Election Law Cases-chapter XV

8/12/2019 Election Law Cases-chapter XV

1/35

1

EN BANC

ROBERT P. GUZMAN,Petitioner

,

- versus-

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,MAYOR RANDOLPH S. TING ANDSALVACION GARCIA,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 182380

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING*,

YNARES-SANTIAGO*,

CARPIO,CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO**and

ABAD**

,JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Through certiorariunder Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, Rules of Court, the petitioner assails theFebruary 18, 2008 resolution of the Commission of Elections en banc(COMELEC),[1]dismissing his criminalcomplaint against respondents City Mayor Randolph Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion Garcia, both ofTuguegarao City, charging them with alleged violations of the prohibition against disbursing public fundsand undertaking public works, as embodied in Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of theOmnibusElection Code, during the 45-day period of the election ban by purchasing property to be converted into apublic cemetery and by issuing the treasury warrant in payment. He asserts that the COMELEC committedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in thereby exonerating City MayorTing and City Treasurer Garcia based on its finding that the acquisition of the land for use as a publiccemetery did not constitute public works covered by the ban.

Antecedents

On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Tuguegarao City passed Resolution No. 048-2004 to authorize City Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of land for use as a public cemetery of the City.Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor Ting purchased the two parcels of land, identified as Lot Nos. 5860and 5861 and located at Atulayan Sur, Tuguegarao City, with an aggregate area of 24,816 square meters(covered by Transfer Certificates of Title [TCT] No. T-36942 and TCT No. T-36943 of the Register of Deedsin Tuguegarao City), from Anselmo Almazan, Angelo Almazan and Anselmo Almazan III. As payment, City

Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum ofP8,486,027.00. On May 5, 2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the saleand the issuance of new certificates in its name ( i.e., TCT No. T-144428 and TCT No. T-144429).

Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial ElectionSupervisor of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with aviolation of Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code,for having undertaken toconstruct a public cemetery and for having released, disbursed and expended public funds within 45 days
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn1


2/35

2

prior to the May 9, 2004 election, in disregard of the prohibitions under said provisions due to the electionban period having commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9, 2004.

City Mayor Ting denied the accusations in his counter-affidavit but City Treasurer Garcia opted notto answer.

After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan recommended the dismissalof the complaint by a resolution dated December 13, 2006, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned investigator finds thatrespondents did not violate Section 261 subparagraphs (v) and (w) of the OmnibusElection Code and Sections 1 and 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 6634 and hereby

recommends the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[2]

The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation in its own resolution datedFebruary 18, 2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-14

[3] and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, holding

that the acquisition of the two parcels of land for a public cemetery was not considered as within theterm public works; and that, consequently, the issuance of Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 was not forpublic works and was thus in violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Not satisfied but without first filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner has commenced thisspecial civil action under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, Rules of Court, claiming that the COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion in thereby dismissing his criminal complaint.

Parties Positions

The petitioner contended that the COMELEC's point of view was unduly restrictive and would defeat

the very purpose of the law; that it could be deduced from the exceptions stated in Section 261 (v) ofthe Omnibus Election Code that the disbursement of public funds within the prohibited period should belimited only to the ordinary prosecution of public administration and for emergency purposes; and that any

expenditure other than such was proscribed by law.

For his part, City Mayor Ting claimed that the mere acquisition of land to be used as a publiccemetery could not be classified as public works; that there would be public works only where and whenthere was an actual physical activity being undertaken and after an order to commence work had beenissued by the owner to the contractor.

The COMELEC stated that the petition was premature because the petitioner did not first present amotion for reconsideration, as required by Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of

Procedure;[4]

and that as the primary body empowered by the Constitution to investigate and prosecutecases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses andmalpractices,[5]it assumed full discretion and control over determining whether or not probable causeexisted to warrant the prosecution in court of an alleged election offense committed by any person.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) concurred with the COMELEC to the effect that the

acquisition of the land within the election period for use as a public cemetery was not covered by the 45-day public works ban under Section 261(v) of theOmnibus Election Code; but differed from the COMELECas to the issuance of Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514, opining that there was probable cause to holdCity Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia liable for a violation of Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), ofthe Omnibus Election Code.

Issues

The issues to be resolved are:

(1) Whether or not the petition was premature;

(2) Whether or not the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 during the period of the election

ban was covered by the termpublic worksas to be in violation of Section 261 (v) ofthe Omnibus Election Code; and
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6


3/35

3

(3) Whether or not the issuance of Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during the periodof the election ban was in violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

IThe Petition Was Not Premature

The indispensable elements of a petition for certiorariare: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal,board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board or officer hasacted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no appealor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[6]

The COMELEC asserts that theplain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner wasto file a motion for reconsideration vis--vis the assailed resolution, as required in the 1993 COMELECRules of Procedure; and that his omission to do so and his immediately invoking the certiorarijurisdiction

of the Supreme Court instead rendered his petition premature.

We do not sustain the COMELEC.

As a rule, it is necessary to file a motion for reconsideration in the court of origin before invokingthe certiorarijurisdiction of a superior court. Hence, a petition for certiorariwill not be entertained unlessthe public respondent has been given first the opportunity through a motion for reconsideration to correctthe error being imputed to him.[7]

The rule is not a rigid one, however, for a prior motion for reconsideration is not necessary insome situations, including the following:

a. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quohas no jurisdiction;

b. Where the questions raised in the certiorariproceedings have been duly raised andpassed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon inthe lower court;

c. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and anyfurther delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or

the subject matter of the action is perishable;

d. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

e. Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency forrelief;

f. Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grantingof such relief by the trial court is improbable;

g. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

h. Where the proceedings were ex parteor in which the petitioner had no opportunityto object; and

i. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest isinvolved.

[8]

That the situation of the petitioner falls under the last exception is clear enough. The petitioner

challenges only the COMELECs interpretation of Section 261(v) and (w) of the Omnibus ElectionCode. Presented here is an issue purely of law, considering that all the facts to which the interpretation is
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn10


4/35

4

to be applied have already been established and become undisputed. Accordingly, he did not need to firstseek the reconsideration of the assailed resolution.

The distinctions between a question of law and a question of fact are well known. There is aquestion of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Such a

question does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants

or any of them. But there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of thealleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainlythe credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation toone another and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.

