Election LAw Cases I (A-C)

7/29/2019 Election LAw Cases I (A-C)

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[A.M. No. P-94-1067. January 30, 1997]

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF LAOAG CITY, complainants, vs. BIENVENIDO ARZAGA and ALFREDO MAURICIOrespondents.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

This administrative matter arose from two (2) anonymous letters, one dated April 21, 1994 addressed to Judge Federico A.Llanes, MTCC, Branch I, Laoag City and the other dated April 27, 1994 addressed to Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTCBranch 13, Laoag City, charging Bienvenido Arzaga and Alfredo Mauricio, both process servers of the Office of the Clerk ofCourt, MTCC, Laoag City, with influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and manipulation of bonds by usingthe same property for different cases.

On June 22, 1994, Judge Llanes forwarded the said letters, together with the respondents' comments, to the Office of the CourtAdministrator.

In a resolution dated September 19, 1994, this Court referred the matter to Executive Judge Wenceslao Agnir, RTC, Laoag Cityfor investigation, report and recommendation.

In his investigation report dated December 16, 1994, Judge Agnir stated, among others, that both respondents had submitted

their written comments denying the charges; that upon receipt of the complaint, he requested the local media to announce to thepublic that anyone who had evidence against the two respondents could see him; that however, after two months of waiting,nobody came forward to offer any evidence against respondents; that he also interviewed the employees of the City Court toverify the truth of the charges against the respondents, but he obtained no information to give credence to said charges.

Judge Agnir, however, reported that he received a certification from the City Prosecutor's Office of Laoag City, to the effect thatAlfredo Mauricio was convicted of Frustrated Murder on September 29, 1983 in Criminal Case No. 1260-XIII, but was placed onprobation. Alfredo Mauricio had also been charged with eleven (11) other criminal cases like Illegal Possession of FirearmsGrave Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, Serious Physical Injuries, but all of these had been dismissed.

Judge Agnir made no definite recommendation in his report, except to say that he was leaving it to the Court Administrator todetermine whether on the basis of "such a criminal record, Alfredo 'Boy' Mauricio deserves to stay in the service of theJudiciary."

On February 1, 1995, this Court referred the Investigation Report of Judge Agnir to the Office of the Court Administrator forevaluation, report and recommendation. Accordingly, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum to thisCourt recommending that the charges against the two respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.

After a careful examination of the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, this Court on May 29, 1995, resolvedto dismiss the charges against Benjamin Arzaga as recommended but referred the case against Alfredo Mauricio to Judge Agnirfor further investigation relative to how said respondent managed to be appointed to the position of process server despite aprevious record of conviction of the crime of frustrated murder. Judge Agnir was likewise directed to conduct an inquiry onwhether said respondent made untruthful statements in his application by suppressing the fact of his conviction as well as othercriminal charges filed against him though subsequently dismissed.

In compliance with the aforementioned resolution, Judge Agnir submitted his second investigation report dated July 21, 1995. Inhis report, Judge Agnir narrated that respondent Mauricio joined the judiciary on October 4, 1990 as Utility Worker I of MTCC

Branch 2, Laoag City. His commission was signed by then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro and certified by ChieAdministrative Officer Adelaida Cabe-Baumann upon recommendation of Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., then presiding judgeof Branch 2, RTC, Laoag City. On May 5, 1992, respondent was promoted to the position of process server of the Office of theClerk of Court, MTCC, Laoag City. His commission was signed by Romeo P. de Leon in behalf of Adelaida Cabe-Baumann.

Judge Agnir further narrated that respondent disclosed his conviction of the crime of frustrated murder and that he was onprobation for the same in his application. When respondent was asked by Judge Agnir why he did not indicate that othercriminal charges were filed against him, he replied that the question in the application form simply asked for conviction, not merecharges.

