Economics of Con ict, S11: Peacekeepingprivateksg/courses/scipo/SP11.pdf · Economics of Con ict, S11: Peacekeeping ... Third party intervention and con ... Peacekeeping and peacemaking

Economics of Conflict, S11: Peacekeeping

Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (& Ismene Gizelis)

Department of GovernmentUniversity of Essex

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

[email protected]

http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/scipo2016.html

Gleditsch & Gizelis (Essex & PRIO) Peacekeeping April 2016 1 / 21

http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/scipo2016.html

Research paper

Due 2 May

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Key points from last sessions

Information and commitment problems in conflict

Third party intervention and conflict outcomes

Political grievances and economic causes of conflict and weak states


Peacekeeping and peacemaking

Long history of third party intervention in conflict

Traditional intervention focused on private goods (i.e., outcome,incentives of intervener)

United Nations charter

Security as a public/collective good (“maintain international peace andsecurity”)

Peacekeeping per se not mentioned, but

Chapter VI: “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”

Chapter VII: “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peaceand Acts of Aggression”

Chapter VIII: provides for regional agencies in maintaining peace andsecurity


Peacekeeping and peacemaking

Need for definition to identify peacekeeping outside UN (Held andWallensteen 2008):

deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilianpolice in a target state

intended to separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires,maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the securitysituation

Consent of parties: neutral, but not necessarily passive

Peacemaking: Intervention to create peace where none exists

UN primarily engaged in peacekeeping, peacemaking usually carriedout by other organizations/coalition


First UN PKO mission

1948 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

Followed nitiative by United Nations Mediator for Palestine FolkeBernadotte and UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie

50 forces wearing UN guard uniforms to assist in supervising truceafter partition of former British Mandate of Palestine

Precedence for UN peacekeeping

Mixed record on success

Ongoing as of 2016 (with other missions Observer Groups in Lebanon,Golan, & Egypt/Sinai; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon;United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Golan Heights)


UN PKOs

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

510

1520

Year

No

peac

ekee

ping

mis

sion

s


New UN PKOs

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

01

23

45

6

Year

New

pea

ceke

epin

g m

issi

ons

star

ted


Troops (in 1000s), 1992-2015

1995 2000 2005 2010

2040

6080

100

Year

Tota

l pea

ckee

pers

(in

100

0s)


Pre/post Cold War

Supply and demand for peacekeeping

Cold war

Superpower rivalry constrained opportunities for peacekeeping

Hopeless cases with low prospects for added value?

Post Cold War

Less preference divergence, greater scope for peacekeeping mandates

Greater demand for peacekeeping? End long-standing conflicts,characteristics of new conflicts?

Dramatic change in conventional wisdom on peacekeeping


How can peacekeeping work?

Commitment and information problems

E.g., El Salvador 1992

Neither party able to win the war militarily, but many challenges inimplementing a peace agreement

Trust and verification of disarmament

Transition to elections

No civilian police force



Military role

Security challenges in peaceprocesses

Increase costs of confrontation to party

E.g., Liberia

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia UNIOMIL (1993-96,implement the prior Contonou agreement)

Second Liberial Civil War 1997-2003

United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMIL (2003-present): muchstronger military component



Deterrence and containment

Increase costs of transgression beyond conventional warfare, forexample civilians or weak targets

Deterrence: prevent attacks that may otherwise have happened

Kathman et al. 2013 suggest more troops strongly reduce expectedone-sided violence

Gleditsch and Beardsley: robust PKOs can prevent “roaming” rebels


Sudan: JEM and UNAMID

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan

Coalition group opposed to Kharthoum government, but questionsabout non-secterian nature and motives

Active both in Darfur and elsehwhere in Sudan

Did African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)constrain their geographical scope?

Identify conflict polygons, defined by individual attacks

Look at year to year movement to see whether peacekeeping containconflicts?


Sudan: JEM and UNAMID 2009 & 2010

JEM 2009

0 300 km

JEM 2010

0 300 km


Sudan: JEM and UNAMID 2009 & 20100

5000

1000

015

000

2000

0U

NAM

ID T

roop

s

Jan, 2008 Jan, 2009 Jan, 2010 Jan, 2011 Jan, 2012Month

010

020

030

0UN

AMID

Milit

ary

Obs

erve

rsJan, 2008 Jan, 2009 Jan, 2010 Jan, 2011 Jan, 2012

Month



Reconstruction and peacebuilding post-conflict

Addressing factors that led to conflict in the first place

Post-conflict reconstruction

Elections and facilitating transitions to democracy

Security dividend: Gizelis and Cao on health



Proactive peacekeeping: Preventing conflicts before they occur

Only one proactive mission to date

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR, 1992-1995) inMacedonia, followed by Nations Preventive Deployment Force(UNPREDEP, 1995-1999)

Renewal vetoed by China in 1999 (after Macedonia’s diplomaticrecognition of Taiwan)

2001 Albanian revolt (relationship to Kosovo conflict)

However, PKOs may prevent conflict contagion and spillover to otherstates

Study by Collier, Chauvet, and Hegre for Copenhagen Consensussuggest large “extended” benefits of PKOs on risks for other states


Does peacekeeping work?

Conventional wisdom shifted from very negative to positive

Dependent on criteria for success

Did fighting end, and has it resumed within period X?

Does mission complete (possibly narrow) mandate?

Can mission withdraw without a plausible risk of war?

Has the mission provided “value added” over expected trajectoryoutside peacekeeping/peacebuilding?


Selection problem

Inferring causal relationships often difficult due to problems ofselection in treatment

E.g., mortality high in hospitals, but reasonable to conclude thathospitals “cause” death?

Possible selection in peacekeeping

Easy cases chosen, hard cases avoided ⇒ possible overestimate of theeffect of peacekeeping

Hard cases chosen ⇒ likelihood of success low ex ante

Research suggests that UN peacekeeping tends to be applied in difficultcases


Financing and political will

Peacekeeping as a public good and general problem of underprovision

Casualty aversion problem

Black Hawk Down/1993 battle of Mogadishu

Total US casualty toll: 18 killed, 73 wounded, 1 captured (also 2casualties from Malaysia and Pakistan)

Perceived failure prompted withdrawal

Decreased appetite for peacebuilding post Somalia


Documents

Economics of Con ict, S11: Peacekeepingprivateksg/courses/scipo/SP11.pdf · Economics of Con ict, S11: Peacekeeping ... Third party intervention and con ... Peacekeeping and peacemaking