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'CCESSION NBR:8301310096 DOC ~ DATE: 83/01/25 NOTARIZED: YESFACIL:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station~ Unit 2q Tennessee

AUTHBNAME AUTHOR AFP ILIATIONKAMPERgD ~ Ss Tennessee Valley Authority

RECIP ~ NAME REC IP IENT AFFILIATIONDENTONgH ~ RE Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director

SUBJECT: Forwards final rept on indications in recirculation sysmanifoldsRept includes assessment of indications 8 actionplan for resolution of problem, Linear elastic fracturemechanics analysis will be submitted by 830204,

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TENNESSEE VALLEYAUTHORITYCHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 3'740t

400 Chestnut Str eet Tower IX

January 25, 1983

Mr. Harold R. Denton, DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr . Denton:

In the Matter of theTennessee Valley Authority

Docket.No. 50-260

Enclosed is the final report on indications discovered in therecirculation system manifold at the Br owns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2.The enclosed report is the assessment of the indications discovered andthe action plan for resolution. This report was discussed with yourstaff and Region II representatives in a meeting on January 6, 1983.

The enclosed report references the Linear Elastic, Fracture Mechanics(LEFM) analysis performed by General Electric Company. This LEFM

analysis and results were presented to the NRC staff in the January 6

meeting. Xt is not included in the enclosure but will be submitted theweek of February 4, 1983. As requested by the NRC staff, the LEFM

analysis will correlate throughwall crack size with leak detection limitsto demonstrate the "leak before break" capability of the piping. Asdiscussed with the Browns Ferry Project Manager, R. J. Clark of yourstaff, your staff's review of our enclosed report can proceed without the

'EFManalysis.

As a result of NRC staff concerns expressed in our January 6 meeting, TVA

has taken the following actions. We have performed a dye-penetrantexamination on the outside diameter of the suspect welds. Also, theredundancy of the leak detection tape was doubled making the completeloss of the leak detection function extremely remote.

Xn addition, we are making the following commitments in response todiscussions with your staff in our January 6 meeting.

1. If during the next cycle of operation leakage is suspected in eitherof the two welds, or if leak detection is lost in either of the twowelds, NRC will be promptly notified. If either of these eventsoccur, TVA will proceed to monitor and record unidentified leakage atleast every 24 hours to ensure that the technical specification limitof 5 gpm is not reached.

83013i0096 830i25PDR ADOCK 05000260P PDR

An Equal Opportunity Employer

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Mr. Harold R. Denton January 25, 1983

2. NRC Region II will be notified when accelerometer data acquisitionstarts,and a report documenting results will be submitted within 60days after completion of the test.

3. The welds in question will be reexamined at the next unit 2 r efuelingoutage and the results compared to the current examination resultsfor assessment of any potential crack gr

owth.'ased

on the above action plan which includes ( 1) justification byanalysis, (2) installation of instrumentation to assist in assessingvibrational effects, and (3) installation of sensors near the two suspectwelds to ensure early leak detection, TVA concludes that the detectedcracks are unique to unit 2, they will not affect safe operation of theunit, and that star tup as planned on February 16, 1983 is justified.

If your staff has any problems with our approach, please inform usimmediately.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

~E..

Subscrib -.a sworn to eforeme this day of

D. S. KammerNuclear Engineer

1983 ~

Notary PublicMy Commission Expires

Enclosurecc (Enclosur e):

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRegion IIATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Mr. R. J. ClarkBrowns Ferry Project ManagerU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission7920 Norfolk AvenueBethesda, Maryland 20014

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r owns Ferry Nuclear Plant UnitRecirculation Manifold Indications

Assessment and Action PlanFINAL REPORT

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The recent discovery of throughwall intergranular stress corrosioncracking (IGSCC) in the thick-wall recirculation piping at Nine Mile Pointunit 1 has resulted in an increased concern to the BWR IGSCC issue,particularly for larger pipes. As a result, NRC issued IE bulletin 82-03which requires that inspections of increased sensitivity be performed byBWR licensees whose plants are currently in or scheduled to be in arefueling mode or extended outage through January 31, 1983. Browns FerryNuclear Plant unit 2 is currently near the end of an extended outage andthe IE bulletin 82-03 inspections are complete. The completed inspections,which were performed by LMT, Inc., on 40 class 1 welds did not reveal anyunacceptable IGSCC indications.

