Election Case #1

8/3/2019 Election Case #1

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G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICER LUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OFSAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO.TOMAS, SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A,31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO PLACIDO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were thecontending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22,2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. 1

His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on June25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of herlate husband.2 Petitioners request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing severalsignatures of people purporting to be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas. 3

On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman andMembers of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as follows:

Just in case the names "BETTY" or "PETRONILA" or the surname "RULLODA" is written onthe ballot, read the same as it is written but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY NOTCOUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT COUNTED."4

Based on the tally of petitioners watchers who were allowed to witness the canvass of votes duringthe July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placidoreceived 290 votes.5 Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay

Chairman of Sto. Tomas.6

After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate requests of AndresPerez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as candidates for Barangay Chairman ofBarangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan,respectively, issued Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, toADOPT the recommendation of the Law Department as follows:

1. To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY and

PETRONILA S. RULLODA; and

2. To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and San Jacinto, Pangasinan todelete the name of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate for Barangay Chairman inBarangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name of PETRONILA S. RULLODA,candidate for Barangay Captain in Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.7


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The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELECs Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23,2002, setting forth the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the July15, 2002 synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9thereof which reads:

Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall be no substitution of candidatesforbarangayand sangguniang kabataan officials.8

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No.4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner fromrunning as substitute candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation ofrespondent; and to proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,Pangasinan.

Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing that since the barangay election isnon-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed. Moreover, petitioner did not file any certificateof candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely,respondent Placido.9

Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment. It contends that its Resolution No. 4801 wasissued not pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but as an incident of its inherent administrativefunctions over the conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore, the same may not be the subject ofreview in a petition for certiorari. Further, the COMELEC alleges that it did not commit grave abuse ofdiscretion in denying due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy and in proclaiming respondentconsidering that he was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas. 10

We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent got only 290votes. Respondents did not deny this in their respective Comments.

In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popularvote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will ofthe electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereignpower of the people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of validvotes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those whoreceive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms ofgovernment the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declaredcarried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.11

Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed in barangay

elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after thelast day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered oraccredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a personbelonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy toreplace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidatenominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the officeaffected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If thedeath, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election andmid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in


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the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted bythe entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be nosubstitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute. Such aninterpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of election laws which is to giveeffect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.12 It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear andunmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so

construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.13

Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution ofcandidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such arestrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there ismore reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than whenpolitical considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioners favor can not be counted becauseshe did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the only candidate for BarangayChairman. His claim is refuted by the Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the

assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that petitioners letter-request to beallowed to run as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as acertificate of candidacy.14

To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of thetrue will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end thatthe will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technicalobjections.15

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if

they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice oftheir elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder inany way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correctascertainment of the results.16

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed ResolutionNo. 5217 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it denied due course to petitioners certificate ofcandidacy, is declared NULL and VOID. The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido asBarangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE, and the Board ofCanvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected BarangayChairman thereof.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 142907 November 29, 2000

JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS, petitioner,vs.HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OFTHE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CALOOCAN CITY (BRANCH 125) and ANTONIO M.

SERAPIO, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case before the Court is an original special civil action for certiorari and prohibition withpreliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to annul the decision of the RegionalTrial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 125, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the proclamation of the Protestee, Jose Emmanuel

Carlos, by the Board of Canvassers is accordingly SET ASIDE.

"The Court hereby FINDS the Protestant, ANTONIO SERAPIO, as the DULY ELECTEDMAYOR OF VALENZUELA CITY.

"SO ORDERED."1

The Facts

Petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos and respondent Antonio M. Serapio were candidates for theposition of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during

the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers, Valenzuela, Metro Manila proclaimedpetitioner as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having obtained 102,688 votes, the highestnumber of votes in the election returns.

On June 1, 1998, respondent Antonio M. Serapio who obtained 77,270 votes, the second highestnumber of votes, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, an election protestchallenging the results. Due to the inhibition of all judges of the Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela,the case was ultimately assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 125, presidedover by respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.

On June 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the trial court an answer with affirmative defenses and motionto dismiss. The court denied the motion to dismiss by order dated January 14, 1999. Petitionerelevated the order to the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on petition for certiorari andprohibition,2 which, however, has remained unresolved up to this moment.

In the course of the protest, the municipal treasurer of Valenzuela, who by law has custody of theballot boxes, collected the ballot boxes and delivered them to the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City.The trial court conducted a pre-trial conference of the parties but it did not produce a substantialresult as the parties merely paid superficial service and only agreed on the following:


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1. Both parties admit their capacity to sue and be sued;

2. Both parties admit that the protestant was a candidate during the May 11, 1998 election;

3. Both parties admit that the protestee has been proclaimed as the elected mayor ofValenzuela, Metro Manila, on May 21, 1998;

4. Both parties admit that the protestee allegedly obtained 102,688 votes while the protestant

obtained 77,270 votes per canvass of election returns of the Board of Canvassers.

The pre-trial was then concluded and the parties agreed to the creation of seven (7) revisioncommittees consisting of a chairman designated by the court and two members representing theprotestant and the protestee.

