Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
ElectoralFormulaandFragmentationinHongKong
JohnM.CareyDepartmentofGovernment
DartmouthCollegeHanover,NH03755
http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jcarey/
AbstractThedirectlyelectedrepresentativestoHongKong'sLegislativeCouncilarechosenbylistproportionalrepresentation(PR)usingtheHareQuotaandLargestRemainders(HQLR)formula.Thisformularewardspoliticalalliancesofsmall-to-moderatesizeanddiscouragesbroaderunions.HongKong'spoliticalleadershaverespondedtothoseincentivesbyfragmentingtheirelectoralalliancesratherthanexpandingthem.TheleveloflistfragmentationobservedinHongKongisnotinherenttoPRelections.AlternativePRformulaswouldgenerateincentivestoformbroader,moreencompassingalliances.Indeed,mostcountriesthatusePRemploysuchformulas,andthemostcommonlyusedPRformulawouldgenerateincentivesoppositetoHQLR's,rewardingbroaderelectoralalliancesratherthandivisions.KeywordsHongKong,LegislativeCouncil,elections,electoralsystem,proportionalrepresentation
DRAFT:June9,2016
IntroductionHongKong'spoliticalagendahasfeatureddebatesinrecentyearsoverhowitstopofficial,thechiefexecutive,iselected(Langer2007,Zhang2010,Ip2014,Young2014).ThispaperreviewshowtherulesforelectingHongKong'slegislatorshaveaffectedpartysystemdevelopmentandlimitedtheeffectivenessoftheLegislativeCouncil(LegCo).BuildingonexistingscholarshiponhowvotesaretranslatedintoLegCorepresentation,IexaminehowelectoralrulesshapethestrategiespursuedbyHongKongpartyleaders.IalsoplaceHongKongelectionsinabroadercomparativeperspective,illustratinghowLegCoelectoraloutcomeswoulddifferundertheproportionalrepresentationformulamostcommonlyusedindemocraciesaroundtheworld.AndIshowthatevenbehaviorthatseemscounterproductive,suchasfailingtoformbroadalliances,isastrategicresponsetoHongKong'selectoralrulesratherthanasymptomofpoliticaldysfunction.ManyobservershavenotedthatHongKongelectionsarecharacterizedbyintensefragmentationoflists.MostnotablyMaNgocandChoyChi-keung,inavarietyofinvestigations(discussedbelow),haveemphasizedthattheformulaforlistproportionalrepresentation(PR)usedinHongKong,knownasHareQuotawithLargestRemainders(HQLR),encouragesfragmentation.Ratherthanrewardinganelectoralallianceforunitingasmanyvotesaspossibleunderonebanner,HQLRpunishesbigwinnersandencouragespoliticalalliestodivide.TheeffectofHQLRistohinderthedevelopmentofstrongpartieswithencompassingplatforms,limitingtheLegCo'spotentialasarepresentativeinstitution.MostdemocraciesthatuselistPRtoelecttheirlegislaturesdonotuseHQLR,andthemostcommonlyusedPRformularewardslistsizeratherthanpunishingit.ThispaperdemonstratestheextenttowhichanalternativePRformulawouldproduceincentivestounitepartylists,andcontraststhesewiththeincentivestofragmentpresentinHongKong.ItalsoillustratestheopportunitycostsHongKongpoliticianswouldconfront,giventherulesunderwhichtheycompete,iftheydidnotfragmenttheirlistsandinsteadpursuedunifiedalliances.Thepaperproceedsasfollows.First,IcomparethemechanicsoftheHQLRformulawiththemostcommonlyusedPRformulaworldwide,theD'Hondtdivisorsmethod.Next,Iillustratethephenomenonunderconsideration,thepatternofpartyandlistfragmentationinLegCoelectionsunderHQLR.ThenIreviewthekeyinstitutionaldesigndecisionsthatproducedthecurrentelectoralsystem,whatpriorscholarshiphastosayaboutthesystem,andwhatthispaperadds.ThenextsectionintroducestheideaofelectoralefficiencyanddemonstratesthatHongKongpartyleadershaverespondedtotheincentivesHQLRgenerates,butthattheincentivesunderD'Hondtwouldbestarklydifferent.ThelastsectionlocatesthecaseofHongKongincomparativeperspectiveandconsiderstheeffectsofelectoralsystemdesignondemocracyinthespecialadministrativeregion.PRFormulasThetwomostcommonformulasforallocatingseatsinlistPRsystemsaretheHQLRandtheD'Hondtmethods.Despitetheircommonpurpose,themethodsdiffermechanicallyandintheireffectsonelectoraloutcomes.HQLR:Thebasicprinciplehereistoseta“retailprice,”inthecurrencyofvotes,atwhichseatsineachelectoraldistrictmaybe“purchased”bylists.Thatprice,orquota,isdeterminedby
