Electoral Politics in Africa: The Experience of Zambia and Zimbabwe

1 M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transi-tions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 243.

2 R. Joseph, ‘Africa, 1990–1997: From Abertura to Closure’, Journal of Democracy, 9:2 (1998), p. 4. See also, e.g. C. Monga, ‘Eight Problems with African Politics’, Journalof Democracy, 8: 3 (1997), pp. 156–70; V. Randall and L. Svåsand, ‘Political Parties andDemocratic Consolidation in Africa’, Democratization, 9: 3 (2002), pp. 30–52; and

William Tordoff and Ralph Young

Electoral Politics in Africa: The Experience of Zambia and Zimbabwe

BY BRINGING TO AN END THE DICTATORIAL REGIMES OF

Matthieu Kérékou in Benin and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, the1991 multiparty elections opened the floodgates of political reformthroughout sub-Saharan Africa. Over the following decade, competi-tive elections were held in most states, placing pluralist competitionfirmly on the political agenda. Indeed, whereas in 1989 there were29 single-party states – and only five with functioning multipartysystems – by 1994 no de jure single-party state remained, and thenumber of military regimes had shrunk considerably. Within the next 15 years, 20 African countries had changed their governmentspeacefully through multiparty elections; three of them (Benin, Madagascar and Mauritius) had seemingly even satisfied ‘theminimal two turnover test for democratic consolidation’.1

From the mid-1990s, however, a number of analysts suggested thatthe momentum of democratic reform efforts was already receding.They pointed to an emergent pattern of dominant-party politics,underpinned by powerful presidential institutions, and to the preva-lence of ineffective opposition forces split into numerous small andunstable groupings that were frequently vehicles for the advance-ment of individual politicians or narrow regional and ethnic inter-ests. Moreover, neo-patrimonial systems could often be detectedbehind the façade of nominally democratic institutions ‘contrived tosatisfy prevailing international norms of “presentability” ’.2 If some ofthis criticism was, undoubtedly, overly pessimistic, it did seem that

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404 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

© Government and Opposition Ltd 2005

multiparty competition had merely replaced intra-party competitionas the dominant link to continuing systems of presidential power. Insuch settings, the stress placed on the critical role of elections inAfrica’s democratic transitions appeared exaggerated.

Yet elections have clearly remained vital to transition processes:they opened political space within which competition for poweramong contending leaderships could occur; they provided means oflegitimizing ground rules for such struggles for power; and theycreated a mechanism which facilitated stable regime change. Andthough multiparty elections in African states at the start of the 1990soften appeared to offer no more than a ‘circulation of elites’ becauseof the frequent resurfacing of former regime notables in oppositionranks, over time they could be expected to provide greater oppor-tunities for significant change.3 More than any other factor, it hasbeen the occurrence of reasonably regular elections which has keptpluralist competition and public accountability on African politicalagendas; ‘if nothing else, the convening of multiparty elections servesthe minimal functions of marking democracy’s survival’.4 Against abackground of such concerns, we examine the experience of twoneighbouring southern African states, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Bothcountries have seen major alterations to their systems of governmentfollowing a quartet of elections held between February 2000 andMarch 2002. These elections were to produce major shifts in thebalance between ruling parties and opposition forces, thereby prom-ising to weaken the grip of dominant-party political systems under-pinned by powerful executive presidencies. The discussion exploresthe setting in which these electoral shifts occurred and marks out (as of early 2004) the domestic and international factors that haveconditioned – and limited – their impact.

THE SETTING

Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) is almost double the area ofZimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), but has a smaller population – over

C. Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar, Council for the Development ofSocial Science Research in Africa, 2000.

3 J. Barkan, ‘Protracted Transitions among Africa’s New Democracies’, Democrati-zation, 7: 3 (2000), pp. 227–43.

4 M. Bratton, ‘Second Elections in Africa’, Journal of Democracy, 9: 3 (1998), p. 52.

ELECTORAL POLITICS IN AFRICA 405


10 million as against 13 million for its neighbour. Though eachcountry is characterized by significant ethnic divisions, Zambia is themore culturally and linguistically fragmented. Around 40 per cent of the population in both countries are urban dwellers, and bothsocieties exhibit sharp urban–rural inequalities, though these havediminished as living conditions in the urban areas have declined andpoverty has increased. Both have relatively advanced modern sectors,anchored in Zambia’s case to its large-scale copper-mining industryand in Zimbabwe’s to significant mining and manufacturing sectorsand a substantial commercial farming base. In each case, the raciallyexclusive systems imposed under colonialism provided an energizingfocus for the black nationalist movements that emerged after theSecond World War. A powerful boost was given to nationalism byBritain’s unpopular establishment of the Central African Federationin 1953, uniting the two Rhodesias with Nyasaland (now Malawi).After a sometimes bitter, though not prolonged, struggle spear-headed by the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Zambiaachieved independence in October 1964, with Kenneth Kaunda aspresident. Barely a year later it had to confront the crippling eco-nomic effects of Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence(UDI) and the consequent resort to arms by the rival nationalistmovements – the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and theZimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a breakaway from ZAPUin 1963 whose leadership core has been dominated by RobertMugabe since 1976.5

POST-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS

The consequences of the independence settlement reached at theLancaster House Conference in 1979 were to entrench the white-dominated structures of a capitalist economy in Zimbabwe.6 Under

5 See W. Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, Manchester, Manchester University Press,1974, and W. Tordoff (ed.), Administration in Zambia, Manchester, Manchester Uni-versity Press, 1980; C. Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe’s Inheritance, Basingstoke, Macmillan,1981; and C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, London,Pinter, 1989.