Meantime, on May 12, 1999, petitioner filed a consolidated motion that included a prayer for authorityto photocopy all the official copies of the revision reports in the custody of the trial court. However, thetrial court denied the issuance of such authorization.3 The court likewise denied a motion forreconsideration of the denial.4Then petitioner raised the denial to the COMELEC on petition forcertiorari and mandamus,5 which also remains unresolved until this date.

The Revision Results

The revision of the ballots showed the following results:

(1) Per physical count of the ballots:

(a) protestant Serapio - 76,246 votes.

(b) protestee Carlos - 103,551 votes.

(2) Per revision, the court invalidated 9,697 votes of the protestant but validated 53 stray votesin his favor.

The court invalidated 19,975 votes of the protestee and validated 33 stray votes in his favor.

The final tally showed:

(a) protestant Serapio - 66,602 votes.

(b) protestee Carlos - 83,609 votes, giving the latter a winning margin of 17,007 votes.

The Trial Court's Ruling

Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its findingof "significant badges of fraud," namely:

1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the court did not fit into the padlocks of theballot boxes that had to be forcibly opened;

2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any ballot and two (2) ballot boxes out of the seven(7) ballot boxes did not contain any election returns;


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3. Some schools where various precincts were located experienced brownouts during thecounting of votes causing delay in the counting although there was no undue commotion orviolence that occurred;

4. Some of the assigned watchers of protestant were not in their posts during the counting ofvotes.

On the basis of the foregoing badges of fraud, the trial court declared that there was enough pattern

of fraud in the conduct of the election for mayor in Valenzuela. The court held that the fraud wasattributable to the protestee who had control over the election paraphernalia and the basic services inthe community such as the supply of electricity.

On April 24, 2000, the trial court rendered a judgment ruling that the perpetuation of fraud hadundoubtedly suppressed the true will of the electorate of Valenzuela and substituted it with the will ofthe protestee. Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes in favor of the protestee, the trial court setaside the proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by the Municipal Board of Canvassersand declared protestant Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.6

Hearing news that the protestant had won the election protest, the protestee secured a copy of the

decision from the trial court on May 4, 2000. On the other hand, notice of the decision was receivedby the protestant on May 03, 2000.

On May 4, 2000, protestant filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal.7 On May4, 2000, the trial court gave protestee five (5) days within which to submit his comment or oppositionto the motion.8

Petitioner's Appeal to Comelec

Meantime, on May 04, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court tothe Commission on Elections.9

The Petition at bar

On May 8, 2000, petitioner filed the present recourse.10

Petitioner raised the following legal basis:

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to entertain special civil actions of certiorari andprohibition;

(2) There are important reasons and compelling circumstances which justify petitioner's direct

recourse to the Supreme Court;

(3) Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she declared respondentSerapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela despite the fact that she found that petitionerobtained 17,007 valid votes higher than the valid votes of respondent Serapio;

(4) The assailed decision is contrary to law, based on speculations and not supported by theevidence as shown in the decision itself.11

The Issues


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The issues raised are the following:

1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by petition for certiorari as a specialcivil action, the decision of the regional trial court in an election protest case involving anelective municipal official considering that it has no appellate jurisdiction over such decision.

2. Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when thecourt set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared respondent Serapio as the duly

elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite its finding that petitioner garnered 83,609 valid voteswhile respondent obtained 66,602 valid votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes.

TRO Issued

On May 8, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order ordering respondent court to cease anddesist from further taking cognizance of Election Protest No. 14-V-98 more specifically from takingcognizance of and acting on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by respondent Serapio onMay 4, 2000.12

Respondent's Position

On May 15, 2000, respondent Serapio filed his comment with omnibus motion to lift the temporaryrestraining order and to declare petitioner in contempt of court for violating the rule against forumshopping.13 He submitted that Comelec and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the presentpetition for certiorari assailing the decision dated April 24, 2000 of the regional trial court. Assumingthat this Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction and applying the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, the Comelec has jurisdiction since petitioner has perfected his appeal therewith beforethe filing of the instant petition. Certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal; the present petition isviolative of Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum-shopping; issues raised are factual, not correctibleby certiorari; and that the temporary restraining order should be lifted, the petition dismissed, andpetitioner and counsel should be made to explain why they should not be punished for contempt of

court.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition impressed with merit.14

I. The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibitionand mandamus against the decision of the regional trial court in the election protest casebefore it, regardless of whether it has appellate jurisdiction over such decision.

Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

"(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls, andover petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeascorpus."

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that:


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"SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial orquasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or anyplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may filea verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgmentbe rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, andgranting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolutionsubject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and asworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule46."

By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election (Comelec) has appellate jurisdiction over electionprotest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of general jurisdiction, asprovided for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

"(1) x x x.

"(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returnsand qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdictionover all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general

jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction."

In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition andmandamus involving election cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.15 This point has been settled inthe case ofRelampagos vs. Cumba,16 where we held:

"In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling inthe Garciaand Uyand Veloria cases. We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1,Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, theCOMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." (Emphasis ours).

Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (regional trialcourts) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes

jurisdiction firstshall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.17

Ergo, this Court has jurisdiction over the present petition of certiorari as a special civil actionexpressly conferred on it and provided for in the Constitution.

Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same would not bar the presentaction as an exception to the rule because under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy


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and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.18 The exception is sparingly allowedin situationswhere the abuse of discretion is not only grave and whimsicalbut alsopalpable andpatent, andthe invalidityof the assailed actis shown on its face.

II. Certiorari lies. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction. Its decision is void.

The next question that arises is whether certiorari lies because the trial court committed a grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deciding the way it did ElectionProtest Case No. 14-V-98, declaring respondent Serapio as the duly "elected" mayor of Valenzuela,Metro Manila.

In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popularvote"19through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the willof the electorate.20"An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereignpower of the people."21"Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer tothe conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and thecasting and counting of votes."22 The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or pluralityof valid votes cast in the election.23 "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by

those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republicanforms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can bedeclared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in theelection."24 In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides theelection protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall beproclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified,the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, can not be declaredelected.25 "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiatedloser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person whohas obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number ofvotes to be declared elected."26 In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to

the office."27

"Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not beallowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate inthe choice of their elective officials. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed tothe end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by meretechnical objections. In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all meanswithin its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court frownsupon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free andintelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results."28

In this case, based on the revision of ballots, the trial court found that:

First, by canvass of the Municipal Board of Canvassers the results were:

Carlos - 102,668 votes

Serapio - 77,270 votes, or a winning margin of 25,418 votes

Ramon Ignacio - 20 votes.


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and consequently, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner Carlos the duly elected mayor ofValenzuela, Metro Manila.

Second, by physical count of the ballots, the results were:


Serapio - 76,246 votes, or a winning margin of 27,305 votes.

Third, by revision of the ballots, the trial court found in a final tally that the "valid" votes obtained bythe candidates were as follows:


Serapio - 66,602 votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes.

Consequently, the final tally clearly showed petitioner Carlos as the overwhelming winner in the May11, 1998 elections.

However, the trial court set aside the final tally of votes because of what the trial court perceived to be"significant badges of fraud" attributable to the protestee.29 These are:

First: The failure of the keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the trial court to fit the padlocks onthe ballot boxes that compelled the court to forcibly open the padlocks. The trial court concluded thatthe real keys were lost or the padlocks substituted pointing to possible tampering of the contents ofthe ballot boxes.

Procedurally, the keys to the ballot boxes were turned over by the Board of Election Inspectors fromthe precinct level to the Municipal Board of Canvassers and finally to the municipal treasurer forsafekeeping. The three-level turn-over of the keys will not prevent the possibility of these keys being

mixed up. This is an ordinary occurrence during elections. The mere inability of the keys to fit into thepadlocks attached to the ballot boxes does not affect the integrity of the ballots. At any rate, the trialcourt easily forced open the padlocks and found valid votes cast therein;

Second: Seven (7) ballot boxes were found empty. Thus, the trial court concluded that there were"missing ballots" and "missing election returns." This is pure speculation without factual basis. "Thesea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." 30 Onthe other hand, the Summary of Votes as revised does not show any unaccountedprecinct orwhether there was any precinct without any ballot or election returns. It is a standard procedure of theCommission on Elections (Comelec) to provide extra empty ballot boxes for the use of the Board ofElection Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers, in case of necessity.

The empty ballot boxes found could be the empty reserve ballot boxes that were not used by theBoard of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers since there was neither proof nor even aclaim of missing ballots or missing election returns.

Third: Some schoolhouses experienced brownout during the counting of votes. There was nothingextraordinary that would invite serious doubts or suspicion that fraud was committed during thebrownout that occurred. Indeed, one witness stated that it was the first time that he observedbrownout in Dalandanan Elementary School and another stated that the brownout was localized inColoong Elementary School. Since counting of votes lasted until midnight, the brownouts had caused


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only slight delay in the canvassing of votes because the election officials availed themselves ofcandles, flashlights and emergency lights. There were no reports of cheating or tampering of theelection returns. In fact, witnesses testified that the counting of votes proceeded smoothly and nocommotion or violence occurred. So, the brownouts had no effect on the integrity of the canvass.

Fourth: The absence of watchers for candidate Serapio from their posts during the counting of votes.This cannot be taken against candidate Carlos since it is the candidate's own look-out to protect hisinterest during the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns. As long as notices were duly

served to the parties, the counting and canvassing of votes may validly proceed in the absence ofwatchers. Otherwise, candidates may easily delay the counting of votes or canvassing of returns bysimply not sending their watchers. There was no incomplete canvass of returns, contrary to what thetrial court declared. The evidence showed complete canvassin Valenzuela, Metro Manila.31

"We cannot allow an election protest on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the wholeelection process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing todisembank from the water."32

Assuming for the nonce that the trial court was correct in holding that the final tally of valid votes asper revision report may be set aside because of the "significant badges of fraud", the same would be

tantamount to a ruling that there were no valid votes cast at all for the candidates, and, thus , nowinner could be declared in the election protest case. In short, there was failure of election.

