.Sincerecreationalfisheriesinbothlocationspracticevoluntarycatch-and-releaseforallbillfishspecies,promotingthegrowthoftherecreationalfishingsectorpresentsasustainablewaytoincreaselivelihoodsincoastalcommunities,aswellastoraisefundsforconservationandfisheriesmanagement.

Usinganaverageof200tripsperyearforafull-timechartercaptain,theseprojectedincreaseswouldalsosupporttheestablishmentofnewcharterbusinesses.InGrenada,a3%,5%and10%increasecouldsupporthalfafull-timecharter,slightlylessthanonefull-timechartersandthreefull-timechartersrespectively.IntheDominicanRepublic,a3%,%5and10%increasewouldsupportuptoonenewfull-timecharters,twofull-timechartersorfourfull-timecharterrespectively.Allestimatesinthisscenarioarebasedonuncertaineffortandparticipationestimatesresultinginwideconfidenceintervals.Theuncertaintyinthiseffortdatahighlightstheneedtomoreformallycollectrecreationalfisheriesdata,whichissomethingstillbeingpursuedthroughtheCaribbeanBillfishProject.Bothcountriesshouldimplementandmaintaincatch,effortandparticipationdatacollectioneffortsassoonaspossible.

Giventhelackofrecreationaldataforeitherpilotcountry,theprojectreliedonanexternalefforttocollectbasicinformation,includingexpendituredata,willingness-to-payforconservationfundingandfor-hirecostandearningsdata(GentnerandWhitehead2018).TableGbelowsummarizesthecurrenteconomicimpactofrecreationalfishinginbothcountries.

TableG.EconomicSummaryoftheRecreationalfisheriesintheDominicanRepublicandinGrenada

MetricDominicanRepublic Grenada

Low High Low High

CharterBusinessCashFlow $36,319,120 $43,761,744 $5,475,973 $16,640,454

PrivateStampRevenue $993,243 $1,251,405 $490,769 $914,498

GovernmentStampRevenue $1,108,328 $1,396,401 $914,498 $1,020,458

Expenditures $28,328,229 $45,116,709 $10,221,579 $14,340,177

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Low High Low High

GDP $70,220,399 $111,835,911 $25,337,389 $35,546,625

Employment 2,870 4,571 1,036 1,453

Notethattheper-personper-tripfeesfortheco-managementtrustwerederivedusingtheaveragenumberofannualtripstakenbybillfishanglersfromtheWTPsurveyandtheestimateoftheWTPforaconservationtrustestimatedasanannualnumber.Theestimatespresentedabovearebasedonchargingbothresidentandtouristanglerthataverageamount.Theperpersonpertripvalue,around$30perpersonpertrip,maybetoohighforresidentanglers,particularlyinGrenada.Itwouldlikelybepreferabletochargeresidentanglersanannualfeethatwaslessthan$30afishingtrip.Ifresidentswerechargedalowerfee,thetrustwouldraiselessfunds.Regardlessoftheleveloffeecharged,theopportunitytoraisesubstantialfundsissound,particularlyundercontinuedgrowthinrecreationalfishingtourism.

Scenario4:Transitioningthelow-valuecommercialartisanalbillfishfishermentowardsahigher-valuerecreationalfishery.

Inover-exploitedfisheries,astrategytoimprovestockhealthwhilesupportinglivelihoods,istosupportthetransitionofcommercialfishermentothefor-hirerecreationalfishingsector(i.e.chartercaptains).OneoftheinitialfisheryinterventionsinvestigationsoftheCaribbeanBillfishProject,wasassessingthefeasibilityoftransitioningthelow-valuecommercialartisanalbillfishfisheryinthepilotcountriestowardsahigher-valuerecreationalfishery.Scenario4thereforeassessedtheviabilityofsuchanoption.

WiththeriseinpopularityoftheDominicanRepublicasatop-ratedbillfishdestination,andgiventheeconomicrealitiesofbeingaFADfishermaninthenation,manycommercialfishermenhavealreadystartedleadingcharterrecreationalfishingtrips.Inmanycasesthough,thesenewcaptainsdonotpracticecatchandreleasefishing.Instead,theyharvestallbillfishtohangatthedockasaformofadvertisement,andthensellthatfishtofurtherincreaseprofits.Inordertohaveasustainabilityoutcome,anyincreaseinchartereffortwouldnecessarilyneedtobecoupledwithlimitedentryandmandatorycatchandreleaseofbillfish.Largefisherymanagementcapacityimprovementswouldberequired,particularlyintheDominicanRepublic,beforethesesustainabilityensuringlimitationscouldbeeffectivelyenforced.Asaresult,theseenablingfactorsneedtobeaddressedbeforethisstrategycouldberesponsiblyadvocatedfor.TableHbelowdetailstheeconomicrealitiesacrossallsectorsinbothpilotcountries.

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TableH.AverageAnnualCashFlowsforeachfisheryinGrenadaandintheDominicanRepublic

Country FleetAverageAnnualCash

Flow

Both Charter $17,400

Grenada

FAD $3,038

TypeI&II $52,148

TypeIII $54,042

DominicanRepublic FAD $1,221

FromTableH,itisclearthatGrenadianTypeI,IIorIIIlonglinecaptainswouldnothaveanyincentivetoswitchtocharterfishing,sincetheyearnaconsiderablyhigherincomefromthelonglinefishery.FADcaptainsontheotherhandearnlessthantheaverageannualcashflowofachartercaptain,andcouldthereforebemotivatedtotransitiontocharterfishing.FADcaptainsmaynonethelesshavetoovercomethehighcostsassociatedwithswitchingfromsmaller-scalecommercialfishingtocharterfishing,asillustratedinTableI.

TableI.CostsforDifferentRecreationalVesselTypes

Alternatively,captainscouldofferlowercoststripsinopenboatsasevidencedinMexicoandCentralAmerica.Full-daycharterpricesonthelargertrollingyachtscostupwardsof$1,500/daywhereasopenpangatripsgenerallycost$250/day.

Ata$250/daycharterrate,andwitha200-dayfishingseason,annualcashflowswouldbehigherthanthoseforcurrentFADfishersineithercountry.ThecostsassociatedwithpurchasingalargertrollingyachtontheotherhandwouldbeprohibitiveforcurrentFADfishermen.

Undera3%tourismgrowthscenarioinGrenada,aFADfishermancouldexpecttomakeabouttwicehiscurrentcashflow,ifonlyonefishermanmadetheswitchattheendof10years.Undera10%tourismgrowthscenario,iftwofishermenswitched,theywouldearnslightlymorethanthebasin-wideannualaveragecashflowinthecharterbusiness.Thelatterfindingssuggestthatthelivelihoodopportunities

VesselType VesselCost AnnualPaymentat10%Interestfor15Years

NewInboardYacht $500,000 $64,476

UsedInboardYacht $214,258 $27,624

UsedCenterConsole $50,000 $6,444

NewLocalPanga(25'40hp) $6,000 $768

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fromtransitioningfromcommercialtorecreationalfishinginGrenadaarelimited,unlessthereisamoredrasticgrowthintourism.

TheDominicanRepublicprovidesaverydifferentscenario,whichalsoexplainswhysomecommercialfishermenhavealreadymadetheswitchinMacau.Whentherecreationalfisherywasgrowingatitsfastestrate,15commercialfishermenswitchedtorecreationalfishing.However,eightofthosefishermenhaverevertedbacktocommercialfishing.Thelowestlevelofincreasedtourismfromthepreviousscenario,3%,generatesslightlylesscashflowthantheaverageannualcashflowseenforasinglechartervesselinDR.However,thisrepresents13timesmoreannualcashflowthanaFADfishermanintheDominicanRepubliccurrentlymakesayear.Asaresult,evenifeachboatwasnotrunning180tripsayear,13commercialfishermencouldconverttorecreationalfishingandstillbebetteroffthanfishingFADscommercially.Atthehighestleveloftourismincrease,10%,sevennewfull-timechartercaptainscouldbesupportedatthebasinwideaveragecashflow,orslightlylessthan100fishermencouldconvertandmakeslightlymoremoneythanfishingFADscommercially.

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TableofContentsExecutiveSummary......................................................................................................................................ii

Introduction.................................................................................................................................................3

PilotCountryContext...................................................................................................................................5

Grenada....................................................................................................................................................5

LonglineFishery....................................................................................................................................5

FADFishery...........................................................................................................................................8

Recreational.........................................................................................................................................9

DominicanRepublic..................................................................................................................................9

FADFishery.........................................................................................................................................10

Recreational.......................................................................................................................................11

ModelingMethodology..............................................................................................................................13

CommercialCashFlowModels..............................................................................................................13

RecreationalSectorModels...................................................................................................................16

For-HireRecreational.........................................................................................................................16

PrivateRecreational...........................................................................................................................16

GeneralModelAssumptions..................................................................................................................17

RecreationalModels..........................................................................................................................17

CommercialModels...........................................................................................................................17

DataCollection...........................................................................................................................................18

RecreationalSectors...............................................................................................................................18

PrivateRecreationalAnglers..............................................................................................................21

CharterCostandEarnings..................................................................................................................26

EffortEstimates..................................................................................................................................30

CommercialDataCollection...................................................................................................................31

Grenada..............................................................................................................................................31

LLFishery............................................................................................................................................32

FADFishery.........................................................................................................................................36

DominicanRepublic............................................................................................................................38

ScenarioAnalysis........................................................................................................................................41

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Scenario1:ImpactsonFoodSecurityandonRevenuesofBlueandWhiteMarlinHarvestReductionsinGrenada..............................................................................................................................................42

CurrentState......................................................................................................................................42

ProposedScenario..............................................................................................................................44

ICCATCountryLevelQuotaScenario.................................................................................................44

KeyAssumptions................................................................................................................................46

Recommendations.............................................................................................................................46

Scenario2:CashflowimpactsofSailfishHarvestReductioninGrenadaandintheDR........................46

Context–ActivityObjectives.............................................................................................................46

CurrentState......................................................................................................................................47

ProposedHarvestReductions............................................................................................................47

Case1–10%HarvestReduction........................................................................................................48



KeyAssumptions................................................................................................................................50


Scenario3:EconomicimpactsofincreasingtourismgrowthinGrenadaandDR,andoptionsforfundingbillfishco-managementtruststhroughrecreationalfishinguserfees.....................................51

CurrentState......................................................................................................................................51

ProposedIncreasesinEffort..............................................................................................................52

Scenarios............................................................................................................................................52

KeyAssumptions................................................................................................................................56


Scenario4:Transitioningthelow-valuecommercialartisanalbillfishfishermentowardsahigher-value

recreationalfishery................................................................................................................................57

CurrentState......................................................................................................................................57

ProposedScenario..............................................................................................................................57

ScenarioAnalysis................................................................................................................................58

KeyAssumptions................................................................................................................................59


Discussion...................................................................................................................................................60

LiteratureCited..........................................................................................................................................62

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IntroductionWithinthecontextoftheCaribbeanBillfishProjectandtheOceanPartnershipProject,theobjectiveofthecurrentactivitywastoassessthebusinesscasevaluepropositionassociatedwithfisheryinterventionsthatreducebillfishmortalityandtoexaminecompensationand/orvaluetransferpathwaysbetweenthecommercialandrecreationalsectors.Inordertodevelopafisherydevelopmentprojectforinvestment,therewasaneedtodeveloptoolsthatcanexaminethefinancialandlivelihoodimplicationsofinterventionsusedtoachievetriplebottomlineoutcomes.Figure1detailsthestepsfollowedintheCBPprojecttodevelopthesemodels.ThecurrentEconomicImpactAnalysisfocusedonsteps1,and3-7;step2wascompletedpreviously,andstep8iscurrentlybeingcompletedbyanotherconsultant.AcorefocusofthecurrentactivitywasthereforetobuildontheFisheryPerformanceIndicatorassessment,bycollectingdataonharvestersandsupplychainsinordertodevelopcashflowmodelsofthecommercialandrecreationalfisherysupplychainsineachpilotcountry.Figure1.StepsinQuantitativeFisheriesInvestmentProjectDevelopment(Steps2and8wereconducted

outsidethisproject)

Theresearchefforttookadvantageofmanydatacollectionsynergiesandrelationshipsoutsidethisparticularprojecttotakeadvantageofallopportunitiesandkeepcostslow.Datawascollectedtoidentifythefullextentofpotentialrentthatisnotcurrentlycapturedbylocalfishingcommunities.Theinformationcollectedwasusedtobuildcashflowmodelsofallfisheries

1.ModelSpecification

2.RapidInitialAssessment-

FPIs

3.SupplyChainMapping

4.GapAnalysis5.DataCollection

6.GroundTruthingModel&Assumptions

7.ScenarioAnalysis

8.BusinessCaseFinancial

Analysis

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sectorsinGrenadaandintheDominicanRepublic,providingcontextabouttheperformanceofbillfishfisheriesinbothcountries,andhighlightingspecificissuesthatneededtobeaddressedinordertoimprovetheirvalue;bothofwhicharepre-requisitestothedevelopmentofbusinesscases.Documentingthevalueofthebillfishrecreationalandcommercialfisherythrougheconomicanalysesshedslightonthepracticalityofpolicyinterventionsproposedforthebusinesscases.Thecashflowmodelsdetailedhereinwereusedasthebasisofthefinancialmodelsusedtocreatethebusinesscasedocuments.Inadditiontothescenariosexaminedbythebusinesscaseteam,thisdocumentcontainsscenariostosupportandaddcontexttothateffort.Thestudyresultsmaythereforealsomotivateinvestmentinenhancedmanagement,andinpotentialinstitutionalarrangementsthatprovidestrongeconomicincentivesforlocalcommercialfisherstoabstainfromlandingbillfish.Rapidrecreationalandcommercialbillfishfisheryassessmentswereusedbythebusinesscaseteam,consistingofrepresentativesofConservationInternational(CI),FoodandAgriculturalOrganizationtotheUN(FAO),WildernessMarkets(WM)andstakeholdersinthepilotcountriestoidentifyvalue-creationopportunitiesintherespectivesupply-chains,aswellasaspectswithincountriesthatcanbecomethefocusofthemanagementreforms.Theanalysisdirectlyhelpedinformandstructurethebusinesscasesbyhelpingstructurethetheoryofchange.Finally,theeconomicdatacollectedthroughthisprocesswascomplementaryandsupplementarytothatcollectedthroughotheractivitiesandfunctionedasastartingpointforthedrill-downprocesstoinformthevaluepropositionavailableinthepilotcountriesandbegintoidentifywaystotransferthatvalueacrosssectors.Thus,thisworkalsofilledanessentialknowledgegapforthelargermulti-sectorCaribbeanBillfishproject.TheEconomicImpactAnalysisextendstheknowledgegainedduringtheFisheryPerformanceIndicator(FPI)process,includingthroughthedevelopmentofspreadsheet-basedcashflowmodelsforthefisheriesthattargetpelagicspeciesinthepilotcountries;thesemodelswereusedtoexaminetheannualprofitchangesfromfisheryinterventionsthatreducedbillfishmortality.Profitchangeswereforecastedforthedurationoftheproposedproject,providingfinancialinformationthatinvestorsandfunderswanttoseeinthebusinesscasesunderdevelopment.ThefinancialmodelingfortheOPPCaribbeanbusinesscaseswasconductedbyWildernessMarketsusingthedatacollected,andcashflowmodelsdevelopedunderthisactivity.Theoverallgoalwastobuildananalysistoolandthenusethattooltoanalyzescenariosgeneratedbythestakeholder-drivenbusinesscasedevelopmentprocess.Notethattheanalysisdidnotmodelanydemandchangesrelatedtochangesinmarketsnordiditmodelanypotentialbiologicalchangesinbillfishstock.ThemodelsanddatacollectedweregroundedandvalidatedduringstakeholderoutreachmeetingsconductedbyGCGandWMinbothpilotcountries.Businesscaseideaswerepresentedandvalidatedinthesemeetingsandanyfinaldatagapswerefilled.Workpresentedheredocumentsalltheseeffortsanddistillsthemodelsdevelopedintoasetoffourpolicyanalysisscenarios.ThescenariosareinadditiontothefinancialmodelingconductedfortheformalbusinesscaseconductedbyWMandservetoprovidecontextforthosecasesandexploreideasthatmaynotrisetothelevelofabusinesscase.First,thepilotcountrycontextisbrieflydescribed.Nextthemethodologyisdetailedandthedatacollectedissummarized.Thefinalspreadsheetmodelsare

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describedandthereportculminateswiththeanalysisforfourpolicyscenarios.themethodologytodevelopcashflowmodelsofallsectors,commercialandrecreational,acrossbothpilotcountries,GrenadaandtheDominicanRepublic.

PilotCountryContextCountrycontextisprovidedtosetthestagefortheworkcompletedandprovidecontextforthescenariosanalyzedlaterinthisdocument.ThecontextsectionbeginswithGrenada,describingtheircommerciallongline(LL)sector,theirfishaggregatingdevice(FAD)sectorandtheirrecreationalsectorthattargetspelagicspecies.Next,thecommercialFADsectorandthepelagicrecreationalsectorsintheDominicanRepublicaredescribed.Theinformationinthissectionwasderivedfromdeskresearch,theconductoftheFisheryPerformanceIndicators(FPI)rapidassessmenttool(Gentneretal.2018),anonlinesurveyofrecreationalanglers(GentnerandWhitehead2018)andtwovisitstoeachpilotcountry.Rapidassessments,liketheFPIs,arethetopofthedatafunnelthatledtothespecificationofthedatacollectionandmodelingmethodologies.

GrenadaOfficiallandingsdataoflargepelagicfishesinGrenadaindicatethatyellowfintuna,themaintargetspecies,hasmaintainedanincreasingtrendinthelandingssince2000,reachingitshighestrecordvalueof1609tin2016,accountingfor68%ofthelandedcatchofthemainlargepelagicspeciesfortheperiodof2014-2016.Initially,fortheFPIs,disaggregatedlandingsdatainGrenadawasnotavailable,sotheprojecthadtorelyonaggregateddataasreportedtoFAO.Throughtheworkonthisproject,thelatterdataforGrenadawasobtained,whichalloweddisaggregatedanalysisoflandingsbyspeciesandgeartypeforthebusinesscasethatfollowedfromtheworkdescribedhere.

Grenadahasarobustdatacollectionsystemthatispaperbased,butthereisadatadigitalizationbacklogthatdatesbackto2013,thelastfullyearofdataentry.TheMinistrysendsadatacollectortothefirstdealerweeklyandcollectsvolumeandvalue.Whilesomefishislandedandsolddirectlytotheconsumerorconsumedbythefishermenwithoutbeingrecorded,officialundercoverageisonlyestimatedtobebetween10-25%.

Generally,recreationalharveststhataresoldarenotcapturedunlessthefishwassoldthroughofficialchannels.Thecharterboatsintheregionandtheonebillfishtournamentpractice100%catchandreleaseforbillfish.Thechartervesselsretaindolphinfish,wahoo,kingmackerelandyellowfintunaforclientconsumptionandsale.Inthisfishery,thefisharethepropertyoftheboat.Theywillgivetheclientasmallamountoffishequivalenttoonemeal’sworth,theremainderistypicallysold.Itisunknownhowmuchofthatfishmovesthroughanofficialdealer.

LonglineFishery

FisheryDetailsTheGrenadianlongline(LL)fisheryisprosecutedbythreetypesoffishingvessels.Type1boats(Figure2)are4.5–7minlengthsingleortwinoutboardpowerandsetbetween100-150hooks.Theytypicallydonottravelmorethan10nauticalmilesfromthecoastandreturntoporteverydayastheygenerallyhavenoicecapacity.Tobeabletoselltotheexporterandgetexportprices,theywillrunindividualfishbacktothebuyerwhileleavingthegearfishing.TypeIIboats,orTrinidadianstylefiberglasspirogues,

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areapproximately9minlengthwithasmallcabintop,capacityfor3crewandpoweredbyoneortwooutboardmotors.Theytendtoincludesomebasicelectronicequipmentandsafetygear.SeeFigure3forapictureofTypeIIvessels.TheTypeIIboatsset200-300hooksonovernighttripsoperating30-35nauticalmilesoffshore.Theyusuallyhaveicecapacity.TheTypeIIIvessels,Figure4,arecapableoffishingoperationsoffourtosixdays,deploymentof400-600hooksandhaveasingleinboarddieselengine.Theyhavesignificanticecapacity,butnorefrigeration.Theyfishyear-roundusingfrozenimportedbaittochumforthepreferredflyingfishbait,whilesometimesusinglocallycaughtjacksanddeadbaitwhenflyingfisharescarce.

Figure2.TypeIVessels.

Figure3.TypeIIVessels.

Figure4.TypeIIIVessels.