As a result of indications that were found in a sweepolet at Hatch unit 2,NRC region II inspectors requested that TVA examine a sweepolet-to-manifold)oint nearest the manifold end cap. TVA proceeded to perform a preliminaryexamination on sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-36 in loop B and foundunacceptable indications. LMT was then called back to Browns Ferry toexamine sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-36 and three additional sweepolet-to-manifold welds. LMT found three unacceptable indications in weld KR-2-36 and one unacceptable indication in the loop A sweepolet-to-manifold weld)oint nearest the end cap (KR-2-14). As a result of the unacceptableindication in KR-2-14, the four remaining sweepolet-to-manifold welds wereexamined. No additional unacceptable indications were found.

Descri tion of the Indications

The unacceptable indications which were found in the loop B sweepolet-to-manifold joint nearest the end cap (KR-2-36) were determined to be in theheat-affected zone (HAZ) of the manifold, and their orientations lookingdown toward the sweepolet were approximately 1:30, 4:00, and 5:00 o'lockpositions —assuming a 12:00 o'lock reference position in the directiontoward the manifold end cap. .The indication which was found in the loop Asweepolet-to-manifold )oint nearest the end cap (KR-2-14) was alsodetermined to be in the HAZ of the manifold, and its orientation lookingdown toward the sweepolet was approximately at the 1:30 o'lock position—.

assuming a 12:00 o'lock reference position in the direction toward the'anifoldend cap. All of the indications were interpreted by LMT to be

cracks and were determined to be approximately 1-1/4 inches in length and20-percent wall thickness in depth. A detailed report summarizing theultrasonic inspections has been prepared by LMT and submitted to TVA."

TVA proceeded to drain the recirculation lines so that radiography could beperformed on the two welds in the four areas where the UT indications werefound. The radiography was performed by Industrial laboratories, Inc. Thetechnique involved double-wall shots taken with a 100-curie iridium sourceand M-type film. Source location was such that straight shots- as well asvarious angle shots were made in the areas containing the indications. Thesensitivity level was 2T.

'

The X-rays confirmed the evidence of cracklike indications in the4:00 o'lock and 5:00 o'lock positions of sweepolet-to-manifol'd weldKR-2-36. The X-rays could not confirm the presence of cracklikeindications in the 1:30 o'lock position of weld KR-2-36 nor in the 1:30o'lock position of weld KR-2-14; however, these X-rays have been sent toAptec Engineering for image enhancement. Preliminary results from Aptecconfirm the cracklike indication in the 1:30 o'lock position ofweld KR-2-36.

Based on the ultrasonic examinations pet formed by LMT and the radiography,performed by Industrial Laboratories, it is TVA's position that three smallcracks exist in sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-36 and one small crackexists in sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-14. Because the original shopX-rays and the ASME Section XI preservice examinations did not reveal anysimilar indications in these areas, TVA believes that these cracks areservice induced.

Assessment of Indications

TVA does not believe that the detected indications are the result of IGSCCindications because shop records show that both joints KR-2-36 and KR-2-14were solution annealed after the final welding was complete and thereforeare not sensitized. This has been verified by review of the original shopradiographs and the original heat treatment records. Also, metallographywas performed by. TVA adjacent to and in shop weld KR-2-36'loop B) and inshop weld KR-2-14 (loop A). Both welds were examined in the area of theindications and had solution-annealed microstructures. The pipe adjacentto shop weld KR-2-36 was tested using in-place, electrolytic-oxalic acidetch (ASTM A262, practice A). No sensitization was found using thismethod. Additionally, delta ferrite readings taken by TVA in the shopwelds showed less than, 1 percent delta ferrite, whereas the field weldsadjacent to the headers had 8- to 10-percent delta ferrite. This low levelindicates that the delta ferrite present from welding was transformed toaustenite by the solution heat treatments. The metallurgical reportdescribing these findings is attached at the end of this report.