[9]

II

Acquisition of Lots 5860 And 5881During the Period of the Election Ban,

Not Considered as Public Works in Violationof Sec. 261 (v), Omnibus Election Code

The COMELEC held in its resolution dated February 18, 2008 that:

To be liable for violation of Section 261 (v), supra, four (4) essential elements mustconcur and they are:

1. A public official or employee releases, disburses, or expends any publicfunds;

2. The release, disbursement or expenditure of such funds must be withinforty-five days before regular election;

3. The release, disbursement or expenditure of said public funds is for anyand all kinds of public works; and

4. The release, disbursement or expenditure of the public funds should not

cover any exceptions of Section 261 (v). (Underscoring supplied).

Applying the foregoing as guideline, it is clear that what is prohibited by law is therelease, disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public works.

Public works is defined as fixed works (as schools, highways, docks) constructed forpublic use or enjoyment esp. when financed and owned by the government. From thisdefinition, the purchase of the lots purportedly to be utilized as cemetery by the City

Government of Tuguegarao cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as publicworks, hence it could not fall within the proscription as mandated under theaforementioned section of the Omnibus Election Code. And since the purchase of the lotsis not within the contemplation of the word public works, the third of the elements statedin the foregoing guideline is not present in this case. Hence since not all the elementsconcurred, the respondents are not liable for violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus

Election Code.

The foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC is correct.

Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Codeprovides as follows:

Section 261.Prohibited acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:x x x

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds.- Anypublic official or employee including barangayofficials and those of government-owned orcontrolled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular

election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends anypublic funds:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn13


5/35

5

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

(a) Maintenance of existing and/or completed public works project: Provided, thatnot more than the average number of laborers or employees already employed therein

during the sixth- month period immediately prior to the beginning of the forty-five day

period before election day shall be permitted to work during such time: Provided, further,That no additional laborer shall be employed for maintenance work within the said periodof forty-five days;

(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or negotiatedcontract awarded, before the forty-five day period before election:Provided, That work forthe purpose of this section undertaken under the so-called takay or paquiao systemshall not be considered as work by contract;

(c) Payment for the usual cost of preparation for working drawings, specifications,bills of materials and equipment, and all incidental expenses for wages of watchmen andother laborers employed for such work in the central office and field storehouses before

the beginning of such period:Provided, That the number of such laborers shall not be

increased over the number hired when the project or projects were commenced; and

(d) Emergency work necessitated by the occurrence of a public calamity, but suchwork shall be limited to the restoration of the damaged facility.

No payment shall be made within five days before the date of election to laborerswho have rendered services in projects or works except those falling undersubparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of this paragraph.

This prohibition shall not apply to ongoing public works projects commenced beforethe campaign period or similar projects under foreign agreements. For purposes of this

provision, it shall be the duty of the government officials or agencies concerned to reportto the Commission the list of all such projects being undertaken by them.

(2) The Ministry of Social Services and Development and any other office in otherministries of the government performing functions similar to the said ministry, except forsalaries of personnel and for such other expenses as the Commission may authorize after

due and necessary hearing. Should a calamity or disaster occur, all releases normally orusually coursed through the said ministries shall be turned over to, and administered anddisbursed by, the Philippine National Red Cross, subject to the supervision of the

Commission on Audit or its representatives, and no candidate or his or her spouse ormember of his family within the second civil degree of affinity or consanguinity shallparticipate, directly or indirectly, in the distribution of any relief or other goods to thevictims of the calamity or disaster; and

(3) The Ministry of Human Settlements and any other office in any other ministry

of the government performing functions similar to the said ministry, except for salaries ofpersonnel and for such other necessary administrative or other expenses as theCommission may authorize after due notice and hearing.

As the legal provision shows, the prohibition of the release, disbursement or expenditure of publicfunds for any and all kinds of public works depends on the following elements: (a) a public official oremployee releases, disburses or spends public funds; (b) the release, disbursement and expenditure ismade within 45 days before a regular election or 30 days before a special election; and (c) the publicfunds are intended for any and all kinds of public worksexcept the four situations enumerated inparagraph (v) of Section 261.

It is decisive to determine, therefore, whether the purchase of the lots for use as a public cemeteryconstituted public works within the context of the prohibition under the Omnibus Election Code.


6/35

6

We first construe the term public workswhich the Omnibus Election Codedoes notdefine with the aid of extrinsic sources.

The Local Government Code of 1991considers public works to be the fixed infrastructures andfacilities owned and operated by the government for public use and enjoyment. According to the Code,

cities have the responsibility of providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of

their residents and funded out of city funds, such as, among others, roads and bridges; school buildingsand other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; and clinics, health centers and otherhealth facilities necessary to carry out health services.

[10]

Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the engineering and constructionarm of the government, associates public works with fixed infrastructures for the public. In the declarationof policy pertinent to the DPWH, Sec. 1, Chapter 1, Title V, Book IV, Administrative Code of1987, states:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain an engineering andconstruction arm and continuously develop its technology, for the purposes of ensuringthe safety of all infrastructure facilities and securing for all public works and highways thehighest efficiency and the most appropriate quality in construction. The planning, design,construction and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, especially national

highways, flood control and water resources development systems, and other

public works in accordance with national development objectives , shall be theresponsibility of such an engineering and construction arm. However, the exercise of thisresponsibility shall be decentralized to the fullest extent feasible.

The enumeration in Sec. 1, suprainfrastructure facilities, especially national highways, floodcontrol and water resources development systems, and other public works in accordance with nationaldevelopment objectivesmeans that only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the public areregarded as public works. This construction conforms to the rule of ejusdemgeneris, whichProfessorBlackhas restated thuswise:

[11]

It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an

enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, suchgeneral words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as

applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specificallymentioned. But this rule must be discarded where the legislative intention is plain to thecontrary.

Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the termpublic worksasused in Section 261 (v) of theOmnibus Election Code is properly construed to refer to any building orstructure on land or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the Government for public use and paid

for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of construction or adaptation undertaken andcarried out by the national, state, or municipal authorities, designed to subserve some purpose of publicnecessity, use or convenience, such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.; or, in other words,all fixedworks constructed for public use.[12]

It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner's insistence that the acquisition

of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the public funds forpublic works in violation of Section 261(v) of theOmnibus Election Codewas unfounded andunwarranted.

IIIIssuance of the Treasury Warrant

During the Period of the Election BanViolated Section 261 (w), Omnibus Election Code

Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Codereads thus:

x x x(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public

works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.- During the period of fortyfive days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn14


7/35

7

who: (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or worksexempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrantsor any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of valuechargeable against public funds.

x x x

The OSG posits that the foregoing provision is violated in either of two ways: (a) by any personwho, within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days before a special election, undertakes theconstruction of any public works except those enumerated in the preceding paragraph; or (b) by anyperson who issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money,goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds within 45 days preceding a regular electionand 30 days before a special election.

