Electoral Support for Community Growth Management Policy

Electoral Support for Community GrowthManagement Policyn

Christopher Hawkins, University of Central Florida

Objectives. This study seeks to explain the variation in voter support for growthmanagement policy. Interest group theory of local politics and property rights isused as a theoretical framework to explore how competing pro-growth and anti-growth interests influence the level of electoral support at the ballot box. Methods.Survey data collected from local planning officials in Massachusetts are analyzedusing a two-stage Heckman selection model. Results. The results indicate thatdevelopment competition has a negative effect and controversy over development apositive effect on the probability of a community placing growth managementpolicy on the local ballot. The analysis further indicates that environmental interestsand suburban communities have a positive influence on the percentage of votes castin favor of conservation-oriented growth management policy. Neighborhood-basedinterests, on the other hand, have a negative influence on voter support. Conclu-sions. The findings suggest that compared to the normal legislative process, ballot-box voting allows anti-growth and localized interests the opportunity to craft pro-posals and then mobilize support for policy changes.

To address traffic congestion, pollution, and the loss of open-space landthat often accompanies development, local communities have adopted avariety of growth management policies. However, the process by whichcommunities adopt policies has changed in recent years. This is evident fromthe increasing frequency of direct democracy where land-use policy makingoccurs at the ballot box. Through initiative or referenda processes, orga-nizations can be heard independently of government officials and citizengroups and slow-growth interests have an opportunity to directly put land-use issues on the community development agenda (Gerber, 1999).

Previous research indicates that there are a variety of local characteristicsthat influence the likelihood that a community will propose an open-spaceland protection ballot measure (Fulton et al., 2001; Howell-Moroney, 2004;Nguyen, 2007; Romero and Liserio, 2002). Furthermore, research on localpolicy change suggests that organized pro-growth and anti-growth interestshave differing views regarding growth management policy (Jeong, 2006).

nDirect correspondence to Christopher Hawkins, Department of Public Administration,University of Central Florida, 4000 Central Florida Blvd., HPA II, Ste. 238, Orlando, FL32816-1395 [email protected]. The author will share all data and coding materialswith those wishing to replicate the study. The author thanks the anonymous reviewers fortheir helpful comments.

SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume 92, Number 1, March 2011r 2011 by the Southwestern Social Science Association

mailto:[email protected]




This study extends this literature to test the extent to which the support oforganized groups for growth management influences voter approval of pol-icy adoption at the ballot box. In the first section, I review the theoreticalliterature on interest group theories of local politics and property rights(Eggertsson, 1999; Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez, 2005) and discuss land-usepolicy setting in the context of ballot-box voting. In the second section, Idiscuss the application of this framework to the local adoption of the Mas-sachusetts Community Preservation Act (CPA). I then describe the studymethodology, including data collection and model specification. I concludewith a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the results.

Interest Group Politics of Land Use

Growth management policy seeks to promote a suitable relationship be-tween land use and infrastructure, with an emphasis on conservation(Strong, Mandelker, and Kelly, 1996). Although there is a wide range ofpolicy efforts with varying levels of complexity that have been implementedacross local governments, the adoption of growth management policy isinfluenced by competing preferences of pro-growth and anti-growth inter-ests. These groups have narrowly defined goals and often exhibit conflictingpolicy objectives. Interest group theory of property rights (Eggertsson, 1999)focuses on how the political influences of these competing interests aremanifested in development policies (Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez, 2005).

Pro-Growth Interest

Pro-growth interests are defined as organizations and groups that areconcerned with advancing economic and growth policies that favor landdevelopment, infrastructure provision and expansion, and a lax land devel-opment regulatory environment. Pro-growth interests are often identified asbusinesses and real estate interests (Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez, 2005).These pro-growth development interests can be conceptualized as part of agrowth machine (Molotch, 1976), in which business and landowners con-sort with elected officials to craft policies to promote future development. Incontrast, the property rights interest group framework posits that futuredevelopment can be affected when land-use policies are adopted that alterproperty rights and restrict the availability of developable land (Riddiough,1997). Elected officials can generate political support from businesses andlandowners by altering the distribution of property rights through land-useregulations and zoning that favor the interests of these groups (Riker andSened, 1996). Since local governments are highly dependent on local prop-erty taxes for revenue, elected officials often work cooperatively with localbusinesses and landowners on development issues.

Electoral Support for Community Growth Management 269

Regulations and policies aimed at land preservation are in many instancesviewed in a negative light by developers and pro-growth interests. This isattributable to the uncertainty of where land may be preserved and theextent to which it will limit the opportunity for future development (Mayerand Somerville, 2000). Feitelson (1993), for example, finds that land-usecontrols directly affect developer costs and developer expectations. If ameasure limiting growth is anticipated to be on an upcoming ballot, de-velopers may speed up or delay construction (Lillydahl and Singell, 1987).1

Anti-Growth Interests

Generally opposite pro-growth interests are anti-growth advocates. Anti-growth interests are defined as groups whose sentiment toward growth favorslimited development and the preservation of land from intense residentialand commercial uses. Environmental groups are closely aligned with thisposition and prefer to maintain community character, emphasize well-planned development, and are likely to support land-use policies that areconservation oriented. Anti-growth interests can also be viewed through thelens of the property rights framework. For instance, land conservationmeasures supported by anti-growth interests will arise as the availability ofenvironmental public goods in the form of open spaces declines and un-developed land is threatened (Libecap, 1989).