TVA believes that the indications were fatigue induced for the followingreasons. There was a past problem with recirculation pump flow-inducedvibrations and audible noise in. the general area of the unit 2 reactor.TVA therefore believes that there is a strong possibility that thisphenomenon caused vibrations in the recirculation piping system. Thisproblem was discovered in December 1979. If fatigue is the real cause, TVAbelieves that the two sweepolet-to-manifold joints with unacceptableindications would be the most likely locations to experience fatigueproblems because the amplitude of vibration is expected to be greater nearthe free ends (capped ends) of the 22-inch recirculation manifold. Thisgreater amplitude would then result in'higher cyclic stress levels in thesuspect sweepolet joints. Also, the locations and orientations of theindications in the manifold HAZ are where one would expect fatigue crackingcaused by vibration-induced bending moments on the sweepolets because thestress levels in the area of the indications are higher . This has beendocumented by past research conducted by Battelle Memorial Instituterelative to fatigue in sweepolet branch connections (previously sent toNRC).2 TVA determined that the audible noise was due to a resonantfrequency that was generated by the recirculation pumps when they wereoperating at approximately 80-percent capacity. TVA has eliminated this

noise problem by operating the pumps at different speeds during startup andduring normal operation as the unit passes through these critical points.If fatigue cracks were initiated as a result of these vibrations, TVA

believes that the driving force has been eliminated.

In response to a question that was raised during TVA's presentation to NRC

on January 6, 1983, TVA stated that the OD surfaces of welds KR-2-14 andKR-2-36 had not been liquid penetrant examined. Because of this concern,TVA performed a documented liquid penetrant examination of these welds onJanuary 10, 1983. The welds were evaluated in accordance with theacceptance criteria of ASME Sections III and XI and both were found to beacceptable.

Action Plan

Two basic options are available to disposition the cracks that were foundduring the subject inspection: (1) repair by welding or (2) perform alinear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) analysis to demonstrate that theflaws will not propagate to an unacceptable level during the next cycle ofoperation and monitor the two welds for any service-induced stresses.TVA ruled out performing a repair at this time for the following reasons.Because the flaws are assumed to be service induced, a throughwall repairwould be involved. This would involve extremely high personnel exposurerates, as well as posing problems with back purging and moisture. Inaddition, the welding would sensitize the manifold in the excavated areasand a worse condition could develop as a result of a throughwall repair.The "backlay" repair technique, which has been used by other utilities, hasnot been demonstrated to be acceptable for sweepolet-to-header welds andin TVA's opinion is not an acceptable repair technique for fatigue-typecracking at this time.

Because of the many problems associated with any type of weld repair, it isTVA's decision to provide justification for continued operation in the"as is" condition. This justification will consist of ( 1) performing LEFM

analysis to show that the indications will not grow to unacceptable sizesduring the current fuel cycle, (2) installing instrumentation(accelerometers, etc.) near both suspect welds to assess the vibrations,(3) installing moisture-sensitive tape near the suspect joints to monitorfor leakage at these joints, and (4) reinspecting the suspect welds at thenext refueling outage and determining if any crack growth has

occurred.'he

following discussion presents the details of this justification.

1.0 Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM)

An LEFM analysis has been performed by General Electric Company (GE)to predict the growth of the indications during the next fuel cycle.The analysis predicts growth by using the anticipated system loadingfrom the design stress report.

The fatigue crack growth as well as IGSCC crack growth (conservativelyassuming 0.2 ppm 02 environment and a furnace-sensitized condition)

.was determined. In both cases, the end-of-cycle sizes of theindications are shown to be acceptable using the criteria in theproposed Appendix X to ASME Section XI. The GE analysis will alsocorrelate allowable throughwall crack size with leak detection

capabilities to demonstrate the "leak before break" capability ofaustenitic stainless steel piping. TVA will submit this report to NRCunder, separate cover before startup of unit 2.3