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TheLLsupplychainisaverystraightforwardsupplychain(Figure5).ThevastmajorityofthefishcaughtaretunaandthosefishareexporteddirectlytotheUSasfresh,neverfrozenproduct.TherewerethreeexportersinGrenada,butoneisfunctionallyoutofbusinessandtheotherhandleslessthan20%ofthemarket.Thefirstdealeristheexporterinallthreecases.In2016,Grenadaexported1.4tofyellowfintunaworth$5.9millionUSD.Productisexportedfreshviacommercialpassengerandcommercialfreightaircraft.Theproductisminimallyprocessed.Itisgilledandguttedwhileatsea,andfortheTypeIIandIIIboats,packedinice.Billfish,dolphinfishandwahooandtunanotgradingoutforexportareallsoldinthelocalmarkets.The“bycatch”(thefisherscallitbycatch)iseconomicallyimportantandmaybesoldfreshorfrozenforlatersalelocally.Thereislimiteddistributionoffish.Thelargestbuyerishorizontallyintegratedintogeneralfoodservicesupplyforthehotelsandrestaurants.Heownsafleetoftrucksforthisbusinessandusesthosetruckstodeliverfish.Generally,however,mostseafoodissoldatfreshmarketsatthepointoflanding.Forthisfleet,thekeypointsinthesupplychainarethethreefishhousesbuiltbytheJapanInternationalCooperationAgency(JICA),andtwootherprivatefacilities.ThelargestexporteroperatesoutofoneoftheJICAfacilitiesthathasbeenpurchasedfromthegovernment,renovatedwithprivatecapitalandcurrentlyoperatedasapublicprivatepartnershipinSt.George’s.IthasbeenfullymodernizedwithahighcapacityammoniaiceplantandiswholefishHAACPcompliant.TheothertwoexportbuyersoperatefromprivatedocksortakedeliveryfromthepublicJICAdocksandmovetheproducttotheirfacilities.TheotherexporterinSt.Georgesalsodoesvalueaddedprocessingsmokingsomeofthebillfishtheybuy.TheyalsoloinandvacuumpacksnappersforexporttotheEUwhentunaisoutofseason.ThesecondJICAfacilityonthewestsideoftheislandisinGouyave.Ithasaniceplant,aretailmarket,coldstorageandaHACCProom.Currentlythisfacilityisnotinvolvedinexportingtuna,butthereisinterestinre-openingitforthatpurpose.

Figure5.GrenadaLonglineSupplyChain.

Therearealotoffactorsatplayinthefirstdealerspace.TunaisgradedintheUSbythebuyerandthepriceassignedoncegraded.Theimporterwillnottakeanyofthegradingrisk,whichleavesthatrisktobesharedbetweenthedealerandtheharvester.Tunagradingisnotanexactscience.DealersthatdopredictivegradingseemtodobetterintheUSmarket.Manyriskfactorscouldharmtheproductgradeonceitleavesthedealer’shandsthatthedealerhasnocontrolover.Alldealerstrytohandlethisgradingriskindifferentwaysandhavetriedmanywaysinthepast.Somearesellingonconsignment,transferringalltherisktotheharvester,butgenerallyresultinginhigherdocksideprices.However,this


LocalMarket


Export

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delayspayoutandsettlementwiththedealer.Someoffer“standard”pricesfortunatransferringalltheriskbacktothedealer,butnotwithoutcompensationforthatrisk.Thereisgrumblingamongstthefishermenthatthedealersaretakingadvantagebecausepricingisn’talwaystransparent.Pricingtransparencyisdrivinginterestintwolocationstostartacooperativethatalsodoestheexportingpayingtheharvesterseitheronconsignmentorviaapredictedgrade/pricewithmarkupsforicepacks,boxesandshippingcosts.Theprocessingfacilitiesarerelativelysmall,butnotmuchroomisneededasfreshfishareboxedandrefrigeratedfortwiceweeklyflightstothemainland.Allprocessingisdoneatsea,exceptforonebuyerthathassomevalueaddedcapabilitywithasmokingplant.HeusedtorunsailfishthroughthesmokerforsaletotheUSuntiltheUSbannedimportsofbillfish.Thelargestexporter’sstateoftheartammoniaiceplantcanfreeze20mtoficeaday.Allfirstdealersfronttheboatsfuel,ice,bait,gearandprovisionsandthereisanexpectationiftheboattooktheloan,theboatwilllandtheirfishatthesamedealerthatfrontedthesupplies.

FADFishery

FisheryDetailsFigure6showsthetypicalFADfishingvessel.Generally,theyareverysimilartotheTypeIboatsabove,butwithoutLLreels.Typically,theyare4.5-7meterslongwithasingleoutboard.MostoftheGrenvilleboatshaveicecapacityanduseice.Thevesselsmayparticipateinotheractivitiesincludingwatertaxi(inCarriacou)andotherdemersalfisheries.ThecenteroftheFADfisheryistheportofGrenvillebutthereareactiveFADfishersinCarriacouandPetitMartinique.OneoftheFADfishersonCarriacoutakesafewcharterrecreationaltripseachyearandwasinterestedinexpandingthatbusiness.TherearenoothercharterfishingoperationsontheislandofCarriacou.Alltold,thereareprobably120boatsregisteredthatareofatypethatfishFADs,butprobably50orlessareactiveinGrenville,CarriacouandPetitMartinique.

Figure6.FADFishingVessel

TheGrenadaFADfishersfishrelativelyfewFADs.Theytakedaytripsandwilltrollplasticsquidbaitsforvariouspelagicspecies.TheywillalsocatchsmallpelagicstouseaslivebaitsaroundtheFADs.Thesupplychain,depictedinFigure7,isverysimple.FortheGrenvillefishery,allthefishareoffloadedinGrenvilleataJICAfacilityandaresolddirectlytocustomersafterasinglemarkup.Thereisno

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distribution.SimilarlyfortheouterislandsofCarriacouandPetitMartinique,theharvestgoesdirectlytolocalconsumption.Onoccasion,thefishersinPetitMartiniquewillsendhighqualitytunadowntoSpiceIslandFishHouseinSt.GeorgesononeoftheLLboats.AlsoonoccasionthePetitMartiniqueFADfisherywillexportfishdirectlytotheislandsofMartinique.

Figure7.GrenadaFADSupplyChain.

Recreational

FisheryDetailsDocumentingtherecreationalsectorwasmuchmorechallengingforanumberofreasons.First,theuniverseofprivateanglersisunknownandunknowable.Iftouristfishersareincluded,therecreationalfisherycouldhavemoreparticipantsthaneithercommercialfishery.Second,thereisabsolutelynodataavailableforthefishery.Therearenoeffortestimatesnorcatchestimates.Thetourismministry,PureGrenada,conductsanexitsurveyattheirairportandthatsurveyincludesaquestionregardingfishingactivity.Theresponsestothatquestionwereusedtogeneratearoughestimateoftouristfishingeffort.Regardinglocalprivateanglingeffort,thereisnodata.Itisa100%releasefisheryforbillfishthattargetsmediumtolargebluemarlinwithlargetunaanoccasionaltarget.Thefleetalsocatchesdolphin,wahoo,barracudaandkingmackerel.Fortunately,itseemstobeaverysmallfishery.TheremaybeasmanyasfourcharterboatsinSt.Georges,withonlyoneboatcharteringatwhatwouldbeconsideredafull-timelevel.

DominicanRepublicCODOPESCA,collectsfisherieslandingsthroughaseriesofenumeratorsateverylandingslocation.Theenumerators use paper notebooks to record landings data. Regarding volume, only recently didCODOPESCA switch from using subjective species groups to individual species for data collection.Additionally,thereiscurrentlyabacklogonthedataentrysidethatstretchesbackto2011,thelastyearfully entered into anelectronicdatabase.CODOPESCAwas still using the subjective species groups in2011.Inadditiontonoactualspeciesinformationinthepre-2011data,thereisnowaytodelineatethepelagic fishers in the data set objectively. They do record gear type and fishing location, but there isenoughoverlapwithothergearsandlocationsthatitisimpossibletoidentifyFADfishingtripswith100%accuracy.Thebestthingabouttheirenumeratordatacollectionsystemforthisprojectisthecollectionofcostandearningsinformationforeverytriprecordedontheirforms.

CODOPESCA’sofficialFAOreportedlandingsdataonlargepelagicfishesintheDR,likelycomingfromtheFADfisheryasdescribedabove,indicatethatdolphinfish,blackfintuna,yellowfintuna,andkingmackerel

HarvesterFirst

Dealer/RetailMarket

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representthemostlandedspeciesinthatfisherybetween2001and2016.Thelandingsoftherestofthelarge pelagic fish species including sailfish, blue marlin, albacore, skipjack, tunas, wahoo and ceromackerel have maintained a relative stable trend through 2014. However, since 2014, landings ofdolphinfish, yellowfin tuna, kingmackerel, sailfish, and bluemarlin have shown noticeable increases.Averagelandingsinrecentyears(2014-2016)indicatethatthegrouprepresentingalltunasaccountforalmost half (49.4%) of the landings for that period, followed by the group that represents landing ofkingfishes;whilethebillfishgroupanddolphinfishrepresentequalproportionsoftheaveragelandingsin2014-2016.

FADFishery

FisheryDetailsOverall,thepelagicfishersaremuchliketheGrenadaFADfishers;theywilltrollsmallplasticsquidskirtsfordolphinfishandbaitaroundtheFADsandwillfishdroplinesforbillfishandtunaaroundtheFADs.Figure8showsthepangastylefishingboatwhichareusedforFADfishing.Theboatscanbemadeofwood,fiberglassoverwoodorallfiberglass.Theyhaveahighbow,narrowwaterlinebeamandaflairatthewaterlineforincreasefloatation.Theboatsusevarioussizesofoutboardsbasedonthelengthoftheboat.Ageneralruleofthumbis15hpfora5meterpanga,30hpfora6-7meterpangaand40hporgreaterfora7meterorgreaterpanga.

Figure8.PangaorBotestylefishingboat.

Eachvesselcarriestwofishersandeachmanstwotrollinglines.Livebaitiscaughtbytrollingsmallplasticsquidsorbyfishingcutbait.LivebaitsareusedtobaitdroplinesusedaroundFADstocatchlargerpelagics.Droplinesconsistofaheavymainlinewithasinglehookattachedtoaplasticjugorfloat.Thehookisset40–50 fathomsdeepand is fishedweightedorunweighteddependingon species targeted. In somelocations there have been agreements to fish only a certain number of drop lines, however, thoseagreementsaregenerallyviolated.DroplinelimitagreementsareprimarilyinplaceforthesailfishpulsefisheryintheareaaroundBarahona.MostFADfisherselsewheredeployasmallnumberofdroplinesat

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anyonetime,generallyoneortwo,aroundtheFAD.Inthesailfishpulsefishery,boatswillset20plusdroplinesalongthecoastnotassociatedwithFADs.Thelargeamountoffloatinggearcreatesseveregearconflictsandalsoresultsinlostgearthatcontinuestofish(ghostfishing)whichinducesmortalityforfishthatarenotlanded.OtherFADfishersreportseeingdeadsailfishwiththesedroplinebuoysstillattached.

PresentlyfishersintheFADfisherypreferpangasof5-8mwithanoutboardengineof30-40HP.Thecostofthenewvesselisaround$2300-$2700US.FADconstructioncostsrangefrom$100-$150US.ThemostexpensiveinputinFADconstructionisthecable/ropethatconnectstheanchorwiththebuoy,sometimesasmuch50%ofthetotalcost.Thebuoys(bolsa)areusuallyconstructedofrecycledplasticjugsorrecycledstyrofoaminsulationtiedtogetherorencasedinscrapseinenet.Mostofthecostinthebuoyisinthelabor. The anchor (or “the doll” or muñeca) is made of concrete poured into large cans with steelreinforcementbar.Theanchorrequires thepurchaseofbothconcreteandsteel reinforcingbaralongwithlaborcosts.Eachboatownerwillsetandmanagebetweenfiveand10FADs.FADsdonotlastforverylongandinvestmentinnewFADsiscontinuous.SomereportloosingasmanyastwothirdsoftheirFADsannually.

Figure9displaystheverysimplesupplychainforpelagicspeciesintheDR.DRimportsthemajorityofitsseafoodandallpelagicproductionstaysintheDRfordomesticconsumption,exceptforasmallamountofdolphinfish.Manyofthefirstbuyers/dealerareverticallyintegratedfromtheboatallthewaytotherestaurantsinSantoDomingoandPuntaCana.Atthelocallevel,thefirstbuyer/dealerisalsothelocalretailer. There does seem to be a little independent distribution by small truckswith domestic chestfreezersorlargerrefrigeratedtrucksthatarealsohaulingotheragriculturalproducts.Theywillbuythefishatthedealer’smarkup/marginandthendistributethosefishtorestaurantsandsometimesmarketstobesoldfortheirmarkup.

Figure9.DominicanRepublicSupplyChain.

Recreational

FisheryDetailsTherecreationalfisheryintheDRissubstantiallylargerthanGrenada.Therearefarmoreprivateandcharterboatsinvolvedinthebillfishfishery.MostofthebillfisheffortisclusteredonthesouthsideoftheDRinthesameareasastheFADfishing.TheDRhasbuiltareputationforveryhighcatchratesforsmalltomediumsizedbluemarlinsandtherecordforthemostbluemarlincatchesinasingledaywasbrokeninlate2016.TheDRalsohasexcellentwhitemarlinandsailfishfishing.Itispossibletocatcha

Harvester FirstDealerLocalRetail

DistributorRestaurant

Market

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billfishslam,sailfish,bluemarlinandwhitemarlin,allonthesametrip,andalthoughrare,possibletocatchasuperslam;sailfish,bluemarlin,whitemarlinandspearfish.Thefisheryisveryseasonalwiththedifferentspeciesmovingfromwesttoeastthroughtheyearindifferentwaves.Thereareessentiallyfourmarinasthattargetbillfishfromthesoutherncoast.Allmarinasare100%billfishcatchandreleasemarinas,althoughtheprivateboatsandcharterswillkeepdolphinfish,yellowfintunaandwahooforthetableandsometimesforsale.Fromwesttoeast,thesemarinasareClubNauticoinSantoDomingo,CasadeCampoinLaRomana,CapCanainPuntaCanaandClubNauticoinCabezadelToro.TheprivateboatfleetismostlylocatedatClubNauticoinSantoDomingo.TheClubNauticomarinahas100slipsandabout50privatesportfishingboats.Itisagainsttheirrulestorunafor-hirebusinessoutoftheirmarina.20-25ofthoseboatswillfollowthefishmovingeast,firststoppinginCasadeCampo,thenCapCanaandfinallyClubNauticoinCabezadelToro.ThereisoneotherareawithsportfishingboatsthatmaytargetbillfishandthatareaisPuertoBahiawithapproximately20boats.TheFPIteamdidnotvisitthismarina,butfromallconversations,theiroperationswereverysimilartothemarinasvisited.CasadeCampogenerallyhasafishingseasonthatrunsfromJanuarytoMaywithJanuarybeinga“pre-season”monthwithveryfewboats.TheseasonpeaksinMarchandAprilwithasmanyas35boatsparticipatinginthefisheryfromthatmarina.Generally,largeAmericanandotherforeigncountryboatsarriveinMarchatCasadeCampo.Theforeignboatsaregenerallyrunbyafull-timecaptainandmateandtheowneroccasionallyfliesintofishfromhisboat.Therestofthetime,thecaptainwillcharterthevessel.BeginningattheendofApril,thelocalboatsthataretransientandtheforeignboatswillbegintomovetoCapCanajustoutsideofPuntaCana.CapCanaisthelargestmarinawithroomfor152sportfishingboats.Itstaysatabout80-90%occupancy.Ofthe130orsoboatsatanyonetime,18arefulltimechartersplus15-20boatsthatwillcharterseasonally.MostofthoseseasonalchartersareUSboatswiththreefromPuertoRico.TheforeignboatsgenerallystayuntilAugust.CapCanahasextremelyshortrunstothefishinggroundsandsometimes,iftheyarenotrunningtotheFADs,theycanputlinesinforsailfishlessthanamilefromthemarinaentrance.WhileCapCanamarinapromotesyear-roundfishing,sailfishseasonisJanuarytoApril,whitemarlinpeaksfromApriltoAugustandbluemarlinpeaksAugustthroughOctober,butlatelybluemarlinfishinghasbeenverygooduntilJanuary.SummersusedtobeveryslowforCapCana,butfishingcontinuestoimprovedrawingmorebookings.ThebluemarlinreleaserecordwasbrokenDecember11,2016with23bluemarlinsreleasedinasingleday,andsincethemarinahasbeenfloodedwithcharterbookings.Numbersfor2017havesurpassed2016numbersinMay.Marlinmagazinecoveredthatrecord,alsoincreasingdemand.2Also,the2016BillfishReportrankedCapCanathe#2BillfisheryoftheYearfor2016.3Finally,ClubNauticoCabezadelToroisnotafullmarina,butaseriesofprotectedmooringswhere11charterboatsworkandwherethereisspaceforClubNauticomembersthatmovetheirboatstofollowthebillfishseasonally.AhandfuloftheClubNauticoboatswillfinishtheseasonhere.

2http://www.marlinmag.com/atlantic-blue-marlin-release-record-broken-by-blue-bird-in-cap-cana-dominican-republic3http://billfishreport.com/2017/billfish-report/2016-billfisheries-of-the-year-2-punta-cana/

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Overall,allboatsutilizeahiredcaptainandamate,includingtheprivateboats.Theforeignboatsthatcharter,targetahighnetworthclientelethatiscomingtotheDominicanRepublicspecificallytofish.Thelargeforeignboatswillcharge$3000+perdayandtheirclientswilltypicallybookmultipledays.Thereisonelargevesselthatcharges$5000/day.Theexpensiveforeigncharterswilloftenrentacondoatthemarinaandwillofferacondofortheirclientsaswellforanadditionalfee.The“homeport”chartersareconsiderablylessexpensive.Theirfeesarearound$1500adayandsometimeswillrunsplitcharters.4TheirmarketisinexperiencedbiggamefishermenwhoareinPuntaCanaforavacationthatincludesmanyactivities.Thelocalboatswillsellcatchiftheyhaveabigdayfornon-billfishspecies.BothCapCanaandCasadeCampokeepdetailedcatchandeffortstatisticsforallboatsintheirmarina.In2016,42boatsfromCasadeCampotook594tripsover112fishingdays,raising1025billfishandreleasing645billfish.In2016,131boatsfishingfromCapCanatook889tripsreleasing2821billfish.Thatisaveryimpressiveaverageofoverthreebillfishcaughtandreleasedoneverytrip.Whiletheseestimatescoverthetwomostpopularmarinasforbillfishing,theseestimatesarelowerboundsonthenumberofboats,effortandreleases.

ModelingMethodologyThemodelingmethodologysectiondescribestheprocessusedtoproduceamodelofpelagicsupplychaininaquantitativeway.Below,thecreationofthecashflowmodelsofthesupplychainsforeachsectorineachpilotcountryisdetailed.Themodelstrackproductionfromtheharvestertotheconsumer,orinthecaseofexports,whentheproductleavesthecountry.Forthecommercialsectors,commercialharvestersandfor-hirerecreationalproviders,cashflowsaretrackedusingmarginsforeachlinkinthechainforwardoftheharvester.Forboththeprivaterecreationalsectors,privateboatersthemoretypicalmarginingbackwardmodelasprivaterecreationaltripsarefinaldemandproducts.

CommercialCashFlowModelsFigure10showsagenericfisherysupplychainexplaininghowthemarginingforwardtechniqueworks.Eachsupplychaindetailedaboveforeachsectorineachcountrycanbecollapsedfromthismodeldependingonthepercentagedistributionsfromonelinktothenext.Eachlinkinthechainproducesacashflowgeneratedbythatsector,withthesumprovidedinthespreadsheetmodelsacrossallsectorsequaltothetotaldomesticcashflowinthatparticularsupplychain.Eachmodelincludesthecashflowineachlinkofthechainalongwithlaborreturnstotheharvestingsector,withlaborreturnsbeingcalculatedusingthesharesysteminplaceforeachgeartypeineachfishery.

Theremaybemultiplepathwaystotheconsumer,somemoredirectthanothers.Inthesecases,itisimportanttomaptheflowsusingtradeflowpercentages.Somefisheriesdon’thavetransportersbeforethefirstbuyer.Somegodirectlyfromthefirstbuyertoretail.Somegodirectlyfromthefirstbuyertoexport.Inbuildingthesetypesofmodelsitisimportanttotraceallthesepathways.Ateachlinkinthechain,itisnecessarytoestablishtheprofitderivedinthatlinkperunitofproduction.

4Asplitcharterisacharterthatisoperatedmorelikeaheadboat.Thatis,eachpersononthetrippaysasetfeethatissomeportionofthecharterfeeandthepatronsmaynotknoweachother.

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Figure10.GenericModelSchematic.

Attheharvesterlevel,thismeansbuildingamonetarytriplevelprofitfunctionthattakesrevenues,subtractscostsanddevelopsprofit.Profitsfortheentirefleetare:

1) !"# = %&'&(&)*

2) !+# = +,(,)*

3) /# = !"# − !+#4) Π4 = /#5

#)* 5) !"4 = !"#5

#)*

Wherethesubscripthrepresentstheharvestsector,iindexesthetrip,i=1tomfortheanalysisperiod,jindexesspeciesovernspeciesandkindexescostcategoriesoverncostcategories.Fortheharvesterlink,TRhisthesumthepoundsoffishjtimesthepriceoffishjforalljfishcaughtonthetrip.Similarly,fortheharvesterlink,TChisthesumofallcostsacrossthefleetsuchasconsumablefishinggear(hooks,line,lightsetc.),fuel,food,ice,baitandcrew,captainandboatshares.Iftheequationisdenominatedinpounds,profitcanbeestimatedbysimplyapplyinganewestimateofpoundsharvested.Iftheparticularpolicyinterventionchangescostsinasignificantway,costscanbemanipulatedtoestimateprofitchanges.Ifthepolicyinterventionchangesprices,theprofitchangesfromthatshiftcanbeestimatedtoo.