dividingthetotalnumberofvalidvotescastinadistrictbytheDM.1Aftervoteshavebeentallied,eachlistisawardedasmanyseatsinthedistrictasfullquotasofvotesitwon.Foreachseatawardedinthismanner,aquotaofvotesissubtractedfromthelist’sdistricttotal.Ifnotallseatsinthedistrictcanbeawardedonthebasisoffullquotas,anyremainingseatsareallocated,oneperlist,indescendingorderofthelists’remainingvotes.Theseseats,therefore,arepurchasedforlessthantheretailprice(orquota)foraseat.Liststhatwinseatsonthebasisoftheirremaindersare,effectively,buyingseats“wholesale,”atreducedprices.Notethat,underHQLR,itisvirtuallyimpossibleforallseatsinadistricttobepurchasedatretailprice,sotheHQLRmethodalmostguaranteesthat,withinagivendistrict,listswillpaydifferentpricesforseatstheywin.D'Hondt:UnderD'Hondt,allseatsareawardedaccordingtoauniformprinciple.Ratherthansetapriceinvotesforthepurchaseofseats,divisorsmethodsusethetalliesofvotesacrossliststoestablishamatrixofquotientspertainingtolists,thenallocateseatsindescendingorderofquotientsuntilalltheseatsinagivendistrictareawarded.Ahypotheticalexampleillustrates.Imagineadistrictinwhichfourlists–A,B,C,andD–competeand1,000votesarecast.ThevotesaredistributedacrosslistsasillustratedinTable3:405,325,185and85,respectively.D'Hondtproceedsbycalculatingamatrixofquotientsbydividingeachlist’stallybythesequenceofintegers1,2,3,andsoon.ThesequotientsareshowninthesuccessiverowsofTable3.
[Table1]Oncethematrixisconstructed,seatsareawardedinthedescendingorderofquotients.Inthisdistrict,forexample,ifDM=6,thenthedistributionofseatsunderD'HondtwouldbeA(3),B(2),C(1),D(0).Bycontrast,underHQLRtheseatdistributionwouldbeA(2)B(2),C(1),D(1),thusbenefittingthesmallestlistanddisadvantagingthelargestrelativetoD'Hondt.ThesetwoformulasarebyfarthetwomostcommonlyusedamongdemocraciesthatelecttheirlegislativeassembliesbylistPR.2Forty-fourdemocraciesuseD'Hondt,HQLRissecondatthirty-six,andanotherfifteencountriesusevariants–eitherincreasingtheintervalsbetweendivisors(forexample,GermanyorNewZealand),orestablishingasmallerquota(forexample,SouthAfrica),orcombiningdifferentformulasfortheallocationofseatsindifferenttiers(forexample,BelgiumorGreece)(Colomer2004;Nohlen2005;Wikipedia2015).
1TheHarequotaisalsoknownasthe“simple”quota.2Eitheraquotas-and-remaindersapproachoradivisorsapproachcanbemodifiedfromitssimplestvariantinordertoadjustthedegreetowhichtheformularewardslargeversussmalllists.Thesimplestquota-basedformula,HQLR,isrelativelyfriendlytosmalllistsbecausethequota(retailprice)itsetstopurchaseseatsishigh.Liststhatwinenoughvotestopurchaseseatsatretailpayasteeppricefordoingso,andinturnhavetheirtalliesdiminishedrapidly,meaningthatlotsofseatstendtobeawardedbyremainders,atdiscountprices,andtoliststhatdidnotnecessarilysecureanyfullquotas.Bycontrast,thesimplestdivisorsformula,D'Hondt,isrelativelyfriendlytolargelistsbecause,inconstructingthematrixofquotientsbywhichseatswillbeawarded,iterodesthetalliesoflargelistsmoregraduallythandoalternativesequencesofdivisors(forexample,1,3,5,…).Thus,thesimplestvariantsineachfamilyofformulashaveoppositeeffects.
LegCofragmentationSincethetransferofsovereigntyfromtheUnitedKingdombacktoBeijingin1997,andtheformationofanewLegCounderHongKong'sBasicLaw,theassemblyhasgrowninsize.Still,onlyhalfofitsmembersaredirectlyelected,whereastheotherhalfarechosenby"functionalconstituencies,"acorporatistsysteminwhichkeydecision-makersarechosenbycommercial,professional,andcivicgroupswhosevotingweightdoesnotcorrespondtotheirshareofthepopulation(Pepper2000,Ip2014).ThesizesofthesecohortsareshowninTable2.
[Table2]
ThedirectlyelectedrepresentativesarechosenbyPRinfivegeographicaldistricts.Table3showsthenumberofseatsawardedineachgeographicalconstituencyintheHKSARineachelectionsince1998.