2.0 Vibration and Dia nostic Instrumentation

As stated previously, in December 1979, TVA detected a loud audiblenoise in the unit 2 reactor and control areas at some point duringstartup with the recirculation pumps in a balanced flow mode. TVAsuspects that the noise emanated from the recirculation piping andthat these vibrations were the principal driving force in initiatingthe cracks; therefore, TVA will conduct a vibration and diagnostictest of the recirculation system piping during startup and operationof the unit. During this test, TVA will attempt to reproduce thenoise that was hear d and will monitor various parameters to determinethe cause. In addition, any excessive vibrations in the vicinity ofwelds KR-2-14 and KR-2-36 during normal operation will be factoredinto the GE analysis to determine whether the predicted crack growthrates are affected. Although the test and associated instrumentationare considered temporary by TVA, the installation of allinstrumentation, mounting brackets, elyctrical cable, etc., will beperformed in accordance with TVA-approved procedures. As discussed inthe meeting with NRC on January 6, 1983, TVA anticipates that allpertinent data associated with the test will be taken within the firsttwo months of operation. NRC Region II will be notified when TVAbegins collecting data so that NRC may observe the test data. In

"addition, TVA will submit a written report of the results of the datawithin 60 days after the test has been completed.

Four types of test instrumentation will be installed on the unit 2recirculation system .for the purposes of this test. Each type isbriefly explained below. As stated previously, this test istemporary; and once the pertinent data is collected, theinstrumentation will be removed as unit conditions permit.

2.1 Accelerometers

Endevco model 2273 AM20 high-temperature, radiation-hardenedaccelerometers will be used to detect the higher frequencyrecirculation system piping vibration. The accelerometers areshown schematically in figures 2, 3, and 4. The locations areindicated by the symbols V, T, or H, representing vertical,tangential, or horizontal acceler ometers. A list will bemaintained identifying the sensor, its charge converter, fieldcable number, penetration identification, and pin identificationfor each test point designation.

2.2 Proximit Probes

A Bentley Nevada 7200 series proximity transducer system will beused to monitor the recirculation pump speeds. Each pump willhave two transducers mounted for this purpose.

2.3 Position Transducers

Houston Scientific International; Inc.,'series 1850 positiontransducers will be used to measure thermal and low-frequencypipe movement. If the transducers cannot be physically mountedfar enough from the recirculation pipes, then some sort ofcooling air bath will be needed. The transducers must also bewrapped with lead to decrease the amount of radiation exposure.

If available, Ailtech model SG125 high-temperature, weldablestrain gages will be used to measure the static and dynamicstrains in the recirculation loop piping during the unit heatupand operation. Figures 5 and 6 indicate the locations where thegages will be installed. Each gage will be individually welded,in place, using a low energy capacitive discharge weldingtechnique in accordance with ASME Sections III and XI. Afterinstallation, each gage will be protected from damage by wrappingit with a silicon rubber mat and by indenting the mirrorinsulation to prevent surface contact strains. Cabling from eachstrain gage will be routed from underneath the insulation throughthe holes at the accelerometer mounting clamps. As stated duringthe meeting with NRC on January 6, 1983, TVA will install thestrain gages as availability permits.

3.0 Leak Detection

The leak detection system to be installed on the reactor recirculationpiping in the areas of the crack indications is the Techmark LimitedSystem TUM 100. ~ This system utilizes a moisture-sensitive tape as theactive element. The tape consists of a pair of spaced copper foilconductors separated by a polyester webbing impregnated with achloridefree salt. In the dry (normal) condition, the tape has aresistance in the megohm range. When moisture or saturated steamreaches the tape, the resistance drops to the 10,000-ohm range. Thischange activates the display/control equipment to the alarmcondition.

The moisture-sensitive tape is fastened to small steel plates whichare strapped to the outside of the piping insulation. A 1/2-inch-diameter guide tube penetrates the piping insulation and provides apath from the pipe OD to the"tape mounting plate (see figure 7). Anymoisture or steam which might escape as a result of a throughwall pipecrack will activate the moisture-sensitive tape through the guidetube. The System 100 is reportedly sensitive to leak rates of0.1 gpm.