Environmental degradation from residential and commercial develop-ment is a major concern consistently highlighted by anti-growth advocates.The emergence of growth management policies is often attributable to theheightened intensity and controversy over local growth that is linked withsprawling development patterns (Lewis and Neiman, 2002:167). Not sur-prisingly, conflict emerges, which further shapes a community’s positiontoward restricting or supporting new development. This has implications fornot only the supply and demand of housing construction, but future eco-nomic development and growth.

Localized Interests

Growth management policy is also influenced by localized neighborhoodinterests where environmental protection and conservation is a typical pref-erence. Previous studies suggest the positive aspects of growth managementpolicies for neighborhood groups. For example, parks and open spaces pro-

1It should be noted that beyond the environmental benefits of land preservation, openspace may have positive effects on the marketability of housing. For example, houses close toopen spaces and undisturbed areas may sell at a premium. Housing developers that incor-porate public goods into a development can then advertise the environmental features(Ihlanfeldt, 2007).

270 Social Science Quarterly

vided by growth management policies have positive economic effects onland values (Geoghega, 2002). Cost savings to communities are also linkedto the protection of open spaces and valuable environmental features(Strong, Mandelker, and Kelly, 1996). Citizen discontent and politicalmobilization against new growth that is perceived to threaten quality of lifealso result in greater local support for growth control (Bollens, 1992).

Community Characteristics

Extant research suggests that local growth policies are linked to political,economic, and demographic characteristics of communities. For example,communities that are seeking to enhance the local tax base and addressunemployment tend not to prefer policies that reduce opportunities forgrowth (Baldassare and Wilson, 1996; Feiock, 2002). Suburban commu-nities experiencing population growth are found to more favorably endorsegrowth management (Donovan and Neiman, 1991) and support for growthmanagement tends to be more prevalent in affluent and predominantlywhite homeowner suburban communities (Baldassare, 1990). Homeownerassociations in these areas are often more homogenous and can more easilymobilize against growth than can lower-income groups. Growth manage-ment may also be used as an exclusionary mechanism by reducing theavailability of affordable housing (Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006).

Ballot-Box Policy Setting

By the early 1990s, many states began passing enabling legislation thatempowered local governments to develop and implement various growthmanagement strategies through direct democracy (Hamin, 2003). Duringthe November 2000 elections, for example, there were 553 state and localballot measures that dealt with growth-related issues, and 257 that dealtspecifically with open-space protection. Measures that would increase openspace and provide recreation opportunities passed at a very high rate, par-ticularly in the Northeast (Myers and Puentes, 2001).

With many communities experiencing the positive and negative effects oflocal growth, elected public officials are under pressure from constituentgroups to maintain levels of public services. This includes the provision ofpublic goods in the form of recreational resources and open-space land.Elected officials must also react to economic interests that expand the taxbase and provide employment opportunities for local residents. Within theconfines of the normal legislative process, interest groups that control po-litical resources can influence legislation more than others (Clingermayerand Feiock, 2001). Economic interests are typically better positioned tobargain over the allocation of property rights and influence legislative policy.


Direct democracy allows citizens a greater opportunity to craft policies.Through this mechanism, ‘‘voter approved measures may provide a meansof breaking city policies out of the growth machine pattern at an earlierstage’’ (Romero and Liserio, 2002:344). This does not lessen the sharpdivisions among pro-growth and anti-growth interests; rather, the directlegislative process often increases community political conflict over growth(Donovan and Neiman, 1992). Where citizens have shaped land-usepolicy through the ballot box, there generally tends to be more policiesadopted. Also, land-use policies enacted by direct democracy tend to bemore restrictive than those originating from city councils (Lewis andNeiman, 2002). Furthermore, interests that have a stake in the policyare often quick to mobilize and undertake campaigns to undermine oradvocate for the ballot. In some instances, the ballot proposition is craftedby interests that favor growth-related policies, rather than citizen anti-growth interests (Gerber, 1999). Thus, it is reasonable to characterize theeffect of ballot-box voting as one of interest conflict and mobilization toshape distributional benefits for one group over another. This, of course,is intensified when distributional consequences shape land uses and oppor-tunities for development and growth and thus the overall character ofcommunities.