We concur with the OSGs position.

Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act under subparagraph (a) above andthat under subparagraph (b) above. For purposes of the prohibition, the actsare separateand distinct,considering that Section 261(w) uses the disjunctive orto separatesubparagraphs (a) and (b). In legal hermeneutics, oris a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives

a choice of one among two or more things.[13]

The word signifies disassociation and independence of onething from another thing in an enumeration. It should be construed, as a rule, in the sense that it ordinarilyimplies as a disjunctive word.

[14]According to Black,

[15]too, the word andcan never be read as or, or vice

versa, in criminal and penal statutes, where the rule of strict construction prevails. Consequently, whetheror not the treasury warrant in question was intended for public works was even of no moment indetermining if the legal provision was violated.

There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the OmnibusElection Codewas violated when City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No.0001534514 during the election ban period. For this reason, our conclusion that the COMELEC enbanc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing E.O. Case No. 06-14 for lack of merit is inevitable andirrefragable.

True, the COMELEC, as the body tasked by no less than the 1987 Constitution to investigate andprosecute violations of election laws,

[16]has the full discretion to determine whether or not an election case

is to be filed against a person and, consequently, its findings as to the existence of probable cause are notsubject to review by courts. Yet, this policy of non-interference does not apply where the COMELEC, as the

prosecuting or investigating body, was acting arbitrarily and capriciously, like herein, in reaching a differentbut patently erroneous result.[17]The COMELEC was plainly guilty of grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise ofjudgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary ordespotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as toamount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law.

[18]

WHEREFORE, WE grant the petition for certiorariand set aside the resolution dated February 18,2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-14 by the Commission of Elections en banc.

The Commission on Elections is ordered to file the appropriate criminal information againstrespondents City Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion Garcia of Tuguegarao City forviolation of Section 261 (w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code.

Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn17


8/35

8

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 94521 October 28, 1991

OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner,vs.HON. COMMISSIONER HAYDEE B. YORAC OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. 94626 October 28, 1991

OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONER ON ELECTIONS and JEJOMAR C. BINAY, respondents.

Pedro Q. Quadra for petitioner.

Romulo B. Macalintal for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:p

Petitioner Oliver L. Lozano filed these two special civil actions for certiorari, namely: G.R. No. 94521 whichseeks the review of the undatedorder1of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac denying the motion for her voluntary inhibitionand/or disqualification in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs. Mayor Jejomar C.

Binay"; and G.R. No. 94626 which prays for a reversal of the en bancresolution2promulgated byrespondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on August 7, 1990 3dismissing the disqualificationpetition and criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Mayor Jejomar C. Binay in connectionwith the January 18, 1988 local elections, and its minute resolution of August 15, 1990 4denying duecourse to petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The backdrop of this case on record reveals the following antecedent facts:

1. On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections, petitioner and Bernadette Agcorpa, a

registered voter of Makati, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against then candidate formayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of municipal funds toenhance his candidacy and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa.

2. The disqualification case was assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC composed ofCommissioner Haydee B. Yorac, as presiding officer, and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and Magdara B.Dimaampao, as members.

3. The Second Division, through its Presiding Commissioner, referred the case to the Law Department ofrespondent commission for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect. On February 4, 1988, Binayfiled his counter-affidavit with said department.

4. On June 21, 1988, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the inhibition and/or disqualification ofCommissioners Yorac and Africa. This was the first of several motions for inhibition filed by petitionerbefore respondent commission. Petitioner also prayed that the disqualification petition be referred for

consideration en banc. Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for inhibition. On August 10, 1988, theCOMELEC en banc denied the prayer that the case be heard en banc,ruling that "no substantial reason


9/35

9

exists why this case should be taken en banc; and considering finally that the case is set for hearing by theSecond Division."

5. On October 26, 1988, petitioner Lozano himself filed a motion to disqualify Commissioner Yorac becauseshe postponed motu proprioa hearing set on the ground that she will study the issue of jurisdiction. Saidmotion was denied.

6. On November 3, 1988, the COMELEC en bancpromulgated Resolution No. 2050 which provides thatpetitions for disqualification filed prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections based on Section 68 of theOmnibus Election Code but not resolved before the elections shall be referred for preliminary investigationto the Law Department which shall submit its report to the Commission en banc. Pursuant to saidresolution, the Second Division on even date referred back the disqualification case against respondentBinay to the Law Department "before taking any action thereon."

7. On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed another motion praying that the disqualification case be heardand decided en banc invoking therein COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Instead of issuing a formalresolution, respondent COMELEC authorized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a member of this

Court) to reply to petitioner's counsel.

8. On May 23, 1990, the Law Department submitted its investigation report 5recommending that criminalcharges be filed against respondent Binay for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, asfollows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division)RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. To file the necessary information against Mayor Jejomar Binay before the properRegional Trial Court of the National Capital Region for violation of Section 261(a) of theOmnibus Election Code, the prosecution thereof to be handled by the Special ProsecutionCommittee;

2. To dismiss the charge against Mayor Jejomar Binay for threats and intimidation underSection 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code for lack of evidence; and

3. To dismiss the charge against Conchitina Bernardo for insufficiency of evidence.

9. On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a motion praying that the disqualification case be, resolved jointly with

the investigation report of the Law Department.

10 On July 9, 1990, petitioner filed a third motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification ofCommissioner Yorac for having issued a previous memorandum addressed to the chairman and membersof respondent commission expressing her opinion that Binay should first be convicted by the regular courtsof the offense of vote buying before he could be disqualified. The full text of said memorandum 6reads:

I submit for the Commission's consideration the matter of the procedural problems in theabove case.

The chronology of events, so far as this case is concerned, is as follows:

1. SPC No. 88-040 for the disqualification of Jejomar Binay, then candidate for Mayor ofMakati was filed on January 11, 1988. It was assigned to the second Division.

2. On July 29, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to set the case for hearing alleging that theCommission on Audit (COA) had officially confirmed the allegations of the complainants.

3. Hearings were actually conducted on August 11, September 12, October 12 andOctober 19, 1988.


10/35

10

4. On November 3, 1988, the Commission en bancadopted Resolution No. 88-2050,which, inter aliaprovides that:

1. . . .

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the

commission may motu proprio,or on motion of any of the parties, referthe complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an

instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conducta preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions ofthe election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective ofwhether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election;

xxx xxx xxx

3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigationwithin thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its

study, report and recommendation to the Commission en bancwithin

five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If itmakes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study theinformation for filing with the appropriate court.