Themodelingeffortdidnotestimateseafooddemandmodelstolookatpricechangesforlargechangesinharvestlevelsnordiditestimatepotentialstockchangesthatcouldarisefromanychangeinharvestlevels.Italsodoesnotestimatehowcostsmightchangeforchangesinstockavailabilityoranyotherexogenousorregulatorychange.Itisastaticlookatcashflowsthatassumesallotherthingsintheeconomystaystatic.Theceterisparibusassumptionworkswellformarginalchangesinharvests.


LocalMarket


Export

Fromfleetcashflowmodelsspecifiedbelow

Docksidepricechangesandfishingcostchangesenterthemodelhere.

Valueiscapturedinthissectorandallsubsequentsectorsusingnetmargins.

Eachmid-supplychainlinkiscapturedbypercentagesofproductthatflowstoeachsector.Somemodels,likeFADsectorforbothpilotcountries,collapsetofirstdealer=localmarket.

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However,aschangesbecomelarger,itislikelythatfisherswillchangetheirbehaviortoreducecostsorincreaserevenuesinthefaceofregulatorychangers.Itisalsolikelythatforlargechangesintheharvestsorabundance,thatpriceswouldchange.

Thecashflowmodelsalsoexcludeannualcosts,depreciationandtaxes.ThatdataisnotavailablefromtheDominicanRepublicenumeratordata.Also,anddescribedmorefullybelow,annualcostdatafromthein-personsurveyofGrenadiancaptainswasplaguedbyhighitemnon-response.Finally,WMdoesnotuseannualcosts,onlytripcosts,initsfinancialcalculationsforthebusinesscase.

Whileitisdifficulttocapturecostandearningsdatafromcommercialfishermen,itisevenharderfortheotherlinksinthesupplychain.TheUShashadverylowresponseratestocostandearningssurveysintheircommercialfisheriesandgenerallyonlyhasgooddatafromprogramsthatrequirethereportingofcostandearningsdata.Atleastonthecommercialside,comparedtootherlinksinthesupplychain,auniverseofparticipantsisgenerallyavailablethroughafishinglicenseoravesselregistry.Additionally,thefirstbuyergenerallykeepstotalrevenuerecords,iftheministrydoesnot.Ifthatfirstbuyeralsofrontsfishingsuppliesandfueltothefishers,thatbuyerwillgenerallyhaveallthecostandreturninformationforeachtripintheirsettlementsheetsforeachfisherandtrip.Sometimesthatcanbethemostefficientwaytocollectcostandearningsdata.

Unfortunately,alltherestofthelinksinthesupplychainaredifficulttotrackdownastheyarerarelyaswellregisteredastheharvesters.Ifyoucanfindthem,theyarealsoreluctanttosharecostinformation.However,itisoftenveryeasytoaskthemonesimplequestion;Howmuchdidyoumarkupthispoundoffishbeforeyousoldittothenextlinkinthechain?Markup,alsocalledmargin,isthegrossprofitratioperpoundofproductandisoftenexpressedasapercentage.Soforthisproject,profitforthefirstbuyer/dealerwillgenerallybeproxiedbygrossmarginandcanbeexpressedas:

6) Π789:8; ≡ =789:8;(!"4)

Ormoregenerically,profitsforalllinksinthesupplychainpasttheharvesterareexpressedas:

7) /#?* ≡ @#?*(=#?*(!"#))

where@isthepercentageoftotalproductenteringthatlinkinthechain,iindexesthesupplychainlinksandMiisthemarginoftheithlinkexpressedinpercentageterms.Profitfortheentiresupplychainis:

8) ΠABA9: = /4 + /#(#

Theseriesofequationsabovearesufficientlyflexibletohandleevenacomplexsupplychainwithbranchesandskips,ifeachpotentialpathwayissummedtothefinalconsumer.DuringthecourseoftheFPIeffort,theteamwasabletogathersomebasicdataontheharvestersandthesupplychainincludingthebasicstructureofthesupplychainsandtheplayers(Gentneretal.2018).Inbothpilotcountries,thesupplychainsareverysimpleandstraightforward,generallyonlyincludingafirstbuyerandperhapsawholesalerorimporterbutoftenthefirstbuyeristheentiresupplychain.Inmanycasestheentiresupplychainisverticallyintegrated.Theboatowneristhefirstbuyer,isthewholesalerandoftentheretailer.TheFPIprocesswasabletocollectalotmoredatathanexpectedandtherestofthedatacollectionisdescribedindetailbelow.

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RecreationalSectorModelsBothrecreationalsectorsareviewedasfinaldemandsectors.Assuch,allcostsincurredarejustthat,costsandnoteconomicvalueorbenefit.Thereisnoneedtoestimatevaluesbackwardsthroughtheirinputsupplychains.Forthefor-hiresector,equations1-4abovecompletelydescribetheentireprofitfromthisindustry.Ontheprivateanglerside,theequivalentmeasuretoprofitascommercialeconomicvalueisconsumerwillingness-to-pay(WTP).TherecreationalmodelingeffortwillusetheresultsofanexternalsurveyfundedthroughFAOtoestimatetheWTPforaccesstothebillfishresourceandtheWTPforincreasesinbillfishcatchthatmightresultfromanyproposedintervention(GentnerandWhitehead2018).

Effortandparticipationdrivethesemodels.ItwasunknownifeffortorparticipationestimatescouldbegeneratedforthiseffortfromtheWTPsurvey,butaroughmethodwasdevelopedfortheWTPpublicationandthatmethodwasutilizedforthiseffort(GentnerandWhitehead2018)anddescribedbelow.Itproduceswideconfidencelimitsbasedonassumptionsusedsoupperandlowboundvaluesareprovidedbythemodels.

Theoutputsoftherecreationalmodelsincludecharterbusinesscashflow,licenserevenue,forbothprivateandgovernmentrunlicensefunds,anglerexpendituresandgrossdomesticproductandemploymentinboththecurrentbasecaseandthechangescenario.Thescenarioinputsaredrivenbyprivateandchartereffortincreasesorresidentornon-residentparticipationincreases.Anyscenariothatimpactseithereffortorparticipationcanbemodeled.MultipliersforemploymentandcontributiontogrossdomesticproductwerecalculatedfromtheWorldTravelandTourismCouncil’sreportontheimpactofCaribbeantourism.5

For-HireRecreationalThefor-hirerecreationalsectorisafinaldemandsectorandrecreationalfishingtripsarethedriverofanychangesinprofitandvalueforthepilotcountriesfromanyintervention.Tocompletethismodel,costandearningsdatawillbecollectedfromthechartervesselsonapertripbasis.Estimatingcurrentvalueandanychangesinvaluewillrequireestimatesoffishingeffort.Estimatingfishingeffortwillbethemostchallengingaspectofthisproject.Inadditiontotheprofitderivedbythebusinessforrecreationalfishing,theconsumersderivevalueaswell.Theestimationofthatvalueisdetailedinthefollowingsectiononprivateanglingtrips.

PrivateRecreationalPrivaterecreationaltripsareanoddformofconsumergood.Thereisnomarketprice,onlyexpendituresrequiredtotakethetrip.Asaresult,valuingaccessandcatchcannotbedonebysimplyobservingmarkettransactions.Instead,non-marketvaluationtechniquesmustbeusedtovaluerecreationaltrips.Thenon-marketvaluationtechniquesinvolveeitherobservingbehaviororpresentinganglerswithhypotheticaltripscenariosinasurvey.Thelater,calledrevealedpreferencetechniques,wouldbeimpossibletoapplyinthiscaseastherearenocurrentdatacollectioneffortsfortherecreationalsectorineitherpilotcountry.ToaddresstheseconcernsmorebroadlyfortheCaribbean,

5https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/regions-2017/caribbean2017.pdf

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FAOfundedaseparatessurveyofanglerbehaviorintheregion.ThemethodsandresultsofthateffortaredetailedinGentnerandWhitehead(2018).

GeneralModelAssumptionsGeneralassumptionsaredetailedbymodelbelow.Basiceconomictheoryassumptionsaboutpropermarketfunctionandbusinessandconsumerrationalityareassumedtohold.Thatisfirmsandconsumersareassumedtobepricetakersinacompetitiveandfreemarketplace.Overall,nomodelscontainadynamiccomponentorbehavioralfeedbackloop.Theyareassumedtoprojectchangesbestaroundmarginalchangesinmarketconditions.Allvaluesarein2018USdollars.

RecreationalModels1. GrenadianmodelassumesthatCaribbeanwideexpendituresareappropriateforGrenadian

billfishanglers.2. GrenadianandDominicanRepublicchartercashflowmodelsassumethattheaveragecashflows

fortheboatsreportingfromtheentireCaribbeanareappropriateforthepilotcountriesastherewasnotenoughcharterresponsetotheWTPonlinesurveytostratifybycountry.WithoutanyinformationonthissectorintheCaribbeanfromanysource,itisunknownifthisisanaccurateassumption.FromGCGworkinthisregionandwithpelagicsportfishingchartersglobally,theoperationsintheDominicanRepublicandGrenadaaresimilartopelagiccharteroperationselsewhere.

3. AssumesDominicanRepublicnon-residentparticipationrateisthesameastheGrenadiannon-residentparticipationrate.

4. AssumesresidentparticipationrateinallmarinefishingactivitiesissameastheCaribbeanwiderateproducedbyCisneros-MontemayorandSumaila2010.

5. AssumesUSpercentageofallmarinerecreationalfishermenthatarefishingforlargepelagicsappliestotheCaribbeanandthetwopilotcountriesinparticular.

6. Assumestheaverageparticipantsperboattripis4.8anglersastakenfromtheUSLargePelagicSurvey.

7. AssumestheUSeffortproportiondirectedathighlymigratoryspecies(HMS)versusallotherspeciesappliestotheCaribbean.

8. AssumestheHMSeffortproportionsintheUScanbeappliedintheCaribbean.9. Assumesalleffortincreasesbymodeatthesameproportionascurrentproportions.10. AssumesthattheCaribbeanwidemultipliersfortheimpactoftourismexpendituresonGDPand

employmentcanbeusedforGrenadaandtheDominicanRepublic.

CommercialModels1. Allcommercialvesselsassumethatthevesselisnotowneroperated.Cashflowrepresentsreturn

tothevesselowner.Iftheownerisalsothecaptain,thecashflowwouldalsoincludethecaptain’sshare.Therearepercentagesofvesselownershipintheinputspageifafurtherbreakdownofcashflowsisnecessaryordesired.

2. Bothmodelsdonotcontainlandedgradesanduseaveragedocksidepricesandthereforerevenuesforexportsanddomesticsupplychainfish.FortheDominicanRepublicthishasnoimpact.ForGrenada,thismasksthetunagradeissues.Themodelwouldstillallowimprovedpricesforbettergradesbyraisingtheaveragetunaprice.

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3. Grenadamodelassumesthatthetripspervesselperyearestimatesfromthelandingsdataaremoreaccuratethantheself-reportedtotalsestimatedfromthesurvey.

4. GrenadamodelassumesthatallYFTandBETlandedmakethegradeforexport.Therearenogradesreportedinthelandingsdata.

5. GrenadamodelassumesthatthenetexportmarginsfromthelargestexporterfitallGrenadianexporters.

6. Grenadianmodelassumesthat2013landingsrevenuedataissuitableforusewith2017expensesandthattherehasnotbeenanysignificantstructuralchangeintheindustry.

7. DominicanRepublicmodelassumesthat2011landingsrevenueandcostdataissuitableforuseandthattherehasnotbeenanysignificantstructuralchangeintheindustry.

DataCollectionOverall,itwasdifficulttoconductstatisticalsamplesofthesefisherysectorsinthepilotcountries.Therewasnouniversalframeforanyofthesesectors.Bothpilotcountrieshavecommercialfishinglicenses,butneitherofthemseparatesoutlonglineorFADfishingboatsdirectly.Neitherlicenseframecontainsanycontactinformationeither.Similarly,fortherecreationalsector,thereisnofishinglicenseandnodatacollectedonthatsectoratall.Asaresult,anysurveyingwillrelyonasampleofconvenience.Specificsamplingregimeswillbediscussedforeachcountryandsectorbelow.

Whilethefisheriesineachcountryhavetheirsimilarities,theculturesandcommunitiesaredifferent.Thedatacollectionsectionwillcovertherecreationaldatacollection,themorecomplicateddatacollectionfirst,followedbythecommercialdatacollectionsineachpilotcountry.

RecreationalSectorsBothGrenadaandtheDominicanRepubliclackrecreationalfishinglicensesandrecreationaldatacollectionsystems.Asaresult,therewasnoframeofsaltwaterrecreationalanglersavailabletouseforstatisticalsamplingpurposes,norwastherealistofsaltwaterrecreationalparticipantsineitherpilotcountryavailabletoestablishtotalparticipationandthereforetotalfishingeffort.

Onewaytoaddressthelackofauniverseofrecreationalanglersistoconductatelephoneormailscreeningsurveythatreachesouttolocalresidentstodevelopasampleframeandtoestablishaparticipationratethatcanbeusedtodevelopresidentparticipationestimatesbyisland.Fortouristanglers,in-personexitinterviewsatairportscanbeusedtoscreenvisitors,establishaparticipationrateandrecruitparticipantsforamoredetailedfollow-upsurvey.However,duetotimeandbudgetconstraintsonthisproject,noneoftheseoptionswereavailable.

Instead,thisprojectusedasampleofconveniencetocontactrecreationalbillfishanglersthroughanonlinesurveyusingSurveyMonkey.Thedataelementsneededforthiseffortwereaddedtoalargersurveyofmarlinanglers’willingness-to-pay(WTP)forincreasesincatchqualityandWTPforconservationtrusts.TheWTPsurveywasfundedthroughtheInternationalGameFishAssociation(IGFA)andthefullmethodologyandresultsaredetailedbyGentnerandWhitehead(2018).

IGFAwasacollaboratoronthisstudy,volunteeringtheuseoftheiremaillistandpostsontheirsocialmediapages.MarlinMagazineofferedtofeaturethesurveyintheirNovemberconservationcolumn

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andpostthesurveyonlineonthewebsiteandsocialmediasites.Additionally,theownerofalargeCaribbeantournamentseriesvolunteeredtheuseoftheirtournamentregistrationlistsfromlastyear.Additionally,anglingclubsinbothpilotcountries,GrenadaandtheDominicanRepublic,providedtheirmembershiplists.Finally,twopopularmarinasintheDominicanRepublicagreedtosendthesurveylinkaroundtoboatownersthathadrentedboatslips.

Allemaillistsweresentalinktothesurveyinstrumentandthesourceofthesamplewastracked.Allemaillistswereremindedtoparticipatethreetimesoverabouta30-dayperiod.Incentiveswereofferedtoencourageparticipation.Theincentivewasanentrytowinoneof10YetiRamblersengravedwiththeIGFAlogo.ThesurveywentliveonOctober4thandthedrawingwasheldDecember1st.Allwinnerswerenotifiedimmediatelyandtheirprizesshippedwithintheweek.ThesurveyinstrumentwasavailableinEnglishandSpanish.TheSpanishtranslationwasdonebyanativeSpanishspeaker,Dr.FreddyArocha,whoisabillfishstockexpertintheCaribbeanandveryfamiliarwiththeidiomaticnatureofSpanishrelatingtorecreationalfishing.Overall,1,101anglersvisitedthesurveylinkwith56%completingthesurveyoncetheyinitiatedthesurvey.Table1containsthevisitationstatisticsbysamplesource.

TheIGFAmailingwentoutto61,000emails.TheemailindicatedthesurveywasforanglersthatparticipatedinCaribbeanbillfishfisheries.Therewasnogoodwaytoscreenthisworldwidelistinadvance,sotheinvitationwassenttoeveryone.TheIGFAlistgeneratedthemostvisitstothesurveyat859.Theircompletionratewasalsothehighestat68%.ElevenIGFAmemberschosetotaketheSpanishversionofthesurvey.Theemaillists,whichcontainedregionaltournamentparticipantsandfishingclubmembers,contained1,442emailaddresses.1,235ofthoseemailscamefrombillfishtournamentregistrationlistsand191peoplerespondedtoeithertheinitialinvitationoroneofthreefollow-upemails.Thetournamentregistrationlistsub-grouphada50.8%surveycompletionrate.ThesecondgroupofemailscamefromtheGrenadianGameFishingAssociationwhosupplied207emailaddresses.Only21anglersrespondedtothisinvitation.

Table1.SurveyInitiationbySampleSource.

SampleSource Language COUNT PERCENTIGFA English 859 73.04%IGFA Spanish 11 0.94%EmailList English 249 21.17%EmailList Spanish 34 2.89%MarlinMagazine English 23 1.96%

ThesameweblinkwassenttoaDominicanRepublicsportfishingorganization,ClubNautico,andthemarinamanagersatCasadeCampoandPuntaCana.AsdisplayedinTable1,34ofthoserespondentschosetorespondtotheSpanishversionofthesurvey.Finally,whileMarlinMagazinewentaboveandbeyondtohelpthissurveyeffort,verylittleresponsecamefromthementioninthemagazine,fromsubsequentpostingofthecolumnonlineorthroughcrosspostingonsocialmediapages.6Thepoorresponsefromthemagazinewassurprisingtotheresearchteam,whocollectivelyexpectedthisavenuetoyieldmoreresponse.Whileitisunderstoodthatfewrespondentswilltakethetimetotypeinthe6https://www.marlinmag.com/caribbean-billfish-project-conservation-plan

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URLtoasurveyfoundonapostcardoramagazinepage,itwashopedthatthewebversionofthearticleorthesocialmediapostswouldhavedrivenmoretraffic.

Thesurveyscreenedfor12-monthfishingactivityintheCaribbean.ThedemographicsofthesetwosamplesarepresentedinTable2.Somewhatsurprisingly,demographicsofthesetwosamplesareverysimilar,althoughnotestsforstatisticaldifferencewereconducted.Theaverageyearsoffishingexperienceis35forbothsamples.Theaverageageisinthemid-50s.Eighty-sevenpercentofthosewhodidnottargetbillfisharewhite/Caucasianwhile72%ofthesamplewhohadtakenaCaribbeanbillfishingtripintheprevious12monthsarewhite/Caucasian.Theaveragehouseholdsizeisthreeandmalesrepresented86%-88%ofthesamples.Theaverageyearsschoolingisbetween15and16forbothsamples.Theaveragehouseholdincome(inUS$)is$161,000forthosewhodidnottargetbillfishand$241,000forthosewhodidtargetbillfish.

Table3containstheresultsoftheethnicityquestionexpandedtoincludeallethnicitycategoriesincludedinthesurvey.Again,itisapredominantlywhite/Caucasiansample.Inbothsamples,thesecondmostrepresentedethnicityrepresentedwasHispanicat5.0%and12.0%fortheanglerswithno12-monthfishingexperienceandthosewith12-monthfishingexperience,respectively.Forthosewhotargetedbillfishduringthe12monthspriortothesurvey,thesurveyaskedquestionsabouttheirbillfishingavidity(Table4).Respondentstookanaverageofninebillfishingtripsandfishedanaverageof16daysoneachofthesetrips.Thirteenofthesedaysweretypicallyspentonaprivateboat,whilethreedayswereonacharterboat.Tolabeltheserespondents,mostarewhatwouldbeconsideredtobehighincome,highlyexperienceanglerswithfishingashighlycentralintheirlifethattakemulti-dayfishingtripstotheCaribbeanandnottheall-inclusiveresortpatronwhotakesasingledayfishingtripaspartofmanyrecreationalactivities.Thedemographicsinthesurveyresultsisanartifactofthesamplesourcesused.Table2.SampleSummary.

Variable 0daysforbillfishinpast12months 1+daysforbillfishinpast12months

n Mean SD Min Max n Mean StdDev Min Max

experience 222 34.55 17.08 1 71 230 34.80 16.00 2 70

age 217 55.19 13.46 20 80 227 53.29 13.76 18 83white 228 0.87 0.34 0 1 239 0.72 0.45 0 1

house 218 2.61 1.27 1 8 229 2.74 1.30 1 7

male 228 0.86 0.34 0 1 239 0.88 0.33 0 1school 219 15.38 2.17 10 18 227 15.63 2.18 10 18

Income($1000) 180 $161.25 $135.89 0.05 $800 198 $241.19 $372.25 0.05 $3,000Table3.EthnicityExpanded.