The Second Investigation Report also mentioned the name of two (2) persons from whom respondent Mauricio allegedly askedfavors using the name of Judge Fernandez. The first was Jimmy Lao, a realtor-businessman of Laoag City who told JudgeAgnir that two (2) years earlier when he had a case pending before the sala of Judge Fernandez, respondent Mauricio


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approached him and asked for two (2) tires allegedly for the car of Judge Fernandez. Mr. Lao said that when he went to verifythe request, he was not able to talk to Judge Fernandez but a court staff member told him that Judge Fernandez was not in thehabit of asking favors from litigants and that in all probability, the tires were intended for Mauricio's owner-type jeep which wasthen in the process of being assembled. When he confronted Mauricio about it, the latter told him that he (Mauricio) was onlyjoking.

The second interviewee was German Reantillo, administrative officer of the City Engineer's Office of Laoag City who confirmedthat sometime ago he gave Mauricio thirty (30) liters of gasoline on the respondent's representation that this was for JudgeFernandez; that sometime later he had the occasion to mention the matter to Judge Fernandez who denied that he authorizedMauricio to ask gasoline in his behalf.

Both Lao and Reantillo however refused to be placed under oath or to reduce their statements in writing because they did notwish to be involved in a formal investigation where they would have to be confronted by respondent. Furthermore Lao said hedid not wish to incur the ire of the respondent and that anyway he did not give Mauricio the tires.

On July 17, 1995, Judge Agnir called respondent Mauricio to another hearing and confronted him with these new charges.Respondent denied them as expected.

Judge Agnir further claimed that respondent is known to be a troublesome fellow. MTC Judge Llanes even had to file anadministrative case against respondent for serious misconduct and insubordination.

Judge Agnir then strongly recommended the immediate and summary dismissal from the service of respondent Mauricio forbeing the "ultimate undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary." He added that he was recommending this course of

action aware of the potential danger to his person given respondent's violent nature as documented by his criminal record.Judge Agnir was "hopeful though that the respondent's summary dismissal will send a chilling message to other couremployees similarly engaged in nefarious activities and unethical practices which though petty in many instances indelibly stainthe image of the judiciary.

Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The Deputy Court Administrator to whom the case was assigned for review submitted the following observations, viz:

A careful scrutiny of the 201 File of respondent Mauricio shows that he joined the judiciary not on 4 October 1990 as UtilityWorker I but on 1 August 1989 as a Court Aide of MTCC, Branch 2 of Laoag City as a recommendee of Judge Angelo M.Albano, MTCC, Laoag City. Respondent's appointment was by virtue of a Supreme Court Resolution dated 1 August 1989 andhis commission was signed by then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro and certified by Former Assistant Chief Administrative

Officer Orlando B. Carino and Former Chairman of the Selection Board Daniel T Martinez.

It was also discovered that on 24 January 1990 Atty. Carino sent a telegram to Mauricio ordering him to submit a copy of theOrder placing him on probation pending the approval of his appointment as Utility Worker I. Accordingly respondent sent a copyof the said Order and in his 1st indorsement dated 22 February 1990, Atty. Carino referred the Probation Order to Atty. PoncianoR. Solosa, Assistant Director of the Civil Service Commission Field Office for appropriate action.

Per Court Resolution dated 4 October 1990 respondent was appointed as Utility Worker I and was promoted as Process Serverby virtue of a Court Resolution of 5 May 1992.

On 19 January 1993 Police Inspector Felizardo Ellano of the PNP-CIS Command in Camp Capt. Valentin San Juan, Laoag City,sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice through the Record Section requesting that a check be conducted on the records ofMauricio who was at that time being charged by their Office with the crimes of Less Serious Physical Injuries and Resistance

and Disobedience Upon Agents of a Person in Authority. Police Officer Ellano likewise informed the Court that the respondenhas already been charged of several offenses in different courts in Laoag City which according to him was a clear showing thatMauricio is a violent man, a habitual offender and extremely defiant of the law.

Records show that the respondent twice accomplished Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service Commission Form 212, Revised1982) on two (2) separate occasions: on 5 June 1989 before his appointment as Court Aide and on 13 September 1990 prior tohis appointment as Utility Worker. In both instances, Mauricio disclosed his conviction of Frustrated Murder and the fact that hewas on probation.