6 C. Stoneman, ‘The Economy: Recognizing the Reality’, in C. Stoneman (ed.),Zimbabwe’s Prospects, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988, p. 43.



British pressure, the Patriotic Front (the ZANU/ZAPU alliance)accepted a constitution effectively guaranteeing the continuance ofwhite minority or foreign ownership of all the country’s main eco-nomic resources, including commercial farm land and mining. Suchan outcome was not without benefits; indeed in the 1980s, a rate of economic growth some three times the African average wasachieved. However, the policies pursued militated against the earlyadoption of radical land reform and state majority-control measures.The existing white–black social gap remained, while inequalitiesamong Africans were, if anything, accentuated, with a sharpeningurban–rural divide between a growing urban elite of civil servants,professionals and entrepreneurs and the peasant majority.

For the first decade after independence in each country, reformin Zambia was more far-reaching than in Zimbabwe. Zambiaresponded to Rhodesia’s UDI by accelerating measures to reduce itsdependence on the white-ruled territories to the south. Steps werealso taken to increase local control over an economy still largely dom-inated by foreign interests; these culminated in the takeover between1968 and 1970 of many foreign-owned enterprises, including themining industry, insurance companies and building societies; large-scale commercial agriculture remained, however, unaffected. Thereality of public control was reduced by the management contractsusually given to the companies being acquired and the continuingshortages of local managerial and professional manpower. Thebuoyant price of copper, accounting for 90 per cent of Zambia’sforeign exchange earnings, enabled the regime to pursue ambitiouseducational programmes, and greatly to extend the range of healthand other social services; the economy itself averaged a 13 per centannual growth rate in real terms from independence until 1970.Manpower was localized wherever possible, and Zambian participa-tion in the private sector was encouraged.

Ideology played a less significant role in shaping policy in eithercountry than the statements of their leaders suggested. Kaunda’sclaim that his government’s economic reforms were institutionaliz-ing his Humanist philosophy remained unconvincing, since Human-ism’s core stress on an egalitarian and ‘man-centred’ society rancounter to the dominant, mainly materialist values projected by thenewly emergent entrepreneurial and professional strata whose risethe economic reforms encouraged. Faced with the fact that Human-ism could not be implemented without greater central direction,



Kaunda took progressively more decision-making into his ownhands.7 Though opposition parties existed, the real challenge toUNIP came from within: infighting between various sectional groupsweakened UNIP’s cohesion and effectiveness, and precipitated theintroduction of a one-party state in 1972–73. While competitive elec-tions were retained within the new framework, democratic practicewas eroded.

In Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s government did introduce an array ofsocial reform measures after assuming power in April 1980, includ-ing the provision of free primary schooling and medical care, theracial integration of schools and hospitals, and the Africanization ofthe public service. In most respects, though, Mugabe’s Marxist com-mitments – honed during the armed liberation struggle – were notreflected in the pragmatic policies his government pursued,8 and afundamental restructuring of the economy was avoided. The empha-sis was placed instead on reviving the war-torn economy; thus, foreigninvestment was encouraged, trade links with South Africa were main-tained, and unofficial strikes and work stoppages were banned. By1987, mainly through the ‘willing seller, willing buyer formula’, thegovernment had acquired 2.2 million hectares of commercial farmland on which it resettled 40,000 peasant families, with Britain pro-viding half the funding. Though the land issue had proved highlycontentious during the Lancaster House negotiations, land reformwas played down after the mid-1980s, when the focus shifted fromresettlement to the need to stimulate market production in the ‘com-munal areas’ (or zones reserved for African settlement under theformer regime).9 But the dilemma which the land problem createdwould not go away, given the conflicting demands for land byZANU–PF supporters and the need to maintain agricultural pro-duction to underpin the country’s export economy. To achieve the

7 C. Gertzel, C. Baylies and M. Szeftel (eds), The Dynamics of the One-Party State inZambia, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984, esp. ch. 4.

8 See J. Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, Berkeley, University of California Press,1990, p. 227.

9 By 1997 these figures had increased to 3.3 million ha. and 71,000 peasant families, considerably lower than the government had planned. See chapters by J. Cusworth and L. Cliffe in T. A. S. Bowyer-Bower and C. Stoneman (eds), Land Reformin Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000, pp. 25–34 and 35–46respectively.



latter, the government depended heavily on the country’s substantialcommercial farming community – an estimated 4,500 strong in 2000,and still mainly white a generation after independence.10 Though the need for land reform was recognized even by the CommercialFarmers’ Union, the farming community made clear its oppositionto legislation introduced in the early 1990s to facilitate compulsoryland acquisition.11 Throughout the decade the government andWestern donors failed to agree a solution to the land issue, and theopportunity to undertake planned and orderly reforms was missed.The internationalization of what was basically a domestic problemserved to influence the form and pace of reform.

Until Zambia’s one-party state was created in 1972, UNIP’s strug-gle to maintain party unity had largely reflected concern that a break-away group might coalesce with the official opposition, the AfricanNational Congress. In Zimbabwe too, Mugabe and ZANU–PFintended from the outset to create a one-party state, partly to checkcontinuing intra-Shona rivalries which were adversely affecting boththe party and the government. However, talks aimed at effecting a merger of ZANU and ZAPU got nowhere until December 1987,when a unification accord was negotiated. Important constitutionalchanges were instituted under which Mugabe became executive pres-ident while the special representation granted to the white minorityby the Lancaster House agreement – 20 seats in the House of Assem-bly and 10 in the Senate – was ended. The expected creation of aone-party state was held up in 1989 by the ‘Willowgate’ corruptionscandal, which led to the resignation of five ministers, weakenedZANU–PF’s urban support base,12 and was exploited by the Zim-babwe Unity Movement. This new party was joined in opposingsingle-party rule by the labour movement, university students andhuman rights groups. But it was division over this issue within theruling party’s political bureau that proved decisive;13 in 1990 the

10 See C. Stoneman, ‘Zimbabwe Land Policy and the Land Reform Programme’,in Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, p. 51.