Race

0daysforbillfishinpast12months

1+daysforbillfishinpast12months

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

Multiple 3 1.36% 12 5.53%

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Race

0daysforbillfishinpast12months

1+daysforbillfishinpast12months

Frequency Percent Frequency Percent

AmericanIndianorAlaskanNative 1 0.45% 1 0.46%

Asian/PacificIslander 6 2.73% 3 1.38%

BlackorAfricanAmerican 1 0.45% 3 1.38%Hispanic 11 5.00% 26 11.98%White/Caucasian 198 90.00% 172 79.26%

Table4.BillfishingAvidity.

Variable1+daysforbillfishinpast12months

n Mean StdDev Min Max

trips 239 8.67 14.27 1 100

days 239 16.44 19.66 1 100private 239 13.18 17.70 0 99

charter 239 2.62 7.02 0 60

PrivateRecreationalAnglersExpenditureestimateswerecalculatedassimplemeansasdetailedinGentnerandSteinback(2008).Ifarespondentcompletedanyexpenditurecategoryintheexpendituretable,allmissingresponseswerere-codedaszeros.ThesurveycollectedinformationonfishingmodeoftheirlastCaribbeanfishingtripandthecountryoftheirlasttrip.Thecountryoftheirlasttripwascomparedtotheircountryofresidencetodevelopwhethertherespondentwasaresidentofthecountrywheretheytooktheirlasttrip.Residentstatusandfishingmodewereusedtopoststratifytheexpendituremeans.Initialmeanswererunonthosestrataandoutlierswereeliminatedbystrataandexpenditurecategory.Outlierswereremovedbycalculatingthepercentstandarderror(PSE)foreachmean.Anymeanwithhigherthana20%PSEhadtheupper5%ofitsdistributiontruncatedatthe95%value(GentnerandSteinback2008).Fishingdayswerecollectedinthesurveyandtotaltripexpenditureswerecalculatedandthendividedbytotalfishingdaystoderiveanestimateofexpenditureperfishingday.

Tables5and6displayexpendituresforprivateboatanglerandcharterboatanglers,respectively,afteroutlierswereremoved.Withoutliersremoved,thetotalspendingbyprivateboatanglerswas$1,583forresidentsand$7,055fornon-residents.Fishermenutilizingthechartermodespent$1,863and$6,807forresidentsandnon-residents,respectively.Itisinterestingtonotethatresidentsandnon-residents,whethertheyarefishingonprivateboatsorcharterboats,spendverynearlythesameamountpertripintotalandperfishingday.Asistypicalforanglersurveys,thesinglebiggestexpenditureitemsfornon-residentsineithermodearecharterfees,airfareandlodging.Forresidents,thesinglebiggestexpenditureitemsarefuelforprivateboatanglersandcharterfeesforthecharterangler.

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Table5.PrivateBoatExpendituresbyResidentStatuswithOutliersRemoved.

PrivateBoatMean

ExpenditureN Standard

Error95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

ExpenditureCategory

ResidentStatus

$1,202.83 112 $276.73 $654.48 $1,751.18Airfare non-residentresident $9.30 43 $6.50 ($3.81) $22.42

BaitandTackle non-resident $537.03 112 $80.73 $377.06 $697.00resident $246.42 43 $59.35 $126.64 $366.20

CarRental non-resident $48.79 112 $12.02 $24.97 $72.62resident $9.30 43 $6.50 ($3.81) $22.42

CharterFees non-resident $0.00 112 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00resident $0.00 43 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

FoodandBeverage

non-resident $1,191.77 112 $238.76 $718.64 $1,664.89resident $316.05 43 $63.75 $187.39 $444.71

Fuel(VehicleandBoat)

non-resident $2,540.58 112 $329.66 $1,887.33 $3,193.83resident $792.00 43 $151.38 $486.51 $1,097.49

Lodging non-resident $960.54 112 $183.16 $597.59 $1,323.50resident $77.33 43 $33.22 $10.28 $144.37

MiscellaneousCosts

non-resident $455.09 112 $88.86 $279.00 $631.17resident $106.05 43 $24.40 $56.81 $155.28

OtherRecreationalActivities


TotalDailyExpenditures

non-resident $2,767.35 112 $570.66 $1,636.56 $3,898.14resident $1,036.55 43 $206.40 $620.03 $1,453.07

TotalTripExpenditures

non-resident $7,055.85 112 $930.17 $5,212.65 $8,899.05resident $1,583.19 43 $247.46 $1,083.79 $2,082.58

Table6.CharterPatronExpendituresbyResidentStatuswithOutliersRemoved.

CharterMean


Error95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

ExpenditureCategory

ResidentStatus

$999.00 105 $103.94 $792.89 $1,205.11Airfare non-residentresident $25.00 8 $25.00 ($34.12) $84.12

BaitandTackle non-resident $140.33 105 $29.31 $82.21 $198.46resident $271.25 8 $181.97 ($159.04) $701.54

CarRental non-resident $68.48 105 $11.83 $45.03 $91.93resident $46.88 8 $26.07 ($14.76) $108.51

CharterFees non-resident $2,811.52 105 $268.68 $2,278.72 $3,344.32resident $706.25 8 $113.56 $437.72 $974.78

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CharterMean


Error95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

FoodandBeverage



non-resident $230.00 105 $85.52 $60.41 $399.59resident $175.00 8 $121.74 ($112.88) $462.88

Lodging non-resident $1,404.00 105 $149.96 $1,106.62 $1,701.38resident $375.00 8 $154.69 $9.22 $740.78

MiscellaneousCosts





non-resident $2,970.79 105 $231.77 $2,511.19 $3,430.40resident $819.94 8 $152.89 $458.40 $1,181.48


non-resident $6,807.11 105 $452.06 $5,910.66 $7,703.56resident $1,862.50 8 $395.36 $927.62 $2,797.38

AllattemptsweremadetostratifytheexpenditureestimatesbyCaribbeancountry.Mostcountriesdidnotcontainenoughresponsetoreportestimates.Table7containstheexpenditureestimatesfortheDominicanRepublic.EventhoughGCGobtainedaGrenadaspecificemaillistwithover200emailaddresses,onlyfourresponseswerefilledwithallmissingvaluesfromthissecondpilotcountry,soitsfiguresarenotreported.

ReferringtotheDRestimatesinTable7,19non-residentchartermodeanglers,24non-residentprivateboatanglers,oneresidentcharteranglerand10residentprivateboatanglersrespondedtothesurvey.Non-residentcharteranglersspentthemostoncharterfees($3,251)andnon-residentprivateboatanglersspentthemostonfuel($3,683).Residentprivateboatanglersspentthemostonfuel($1,325)andresidentcharteranglersspentthemostonlodging($1,367).However,residentcharteranglerestimatesshouldbetakenwithagrainofsaltastheyarebasedonasingleobservationthatdidnotindicateanycharterfeeexpenditures.Overall,DRcharterboatexpendituresareverysimilartothosepresentedinTables5and6withtheDRcharterexpenditurebeingslightlyhigher.Foranglersonprivateboats,theDRresidentexpendituresarenearlyidenticalbutthenon-residentexpendituresarenearly$4,000less.

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Table7.TripExpenditureEstimatesfortheDominicanRepublic.DominicanRepublic Mean


Error95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

ExpenditureCategory ResidentStatus

FishingMode

$1,604.21 19 $403.77 $755.92 $2,452.50Airfare non-resident CharterPrivateBoat $1,354.00 24 $382.34 $563.06 $2,144.94

resident Charter $0.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $20.00 10 $20.00 ($25.24) $65.24

BaitandTackle non-resident Charter $69.21 19 $33.67 ($1.53) $139.95PrivateBoat $893.75 24 $231.38 $415.11 $1,372.39

resident Charter $1,500.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $176.10 10 $72.36 $12.41 $339.79

CarRental non-resident Charter $55.26 19 $23.85 $5.16 $105.36PrivateBoat $82.29 24 $34.82 $10.26 $154.33


CharterFees non-resident Charter $3,251.05 19 $672.10 $1,839.02 $4,663.09PrivateBoat $0.00 24 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

resident Charter $1,000.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $0.00 10 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

FoodandBeverage non-resident Charter $652.63 19 $186.71 $260.37 $1,044.90PrivateBoat $1,847.08 24 $825.15 $140.13 $3,554.03

resident Charter $275.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $385.00 10 $141.63 $64.62 $705.38


non-resident Charter $42.11 19 $39.42 ($40.70) $124.91PrivateBoat $3,683.33 24 $882.80 $1,857.12 $5,509.54

resident Charter $0.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $1,325.00 10 $546.97 $87.66 $2,562.34

Lodging non-resident Charter $1,367.11 19 $260.43 $819.97 $1,914.24

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DominicanRepublic MeanExpenditure

N StandardError

95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

ExpenditureCategory ResidentStatus

FishingMode

$1,604.21 19 $403.77 $755.92 $2,452.50Airfare non-resident CharterPrivateBoat $1,354.00 24 $382.34 $563.06 $2,144.94

resident Charter $0.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $20.00 10 $20.00 ($25.24) $65.24PrivateBoat $1,765.63 24 $519.84 $690.26 $2,840.99

resident Charter $1,000.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $125.00 10 $100.35 ($102.00) $352.00

MiscellaneousCosts non-resident Charter $61.84 19 $32.58 ($6.60) $130.28PrivateBoat $677.08 24 $296.20 $64.34 $1,289.82

resident Charter $0.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $215.00 10 $59.18 $81.12 $348.88


non-resident Charter $332.63 19 $96.00 $130.93 $534.33PrivateBoat $106.25 24 $50.03 $2.76 $209.74



non-resident Charter $3,486.22 19 $608.33 $2,208.17 $4,764.28PrivateBoat $5,311.99 24 $2,363.41 $422.90 $10,201.07

resident Charter $567.86 1 . . .PrivateBoat $2,018.30 10 $686.42 $465.50 $3,571.10


non-resident Charter $7,436.05 19 $971.78 $5,394.41 $9,477.70PrivateBoat $10,409.42 24 $2,675.59 $4,874.54 $15,944.29

resident Charter $3,975.00 1 . . .PrivateBoat $2,351.10 10 $643.56 $895.26 $3,806.94

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CharterCostandEarningsWhilethefocusofthissurveywasonanglersandnotcharterbusinesses,theresearchteamrealizedearlyinthesurveydevelopmentthatallofthesamplesourceswouldreachcharterboatcaptainsandcharterboatowners.Insteadofscreeningthoseindividualsoutofthesurvey,theresearchteamdevelopedachartermodule.Earlyinthesurvey,participantswereaskediftheyownedaboat,and,ifyes,thesurveyaskediftheyevercharteredthatboat.Iftheiranswertothatquestionswasyes,theywereadministeredthechartermodule.Oncethatmodulewascomplete,theirsurveywascomplete.Tables8and9displaythebasicsamplecharacteristicsofthechartercaptainsinthissample.LookingatTable9,itisclearthatcountrylevelstratificationwillbeimpossibleexceptforBarbados,theDRandPuertoRicoforbothsamplesizereasonsandconfidentialityreasons.Takeforinstance,Grenada,wheretherearereallyonlytwofulltimechartercaptainsandperhapsanothertwoparttimechartercaptains.Itwouldnotbeethicaltopresentconfidentialbusinessinformationthatcouldbeeasilydeducedpresentingestimatesfromthosetwovessels.Table8.CharterCharacteristics(Means).

Detail N Mean StandardError

95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

BoatLength 52 37.70 1.86 33.97 41.43FuelCapacity 48 551.21 74.86 400.61 701.80TotalHP 49 984.14 125.01 732.79 1,235.50BoatValue 46 $556,775 $165,498 $223,445 $890,105

Overall,chartersintheCaribbeanuse“Sportfisher”typeboatsthataverage37.7feetlongwithfullcabins(59.6%)and551gallonsoffuelcapacity,followedbycenterconsoleboatsat34.6%.Themajorityofthoseboatsarediesel-operatedwith984totalhorsepoweronaverage.Averagecurrent,fairmarketvalueofthevesselsusedforcharteringisjustoverahalf-millionUSdollars.Only43.1%ofrespondentskeeptheirboatyear-roundintheCaribbean.WhendoingtheFPIstudiesintheDR,GCGfoundthatmanyofthechartersareownedbyboatownersthatmayormaynothaveapermanentresidenceintheCaribbeanbutmovetheirboatstofollowthefisharoundtheCaribbean(Gentneretal2017).Formost,onlyaportionoftheirtripsarechartertrips.46%reporttakingonly25%orlessoftheirtripsfor-hireand,ontheothersideofthatcoin,only6%reporttakingalloftheirtripsasfor-hiretrips.Theparttimenatureofsomeofthechartercaptainsisborneoutbythequestionaboutthetypeoffor-hirebusinesstheyare,with21.9%sayingtheyarefulltimecharters,31.3%self-identifyingaspart-timecharters,15.6%identifyingascostrecoverychartersand31.3%indicating“other”astheirtype.Remainingrespondentsseemedtohavemisunderstoodthequestion,indicatingtheywerea“fun”charterorsomevariationofacostrecoverycharter.Finally,39.4%respondedthattheysellfishand,ofthose,themajoritydoesnotsellfisheverytripwith60.7%sayingtheydon’tsellfishon75-99%oftheirtrips.Thefishsalesquestionwasaskedofallrespondentsanditwasfoundthat8.3%oftheprivateanglerssoldfish.

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Table9.CharterCharacteristics(Frequencies)

Detail Response FrequencyCount

PercentFrequency

CharterCountry

Bahamas 1 4.76%Barbados 4 19.05%DominicanRepublic 4 19.05%Grenada 2 9.52%Mexico(Caribbeancoast) 2 9.52%PuertoRico 4 19.05%TrinidadandTobago 3 14.29%Venezuela 1 4.76%

BoatTypeCenterconsole 18 34.62%Cuddycabin 3 5.77%Sportfisher 31 59.62%

FuelType Diesel 30 60.00%Gasoline 20 40.00%

KeepaBoatintheCaribbean?

No 29 56.86%Yes 22 43.14%

PercentFor-HireTrips

0%(none) 8 16.00%100%(allofthem) 3 6.00%Between1%and25% 23 46.00%Between25%and50% 11 22.00%Between75%and99% 5 10.00%

TypeofCharter

Costrecovery 5 15.63%Full-timecharter 7 21.88%

Other(pleasespecify) 10 31.25%Part-timecharter 10 31.25%

DoYouEverSellFish

No 20 60.61%Yes 13 39.39%

PercentTripswithNoFishSales

0%(none) 1 3.57%

Between1%and25% 7 25.00%

Between25%and50% 3 10.71%

Between75%and99% 17 60.71%

Table10containstheresultsforthechartercostandearningsquestions,aggregatedacrossallcountries.Meanswerecalculatedasabovewiththeoutliersremovedusingthesamepreviouslydescribedoutlierrule.Totalrevenueappearstobequitelowat$21,796peryear.Fortunately,thesurveyaskedhalfandfulldaypricesandthetotalnumberofhalfandfulldaytrips.Onaverage,usingthistotalrevenuefigure,thesebusinesseslosemoneyastotalannualcostsarehigherthanrevenues.Thatistobeexpectedifthemajorityoftheseboatsarepart-timechartersorcostrecoverycharters.Thehighestannualcostwasannualrepairandmaintenanceat$12,459.Thesecondhighestwasannualboatinsuranceat$3,123peryear.Whileonly39%respondedtheysoldfish,averageannualfishsaleswere$2,623.Intotal,theiraveragehalfdaytripcostsare$492/tripandfulldaytripcostsare$761/trip.With

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halfdaypricesaveraging$578andhalfdaytipsaveraging$81,marginsarethereforeverytightforthehalfdaytrips.Ontheotherhand,withfulldaypricesaveraging$1,344/tripandtipsaveraging$181,marginsaremuchbetteronfulldaytrips.Onaverage,eachvesselistaking22halfdaytripsand19fulldaytrips,whichisindicativeofapart-timecharter.Itisnotunusual,forachartercaptaininawarmweatherlocation,toaverageover200tripsayear.

Table10.AggregateCharterCostsandEarnings.

EstimateType ExpenditureCategory

MeanExpenditure N Standard

Error95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

AnnualEstimates

AnnualBoatInsurance

$3,123.29 28 $624.02 $1,842.91 $4,403.66

AnnualGearandTackle $2,657.21 28 $591.89 $1,442.75 $3,871.67

AnnualInterest $0.16 25 $0.11 ($0.07) $0.39

AnnualLicensing $403.46 28 $92.16 $214.37 $592.55AnnualMooring

Fees $4,225.07 28 $1,083.86 $2,001.17 $6,448.97

AnnualOther $2,653.78 27 $772.64 $1,065.59 $4,241.96AnnualRepair

andMaintenance $12,459.00 28 $2,877.53 $6,554.80 $18,363.20

FishSaleRevenue $2,622.71 24 $585.84 $1,410.80 $3,834.62

TotalAnnualCost $25,427.18 28 $4,870.19 $15,434.37 $35,419.98TotalRevenue $21,796.19 36 $4,542.62 $12,574.19 $31,018.20

FullDayTripEstimates(PerTripExceptforTotalFullDayTrips)

FullDayBaitCost $54.78 27 $10.20 $33.82 $75.74FullDayBoat

Share $143.67 27 $40.09 $61.26 $226.07

FullDayCaptainShare $95.70 27 $26.28 $41.69 $149.72

FullDayFoodandBeverages $66.07 27 $12.40 $40.58 $91.57

FullDayFuel $270.93 27 $52.71 $162.59 $379.26FullDayGearUsedonTrip $35.30 27 $6.91 $21.10 $49.50

FullDayIce $15.37 27 $2.77 $9.67 $21.07FullDayMate

Share $50.70 27 $12.71 $24.59 $76.82

FullDayOilandLube $28.70 27 $6.24 $15.88 $41.53

FullDayPrice $1,343.84 38 $160.62 $1,018.39 $1,669.30

FullDayTips $180.60 35 $30.45 $118.72 $242.48TotalFullDayCostperTrip $761.22 27 $113.57 $527.77 $994.67

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EstimateType ExpenditureCategory

MeanExpenditure N Standard

Error95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

TotalFullDayTrips 19.28 47 3.46 12.31 26.24

HalfDayTripEstimates(PerTripExceptforTotalFullDayTrips)

HalfDayBait $39.97 29 $7.13 $25.37 $54.56

HalfDayBoatShare $68.44 27 $18.06 $31.33 $105.56

HalfDayCaptainShare $70.85 27 $18.08 $33.70 $108.01

HalfDayFoodandBeverages $52.86 29 $9.31 $33.79 $71.93

HalfDayFuel $171.47 30 $31.10 $107.85 $235.08HalfDayGearUsedonTrip $31.61 28 $5.59 $20.14 $43.07

HalfDayIce $12.28 29 $1.75 $8.69 $15.87HalfDayMate

Share $51.41 27 $11.57 $27.62 $75.19

HalfDayOilandLube $18.79 28 $3.28 $12.05 $25.52

HalfDayPrice $577.94 31 $91.92 $390.21 $765.66HalfDayTips $81.53 30 $15.98 $48.86 $114.21TotalHalfDayCostperTrip $491.73 30 $68.79 $351.04 $632.42

TotalHalfDayTrips 21.74 27 6.38 8.63 34.85

Table11takesthedataabove,removesthemissingdata,takesouttheparttimeandcostrecoveryoperatorsandcalculatesannualmeancashflow.Overall,aftertaxesanddepreciation,charterboatsearnabout$17,400,beforedepreciationandtaxes.Themeansareacrossvesselsself-selectingasfull-timecharters.

Table11.AnnualCashFlowSummaryMeans.

AnnualEstimate N MeanGrossRevenue 17 $57,919VariableCosts 17 $12,751

FixedCosts 17 $30,400CashFlow 17 $17,400

Depreciation 17 $21,426

Tax 17 -$1,664

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EffortEstimatesAgain,therearenodatacollectioneffortsineitherpilotcountrydirectedatrecreationalanglers.Asaresult,wehavenocompleteparticipation,effortorcatchestimatesfromeithercountry.However,wedohavesomeestimatesinbothcountries.

GrenadaTheGrenadaMinistryofTourismreleasedsomestatisticsfromtheirairportinterceptsurvey.OnequestiononthatsurveyaskedwhatactivitiesthevisitorparticipatedinwhiletheywereinGrenada.Table12containsthesummaryofthefishingresponsetothatquestion.Fromtheirdata,itshowsthat4.9%ofvisitorsindicatedtheyhadgonefishingontheirtrip.With146,899visitorsin2017,thatmeanstherewere7225tripstakenbyvisitors.Dividingthatnumberby4.8personsperboattripyields1,500vesseltripsbytourists.Thatnumberwouldnotincluderesidentfishingtripsandassumesallvisitorsindicatingtheyhadfishedontheirvisitfishedforjustoneday.TheestimatesseemslightlyhighastherearebetweentwoandfouractivecharterboatsinGrenada.Onlyoneisfulltimecharterrunningapproximately200tripsayear.Ifallfourwerefulltimechartersrunning200tripsayear,thetotalchartereffortwouldbe800trips.Ifeachvesselhadafullfamilyoffouronthevessel,thatisstillonly3840persontrips.ItisalsohardtobelievethatGrenadawouldhavenearlythesamenumberofboattripsasthetwoverybusymarinasreportingfromtheDR.Itispossiblethattouristsarerespondingyestotheexitsurveyquestionwhentheydoanysortoffishingwhileparticipatinginsailingorotherboatrelatedrecreation.