Study Context: Massachusetts Community Preservation Act (CPA)

Land conservationists are always pressed for donors. Similarly, many localgovernments have difficulty finding the resources to implement their land-preservation goals. To generate funds, communities across the state of Mas-sachusetts are adopting an innovative growth management policy called theCommunity Preservation Act (CPA). The CPA is a state-wide communitydevelopment initiative that began in 2000 as a way for local governments toprimarily conserve open space as well as to develop more affordable housingand protect cultural resources and historic sites.

Each community must approve the CPA through a ballot referendum thatis assembled by local residents, and that stipulates the percentage of theproperty tax surcharge that will be assessed for land protection (up to 3percent). A minimum of 10 percent of the annual revenues that are gen-erated must be used for each of the three core areas: conservation of openspace, affordable housing, and historic resources. The remaining 70 percentof the funds can be allocated for any combination of these allowed uses,including recreational land uses (Community Preservation Coalition).

Although communities are not required to report how they are usingthe funds, data collected by a coalition of CPA advocates indicates thatapproximately 41 percent of the funds have been used to protect openspace (Sherman and Luberoff, 2007:17). Some research indicates that asmuch as 71.2 percent of the CPA funds spent for affordable housing projects


by local governments have been used to purchase existing units (Dillemuth,2006).2

Data and Method

Dependent Variable

This study seeks to explain the variation in voter support for growthmanagement policy (e.g., local adoption of the CPA). To collect data oncommunity development issues, a survey was mailed to the planning di-rectors of all 351 cities and towns in Massachusetts in 2005. Since it isprobable that most planners are engaged to some extent in the communitydevelopment process, their perceptions represent relatively reliable data onlocal growth issues. Of the 140 communities that have voted on the CPAbetween 2000 and 2005, 100 passed the ordinance and 40 failed to pass theordinance (Community Preservation Coalition). Data were collected on 94of the 140 communities that placed the CPA on the local ballot.

Regression analysis is used to identify key predictors of voter support ofgrowth management policy across communities. Bias is introduced in es-timating a regression equation because not all of the 351 communities havevoted on the CPA. To overcome this limitation, a Heckman two-step se-lection model is used to account for the censored data of the dependentvariable. In the first equation (selection equation) of the two-step model, theprobability of a municipality voting on the CPA is estimated with a probitmodel. Communities that placed the CPA on the ballot for a community-wide vote between 2000 and 2005 are coded 1, and all communities that didnot have a ballot vote on the CPA are coded 0. In the second equation(outcome equation), OLS is used to estimate the parameters. The dependentvariable is the proportion of votes cast at the ballot box in favor of the CPA,which ranges from 26 percent to 89 percent.

Independent Variables

A condition in properly specifying a Heckman selection model is that atleast one independent variable is included in the selection equation that is

2The City of Cambridge was excluded from the analysis because nearly all of its CPA fundshave been used for affordable housing. Dillemuth (2006) reports that excluding CPAexpenditures by the City of Cambridge between 2001 and 2006 n ( npartial expenditures),approximately 31 percent of all CPA funds that have been used for affordable housing bylocal governments drops to approximately 17 percent, putting it well behind expenditures foropen space. Her analysis indicates that although the affordable housing category includesappropriations for projects involving real property (purchase of affordable housing units orland, funding for predevelopment or construction of units, and improvements to structures)only 9.3 percent of the funds have been used for actual site acquisition for housing (this iswithout Cambridge).


not included in the outcome equation. This is referred to as the exclusionrestriction (see Wooldridge, 2003:588–89). Therefore, I develop a measurebased on the findings from Fulton and colleagues (2001), which suggeststhat conservation is not an issue in communities that have little open spaceleft to preserve. In effect, ‘‘cities do not vote on open space because they arecities’’ (Howell-Moroney, 2004:174). In this study, a dummy variableindicates if a local government is a central city of a New England CountyMetropolitan Area. This is used to explain the likelihood that the CPA willbe placed on a ballot before estimating the voter acceptance.

The main theoretical variables in both the selection and outcome equa-tions are related to theories of interest group politics and land use. Previousstudies have used proxies to operationalize pro-growth and anti-growth in-terests in shaping land-use policy (Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez, 2005). Inthis study, survey respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale(with 1 representing low) their perception of support from real estate de-velopers and businesses for local conservation and land-use policies. Anti-growth interests are indicated by the survey respondent’s perception of en-vironmental organization support for local conservation policy. This ismeasured on a one to five scale (with 1 representing low). It is expected thatanti-growth interest support will increase the proportion of votes cast infavor of the CPA and pro-growth interest group support is expected to havea lesser influence on voter behavior. To account for highly localized interests,the survey respondent was also asked to indicate on a one to five scale thesupport of local conservation efforts by neighborhood organizations. Local-ized interest support in the form of neighborhood associations is expected tohave a positive effect on voter approval. Table 1 presents the results of thesurvey in which respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which theseinterests in their community support local efforts to improve conservationand manage growth. The distribution shows clear distinctions between pro-growth and anti-growth interest support. It is also apparent that businessesappear to be largely ‘‘neutral’’ with regard to support for conservation andgrowth management efforts. Approximately 57 percent of this pro-growth

TABLE 1

Distribution of Survey Respondent Perceptions of Interest Group Support for theCommunity’s Conservation and Growth Management Efforts

Real Estate Business Environmental Neighborhood

Strongly support 2.66 3.46 59.77 32.64Moderately support 10.27 18.46 27.97 46.44Neutral 34.98 57.69 7.66 13.39Moderately oppose 39.54 17.31 4.21 4.60Strongly oppose 12.55 3.08 0.38 2.93

NOTE: Cell entries are percentages.


interest group was assigned a value of 3 on the five-point scale by the surveyrespondent.