11 G. J. Naldi, ‘Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Some Legal Aspects’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies, 31: 4 (1993), pp. 585–600.

12 See Richard Brown, ‘Zimbabwe: Recent History’, in K. Murison (ed.), AfricaSouth of the Sahara 2004, London, Europa, 2004, p. 1224.

13 B. Raftopoulos, ‘Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in Zimbabwe’, Review of African Political Economy, 19: 54 (1992), p. 73.



government announced that it would not impose a one-party systembut would follow a strategy similar to Kaunda’s under Zambia’s FirstRepublic of establishing one-party rule through the ballot box.ZANU–PF came close to achieving this aim in the April 1995 generalelection, when a combination of elected, nominated, ex-officio andtraditional members gave it control of 147 of the legislature’s 150seats. It was thus apparent that the primary constraints on Mugabe’sexercise of presidential power would be self-imposed.14

In Zambia, during the almost 19 years that Kaunda presided over aone-party state, parliamentary and presidential elections occurredregularly every five years; the former were based on intra-party com-petition, while the latter enabled electors to approve or reject theparty’s sole candidate. Yet under the Second Republic, as the NationalAssembly’s ability to scrutinize government actions diminished, publicexpenditure spiralled out of control. With mounting economic diffi-culties, the quality of Kaunda’s leadership deteriorated and, seeminglyconvinced of his indispensability, authoritarian tendencies increased.He sought help from the IMF and World Bank to restore Zambia’scredit-worthiness, but the politically unpalatable conditions theyimposed in return for aid forced a break in relations with both insti-tutions between 1987 and 1989. Food riots, rising unemployment andfalling standards of living, a coup attempt in 1990 and the emergencethat year of an organized opposition – the Movement for MultipartyDemocracy (MMD) – were clear signs that the Kaunda regime had lostits legitimacy. With multiparty politics reluctantly restored, the MMDand its leader, Frederick Chiluba, the former head of the Zambia Con-gress of Trade Unions, easily won the 1991 elections. The MMD didespecially well in UNIP’s former urban Copperbelt strongholds, andoverall captured 125 of the 150 National Assembly seats, with Chilubareceiving 75 per cent of the presidential vote; UNIP retained strongsupport only in the Eastern Province. It was much to Kaunda’s creditthat he yielded to the strong domestic political pressure to hold theseelections, that they were remarkably ‘free and fair’, and that heaccepted his defeat with good grace.15 The outcome was importantboth for Zambia and the cause of democracy in Africa.

14 C. Sylvester, ‘Whither Opposition in Zimbabwe?’, Journal of Modern AfricanStudies, 33: 3 (1995), pp. 403–23.

15 See C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, ‘The Fall and Rise of Multiparty Politics in Zambia’,Review of African Political Economy, 19: 54 (1992), pp. 75–91; and K. Panter-Brick,



MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN THE 1990S: REGENERATION AND CRISIS

In Zimbabwe the dominance of ZANU–PF declined in the years following the April 1995 National Assembly elections. The struc-tural adjustment programme introduced in 1991 under World Bank supervision had brought limited benefits, and had increasedunemployment and prices of basic household commodities. Publicspending threatened to spiral out of control when, in August 1997,Mugabe awarded liberation war veterans substantial benefits and, ayear later, agreed to commit troops – eventually 11,000 – to assist thegovernment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which waswracked by civil war. By August 1999, inflation reached 63 per centper annum and the proportion of Zimbabweans living below thepoverty line increased to over 60 per cent (from 40 per cent in1990).16

The mounting union militancy evident since 1996 was givenbroader focus by national strikes called by the Zimbabwe Congressof Trade Unions (ZCTU) in December 1997 and March 1998, whileserious urban riots underlined growing popular unrest. In Septem-ber 1999 the ZCTU launched a new party, the Movement for Demo-cratic Change (MDC); this was led by Morgan Tsvangirai who, likeMugabe, was from the numerically dominant Shona community17

and, like Chiluba in Zambia, was a veteran trade unionist – he hadbeen ZCTU secretary general since 1988. Along with trade unionists,the MDC’s leadership incorporated an unexpectedly broad range ofinterests – the white farming community, manufacturing and com-merce, the university-based intelligentsia and civil society groups –which filled the political vacuum resulting from the failure of theopposition parties (14 in all) to mount a coherent challenge toZANU–PF in the 1995 legislative elections. By early 1998, 96 groupshad coalesced under Tsvangirai’s leadership into the National

‘Prospects for Democracy in Zambia’, Government and Opposition, 29: 2 (1994), pp. 231–47.

16 C. Stoneman, ‘The Zimbabwean Economy in 1997–98’, Britain Zimbabwe Society(BZS) Zimbabwe Review, 98: 3 (1998), pp. 1–15; and L. M. Sachikonye, ‘Whither Zim-babwe? Crisis and Democratization’, Review of African Political Economy, 29: 91 (2002),pp. 14–15.