Table12.GrenadaAirportSurveyResults.

Response Frequency Percent

Yes 27 4.92%

No 516 93.99%

NotStated 6 1.09%

TotalInterviews 549 100.00%

TotalVisitorsin2017 146,899TotalTouristFishingTrips 7,225

Ontheresidentside,itwasdeterminedthroughtheFPIvisitsandsubsequentvisitsthattherewere15vesselsthatwereriggedforoffshorefishingthatparticipatedactively.Theestimateof15boatswasusedtoestimatethelowerboundestimateontotalresidenteffort.TheupperboundonresidenteffortwasgeneratedbymultiplyingtheGrenadianpopulationtimesthepercentageofthepopulationthatparticipatesinrecreationalfishingfromCisneros-MontemayorandSumaila(2010)of22.79%.ThatnumberwasfurtherreducedbythepercentageofUSanglersthatparticipateinlargepelagicfishing,0.33%,fromtheLargePelagicSurvey.7Usingthesetwomethodologies,totalpelagicfishingeffortinGrenadawasestimatedbetween1954and3641tripsin2017.

7MRIPOnlineQueries:https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/recreational/queries/index.html

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DominicanRepublicFromtheFPIreport,weknowthatmosteffortisconfinedtoasmallnumberofmarinas.Twoofthosemarinaslogeverytriptakenbyeveryboatandkeepcatchandreleasestatisticsonbillfish.BothMarinaCapCanaandCasadeCampoMarinakeepdetailedcatchandeffortstatisticsforallboatsintheirmarina.In2016,42boatsfromCasadeCampotook594tripsover112fishingdays,raising1025billfishandreleasing645billfish.In2016,131boatsfishingfromCapCanatook889tripsreleasing2821billfish.Thatisaveryimpressiveaverageofoverthreebillfishcaughtandreleasedoneverytrip.Whiletheseestimatescoverthetwomostpopularmarinasforbillfishing,theseestimatesarelowerboundsonthefor-hirenumberofboats,effortandreleases.Fortheprivaterecreationalsector,ClubNauticorepresentativesestimatethenumberofprivaterecreationalboatsthattargetpelagicsat200.Usingaverageannualavidityestimatesfromthesurveyforresidentprivateboateavidityrates,lowerboundtotalprivateboateffortwasestimated.Combinedwiththetotalnumberofchartertripstakenfromthemarina,thelowerboundeffortestimatewasestimatedat7143boattrips.InconversationswithClubNautico,theyestimatedafewyearsagothattherewere9000totalboattripstakenforbillfishfishing.Thatestimatewasassumedtobetheupperboundoneffort.Itispossiblethattherearefarmorerecreationalfishingtripsbeingtakenintheregion.Therewereover6.1millionvisitorstotheDominicanRepublicin2017.8Evenifall9000tripsestimatedabovewerechartertripsbytourists,thatrepresentsatouristparticipationrateof0.14%,whichseemslowforadestinationknownforitshighqualitybillfishfishingandcertainlywhencomparedtothetouristfishingparticipationrateof4.9%foundforGrenadaabove.

CommercialDataCollection

GrenadaLocalfisheriesgovernanceisentrustedtoafisheriesdivision,theFMU,astheleadagencyresponsibleformanagementanddevelopmentoffisheries.ThefunctionsentrustedtotheFMUincludeextension,fishingtechnology,datamanagement,marineprotectedareamanagement,resourceassessmentandfisheriesmanagement.TheheadoftheFMUistheChiefFisheryOfficer,whomisappointedbytheMinisterunderadvisementoftheFAC.FisheriesOfficersarebasedateachofthesevenDistrictFisheryCentersaroundtheislandsandareresponsibleofmonitoringandcontrollingtheaspectsstipulatedinthecurrentregulations.MonitoringiscurrentlyconductedonsitebyFisheryOfficersatlocalfishmarketsandprocessingplants.Generally,theydon’tgatherdatafromthefishermen,butinsteadgatheritfromthefirstdealer.Afteralongwaitingperiod,theteamwasabletoobtaindisaggregatedlandingsdata,whichdoescontainspeciesvolume,priceandvalue.IttookoursecondvisittothecountrytopresenttheFPIresultsandbusinesscaseconceptsbeforethelandingsdatawouldbeshared.However,theagencydoesnotcollectcostdataonanytripssoaseparatedatacollectioneffortwaslaunchedtocollectcostandearningsdata.

Thereare2,028licensedvesselsfromtheboatregistrylistprovidedbytheFMU.Allfisheriesarecompletelyopenaccessandeveryfishermanneedsalicense,theboatneedsaregistrationandthefirstdealerneedsalicense.Thefirstdealerisrequiredtoreportalllandings,volumeandvalue,byspecies.

8https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/05/05/979728/0/en/Dominican-Republic-Announces-2017-Developments-and-Boasts-Strong-Tourism-Statistics.html

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Unfortunately,thereisnocleardelineationintheregistrationlistregardinggeartypesorfisheriesinwhichtheboatlandsfish.Additionally,theregistrationlistdoesnotusethesamenomenclature(TypeI–III)thattheFisheriesMinistryhasadopted.Thereare336openpiroguesinthelist(TypeI),278pirogue(TypeII)and81“LLNF”(TypeIII).Ifthosenaïveclassificationsarecorrectthatmeansthatthereare695vesselsthatarecapableofdeployingLLgear.However,intalkingtothemainexportbuyerwhoappearstohandle80-90%ofallexporttuna,hesaysthereare60-80TypeIIandmostlyTypeIIIboatsinthefishery.IfyouincludetheTypeIvessels,thatmayaddanother40vessels.Whilealltheseboatshavesoldfishtohiminthepast,heregularlyworkswiththesame60vessels.Fora10%sampleofallthreevesseltypesusingthenaïveclassificationfromthefisheriesregistrationlist,targetsamplingratesforthecostandearningsdatacollectionwas33TypeIboats,28TypeIIboatsandeightTypeIII.

InGrenville,themajorfocusoftheFADfishery,thereare60-100boatsregisteredbutonly40-45activevessels.ThereareonlyahandfulofFADfishersinCarriacouandreallyonlytwoinPetitMartinique.Itwillbeimportanttocollectdataineachlocation,butmostofthesamplingwillbecarriedoutinGrenville.Followingthe10%samplingruleabove,GCGattemptedtoconductasmanyassixinterviewsinGrenville,twoorthreeinCarriacouandatleastoneinPetitMartinique.

ItwasdecidedthattheoveralldatacollectionbeconductedbytheFisheriesOfficersastheFMUdeemedthefinancialinformationsensitiveandonlyfisheriesofficersshouldbeprivytoit.Therewasconsiderablesuspicionandconcernabouthowthisdatawillbeusedandwhattheconclusionswillbe,mainlyfromtheFMUandnotthefishers.SomeofthecautionwasbeingdrivenbytheirrecentjoiningofICCATandthepoliticaluncertaintyinthecountrysurroundingalocalelectionandthepotentialforachangeinleadershipwithintheFMU.ThefinaldatasheetsweredeliveredtoGCGduringtheMarch2018CBMCmeeting.Theformswerereviewedandthedataenteredduringthemeetingsoanyquestionscouldbeaddressed.MonetarysurveyresponseswereconvertedtoUSDusinganexchangerateof0.37USDtoECD.9Cashflowestimatedinthetablesbelowisnetofcaptainandcrewshare.Basically,cashflowisthecashflowfortheboatowner.Ifthecaptainisthevesselowner,cashflowswouldbehigherbytheamountofthecaptain’sshare.

LLFisheryLookingatTable13,sevenTypeIandIIboatsweresampledand22TypeIIIboatsweresampled.TherewasnodelineationduringthesurveybetweenTypeIandIIvessels.MostoftheTypeIandIIboatswerefromtheportofGouyave(57%).Allofthemusedoutboardmotorsandself-classifiedasfull-timefishermen.Most,50%,werebetween35and44yearsoldand60%obtainedlessthana9thgradeeducation.Finally,80%earnedlessthan$10,000ECDperyear.FortheTypeIIIvessels,46%werefromSt.Georges.Alloftheirvesselswereinboarddieselsand91%consideredthemselvesfulltimefishermen.52%wereinthesame35-44yearoldagegroupastheTypeIboats.Theyweremoreeducatedwith59%finishinghighschool,howevertherewasahighdegreeofitemnon-responsetothisquestion.Therewasevenmoreitemnon-responsetotheincomequestionwithonly13captainsgivingtheirincome.Italsoappearsthatthereweresomeprotestresponsesgivenas46%respondingsaidtheirincomewaslessthan$5,000ECD(or$1,850USD).Inspeakingwiththeinterviewers,incomeandtriprevenuewerenotansweredbythemajorityoftheLLvesselcaptains.

9http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=XCD&To=USD

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Table13.FrequenciesforCategoricalVariablesintheSurveyofLLVessels.

VesselType Table Variable Frequency Percent

I

PortGouyave 4 57.14%Grenville 1 14.29%Victoria 2 28.57%

EngineType outboard 7 100.00%FishermanType full-time 6 100.00%

Age25-34 2 33.33%35-44 3 50.00%45-54 1 16.67%

EducationLessthan9thgrade 3 60.00%Highschoolgraduate 1 20.00%Somecollege 1 20.00%

Income$10,0001-$25,000 1 20.00%$5,001-$10,000 2 40.00%Lessthan$5,000 2 40.00%

III

Port

Carenage 6 27.27%

Gouyave 1 4.55%

GrandMal 5 22.73%

St.Georges 10 45.45%

EngineType inboard 22 100.00%

FishermanTypefull-time 19 90.48%

part-time 2 9.52%

Age

25-34 6 28.57%

35-44 11 52.38%

45-54 2 9.52%

55-64 1 4.76%

lessthan25 1 4.76%

Education

Lessthan9thgrade 1 5.88%

Somehighschool 4 23.53%

Highschoolgraduate 10 58.82%

Somecollege 1 5.88%

Bachelor'sdegree 1 5.88%

Income

$10,0001-$25,000 3 23.08%

$5,001-$10,000 4 30.77%

Lessthan$5,000 6 46.15%

Table14containsmoredescriptivestatisticsofthetwovesseltypes.CIwasveryinterestedinhowmuchofthesevesselscatchwasgoingtohomeconsumptionandnotenteringthemarketforfoodsecurity

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reasons.FortheTypeIvessels,9.2%wasbeingconsumedand10.5%wasbeingsharedwithfriendsor19.7%wasbeingusedforlocalfoodsecurity.FortheTypeIIIvessels,6.3%wasconsumedand6.9%wasgivenawayor13.2%wascontributingtolocalfoodsecurity.Table14.LLFleetCharacteristicsbyVesselType.

VesselType Variable N Mean Standard

Error

Lower95%ConfidenceInterval

Upper95%ConfidenceInterval

I

Percentsold 6 79.17% 3.00% 71.44% 86.89%Percentconsumed 6 9.17% 2.39% 3.03% 15.30%Percentgivenaway 6 10.50% 2.43% 4.25% 16.75%Percenttuna 4 61.25% 18.75% 1.58% 120.92%Percentbillfish 3 29.17% 15.57% -37.82% 96.15%Percentother 3 12.50% 6.29% -14.57% 39.57%Vesselowner? 7 71.43% 18.44% 26.30% 116.56%Marketvalueofvessel 7 $11,972.14 $1,417.40 $8,503.88 $15,440.40Horsepower 7 48.57 4.04 38.68 58.46

Fuelcapacity 6 17 2.236068 11.252004 22.747996Vessellength 6 18.17 0.31 17.38 18.96Captainshare 5 26.27% 0.79% 24.08% 28.46%Crewshare 5 27.38% 1.64% 22.82% 31.94%Boatshare 5 46.35% 2.32% 39.90% 52.80%

Totalannualtrips 6 185.00 22.78 126.45 243.55

III

Percentsold 21 87.05% 1.97% 82.94% 91.16%

Percentconsumed 20 6.25% 1.07% 4.02% 8.48%

Percentgivenaway 20 6.85% 1.23% 4.27% 9.43%

Percenttuna 21 68.10% 1.67% 64.61% 71.58%

Percentbillfish 21 21.31% 1.63% 17.90% 24.72%

Percentother 21 12.74% 2.13% 8.30% 17.17%

Vesselowner? 20 50.00% 11.47% 25.99% 74.01%

Marketvalueofvessel 22 $48,537.27 $3,378.38 $41,511.55 $55,563.00

Horsepower 22 195.77 17.41 159.57 231.97

Fuelcapacity 21 340.47619 38.671241 259.8094 421.14298

Vessellength 22 38.73 1.24 36.15 41.30

Captainshare 3 12.74% 8.50% -23.85% 49.33%

Crewshare 3 43.24% 6.76% 14.17% 72.32%

Boatshare 3 44.01% 1.79% 36.31% 51.71%


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71%fortheTypeIandIIfleetowntheirownvesselswhileonly50%oftheTypeIIIcaptainsowntheirownvessel.FortheTypeIfleet,theirvesselsare18feetlong,poweredby49horsepowermotorsthathave17gallonsoffuelcapacityandarecurrentlyworth$11,972.Theytake185tripsperyearandthecaptainearns26.5%ofthenetrevenueswhilethecrewearns27%andthevesselearns46%.TheTypeIIIvesselsare39feetinlength,poweredby196horsepowerthathave340gallonsoffuelcapacityandarecurrentlyworth$48,537.Theytake21tripsayear.Itemnon-responsewasahugeproblemforthesharesystemquestionswithonlythreecaptainsrespondingtothequestion.Thereweremanycommentswritteninthemarginscallingthisquestiontoopersonalordiscriminatory.ThesamecaptainshadnoissuetellingtheFPItimetheirsharearrangements.Acrossthesethreecaptains,crewreceive43%,captainreceives13%andtheboatreceives44%.Duetothelevelofitemnon-responseacrosstriprevenuedescribedabove,tripticketdatawascombinedwiththecostdatatoproducecashflowsbyvesseltype.Cautioniswarrantedwiththesmallsamplesizesusedforthetripcostinformation.Triprevenuedatarepresentsacompletecensusoftripticketdata.Table15summarizesthecostsandearningsofthesetwovesseltypes.Forbothtypesofvessels,fuelwasthesinglehighestcostcategory.

Table15.LLTripCostsandEarningsbyVesselType.

TypeIII Tripticket Self-ReportedTriprevenue $7,507.67 $9,435.00

Tripcost $1,653.73

Netrevenue $5,853.94 $8,213.08

Returntothevessel $2,576.32 $669.05

Captainshare $745.79

Crewshare $2,531.24

Vesselmarketvalue $48,537.27

annualcosts $8,716.95

TypeI&II Tripticket Self-ReportedTriprevenue $2,403.80 $1,822.87

Tripcost $552.90

netrevenue $1,850.90 $931.78

returntothevessel $857.89 $252.99

Captainshare $486.23

Crewshare $506.78

vesselmarketvalue $11,972.14


FortheTypeIIIboats,thatisfollowedbyiceexpendituresandfortheTypeIboatsbyoil.TotaltripcostsfortheTypeIandIIboatswas$552.90andfortheTypeIIIboats$1,654pertrip.NetrevenuethenfortheTypeIandIIboatswas$932fromtheself-reporteddataonlyand$1,851usingthetripticketrevenue.FortheTypeIIIboats,netrevenueusingonlytheself-reporteddatawas$8,213/trip,butthat

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isbasedononlytwoobservations.Whenusingthetripticketdata,thenetrevenuefigurewas$5,854/trip.Tripcashflow,whichforthisworkisthereturntothevessel,is$858/tripfortheTypeIandIIboatsand$2,576fortheTypeIIIboats,basedontripticketrevenue.Toestimatethereturntoanowneroperator,thecaptain’ssharewouldneedtobesummedwiththereturntothevessel.Forexample,anowneroperatorofaTypeIIIvesselwouldbringhome$3,322/trip.Themodelingeffortwillusethetripticketrevenuecashflowprojectionsasthosearemorerobust.Annualcostestimateswerenotdeemedreliableduetolowresponseandallmodelingwillbebasedontripcashflowonly.

FADFisheryInGrenville,themajorfocusoftheFADfishery,thereare60-100boatsregisteredbutonly40-45activevessels.ThereareonlyahandfulofFADfishersinCarriacouandreallyonlytwoinPetitMartinique.MostofthesamplingwascarriedoutinGrenville.LookingatTable16,23FADfishers,allfromGrenville,weresampled.Overall,thisfleetrespondedtothissurveywithlessitemnon-response.83%considerthemselvesfull-timefishermen.Theyarepredominantly35-44(45%)andhavelessthana9thgradeeducation(50%)andreportmaking$50,001-$100,000(55%).

Table16.FrequenciesforCategoricalVariablesintheSurveyofFADVessels.

Variable PORT Frequency PercentPort Grenville 23 100.00%

EngineType outboard 23 100.00%

FishermanType

fulltime 19 86.36%parttime 3 13.64%

Age

25-34 8 36.36%35-44 10 45.45%45-54 2 9.09%

lessthan25 2 9.09%

Education

Lessthan9thgrade 11 50.00%

Somehighschool 7 31.82%Highschoolgrad 3 13.64%

Associatesdegree 1 4.55%

Income

$10,001-$25,000 4 18.18%$25,001-$50,000 2 9.09%

$50,001-$100,000 12 54.55%

Over$100,000 2 9.09%Lessthan$5,000 2 9.09%

Table17summarizestheFADfleetvesselcharacteristics.Forthisfleet,andofconcernforCIregardingfoodsecurity,13.1%ofharvestiskeptforhomeconsumptionand11.6%isgivenaway,for30%oftheircatchgoingtosupportlocalfoodsecurity.Applyingthatfiguretobillfishcatch,whichis15.6%oftheircatch,4.7%oftheirbillfishharvestissupportinglocalfoodsecurity.Only48%ofthesecaptainsarevesselowners.Theyfish19footboatswith57horsepowerand30gallonfuelcapacity.Thevesselsare

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currentlyworthapproximately$9,172.Theyfish212tripsayearandsplittheirsharesinthreeequalportions.

Table17.FADFleetCharacteristics.

Variable N Mean StandardError

Lower95%ConfidenceInterval

Upper95%ConfidenceInterval

Percentsold 15 70.20% 4.12% 61.37% 79.03%Percentconsumed 14 13.07% 3.54% 5.43% 20.71%Percentgivenaway 14 11.57% 2.03% 7.19% 15.96%

Percenttuna 18 47.78% 5.60% 35.95% 59.60%Percentbillfish 18 15.56% 3.26% 8.69% 22.43%Percentkingfish 18 11.11% 2.27% 6.32% 15.90%Percentdolphin 18 19.33% 3.84% 11.24% 27.43%Percentother 19 7.11% 2.14% 2.61% 11.60%Vesselowner? 23 47.83% 10.65% 25.74% 69.91%Marketvalueofvessel 20 $9,172.30 $765.36 $7,570.39 $10,774.21Horsepower 23 57.17 1.80 53.44 60.91Fuelcapacity 22 30.27 2.61 24.85 35.69Vessellength 23 18.91 0.16 18.59 19.24Captainshare 18 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 33.33%Crewshare 18 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 33.33%Boatshare 18 33.33% 0.00% 33.33% 33.33%


Table18containsthesummaryoftripcostsandearnings.Overall,thisfleetmakes$230/tripbasedontheself-reporteddataand$525basedonthetripticketdata.Whiletherewasmuchlessitemnon-responsetothisquestionthantheTypeIIIboats,thetripticketbasedcalculation,usingself-reportedcosts,willbeusedforthemodelingtoremainconsistent.ItisinterestingtonotethatthisfleethadmuchlessofaproblemrespondingtothetriprevenuequestionthantheLLvesselsdid.Thesinglebiggesttripexpenseforthisfleetisalsofuelwithgearsecond.Totaltripcostswere$144resultinginanetrevenueof$76usingtheself-reporteddataand$381usingthetripticketdata.Theresultingcashflowfortheboatis$22usingtheself-reporteddataand$127usingthetripticketdata.Iftheboatisownedbythecaptain,thecashflowwouldbe$254/tripusingthetripticketrevenue.

Table18.FADTripCostandEarnings.

FAD Tripticket Self-Reported

Triprevenue $524.86 $230.30

Tripcost $143.93

netrevenue $380.93 $75.69

returntothevessel $126.96 $21.58

Captainshare $126.96 $21.58

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FAD Tripticket Self-Reported

Crewshare $126.96 $21.58

vesselmarketvalue $9,172.30


DominicanRepublicCODOPESCA,collectsfisherieslandingsthroughaseriesofenumeratorsateverylandingslocation.Theenumeratorsusepapernotebookstorecordlandingsdata.Purportedly,theenumeratorsprofileeveryfishing trip taken in the country. CODOPESCA makes no attempt to estimate their undercount andgenerallyassumestheyareobtainingacensusoffishingtrips.TherearemanystrengthsandweaknessoftheDRsamplingprogram.Theprogramisextensiveandthedatacollectedincludescostsandearningsforeverytripprofiled.Unfortunately,theylackthehumanresourcestodataenterpaperformsinatimelyfashionandhaveadatabacklogstretchingbackto2011.Theprojectoptedtousethe2011databecausethisprojectdidnothave thebudget for thekindof sample that is freelyavailable in thisdataset.AllattemptsarebeingmadetonudgeDRtoincreasetheircapacitytoanalyzethisdata.