5. On the same date, conformable with Resolution No. 88-2050, the Second Divisionreferred SPC No. 88-040 to the Law Department.

6. In the course of the investigation by the Law Department, the case became entangledwith procedural difficulties the resolution of which has been sought in the SecondDivision.

My own personal thinking on the matter is that since the preliminary investigation is thedetermination of criminal liability, with the administrative consequence of removal

imposable only as long term sanction, i.e., after final criminal conviction, the matter ofprocedure in the preliminary investigation is one that should be addressed to thecommission en bancrather than to either of its divisions.

11. On August 2, 1990, petitioner received a notice setting the promulgation of judgment en bancforAugust 6, 1990. Petitioner on August 3, 1990 filed an objection to the promulgation of judgment enbanc,allegedly because there was no showing that the case was referred to the commission en banc uponunanimous vote of all the members of the Second Division.

12. In its aforestated August 7, 1990 resolution which is herein assailed, the COMELEC en banc dismissedthe petition for disqualification and the criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Binay. Duringthe promulgation of judgment, petitioner asked that the same be suspended until after the resolution of

the legal issues raised involving constitutional and jurisdictional questions. Commissioner Yorac waslikewise requested by petitioner to decide the motion for her inhibition. In her undated order subject of thepetition in G.R. No. 94521, as stated in limine,Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for for inhibition,stating that:

During the deliberations on this case, I seriously considered inhibiting myself fromparticipating and voting despite the flimsy basis which was cited for it. But I becameconvinced, from the information that was coming in, that the motion was really part of anumbers game, being played out on the basis of information emanating from the

Commission itself as to the developments in the deliberation and the voting. Reliableinformation also shows that approaches have been made to influence the voting.

It is for this reason that I do not inhibit myself from the voting in this case consistent withmy reading of the law and the evidence.


11/35

11

13. The aforesaid resolution of August 7, 1990 dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of merit.The motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 1990,on the ground that "pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion forreconsideration of anen bancruling of the Commission is one of the prohibited pleadings, and thereforenot allowed under the Rules.

Succinctly condensed, the petition filed against respondents COMELEC and Binay raises the followingissues:

1. Contrary to the requirement under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure, SPC No. 88-040 was referred to the Comission en banc without the requiredunanimous vote of all the members of the Second Division.

2. The minute resolution of August 15, 1990 is null and void for having been issuedwithout prior notice to the parties and without fixing a date for the promulgation thereof.

3. Respondent commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amount to lack of

jurisdiction in not finding Binay guilty of vote- buying, contrary to the evidence presented

by petitioner. 7

In G.R. No. 94521, this Court issued on August 16, 1990 a temporary restraining order 8orderingrespondent Commissioner Yorac to cease and desist from participating in the deliberation and resolution of

the motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1990 filed in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, etal. vs. Jejomar Binay."The order was served in the office of Commissioner Yorac on August 17, 1990 at11:25 A.M.9 It appears, however, that the motion for reconsideration was denied by respondentcommission en bancin a resolution dated August 15, 1990, copy of which was served on petitioner onAugust 17, 1990 at 12:35 P.M. Consequently, the issue on the inhibition and disqualification ofCommissioner Yorac has been rendered moot and academic.

Granting arguendo that the petition for inhibition of Commissioner Yorac has not been mooted by theresolution en bancdismissing the main case for disqualification, petitioner's postulation that she should

have inhibited herself form hearing the main case, for allegedly having prejudged the case when sheadvanced the opinion that respondent Binay could only be disqualified after conviction by the regional trialcourt, is of exiguous validity. In the first place, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1,Rule 4 thereof, prohibits a member from, among others, sitting in a case in which he has proof. There is noshowing that the memorandum wherein Commissioner Yorac rendered her opinion was ever made publiceither by publication or dissemination of the same to the public. Furthermore, the opinion of CommissionerYorac was based on prior cases for disqualification filed with the COMELEC wherein prior conviction of the

respondent was considered a condition sine qua nonfor the filing of the disqualification case. 10Weaccordingly find no compelling reason to inhibit Commissioner Yorac from participating in the hearing anddecision of the case.

Similarly, we find the petition in G.R. No. 94626 devoid of merit. Petitioner first avers that under Section 2,Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a case pending in a division may be referred to and decided bythe Commission en banconly on a unanimous vote of all the members of the division. It is contended thatSPC No. 88-040 which was pending before the COMELEC's Second Division was referred to theCommission en bancwithout the required unanimous vote of all the division members, petitioner allegingthat Commissioner Andres R. Flores voted for the referral of the petition for disqualification to the division.It is, therefore, the submission of petitioner that the resolution of the Commission en bancdated August17, 1990 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for being unconstitutional.

The argument of petitioner is not well taken. COMELEC Resolution No. 1050 issued by the commission enbancon November 3, 1988 is the applicable law in this disqualification case. It provides:

xxx xxx xxx

RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing thedisposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election


12/35

12

Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987:

1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any ofthe grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed

directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate,

shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the actscomplained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results

in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the actscomplained (of), the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondentcandidate from continuing as such candidate.

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motuproprio,or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department ofthe Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power toconduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of theelection laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent

has been elected or has lost in the election.

2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code inrelation to Section 6 of the Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidatewho has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case.However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the LawDepartment of the Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent

candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case.However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the LawDepartment. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding ofguilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, thecomplainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with

the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order thesuspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30)

days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation tothe Commission en bancwithin five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminaryinvestigation. If it makes a prima faciefinding of guilt, it shall submit with such study theinformation for filing with the appropriate court. 11

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to petitioner's submission that said resolution has been repealed by the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure which took effect on November 15, 1988, there is nothing in the resolution which appears to beinconsistent with the procedural rules issued by the COMELEC.

Firstly, Resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of the variance in opinions of the members of

respondent commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of disqualification filed pursuant toSection 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or the ElectoralReforms Law of 1987, and the manner of disposing of the same had not been uniform. Hence, theCOMELEC decided to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of these disqualification cases. Within thispurpose in mind, the Commissionen banc adopted Resolution No. 2050. The transitory provision underSection 2, Rule 44 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that these rules shall govern all casespending at the time of effectivity thereof, except to the extent that in the opinion of the commission, or thecourt in appropriate cases, an application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event theformer procedure shall apply. We believe that Resolution No. 2050 qualifies and should be considered as

an exception to the generally retroactive effect of said rules.