17 The Shona represent nearly 80 per cent of Zimbabwe’s population, and theNdebele under 20 per cent.



Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to put forward the case for constitu-tional reform. The government responded by appointing, in April1999, a 395-member Constitutional Convention to revise the consti-tution. The proposals eventually produced would have left intact thepresident’s powers and made it easier for land to be acquired forresettlement. Unexpectedly, when they were put to voters in a refer-endum in February 2000, the government lost decisively on a lowpoll; the ‘no’ campaign, spearheaded by the fledgling MDC withNCA support, captured 54.6 per cent of the votes and carried 63 ofZimbabwe’s 120 constituencies.18

This defeat underlined the narrowing range of options availableto the regime, and determined a beleaguered president to revive theland issue with a new ruthlessness. The relaunching of land reformefforts had been under review since 1996; and following a donors’meeting in September 1998 the government had produced a phasedreform programme and been promised a World Bank loan. But withincreasing domestic pressures, the regime also published a list of1,471 commercial farms due for acquisition in November 1997, andissued compulsory acquisition orders for 871 farms in November1998; both initiatives were withdrawn after donor disapproval.19 InFebruary 2000, soon after the referendum defeat, war veterans beganto invade commercial farms. The government not only failed toobserve two court orders requiring the police to remove them, butpushed a constitutional amendment through the House of Assemblypermitting it to confiscate land without compensation. During thenext four months over 1,000 farms were invaded. The chief sufferersof the violence which engulfed many rural areas were white farmers,farm workers and MDC supporters; 34 deaths were reported. It was

18 M. Sithole, ‘Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Democracy, 12: 1(2001), pp. 163–5, 168–9; and S. Dansereau, ‘Zimbabwe: Labour’s Options within theMovement for Democratic Change’, Review of African Political Economy, 28: 89 (2001),pp. 404–7.

19 T. A. S. Bowyer-Bower and C. Stoneman, ‘Land Reform’s Constraints andProspects: Policies, Perspectives and Ideologies in Zimbabwe Today’, in Bowyer-Bowerand Stoneman, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, pp. 10–11; and ‘Zimbabwe: Strike ParalyzesCountry’, Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 35: 2(1998), p. 13360; ‘Zimbabwe: U-Turn on White Farm Seizure’, Africa Research Bulletin,35: 12 (1998), p. 13727; and ‘Zimbabwe: Softer Line on Land Acquisition’, AfricaResearch Bulletin, 36: 2 (1999), p. 13802.



against this background of widespread intimidation that the cam-paign for the June 2000 legislative elections took place.

For the first time since 1985 ZANU–PF faced a real challenge. Itbased its campaign on the land issue – ‘land is the economy, and theeconomy is land’ – while adopting a stridently ‘anti-imperial’ stanceand playing the race card with particular venom. Yet Tsvangiraiappreciated, in a way that Mugabe failed to do, that it was jobs, notland that the young in the urban areas wanted. The election itselfproduced a fundamental realignment of the country’s political land-scape. The MDC won 57 seats to ZANU–PF’s 62; it swept the boardin the capital Harare and in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second city; it alsodid well in the other urban centres and decimated ZANU–PF’ssupport in Matabeleland, ZAPU’s former stronghold. Nonetheless,ZANU–PF’s vote in Mashonaland held firm, and Tsvangirai himselffailed to win a seat. ZANU–PF’s grip on power was assured throughthe 30 nominated and reserved seats under the government’scontrol, though Mugabe had lost the majority he needed to pushthrough constitutional changes. Given widespread campaign vio-lence, it was questionable whether the election could be accepted as‘free and fair’; the external observer missions were divided over thisissue. The intimidation notwithstanding, ZANU–PF’s command of itsMashonaland bastions would probably have ensured the ruling partya narrow victory overall. Yet Mugabe emerged from the election as aleader of diminished stature who was prepared to plunge Zimbabweinto economic crisis in order to secure his retention of politicalpower.20

Initially, Zambia’s democratic prospects had appeared encourag-ing, underpinned as they were by the continuing vitality of politicalpluralism, the occasional robustness of parliamentary debate, insti-tutional innovations to secure greater executive accountability, andthe way in which sections of the press – notably the independent Post– continued to exercise a critical function; the judiciary, by and large,upheld the rule of law, even on occasion finding against the

20 See D. Compagnon, ‘Zimbabwe: Life after ZANU–PF’, African Affairs, 99: 396(2000), pp. 449–53; L. Laakso, ‘The Politics of International Election Observation:The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 40: 3 (2002), pp.437–64; and D. Pottie, ‘Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe, 2000’, Electoral Studies,21: 3 (2002), pp. 485–92.



government.21 The cabinet seemed set to recover much of its formerstatus and steps were taken to depoliticize the civil service. In pursuitof an economic recovery strategy agreed with the IMF, the govern-ment strengthened the ministry of finance and sought to increaseaccountability while curbing expenditure; it also trimmed food sub-sidies substantially – a measure provoking serious urban unrest whenattempted by the former Kaunda regime.

However, a virtually unfettered form of presidential governmentsoon re-emerged. The prospect that a reinvigorated parliamentwould check the executive proved illusory. The reforms of the par-liamentary committee structure and the horizontal checks on presi-dential power were ineffective, while the reports of the commissionerfor investigations into state malpractice were mostly ignored. More-over, long-term reform of the public sector was neglected, the lackof financial skills remained ‘chronic’,22 and audit controls over government departments were weak. Corruption was widespread,23

political opponents were harassed and pressure was exerted on theindependent press. A fall in the copper price on world marketscaused government revenues to decline, making it difficult to main-tain essential services. Overall, the state’s institutional framework was not strong enough to sustain Zambia’s new market economyapproach. This added to existing delays in privatizing state-ownedcompanies. Nevertheless, privatization did proceed and gathermomentum during the 1990s, enabling the Chiluba government tocredit itself with having privatized more than 80 per cent of thecountry’s state-owned companies; this process culminated in March2000, after lengthy negotiations, in divestiture of the loss-makingZambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM).24

21 P. Burnell, ‘The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia: Millennium Dawnor Millennium Sunset?’, Contemporary Politics, 7: 2 (2001), pp. 104–5.