The charges against respondent Mauricio for influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and manipulation ofbonds by using the same property for different cases do not appear to have been sufficiently established by clear evidence. Thetwo (2) persons from whom the respondent allegedly asked favors using the name of Judge Fernandez both refused to beplaced under oath or reduce their statements in writing. But administrative charges cannot be based on mere conjecture. The


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complainant has the burden of proof and such proof must be clear, solid and convincing to compel the exercise of disciplinarypower over the person indicted.

On respondent's conviction of Frustrated Murder, there was full disclosure of the conviction and apparently was not a legaobstacle to respondent's appointment because he was placed on probation. Therefore, respondent's conviction of a crimeshould not be taken as a basis of any administrative action against him.

The foregoing notwithstanding we do not see any reason to disturb the Investigating Judge's finding that respondent is atroublesome and violent person as shown by his criminal record certified by the City Prosecutor of Laoag City. There is thereforemerit in Judge Agnir's recommendation of immediate and summary dismissal of the respondent from the service for being the"ultimate undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary."

It is commendable that Judge Agnir has opted to resist the temptation to be silent in the face of what he perceives to be adeleterious influence in the court.

Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil ServiceLaws "being notoriously undesirable" is classified as a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of dismissal, or forcedresignation under Resolution No. 89-506 dated 20 July 1989 of the Civil Service Commission.

Time and again the Court has held that "A court employee being a public servant must exhibit the highest sense of honesty andintegrity not only in the performance of his duties but also in his personal and private dealings with other people to preserve thecourt's name and standing. Therefore, it becomes imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain itsgood name and standing as a true temple of justice." (Paredes vs. Padua, 222 SCRA 81).

Equally compelling is the decision of the Court in the case ofMirano vs. Saavedra, 225 SCRA 77 which states that "The conducand behavior of everyone connected with the office charged with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to thelowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility."

On the foregoing antecedents, it was recommended by the Deputy Court Administrator that respondent be declared notoriouslyundesirable and be considered resigned from the service with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits anddisqualification from employment in the government service for a period of one (1) year. It was further recommended, however,that respondent be reemployed in the government service other than the judiciary.

In reviewing the aforesaid report and recommendation submitted for the Court's consideration, we find the foregoingobservations to be correct. We, nonetheless, find the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator to be verylight. Consequently, we adopt the investigating judge's recommendation for respondent's dismissal from the service, the same

being warranted and justified by the facts attendant to the instant case.

Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highessense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with otherpeople. No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officersand employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.In addition, the Code ofConduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provide that every public servant shall at all times upholdpublic interest over his or her personal interest.

By his acts and misdeeds, respondent has undermined the public's faith in our courts and, ultimately, in the administration ojustice. The same make him unfit as a court employee. His employment must therefore be terminated at once. Court personnemust adhere to the high ethical standards of public service in order to preserve the Court's good name and standing.

Time and again, this Court has emphasized that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliestclerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be freefrom any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent ALFREDO MAURICIO is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits andwith prejudice to his reemployment in any branch of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995


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SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners,vs.HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil ServiceCommission, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitionersSalvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service

Commission ("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.

Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner deLima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the CiviService Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710signed by public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively,of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994. 1Resolution No. 94-3710 needs to be quoted in full:

RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710

WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides that ". . . as an independentconstitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises;"

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to streamline itsoperations and improve delivery of public service;

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it necessary to immediately effect changes in the organization of theCentral Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions which weretransferred to the Regional Offices;

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to effect thefollowing changes in its organization, specifically in the Central Offices:

1. The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Auditand OPR [Office of Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and Development Office

(RDO).

2. The Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) is renamed Human Resource DevelopmenOffice (HRDO).

3. The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said functions are herebytransferred to HRDO:

a. Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS;

b. Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and

c. Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments under OPIA.

4. The Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) is renamed Management Information Office (MIO).

5. The Information technology functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit are transferred toMIO.

6. The following functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said functions arehereby transferred to the Office of the Executive Director:

a. Financial Audit and Evaluation;


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b. Internal Management and Improvement;

c. Research and Statistics; and

d. Planning and Programming.