TwoofthelargestdrawbacksintheDRenumeratorprogramaretheiruseofarbitraryspeciesgroupsintheirdatacollectionprocess,atleastin2011,anddatacollectionconsistency.Whiletheycollectvolume,priceandtotalvaluedata,thesearbitrarygroupingsmakeitimpossibletoseparateoutpelagicspecies.TheinabilitytoseparateoutspeciesalsofactorsintoourdifficultydefiningwhatconstitutesaFADfishingtrip.TheDRhaschangeditsdatacollectionprotocoltoincludeindividualspeciessince2011,butthatdatawas notmade available to the team due to data entry backlogs. The second large drawback is datacollectionconsistency.Thereishighturnoverintheenumeratorstaffand,often,thejobsarehandedoutaspoliticalfavorsandnotnecessarilytothosewithfisheryexperience.Thehighturnovershowsinthewaysomeofthedataisrecorded.Forinstance,theydon’trecordvesselregistrationnumbersforeachtripbutinsteadusethevesselname.Someboatsaren’tnamedsothenumbercategorized“SinNombre”orrecordedasbyboatcolormakeparsingoutthetotalnumberofannualtripspervesselverydifficult,aswillbeseenbelow.Additionally,thereareobviouscodingerrorsacrosssomevariables.Forinstance,shares are recorded in percentage form sometimes and inmonetary term by other interviewers. AsmentionedintheFPIreport,CODOPESCAwouldbewellservedtodevelopadatacollectionprotocolandtrainingmanualandrequireregulartrainingacrossallenumerators.

Table19detailssomeofthebasicstatisticsforthe2011enumeratordataset.Therewere33,436tripsprofiledin2011countrywide.However,tripsarenotfullycategorizedaspelagictripsorFADtripsinthedataset.Thedatasetdoesincludefishinglocationandfishinggear,howeverandvariouscombinationsofthosevariableswereusedtoidentifyFADtrips.Regardingfishingsite,ifitwascodedasFAD(bolsa),andindicatorvariablewascreated,pelagicsite,andthevalueofthatvariablesettoone.Inthisdataset,1,253,or3.75%,ofalltripsweretripstofisha“bolsa”.Mostofthecodesinthefishinglocationvariablerefertospecificlocationslike“FrentealBelance”whichdoesnothelpdetermineifitwasaFADtripornot.Geartypeinthedatacontainscodesfortrollinghandline(LCU=linearcullican)andhookandline(LCO=linearcordell).Ifeitherofthesetypesofgearswereindicated,anindicatorvariablewascreated,pelagicgear,indicatingthegearwasconsistentwithFADfishing.Thereisnogearcodeforfishingwithjugs/droplines.

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Table19.DRFADFishingTripProfiles,2011.Sample

Characteristic Count Percent

TotalTripsin2011 33,436 100.00%PelagicSite 1,253 3.75%PelagicGear 866 2.59%FAD 1,498 4.48%

FAD2 11,074 33.12%

FromTable19,866tripsusedpelagicgear.Ifbothpelagicsiteandpelagicgearindicatorvariablesequaledone,theindicatorFADwassetequaltooneandotherwisezero.1,498trips,or4.48%ofalltrips,metthisdefinition.Themethodused is themostconservativewaytodefineFADtrips. Inordertoexplorethesensitivityofthisassumption,amoreexpansivedefinitionofwhatconstitutesaFADtripwasconstructed.Asmentionedabove, therearemanycodingerrors in thedata.For thegearvariable, therearemanymisspelling andmiscoding of LCO and LCU that include terms like “cullican” and “cordell” aswell asshortening of both abbreviations. FAD2 was coded as a one if there was any chance there was amisspellingofeithergeartypeoritsacronym.

Regardingvolume,onlyrecentlydidCODOPESCAswitchfromusingsubjectivespeciesgroupstoindividualspeciesfordatacollection.Asaresult,pelagicpricescannotbetrackeddirectlyormodeleddirectly.TheinabilitytotrackspeciespriceshouldbefineforthisprojectasrevenueincreasescanstillbemodeledandwefoundduringtheFPIsthattherewaslittlepricevariationduringtheyearoracrossspecies.

Table20containsthemeansanddescriptivestatisticsforallofthetripsprofiled(33,436)inthe2011data.Thevaluesinallthecostandearningsestimatesherearein2016USdollars.Thevalueswerefirstinflatedto2016DominicanPesos(DOP)usingtheWorldBank’sCPIfigures(onlyavailablethrough2016).10Next,DOPswereconvertedtoUSdollarsusingexchangeratesbymonthfor2016.11Acrossalltypesoftripsforalltypesofspecies,grossrevenuepertripaveraged$317.31andnetrevenueaveraged$262.55.Crewshareaveraged$28.53,captain’sshareaveraged$35.07andtheboatshareaveraged$21.78.Theestimatesareveryconsistentwithlowstandarderrorsandtightconfidenceintervals.Asaresult,outliersdidnothavetobeaddressedbecausepercentstandarderrorswereallbelow20%.ThetightvariancesarewhyGCGchosetousetheenumeratordata.Thesheernumberofobservationswillgreatlyimprovethecashflowmodelsusedforthebusinesscases.Cashflow,ascalculatedasnetrevenueminuscrewshare,ortheboatshareplusthecaptain’sshare,was$41.40.Thecashflowvalueseemslowerthanthetablewouldsuggestasthereare12,054observationsonnetrevenuethataremissingshareproportions.Therewere356(1.1%)tripswithnegativecashflowandanother1,868tripswithlessthan$5ofcashflow.Therewere1,283tripswithnegativenetrevenue,beforeevenpayingthecrew.

10https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=DO11https://www.exchange-rates.org

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Table20.MeansAcrossAllDRTrips(2016USDollars).

Variable N Mean StdErr95%LowerBound

95%UpperBound

Fuel 24,719 $67.84 $5.17 $57.71 $77.98Oil 13,789 $7.52 $0.92 $5.72 $9.32Ice 8,087 $11.60 $0.89 $9.85 $13.34GrossRevenue 32,887 $317.31 $43.96 $231.14 $403.48TotalCost 26,450 $72.98 $5.42 $62.36 $83.61NetRevenue 32,570 $262.55 $42.42 $179.40 $345.69BoatShare 7,738 $21.78 $1.30 $19.23 $24.34Captain'sShare 26,988 $35.07 $0.93 $33.25 $36.88CrewShare 21,383 $28.53 $0.54 $27.47 $29.59

CashFlow 21,382 $41.40 $1.15 $39.14 $43.67

Table21displaysthesamemeansusingtheconservativedefinitionofaFADtrip.Netrevenuesonthesetripsarelower($93.68),butcashflowishigher($63.38).Themoststrikingthingisthesmallamountoficeusedpertrip.Allsharesarehigherforthesetypesoftripsaswell.3.4%ofthesetripshadnegativecashflow(50trips)whichisthreetimeshigherthanthesampleoverall.Another51trips(3.4%)hadlessthan$5ofcashflow.98tripshadnegativenetrevenue.Standarderrorsarestillsmallandconfidenceintervalsarestilltight.ThecashflowestimatesinTable21aretheonesusedforthemodelingexercisedescribedbelow.Table21.MeansAcrossConservativeFADTripDefinition(2016USDollars).


95%UpperBound

Fuel 1,447 $57.34 $0.82 $55.74 $58.94Oil 1,127 $4.27 $0.09 $4.09 $4.44Ice 113 $1.19 $0.05 $1.09 $1.30GrossRevenue 1,455 $147.56 $3.27 $141.15 $153.98TotalCost 1,454 $60.52 $0.85 $58.85 $62.18NetRevenue 1,389 $93.68 $3.05 $87.69 $99.67BoatShare 673 $33.67 $1.54 $30.64 $36.70Captain'sShare 1,124 $42.74 $1.43 $39.93 $45.56CrewShare 1,065 $41.11 $1.34 $38.48 $43.74

cash_flow 1,065 $63.58 $2.31 $59.05 $68.11

Table22containsthemeansacrosstheexpansivedefinitionofaFADtrip.Cashflowestimatesarelowerasarenetrevenues.SharesarelowerandiceusageishigherthantheconservativeFADdefinition.Thenextquestioniswhichdesignationweusetobuildthecashflowmodelsforthebusinesscases.Bothsubsetshaveverygoodstatisticalproperties.

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Table22.MeansAcrossExpansiveFADTripDefinition(2016USDollars).


95%UpperBound

Fuel 8,079 $45.41 $0.64 $44.15 $46.67Oil 5,015 $4.72 $0.20 $4.34 $5.11Ice 2,946 $7.16 $1.16 $4.89 $9.44GrossRevenue 10,852 $98.00 $3.00 $92.11 $103.89TotalCost 8,463 $48.96 $1.05 $46.91 $51.01NetRevenue 10,828 $59.33 $2.18 $55.06 $63.60BoatShare 2,408 $21.14 $0.70 $19.77 $22.52Captain'sShare 9,300 $35.57 $1.68 $32.28 $38.86CrewShare 7,059 $32.71 $0.56 $31.62 $33.80cash_flow 7,059 $44.19 $0.78 $42.66 $45.73

Generally,thefishbuyersfinancethetripcosts.Theywillloantheboatsfishingline,hooks,squidskirts,fuel and food, payable upon settlement of the fish ticket. From the FPIs, CODOPESCA officers andfishermenrelatedthatitisnotuncommonforthefisherstobeindebttothefishhouse.Thebuyerwilloftenstillpaythefisherssomecashonamoneylosingtripsotheycancoverlivingexpenses,butthisputsthefishermeninfurtherdebttothebuyer.Whilethatdoesappeartobehappening,itishappeningacrossarelativelysmallnumberoftripsinthisdataset.Fuelcostsare,byfar,theirsinglebiggesttripcosts.Theenumeratorsdonotcollectannualcosts,butfromtheFPIsweknowthatannualcostsforthisfleetareverylow.Theothermaindrawbacktoestimatinganannualcashflowfigureisanestimateoftheaveragenumberoftripsperboat.Thedataonvesselsintheenumeratordataisveryroughasdescribedabove.Thereisnouniqueidentifierusedinthedatasetandsubjectiveboatnamesand/orcolorsareusedtodelineateboats.Evenafterconsolidatingduplicatesvesselnamesandsimilarspellingsbyhand,theaveragenumberoftripspervesselperyearislow.AcrosstheFAD2definitionoftrips,eachvesseltook10tripsperyearwithalowerboundof8.6tripsandanupperboundof11.5tripsperyear.AftermanyqueriestoCODOPESCAwewereunabletoimproveuponthisestimate.

ScenarioAnalysisThescenarioanalysissectionshowcasesthecapabilityofthemodelsdesignedtoanalyzepolicyscenarios.ThescenarioanalysissectionwasincludedtoprovidesupporttothelargerbusinesscasedevelopmentbyWildernessMarkets(WM).ThemodelsdescribedherewereprovidedtoWMandunderpintheirinvestmentmodels.ThescenariosprovidedhereweredevelopedinconsultationwithFAO,CIandWMtoprovidecontexttothebusinesscasesandtobackstopassumptionsandexaminepathsnottakenintheactual,briefbusinesscasedocuments.

Scenario1looksatthefoodsecurityandrevenueimplicationsofreducingblueandwhitemarlinharvests.Thecurrentlevelsofharvestbeingkeptforfamilyandfriendconsumptionbythecommercial

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sectoriscomparedtotheICCATquotasofbluemarlinandwhitemarlinandthefinancialimplicationsofthoseharvestreductionsareestimated.Scenario2examinessailfishharvestreductions.Whilethestockstatusforsailfishisnotoverfishedandoverfishingisnotoccurring,theassessmentitselfishighlyuncertain.So,whileICCAThasnotsetasailfishquotaandisnotcurrentlyadvocatingforsailfishharvestreductions,thisscenarioexaminestheimpactofthosereductions.

Thesecondgroupofscenariospertaintotherecreationalsectorsinbothpilotcountries.Initially,althoughnotapartofcurrentbusinesscases,theCBPsuggestedthattheremayberoomforaCoasianbargainbetweentherecreationalsectorthatwouldbenefitfromcommercialharvestreductionsandthecommercialsector.Asaresult,thepotentialfundingforsuchamechanismwasexploredandprojectedthroughaseriesofrecreationalfishingtourismgrowthscenarios.Thefinalgroupofscenariosexaminesthepossibilityofconvertingcommercialfishermenintochartercaptains.

Scenario1:ImpactsonFoodSecurityandonRevenuesofBlueandWhiteMarlinHarvestReductionsinGrenadaGrenadaisintheprocessofjoiningICCAT.ICCATstockassessmentshaveshownbothbluemarlinandwhitemarlinstockstobeoverfishedandhassetcountrylevelquotasforbothspeciestorecoverbothstocks.Itrecommendsallmembernationsusecirclehooksandreleaseallbillfishtostayunderthesequotas.Ithassetquotaslowinhopesthatallharvestwillbeeitherbycatchorusedtosupportlocalfoodsecurity.IndiscussionwithUSICCATexperts,Grenadawilllikelybeassigneda10mtquotaforbluemarlinanda2mtquotaforwhitemarlin.Thescenarioslookattheimpactofreducingharvestsofbillfishonlocalfoodsecurityandrevenues.

CurrentState–SummaryofCurrentBillfishLandedVolume

BasedonlandingsdatacollectedbytheFisheriesMinistryfromthefirstdealerprovidedfortheFPI,Table22displaysthetotalharvestofallbillfishspeciesinGrenadafor2013,thelastyearofdisaggregatedlandingsdataavailablefromtheMinistry.Allweightsareheadedandguttedweights(Gentneretal.2018).

Table22.TotalGrenadianHarvestsofBillfishSpecies.

Species PoundsMetricTons

BlueMarlin(bluemarlin) 90,279 40.95

WhiteMarlin(whitemarlin) 15,860 7.19

Sailfish 211,361 95.87

BelowaretablesontheretailpricesofotherproteinsourcesinthesupermarketinGrenada.Table23showsfrozenimportedchickenlegsarenearlyhalfthepriceoffreshlocalchickenwhichis20centsa

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poundlessthantheaverageofallfishfromthe2013landingsdatasummarizedabove.Asshowninthetable,billfishisonly2centsapoundhigherpricedthanallotherfish.

Table23.PricesforSubstituteProteinsinGrenada.

Product Fresh/Frozen Local/Import PriceUSD

Chickenlegs Frozen Import $1.19

Wholechicken Fresh Local $2.41

Allfish Fresh Local $2.61

Billfish Fresh Local $2.63

Bonelessskinlesschickenbreasts Frozen Import $5.49

Tilapia Frozen Import $6.85

RegardingfishpricesthetablebelowcontainspricesforotherfreshfishinGrenadawithpricescheaperthanmarlins.AsstatedintheFPIreports,generallyallfishbesidesexportfishreceiveonaveragethesamepriceatthedockandgenerallyhavethesamepriceinthemarketregardlessofspecies.Asthetableshows,onlyshark,blackfintunaandbonitoaresignificantlylessexpensivethantheaveragefishprice.

Table24.PricesforSubstituteFishSpeciesinGrenada.

SpeciesAveragePriceUSD

Shark $1.42

Blackfintuna $1.76

Bonito $1.87

FlyingFish $2.46

SkipJackTuna $2.48

Butterfish $2.50

KingMackerel $2.53

Albacore $2.62

Cavalli(miscellaneousjacks) $2.62

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FromtheFAOFoodBalancequerytool,thetotalsupplyofseafoodproductsconsumedinGrenadain2013was2,920metrictons,includingimportsandnetofexports.12Blueandwhitemarlinlandingsrepresentonly1.6%ofthetotalsupplyofseafoodinGrenada.

ProposedScenarioFromthetableabove,itisclearboththebluemarlinandwhitemarlinquotaswouldbeexceededwithoutreductionsinharvests.However,ConservationInternationalwasconcernedthatreducingbillfishharvestwouldimpactfoodsecurity.Asaresult,GCGaddedquestionstothesurveyoffishingvesselsregardingtheamountofbillfishbeingretainedforpersonalconsumptionandfortradeorgiftingtofriendsorrelatives.

TheobjectivehereistoanticipatetheimpactofpossibleICCATcountrylevelquotasforbluemarlinandwhitemarlin(i.e.harvestreductions)onincomeandonfoodsecurity.

ICCATCountryLevelQuotaScenarioCurrentusesofbillfishcaughtinGrenadabyspeciesandfleetareasfollows(Table25).

Table25.CurrentDispositionofBillfishSpeciesbyVesselType.

Fleet BillfishDisposition PercentBlueMarlinVolume(mt)

WhiteMarlinVolume(mt)

SailfshVolume(mt)

TypeIII

Sold 87.05% 29.9 5.8 46.4

Consumed 6.25% 2.1 0.4 3.3

GivenAway 6.85% 2.4 0.5 3.7

TypeI&II

Sold 79.17% 4.6 0.4 33.4

Consumed 9.17% 0.5 0.0 3.9

GivenAway 10.50% 0.6 0.1 4.4

FAD

Sold 70.20% 0.6 0.0 0.2

Consumed 13.07% 0.1 0.0 0.0

GivenAway 11.57% 0.1 0.0 0.0

Total

Sold 35.0 6.2 80.1

Consumed 2.8 0.5 7.2

GivenAway 3.1 0.5 8.1

Basedonthesurveydataandthe2013landingsdata,reducingbluemarlinandwhitemarlinquotasto10and2mtrespectivelywillhavenoimpactonfoodsecurity,assumingthatthebluemarlinandwhite

12http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS

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marlinharvestquotasareallocatedfirstforfoodsecuritypurposes(i.e.“consumed”or“givenaway”intableabove).Currently,allvesselsretain5.9mtofbluemarlinforhomeconsumptionortogiveawayandonlyretain1mtofwhitemarlinforhomeconsumptionortogiveaway.However,therewillhavetobereductionsinbluemarlinandwhitemarlinharveststhatarecurrently“sold”.

TomeetthepossibleICCATquotas,bluemarlinharvestwillhavetobereducedfrom41mtto10mtorareductionof31mtandwhitemarlinharvestswillhavetobereducedfrom7mtto2mt.Asapercentageoftotalbillfishharvest,thisamountstoa25.1%reductioninbillfishlandings.ThecashflowimpactsofthatlevelofreductioninbillfishlandingsarepresentedinTable26.Thereductioninblueandwhitemarlinharvestrepresentsonlya1.4%reductionintotalfishsupplyinthecountry.

Table26.CashFlowImpactsofMeetingPotentialICCATQuotas.

Country FleetAnnualCost NPVOver10Years

Grenada

FAD -$1,270 -$9,807

TypeI&II -$167,117 -$1,290,433

TypeIII -$199,687 -$1,541,930

Labor(CaptainsandCrew) -$5,142 -$39,705

Exporters -$159,236 -$1,229,578


Total -$4,730,343

Basedonthecashflowmodelsandtheexistingpricesforbillfish,theneteffectofthisscenarioisaloss.A25%reductioninblueandwhitemarlinharvestsreducecashflowsinGrenadaby$4.7millionovertenyears.MostofthoselossesareborneoutbyTypeIIIvessels,assumingthatthebluemarlinandwhitemarlinharvestquotasareallocatedfirstforfoodsecuritypurposes(i.e.“consumed”or“givenaway”intableabove).

Pricescannotbeprojectedbecausenodemandmodelswereestimated.Asvolumesdrop,allotherconditionsequal,pricesshouldrise,reducingtheseimpacts.Thelevelofbillfishharvestreductionstranslatesintoa1.4%reductionintotalseafoodsupplyinGrenada,whichisasmallportionoftotalfishsupply.Additionally,fromtheFPIsandanexaminationofthelandingsdata,thereisverylittlemarketdifferentiationinpriceacrossallfishspecies.Asaresultofasmalldropinvolumeinanessentiallyundifferentiatedmarket,itisexpectedthatpricesforbillfishwillincreaseonlyslightly.Also,ifharvesterscouldchangetargetsormakeupforthedifferenceintheharvestofotherspecies,theimpactofreductionswouldbeless.Ifmorebillfisharereleased,itwillmakemoreholdspaceformorevaluabletunas.Iftheychangetheirbaitsorfishingdepthitmightbringinmorehighervaluetunasaswell.Withoutdetailedbehavioraldata,itisnotpossibletoprojectthosegains.Complementaryscenarioanalyses(i.e.compensatinglostincomefrombillfishharvestreduction,withhigherqualityandbetterpricedtuna,particularlyyellowfin)arebeingmodelledthroughaseparatestudyledbyWilderness

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MarketsincollaborationwithGCG,CI,andFAO.Finally,ifharvesterscouldotherwisereducecostsorchangeproductionpractices,theimpactofreductionscouldbelessaswell.Asaresult,thesecostsrepresentupperboundsonthetruecostofthesereductions.