22 P. Burnell, ‘Financial Indiscipline in Zambia’s Third Republic: The Role of Parliamentary Scrutiny’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 7: 3 (2001), pp. 34–64.

23 E. Cromwell, ‘Zambia: A Wind of Change in Expenditure Management’, in J. Healey and W. Tordoff (eds), Votes and Budgets: Comparative Studies in Accountable Governance in the South, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1995, pp. 153–207; and M. Szeftel,‘“Eat with Us”: Managing Corruption and Patronage under Zambia’s Three Republics,1964–99’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 18: 2 (2000), pp. 207–24.

24 Burnell, ‘The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia’, pp. 100–1; and J. Craig, ‘Evaluating Privatisation in Zambia: A Tale of Two Processes’, Review of African Political Economy, 27: 85 (2000), pp. 357–66.



The fact that the MMD, like many of the ‘new democracy’ move-ments that surfaced in Africa during the 1990s, was a broad andpotentially unstable coalition meant that it could not ride roughshodover the competing interests of its constituent groups. This becameclear in April 1993, when three of the four ministers dismissed byChiluba left the MMD to form a rival party. As the economy wors-ened, Chiluba’s own position became less secure, as became evidentin 1995 when the National Assembly debarred Kaunda from stand-ing as UNIP’s presidential candidate on the grounds that his parentshad been born in Malawi. Coupled with the arrest of eight promi-nent UNIP members in the build-up to the November 1996 polls,this provocative act led some donors to suspend aid and triggered anelection boycott by UNIP and six smaller parties. Predictably, theboycott proved counter-productive, though the easy victory ofChiluba and the MMD on a low poll was mainly due to the failure ofthe opposition parties to unite – 11 parties contested parliamentaryseats in 1996 and four presidential aspirants challenged Chiluba(three of them former members of the MMD government). TheMMD won 131 of the 150 elected seats, six more than in 1991.25

Except in the Eastern Province, where UNIP retained considerablesupport, it also did well in the December 1998 local government elec-tions in which all the main opposition parties participated – includ-ing the United Party for National Development (UPND), formedonly that month and led by Anderson Mazoka, a successful busi-nessman and the Anglo American Corporation’s former chief exec-utive in Zambia. A critical question was whether in the next nationalelections, the opposition parties would be able to unite to mount aneffective challenge to the ruling party.

These elections, in December 2001, were to prove the most tightlycontested, and certainly the most controversial, in Zambia’s post-independence history. The ill-judged attempt by Chiluba in 2001 to

25 C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, ‘The 1996 Zambian Elections: Still Awaiting Democ-ratic Consolidation’, Review of African Political Economy, 24: 71 (1997), pp. 113–28; P. Burnell, ‘Whither Zambia? The Zambian Presidential and Parliamentary Electionsof November 1996’, Electoral Studies, 16: 3 (1997), pp. 407–16; J. K. van Donge, ‘Reflec-tions on Donors, Opposition and Popular Will in the 1996 Zambian General Elec-tions’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 36: 1 (1998), pp. 71–99; and C. J. J. Mphaisha,‘The State of Democratization in Zambia’, Journal of Commonwealth and ComparativePolitics, 38: 3 (2000), pp. 131–46.



engineer support for a constitutional change permitting him to standfor a third term was opposed by an array of civil society groups; it wasunpopular with donors and regional neighbours like South Africaand Botswana; and it provoked a serious split within the MMD.26 InMay Chiluba declared that he would not seek re-election, openingthe way for Levy Mwanawasa to stand in his place. A respected lawyer,Mwanawasa had served briefly as solicitor general under Kaunda in the mid-1980s, and was the new MMD government’s first vice-president; having resigned in 1994 over the spread of corruption, he was untainted by the scandals that had so damaged the regime’sreputation. A non-Bemba, he was also a useful foil to charges ofBemba domination of the MMD, while his family links gave him localstanding in the Central, Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces, with theirelectorally crucial urban populations. Yet his political base within theMMD was narrow and he risked being seen as Chiluba’s ‘puppet’.

Unlike Zimbabwe, where the 1987 constitutional reforms had sep-arated the tenures of the president (six years) and the legislature(five years), Zambia since independence had always held simultane-ous elections. The December 2001 elections attracted 11 presiden-tial candidates, while 17 parties contested for seats in the NationalAssembly. As in 1996, there was little policy content to a campaignthat focused less on the secondary differences among the partiesthan on the candidates themselves. Of the 2.6 million registered elec-tors, 67.8 per cent voted, thereby recording the highest turnout sincemultiparty politics was restored, though the voter registration exer-cise had enrolled only 55.5 per cent of the estimated electorate.While Chiluba had won decisively in 1991 and 1996, Mwanawasa onlynarrowly defeated Mazoka, his leading opponent, taking 29.2 percent of the valid votes against the UPND leader’s 27.2 per cent; lessthan 34,000 votes separated the two. Mwanawasa retained the MMDstrongholds in Copperbelt, Northern and Luapula provinces butonly just carried his home Central Province. Mazoka capturedLusaka, Southern, Western and Northwestern provinces, the lastthree by imposing margins. The National Assembly results were stillmore problematic, for though it remained the largest party, the

26 P. Burnell, ‘Zambia’s 2001 Elections: The Tyranny of Small Decisions, “Non-Decisions” and “Not Decisions” ’, Third World Quarterly, 23: 6 (2002), p. 1111; G. Mthembu-Salter, ‘Zambia: Recent History’, in K. Murison (ed.), Africa South of the Sahara 2004, London, Europa, 2004, pp. 1200–1.