13/35

13

Secondly, prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 2050, petitioner had filed several motions with theSecond Division asking for the referral of the disqualification case to the Commission en banc. After theCOMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 2050, petitioner filed another motion for the referral of the caseto the Commission en banc, specifically invoking Resolution No.2050.12 In the words of petitioner in his said motion, under the aforesaid resolution, "once the petition

for disqualification is forwarded to the Law Department, the case is deemed en bancbecause the report is

submitted En bancby the law Department." Petitioner having invoked the jurisdiction of theCommission en bancis now estopped from questioning the same after obtaining an adverse judgmenttherefrom.

Thirdly, Commissioner Andres R. Flores, who opined that the disqualification case should first be resolvedby the Second Division, has since then clarified his position after he was reminded that Resolution No.2050, which he had admittedly "completely forgotten" had "laid down a definite policy on the disposition ofdisqualification cases contemplated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 13

Lastly, Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases.The COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in general.

Hence, as between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.

Anent the propriety of the issuance of the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, sufficeit to say that the requirement of notice in the promulgation of resolutions and decisions of the COMELECembodied in Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules does not apply in the case at bar for the simple reason thata motion for reconsideration of an en bancruling, resolution, order or decision is not allowed under Section1, Rule 13 thereof.

Respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for disqualification and in holding that respondent Binay is

not guilty of vote buying, ruled as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The commission concurs with the findings of the Law Department on enumeration Nos. 2

and 3 but rejects exception to the recommendation for prosecution of respondent Binayunder No. 1 therefor, it appearing that there is a clear misappreciation of the evidencesubmitted considering the inconsistencies in the testimonies of material witnesses for thepetitioners, as well as the correct interpretation and application of the law cited as basisfor the prosecution of respondent Binay.

xxx xxx xxx

The seventeen (17) Affidavits submitted by petitioners attached to their original petitionfor disqualification dated January 11, 1988, differ form the twenty (20) affidavits attachedto the memorandum of petitioners filed with the Commission (Second Division) on August22, 1988. The records of the case do not show that these seventeen (17) affidavits

attached to the original petition were affirmed by the affiants during the investigationconducted by the Law Department of this Commission. Of the twenty (20) affidavitsappended to the Memorandum of August 22, 1988, only five (5) of the affiants were ableto affirm their testimonies before hearing officer Alioden Dalaig of the Law Department of

this Commission . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In his counter affidavit, respondent Jejomar C. Binay denied the allegations in the petition

for disqualification and interposed the defense that:

The Christmas gift-giving is an annual project of the Municipal

Government of Makati ever since the time of Mayors Estrella and Yabutin the spirit of yuletide season wherein basic and essential items aredistributed to the less fortunate and indigent residents of Makati out of


14/35

14

funds appropriated for the purpose duly budgeted and subject to auditby the Commission on Audit and same were prepared sometime onOctober 1987 long before I filed my certificate of candidacy and ceasedto be the Acting Mayor of Makati, . . .

The alleged ticket bearing my name, assuming its existence, indicates

nothing of significance except that of a Christmas and New Year greetingand is not suggestive of anything which may be considered or

interpreted to be political in nature such as indorsing my candidacy forthat matter. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

It is undisputed that at the time the supposed "gift-giving" transpired between the periodsof December 22-30, 1987, respondent Binay was no longer Mayor of the Municipality ofMakati having resigned from the position on December 2, 1987, to pursue his candidacyfor re-election to the same position. The OIC Mayor of Makati on the dates complained of,

December 22-30, 1987, was OIC Mayor Sergio S. Santos who stated in his affidavit dated

February 4, 1988, that he was Officer-in-Charge of Makati, Metro Manila, from December2, 1987 to February 2, 1988, and that as such he implemented on December 18, 1987 themunicipal government's annual and traditional distribution of Christmas gifts.

There is ample evidence to show that it was not respondent Binay who "gave" the plasticbags containing Christmas gifts to the witnesses who executed affidavits for thepetitioners. The "giver" was in fact the Municipality of Makati. And this is evidenced by thefollowing documents attached to the records of this case:

1) Certification dated January 11, 1988 issued by OIC Roberto A. Changattached as Annex A to respondent Binay's counter affidavit dated

February 5, 1988.

2) COA Report dated January 11, 1988 attached as Annex "R" to thepleading denominated as Motion to Set Hearing filed by complainantOliver Lozano dated July 26, 1988, filed in connection with SPC No. 88-040 for disqualification against respondent Binay;

The findings of the COA Report itself (dated June 21, 1988) upon which petitioners relyheavily in their disqualifications case against respondent Binay, identify the "giver" of theChristmas gifts as the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Binay. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Binay's allegation that the gift-giving was an annual project of the Municipal

Government of Makati was not denied nor disputed by the petitioners who in fact madecapital of the aforequoted findings of the Commission on Audit in their charge againstrespondent Binay for alleged misuse of public funds. Also, petitioners in their latestpleading filed with the Commission on July 2, 1990, entitled "Motion To Resolve TheDisqualification Case Jointly With The Investigation Report of the Law Department"instead of rebutting respondent Binay's allegation that the Christmas gift giving is anannual project of the Municipal Government of Makati ever since the time of MayorsEstrella and Yabut, merely stated that:

. . . Assuming arguendothat Mayor Estrella had practiced this gift-givingevery Christmas, the fact is, that there had been no electoral campaignon-going during such distribution and/or no election was scheduled

during Mayor Estrella's tenure.

"This is also true in the case of Mayor Yabut."


15/35

15

More Petitioners' documentary evidence, among which are Exhibits "A", "A-1"; "A-2"; "A-20";"B"; "B-1"; "B-2"; "B-25"; "C-1"; "C-2"; "C-27"; "D"; "E" and "F", all show indubitablythat the Christmas packages which were distributed between the periods of December 22-30, 1987, were ordered, purchased and paid for by the Municipality of Makati and not byrespondent Binay. There is more than prima facieproofs to show that those gift packagesreceived by the witnesses for petitioners were intended as Christmas presents to Makati's

indigents in December 1988.

It would therefore appear from the evidence submitted by the petitioners themselves thatthe giver, if any, of the Christmas gifts which were received by the witnesses for thepetitioners was in fact, the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Jejomar C. Binay.The presence of respondent Binay, if at all true at the time the gifts were distributed bythe Municipality of Makati to the recipients of the Christmas gifts, was incidental. It didnot make respondent Binay as the "giver" of those Christmas gifts. Nor did the giving ofsuch gifts by the Municipal Government of Makati influence the recipients to vote forrespondent Binay considering that the affiants themselves who testified for the petitionersadmitted and were aware that the gift packages came from the Municipality of Makati and

not from respondent Jejomar C. Binay.