[Table3]Withineachdistrict,parties,alliances,orevenindividualpoliticianscanregistertopresentacandidatelist.Eachvotercastsaballotforamost-preferredlist.3Aftereachlist'svotesaretallied,theHQLRformulaisusedtoconvertvotestoaproportionalshareofseatswithineachdistrict.Onceeachlist'sshareofseatsisdetermined,winningcandidatesareidentifiedbytheirlistpositions.Ifalistwinsoneseatinthedistrict,onlyitstopcandidateiselected;ifitwinstwoseats,thetoptwoareelected;andsoforth.FragmentationinHongKongelectionsisdrivenbythreerelatedtrends–themultiplicationofpoliticalparties,splitswithinpartiesbywhichpartiessometimesrunmultiplelistsinthesamedistrict,andtheproliferationoflistsaffiliatedwiththemajorpoliticalcamps–pro-democraticandpro-Beijing–butunderNonpartisanlabels.ThecombinedeffectsofthesephenomenaareillustratedinFigure1,whichshowsthevoteshareforlistswithineachcampandamongnon-alignedlistsforeachelectionsincethecurrentelectoralruleshavebeeninplace.
[Figure1]Thevotesharesacrossthebroadcampsarefairlyconsistent,withthepro-democracysidewinningmajoritiesoftheoverallvote,albeitbydecliningmarginsabovethepro-Beijinggroupovertime.Thefragmentationwithincamps,however,isstriking,startingin2000amongthepro-democratsandincreasingthereafteronbothsides.Thesplinteringreflectsanincreasingfragmentationbothamongpartiesandwithinthem.Inthe2000election,forthefirsttime,theDemocraticPartyranmultiplelistsinNewTerritoriesEast(twolists)andWest(threelists)districts.By2004,theADPLjoinedtheDemocrats,splittinglistsinKowloonWest,andinthatsameelection,sixofthepro-democraticcamp's18seatswenttoNonpartisanliststhatwonasingleseateach.Bythe2012election,thepro-BeijingDABranmultiplelistsinHongKongIslandaswellasNewTerritoriesEastandWest.4
3Voterscannotindicateanypreferenceamongthecandidatesonalist;thuslistsare"closed."4TheAppendixshowsvotesharesandseatswonforeachparty,andfornon-partisanlists,foreachelectionsince1998,andprovidesfurtherinformationondatasources.
EngineeringfragmentationanddiagnosingtheeffectofHQLRTheselectionofHQLRwaspartofapackageofelectoralreformsadoptedbythegovernmentofthePeople'sRepublicofChinainthelate1990s,whensovereigntyoverHongKongwastransferred.InthelatestagesofBritishruleinHongKong,thecolonialgovernmentconductedtwoelectionsinwhichsomemembersoftheLegCoweredirectlyelected.5In1991,thoseseatswereelectedbyblockvoteintwo-memberdistricts;in1995,theywereelectedbysingle-memberdistrict(SMD)plurality.Eithermethodallowsacampthatcancommandpluralitysupporttocapturealargewinner'sbonus,andHongKong'spro-democraticforcesdominatedbothelections,winning16ofthe18directlyelectedseatsin1991and17of20in1995.TheseoutcomesalarmedtheofficialsinBeijingwhowerepreparingforthereabsorptionofHongKongandcraftingtheinstitutionsthatwoulddefinegovernanceunder"onecountry,twosystems"(Lam1995,Wong1998,Ho1999,Baum2000,Pepper2000).LauSiu-kai(1999)providesadetailedaccountofthedeliberationsofthatera.From1994to1996,LauservedasaconvenerfirstoftheElectoralAffairsStudySubgroupforHongKong,thenoftheSubgrouponElectoralMethodsfortheFirstLegislature(SEMFL),bothappointedbytheNationalPeople'sCongressinBeijing.HeacknowledgeshowpreventingthedevelopmentofeffectivelegislativepartieswasacentralpriorityforBeijing:
"TheCommunistregime…realizedfullwellthattheappearanceofpoliticalpartieswasinevitablewhenevertherewereelections,particularlypopularelections.Itneverthelessdidnotwanttoseetheriseofanti-CommunistpoliticalpartiesinHongKong.NorcouldChinatoleratethedominationofthelegislaturebyapowerfulpoliticalparty,whichthencouldusethevetopowersatthelegislature'sdisposalto'blackmail'theexecutiveortobringaboutstalematebetweentheexecutiveandlegislativebranches…IndevisingtheelectoralarrangementsforthefirstlegislatureoftheHKSAR,therefore,Chinastrovetoimpedethedevelopmentoflocalpoliticalparties,particularlythosewithpro-democraticandanti-Communistinclinations."(Lau1999:13-14).