7. The library service and its personnel under OCPR are transferred to the Central Administrative Office.

8. The budget allocated for the various functions shall be transferred to the Offices where the functions

are transferred. Records, fixtures and equipment that go with the functions shall be moved to where thefunctions are transferred.

Annex A contains the manning list for all the offices, except the OCES.

The changes in the organization and in operations shall take place before end of July 1994.

Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.(Signed)Patricia A. Sto. TomasChairman(Signed) Did not participate

Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr., Thelma P. GamindeCommissioner CommissionerAttested by:(Signed)Carmencita Giselle B. DaysonBoard Secretary V2

During the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission held in the morning of 28 July 1994, ChairmanSto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners, expressed the determination of the Commission to implementResolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority.

Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the Court required public respondents to filea Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the Commission assigning petitioneFernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying thatpublic respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders. The Court, in a Resolution dated 27 September1994, granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners.

The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994, on the Petition and then moved to lift the TemporaryRestraining Order. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a separate Comment dated 28 November 1994, defending thevalidity of Resolution No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of the Petition. Petitioners filed separate Replies to theseComments. The Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder (denominated "Comment [on] the Reply").

The principal issues raised in this Petition are the following:

(1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to

the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of PersonneInspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research andDevelopment Office]; and

(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.

I.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title ISubtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the Commission in the following terms:

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission The Commission shall have the following offices:


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(1) The Office of the Executive Director . . .(2) The Merit System Protection Board . . .(3) The Office of Legal Affairs . . .(4) The Office of Planning and Management . . .(5) The Central Administrative Office . . .(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records . . .(7) The Office of Position Classification andCompensation . . .(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination andPlacement . . .

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in theformulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, meritpromotion and employee incentive benefits and awards.

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development . . .

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Auditshall develop policies, standards, rules and regulationsfor the effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management programs andthe exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service RegionaOffices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel programs and evaluationsystems.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development andimplementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employeesin the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and awards systemsposition classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee welfare and benefitsdiscipline and other aspects of personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.

(13) The Office of the Corporate Affairs . . .(14) The Office of Retirement Administration . . .(15) The Regional and Field Offices. . . . (Emphases in the original)

Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the Commission and their respective functions, the 1987 RevisedAdministrative Code goes on to provide as follows:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with atleast one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out theirrespective functions. As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect chances in theorganization as the need arises.

xxx xxx xxx 3

(Emphasis supplied)

Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each of the otherOffices listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of

Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises a group of positions within the agency called the Civil ServiceCommission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions. These functions are relatedto one another, each of them being embraced by a common or general subject matter. Clearly, each Office is an internadepartment or organizational unit within the Commission and that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as althe other Offices within the Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little differently, theseoffices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.

What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do? Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows that thereby theCommission re-arrangedsome of the administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the Commission and, among other thingsmerged three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and Development Office(RDO)." The same Resolution renamedsome of the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for Human ResourceDevelopment (OHRD) was renamed Human Resource Development Office (HRDO); the Office for Central PersonneRecords (OCPR) was renamed Management Information Office (MIO). The Commission also re-allocated certain


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functions moving some functions from one Office to another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM (Office ofPlanning and Management) was transferred to the newly named Management Information Office (MIO). This re-allocationor re-assignment of some functions carried with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the Officewhere the function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to thecarrying out of such functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were transferred.

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in that Resolution in broadterms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery ofservice." These changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and

devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and its staff may be broughtcloser physically to the government employees that they are mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had beencentralized in the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all over the countrywere compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of personnel transactions. Upon the other hand, the dispersal of thefunctions of the Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field Offices attached to various governmental agenciesthroughout the country makes possible the implementation of new programs of the Commission at its Central Office inMetropolitan Manila.