MMD captured only 69 of the 150 elected seats; even with the eightnominated deputies at the president’s disposal, the party was nowdenied a legislative majority. The UPND took 49 seats, while UNIPcame next with 13. While the elections showed that ‘electoral democ-racy’ remained firmly on the country’s agenda, the conduct of theelections was so marred by procedural lapses on the part of theZambia Electoral Commission – particularly over voter registrationand the publication of the results – that the European Unionobservers concluded that they were ‘not confident that the declaredresults represent the wishes of the Zambian electors on polling day’.27

Mazoka and two other party leaders quickly filed separate petitionschallenging the outcome.

The elections appeared to signal a major shift in the contours ofthe Zambian political terrain, with the emergence of a more broadlybased multiparty framework replacing the existing pattern of one-party dominance. Yet the new Mwanawasa government found itselfconfronted with a triangular power struggle that was to risk plung-ing the Third Republic into crisis. With Chiluba remaining initiallyas MMD party president, tensions quickly developed over the extentof the influence he might exercise over cabinet appointments; byMarch 2002 open warfare between the two camps was disruptingboth the cabinet and the party. In July, the National Assembly votedunanimously (at Mwanawasa’s request) to remove Chiluba’s immu-nity from prosecution for corruption, making him the first Africanpresident to experience this humiliation. When, in February 2003,the Supreme Court turned down Chiluba’s appeal against this deci-sion, corruption charges were immediately brought against him. Hewas arrested a second time in August 2003, by then facing 165 sepa-rate charges. Mwanawasa sought to replace by stages Chiluba loyal-ists in the senior ranks of the civil service, the security services, theMMD and, more cautiously, in the cabinet. He also actively courtedhis opponents, encouraging defections to the MMD, appointingopposition MPs to the government, and concluding a cooperationagreement with UNIP.

27 ‘European Union Election Observation Mission: Zambian Elections 2001, FinalStatement’, 5 February 2001 (sic), p. 3, at http://www/eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/Zambia/. See also Burnell, ‘Zambia’s2001 Elections’, p. 1106.

http://www/eu.int/comm/external_



But economic problems persisted and were causing mountinglabour unrest, while government overspending worsened Zambia’srelations with the IMF. In October 2002, when nearly 3 million Zambians badly needed food aid because of a serious drought, thegovernment’s standing with the donor community was damaged byits rejection of genetically modified American maize. Presidentialdominance created a further problem for the government, this timein the constitutional sphere. Under pressure from the Oasis Forum,an organization of civil groups formed in 2001 to oppose Chiluba’s‘third term’ project, Mwanawasa appointed a 45-member constitu-tional review commission, with the reduction of presidential powera possible outcome. The Chiluba camp played upon the MMD’sreduced political standing and influence in the Copperbelt, North-ern and Luapula provinces, which constituted its traditional heart-land. As 2003 closed, Mwanawasa continued to lead a divided rulingparty, while the Supreme Court’s ruling over the December 2001election was still awaited.

Though the Zambian contest had not been free of violence, theZimbabwe campaign for the March 2002 presidential election wasdisfigured throughout by widespread intimidation, particularly in therural areas where ZANU–PF concentrated its efforts; MashonalandEast, West and Central became virtual ‘no-go’ provinces for Tsvangi-rai’s MDC. In the run-up to the election the government placedseveral draconian measures before parliament; these included meas-ures empowering the police to obstruct opposition campaign activi-ties, criminalizing criticism of the president, disenfranchizingZimbabweans living abroad and undermining the independence of the press. The National Assembly initially rejected one measureand forced revision of a second, highlighting the fact that presi-dential authoritarianism now divided the ruling party as well as theelectorate.28

Another feature distinguishing Zimbabwe from Zambia was theextent to which events in Zimbabwe became internationalized. TheNigerian-brokered Abuja Accord in September 2001 had reflectedmounting Commonwealth concern at developments; it had involveda British pledge of funding to support land distribution in return forZimbabwe’s promise to maintain the rule of law and observe

28 ‘Zimbabwe: Battle of Wills’, Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and CulturalSeries, 39: 1 (2002), p. 14718.



democratic principles. It was quickly followed by a visit to Harare bythe South African and Malawi presidents to underline the regionalimpact of Zimbabwe’s problems. The Abuja Accord was clearly beingignored. In December the European Union and the Commonwealthdelivered separate ultimatums to the Mugabe government over therepression of political opponents; the American government hadalready initiated sanctions targeted at Mugabe and key members ofhis regime.

The election itself, if relatively calm by the standards of the cam-paign, was surrounded by procedural controversy – not least over thesharp reduction of urban polling centres – and the numerous tell-tale signs of tampering with the results. Mugabe’s majority droppedsharply from 1996, when he had captured 93 per cent of the vote;but with 56 per cent to Tsvangirai’s 42 per cent, his electoral machinehad done enough – legally or illegally – to ensure victory. Thoughtrounced in the urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo, Mugabecarried five rural provinces, losing only in Matabeleland North andSouth and (narrowly) in Manicaland on the Mozambique border.29

As in June 2000, the election divided the observer groups, withthe Southern African Development Community (SADC) ministerialmission as well as teams from South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia, Tan-zania, and the Organization of African Unity accepting the outcomeas legitimate, while those from Norway, the SADC ParliamentaryForum and virtually all Zimbabwean observer networks were criticalboth of the conduct of the elections and the accompanying violence.The unfavourable report of the Commonwealth Observer Group ledto a recommendation from the three Commonwealth leaders man-dated for this task – John Howard, prime minister of Australia, andpresidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo ofNigeria – that Zimbabwe be suspended from participation in Com-monwealth affairs for a year for flouting the principles of democracyand human rights which had been strongly confirmed in the Com-monwealth’s own Harare Declaration of 1991.30 This ban was subse-quently extended, first to December 2003 and then, after dividing

29 For discussion of the 2002 election, see especially R. Bush and M. Szeftel, ‘Sovereignty, Democracy and Zimbabwe’s Tragedy’, Review of African Political Economy,29: 91 (2002), pp. 5–12.