The foregoing conclusion is confirmed by petitioners' witnesses in the persons of LolitaAzcarraga, Johnson Carillo, Rommel Capalungan, Renato Leonardo, Manuel Allado, EdwinPascua, Wilberto Torres, Apolonio De Jesus, Caridad Reposar, Artemus Runtal and JoseErmino who, in their sworn statements, uniformly described the gift package as labelled

with the words "Pamaskong Handog ng Makati", a clear indication that the "giver" of theChristmas gifts was indeed the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Binay.

There is one aspect of this case which somehow lends credence to respondent Binay'sclaim that the instant petition is a political harassment. It is noted by the commission thatwhile the criminal indictment against respondent Binay is for alleged violation of Section261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioners did not implead as party respondentsthe affiants who received the Christmas packages apparently in exchange for their votes.

The law on "vote buying" [Section 261 (a)supra] also penalizes "vote-buying" and "vote-selling", then the present indictment should have been pursued against both respondentBinay and against the affiants, against the former for buying votes and against the latterfor selling the votes. 14

xxx xxx xxx

We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, indismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists toshow that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The traditional gift-giving of theMunicipality of Makati during the Christmas season is not refuted. That it was implemented by respondentBinay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying toinfluence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law

too far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondent was buying the votes of the Makatiresidents. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote-buying. There hasto be concrete and direct evidence or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge thatrespondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying. We are convinced that the evidence presented, as swell asthe facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant such finding.

Finally, we have consistently held that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, and the same is true underthe present one, this court cannot review the factual findings of the Commission on Elections absent agrave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitratriness in its decision, order or resolution. Thus:

The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorarijurisdication of thiscourt as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained

inAratuc vs. Commission on Elections, "not as broad as it used to be" under the oldConstitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretionamounting to patent and substantial denial of due process." Moreover, the legislative


16/35

16

construction of the constitutional provision has narrowed down "the scope and extent ofthe inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorariasdistinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a case decided under theConstitution of 1935, this Court speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion, ruledthat "this Court can not . . . review rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on

Elections," as there is "no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended

to place the [said] Commissioncreated and explicitly made "independent" by theConstitution itselfon a lower level" than statutory administrative organs (whose factualfindings are not "disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely noevidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings.") Factual matters weredeemed not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either "as an original actionfor certiorarior as an appeal by certiorari. . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorariis oneof jurisdictionlack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess ofjurisdiction" while "petitions for review oncertiorariare limited to the consideration ofquestions of law."

The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier. Indeed, as

early as the year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, this Courtheld that the Electoral Commission's "exclusive jurisdiction" being clear from the language

of the provision, "judgment rendered . . . in the exercise of such an acknowledged poweris beyond judicial interference, except "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary andimprovement use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Originallylodged in the legislature, that exclusive function of being the "sole judge" of contests

"relating to the election, returns, and qualifications "of members of the legislature wastransferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935 Constitution. Thatgrant of power, to use the language of the late justice Jose P. Laurel, "was intended to beas complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature . . . " . . .

. . . A review of the respondent Commission's factual findings/conclusions made on thebasis of the evidence evaluated is urged by the petitioner, "if only to guard against orprevent any possible misuse or abuse of power." To do so would mean "digging into themerits and unearthing errors of judgment" rendered on matters within the exclusivefunction of the Commission, which is proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this

Court. . . . 15

The charge against respondent Binay for alleged malversation of public funds should be threshed out andadjudicated in the appropriate proceeding and forum having jurisdiction over the same. Consequently, itwas properly dismissed by the Commission on Elections.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac in G.R. No. 94521 andthe challenged resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94626are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No. 94521 is hereby LIFTED andSET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.


17/35

17


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 87743 August 21, 1990

ROBERT F. ONG, petitionervs.MARIA TERESITA HERRERA-MARTINEZ, THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA and THE CITYTREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.

Claro Jordan M. Santamaria for petitioner.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus, Magtalas, Catalan & Associates for respondents.

Nemesio C. Garcia, Jr. for City Council.

PARAS, J.:

Petitioner Robert F. Ong assails the appointment and assumption of duties as Councilor in the City Councilof Manila of respondent Ma. Teresita Herrera-Martinez, in place of deceased Councilor Saturnino Herrerawho represented the Third District of Manila.

It appears that Saturnino Herrera, who was the father of respondent Martinez, was one of the Liberal Partycandidates duly elected as Councilor for Manila's Third District in the local elections of January 18, 1988.He performed his duties as such councilor until his death on October 14, 1988, thus leaving the position

open for the appointment of a qualified replacement from the same political party where the deceasedcouncilor belonged.

Petitioner, who was a defeated candidate of the Liberal Party in the Third District of Manila, on thestrength of an indorsement by the Treasurer of the said party in the district which was allegedly supportedby 80% of the ward leaders of the party of the same district as embodied in their resolution, wasappointed on February 9, 1989 as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) by the Secretaryof Local Government to fill the vacancy created by the late Councilor Saturnino Herrera. On the same date,petitioner took his oath of office as such councilor after which the Secretary of Local Government informedMayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. and Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer Danilo Lacuna of the appointment ofpetitioner. Likewise, in his lst Indorsement of March 13, 1989, the Undersecretary of Local Governmentforwarded petitioner's appointment to Presiding Officer of the City Council Danilo Lacuna.

In the regular session of the City Council held on March 9, 1989, said Council, acting on the letter of theSecretary of Local Government dated February 9, 1989 informing them of the four appointments includingthat of petitioner, moved to exclude petitioner and the other appointees from the session hall. In the

subsequent session of the Council on March 14, 1989, petitioner and his co-appointees were formallyexcluded from the session hall with sixteen (16) councilors voting for such exclusion and none against it,

with the rest of the Council members abstaining.

The records show that respondent Martinez went through the legal formalities or standard procedure prior

to her appointment to the vacated position subject of this. controversy.

Thus, on November 4, 1988, nine out of the eleven incumbent LP Councilors in the City Council endorsed

the appointment of respondent per their resolution. This resolution was forwarded to the Office of the

Chairman of the Liberal Party, Manila Chapter.


18/35

18

On March 1, 1989, aforesaid Chairman, in turn, nominated respondent for appointment per his letter-nomination to President Corazon Aquino thru the Secretary of Local Government. On March 8, 1989,Senate President Jovito Salonga as National Head of the Liberal Party was furnished with a copy of thisletter-nomination.

On March 13, 1989, Congressman Leonardo Fuguso as President of the LP Third District Chapter also

nominated respondent to National President Salonga of the Party. President Salonga, in turn, nominatedrespondent to Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of Local Government pursuant to Section 50 of the

Local Government Code.