Restrictingtheshareofdirectlyelectedrepresentativesandstackingthefunctionalconstituencieswithrepresentativesselectedindependentlyfrompartiespromotedthisagenda,butinBeijing'sestimation,sodidabandoningthemajoritarianformulasthathadbeenusedunderBritishsovereigntyforthedirectlyelectedLegCoseats:
"Inviewoftheanti-CommunistsentimentsinHongKongandtheinstinctualtendencyofamajorityofthepeopletovoteforpoliticianswhostoodfortheinterestsofthemaninthestreet,itwasunavoidablethatmorethanhalfoftheseatswouldbewonbythepro-democracyandpro-grass-rootspoliticians.Still,ifadecentminorityofdirectlyelectedpoliticianstookafriendlystancetowardChinaandamoderatepositiononsocio-economicissues,thepoliticalcloutofthemajoritycouldbebluntedtoacertainextent"(Lau1999:15).
TheBeijinggovernmentconsideredadoptingeitherlistPRorthesinglenon-transferablevote(SNTV)system.Thelatterpresentsthegreatestobstaclestopoliticalpartydevelopmentofanysystemusedtoelectnationallegislatures(Cox&Shugart1996,Cox,Rosenbluth,andThies1999,5Thecolonial-eraLegCowasanadvisorybodyandamajorityofitsmemberswereeitherselectedbyfunctionalconstituenciesorappointedbythegovernor.
Reynolds&Carey2012),butBeijingeventuallysouredonSNTVbecause,bythelate1990s,itwasusedonlyinTaiwan(Lau1999).Ultimately,theNationalPeople'sCongressoptedforlistPR,withthegoalofallowingpro-Beijingpoliticianstotransfertheirroughly40%supportintheelectorateintoacorrespondingnumberofseatsintheLegCo.Incombinationwiththefunctionalconstituencyseats,whichover-representbusinessandfinancialinterestsinclinedtoavoiddirectconfrontationwithBeijing,thesystemhasrealizeditsdesigners'goalsofpreventingthedevelopmentofapro-democracypartythatcouldcontroltheLegCoanduseitasaplatformtochallengethechiefexecutive'sdominanceinsettingpolicy(MaandChoy1999).ScholarsofHongKongelectionshavewidelynotedthattheadoptionofPRprovidedinsuranceforBeijingagainstapro-democracytsumamiintheLegCo(Fung1996,Ho1999,Baum2000,Choy2013).Theseaccountsnote,correctly,thatPRprovidesfewerincentivesfortheformationofbroadelectoralalliancesthandothemajoritarianelectoralrulesthatgovernedcontestsfortheLegCo'sdirectlyelectedseatsin1991and1995(Duverger1951;Cox1997).Nevertheless,therearetworelevantcomparisonsatworkhere.ThefirstisbetweenmajoritarianelectoralrulesandPR,andthesecondisamongPRformulas.ScholarshiponHongKongelectionshaswidelyrecognizedtheformer,emphasizingthatPRelectionshavefosteredmorepartyfragmentationthanwouldmajoritarianones(Cheng2001and2010,Cheung2005,Lee2010,Yip2014),butlessfrequentlyrecognizedtheroleplayedbythechoiceofHQLRratherthanotheravailablePRformulas.ThemostprominentexceptionsareaseriesofstudiesbyMaNgocandChoyChi-keung,bothindividuallyandincollaboration.ThesescholarsemphasizedearlyonthatBeijing'ssupportofPRelectionswasastrategicmovethatcouldfragmentthepro-democracycamp'sforcesintheLegCo(MaandChoy1999,Ma2001and2002).Theexperienceofthefirsttwoelectionsafterthetransferofsovereignty,in1998and2000,featuredrivalrieswithinparties,andthefirstinstancesofstrategiclistsplitting(Choy2002).MaandChoyprescientlyattributedthisphenomenontothedisadvantagethatlargelistsfaceunderHQLRinwinning"thelastseat"inanygivendistrict(2003a,fn.7),andforthe1998electiontheyidentifiedtwodistrictsinwhichseatdistributionsacrosspartieswouldhavedifferedhadtheD'HondtformulabeenusedratherthanHQLR(2003b).Asstrategiclist-splittinghasincreasedinHongKongandspreadfromthepro-democratictothepro-Beijingcamp,thesescholarshavechronicledthefragmentation,diagnosedHQLRasamotivatingfactor,andidentifiedthephenomenonasacontributingfactortotheLegCo'sweaknessasacounterweighttothechiefexecutive(Ma2005,2012,2014;Choy2014;seealsoChen2015).BuildingonthefoundationestablishedbyMaandChoy,theremainderofthispaperoffersanumberoffurthercontributions.IillustratethevirtualdisappearancefromHongKongelectionsofcompetitionforseatsbyfullquota.Then,usingdistrict-levelreturnsfromeveryelectionsince1998,Iproducesimulatedoutcomesshowingthattheimpetustowardfragmentationwouldnothaveapplied–indeed,itwouldhavebeenreversed–ifHongKongemployedthemorewidelyusedD'HondtdivisorPRformularatherthanHQLR.IalsoproducesimulationsthatillustratehowrecentelectoralresultswouldhavedifferedunderHQLRhadthepro-democraticcampnotpursuedlistfragmentation.Inall,theseanalysesindicatethatthecurrentrulesmakelistfragmentationaneffectivestrategyforpartyleaders,whereasotherruleswouldalterstrategies,andcouldproduceaLegCowithbroaderpartyalliances.