In such case, the proper remedy is an action before the Commission on Elections en bancto declarea failure of election or to annul the election.33 However, the case below was an election protest caseinvolving an elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within theexclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate regional trial court.34

Nonetheless, the annulment of an election on the ground of fraud, irregularities and violations ofelection laws may be raised as an incident to an election contest. Such grounds for annulment of anelection may be invoked in an election protest case. However, an election must not be nullified and

the voters disenfranchised whenever it is possible to determine a winner on the basis of valid votescast, and discard the illegally cast ballots. In this case, the petitioner admittedly received 17,007 validvotes more than the protestee, and therefore the nullification of the election would not lie. The powerto nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise thevoters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure.35

As heretofore stated, in this jurisdiction, elections are won on the basis of a majority or plurality ofvotes cast and received by the candidates. "The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoralmandate, not perceived entitlement to the office."36

More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.37

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that:

"Sec. 6. Failure of Election.If, on account offorce majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or otheranalogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or hadbeen suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the votingand during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody ofcanvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failureor suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commissionshall, on thebasis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for theholding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to


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elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or whichresulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause ofsuch postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect." (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, RA 7166 provides that:

"Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections".-- The postponement,declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6

and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by amajority vote of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occurbefore or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)

It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en bancthat is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare afailure of election.38

"In a petition to annul an election under Section 6, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two conditions must beaverred in order to support a sufficient cause of action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect morethan 50% of the votescast and (2) the good votes can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is onlywhen these two conditions are established that the annulment of the election can be justified because

the remaining votes do not constitute a valid constituency."39

We have held that: "To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must occur: first, no voting hastaken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, theelection nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect theresult of the election."40 Neither of these conditions was present in the case at bar.

More recently, we clarified that, "Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code,there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a)the election in any polling place has not been heldon the date fixed on account offorce majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been

suspendedbefore the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during thepreparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, suchelection results in a failure to electon account offorce majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or otheranalogous causes."41

Thus, the trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by disregarding andsetting aside the results of the election. Nonetheless, as herein-above stated, the trial court erred tothe extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because the grounds for failure of election were notsignificant and even non-existent. More importantly, the commission of fraud can not be attributed tothe protestee. There was no evidence on record that protestee had a hand in any of the irregularities

that protestant averred. It is wrong for the trial court to state that the protestee had control over the"election paraphernalia" or over electric services. The Commission on Elections has control overelection paraphernalia, through its officials and deputies.42 The Comelec can deputize with theconcurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the government,including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,honest, peaceful, and credible elections.43 On the other hand, electric utility services in Metro Manila,including Valenzuela are under the control of its franchise holder, particularly the Manila ElectricCompany, a public service company, certainly not owned or controlled by the protestee. In fact,during election period, Comelec has control over such utilities as electric and even telephoneservice.44 What is important, however, is that the voters of Valenzuela were able to cast their votes


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freely and fairly. And in the election protest case, the trial court was able to recount and determine thevalid votes cast.

Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that power islimited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections.45 The result is a failure ofelection for that particular office. In such case, the court can not declare a winner.46 A permanentvacancy is thus created. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as providedby law.47

We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor ofValenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela,even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor. In fact, without a single vote in his favor asthe trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the decision is not supported by the highest number ofvalid votes cast in his favor. This violated the right to due process of law of petitioner who was notheard on the issue of failure of election, an issue that was not raised by the protestant. "A decision isvoid for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard." 48 Thetrial court can not decide the election protest case outside the issues raised. If it does, as in this case,the trial court is ousted of its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is a basic principle that a decision with absolutely

nothing to support it is void.49 "A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directlyor collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or byresisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked."50Here, the trial court indulgedin speculations on its view of the voice of the people, and decided the case disregarding theevidence, but on its own intuition, ipse dixit.51 How was this voice communicated to the trial court?Certainly not by competent evidence adduced before the court as it should be, but by extra-sensoryperception. This is invalid in law. Contrary to its own finding that petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votesagainst 66,602 valid votes for the respondent as second placer, or a plurality of 17,007 votes, the trialcourt declared the second placer as the winner. This is a blatant abuse of judicial discretion by anyaccount. It is a raw exercise of judicial function in an arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting toevasion of the positive duty to act in accord with law. 52

In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not merely reversible error,but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the publicrespondent Judge. "By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must begrave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner byreason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to anevasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law."53 We must emphasize that election to office is determined by the highestnumber of votes obtained by a candidate in the election.

The Judgment

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTSthe petition. The Court ANNULS and DECLARES VOIDthedecision dated April 24, 2000 of the trial court in Election Protest Case No. V-14-98.

The temporary restraining order we issued on May 8, 2000, is made permanent.

Let Election Protest Case No. V-14-98 be remanded to the trial court for decision within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice of this decision. The judge shall report to this Courton the decision rendered within five (5) days from rendition submitting a copy thereof to the Office ofthe Clerk of Court en banc.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn53http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_142907_2000.html#_edn53


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This decision is immediately executory.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 106291 February 9, 1993

ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINANand EMILIANO MICU respondents.