On March 17, 1989, Secretary Santos, acting for the President, issued an appointment to respondent.

Then on March 21, 1989, the first session day after respondent's appointment, the City Council, by a voteof twenty-four members in favor with no member opposing recognized her as member of said Council.

Finally, the Presiding Officer of the City Council directed its Secretariat to include the name of respondentin the payroll of the City Council.

Respondent thus assumed and performed her duties as Councilor for the Third District of Manila until therestraining order of the Court issued on April 20, 1989 was received by respondent.

This petition now seeks to annul the appointment of respondent Martinez and to declare petitioner to be

the holder of the position of Councilor in place of deceased Saturnino Herrera.

Petitioner anchors his appeal on the following grounds:

1. The Secretary of the Department of Local Government, in appointing respondent Martinez on March 17,1989, violated the election ban on appointments under Res. No. 2054 of the Comelec dated December 7,1988 since her appointment was not cleared for exemption from the election ban and, therefore, the samewas made beyond and in excess of the Secretary's authority and by reason of which, the appointment is

null and void.

2. Respondent Martinez is not a member of the Liberal Party and cannot be appointed to the position ofCouncilor, a vacancy created by the death of a member of said Party.

3. Petitioner's appointment is valid, complete and beyond recall.

4. Petitioner is entitled to the position held by respondent. Respondent, on the other hand, argues:

1. Petitioner misled the Court in claiming that he has a right to the contested position. His appointmentwas indorsed only by the Treasurer of the LP Chapter, 3rd District of Manila. The Treasurer's indorsementwas not known nor authorized by the head of the LP in said district. Neither was the nomination brought to

the attention of the Chairman of the LP, Manila Chapter. The proper procedure was not observed bypetitioner. The unauthorized action of petitioner cannot be cured or ratified by an alleged resolution of80% of ward leaders and which resolution was adopted long after the appointment of petitioner. Hence,petitioner's appointment was void from the very beginning for lack of authority of the Treasurer who

nominated him.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, respondent also contends that the former has not assumed office; neitherhas he exercised or performed the functions of the position because he was prevented from doing so bythe outright refusal of the City Council to recognize his appointment.

2. Petitioner has no right to the position and for which reason, he lacks the legal personality to institute thepresent petition for quo warranto, mandamusand prohibition.


19/35

19

While petitioner claims that he took his oath on February 9, 1989 which was a calculated move to avoidthe election ban on appointments, he used a Residence Certificate issued on February 22, 1989 only. Thismeans that he could not have taken his alleged oath before the issuance of the residence certificate.

3. The appointment of respondent possesses all the requisites of a valid appointment according to legal

and regular procedures. She avers that her appointment was indorsed by nine out of eleven LP incumbent

councilors and that her nomination was favorably indorsed by the Liberal Party hierarchy from theChairman of the Third District, thru the Chairman of the Manila Chapter up to the National President of the

LP; and, that she was duly appointed on the basis of the series of nominations of the LP hierarchy.

4. The appointment of respondent is not covered by the election ban contemplated under Sec. 261 (g) ofthe Omnibus Election Code.

The case for respondent appears meritorious. Respondent had gone through the regular and standardnomination process which had been officially acknowledged by the Secretary of Local Government.

Sec. 50 of the Local Government Code specifically provides:

In case of permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniangpanglungsod, sangguniang bayan or sangguniang barangay, the President of thePhilippines, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government, shall appoint aqualified person to fill the vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang

panglunsod of highly urbanized and component cities; the governor, in the case ofsangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniangbarangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come fromthe political party of the sangguniang member who caused the vacancy, and shall servethe unexpired term of the vacant office. (Emphasis supplied)

Since deceased Councilor Saturnino Herrera who had caused the contested vacancy comes from the LiberalParty, it follows that his mode of replacement should be governed by the standing rules of the aforenamedParty.

Thus, We quote the pertinent sections of the 1967 Liberal Party Revised Rules (1971 Reprint furnished bythe Comelec):

Rule 32.Approval of Resolution of District, Provincial, City of Municipal Government.Resolutions adopted by provincial, district, city or municipal committee shall not be finalunless approved by the National Directorate, the Executive Committee, or the PartyPresident. (Under Chapter Ill on The Manila City Special Rules)

Thus, too, Section A (3) of Rule 10 of the Liberal Party Rules (on the Powers of the National Directorate)provides:

3) To choose and proclaim official candidates of the Party for provincial positions, andwhenever necessary, convenient or proper, also for Municipal and City positions, inaccordance with the requirements of these Rules.

Conformably with the aforequoted provisions of the Liberal Party Rules, all resolutions, which may include

resolutions nominating replacements for deceased city councilors, should first be approved either by theNational Directorate, the Executive Committee or the Party President in order that said resolutions could beconsidered final and valid.

Logically and by analogy, the National Directorate or in its stead, the Executive Committee or the PartyPresident may choose and nominate the party's proposed appointee, from among its members, to theposition vacated by a deceased city councilor.


20/35

20

Correspondingly, We quote hereunder the body of the letter-nomination of the then LP National PresidentJovito R. Salonga explicitly manifesting the full support of the party hierarchy for herein respondent. Thus

I hereby nominate in behalf of the Liberal Party of which I am the incumbent President

Ms. Maria Teresita Herrera-Martinez, to take the place of Councilor Saturnino C. Herrera

of the Liberal Party who passed away on October 14,1988.

Ms. Martinez is likewise the recommendee of the Liberal Party, Manila Chapter headed byformer Assemblyman Lito Atienza. She is also recommended by Congressman LeonardoFuguso. Please be advised that the Liberal Party, under which the late Councilor SaturninoC. Herrera was elected, has no nominee to the vacated position other than Ms. MariaTeresita Herrera-Martinez. This is also to serve notice that no other person is authorizedto nominate any LP member to any vacancy in the City Council of Manila." (Emphasissupplied)

Acting on the solid recommendation of the LP hierarchy, from the district level up to the national level, the

Secretary of Local Government correspondingly issued the letter-appointment to respondent Martinez, the

pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

Upon the recommendation of the President of the Liberal Party and the Chapter Presidentof the Liberal Party, 3rd District of the City of Manila, and pursuant to the provisions ofexisting laws, you are hereby appointed member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, City ofManila, Vice Councilor Saturnino C. Herrera. (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, respondent's appointment was accepted or recognized by the City Council in its session of March21, 1989. The minutes of said session reveal that twenty-four (24) councilors voted to accept theappointment of respondent and not a single member objected to or opposed the acceptance. Right thenand there, the Presiding Officer announced the acceptance of respondent's appointment and the Chair

directed the Secretariat to include her name as a new member of the City Council.