Distributionalconsequences:Electoralefficiency,size,andseatbonusesElectoralefficiencymeanswinningthemostseatspossible,givenone'slevelofsupportintheelectorate.Imagineasetofpoliticianswhoshareacommonpurpose–whethertoincrease(orreduce)taxrates,toincrease(orreduce)socialwelfarespending,toincrease(orrelax)environmentalregulations–andwhoexpectsomelevel,X,ofsupportforthisplatformamongvoters.Forthissetofpoliticians,maximizingelectoralefficiencymeansconvertingXintothelargestpossibleshareofseatsinthelegislature.UnderHQLRpurchasingseatswithremaindervotesisalwaysmoreefficientthanpurchasingthemwithfullquotas.Itfollowsthatanygroupofpoliticiansmaximizesitsefficiencybypurchasingasmanyseatsaspossiblebyremaindersandasfewaspossiblebyfullquota.Towinanyseatbyfullquotaistoover-pay.HongKongpoliticianshavelearnedthislessonwell.Figure2showsthepercentageofseatswonbyfullquotaamonglistswithineachcampforeachelectionsince1998.Forthefirstthreeelections,bothcampspaidfullpriceforabouthalfoftheirseats,andpurchasedtheotherhalfatreducedprices,byremainders.Theproliferationofliststhatjumpedmostdramaticallyin2008correspondedtosharpreductionsintheshareofseatsforwhicheachcamppaidfullprice.Bythe2012election,ofthe34seatscapturedbylistsfromthetwomajorcamps,onlythreewerewonbyfullquota.
[Figure2]Anotherwaytothinkaboutelectoralefficiencyisintermsofwhethertheshareofseatswonbyapartyoracampexceedsitsshareofthevote(abonus),orfallsshortofitsvoteshare(apenalty).Drawingonthedistrict-levelelectoraldatadescribedabove,Icalculatedthebonusforeveryparty(andnonpartisanlist)thatcontestedanydistrict-levelelectionsinHongKongfrom1998to2012.Figure3showsaseriesofplots,oneforeachelection,ofeachparty'soverallvoteshareagainstitsseatbonus.Thesmallestpartieswinsome,albeitmodest,votesharesandnorepresentationandso,bydefinition,sufferpenalties.Thosepenaltiesaffordforsurplusrepresentationthatisdistributedacrossthepartieswinningseats.Buthowthebonusesaredistributedillustratestherelationshipbetweenelectoralsizeandelectoralrewards.EachplotinFigure3includesthequadraticbest-fitline,illustratingtheshapeofthevote-bonusfunction.Inthefirsttwoelections,thefunctionwasconvex,whichistosaytherewerediminishingreturnstoscale.Thelargestpartiesdidnotnecessarilywinlargestseatbonuses.Bywinningseatswithfullquotas,theywereover-paying,andconvertingvotersupportintorepresentationinefficiently.Efficiencywasgreatestforpartiescapturingmoderatevoteshares,between5-15%,whichwerewinningseatsbasedonlyonremaindervotes.
[Figure3]Notealsothatthevoteshareofthelargestpartytendstodiminishovertime,from43%in1998,to29%in2000,to21%in2004,risingslightlyto23%in2008,andfallingagainto18%in2012.Thisisnoaccident;instead,itistheresultofthestrategicresponseofpoliticianstothediminishingreturnstosizeintheearlyelectionsunderHQLR.Whenbeingbigdoesnotconveyanelectoralreward,politicians–evenpotentialallies–aremotivatedtodivergeratherthantocoalesce.Asthesizeofthelargestpartiesdiminishes,therearenomorecompetitorswhowouldeverpayfullpriceforaseat.Thevote-bonusfunction,whichissensitivetothestrategicbehaviorofpartiesunderHQLR,losesitsconvexshape.Theproliferationofpartieswithineachcampand,insomecases,thelistswithineachpartyisastrategytomaximizeelectoralefficiency
–neverpayingfullpriceforaseatthatcouldbewonmorecheaply,andideallychannelingsurplusvotestootherlistsfightingformoreorlessthesamesetofpolicies.NowconsiderhowtheseincentiveswouldhavedifferedhadHongKongusedD'HondtratherthanHQLR.Figure4replicatestheplotsfromFigure3,thistimesimulatingtheoutcomesthatwouldhaveobtainedhadHongKongusedtheD'HondtformularatherthanHQLR.TheD'Hondtformularewardssize,providingeconomiesofelectoralscale,andconferringlargerbonusestolargerparties.Notethattheshapeofthevote-bonusfunctionunderD'Hondtisconsistentlyconcave,eveninthefaceofincreasingpartyandlistfragmentation.D'Hondtprovidesincreasingreturntoscale,rewardinglargerlistswithlargerseatbonusesatanyleveloflistfragmentation,thusmotivatingpoliticianstoformandsustainbroadalliances.
