近年におけるアメリカの役員報酬とコーポレート・ガバナンス改革

中 井 誠

要旨：

2008 2009

2009 1007 10

9 10

1

キーワード：

はじめに CEO

CEOCOO( )

CEOCEO

CEO

1 Citigroup Global Market Japan Inc. ”Corporate Securities

Strategy”, 2010 2 26

－ 91 －

CEO

CEO

CEO

CEO2

2005S&P 500 CEO 1980 42 2000

525 2005 4113 CEO

4

5 2003

6

Jensen and Meckling (1976)

19901960 1960

2 E CEO 2010 23 AFL-CIO United for Fair Economy

(2007 ) 262 4010

4 Jensen & Murphy, Bushman & Smith5 2002 6 76

2003 12

－ 92 －

19701980

1990

7

8

１．利害調整機能としてのコーポレート･ガバナンス

7

2001 18 Executive Compensation Social Science Research Network(SSRN)

2010 3 1,000

－ 93 －

9

19902001

6

2002 7

10

401(K)

2002 7

２．経営者報酬を吊り上げたストック・オプションの導入とその問題点

1990 CEO

1990 1980

9

2008 1210

2002 11

－ 94 －

CEO CEO

CEOCEO

11

199012

2008

2000 13

11 2007 ( ) 9 3112 1994 1980 2.45

13 2000 pp.314-344

－ 95 －

199814

2008

1

2010 CEO1

CEOBank of America

Merrill Lynch CEO 1 8368

2 2008 CEO 10CEO

14 2000 pp.344-345

－ 96 －

３．サブプライム金融危機以前の経営者報酬に対する批判

2006

200215

198042 2000 525

2006

Say-on-PaySEC

2006 16

Say-on-PaySay-on-Pay

Say-on-Pay

15 2009 8 1116 2.

－ 97 －

17 2007 2 AflacSay-on-Pay 18

４．サブプライム金融危機後の経営者報酬規制

2008 CEO

GM

2008 10 7,000Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP

2008 2009 TARP GM,

2009 2 4TARP

2 50 4,500

2 17 7,872 2009Say-on-Pay

502008 S&P500 500 CEO 1,040

11 TARP 10 5340 1,834 3

5050

19

17 (2009) MERCER18 (2009) p319 pp.3-7

－ 98 －

2009 CEO TARP4 CEO 4

CEO 150 CEO 80CEO 60

５．経営者報酬規制強化を巡る議論

2009 7 28 4028 31

Say-on-Pay Aflac,Intel, Hewlett-Packard 24

20 2007 2008CEO

20 p12

－ 99 －

2009 6 1,728GM 2010

GM 58GM

GMGM CEO

5 1,000 74,000GM

2009 Say-on-Pay

６．日本におけるコーポレート・ガバナンス改革

2000 2000

－ 100 －

2010 2 26 Citigroup

1007 41 12

5 100109 198 21

6 103 4 10

21 Citigroup(2010) P6.

－ 101 －

7 2008 2009 10Citigroup

おわりに

CEO

1990

－ 102 －

参考文献

1 2009

2 20003 2007 4 pp6. 68-70. 4 2008

125 20016 2010

7 2007 9 128 2001

9 200210 201011 200312 199913 2009

8 1114 2003 90

International Department Working Paper Series 03-J-6 915 Financial Stability Forum, ’FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices’, April 2, 2009, http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/etc/20090403_2/02.pdf. 16 Girma S, Thompson S. and Wright P. (2007) “Corporate Governance Reforms and Executive Compensation Determination: Evidence from the UK”, University of Manchester, Manchester Journal. Jan (01), Pages: 65-81.

－ 103 －

17 Jensen M.C. and Fuller, J. (2002) “Just Say No to Wall Street Courageous CEOs are putting a stop to the earnings game and we will all be better off for it.”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Winter. 18 Jensen, Michael C. (2001) “How Stock Options Reward Managers for Destroying Value and What To Do About It”, Harvard NOM Research Paper No. 04-27. 19 Jensen M.C. and W. H. Meckling (1976) “Theory of the Firm: Manegerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3(4), pp.305-360. 20 Jensen and Murphy (1990) “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 #2. 21 Kaplan, Steven N. (1994) “Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States” , Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), pp. 510-546. 22 Kaplan, Steven N. (2007) “Are UC CEO Overpaid”, Written Testimony in US House Committee on Financial Services, Hearing of Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation, Sep 8. 23 Levine, Ross (2004) “The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3404, September. 24 Monks, Robert. and Minow, N. (1995) “Corporate Governance”, Blackwell Publishers Limited.,

199925 Waxman, H. (2007) "Executive Pay: Conflicts of Interest Among Compensation Consultants" United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Majority Staff.

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