Mobilization to growth often stems from the controversy over develop-ment and perceptions about growth that drives an anti-growth sentiment(Baldassare, 1985, 1990; Baldassare and Wilson, 1996). To account for thisfactor, survey respondents were asked to indicate on a one to four scale (with1 representing not at all controversial and 4 always controversial) the level ofcontroversy over residential development in the community. It is hypo-thesized that a higher level of controversy will mobilize a community toplace the CPA on the ballot. Additionally, a survey question is used toindicate the extent to which there is competition with neighboring com-munities to attract economic growth, with 1 indicating strong competition;0 otherwise. The need to compete for development, particularly in areaswith a high unemployment rate, may reduce the probability of a communityplacing the CPA on the ballot for a community vote and undermine passageof growth management at the ballot box.

Control Variables

A range of socioeconomic variables are included in the regression analysisthat are hypothesized to influence a community placing the CPA on theballot and eventually influencing voter acceptance. Data for each commu-nity were compiled from the U.S. Census and include population changebetween 1990 and 2000, percent white, and median household income.Previous research finds that wealthier and more homogenous and whitecommunities are strongly associated with more limits on growth (Baldassareand Protash, 1982; Donovan and Neiman, 1995). Focusing on ballot mea-sures, Romero and Liserio (2002) find that smaller, wealthier, and whiterareas are more likely to include open-space preservation measures on theballot. Such ‘‘elite’’ communities, it is argued, share common values andconcerns regarding growth and development, which enables them to mo-bilize as a collective to maintain their economic status (Guest and Oropesa,1984).

Growth rates are also found to influence ballot measures in previousstudies. In retesting Romero and Liserio’s study, Howell-Moroney (2004)finds that places experiencing sprawl are more likely to propose open-spaceballot measures. In the context of Massachusetts, Hamin, Steere, andSweetser (2006) find that communities experiencing population growthtended to place the CPA on the local ballot and pass it. Geographic variationacross the state also influences ballot measures (Nguyen, 2007). Most of thecommunities that passed the CPA, in fact, also tend to be located nearI-495, which encircles the Boston metropolitan area. A dichotomous mea-sure of whether the community is in the Boston metro area is used to controlfor regional location. Population in 2000 (logged) is used to control for the


size of the community and a dummy variable is used to indicate whether thecommunity is a suburban local government.

Since funds are generated from a surcharge on property values, the res-idential and commercial property tax rate in 1999 was obtained from theMassachusetts Municipal Data Bank to account for tax pressure. Fundsgenerated from the surcharge can be used for affordable housing, but sincethis has been an element of the CPA that has tended to undermine itspassage, a control variable measured as the percent of the existing housingstock that is subsidized is also included (Hamin, Steere, and Sweetser, 2006).Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the independent variables.

Results and Discussion

In general, the results suggest that environmental interest group supportof local conservation efforts plays an important role in community residentsvoting in favor of local growth management policy. Somewhat surprisingly,support from localized interest in the form of neighborhood associations isnegatively related to the percentage of votes cast in favor of the CPA. Table3 reports the coefficient and standard error for each of the independentvariables of the selection and outcome equations. Since not all the com-munities voted on the CPA, the original sample size of 180 observations wasreduced to 94 in the outcome equation. The model as a whole is statisticallysignificant with a Wald chi-square value of 71.00 (p 5 000).

Turning first to the results of the selection equation presented in thebottom half of Table 3, controversy over residential development is signifi-cant (po0.05) and positively related to a community placing the CPA onthe ballot. This result may reflect the emergence of local policy entrepre-neurs who respond to the heightened concern over residential developmentby mobilizing efforts to place the growth management policy on the ballot.Since one of the goals of the CPA is to generate enough local funding topreserve open-space land and better manage community growth, placing theCPA on the ballot may reduce the negative effects of development andpreserve quality of life that is guarded by residents.

The results of the selection equation in Table 3 also indicate that com-petition with neighboring communities has a negative effect on the prob-ability that a community places the CPA on the ballot (po0.05). At theballot box, voters need to balance the need for protecting more open-spaceland with maintaining a reasonable tax base by keeping opportunities forland to be developed for commercial use. One explanation for this result isthat communities that think they are in stiff competition for developmentdo not want to impose new taxes or restrictions on land use because it maydrive away new development.