Constante P. Pimentel and Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and Pimentel. Apostol. Layosa and Sibayan LawOffices for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a special civil action forcertiorariunder Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, in

relation to Section 1, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,to set aside the 29 July 1992 Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) en bancwithout prior notice and hearing in connection with Special Cases SPC. No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384.

The challenged resolution annulled the proclamation of the petitioner as the second winningcandidate for theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its SixthLegislative District, in the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are:

4.1. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, ("ANNEX A", supra) OF JULY 29, 1992 IS ULTRAVIRESAND VOIDAB INITIO BECAUSE IT WAS ISSUED EX-PARTE, WITHOUTNOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED THE PETITIONER TO BE HEARD ANDTHEREFORE VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS;

4.2. THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATESTHE COMMISSION'S OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE; AND FINALLY;

4.3. THE UNCONTESTED COCS LONG COMPLETED, FINAL AND ALREADY USEDFOR THE PROCLAMATION OF OTHER PROVINCIAL CANDIDATES, CANNOT BECORRECTED THRU A MERE PETITION, TWENTY-ONE DAYS THEREAFTER, BUT

MAY BE A PROPER SUBJECT OF A REGULAR ELECTION PROTEST. 1

In the Resolution of 11 August 1992, 2this court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)directing the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing its 29 July 1992 Resolutionand requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. After the filing of separate comments bythe private and public respondents and the consolidated reply thereto by the petitioner, this Courtgave due course to the petition, considered the separate comments of the public and privaterespondents as their answers thereto and declared the case submitted for decision.

The pleadings disclose the following uncontroverted facts:


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Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of 11May 1992 for the two (2) seats in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinanallotted to its Sixth Legislative District under COMELEC Resolution No. 2379 in relation to Section 3of R.A. No. 7166. 3

Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.

During the canvassing, on 21 May 1992, by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of the

Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for these ten (10) municipalities, private respondent objected to theinclusion of the COC for San Quintin. This was the only COC that was contested. Accordingly, theCOCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. The PBC thereafteroverruled the objection, prompting the private respondent to appeal the ruling to the COMELEC,which docketed the same as SPC No. 92-208. On 6 June 1992, the COMELEC en bancpromulgatedtherein a resolution which reads:

Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling ofthe Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, theCommission en banctabulated the votes obtained by candidates Emiliano S. Micu andAtty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the

province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by precinctsubmitted by the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of saidexamination, the Commission rules, as follows:

1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bincein the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereaspetitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for thesame municipality.

Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan isdirected to CREDIT in favor of petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535

votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the municipality of SanQuintin, Pangasinan. 4

On 11 June 1992 or twenty-one days (21) days after the canvass of COCs for the nine (9)municipalities was completed private respondent and the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBCs)of Tayug and San Manuel simultaneously filed with the PBC petitions for the correction of theStatements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alleged manifest errors committed in the "addition"therein. 5

On 18 June 1992, acting on the motion of the petitioner to implement the aforesaid 6 June 1992Resolution, which was claimed to have become final, the PBC credited in favor of the petitioner and

private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said resolution. As of that date, on the basisof the COCs for San Quintin and nine (9) other municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 voteswhile the private respondents had 27,369 votes. Petitioner thus led the private respondent by amargin of one (1) vote. This notwithstanding, petitioner was not proclaimed winner because of theabsence of authority from the COMELEC.

Accordingly, petitioner filed in SPC No. 92-208 a formal motion for such authority. It was, however,only on 29 June 1992 that the COMELEC en bancpromulgated a Supplemental Order directing thePBC "to reconvene, continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for theSangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other candidates for provincialoffices who have not been proclaimed as of this date." 6


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Meanwhile, on 24 June 1992, the PBC now headed by Director Felimon Asperin of the COMELECwho was designated to replace one Atty. Obsequio who had earlier returned to his station inZamboanga City acting on the aforementioned petitions for correction of the SOV's of Tayug andSan Manuel heard the testimonies of Nelly Valera and Bonita Vidal, Election Registrars andChairpersons of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, respectively, and ofDr. Corazon Lagmay, Member of the MBC of Tayug, despite the objections of the petitioner who alsoasked, on grounds of bias and partiality, for the disqualification of Atty. Asperin. Valera and Lagmayboth testified that the total number of votes for the petitioner in Tayug should be 2,415 instead of the

2,486 reflected in the Statement of Votes. On the other hand, Bonita Vidal testified that the totalnumber of votes for the petitioner in San Manuel should be 2,179 instead of the 2,185 reported in theStatement of Votes, while that of the private respondent should be 2,888 instead of the 2,892 alsostated in the said SOVs. It then ruled "to allow the Municipal Board of Canvassers of themunicipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan, to correct the Statement of Votes andCertificates of Canvass." 7Petitioner seasonably appealed this ruling to the COMELEC whichdocketed the appeal as SPC No. 92-384.