30 B. Baker, ‘When to Call Black White: Zimbabwe’s Electoral Reports’, Third WorldQuarterly, 23: 6 (2002), pp. 1145–58.



the 2003 Commonwealth summit at Abuja, to December 2004, trig-gering Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the organization.

Confronted with Commonwealth disavowal, American sanctionsand the EU sanctions imposed in February 2002 after the govern-ment expelled the head of the EU observer team (forcing its with-drawal), Zimbabwe faced an international isolation only partlysoftened by the failure of any African state to condemn publicly theregime’s behaviour. Yet behind the scenes there was considerablediplomatic activity as South Africa and Nigeria prodded the two sidestowards compromise, with a government of national unity andMugabe’s stepping down ‘with dignity’ and freedom from prosecu-tion reported to be possible alternatives. The divisions withinZANU–PF between ‘hardliners’ and moderates over a compromisesolution to the impasse became entangled, however, in factionalmanoeuvrings over Mugabe’s successor.31 For its part, the MDC firmlyrejected any formula requiring it to accept the legitimacy of the pres-idential election and was suspicious that South Africa’s stress on‘quiet diplomacy’ masked underlying sympathies for the Mugaberegime. Both the MDC and the ZCTU sought separately to pres-surize the government by organizing national work stoppages (inMarch, April and June 2003), though these had varying impacts.Tsvangirai himself faced a treason charge (first levelled in February2002) for allegedly plotting to assassinate Mugabe. The MDC wascontinuously harassed by the authorities and suffered internal ten-sions over post-election tactics; it also faced persisting credibilityproblems over its ability to deal with Zimbabwe’s economic crisis.

It was the latter which locked the regime into an ever-tighteningvice. The eviction of white commercial farmers accelerated followingthe elections. Though the land reform programme officially ended inearly 2003, the farm dispossessions continued at intervals. By late 2003fewer than 400 white commercial farmers remained; their successorswere frequently regime notables rather than landless peasants.32 Thedamage to the country’s exports and domestic food production wasconsiderable; serious drought made matters worse. Substantial levels

31 ‘Zimbabwe: Mugabe’s Plans Defeated’, Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Socialand Cultural Series, 40: 8 (2003), pp. 15426–7; and ‘Zimbabwe: Marching toMasvingo’, Africa Confidential, 44: 23 (2003), pp. 1–3.

32 ‘Zimbabwe: This Land is our Land’, Africa Confidential, 44: 4 (2003), pp. 1–2;and ‘Zimbabwe: No Chance, Mr. President’, Africa Confidential, 44: 22 (2003), p. 1.



of external food aid began in mid-2002 and were continuing as of early2004, with the government itself accused of denying its own foodstocks to opposition supporters. The urban economy was badlyaffected by rising unemployment, by a devastating inflationary spiral– 116 per cent in March 2002 and around 600 per cent by December2003 – by the impact on domestic banks of the farm expropriations,and by growing shortages of food, household commodities, fuel and,by mid-2003, paper currency. Between 1999 and 2003, Zimbabwe’sgross domestic product contracted by nearly 40 per cent.33

CONCLUSIONS

Most African regimes now respect a constitutional commitment tohold elections at regular intervals. This gives opposition parties anopportunity to unite and mount a stronger challenge, as happenedin Kenya in December 2002 when 14 political parties formed awinning National Rainbow Coalition. Sadly, as the experience ofGabon, Malawi, Tanzania and Tunisia shows, such parties can rarelyovercome their internal divisions and tend in any case to be unsta-ble. Of course, the holding of multiparty elections is not by itselfenough to secure the firm establishment of the democratic process– military and other authoritarian governments have frequentlysought to legitimize their rule through the ballot box. Democracyand authoritarianism are inextricably mixed in several countries. Thespectrum is broad, ranging from the token democracy of Eyadéma’sTogo to the democratic reality of Mauritius, where successive gov-ernments have accepted defeat at the hands of the electorate. Inbetween these extremes is economically prosperous Botswana: a suc-cession of ‘free and fair’ elections since independence in 1966 hasresulted in the establishment of a dominant party state with a non-authoritarian presidential system patterned by Sir Seretse Khama, thecountry’s first president. By contrast Zambia and Zimbabwe – thesubject of our case studies – have only edged towards electoraldemocracy, and in recent years have clearly retreated from it; presi-dential authoritarianism, clientelism, sectionalism and corruptionremain prominent features of both systems.

33 ‘Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth: Bye Bye Bob’, Economist, 13 December2003, p. 57.