The main theoretical variables of interest are related to interest grouptheory of property rights. Property rights are closely linked to land-use


constraints imposed by growth management policies. Within the traditionallegislative process, government officials may impose constraints on individ-uals and organizations by defining what is permissible and what is not,particularly for future land development. As a byproduct, groups and in-dividuals engage in the process of bargaining over the change in the rules of

TABLE 2

Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

Mean SD Min. Max.

Outcome EquationCommunity ConflictDevelopment controversy 2.85 0.81 1 4Competition 0.07 0.26 0 1Interest Group VariablesReal estate 2.52 0.92 1 5Business 2.97 0.74 1 5Environmental 4.40 0.87 2 5Neighborhood 3.95 0.96 1 5Control VariablesSubsidize housing 4.75 3.30 0 20.00Population change 12.26 13.59 � 6.83 71.14Population (log) 71.14 1.01 5.84 11.33Boston metro 0.54 0.50 0 1Suburb 0.53 0.50 0 1White 94.54 4.99 63.60 98.90Household income 63,184 20,258 32,716 141,818Residential tax 14.66 3.25 3.21 20.97Commercial tax 16.41 5.17 3.21 32.48Selection EquationCommunity ConflictDevelopment controversy 2.65 0.80 1 4Competition 0.09 0.29 0 1Interest Group VariablesReal estate 2.54 0.97 1 5Business 2.95 0.75 1 5Environmental 4.38 0.87 1 5Neighborhood 4.02 0.90 1 5Control VariablesSubsidize housing 5.01 4.03 0 20.74Population change 10.18 12.58 � 12.24 71.14Population (log) 9.05 1.24 4.45 11.93Boston metro 0.45 0.49 0 1Suburb 0.46 0.49 0 1White 93.65 7.37 48.60 99.80Household income 59,015 20,390 22,344 153,918Residential tax 15.01 3.18 2.43 21.29Commercial tax 17.71 6.39 2.43 41.78Central city 0.05 0.22 0 1


TABLE 3

Heckman Selection Model Regression Results

Estimated Coefficient Standard Error

Outcome EquationCommunity ConflictDevelopment controversy 0.118 4.246Competition � 13.492 12.833Interest Group VariablesReal estate � 1.421 2.129Business 1.571 2.186Environmental 2.991 n 1.729Neighborhood � 5.193 n n 2.577Control VariablesSubsidize housing � 0.326 0.406Population change 0.271 0.167Population (log) 1.071 3.865Boston metro � 3.552 8.969Suburb 14.570 n n n 3.112White 0.1946 0.3021Household income � 0.00012 0.000079Residential tax 0.034 0.486Commercial tax � 1.235 1.208Constant 49.920 62.347Selection EquationCommunity ConflictDevelopment controversy 0.286 n n 0.139Competition � 0.804 n n 0.369Interest Group VariablesReal estate � 0.131 0.130Business 0.109 0.167Environmental 0.076 0.148Neighborhood � 0.206 0.152Control VariablesSubsidized housing � 0.011 0.037Population change 0.0099 0.0095Population (log) 0.272 n n 0.135Boston metro 0.605 n n 0.257Suburb 0.082 0.289White 0.008 0.025Household income 00002.88 00006.51Residential tax � 0.005 0.042Commercial tax � 0.087 n n n 0.029Central citya � 0.082 0.724Constant � 2.255 2.956lamda 4.868 25.854

aExcluded from the outcome equation.npo0.10; n npo0.05; n n npo0.01.

N 5 180, censored obs. 5 86, uncensored obs. 5 94.

Rho 5 0.46.


the game, which will alter the rights of land uses that will benefit one groupover another. In the context of ballot-box voting, the adoption of growthmanagement policy results from a more intense interaction among interestgroups and voters. The results of the selection equation do not provideevidence to suggest that placing the CPA on the ballot is related to interestgroup support of local growth management and conservation-oriented policy.

Among the other control variables in the selection equation, communitieswith larger populations increase the propensity for a community placing theCPA on the ballot. A community’s location within the Boston metropolitanarea also increases the likelihood of a community vote. These results mayindicate that regional development issues influence residents to mobilize acommunity to vote for growth management policy. On the other hand, ahigher nonresidential property tax rate is negative and significantly related tothe propensity of a community placing the CPA on the local ballot, sug-gesting, perhaps, that economic development that keeps taxes low for busi-nesses competes against land-conservation policy.

The results of the outcome equation are presented in the top half ofTable 3. With regard to pro-growth interests, the results indicate there is nosignificant effect on the proportion of votes cast in favor of the CPA. Sinceadditional conservation policies place more restrictions on development andfurther exclude land from residential conversion, it is expected that eco-nomic interests will be highly motivated to influence policies in their favor.However, the process by which the CPA is adopted may limit their influenceon voters’ policy choice. Although not significant, the relationship betweenbusinesses and voter acceptance is positive. Additional work on the localeconomic makeup of communities may shed light on this relationship. Forinstance, are businesses primarily owned and operated by local residents?Preferences for local growth and development may reflect not only businessexpectations but quality-of-life issues for the resident/business owner as well.