[Figure4]WecanalsosimulatewhatwouldhavehappenedtoHongKong'selectoralalliancesunderHQLRhadtheypursuedunificationratherthanfragmentation.By2008,forexample,fragmentationreacheditsmatureformamongthepro-democraticcamp,whichwononlyoneofitsnineteenseatsbyfullquota.Figure5showstheanalogousplotsforthe2008and2012electionsconductedunderHQLR,butthistimewithvotesforallthelistsfromthepro-democracycamppooledtogetherwithineachdistrictasifthepro-democratshadrununifiedlists.6Inbothcases,thebroadalliancewinslittleornoseatbonus,whereasmuchsmallerlists(inthesecases,pro-Beijingandnon-alignedlists)winlargerbonuses.
[Figure5]Thelessonsfromthesevariousexercisesareconsistent:ElectoralefficiencyunderHQLR'sdual-pricingsystemmeansavoidingpayingfullpriceforaseat.Ineachelectiontodate,HongKongvotershaveconfrontedanincreasinglycacophonoussetofchoiceswhentheycasttheirLegCoballots.Thisisnotbecausepoliticalleadersareinherentlyindividualisticoruncooperative.TheyaresimplyrespondingtotheincentivesgeneratedbyHQLR,wheretheoptimalstrategyisfragmentation.UnderadifferentPRformula,incentivescouldpushintheoppositedirection,encouragingbroadalliancesintheHKSARratherthanfragmentation.D'Hondtisoneoption,anditrewardssizethemost.Otheralternativesarealsoavailable(forexample,theSt.Laguedivisorsmethod),whicharesomewhatmoregeneroustosmallandmid-sizedlistswhileavoidingthedual-pricesystemofHQLR.Thekeypointisthat,underotherPRformulas,theimperativeofelectoralefficiencyistounifythelargestpossiblevotesharebehindacommonlist.DiscussionTheimplicationsofPRforthedirectlyelectedseatsintheLegCohavebeenwidelynotedbyscholars,andthepioneeringworkbyMaandChoyhasemphasizedthespecificeffectsoftheHQLRformula.Thispaperpursuesthatissue,highlightingthestrategicresponseofHongKongpoliticianstoHQLR,andhowelectoralresultswouldhavedifferedunderanalternativePRformula.6Inarecentconferencepaper,JudyChiaYinWei(2012)analyzestheeffectivenessofthelist-splittingstrategiespursuedbythemajorcamps,emphasizingtheimportanceofcoordinatingcampaigneffortstoequalizevotetalliesacrossthelistschasing"cheap"seatsbyremainders.
ItisworthnotingthattheHongKongexperienceisnotunique.Duringmostofthe20thCenturyanduntil2002,ColombiaelecteditsHouseofRepresentativesusingHQLRin33districtswithanaverageDMaround5,akintoHongKong's.LikeHongKong,Colombiaallowedpartiestorunmultiplelistsinagivendistrict–andsplittheydid.IntheBogotadistrictin2002,256separatelistsran,nonecapturedafullquota(5.6%),andall18seatswerewonbyremainders(Pahcon&Shugart2010).SplittinglistsinordertocaptureseatsbyremaindersratherthanfullquotaswassuchastaplestrategyinColombiathatitwaswidelyknownasoperacionavispas(operationwasps),toconveythatatargetwasmoreeffectivelyattackedbyaswarmofsmallpredatorsthanbyasingle,largerassailant.BecauseColombianlegislatorswereincompetitionasmuchwithotherlistsfromtheirownpartiesaswithotherparties,theylackedincentivestocultivatebroadpartyplatformsthatwouldmakethelegislatureasawholeaneffectivepolicy-makingactor.WiththegoalofstrengtheningitsCongress,Colombiaadoptedareformin2006thatmadethreeimportantchanges:switchingthePRformulafromHQLRtoD'Hondt,limitingeachpartytoonelistperdistrict,andallowingpartiestoruntheirsinglelistsundereitheranopenformat–thusaffordingvoterstheopportunitytocastpreferencevotesamongcandidates–oraclosedformat(Shugart,Moreno,andFajardo2007).Followingthereform,thenumberoflistsdropped(aforgoneconclusiongiventherequirementofonelistperparty)andintra-partycompetitionshiftedfromacrosssplitliststowithinopenlists(PachonandShugart2010).Notably,thecorrelationbetweenthevotesharesofthelargestpartiesandtheirseatbonusesgrewstronger(Shugart,Moreno,andFajardo2007,Tables7.4and7.8).ThemovetoD'Hondtrewardseconomiesofscaleandbroaderelectoralalliancesunitedunderacommonbanner.ThechoiceofPRformulaisatechnicalmatterbutitcanhaveprofoundeffectsonthebehaviorofpoliticians,thechoicesofferedtovoters,andthecompositionofthelegislativealliances.ThedecisiontoadoptHQLRforHongKong'sLegCoelectionswasmomentous,andtheeffectswereconsistentwiththegoalsattributedbyLau(1999)toBeijing'selectoralsystemdesigners,toimpedethedevelopmentofaneffectivepro-democraticblockintheLegCo.WereHongKongtouseaformulathatencouragedalliance,ratherthanfragmentation,theLegCo'spotentialtorepresentbroadinterestswithintheHongKongpolicymakingprocesscouldbesubstantiallystronger.