KeyAssumptionsThenetpresentvalueofthestreamofcostsfrombluemarlinandwhitemarlinharvestreductionsarecalculatedusinga5%discountrate,thesamediscountrateusedinthebusinesscases.

Thecurrentscenariosaccountforpotentialcashflowchangesduetosailfishlandingreductions,butdonotmodelsubsequentbehavioralchangebyfishers,suchasexitingthefisheryorcompensatingforlostincomebylandingotherspecies.Thelatterscenario(i.e.compensatinglostincomefrombillfishharvestreduction,withhigherqualityandbetterpricedtuna,particularlyyellowfin)isbeingmodelledthroughaseparatestudyledbyWildernessMarketsincollaborationwithGCG,CI,andFAO.

Harvestreductionsaresharedequally,accordingtocurrentlandingproportions,acrossallgeartypes.

Itisassumedthatthereductionsinharvestcomefromtheuseofcirclehooksandlivereleaseofcaughtbillfish.Otherwisetheharvesterscannotchangetheirproductiontechnology.

Itisassumedthatpricesremainstaticforbillfish,regardlessofsupplylevels,landedandsolddomesticallyorexported.Modellingseafoodsupplyanddemandrelationshipswasbeyondthescopeofthisproject.

Therearenoassumptionsmaderegardinganystockchanges.Therecouldbeadditionalcostsinmonitoring,controlandenforcementinordertomakethesecuts,butthosecostsarenotconsideredhere.

RecommendationsBasedontheanalysisabove,adoptingtheICCATcountrylevelquotasforbillfishwouldnotsignificantlyimpactfoodsecurity,assumingthatthebluemarlinandwhitemarlinharvestquotasareallocatedfirstforfoodsecuritypurposes(i.e.“consumed”or“givenaway”intableabove).Thelostcashflowassociatedwiththoseharvestreductionseachyearissubstantial,asevidencedbytheNPVofthoseloses.Atthevessellevel,thelossesaremoremoderateat$1,678perTypeIIIvesselannuallyand$2,571perTypeI&IIvesselsannually.Grenadalacksahistoryofharvestcontrolrulesanditisrecommendedthatinvestmentsbemadeinmonitoring,controlandenforcement.Itisalsorecommendedthatexternalfundsbeusedtoconvertthefleettocirclehooksandmakesupplychainimprovementssothatfisherscanbeincentivizedtoreducebillfishharvestbyswitchingtohighervaluedproducts.Finally,itisrecommendedthatgeartrialscontinuetofurtherexploretechnologicalchangestoreducebillfishharvest.

Scenario2:CashflowimpactsofSailfishHarvestReductioninGrenadaandintheDR

Context–ActivityObjectivesOneoftheobjectivesofthecurrentactivityistoassessthebusinesscasevaluepropositionassociatedwithpolicyinterventionsthatreducebillfishmortalityinGrenadaandintheDominicanRepublic,andtoexaminepossiblevaluetransferpathwaysbetweenthecommercialandrecreationalsectors.Thecurrentscenarioanalysesfocusonreductionsinsailfishharvest.WhilesailfishisnotsubjecttoICCAT

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countrylevelquotasbecauseithasnotbeendeclaredoverfishednorisoverfishingoccurring,ConservationInternationaldesiredananalysisofthereductioninsailfishharvestinadditiontotheexaminationoftheharvestreductionsICCATwillrequireforblueandwhitemarlinasGrenadaandtheDominicanRepublicharvestmoresailfishthanblueorwhitemarlin(Gentneretal.2018).

CurrentState–SummaryofCurrentLandings,VolumeandValue,inBothGrenadaandtheDominicanRepublic

BasedondataprovidedbytheFisheriesPerformanceIndicators(FPI),Table27containstheestimatedlandedvolumeandvalueofsailfish(sailfish)(Gentneretal.2018).Pleasenote,allpricesareinUSD.Allweightsareheadedandguttedweights,aslanded,ineachcountry.

Table27.VolumeandValueofSailfishLandingsbyPilotCountry

SailfishPricePaidtoHarvester(USD)

LandedVolume(pounds)

LandedValue(USD)

Grenada $1.89 211,361 $398,937DominicanRepublic $1.40 262,350 $367,290

• Grenadalandingsdatafrom2013,thelastyeardisaggregatedlandingsareavailableforGrenada.

• DominicanRepublicdatafromFPIs,whichiswhatthecountryreportedtoFAOfor201613

ProposedHarvestReductionsThefollowingthreeharvestreductionsareconsideredforthepurposesofdecisionmaking:

- 10%reductioninsailfishlandingsovertenyears- 20%reductioninsailfishlandingsovertenyears- 30%reductioninsailfishlandingsovertenyears

Theintentionhereistoanticipatepotentialfuturesailfishquotareductionsandforecastcashflowchangesbasedonthosereductions.CurrentlytheICCATsailfishstockassessmentishighlyuncertainand,whileICCAThasnotdeclaredthestockoverfishednorthatoverfishingisoccurring,theseresultsareinconclusiveduetothelackofexploitationdatafromcoastalsmall-scalefisheries.14Asaresult,itisnotpossibletoestimatesurplusyieldandthereforeapotentialAtlanticwideTAC.15WithoutatotalTAC,itwouldnotbepossibletospeculatewhatcountrylevelquotasmightlooklikeorwhethercurrentharvestratesineithercountryaresustainableornot.16Additionally,notenoughinformationexistsregardingthespatial-temporaldistributionofsailfishtodetermineifreductioninhypotheticalpartialnationalquotaswouldhaveanyimpactontheAtlanticwidestockofsailfish.17Nevertheless,fairlysubstantialreductionsareexaminedhere.GrenadaiscurrentlyinnegotiationstojoinICCATandwould

13DominicanRepublicenumeratordatadoesnotcontainspeciesinformation.14Dr.NelsonEhrhardt,personalcommunication.15Ibid.16Ibid.17Ibid.

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thereforebesubjecttoanysailfishTACthatICCATwouldsetiftheychosetosetacountrylevelTACinthefuture.TheDominicanRepublicisnotamemberofICCATnorisitconsideringmembership.

Case1–10%HarvestReductionCurrentpaymentstoharvestersare$1.89perlbinGrenadaand$1.40perlbintheDominicanRepublic.Table28containsthecashflowimpactsofthisscenario.

Table28.10%SailfishHarvestReductionCashFlowImpact.


Grenada

FAD -$508 -$3,922

TypeI&II -$66,847 -$516,172

TypeIII -$79,875 -$616,773


Exporters -$63,694 -$491,828


Total -$1,882,293

DominicanRepublic

FAD -$53,390 -$412,262



Total -$743,625

Basedonthecashflowmodelsandtheexistingpricesforsailfish,theneteffectofthisscenarioisanoutrightloss.A10%reductioninsailfishharvestsreducecashflowsinGrenadaby$1.9millionandintheDominicanRepublicby$743,625.Inbothcountries,theharvesters,andspecificallytheboatowners,bearthebruntofthereductionincashflow.

Pricescannotbeprojectedbecausenodemandmodelswereestimated.Asvolumesdrop,allotherconditionsequal,pricesforsailfishshouldrise,reducingtheseimpacts.A10%reductioninsailfishharveststranslatesintoa3.3%reductionintotalseafoodsupplyinGrenada,whichisasmallportionoftotalfishsupply.18Additionally,fromtheFPIsandanexaminationofthelandingsdata,thereisverylittlemarketdifferentiationinpriceacrossallfishspecies.Asaresult,asmalldropinvolumeinanessentiallyundifferentiatedmarketforfishspeciesisexpectedtoinducesmallpriceincreases.Also,ifharvesterscouldchangetargetsormakeupforthedifferenceintheharvestofotherspecies,theimpactof

18http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS

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reductionswouldbeless.Finally,ifharvesterscouldotherwisereducecostsorchangeproductionpractices,theimpactofreductionscouldbelessaswell.Asaresult,thesecostsrepresentupperboundsonthetruecostofthesereductions.

Case2–20%HarvestReductionAllthesameassumptionsandpricesholdforscenario2.Table29containstheresultsofthisscenario.



Grenada

FAD -$1,015.95 -$7,845

TypeI&II -$133,693.35 -$1,032,345

TypeIII -$159,749.92 -$1,233,547

Labor(CaptainsandCrew) -$1,566.00 -$12,092

Exporters -$127,388.00 -$983,656

RetailMarkets -$64,118.00 -$495,102

Total -$3,764,587

DominicanRepublic

FAD -$106,779.59 -$824,524

Labor(CaptainsandCrew) -$828.00 -$6,394

RetailMarkets -$84,998.00 -$656,332

Total -$1,487,249

Basedonthecashflowmodelsandtheexistingpricesforsailfish,theneteffectofCase2isalsoaloss.A10%reductioninsailfishharvestsreducecashflowsinGrenadaby$3.8millionandintheDominicanRepublicby$1.5million.Inbothcountries,theharvestersbearthebrunt,andspecificallytheboatowners,ofthereductionincashflow.

Pricescannotbeprojectedbecausenodemandmodelswereestimated.Asvolumesdrop,allotherconditionsequal,pricesforsailfishshouldrise,reducingtheseimpacts.Also,ifharvesterscouldchangetargetsormakeupforthedifferenceintheharvestofotherspecies,theimpactofreductionswouldbeless.Finally,ifharvesterscouldotherwisereducecostsorchangeproductionpractices,theimpactofreductionscouldbelessaswell.Asaresult,thesecostsrepresentupperboundsonthetruecostofthesereductions.

Case3–30%HarvestReductionAllthesameassumptionsandpricesholdforscenario3.Table30containstheresultsofthisscenario.

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Grenada

FAD -$1,523.92 -$11,767

TypeI&II -$200,540.02 -$1,548,517

TypeIII -$239,624.88 -$1,850,320


Exporters -$191,082.00 -$1,475,485

RetailMarkets -$96,177.00 -$742,653

Total -$5,646,880

DominicanRepublic

FAD -$160,169.38 -$1,236,786


RetailMarkets -$127,497.00 -$984,498

Total -$2,230,874

Basedonthecashflowmodelsandtheexistingpricesforsailfish,theneteffectofCase3isalsoaloss.A30%reductioninsailfishharvestsreducecashflowsinGrenadaby$5.6millionandintheDominicanRepublicby$2.2million.Inbothcountries,theharvestersbearthebrunt,andspecificallytheboatowners,ofthereductionincashflow.

Pricescannotbeprojectedbecausenodemandmodelswereestimated.Asvolumesdrop,allotherconditionsequal,pricesforsailfishshouldrise,reducingtheseimpacts.Also,ifharvesterscouldchangetargetsormakeupforthedifferenceintheharvestofotherspecies,theimpactofreductionswouldbeless.Finally,ifharvesterscouldotherwisereducecostsorchangeproductionpractices,theimpactofreductionscouldbelessaswell.Asaresult,thesecostsrepresentupperboundsonthetruecostofthesereductions.

KeyAssumptionsIneachcase,wepresentthenetpresentvalueofthestreamofcostsfromthesescenariosusinga5%discountrate.

InthecaseofGrenada,reductionsaresharedequally,accordingtocurrentlandingproportions,acrossallgeartypes.

Itisassumedthattheharvestersnorprocessorscanchangetheirproductiontechnology.

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Itisassumedthatpricesremainstaticforbillfish,regardlessofsupplylevels,landedandsolddomesticallyorexported.Modellingseafoodsupplyanddemandrelationshipswasbeyondthescopeofthisproject.

Therearenoassumptionsmaderegardinghowtheseharvestreductionswillbeobtainednoranypredictionofstockchanges.Therecouldbeadditionalcostsinmonitoring,controlandenforcementinordertomakethesecuts,butthosecostsarenotconsideredhere.

RecommendationsBasedonthelossesdemonstratedabove,itisrecommendedthatnosailfishharvestreductionsbeundertakenuntilthestockmodelssupportsuchanaction.Inordertodemonstratestockimpactsfromreductionslikethis,bettertemporalandspatialdataonharvestswouldbeneededtoimprovestockmodels.Itisfurtherrecommendedthatbothofthesecountriesimprovethequalityandtimelinessoftheirfisheriesdatacollection.Additionally,bothcountriescurrentlylackharvestcontrolrules(HCRs)foranyspecies.HCRsdependonsolidstockassessmentswhichcurrentlycannotbeprovidedattheAtlanticwidelevelbyICCAT.Thecurrentstockmodelisthereforeincapableofprovidinglevelsofsurplusproductionthatcouldthenbeassignedtomembernations.Currently,neithercountryisanICCATmember.Additionally,bothcountrieslackahistorywitheitherinputoroutputcontrolstoreduceharvestandlackthemonitoringcontrolandenforcementtoenforcethesereductions.Itisthereforerecommendedthatthefocusonanyinvestmentbeimprovingenablingconditionsfirstandforemost.

Scenario3:EconomicimpactsofincreasingtourismgrowthinGrenadaandDR,andoptionsforfundingbillfishco-managementtruststhroughrecreationalfishinguserfees

CurrentState–SummaryofCurrentCashFlowandEconomicImpactsinBothGrenadaandintheDR

BasedondataprovidedbytheFisheriesPerformanceIndicators(FPI)andtheexpenditureandWillingness-To-Pay(WTP)study,thefollowingestimates(Table31)havebeengeneratedtodemonstratethecurrentstateofrecreationaleffortandrecreationaleconomicimpact(Gentneretal.2018;GentnerandWhitehead2018).Pleasenote,allvaluesarein2017USD.

Table31.CurrentStateoftheRecreationalSectorsinEachPilotCountry.


Low High Low High

CharterBusinessCashFlow $36,319,120 $43,761,744 $5,475,973 $16,640,454

PrivateStampRevenue $993,243 $1,251,405 $490,769 $914,498

GovernmentStampRevenue $1,108,328 $1,396,401 $914,498 $1,020,458

Expenditures $28,328,229 $45,116,709 $10,221,579 $14,340,177

GDP $70,220,399 $111,835,911 $25,337,389 $35,546,625

Employment 2,870 4,571 1,036 1,453

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Neithercountryestimatesrecreationaleffort.Effortestimatesdriveallvaluesinthetableabove.AsdetailedintheexpenditureandWTPreportandabove,twoeffortestimationstechniqueswereusedresultinginahighestimateandalowestimateoftotaleffort.Fromthetable,charterbusinessesintheDominicanRepublic(DR)aregeneratingbetween$36.3and$43.8millionincashflow,whileinGrenadatheyaregenerating$5.5to$16.6millionincashflow.Overallanglerexpendituresrangefrom$28.3millionto$45.1millionintheDRandbetween$25.3millionand$35.5millioninGrenada.Theexpendituresgeneratebetween$70.2millionand$111.8millionincontributionstoGDPintheDRandbetween$25.3and$35.5millioninGDPinGrenada.Finally,recreationalfishingforbillfishsupportsbetween2,870and4,571jobsintheDRandbetween1,036and1,453jobsinGrenada.

Ithasbeenproposedthataperpersonpertripfishingfeebeimposedonrecreationalanglersinthecountry.FromtheWTPsurvey,anannualfeewouldrangefrom$251.15peryearforaprivatelyadministeredfundto$280.25forafundadministeredbythegovernment.Takingthatannualfeeandconvertingittoaperperson,pertripfeeusingsurveydataontheaveragenumberoftripsabillfishanglertakesperyearintheregion,thatfeerangesfrom$32.32ifthefeeisadministeredbythegovernmentand$28.97ifthefundisprivatelyadministered.Forthepurposeofthisanalysis,itisassumedthatfeeisleviedonallresidentandnon-residentparticipanttrips.Ifthatfeeisleviedononlytouristanglers,thetrustfundwouldbesmaller.Inthebasecase,thefeecouldgenerateatrustfundbetween$993,243and$1.4milliondollarsintheDR,dependingonwhoadministersthefund,andinGrenadacouldgeneratebetween$490,769and$1.0million.

ProposedIncreasesinEffortThefollowingthreeincreasesineffortareconsideredforthepurposesofdecisionmaking:

- 3%increaseinefforteachyearovertenyears- 5%increaseinefforteachyearovertenyears- 10%increaseinefforteachyearovertenyears

Theintentionhereistoanticipatepotentialchangesineffortasbillfishstockabundanceincreasesorastouristministriesincreaseanglingtourismthroughadvertisingcampaigns.Forinstance,intheDR,overalltourismhasincreased4%-7%ayearoverthelastfiveyears.InGrenada,tourismhasbeenincreasing5%-10%ayearoverthatsametimeframe.

ScenariosTables32and33,includeonlythevalueoftheincreasesinrecreationaleffortandnotthebaseamounts.Thefirsttablescontainthenetpresentvalue(NPV)forthebasecaseaboveinbothcountries.

Table32.DominicanRepublicBaseCase.

MetricDominicanRepublicBaseCaseNPV

Low High

CharterBusinessCashFlow $280,446,620 $337,916,591

PrivateStampRevenue $7,669,563 $9,663,016

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MetricDominicanRepublicBaseCaseNPV

Low High

GovernmentStampRevenue $8,558,212 $10,782,641

Expenditures $218,743,078 $348,379,270

GDP $542,223,308 $863,567,259

RecreationalfishingforbillfishmakesasignificantcontributiontotheDReconomy.Overtenyears,arecreationuserfeeonalltouristanglersforeverydaytheyfishwouldgenerateasmuchas$10.8millionnotaccountingforanyincreasesineffort.

Table33.GrenadianBaseCase.

MetricGrenadaBaseCaseNPV

Low High

CharterBusinessCashFlow $42,284,009 $128,493,177

PrivateStampRevenue $3,789,588 $7,061,508

GovernmentStampRevenue $7,061,508 $7,879,704

Expenditures $78,928,325 $110,731,046

GDP $195,648,602 $274,481,618

Recreationalfishing’scontributiontotheGrenadianeconomyissmallerthanthatoftheDRbutisstillsubstantial.Arecreationaluserfeecouldgenerateasmuchas$7.9millionoverthenexttenyears,assumingthateffortstaysstaticatthe2017level.Itisimportanttopointoutthattheperpersonpertripfeeusedtocalculatetheamountauserfeecouldgenerateisameasureofthetotalrecreationalsurplusavailable.Chargingafeethathighwoulddriveparticipantsawayfromtheactivity,especiallygiventhatuserfeesinsimilartargetdestinationsaremuchlower.CaboSanLucascharges$13/person/day,$25foraweek,$35foramonthor$46fortheyear.CostaRicacharges$15,$30and$50foraweek,amonthandayearrespectively.Annual,non-residentlicensefeesintheUSrangefrom$40/yeartoover$100/year.

GiventheuncertaintyofeffortestimationinGrenada,particularlywithregardtothenumberoftouristfishingtrips,itisassumedthattheseareupperboundestimatesforGrenada.Thehighsideeffortestimatesfornon-residentswasgeneratedusingresponsetotheGrenadianTourismMinistry’stouristexitsurvey.Fromthatsurvey,therewere7,215persontripstakeninGrenada.UsingtheUSaveragenumberofpersonspertrip,thatisequivalenttoroughly1,500vesseltrips.FromtheFPIwork,thereareonlyasmallnumberofchartercaptainsoperatinginGrenada,maybeasfewastwofulltimecaptainsandmaybeanothertwoparttimecaptains.TheonefulltimecaptainwespoketoduringtheFPIsran,at

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most,250tripsayear.Theoneparttimecaptainwespoketoran,atmost,150tripsayear.ThefourboatsinGrenadamaythereforebetaking,atmost,800tripsayear.

Thenextsetoftables(Tables34and35)examineannualincreasesineffortattheratesspecifiedabove.Thelevelsofeffortincrease,compoundingannuallyattheratesinthetable,seemreasonableespeciallyatthelower-boundestimates.ForGrenada,a3%annualincreasegeneratesbetween76and143additionaltripsovertheten-yeartimeseries.Ifthecurrentcharteroperatorsareoperatingatcapacity(200-250tripsperyear),thisrepresentslessthanonemorefull-timecharterbusiness.A5%increaserategeneratesbetween113and282tripsfortheentiretimeseries.A10%increaserategeneratesbetween461and859additionaltrips.Atthe10%annualeffortincreaserate,assumingallnewtripsweretouristtrips,additionalcharterinfrastructurewouldneedtobedeveloped.

FortheDR,a3%annualincreasegenerates352additionaltripsonthehighsideand179additionaltripsonthelowsideovertheten-yeartimeseries.Ifthecurrentcharteroperatorsareoperatingatcapacity(200-250tripsperyear),thisrepresentseitherslightlymorethanonefulltimecharterorslightlyless.A5%increaserategenerates698tripsonthehighsideand355tripsonthelowsidefortheentiretimeseries.The5%levelofeffortincreasecouldcertainlysupportanadditionalthreefull-timecharteroperationsbytheendofthe10-yeartimeperiod.A10%increaserategenerates2,695additionaltripsonthehighsideand2,122tripsonthelowside.Atthatannualeffortincreaserate,assumingallnewtripsweretouristtrips,anadditionaltencharterboatswouldneedtocomeonlinetosupportthatnewdemandassumingallcurrentvesselsareoperatingatornearcapacity.