On 1 July 1992, Atty. Asperin prepared and submitted in SPC No. 92-384 (erroneously denominatedby him as 92-3894) a "Report on the Appeal From The Ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassing(sic) of Pangasinan" 8stating therein that "the Board found the petitions for corrections meritorious and

ruled to allow the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel to correct their respective Statement of Votes and,subsequently, their Certificates of Canvass with respect to the votes" of the petitioner and privaterespondents. 9The report also discloses that on that same date, the herein private respondent filedwith the PBC a Motion To Continue Canvass and To Proclaim Winner. 10

On 4 July 1992, the PBC reconvened and voted to refer the matter of whom to proclaim to theCOMELEC. 11The petition for that purpose was filed by Atty. Asperin, who represented to theCommission that "as per Order of the same Board there were corrections already made in a separatesheet of paper of the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel,Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation,candidate (sic) Emiliano Micu will win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be

considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote."12

On 9 July 1992, the COMELEC en banc, describing the proceeding as "(Connected with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 384)," and without assigning a specific docket number therefor, promulgated aresolution 13 the dispositive portion of which reads:

. . . RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DIRECT the Provincial Board ofCanvassers of Pangasinan, as follows:

(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificate of Votes,as corrected, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the

6th District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6thDistrict of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates ofCanvass, aforesaid, in accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on canvassingand proclamation. 14

It is to be noted that the purported corrections in the SOVs and COCs are not actually incorporated inany of these documents; they appear on separate sheets of paper and were signed merely by theElection Registrar/Chairman of the MBC concerned. Thus, the document pertaining to theMunicipality of Tayug reads:


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CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERROR IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES ANDCERTIFICATE OF CANVASS.

Total votes of Candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. in the Certificate of Canvass and in theStatement of Votes of Tayug, Pangasinan 2,486

Total votes of Candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. as corrected 2,415

CERTIFIEDCORRECT:July 6, 1992

(SGD)(TYP) NELLY M. VALERAElection Registrar andChairman of the MunicipalBoard of Canvassers Tayug,Pangasinan

15

while that for the Municipality of San Manuel reads:

CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERROR IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES ANDCERTIFICATE OF CANVASS.

Votes of Alfonso Bince, Jr. as it appears in the Statement of Votes (page 3) 427(sub-total); Corrected sub-total 421.

Votes of Emiliano Micu as it appears in the Statement of Votes (page 3) 669 (sub-total);

Corrected sub-total 665.

Total votes of Candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. as it appears in the Certificate of Canvass2,185; Corrected total 2,179

Total votes of Candidate Emiliano Micu as it appears in the Certificate of Canvass2,892; Corrected total 2,888

6 July 1992

CERTIFIED TRUE AND

CORRECT:

(SGD) BONITA C. VIDAL(TYP) ELECTION REGISTRAR IICHAIRMAN, MUN. BOARD OFCANVASSERSSAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN

16


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On 21 July 1992, the PBC, with Atty. Asperin dissenting, promulgated a resolution 17 proclaimingherein petitioner as the second duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of theProvince of Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District, with a lead of one (1) vote over theprivate respondent. It maintained that the completed and corrected COCs mentioned in the 9 July1992 Resolution refer to the COCs of the nine (9) municipalities the canvass of which was completedon 21 May 1992, and the corrected COC of San Quintin duly accomplished pursuant to the resolutionof respondent COMELEC of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-208. It was also of the opinion that nocorrection should be made on the COCs of Tayug and San Manuel after the completion and finality of

their canvass.

Consequently, petitioner took his oath of office before Governor Aguedo F. Agbayani on 21 July1992 18and thereafter, assumed office.

Private respondent then filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Motion For Contempt and to AnnulProclamation alleging therein that the act of the majority of the PBC in proclaiming the petitioner was"an utter defiance, disregard and disobedience to a lawful order of" the COMELEC. 19 The orderreferred to is the 9 July 1992 Resolution earlier adverted to. He then prayed that (a) the two (2) PBCmembers who voted for the proclamation of the petitioner be punished for contempt for defying anddisobeying the said resolution, (b) the proclamation of the petitioner be annulled for being void ab

initio and (c) he, the herein private respondent, be proclaimed instead as the second winningcandidate for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its SixthLegislative district.

No copy of this motion was furnished to the petitioner. Neither did the respondent COMELEC set thesame for hearing. 20

On 29 July 1992, the respondent COMELEC en banc, by the affirmative vote of the Chairman and six(6) Members with Commissioner Dario C. Rama voting "to require candidate Bince and therespondent Provincial Board of Canvassers to commenton the motion to annulproclamation" promulgated a resolution 21 under no specific docket number but merely indicating the same as:

(Connected with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384).

The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

. . . the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:

1. To DIRECT Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina,vice-chairman and secretary, respectively, of the Provincial Board ofCanvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not bedeclared in contempt for defying and disobeying the Resolution of this

Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to RECONVENEimmediately and complete the canvass of the Certificate of Votes ascorrected, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of the Municipalitiescomprising the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winningcandidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District (sic) of Pangasinan, on thebasis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid,instead they excluded (sic) the corrected Certificates of Canvass of theMunicipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;


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2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said ProvincialBoard of Canvassers (dissented by (sic) Chairman Felimon Asperin), ofcandidate Alfonso Bince;

3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconveneimmediately and proclaim the winning candidate for the second position ofthe Provincial Board; 6th District of Pangasinan; on the basis of thecompleted and corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the

Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th Districtof Pangasinan, in accordance with law. 22

This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition.