The regression results show that environmental group support has a pos-itive and significant relationship (po0.10), indicating that environmentalgroup support for a community’s conservation efforts translates into a higherproportion of voters supporting the CPA. Theoretically, residents may taketheir cues from organized environmental groups to support communitydevelopment measures that are oriented toward an anti-growth agenda(Gerber and Phillips, 2003). In addition, the direct legislative processthrough which local communities adopt the growth management policymay allow environmental groups to sway voter approval. Although anti-growth interest groups may be diffuse, the process of policy adoption mayprovide opportunities for these interest groups to more easily build votersupport for growth management.

On the other hand, the regression results indicate that neighborhoodorganization support for a community’s conservation policies has a negativeeffect on the passage of growth management policy (po0.05). This resultmay reflect the distributional issues associated with land conservation. Even


though policy entrepreneurs with a strong anti-growth sentiment typicallyconsist of neighborhood groups (Schneider and Teske, 1993), policy adop-tion often results in benefits targeted to some groups over others (Wilson,1980). Although the selection equation suggests that placing the growthmanagement policy on the ballot may be reaction toward residential de-velopment and a mobilization to slow growth, the result of the outcomeequation may indicate the perception from voters that the benefits of landconservation will go primarily to a few geographically organized interests.

An additional explanation for this result is the potential opposition toaffordable housing As Hamin, Steere, and Sweetser (2006) suggest, becausethe CPA generates funds for open space, the negative perception of afford-able housing and the opportunity to use CPA funds for this purpose madeplacing the CPA on the ballot and then generating support more difficult.Organized neighborhood associations may be particularly concerned withthis nexus. Fischel’s (2001:4) ‘‘homevoter hypothesis’’ provides a supportingargument. His thesis holds that homeowners are intensely concerned for thevalue of their homes and, thus, they make political decisions in light of thebenefits of local policies against the cost when the policies affect the value oftheir home. An increase in affordable housing, it is argued, stems in partfrom the limited ability of the local government to pay for additional ser-vices and negative perceptions of potential residents. The result may be areflection of these. Moreover, neighborhood associations may be more or-ganized and prevalent in highly urbanized areas where land conservation isnot a high priority. Thus, the negative relationship may simply reflect thelack of concern due to limited land-preservation opportunities in the com-munity. Lastly, among the control variables, only suburban community issignificant in influencing voter acceptance. This provides evidence consistentwith previous research (see Fulton et al., 2001).

Conclusion

The results of previous research provide important insights into factorsthat shape the likelihood of a growth management ballot being proposed fora community, such as socioeconomic characteristics of communities. How-ever, the coalitions that place these initiatives on the ballot and help themsucceed have not been fully explored (Romero and Liserio, 2002). Thisresearch begins to fill this lacuna by using interest group theories of propertyrights. In particular, this study takes its cue from research that suggests thatthere are differences between pro-growth and anti-growth interests in in-fluencing voter acceptance of growth-related policies. This expectation isborne out in this study.

Conflict over residential development and the negative effects of sprawl,on the one hand, and the need for growth and development on the other,have an influence on how a community responds through policy adoption.


The evidence presented in this study reflects this tension. When there iscompetition for development, communities are less willing to propose ballotmeasures that preserve open spaces. Alternatively, an increase in conflict overresidential development has a positive effect on a community proceeding toa community-wide vote for land preservation and growth managementpolicy. There are, of course, some variables that are difficult to observe andthat could impact the results, such as the local planner’s engagement incollaborative policy making and reducing conflict among competing inter-ests (Hamin, 2003).

Ballot-box voting provides a mechanism whereby residents can proposeland-use policy and a community-wide vote determines success or failure.The extent to which pro-growth and anti-growth forces have success inshaping the distribution of resources is linked to their capacity to influencelocal policy under different governing contexts. Theoretically, it is expectedthat compared to the normal legislative process, ballot-box voting allowsanti-growth interests the opportunity to craft proposals and then mobilizesupport for policy changes. Controlling for local characteristics and thecontext in which the ballot is proposed, the findings presented here suggestthat environmental organizations do positively influence voter acceptance.On the other hand, pro-growth interests that are part of the ‘‘growth ma-chine’’ and that work to concentrate the benefits of development towardlandowners and economic interests are expected to play a lesser role inswaying voter acceptance. The results showing a lack of a statistically sig-nificant relationship between pro-growth interests and support for growthmanagement confirm this.