Though the latter 1990s have witnessed a shift in both states froma dominant-party model to systems marked by significant levels ofpolitical pluralism, the speed with which opposition movements havedeveloped a capacity to challenge incumbent elites has had destabi-lizing effects in the short term. The patronage politics underpinningboth the Chiluba and Mugabe regimes created powerful vested inter-ests that have proved resistant to change. Moreover, the emergentopposition groups have lacked adequate financial and organizationalresources to establish their credibility as alternative governing partiesand they continue to be hampered, in Zambia’s case, by a tendencyto fragmentation. Nor have they had significant impact on broaden-ing the debate over priorities for national development; though Zimbabwe’s grave economic crisis has opened opportunities for theMDC to present a distinctive policy focus, the scope for meaning-ful debate there, as in Zambia, has remained narrow given thecountry’s debt problems and ultimate dependence on the goodwillof external funding agencies. Seemingly vigorous civil society networks have provided an important source of ‘social capital’ onwhich opposition movements have drawn, but their contribution hasbeen restricted by their mainly urban character (apart from thechurches) and their limited activist base (apart from the tradeunions). Civil society groups remain vulnerable to government pres-sures and though the Zimbabwe labour movement might appear inthe short term an exception, they are usually wary of narrow parti-san identification.34

Profound structural changes are needed if either state is to movetowards liberal democracy. Presidentialism – or ‘the divine right ofpresidents’, as a former Zambian minister termed it – has inhibitedgood government and economic development in both countries, and their parliaments are too weak to restrain the executive. SinceZambia’s constitution prescribes a virtually unfettered form of pres-idential government, much will depend on the extent to whichMwanawasa respects the informal constraints on the exercise of hisconsiderable powers, until such time as more effective constitutionaland political checks are imposed on presidential authority. In

34 P. Burnell, ‘The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past,Present and Future’, African Affairs, 100: 399 (2001), pp. 255–9; I. Phiri, ‘Why AfricanChurches Preach Politics: The Case of Zambia’, Journal of Church and State, 41: 2(1999), pp. 323–47; and Dansereau, ‘Zimbabwe: Labour’s Options’.



Zimbabwe Mugabe, who was 80 in March 2004, sacrificed thenational interest to a stubborn determination to cling to power,causing economic collapse and bringing immense suffering to thepeople. Key questions regarding the shape of a post-Mugabe politi-cal settlement remain unresolved.

Although the MMD government in Zambia has retained the multi-party political framework restored in 1991, has held elections atregular intervals and, for the most part, has both upheld the rule oflaw and the free expression of opinion, much remains to be done ifZambia is to extend and deepen its ‘electoral democracy’. As Burnellobserves, ‘Zambia’s experience of economic reform has not yetserved democracy well because it has failed to produce concrete eco-nomic and social improvements.’35 Since 1991, economic reform hasbeen uneven and allocative decisions have frequently been made onthe basis of ‘cronyism, ethnically-rooted clientelism and corrup-tion’.36 The shortage of capital continues to be a severe constraint ondevelopment prospects, while its failure to attract foreign investmentand its heavy indebtedness are clear indications of Zambia’s mar-ginalization in the global economy. For its part, the Mugabe regime’scautious economic strategy disappointed its radical supporters for adecade or more after independence, but considerable headway wasmade in sustaining economic growth and improving social services.During the 1990s, however, economic hardship steadily increased asthe structural adjustment policies dictated by the IMF and WorldBank took effect. As in Zambia, the AIDS pandemic has had graveconsequences. The government reacted with increasing repressionto the mounting socio-economic difficulties which it faced after themid-1990s. The eviction of white farmers and their workers, coupledwith the incidence of drought, resulted in a sharp drop in agricul-tural output; this affected not only Zimbabwe but the whole of South-ern Africa, to which its surplus grain was traditionally exported. Untilsome semblance of democracy is restored, donors have withdrawn orcut back aid, and foreign investment throughout the entire South-ern African region has been threatened.

While there is some prospect of holding fair elections in Zambiaunder Mwanawasa, there is none in Zimbabwe under the Mugabe

35 P. Burnell, ‘Does Economic Reform Promote Democratisation? Evidence fromZambia’s Third Republic’, New Political Economy, 6: 2 (2001), p. 209.

36 Ibid.



regime. However, with this regime out of the way, the recuperativepowers of Zimbabwe are probably greater than those of Zambia,despite the machinery of intimidation that has been progressivelyinstalled since the February 2000 referendum. One important reasonfor this is that Zimbabwe has a stronger state institutional structureand public service than its neighbour, and will be better placed tosustain a market economy approach if, as is likely, this choice isforced upon it in the end by the Bretton Woods institutions. Anotheris the strength of its civil society, as was shown in the June 2000 leg-islative elections and the March 2002 presidential elections, whenvoters resisted intimidation and sometimes violence to turn out inlarge numbers, especially in the urban centres and Matabeleland, tosupport Tsvangirai and the MDC. Judges, journalists and humanrights activists braved the wrath of a vindictive regime in defendingthe rule of law and the freedom of expression. Zambians have notbeen subjected to the same state-sponsored violence as their neigh-bours, and have therefore been tested less.

The experience of Zambia and Zimbabwe certainly underlines thesignificance of elections in sustaining democratic transitions – theyhave altered the balance of competing political forces and have thuseffected change in the dynamics of regimes; they have enforcedaccountability; and they have also tested the political capabilities ofrival claimants to power. Nevertheless, the prospects for stable dem-ocratic change cannot rely solely on the verdict of elections. It isevident in both countries that the political illiberalism associated withunrestrained presidentialism, clientelist politics and corruption mustbe brought under more effective control, and this may well signalthe need for fundamental shifts in the nature of their political frame-works.37 With limited short-term prospects for major structuralreform in either case, the possibilities of ‘democratic survival’ remaindependent on the playing out of the unequal struggle between dominant parties and their opponents in settings where the groundrules of democratic practice remain insecurely anchored.

37 For possible solutions, see A. Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Democratization inSouthern Africa, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999; and J. J. Linz, ‘The Perils ofPresidentialism’, in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democ-racy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp. 108–26.

Documents

Electoral Politics in Africa: The Experience of Zambia and Zimbabwe