It appears that on 13 August 1992, or after the respondent COMELEC received a copy of the TROissued by this Court on 11 August 1992, the PBC, with Vice-Chairman Jose Antonio Guillermodissenting, promulgated a resolution, allegedly pursuant to the aforesaid 29 July 1992 Resolution,proclaiming the private respondent as the second winning candidate for the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District. 23

We find merit in this petition and accordingly rule for the petitioner.

Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling thepetitioner's proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter ofdue process. Moreover, there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities ofTayug and San Manuel to warrant the annulment of the petitioner's proclamation.

1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position as thesecond elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its SixthLegislative District. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity. The ruling ofthe majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992

Resolution of respondent COMELEC does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug andSan Manuel; since, as of that time, the only corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin,which was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for rulingthe way it did. The 9 July 1992 Resolution 24merely directed it:

(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates ofVotes, as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalitiescomprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6thDistrict of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and correctedCertificates of

Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on canvassingand proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)

The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCscould only refer to the nine (9) COCs for the nine municipalities, the canvass for which wascompleted on 21 May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolutionis vague and ambiguous.

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office isnot propertyunder Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, 25and one cannot acquire avested right to public office, 26it is, nevertheless, a protected right. 27Due process in proceedings


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"corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of sheets of paper signed by therespective Election Registrars of Tayug 34and San Manuel. 35These are not valid correctionsbecause the Election Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for theirrespective Boards. Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A]majority vote of all the members of the board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision."That majority means at least two (2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board. 36As to why theElection Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were the only ones who prepared the so-calledcorrection sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the other members of the Boards were no

longer available. Since they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been easilysummoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect the corrections on the Statements of Votes andCertificates of Canvass.

Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered asthe correctedSOVs and COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvasscould only be accomplished either by inserting the authorized corrections into the SOV and COCwhich were originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by preparing a new SOV and COCincorporating therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolutionof the respondent COMELEC referring to "the corrected Certificates of Canvass of the MunicipalBoards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel," 37is palpably unfounded. The Commission could

have been misled by Atty. Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already made in separatesheets of paper of the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel,Pangasinan," 38in his petition asking the COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed. However, if itonly took the trouble to carefully examine what was held out to be as the corrected documents,respondent COMELEC should not have been misled.

Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets if paper constitute sufficientcorrections, they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars preparedthem on 6 July 1992 respondent COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPCNo. 92-384) from the 24 June 1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections. Petitioner maintainsthat until now, his appeal has not been resolved. The public respondent, on the other hand, through

the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had been:

. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmedrespondents (sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayugand 2,179 in San Manuel (see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition). 39

On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:

This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewisedeemed affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra andComelec en bancResolution No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992; 40

If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July1992 that SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were stillprematurely prepared. In any event, the COMELEC could not have validly ruled on such appeal in its29 July 1992 Resolution because the same was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion ForContempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the private respondent. Furthermore, before theresolution of SPC No. 92-384 on the above-mentioned date, no hearing was set or conducted toresolve the pending motion. Therefore, on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution, even if itwas meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been issued in gross violation of therequirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, inrelation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules and


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Procedure, and for having been resolved by the COMELEC en bancat the first instance. The caseshould have been referred first to a division pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987Constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections. 41Moreover, the COMELEC'sclaim that the questioned resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally baseless.The PBC did not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers ofTayug and San Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said MBCs did notconvene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who signed the sheets of paperpurporting to be corrections.

For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, privaterespondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, andthe consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of voted,must necessarily fail.

The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent of 13 August 1992 by theProvincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.

Wherefore, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondentCommission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of private respondent on 13 August

1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan,representing its Sixth Legislative District, are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE and respondentCommission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending incidents comformably with theforegoing disquisitions and pronouncements.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998

MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and setaside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPANo. 95-213 1 dismissing the petition for disqualification against private respondent Ferdinand B.Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended byCOMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of theCOMELEC En Bancaffirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.

Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality ofIguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad,then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.

On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint 2 for disqualification againstTrinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation ofSec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995,Sunga filed another letter-complaint 3 with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation ofSec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of theOmnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint.

This was followed by an Amended Petition 4 for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two(2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violationscommitted by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, 5 the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to itsLaw Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove hisaccusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, whileSunga trailed second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However,notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to fileanother motion to suspend the effectsof the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by theCOMELEC 2nd Division.

On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report 6 to the COMELEC EnBancrecommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions ofthe Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats,intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any equipmentvehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise


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recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly electedMayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga totake his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.

The COMELEC En Bancapproved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of thecorresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4)informations 7 for various elections offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division

for hearing.

On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul theProclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding in itsResolution No. 2050 that

1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of thegrounds specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directlywith the Commission before an election in which respondent is a candidate, shall be inquiredinto by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in

fact been committed . . . .