ReferencesBaum,Richard.2000."Democracydeformed:HongKong's1998legislativeelections-and
beyond."ChinaQuarterly162:439-464.
ChenWeiyang.2015. ("Empiricalanalysisoftheelectoralsystem’seffectsondirectlyelectedrepresentativestotheHongKongLegislativeCouncil.")JournalofChongqingInstituteofSocialism2:38-42.
Cheng,JosephY.S.2001."ElectionsandpoliticalpartiesinHongKong'spoliticaldevelopment."JournalofContemporaryAsia31(3):346-374.
Cheng,JosephY.S.2010."MaintainingthePoliticalStatusQuo?HongKong'sLegislativeCouncilElections."IssuesandStudies46(4):181-216.
Cheung,CK.2005."WhowonpoliticalelectionsinHongKongovertime?"SocialScienceJournal42(2):183-199.
ChoyChi-keung.2002."Thedecisiveeffectoftheproportionalrepresentationsystem:Frominter-partcompetitiontointra-partycompetition,"inOutoftheshadowof1997?The2000LegislativeCouncilelectionintheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegion,KuanHsin-chi,LauSiu-kaiTimothyKa-yingWong,editors.HongKong:TheChineseUniversityPress.
ChoyChi-keung.2013.“比例代表制：早知今日，何必当初”("Proportionalrepresentation:Hadweknowntheoutcome,wewouldnothaveimplementedthissystem.")MingPaoDailyNews.August1.
Colomer,Josep.2004.Handbookofelectoralsystemchoice.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.
Cox,GaryW.1997.Makingvotescount:Strategiccoordinationintheworld'selectoralsystems.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Cox,GaryW.andMatthewSobergShugart.1996."Strategicvotingunderproportionalrepresentation."JournalofLaw,Economics,andOrganization12(2):299-234.
Cox,GaryW.,FrancesM.Mosenbluth,andMichaelF.Thies.1999."Electoralreformandthefateoffactions:ThecaseofJapan'sLiberalDemocraticParty."BritishJournalofPoliticalScience29:33-56.
Duverger,Maurice.1951."Theinfluenceofelectoralsystemsonpoliticallife."InternationalSocialScienceBulletin3:314-352.
Fung,WingK.1996."TheLastLegislativeElectionofHongKongunderBritishRule,1995."ElectoralStudies15(1):119-123.
Ho,Karl.1999."TheHongKonglegislativeelectionof1998."ElectoralStudies18(3)438-445.
Ip,EricC.2014."TheHighCourtofthePeople:PopularConstitutionalisminHongKongunderChineseSovereignty."LawandPolicy36(3):314-338.
Langer,Lorenz.2007."Theelusiveaimofuniversalsuffrage:ConstitutionaldevelopmentsinHongKong."ICON–InternationalJournalofConstitutionalLaw5(3):419-452.
LauSiu-kai.1999."Themakingoftheelectoralsystem,"inPowertransfer&electoralpolitics:ThefirstlegislativeelectionintheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegion.KuanHsin-chi,LauSiu-kai,LouieKin-sheun,andTimothyKa-yingWong,editors.HongKong:The
ChineseUniversityPress,pp.3-34.
Lee,FrancisL.F.2010."Pragmatism,PerceivedReality,andHongKongPeople'sAttitudestowardDemocraticReform."IssuesandStudies46(1):189-219.
MaNgoc.2001."ThedeclineoftheDemocraticPartyinHongKong."AsianSurvey41(4):564-583.
MaNgoc.2002."FactionalismintheDemocraticPartyandthe2000election,"inOutoftheshadowof1997?The2000LegislativeCouncilelectionintheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegion,KuanHsin-chi,LauSiu-kaiTimothyKa-yingWong,editors.HongKong:TheChineseUniversityPress
MaNgok.2005."StrategicCoordinationunderProportionalRepresentation:AStudyattheCandidateLevel."PresentedattheConferenceonthe2004LegislativeCouncilElections,ChineseUniversityofHongKong.April8.