Regardless of the extent to which the benefits of land-use policy arenarrowly concentrated, frequent conflict among groups is expected toemerge as competing interests maneuver to change the rules of the game inorder to improve opportunities for development or increase land for con-servation. An important contribution of this study is that it providesevidence to suggest that anti-growth interests have an influence in policyadoption when the process is one that is decentralized and diffuse. Undernormal legislative arrangements, whereby organized pro-development inter-ests that sway large influences over elected officials, may be more limitedunder a policy adoption process that is focused on local mobilization andthat favors what Clarke and Gaile (1989) refer to as ‘‘territorial groups,’’such as environmental interests. Recent research on the political marketapproach to explaining land-use policy adoption focuses on the structure oflocal political institutions. This study provides evidence outside this per-spective that focuses on governing structures (e.g., mayor or manager formsof government). This is important as the number and type of ballot-boxvoting processes used by state and local government increase across thecountry. With a few exceptions, to date, much of the research on growthmanagement policies enacted through direct democracy is in the context ofthe State of California (Kahn and Matsusaka, 1997; Fulton et al., 2002). In


Massachusetts, land-use policy setting at the ballot box is a relatively newprocess, but one 100 communities have used with varying levels of success topreserve open-space land. The results of the statistical analysis provided inthis study provide new evidence of the factors that influence policy adoptionunder different state and local contexts.

One implication of this study is that although the results suggest thatelectoral support for the measure may be relatively high, the desire to addressaffordable housing coupled with preserving open space may be too com-plicated for some voters. Although this study does not test this propositiondirectly, the results provide a base from which to explore this relationshipfurther. For example, smart-growth principles advocate for affordable hous-ing, economic development, and community preservation, but significantdisconnects may undermine local policy adoption. It can be argued thatthere is a pressing need for more affordably priced housing, but at the sametime this may result in the need for local governments to raise revenues toprovide social services. Opposition to affordable housing and the perceivednegative fiscal impact of new residential development were among the keyarguments against local adoption of the CPA (Hamin, Steere, and Sweetser,2006). The results of the empirical model in this article indicate that or-ganized neighborhood groups have a negative effect on vote outcomes. Aplausible explanation of this finding is the uneasy relationship betweengrowth management and affordable housing that the CPA is intended toaddress. Other states considering a similar policy approach may considerexploring this relationship further if communities are to be successful in thistype of growth management adoption and implementation. Future studiesshould consider conditional effects to empirically analyze the complicatedstructure of relationships involved in voter decisions. Moreover, a multilevelmethod of analysis may shed light on the aggregate level factors that shapevoter outcomes.

REFERENCES

Baldassare, Mark. 1985. ‘‘The Suburban Movement to Limit Growth: Reasons for Supportin Orange County.’’ Policy Studies Review 4:613–25.

———. 1990. ‘‘Suburban Support for No-Growth Policies: Implications for the GrowthRevolt.’’ Journal of Urban Affairs 12:197–206.

Baldassare, Mark, and W. Protash. 1982. ‘‘Growth Controls, Population Growth andCommunity Satisfaction.’’ American Sociological Review 47:339–46.

Baldassare, Mark, and Georjeanna Wilson. 1996. ‘‘Changing Sources of Suburban Supportfor Local Growth Controls.’’ Urban Studies 33:459–71.

Bollens, Scott. A. 1992. ‘‘State Growth Management: Intergovernmental Frameworks andPolicy Objectives.’’ Journal of the American Planning Association 58:454–66.

Burge, Gregory, and Keith Ihlanfeldt. 2006. ‘‘The Effect of Impact Fees on MultifamilyHousing Construction.’’ Journal of Regional Science 46:5–23.


Clarke, Susan E., and Gary L. Gaile. 1989. ‘‘Moving Toward Entrepreneurial: DevelopmentPolicies: Opportunities and Borriers.’’ Policy Studies Journal 17:574–98.

Clingermayer, James C., and Richard C. Feiock. 2001. Institutional Constraints and PolicyChoices: An Exploration of Local Governance. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Community Preservation Coalition. Massachusetts Community Preservation Act: List of CPACommunities. Available at hhttp://www.communitypreservation.org/index.cfmi.Dillemuth, Ann. 2006. The Community Preservation Act and Affordable Housing in Massa-chusetts: Learning from the First Five Years. Available at hhttp://www.mhp.net/i.Donovan, Todd, and Max Neiman. 1991. ‘‘Community Social Status and the Regulationof Residential Land Use.’’ Paper presented to the Western Political Science Association.Seattle, WA.

———. 1992. ‘‘Citizen Mobilization and the Adoption of Local Growth Control.’’ WesternPolitical Quarterly 45:651–75.

———. 1995. ‘‘Local Growth Control Policy and Changes in Community Characteristics.’’Social Science Quarterly 76:780–93.

Eggertsson, Thrainn. 1999. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Feiock, Richard C. 2002. ‘‘A Quasi-Market Framework for Local Economic DevelopmentCompetition.’’ Journal of Urban Affairs 24:123–42.

Feitelson, Eran. 1993. ‘‘The Spatial Effects of Land Use Regulations: A MissingLink in Growth Control Evaluations.’’ Journal of the American Planning Association 59:461–72.