In the case of petitioner, however, a very different scenario took place. The letter dated February 9, 1989of Secretary Luis Santos informing Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer Lacuna that he had appointedpetitioner and three other appointees, carried a request that due recognition be accorded to them,particularly petitioner as member of the Council. Petitioner and the other appointees, as per minutes of theCouncil's session of March 9, 1989, were excluded from the session hall by reason of the seconded motionof the Majority Floor Leader. In the subsequent session of the Council on March 14, 1989, petitioner andhis co-appointees were formally excluded from the session hall when sixteen (1 6) members of the Council

voted in favor of their exclusion and no one against it. Significantly, such exclusion meant that the CityCouncil refused to recognize their appointments.

As a conclusive confirmation of the non-recognition of petitioner's defective appointment, the Secretary ofLocal Government recalled the former's appointment in his letter of March 17, 1989. The letter thus reads:

Dear Mr. Ong:

In connection with our letter of February 9,1989, appointing you as SangguniangPanglunsod member of the City of Manila as a consequence of the death of CouncilorSaturnino C. Herrera, please be informed that we are recalling said appointment itappearing that you were not recommended for the position by the appropriate leader ofthe Liberal Party as mandated by the sub-section b(1) Rule XIX of the, Rules andRegulations Implementing the Local Government Code(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337).(Emphasis supplied)

Both petitioner and respondent have invoked the election ban imposed under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus

Election Code. The election ban covered the period from February 11 to March 27, 1989 by reason of the

Barangay election held on March 28, 1989. Both parties have capitalized on the prohibitive provision for thepurpose of having their respective appointments declared illegal or null and void.


21/35

21

Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code provides thus:

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salaryincreases. During the period of forty- five days before a regular election and thirty daysbefore a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government

office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned

or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any newemployee whether provisional,temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of

the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it issatisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office oragency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influencethe election.

As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of

urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to theCommission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment orhiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void.

The aforequoted provision does not apply to both assailed appointments because of the following reason:

The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is governed by the Local Government Codewhile the appointment referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil Service Law.

For having satisfied the formal requisites and procedure for appointment as Councilor, which is an officialposition outside the contemplation of the election ban, respondent's appointment is declared valid.

The issue on the alleged discrepancy between the dates of petitioner's oath and his residence certificateneed not be tackled now because it will not anymore affect the recalled appointment of petitioner. If ever,the matter casts a doubt on petitioner's credibility and honesty.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the temporary restraining order is correspondingly

LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.


22/35

22


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115022 August 14, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Manila and BUENAVENTURA C.MANIEGO,respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorariand mandamusunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to annul and setaside the orders dated September 23, 1993 and January 25, 1994 of respondent Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes,Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila in Criminal Case No. 93-120275.

The facts reveal that respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection District II,Bureau of Customs, Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued MICP Customs Personnel Order No.

21-92 dated January 10, 1992 assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office ofthe Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. 1The actual transfer of Ebio wasmade on January 14, 1992.

On May 4, 1992, Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting his

transfer. Ebio claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and section 261 (h)of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections.

After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed on May 6, 1995 an information with the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 36, Manila charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B. P. Blg. 881committed as follows:

That on or about January 14, 1992 which was within the election period of the May 11, 1992synchronized elections and within the effectivity of the ban on transfer or detail of officers andemployees in the civil service, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, a public official, being the Collector of Customs VI,Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs, by taking advantage of his position andabuse of authority, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, transfer Jovencio D. Ebio, Chief ofthe Piers and Inspection Division, Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs, toSpecial Assistant in the office of the Deputy Collector for Operations, of the same office, without a

prior written authority from the Commission on Elections.2

Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that the factsalleged do not constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did notviolate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It

purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity of COMELEC ResolutionNo. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Petitioner, through the COMELEC, opposed themotion to quash.


23/35

23

On September 23, 1993, the trial court granted private respondent's motion to quash and dismissedCriminal Case No. 93-120275.3Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied on January 25,1995.

4Petitioner forthwith elevated the case to this Court on a pure question of law.

We affirm.

The basic law supposed to have been violated by respondent Maniego is Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881which reads as follows:

Sec. 261. Prohibited acts.The following shall be guilty of any election offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service.Any public official who makes orcauses any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service includingpublic school teachers,within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.(Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution has fixed the election period for all elections to commence ninety (90) days before theday of election and end thirty (30) days thereafter, unless otherwise fixed in special cases by theCOMELEC.5For the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC fixed a longerelection period of one hundred twenty (120) days before the scheduled elections and thirty (30) days

thereafter. It issued Resolution No. 2314 on September 23, 1991 primarily adopting therein a calendar ofactivities. In the process, it designated January 12, 1992 to June 10, 1992 as the election period, viz.:

RESOLUTION NO. 2314

Pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, theOmnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), and Republic Act No. 7166, the Commission on Electionshas RESOLVED to adopt, the following calendar of activities for the May 11, 1992 elections:

Date/Period Activities

November 28, 1991Start of the period of nomination and selection of official candidates forPresident, Vice-President and Senators (165 days, SEC. 6, R.A.7166)

January 2, 1992Last day for appointment of members of boards of election inspectors(Sec.164, OEC) (Subject to appointments which may be extended later in account of lack of publicschool teachers and disqualifications due to relationship to candidates.)

January 12, 1992ELECTION PERIOD (120 (Sunday) todays, per Res. No. ____ )June 10, 1992 Bans on carrying of firearms Wednesday suspension of elective local officials,

organization of strike forces, etc. (Sec. 261,OEC)6

xxx xxx xxx

On January 2, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2328 for the sole and specific purpose offixing for the said elections the election period from January 12, 1992 to June 10, 1992.

7This Resolution

was published in the January 5, 1992 issue of the Manila Times and the January 6, 1992 issue ofthe Philippine Times Journal.8

On January 2, 1992, the COMELEC also passed Resolution No. 2333 which promulgated the necessaryrules to enforce Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881. We quote its pertinent portions:

RESOLUTION NO. 2333


24/35

24

WHEREAS, the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides:

Sec. 261. Prohibited acts,The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service.Any public officialwho makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee

in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election periodexcept upon prior approval of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, to enforce effectively the foregoing provisions, there is need to promulgate thenecessary rules for the guidance of all concerned;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the power vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus ElectionCode, Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws, the Commission has RESOLVED

to pr

Documents

Election Law Cases-chapter XV