MaNgoc.2012."Politicalpartiesandelections,"inContemporaryHongKongGovernmentandPolitics,LamWai-man,PercyLuen-timLui,andWilsonWong,editors.HongKongUniversityPress:159-176.
MaNgoc.2014."Increasedpluralizationandfragmentation:Partysystemandelectoralpoliticsandthe2012elections,"inNewtrendsofpoliticalparticipationinHongKong,JosephY.S.Cheng,editor.CityUniversityofHongKongPress:185-210.
Ma,Ngok.2015."TheRiseof"Anti-China"SentimentsinHongKongandthe2012LegislativeCouncilElections."ChinaReview–AnInterdisciplinaryJournalonGreaterChina15(1):39-66.
MaNgok,andChi-keungChoy.1999."TheevolutionoftheelectoralsystemandpartypoliticsinHongKong."IssuesandStudies35(1):167-194.
MaNgoc,andChi-keungChoy.2003a."Theimpactofelectoralrulechangeonpartycampaignstrategy–HongKongasacasestudy."PartyPolitics9(3):347-367.
MaNgoc,andChi-keungChoy.2003b.選舉制度的政治效果:港式比例代表制的經驗(Politicalconsequencesofelectoralsystems:TheHongKongproportionalrepresentationsystem.)HongKong:CityUniversityofHongKongPress.
Nohlen,Dieter.2005.ElectionsintheAmericas:Adatahandbook.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
OxfordAnalytica.2015."HongKonghitsstalemateaspoliticalreformstalls."DailyBrief.June22.https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB200431/Hong-Kong-hits-stalemate-as-political-reform-stalls
Pachon,MonicaandMatthewSobergShugart.2010."Electoralreformandthemirrorimageofinter-partyandintra-partycompetition:TheadoptionofpartylistsinColombia."ElectoralStudies29(4):648-660.
Pepper,Suzanne.2000."Elections,politicalchangeandbasiclawgovernment:TheHongKongsysteminsearchofapoliticalform."ChinaQuarterly163:410-438.
Reynolds,AndrewandJohnM.Carey.2012.ThePoliticalConsequencesofElectionDesigninAfghanistan.Kabul,Afghanistan:AfghanResearchandEvaluationUnit.
Shugart,MatthewSoberg,ErikaMoreno,andLuisE.Fajardo.2007."Deepeningdemocracyby
renovatingpoliticalpractices:ThestruggleforelectoralreforminColombia,"inChristopherWelnaandGustavoGallon,eds.,Peace,democracy,andhumanrightsinColombia.NotreDame,IN:UniversityofNotreDamePress,pp.202-267.
Wei,JudyChiaYin.2012."TheParties’StrategicEntryinHongKong’sLegislativeCouncilElectionsundertheLargestRemainderProportionalRepresentation."PresentedattheAmericanAssociationforChineseStudies54thAnnualConference.October13.
Wong,TimothyKa-ying.1998.ThefirstLegislativeCouncilelectionoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegion:Meaningandimpact."Issues&Studies34(9):124:149.
Yip,Stan;Yeung,Ronald.2014."The2012LegislativeCouncilelectioninHongKong."ElectoralStudies35:366-370.
Young,SimonN.M.2014."RealisinguniversalsuffrageinHongKongaftertheStandingCommittee'sdecision."HongKongLawJournal44:689-708.
ZhangBaohui.2010."Beijing's2007politicalreformplanandprospectsforHongKong'sdemocratization."Democratization17(3):442-464.
TablesandFiguresfor"ElectoralFormulaandFragmentationinHongKong"Table1.IllustrationoftheDHDmethodinahypotheticaldistrict
List A B C DVotes 405 325 185 85
1stQ 405.0 325.0 185.0 85.02ndQ 202.5 162.5 92.5 42.53rdQ 135.0 108.3 61.7 28.34thQ 101.3 81.3 46.3 21.3Table2.DirectlyandindirectlyelectedmembershipintheLegCoYear
Elected TotalMembershipDirectly Indirectly
1998 20 30 502000 24 36 602004 30 30 602008 30 30 602012 35 35 70Table3.SeatspergeographicalconstituencyConstituency 1998 2000 2004 2008 2012HongKongIsland 4 5 6 6 7KowloonEast 3 4 5 4 5KowloonWest 3 4 4 5 5NewTerritoriesEast 5 5 7 7 9NewTerritoriesWest 5 6 8 8 9Total 20 24 30 30 35
Figure1.HongKongLegCoElections:PartyListVoteSharesbyCamp
Figure2.Percentageofseatsforwhichlistspaid"fullprice."
Figure3.SeatbonusesbyvoteshareinHongKongelections.
Figure4.SeatbonusesbyvoteshareinHongKongelections–D'Hondtsimulatedresults.
Figure5.Seatbonusesbyvoteshareinthe2008and2012elections–SimulationwithvotesfromallPro-Democraticlistsineachdistrictpooled.