The system to be installed in the vicinity of welds KR-2-14 and KR-2-36 will consist of three loops per weld, or a total of six loops.Each loop operates independently from all other loops and consists oftwo moisture sensors, one transducer, and all necessary cable. To

,provide separation, two loops from one weld will exit through onepenetration while the third loop will exit through a different .penetration. This is shown schematically in figure 8. Thiscombination of sensors provides a double redundant system such that

during operation, in the unlikely event two loops are lost on 'one ofthe welds, leak detection capability is still intact. The locationsof the sensors at each weld are as follows: two near the top, twonear the pipe centerline, and two near the bottom (see figure 9).Outside of containment each loop will be connected to a transducerwhose output is connected to the control/alarm cabinet. Thisconfiguration places all electronic components outside primarycontainment to allow for system maintenance. The control/alarmcircuitry performs continuous scanning of the detectors, transducers,and control circuitry to detect any system failure or the indicationof moisture at any of the sensors. In the event of any alarm, thesystem will identify the loop.

The control/alarm center will be located in the reactor building andwill be monitored once per day by the plant Engineering Section. Thefollowing discussion describes the procedure TVA will use to evaluateany alarm from the leak detection system. (This is also shownschematically in figure 10.)

In the event that an alarm is indicateg by two of the three loopsmonitoring one weld (or two of two loops if only two loops areoperable; or one loop if only one loop is operable), TVA will notifyNRC of suspected throughwall leakage of the suspect weld. At thistime plant personnel will measure and record unidentified leakagewithin the containment in accordance with plant surveillance" instructions to ensure that the leakage is below 5 gpm. Plantpersonnel will continue to monitor and record leakage as conditionswarrant.

In the event that an alarm is indicated by one of the three loopsmonitoring the weld (or one of two loops if only two loops areoperable), the nuclear central office will be notified and anevaluation will be performed to identify the cause of the alarm. .Ifthe alarm is due to a failure of one of the loops of the system,Techmark Limited representatives will be netified so that the loop canbe repaired.

If at any time during the next cycle of operation all three loops ofeither weld KR-2-14 or KR-2-36 are determined to be inoperable, NRCwill be notified. Until such a time when the system can be repaired,plant personnel will proceed to monitor and record unidentifiedleakage within the containment once every 24 hours in accordance withplant surveillance instructions to ensure that the leakage is below5 gpm.

4.0 Ins ections at Next Refuelin Outa e

The two sweepolet-to-manifold joints will be ultrasonically examinedagain at the next refueling outage using similar techniques to thoseused during this outage, and the results will.be compared to thecurrent examination results for assessment of any potential crackgrowth.

Conclusion

As a result of NRC comments during the meeting on January 6, 1983, thisreport addresses the following NRC concerns: ( 1) NRC Region II will benotified when TVA begins to collect vibration data; (2) TVA will submit awritten report of the results of the vibration and diagnostic testingwithin 60 days after the testing is complete; (3) the LEFM analysis willcorrelate throughwall crack size with leak detection limits to demonstratethe "leak before break" capability of the piping; (4) if during the nextcycle of operation leakage is suspected in either of the two welds or ifleak detection is lost in either of the two welds, NRC will be notified;and (5) if either of these events occur, TVA will proceed to monitor andrecord unidentified leakage at least "every 24 hours to ensure that thetechnical specification limit of 5 gpm is not reached.

Based on the above action plan which includes ( 1) Justification byanalysis, (2) installation of instrumentation to assist in assessingvibrational effects, and (3) installation of sensors near the two suspectwelds to ensure early leak detection, TVA concludes that the detectedcracks are unique to unit 2 and will not affect safe operation of theunit.

References

1. Report, "Browns Ferry Unit 2 - Recirc Pipe Weld Examinations-Tennessee Valley Authority," November/December 1982 - TVA-038/039

2.. "Final Report on Fatigue Evaluation of Sweepolet Branch Connections inCarbon Steel Pipe to Bonney Forge Division, Bonney Forge and Foundry,Inc.," May 15, 1970, by C. E. Jaske and H. Mindlin, Battelle MemorialInstitute

3. Linear elastic fracture mechanics analysis by General Electric Companyfor TVA (to be transmitted under separate cover).

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