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motupropio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of theCommission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct apreliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the electionlaws . . . .

2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relationto Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has alreadybeen proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the

complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of thisCommission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondentcandidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However,the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, beforeproclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the correspondinginformation has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petitionfor suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminalcase is pending and said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence ofguilt is strong.

As interpreted in the case ofSilvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides forthe outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification casewas filed before the election but remains unresolved until after the election; (2) Thedisqualification case was filed after the election and before the proclamation of winners; and(3) The disqualification case was filed after election and after proclamation.

If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the letter-complaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it isdeemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11 May 1995, it was clearly


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filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of thedisqualification case.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed theinstant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing thepetition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve thedisqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and the proclamation and assumptionof office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; secondCOMELEC Resolution

No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELECauthorized the filing of four (4) informations against private respondent for violation of the penalprovisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence todisqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was adisqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the dulyelected mayor.

In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General concurredwith petitioner's arguments.

Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sunga's letters-complaint of 22 April

1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was paid by Sunga;the letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC; and, no summons was ever issued bythe COMELEC and private respondent was not required to answer the letters-complaint. It was onlyon 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-calledAmended Petition, docketed for the first time asSPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having beenfiled only after the 8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995,pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.

COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 andthe Silvestre v. Duavit8ruling in support of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The COMELECinsisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was warranted under any of the following

circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election but was still pending(unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before theproclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the election and after theproclamation of the winner.

The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when itdismissed the disqualification case against private respondent Trinidad.

The petition is partly meritorious.

We find private respondent's arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint puerile. COMELEC

itself impliedly recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8 May 1995 electionin the form of letters-complaint, thus

This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form ofletter from petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaignand praying for the latter's immediate disqualification. Another letter dated 7 May 1995 andaddressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II reiterated petitioner's prayer whilealleging that respondent and his men committed acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban.Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the Clerk of Court of theCommission containing substantially the same allegations as the previous letters butsupported by affidavits and other documentary evidence.


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That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of noconsequence. It was merely a reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against private respondenton 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections. Consequently, the Amended Petitionretroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplements and amplifies factsoriginally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and isnot barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. 9

The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part of

petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, "If the fees abovedescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid andmay dismiss the action or proceeding." The use of the word "may" indicates that it is permissive onlyand operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in caseof non-payment of legal fees. That the COMELEC acted on and did not dismiss the petition outrightshows that the non-payment of fees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining thesame. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been cured by the subsequent payment ofdocket fees, and private respondent was served with summons, albeit belatedly, and he submitted hisanswer to the complaint. Hence, private respondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee waspaid, no summons served upon him, or that he was not required to answer.

Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in COMELECResolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filedbefore the election but which remained unresolved after the election. What the Resolution mandatesin such a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for investigation todetermine whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to bedisqualified. The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erringcandidate. This is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No.2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners andthat filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by thesame Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.

Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavitinfringes on Sec. 6 of RA No.6646, 10which provides:

Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by finaljudgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not becounted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election tobe disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or

protestand, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendencythereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence ofhis guilt is strong (emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of thedisqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall"signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which mustbe enforced. 11 The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with thedisqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of thedisqualification case which remains unresolved after the election,Silvestre v. Duavitin effect disallowswhat RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judiciallegislation by the COMELECwhich cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of itsauthority. Interpretative rulings ofquasi-judicialbodies or administrative agencies must always be inperfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions


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into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itselfcannot be limited. Indeed, aquasi-judicialbody or an administrative agency for that matter cannotamend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and aninterpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty ofelection offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of thedisqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason

caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by thecandidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delayingtactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not bedecided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the mainintent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divestthe COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide thedisqualification case. InAguam v. COMELEC12 this Court held

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with

authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that acandidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of suchpower. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Sinceprivate respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment ofthe canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the areaallocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamationto be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and theassumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidatefrom running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.

Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that hisdisqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspectinvolves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any othercriminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure aconviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination ofwhether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrativeproceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heardsummarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which

an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.13

It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sunga's motion to suspend the proclamation ofTrinidad. The last sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares that the Commission mayorder the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought to be disqualified whenever theevidence of his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that the evidence of Trinidad's guiltwas strong as shown in the Report and Recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department

Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioner's petition against the respondent for disqualificationfor the alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,such as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation and coercion of voters, massive


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vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of witnesses and other documents.Consequently, the petitioner's evidence supporting the disqualification of respondent remainunrebutted simply because respondent has expressly waived his right to present evidence inSPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation and objection to the presentation of evidence in SPA No.95-213 dated 16 June 1995, thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known right ofrespondent TRINIDAD.

In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing of four (4)

criminal informations against Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication that there wasindeed prima facieevidence of violation of election laws.

However, Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of theMunicipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds no support inlaw and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is laterdisqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained thesecond highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for adisqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in theabsence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, ifthe votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated

as stray, void or meaningless. 14

Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the sociologicaland psychological elements behind voters' preferences. Election is the process of completeascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its u

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Election Case #1