The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3 was precipitated by theincumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement, thus generating a need to find a replacement for himPetitioner de Lima was being assigned to that Regional Office while the incumbent Regional Director was still there tofacilitate her take over of the duties and functions of the incumbent Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior experience as alabor lawyer was also a factor in her assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public sector unions have been veryactive. Petitioner Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitatedby the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V was under investigation and needed to be transferredimmediately to the Central Office. Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely designee for Director of RegionalOffice No. 5 considering that the functions previously assigned to him had been substantially devolved to the RegionaOffices such that his reassignment to a Regional Office would result in the least disruption of the operations of the CentraOffice. 4

It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite legitimate considerations of administrative efficiencyand convenience in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador CFernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to theCommission's Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is also clear tothe Court that the changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710 re-naming of existing Officesre-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections composing particular Offices; re-allocation of existing functions(and related personnel; budget, etc.) among the re-arranged Offices are precisely the kind of internal changes whichare referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code), quotedabove, as "chances in the organization" of the Commission.

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which may be done onlyby the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place.

The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term "public office" is frequently usedto refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law orenduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions ofgovernment, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. 5We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 hasnotabolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. 6 It is essential to note that none of the

"changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination othe relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees . We find it verydifficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of theCivil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization ofthe commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing needsof the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority had expresslyauthorized the Commission to carryout "changes in the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." 7Assuming, for purposes of argument merelythat legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (andthe Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to theCommission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of suchdelegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration oPolicies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the CivilService Commission


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as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish acareer service, adopt measures to promote efficiency [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to thedepartments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed. (Emphasissupplied)

II. We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached by the respondents inpromulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices inRegions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or employee of the Civi

Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they wereunlawfully removed from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and thatthey cannot, without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.

We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public office butrather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of Director III orDirector IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; andso forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any

particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of DirectoIV of the Commission.

Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as amanagement prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency of government

embraced in the civil service:

Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. . . .

As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shalbe known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotiontransfer, re-instatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personneactions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by theCommission.

(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the sameagency, Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary(Emphasis supplied)

It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions in OPIA and OPRrespectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the Commission in MetropolitanManila and their subsequent assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III hadbeen effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows thatsuch re-assignment did notinvolve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure consideringthat they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their newassigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners hadnot, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.

Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory provisions relevant in the instant case, but also by along line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different agencies or offices of government.

In one of the more recent of these cases, Department of Education Culture and Sports, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, etal., 8 this Court held that a person who had been appointed as "Secondary School Principal II" in the Division of CitySchools, District II, Quezon City, National Capital Region, and who had been stationed as High School Principal in theCarlos Albert High School in Quezon for a number of years, could lawfully be reassigned or transferred to the ManueRoxas High School, also in Quezon City, without demotion in rank or diminution of salry. This Court held:

The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which provides thatexcept for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without his consentfrom one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is predicated upon the theorythat the teacher concerned is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Thus:


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The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far asthe appointed indicates a specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained securityof tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistentlyrejected the officer's demand to remain even as public service dictates that a transferbe made in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature isexpressed in the following statement in Ibaez, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al(G.R. No.L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 1002 [1967]);

That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteedfeature of our Civil Service System, is not open to debate. The mantle ofits protection extends not only against removals without cause but alsoagainst unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciatEd, aretantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamentaguarantee. However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarilydepends, in the first instance, upon the nature of the appointment(Hojillavs. Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].) Such that the rule which proscribestransfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is

predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed nomerely assigned to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et al., 108Phil. 439 [1960]; Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 118 Phil. 728 [1963])[Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138 (1969)]

The appointmentof Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, shecould be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school(Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it couldnot have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointmenwould have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as theexigencies of public service require even without consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27SCRA 138143

Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicablejurisprudence. Her refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by theConstitution is not impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupiesher station in Sinalang Elementary School by appointment. But her first appointment asPrincipal merely reads thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal (Elementary Schoolin the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of Education", without mentioning herstation. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang ElementarySchool or any particular station. She may be assigned to any station as exigency of

public service requires, even without her consent. She thus has no right of choice.(Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