Basedonthechartercashflowmodelsandthecurrentexpenditurerates,theneteffectofthesescenariosissignificant.ItbearspointingoutagainthatthetablesaboverepresentonlytheincreaseandatotalNPVwouldrequireaddingthesevaluestothebasecasevaluealsopresentedabove.Theimpactfortheco-managementtrustsismoderate.ForGrenada,underthemostoptimisticincreasescenario,thetrustonlyraisesanadditional$363,557overtenyears.FortheDR,underthemostoptimisticincreasescenario,effortincreaseswouldraisealmostanadditionalmilliondollarsintrustfunds($861,598).IntheDR,thismeansthat,overtenyears,auserfeecouldgenerateover$11milliondollarsforconservationinvestments.InGrenada,auserfeewouldgenerateover$8milliondollarsforconservation.

Besidestheco-managementtrustfunding,however,increasesinfishingtourismhavelargebenefitsfortheeconomiesofthesecountriesand,sincemostoftherecreationalfishingforbillfishinbothiscatchandrelease,itisaverysustainablepathtoincreasewealthfromtheoceanandprotectcoastalcommunityincome.Charterbusinesscashflowscouldincreasebyasmuchas$4.4millionundera3%increasescenarioinGrenadato$49.3millionundera10%increasescenario.GDPcouldincreaseby$105.3milliondollarsundera10%increasescenarioinGrenada.ThestoryisevenmorepositiveintheDR.Chartercashflowcouldincreasefrom$11.5millionundera3%increasescenarioto$129.6millionundera10%fishingeffortincreasescenario.GDPcouldincreasebyasmuchas$331.2millioniffishingeffortincrease10%ayearforthenext10years.

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Table34.GrenadianScenarioAnalysisResults.

GrenadaEffortIncreaseScenariosNPV

Metric3% 5% 10%

Low High Low High Low High

CharterBusinessCashFlow $1,437,048 $4,366,919 $2,607,606 $7,924,026 $16,217,993 $49,283,441

PrivateStampRevenue $13,666 $28,869 $24,798 $52,385 $154,231 $325,807

GovernmentStampRevenue $15,250 $32,214 $27,671 $58,454 $172,101 $363,557

Expenditures $2,682,427 $3,763,262 $4,867,419 $6,828,656 $30,272,887 $42,470,791

GDP $6,649,237 $9,328,426 $12,065,423 $16,926,964 $75,040,842 $105,277,173

Table35.DominicanRepublicScenarioAnalysisResults.

DominicanRepublicEffortIncreaseScenariosNPV

Metric3% 5% 10%

Low High Low High Low High

CharterBusinessCashFlow $9,531,150 $11,484,302 $17,294,819 $20,838,926 $107,565,044 $129,607,599

PrivateStampRevenue $54,303 $68,417 $98,536 $124,147 $612,845 $772,134

GovernmentStampRevenue $60,595 $76,345 $109,953 $138,532 $683,853 $861,598

Expenditures $7,434,117 $11,839,883 $13,489,633 $21,484,147 $83,898,707 $133,620,550

GDP $18,427,791 $29,348,862 $33,438,285 $53,255,196 $207,969,254 $331,220,432

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KeyAssumptionsIneachcase,wepresentthenetpresentvalueofthestreamofcostsfromthesescenariosusinga5%discountrate.

Effortincreasesaresimplyhypothetical.Theycouldarisefrombettercatchratesdrivenbyconservationactivities.Theycouldarisefromthegeneralgrowthintourisminbothcountries.Theycouldarisefrommarketingcampaignstoattractfishingtourists.

Itisassumedthateffortincreasesinthesameproportionbymode(privateboatorcharterboat)andresidentstatus(residentandnon-resident)foundinthebaselineestimatesabove.

Itisassumedthatpricesandexpenditurelevelspertripremainattheir2017levels.

Theconservationfeeischargedofallanglersonalltrips.

Thereisnoassumptionregardinghowthefeewillbecollectedoranycostsassociatedwithadministeringsuchafee.

RecommendationsOverall,theGrenadaeffortestimatesinthebasecasearelikelyupperboundsoneffort.Asaresult,theeconomicestimatesprovidedforGrenadaarelikewiseupperbounds.ThereisconsiderablymoreconfidenceintheDRestimates.AtthelowerendoftheDRestimatespresentedhere,theestimatesarelikelylowerboundsfortotaleffortasthoseestimatescamefromanactualtripcountcensusatthetwomostpopularmarinas.ThereareothermarinasandsourcesofeffortintheDR.TheupperboundrepresentsthebestestimatesoftotaleffortasderivedbyClubNautico,whichwouldincludeeffortattheother,smallermarinasinthecountry.

Theuncertaintyinthiseffortdatahighlightstheneedtocollectrecreationalfisheriesdatamoreformallyinthecaseofthemarina-basedcatchandeffortdatacollectionintheDRoratallinthecaseofGrenada.Bothcountriesshoulddesignandmaintaincatch,effortandparticipationdatacollectionefforts.

Itisalsoimportanttopointoutthattheperpersonpertripfeesfortheco-managementtrustwerederivedusingtheaveragenumberofannualtripstakenbybillfishanglersfromtheWTPsurveyandtheestimateoftheWTPforaconservationtrustestimatedasanannualnumber.Theestimatespresentedabovearebasedonchargingbothresidentandtouristanglerthataverageamount.Theperpersonpertripvalue,around$30perpersonpertrip,maybetoohighforresidentanglers,particularlyinGrenada.Itwouldlikelybepreferabletochargeresidentanglersanannualfeethatwaslessthan$30afishingtrip.Ifresidentswerechargedalowerfee,thetrustwouldraiselessfunds.Inthemodel,approximately60%oftheeffortisresidenteffort.Thatresident/non-residenteffortproportionwastakenfromUSsurveysofUShighlymigratoryspeciesanglers.Itislikelythattheproportionistoohighfortheseislandnationswheremostoftheeffortcomesfromnon-residents,buttherewasnosourceofdatathatwouldbetterinformthissplitavailable.

Finally,theconceptofauserfeehaswidesupportintheDR.Infact,afeeisalreadybeingchargedbythetwomostpopularmarinas.Thereisalackoftransparencyinthatprogramandthatisdrivingalittle

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distrustintheentiresystem,buttheresidentsunderstandtheneedforauserfee.Currentlythosefeesarebeingassessedtothevesselsthroughtheirslipfees.ItissuggestedthatthefeebeassesseddirectlyattheanglerlevelandthefeebecollectedbythemarinaofficeorbyanenforcementofficialassignedtothemarinaasisdoneinCostaRicaandCaboSanLucas,Mexico.Intheselocations,theanglerisrequiredtopayadailyfeeandisrequiredtoshowproofofthatfeebeforeleavingthemarina.ThereisnosupportforauserfeeinGrenada.Thereareveryfewcharterboatsandthemarinasaresuchthattherearenotwell-definedchokepoints,likeinlets,tocheckfeepaymentlikethereareintheDRorintheotherplaces,suchasCostaRicaandCaboSanLucas.

Scenario4:Transitioningthelow-valuecommercialartisanalbillfishfishermentowardsahigher-valuerecreationalfisheryConservationInternationalaskedforanexaminationofthepossibilityofconvertingcommercialfishermentochartercaptainstobothincreaselivelihoodsandreducebillfishmortality.Increasinglivelihoodswouldrequiretheeconomicrealitiestolineup.Reducingbillfishmortalitywouldrequirethenewcaptainstopracticecatchandreleasefishingandwouldrequirelimitedentryonthecommercialsidesothatanyexitingcaptainwouldn’tsimplybereplacedwithanothercommercialcaptain.

CurrentState–EconomicRealitiesinBothSectors

Fromthepreviouscaseonthecurrentstateofrecreationalfishinginthepilotcountriesandforecastsoftheeconomicactivitygeneratedunderseveraltourismincreasescenarios,anincreaseintourismactivitywouldberequiredtosupportanyadditionalentrantsintothefor-hirefishingsectorineithercountry.Fromthatanalysis,a3-5%increaseintourismorbetterwouldsupportoneadditionalfull-timechartercaptaininGrenadaattheendofthe10-yearperiod.FortheDominicanRepublic,a3%increaseinfishingtourismwouldsupportnearlytwofull-timechartercaptainsanda10%increasecouldsupportuptoanadditional10fulltimechartercaptainsattheendofthe10-yearperiodexamined.

ProposedScenarioInthissection,financialincentivetoswitchfromcommercialfishingintofor-hirerecreationalfishingwillbeexamined.Atanindividualfirmlevel,Table36detailstheeconomicrealitiesinthepilotcountriesinbothsectors.

Table36.AverageCashFlowsbyCountryandSector.

Country FleetAverageAnnualCash

Flow

Both Charter $17,400

Grenada

FAD $3,038

TypeI&II $52,148

TypeIII $54,042

DominicanRepublic FAD $1,221

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FromtheWillingnesstoPay(WTP)study,theaverageannualcashflowforafull-timecharterbusinessintheregionis$17,400(GentnerandWhitehead2018).Averageannualcashflowisbasedontheaveragevesselinoperationintheregionwhichisalarger,twininboarddieselyachtwithacabin.Twininboardtypesofvesselschargeupwardsof$1500perdayforafulldayoffishing.Whileother,smallerandopenvesselsoperateintheregiononafor-hirebasis,theytypicallyonlychargehalfofthatamountorless.WhileGCGdidnotencounteranypangafishermentakingfor-hiretrips,GCGsexperienceinLatinAmericaindicatesthatafulldayfishingaboardapangawithverybasicorpatronsuppliedgearwouldcost$250forafulldayoffishing.

InGrenada,allbuttheFADfishingfleetalreadymakemorethanannualcashflowforafor-hirevessel.TheFADfleetmakessubstantiallylessmoney,sotheincentiveistheretopotentiallyswitch.FromtheFPIwork,severalsmall-scaleFADfishermenonCarriacouexpressedaninterestindevelopingafor-hirebusinessforthemselves.Atpresent,therearenofor-hirefishingvesselsinCarriacou(Gentneretal.2018).

IntheDominicanRepublic,theFADfishermanannualcashflowisfarlessthanwhatafull-timechartercaptainwouldmake.Fromthepreviousanalysis,itwouldnottakemuchofanincreaseinrecreationalfishingtourismtosupportadditionalchartercaptainsiftheysimplywantedtomakemorethantheymakefishingcommercially.Animportantrealitytoconsideristhecostofentryintoacharterbusiness.Table37looksatthecostoffinancingdifferenttypesofvessels.

Table37.VesselPurchasesCosts.

VesselType VesselCost

AnnualPaymentat10%Interestfor15

Years

NewInboardYacht $500,000 $64,476

UsedInboardYacht19 $214,258 $27,624

UsedCenterConsole $50,000 $6,444

NewLocalPanga(25'40hp) $6,000 $768

ItisunlikelythatanysmallscalecommercialfishermenwouldhaveahalfamillionUSDforthepurchaseofavesseloraccesstothattypeofcredit.Evenifthattypeofcreditwereavailable,acharterbusinesswouldnotbeabletoafforda$65,000annualboatpaymentbasedontheannualcashflowfiguresfromthefirsttable.Evenausedinboardyachtofthetypecurrentlyin-servicewouldbebeyondthereachofeventhemostsuccessfulfor-hirecaptainsat$28,000peryearover10years.

ScenarioAnalysisThetablebelowexaminesthepotentialcashflowinyeartenofthe10-yeartourismgrowthscenariosfromthepreviousscenarioanalysis.Table38assumesthehighsideofthegrowthprojectionsandthecharterfeethatcouldbechargedusingatwininboardyachtbutdoesnotincludethepurchaseofsucha

19AveragecurrentvalueofCaribbeanfo-hirefleet.35’twininboarddiesel.

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vessel.Iffisherswishingtoconvert,usedtheirexisting,openpangastyleboatstheywouldhavetocharge60-80%less.The“PangaCashFlow”inTable38belowis60%ofthe“GrossCashFlow.”

Table38.CashFlowsforVariousEffortIncreaseScenarios.

PercentIncreaseOver10Years

GrenadaTrips

GrenadaGrossCash

Flow

GrenadaPanga

CashFlow

DominicanRepublicTrips

DominicanRepublicGrossCashFlow

DominicanRepublic

PangaCashFlow

3% 143 $16,588 $6,635 352 $40,831 $16,332

5% 282 $32,711 $13,085 698 $80,966 $32,387

10% 859 $99,642 $39,857 2,695 $312,614 $125,045

Thereareseveralwaystolookattheseresults.One,acommercialfishermancouldnotcountonmakingenoughmoneytopayforanewtwininboardyachttypevesselunderthesescenarioassumptions.Second,inGrenada,aFADfishermanfacinga3%increaseintourismcouldexpecttomakeabouttwicehiscurrentcashflow,ifonlyonefishermenmadetheswitchattheendof10years.Atthe10%increaselevelinGrenada,iftwofishermenswitched,theywouldmakeslightlymorethanthebasinwideannualaveragecashflowinthecharterbusiness.Generally,thisshowsthereisnotamuchopportunitytoswitchunlessgrowthhappensmoreaggressivelyinGrenada.

ThestoryisdifferentintheDominicanRepublicandthistableexplainswhymanycommercialfishermenhavealreadymadetheswitchinMacau.Thelowestlevelofincrease,3%,generatesslightlylesscashflowthantheannual,full-timecashflowaveragefortheentireCaribbean.However,thisrepresents13timesmoreannualcashflowthanaFADfishermanintheDRcurrentlymakesayear.Asaresult,evenifeachboatwasnotrunning180tripsayear,13commercialfishermencouldconverttorecreationalfishingandstillbebetteroffthanfishingFADscommercially.Atthehighestleveloftourismincrease,10%,sevennewfull-timechartercaptainscouldbesupportedatthebasinwideaveragecashflow,orslightlylessthan100fishermencouldconvertandmakeslightlymoremoneythanfishingFADscommercially.

KeyAssumptionsItisassumedthattheCaribbeanbasinwideaveragecashflowforthefor-hiresectorisapplicabletotheGrenadaandtheDominicanRepublicfor-hireindustries.

LoanratesareonthelowsidefortheDominicanRepublicwhereloanratesforfishingvesselsruninthe12-18%range.BankratesinGrenadaarearound10%.

Additionaltrippredictionsarealltakenfromtheupperboundofthepreviousscenarioanalysis.

Grosscashflowsbelowdonotincludethepurchaseofavesselsuitableforrecreationalfishing.

Scenariosassumeaverage,fulldaycharterfeesfromtheWTPsurvey.Assumingtheaverage,fulldaycharterfeegeneratesanupperboundestimateonthecashflowaspangatripsaregenerally80%lesscostlythantripsontwininboarddieselyachts.

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Pertripcashflowsassumeafull-timeyearis180tripsresultingina$116pertripcashflowforthecaptain/ownerofthevessel.

RecommendationsTheconversionfromcommercialtochartersectorisalreadyhappeningintheDominicanRepublic.Intheregionaroundtheall-inclusiveresortsinPuntaCana,manyoftheFADfishersfromtheportofMacauhaveconvertedfromfishingcommerciallytoofferinglowcost,splitcharterstoall-inclusiveresortguests.Theyoperatefrommooringsjustoffthebeachfromtheseall-inclusiveresorts.Theyoperatefromveryoldtwininboardmotoryachtsoftenwiththesecondinboardremovedandtheweightbalancedwithsandbagsorconcrete.Theprofessionalchartersintheregionrefertotheseoutfitsas“pirate”charterswhosellatcostorbelowcosttripsandusefishsalestomakeuptheirprofits.

Whiletheprofessionalizedfleetpractices100%catchandreleaseforbillfish,thisfleetreliesonkillingbillfishtohangbackattheresorttohelpselltripsforthenextday.Theprofessionalchartersareverymuchinoppositiontothesecharterbusinessesfeelingthattheykilltoomanyfishandgivethesportabadnamebyofferingshort,inshoretripsonunsafeequipment.Anyefforttoconvertmorecommercialfishermentofor-hirecaptainsshouldincludemeasurestoprofessionalizethisfleet.

Oneofthemany“enablingconditions”thatneedworkintheDRistheprofessionalizationoftheentirefor-hireindustryandthisMacaufleetinparticular.Thepiratechartervesselsneedtobesafetyinspectedandperhapssomesortof“certifiedchartercaptain’slicense”berequiredthatrequiredcertaintrainingonthecustomerexperienceandoncatchandreleaseandotherconservationprinciples.Itmightalsobeagoodideatoregisterchartervesselsandperhapsexaminelimitedentryforthefleet.ThebusinesscaseintheDRthatexaminestheconservationtrustconceptmayincludetheseexactrecommendations.

Itbearsmentioningagainthatforthemorebudgetmindedoradventurousangler,pangatripsmayoffernewmarketintheregion.Pangachartersareverypopularforthebudgetmindedanglerthatdoesn’tmindbringingtheirowngearordirectingtheirowntrip.Theoverheadforthesetypesoftripsisverylowasthesetripsareoftenconductedusingcommerciallyoutfittedpangas.ApangabasedoperationtypeofoperationmightbeverysuitablefortheislandofCarriacou,Grenada.Thetourismthereisaimedmoreatadventuroustravelerswithan“eco”theme.Theoperatorstherealreadyownpangassuitableforfishingforsailfishandotherpelagicswithverylittleinvestmentingear.ApangabasedstrategymightalsoworkfortheDR,however,morecontrolsontheindustryneedtobeinstitutedbeforeexploringanexpansionoftheindustrythere.

DiscussionTheworkpresentedheredetailedthecompletedevelopmentofcashflowmodelsofthecommercialandrecreationalfishingsectorsacrossthetwopilotcountriesofGrenadaandtheDominicanRepublic.Theeffortdemonstratedthatitispossibletorapidlyandinexpensivelygatherfisherycontext,mapsupplychains,designcash-flowmodels,populatethosemodelswithprimaryandsecondarydataandanalyzescenariosthatprovidecontextandbackgroundforthelargerbusinesscasescurrentlyindevelopment.Thecontext,model,dataandsupplychainmapswerepassedtoWildernessmarketsandprovidedthecoreoftheirfinancialmodelsforthebusinesscases.GCGworkedcloselywithWilderness

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Marketstodevelopandground-truththosefinancialmodelsandtohelpdevelopthebusinesscasescenarios.

Highlightedthroughoutthisdocumentarethebasicshortcomingsinenablingconditionsfoundinbothpilotcountries.Fortunately,bothcountrieshavegoodcommercialdatacollectionssystems.However,neithercankeeptheirlandingsstatisticsupdatedinatimelyfashion.Theuseofelectronicdataentryterminalswouldprovidebothseafoodtraceability,perhapsleadingtobetterexportmarketaccess,andprovidethelocalfisheriesmanagerswithmoretimelydata.Additionally,neithercountrycollectsanydataonrecreationalfishing.ItwouldbeeasiertoformalizethatdatacollectionandwarehouseitintheministrybecausethetwolargestmarinasintheDominicanRepublicalreadycollectcatchandeffortinformation.Grenadawouldhavetoinstituteadatacollectionsystemfromscratch.

Neithercountrydoesstockassessmentsnorsetsanyharvestcontrolrules(HCRs).InthecaseofGrenada,whoiscurrentlyintheprocessofjoiningICCAT,itwillbecomenecessarytoaddressHCRsinordertomanagetheirbillfishquotas.TheDominicanRepublicisnotcurrentlylookingtojoinICCAT.Bothcountrieswouldalsobewelladvisedtobeginlookingataprocesstolimitentryinalloftheirfisheries.

Finally,itmaybepossible,giventhewillingnessofrecreationalanglerstopayforaccess,togeneratefundstopayforadditionalenablingconditionsorevenaCoasianbargaininthecaseofFADaccessintheDominicanRepublic.However,whilethefundsmaybeavailable,itwouldbepointlesstocompensateFADfishermenintheDominicanRepubliciftherewasn’tatleastsomesortoftrackingandregistryforFADsoratbestlimitedentryfortheportsbeingcompensated.ItisclearthatpreviouscompensationschemeshaveincreasedcapacityintwoDominicanRepubliccommercialfishingports.

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LiteratureCitedCisneros-Montemayor,A.M.andU.R.Sumaila.2010.Aglobalestimateofthebenefitsfromecosystem-

basedmarinerecreation:potentialimpactsandimplicationsformanagement.JournalofBioeconomics.Publishedonline18August2010.

Gentner,Brad,andScottSteinback.2008.TheEconomicContributionofMarineAnglerExpendituresintheUnitedStates,2006.U.S.Dep.Commerce,NOAATech.Memo.NMFSF/SPO-94,301p.

Gentner,Brad,FreddyArocha,ChrisAnderson,KeithFlett,PabloObregon,RaymonvanAnrooy.(2018).FisheryPerformanceIndicatorStudiesfortheCommercialandRecreationalPelagicFleetsoftheDominicanRepublicandGrenada.FAOFisheriesandAquacultureCircularNo.1162.Rome,Italy.http://www.fao.org/3/I8833EN/i8833en.pdf

Gentner,BradandJohnWhitehead.(2018).ExpendituresandWillingness-To-PaySurveyofCaribbeanBillfishAnglers:SummaryReport.FAOFisheriesandAquacultureCircularNo.C1168.Rome,Italy.http://www.fao.org/3/I9667EN/i9667en.pdf

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