Fischel, William A. 2001. The Homevoter Hypothesis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Fulton, William, Mai Nguyen, Chris Williamson, Paul Shigley, Erik Kancler, Jaime Di-etenhofer, and Jill Sourial. 2002. Growth Management Ballot Measures in California. Ventura,CA: Solimar Research Group.

Fulton, William, Rolf Pendall, Mai Nguyen, and Alicia Harrison. 2001. Who Sprawls theMost? How Growth Patterns Differ Across the U.S. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Geoghega, Jacqueline. 2002. ‘‘The Value of Open Spaces in Residential Land Use.’’ Land UsePolicy 19:91–98.

Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1999. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise ofDirect Legislation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Justin H. Phillips. 2003. ‘‘Development Ballot Measures, InterestGroup Endorsements, and the Political Geography of Growth Preferences.’’ American Jour-nal of Political Science 47:625–39.

Guest, Avery M., and R. S. Oropesa. 1984. ‘‘Problem Solving Strategies of Local Areas in theMetropolis.’’ American Sociological Review 49:828–40.

Hamin, Elisabeth M. 2003. ‘‘Legislating Growth Management: Power, Politics and Plan-ning.’’ Journal of the American Planning Association 69:368–80.

Hamin, Elisabeth M., Margaret O. Steere, and Wendy Sweetser. 2006. ‘‘ImplementingGrowth Management: The Community Preservation Act.’’ Journal of Planning Education andResearch 26:53–65.

Howell-Moroney, Michael. 2004. ‘‘What are the Determinants of Open-Space Ballot Mea-sures? An Extension of the Research.’’ Social Science Quarterly 85:169–79.


http://www.communitypreservation.org/index.cfm

http://www.communitypreservation.org/index.cfm

http://www.mhp.net/

http://www.mhp.net/

Ihlanfeldt, Keith. 2007. ‘‘The Effect of Land Use Regulation on Housing and Land Prices.’’Journal of Urban Economics 61:420–35.

Jeong, Moon-Gi. 2006. ‘‘Local Choices for Development Impact Fees.’’ Urban Affairs Review41:338–57.

Kahn, Matthew E., and John G. Matsusaka. 1997. ‘‘Demand for Environmental Goods:Evidence from Voting Patterns in California Initiatives.’’ Journal of Law and Economics40:137–74.

Lewis, Paul G., and Max Neiman. 2002. Cities Under Pressure: Local Growth Controls andResidential Development Policy. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

Libecap, Garry. 1989. Contracting for Property Rights. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Lillydahl, Jane, H., and Larry D. Singell. 1987. ‘‘The Effects of Growth Management on theHousing Market: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Evidence.’’ Journal of UrbanAffairs 9:63–77.

Lubell, Mark, Richard Feiock, and Edgar Ramirez. 2005. ‘‘Political Institutions and Con-servation by Local Governments.’’ Urban Affairs Review 40:706–39.

Mayer, Christopher, and Tsuriel Somerville. 2000. ‘‘Land Use Regulation and New Con-struction.’’ Regional Science and Urban Economics 30:639–62.

Molotch, Harvey. 1976. ‘‘The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy ofPlace.’’ American Journal of Sociology 82:309–30.

Myers, Phyllis, and Robert Puentes. 2001. Growth at the Ballot Box: Electing the Shape ofCommunities. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Nguyen, Mai Thi. 2007. ‘‘Local Growth Control at the Ballot Box: Real Effects or SymbolicPolitics?’’ Journal of Urban Affairs 29:129–47.

Riddiough, Timothy J. 1997. ‘‘The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Taking Risk onLand Value and Development Activity.’’ Journal of Urban Economics 41:56–77.

Riker, William H., and Itai Sened. 1996. ‘‘The Politics of Institutional Change inRepresentative Democracy: A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights.’’ Pp. 283–303in Lee J. Alton et al., eds., Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press.

Romero, Francine S., and Adrian Liserio. 2002. ‘‘Saving Open Spaces: Determinants of 1998and 1999 ‘Antisprawl’ Ballot Measures.’’ Social Science Quarterly 83:341–52.

Schneider, Mark, and Paul Teske. 1993. ‘‘The Antigrowth Entrepreneur: Challenging theEquilibrium of the Growth Machine.’’ Journal of Politics 55:720–36.

Sherman, Robin, and David Luberoff. 2007. The Massachusetts Community Preservation Act:Who Benefits, Who Pays? Available at hhttp://www.hks.harvard.edu/rappaport/research/re-search.htmi.Strong, Ann L., Daniel R. Mandelker, and Erick D. Kelly. 1996. ‘‘Property Rights andTakings.’’ Journal of the American Planning Association 62:5–17.

Wilson, James Q. 1980. The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books.

Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Mason, OH:South-Western.


http://www.hks.harvard.edu/rappaport/research/research.htm



Documents

Electoral Support for Community Growth Management Policy