In the very recent case ofFernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, etc., et a1., 10the Court addressed appointments ofpetitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the National Capital Region" in dismissing a challenge on certiorarito resolutions ofthe CSC and orders of the Secretary of Labor. The Court said:

Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the National Capital Region. They were not, however,

appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the National Capital Region(DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned from one organizational unit to another ofthe same agency where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their services may be used moreeffectively. As such they can neither claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor tosecurity of tenure thereat. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners' reassignment is nota transfer for they were not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They were not given newappointments to new positions. It indubitably follows, therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4 orderingtheir reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in order. 11(Emphases supplied)

In Quisumbing v. Gumban, 12 the Court, dealing with an appointment in the Bureau of Public Schools of theDepartment of Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as follows:


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After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private respondentYap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate aspecific station (Rollo, p. 13). A such, she could be assigned to any station and she is no entitled to stay

permanently at any specific station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974]; Department of EducationCulture and Sports v. Court of Appeals [G.R. 81032, March 22, 1990] citing Brillantes v. Guevarra [27SCRA 138 [1969]). 13

Again, in Ibaez v. Commission on Elections, 14the Court had before it petitioners' appointments as "Election Registrars inthe Commission of Elections," without any intimation to what city, municipality or municipal district they had been

appointed as such.

15

The Court held that since petitioners "were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to anysecurity of tenure or permanence in, any specific station," "on general principles, they [could] be transferred as theexigencies of the service required," and that they had no right to complain against any change in assignment. The Courtfurther held that assignment to a particular station after issuance of the appointment was not necessary to complete suchappointment:

. . . . We cannot subscribe to the theory that an assignment to a particular station, in the light of the termsof the appointments in question, was necessary to complete the said appointments. The approval thereofby the Commissioner of Civil Service gave those appointments the stamp of finality.With the view that therespondent Commission then took of its power in the premises and the demand of the mission it set out toaccomplish with the appointments it extended, said appointments were definitely meant to be complete asthen issued. The subsequent assignment of the appointees thereunder that the said respondenCommission held in reserve to be exercised as the needs of each locality justified did not in any waydetract from the perfection attained by the appointments beforehand. And the respective appointees wereentitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers concerned actually conferred not inthat of any place to which they may have been subsequently assigned. . . . As things stand, in default ofany particular station stated in their respective appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the

petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them. A contrary rule will erasealtogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between appointmentand assignmentas twodistinct concepts in the law of public officers. 16(Emphases supplied)

The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden, 17had been appointed as a "Welfare Office Incharge, Division of Urban, Rural andCommunity Administration, Social Welfare Administration." She was assigned as Social Welfare Incharge of the MountainProvince, by an office order of the Administrator, Social Welfare Administration. After a little more than a year; petitionerwas assigned elsewhere and respondent Ganaden transferred to petitioner's first station in Baguio City. The Court ruledthat petitioner was not entitled to remain in her first station, In Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 18petitioner Dr. Jaro had beenappointed "Physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first assigned to theMunicipal Maternity and Charity Clinics in Batulati, Davao, and later to the corresponding clinic in Saug, Davao and thento Catil, Davao. He was later assigned to the Municipality of Padada, also of Davao Province. He resisted his lastassignment and brought mandamus against the Secretary of Health to compel the latter to return him to his station inCatil, Davao as Municipal Health Officer thereof. The Court, applying Miclat v. Ganaden dismissed this Petition holdingthat his appointment not being to any specific station but as a physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity ClinicsBureau of Hospitals, he could be transferred or assigned to any station where, in the opinion of the Secretary of Health,his services may be utilized more effectively. 19

Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez 20which involved the appointment of petitioner Sta. Maria as "Dean, College oEducation, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was transferred by the President of the University of thePhilippines to the Office of the President, U.P., without demotion in rank or salary, thereby acceding to the demands ofstudent activists who were boycotting their classes in the U.P. College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria assailed his transfeas an illegal and unconstitutional removal from office. In upholding Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the Court, speaking throughMr. Justice Sanchez, laid down the applicable doctrine in the following terms:

4. Concededly, transfers there are which do not amount to removal. Some such transfer can be effectedwithout the need for charges being preferred, without trial or hering, and even without the consent of theemployee.The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." Where the appointment doesnot indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transferaffects no substantial change in title, rank and salary. Thus one who is appointed "principal in the Bureauof Public Schools" and is designated to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal ofanother school.And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to anofficer who is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not prescribe a


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transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassignthe employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. The use of approvedtechniques or methods in personnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promoteoptimum public service cannot-be objected to. . . .5. The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order 77 would stand the test of validity vis-a-vis the principles just enunciated.xxx xxx xxxTo be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College ofEducation, University of the Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university." His appointment is toa specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station. 21(Citations omitted; emphases supplied)

For all the foregoing we conclude that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their stations in theOPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the CommissionsRegional Offices in Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a violation of theiconstitutional right to security of tenure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction oTemporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002


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SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,vs.HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for thepreparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of thenationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine

Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."1

Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee for thepreparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National CentenniaCommission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. PresidentsDiosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.2

Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall terminate upon the completion of all activities relatedto the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to "take charge of thenationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of PhilippineIndependence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."

Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to "prepare, for approval of

the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of" theExecutive Order.

E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:

Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat to becomposed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the NationaCommission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by afull time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.

Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism andthe presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved by the

President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. 4 Petitionewas among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected ExpocorpChief Executive Officer.

On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing allegedanomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic ZoneUpon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the Committee onAccountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees foinvestigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and

independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centenniaprojects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.

On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final ReportNo. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was "the prosecution by theOmbudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public biddingrelative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest biasin the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a validcontract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of thefunds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law." 5
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Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended "the further investigation bythe Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations ofSection 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the RevisedPenal Code.

The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the Fact-finding andIntelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Reportrecommending:

1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation andPreliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chaiSalvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles forviolation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules andRegulations;

2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant.6

In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau,directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.

On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction ofsaid office.

In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was denied in an Orderdated October 5, 2000.

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.

On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding "probable causeto indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring toviolate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution also directed that aninformation for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the

resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pea.

In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, commanding respondents todesist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because:

A.

EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RINGPROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WEREALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLEDCORPORATION.

B.

THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.

C.
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PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" ASDEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7

In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held that thejurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade27 and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and,consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.

This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that "it is the prosecutor, not the

Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. TheOmbudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."

In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:

The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and cityprosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within thejurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to casesrightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providingfor the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") whichvests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" And this isfurther buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutorshall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit theOmbudsmans and Special Prosecutors authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in theoriginal.]

The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in the same case,the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained therationale for this reversal:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. Itpertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act oromission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) givingthe Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) grantingthe Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within thejurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory andprosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from anyinvestigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does notnecessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees by othercourts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayanis not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public

officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsmanare very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by publicofficers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of theSpecial Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component othe Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of theOmbudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases withinthe jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory andprosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on alcomplaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil andcriminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the
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personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act asspecial investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designatedor deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct theSpecial Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions ofthe Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power tomake him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of

the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]

Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner relies. We first address theargument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.

The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as "protectors of the people," who "shall act promptly oncomplaints filed in any form or manner againstpublic officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agencyor instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations." Among the awesome powersfunctions, and duties vested by the Constitution11 upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate any act oromission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,improper, or inefficient."

The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the

"Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:

SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act promptly oncomplaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce theiradministrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficienservice by the Government to the people.

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powersfunctions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officeror employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. Ithas primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primaryjurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of suchcases;

x x x.

The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:

SEC 16.Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during histenure of office.

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a publicofficer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.12

Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of publicofficers cited in jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, eitherfixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of thesovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual soinvested is a public officer.14
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The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation bylaw and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the positionas an office.15

Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) thedelegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance,the tenure of the NCC being temporary.

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most

important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that thecreation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions ofgovernment, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of thecountry, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.16

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegateupon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be describedas executive?

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce

and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 1The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.

The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof:

Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularizethe nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.

In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National CentennialCelebrations in 1998:

Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents an

important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;

Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values;

Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning andcontinuous developmental programming;

Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability, particularly incommunication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and continuousdevelopmental programming;

Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing themultisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective instruments fromthe launching and overseeing of this long-term project;

x x x.

E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the "need to strengthenthe said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and widerparticipation from the government and non-government or private organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalizethe relevance of historical links with other countries."

The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect. Thus, theCommission was vested with the following functions:
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(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of programs and projectson the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for history, economic endeavors, andreinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of theCentennial Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila,the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;

(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of the Centennial;

(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information about the plans and

events for the Centennial Celebrations;

(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs and projects;

(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard, the Commissionshall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) toensure the preservation and maintenance of the historical sites and structures;

(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private individuals andorganizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,

(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well as the status of thepreparations for the Celebration.18

It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,19 created the NCC by executive order. Book II(Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the nature of executive orders:

SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character inimplementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders[Underscoring ours.]

Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development, especially in Central Luzon.Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court:

MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:

And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the task of thecentennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic development of thezone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:

I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack of materialtime I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be inBatangas because I am a Batangeo but President Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon issuffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery inthat area by putting this Expo in Clark Fieldand so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may alsomention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business investments and employmentAnd the Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost jobthey were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have reallycalibrated, accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to thatbecause they had the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was theoriginal plan.

There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy. 20

Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla21 that the holding by a municipality of a town fiesta is aproprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues that the "holding of a nationwide celebration whichmarked the nations 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the nationagovernments proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held:
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[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives authority to themunicipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiestaeven if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for thespecial benefitof the community and notfor the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policyof the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provideentertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not asource of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance ofpublic schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertakingor function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will bedecisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is government inessence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in character. Easily, no governmental or publicpolicy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court cautioned that "there can beno hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; thesurrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive." Thus, in footnote 15 of Toriothe Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the "surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and culturabackgrounds" could produce a conclusion different from that in Torio:

We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and

cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case ofPope v. City of New Haven, et alwas an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resultingin the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The defendants demurred tothe complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental dutyfrom which it received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability isimposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend hiscomplaint to allege that the celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirmingthe order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:

Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public governmentalduties, unless made liable by statute.

A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a public Fourth

of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the air, but whichfailed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of agovernmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)

This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.

At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:

"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence Day, by oustatutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States statute making asimilar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since thegovernment was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized andcelebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse

and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting ofpatriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program including patriotic aisometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage tothe general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x"

Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was meant tocommemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize theliberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty asone united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O223 put it, it was a "vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an opportunity to "showcaseFilipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values." The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost onpetitioner, who remarked during the hearing:


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Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for freedomlove for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of ourhistory, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.

Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a publicofficer.

That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usuabut not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident

and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honoraryoffice, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. 23 Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may becharacterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salarycompensation or fees are attached.24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hocbody" make said commission less of apublic office.

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merelytemporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty be acontinuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual isappointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contractdefining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such

a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer."

At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the otherelements are present "it can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act or a series ofacts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or duringgood behavior."25

Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.26 There the Supreme Court of Rhode Islandruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify itsholder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, aperson holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)

x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under theUnited States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-President of theUnited States.

The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute providesfor the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, "under the auspices othe government of the United States," and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of more than onedelegate from each State and from each Territory of the United States, "whose functions shall continue until closeof the exhibition," and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution of the plan for holding theexhibition." Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the President of the United States, on thenomination of the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed upon thecommission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit beforethe President should announce, by proclamation, the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By anact of Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further increased and

defined. That act created a corporation, called "The Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with thecommission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the commission.The seventh section of the act provides "that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildingserected by the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United StatesCentennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance andadmission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall befixed and established by the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges oany description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall bemade without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have power tocontrol, change, or revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums."The tenth section of the act provides that "it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to
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supervise the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to thePresident of the United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition."

It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the commission werevarious, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only by men of large experience andknowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degreeauthoritative, discretionary, and final in their charact

Documents

Election LAw Cases I (A-C)